1.

Hester v US

RULE:
4th Amendment
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated”

The special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their "persons,
houses, papers, and effects," is not extended to the open fields.

FACTS:
• Hester was convicted by a district court of concealing distilled spirits.
• Hester argued on appeal that the district court had erred in refusing to exclude the
testimony of two witnesses and to direct a verdict for him.
• The witnesses whose testimony is objected to were revenue officers.
• They saw Hester holding a quart bottle, and when Hester saw them he ran.
• One of the officers fired a pistol which caused Hester to drop the jug he was holding.
• The officers examined it and found that it contains moonshine whisky.
• Hester argued that the district court had violated his rights under the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
• “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated”
• He claims that the jug of whisky is inadmissible as evidence because the officers had no
search or arrest warrant.

ISSUE:
• WON examination of the jug of whiskey violated Hester’s rights under the 4 th
Amendment? (NO)

CONCLUSION:
• The Court stated, in affirming Hester’s conviction, that there was no seizure of the jug
because the officers examined the contents of the jug after it had been abandoned.
• The evidence was not obtained by the entry into the house and it is immaterial to
discuss that.
• Furthermore, the fact that the examination of the jug took place on land belonging to
Hester’s father did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the special protection
accorded by the Fourth Amendment did not extend to the open fields.
• The Judgement of Hester’s conviction was AFFIRMED.
 2. People v Burgos

SUMMARY:
An informant identified a certain person as a member of a subversive group who forcibly
recruited him and based on this information, the police went to arrest the suspect. At the time
of the arrest, the suspect was merely plowing his field.

RULE OF LAW:
In a warrantless arrest, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or
is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact.

FACTS:
• Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surrendered to the authorities stating that
he was forcibly recruited by accused Ruben Burgos (D) as member of the NPA,
threatening him with the use of firearm against his life, if he refused.
• Pursuant to this information, PC-INP members went to the house of the Burgos (D) and
saw him plowing his field when they arrived.
• One of the arresting offices called Burgos (D) and asked him about the firearm. At first,
Burgos (D) denied having any firearm, but later, Burgos's (D) wife pointed to a place
below their house where a gun was buried in the ground.
• After recovery of said firearm, Burgos (D) pointed to a stock pile of cogon where the
officers recovered alleged subversive documents. Burgos (D) further admitted that the
firearm was issued to him by Nestor Jimenez, team leader of sparrow unit.

All of these are done without arrest or search warrant. Hence, Ruben Burgos filed an appeal for
his conviction of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of Subversion.

ISSUES:
WON the warrantless search valid? (NO)

RULING:
• NO

The Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature…

• Furthermore, the Constitution itself mandates that any evidence obtained in violation of
the right against unreasonable search and seizure is inadmissible in evidence.
• Consequently, the testimonies of the arresting officers as to the admissions made by the
appellant cannot be used against him.
• If an arrest without warrant is unlawful at the moment it is made, generally nothing that
happened or is discovered afterward can make it lawful. The fruit of a poisoned tree is
necessarily also tainted.

The accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED, on grounds of reasonable doubt, of the crime

with which he has been charged.
 3. US v Arceo

FACTS:
• Alejo Tiongson lived in his house in company with his wife, Alejandra San Andres, and
his wife’s sister, Marcela San Andres.
• On the night of the 20th of February, 1903, between 8 and 9 o’clock at night, the
accused, one of whom was with a gun and the other two each with a bolo, entered the
house of the said Alejo Tiongson without first obtaining the permission of any person.
• As soon as Marcela had discovered the accused in the house she awoke Alejo and his
wife.
• One of the accused wounded Alejo Tiongson, the owner of the house and carried away
out of the said house toward the fields the said Marcela San Andres and illtreated her.
• The court below found that the defendants were each guilty of the crime of entering the
house of another, with violence and intimidation

ISSUE:
Was the trial court justified in finding that the accused were guilty of the crime of entering the
residence of another against his will and with violence and intimidation?

RULING:
• YES.
• According to the court, the inviolability of the house is one of the most fundamental of
all the individual rights declared and recognized in the political codes of civilized
nations. No one can enter into the home of another without the consent of its owners
or occupants.
• The privacy of the home has always been regarded by civilized nations as one of the
most sacred personal rights to which men are entitled.
• Both the common and the civil law guaranteed to man the right of absolute protection
to the privacy of his home.
• The sentence of the court below is therefore modified, and each of the said defendants
is hereby sentenced to be imprisoned for the term of six years of prision correccional,

TAKE NOTE:
• However, under the police power of the state the authorities may compel entrance to
dwelling houses against the will of the owners for sanitary purposes. The government
has this right upon grounds of public policy. It has a right to protect the health and lives
of all its people.
• A man cannot insist upon the privacy of his home when a question of the health and life
of himself, his family, and that of the community is involved. This private right must be
subject to the public welfare.
 4. People v. Aruta

FACTS:
P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant named Benjie, that a certain “Aling Rosa” would be
arriving from Baguio City the following day, with a large volume of marijuana. Acting on said
tip, Abello assembled a team. Said team proceeded to West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City at
around 4:00 in the afternoon 1988 and deployed themselves near the Philippine National Bank
building along Rizal Avenue and the Caltex gasoline station.

While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus stopped in front of the PNB building at around 6:30 in
the evening of the same day from where two females and a male got off.

It was at this stage that the informant pointed out to the team “Aling Rosa” who was then
carrying a travelling bag. Having ascertained that accused-appellant was “Aling Rosa,” the team
approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When Abello asked “Aling
Rosa” about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it to the former. Upon inspection, the
bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked “Cash
Katutak.”

The team confiscated the bag together with the Victory Liner bus ticket to which Lt. Domingo
affixed his signature. Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for
investigation where a Receipt of Property Seized was prepared for the confiscated marijuana
leaves. Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a “Demurrer to Evidence” alleging
the illegality of the search and seizure of the items thereby violating accused-appellant’s
constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure as well as their inadmissibility in
evidence. RTC convicted accused-appellant of transporting eight (8) kilos and five hundred
(500) grams of marijuana from Baguio City to Olongapo City in violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972.

ISSUE/S:
WON the warrantless search resulting to the arrest of accused-appellant violated the latter’s
constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure? (YES)

HELD/RATIO:
• Yes.
• In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not armed with a warrant of
arrest.
• To legitimize the warrantless search and seizure, the accused-appellant must have been
validly arrested under Section 5 of Rule 113 which provides that:
Sec. 5: Arrest without warrant; when lawful.- A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
• In this case, the accused cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she
about to commit one nor had she just committed a crime. Accused was merely crossing
the street and was not acting in any manner that gave a reasonable ground for the
NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime.
• Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to do a warrantless
search of accused-appellant’s bag.
• Stated otherwise, the arrest being illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent
search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. As such, the
articles seized could not be used as evidence against accused-appellant for these are
“fruits of a poisoned tree” and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to the
Constitution.
• ROSA ARUTA Y MENGUIN is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from
confinement
 5. People v. Olivares

FACTS:
• Prosecution witness Tomas Juan of the Valenzuela Police Station testified that in the
morning of December 28, 1981, he was assigned by his station commander to follow-up
the robbery with homicide that took place at Tanada Subdivision in Valenzuela, Metro
Manila.
• He learned from Patrolman Bote that a regular employee of the Cardinal Plastic
Industries (where the crime was committed) had not yet reported for work. With that
information, the police officers proceeded to the business establishment and were able
to confirm from the workers that appellant Danilo Arellano failed to report for work
since the commission of the crime.
• Melchor Salle (cousin of appellant Arellano) volunteered to bring them to Danilo
Arellano, in a factory situated in San Juan, Metro Manila where they found Olivares, Jr, a
friend of Danilo.
• Appellant Olivares accompanied them to Broadway in Quezon City, where they found
appellant Arellano. After being asked about the incident that took place at the Cardinal
Plastic Industries, appellant Arellano readily admitted to the police authorities his
participation in the commission of the crime.
• Thereafter, appellant Arellano was invited to the police station. On further direct
examination, Officer Juan identified in open court the Sanyo cassettes, the tapes and
the wristwatch they recovered from the place where appellant Arellano pointed to
them. Said items were turned over to the police station.
• For the death of the two victims, Mr. Sy (Tiu Hui) and his father Zie Sing Piu, and the loss
of some items, appellants were charged with the complex crime of robbery with double
homicide. The RTC convicted them of the crime charged and sentenced them to suffer
the death penalty and to indemnify the victims’ heirs

On direct appeal to this Court, appellants, who are imprisoned, seek their acquittal on the
ground that their guilt was not proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:
WON the warrantless arrest is valid?

RULING:
• NO. The Supreme Court held that there were no eyewitnesses to the killing and robbery
and thus, no direct evidence points to appellants criminal liability.
• The appellants were arrested without a valid warrant of arrest and their arrest cannot
even be justified under any of the recognized exceptions for a valid warrantless arrest.
• Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which was in effect at that time, any evidence
obtained in violation of their right (pertaining to invalid warrantless arrest) shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
• By virtue of said constitutional protection, any evidence obtained, including all the
things and properties alleged to be stolen by appellants which were taken by the police
from the place of the illegal arrest cannot be used as evidence for their conviction.
• Appellants conviction is herein REVERSED and both are ACQUITTED for the crime
charged.

Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
a) when the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to
commit an offense in his presence;
b) when the offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe
that the person to be arrested has committed it;
c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
 6. People v Suzuki

FACTS:
• Sometime in November 1993, the PNP Narcotics Command issued a directive to all
Chiefs of Narcotics Regional Field Units to cover all domestic airport terminals within
their respective areas of responsibility, following reports that drug trafficking is
prevalent in domestic airports;
• In the morning of 12 April 1994, Hedishi Suzuki and Takeshi Koketsu, both Japanese
nationals, entered the pre-departure area of the Bacolod Airport Terminal.
• Suzuki was bound for Manila via Philippine Airlines and was carrying a small traveling
bag and a box marked “Bongbong’s piaya.”
• Suzuki proceeded to the “walk-through metal detector,”.
• The red light switched on and the alarm sounded, signifying the presence of metallic
substance either in his person or in the box he was carrying.
• Rhodelin Poyugao of the Police Aviation Security Command (PASCOM) to frisk him
bodily.
• Finding no metallic object in his body, PO3 Poyugao picked up the box of piaya and
passed it through the machine. Again, the machine was activated.
• SPO1 Arturo Casugod, Sr. requested Suzuki to open the box. He appeared tense and
reluctant but eventually he consented, saying in faltering English, “open, open.”
• SPO1 Casugod opened the box and found dried fruiting tops which looked like
marijuana.
• They apprehended Suzuki near the entrance of the terminal and brought him to the
PASCOM office. They also brought Takeshi and his wife, Lourdes Linsangan, to the office,
being suspects as conspirators with Suzuki in drug trafficking.
• Suzuki was charged with unlawful possession of marijuana, a prohibited drug, in
violation of the Dangerous Drug Act.
• Suzuki entered a plea of not guilty, and trial followed thereafter.
• The Regional Trial Court convicted Suzuki of illegal possession of marijuana and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death and to pay a fine of P10,000,000.00.
• Hence, the automatic review.

ISSUE:
WON Pascom officers committed unreasonable search and seizure.

RULING:
• NO. PASCOM has authority and the warrantless search is valid.

The Police Aviation Security Command (PASCOM) is the implementing arm of the National
Action Committee on Anti-Hijacking (NACAH), which is a creation of Presidential Letter of
Instruction (LOI) 399.

• On 18 February 1978, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed. Based upon the

Memorandum of Understanding, pursuant to President LOI 399, the PASCOM had the
legal authority to be at the Bacolod Airport, Bacolod City and to inspect luggages hand-
carried bags.
• To simply refuse passengers carrying suspected illegal items to enter the pre-departure
area is to deprive the authorities of their duty to conduct search, thus sanctioning
impotence and infectivity of the law enforcers, to the detriment of society.
• It should be stressed, however, that whenever the right against unreasonable search
and seizure is challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the
constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving consent to the search or
seizure.
• Here, Suzuki voluntarily gave his consent to the search conducted by the PASCOM
agents.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION in the sense that he is sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
 7. Stonehill v Diokno

FACTS:
• Petitioners and the corporations they form were alleged to have committed acts in “violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.”
• Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners personally, and/or
corporations for which they are officers, directing peace officers to search the petitioners and
premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences for personal properties:
o “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements
and Bobbins(cigarette wrappers)” as the subject of the offense for violations of Central Bank
Act, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.
• The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may
be split into (2) major groups, namely:
(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and
(b) those found seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

• Petitioners averred that the warrant is null and void for being violative of the constitution and the Rules
of court by:
1. Not describing with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;
2. Money not mentioned in the warrants were seized;
3. The warrants were issued to fish evidence for deportation cases filed against the petitioner;
4. The searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
5. The documents paper and cash money were not delivered to the issuing courts for disposal in
accordance with law.

• Respondent-prosecutors invoke the Moncado vs People’s Court ruling:

o even if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents,
papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein.

• Petitioner filed an action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction.

ISSUE:
• WON the search warrant are valid?

RULING:
• The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et. al., reversing the Moncado doctrine. Though Stonehill et. al. are
not the proper parties to assail the validity of the search warrant issued against their corporation and
thus they have no cause of action (only the officers or board members of said corporation may assail
said warrant, and that corporations have personalities distinct from petitioners’ personalities),
• The warrants issued to search petitioners’ residences are hereby declared void. Thus, the searches
and seizures made therein are made illegal.

The constitution protects the people’s right against unreasonable search and seizure. It provides:
(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the
manner set forth in said provision; and
(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

In the case at bar, none of these are met.

• The warrant was issued from mere allegation that petitioners committed a “violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.” As no specific
violation has been alleged, it was impossible for the judges who issued said warrants to have found
the existence of probable cause,
• Additionally, the warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the
aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, openly contravenes the explicit command of
our Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to
defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.

We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned and
warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners are null and void.
• Writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects are seized in the
residences of the petitioners.
• However, petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents,
papers and other effects in offices and other premises enumerated.
 8. Microsoft v Maxicorp

FACTS:
• This case involves the issuance of search warrant to the respondent MAXICORP Inc for
alleged violation of Section 29 of Intellectual Property and Article 189 of the RPC(unfair
competition).
• Armed with the search warrants, NBI agents conducted a search of Maxicorp’s premises
and seized property fitting the description stated in the search warrants.
• Maxicorp filed a motion to quash the search warrants alleging that there was no
probable cause for their issuance and that the warrants are in the form of "general
warrants."
• Where the RTC denied the motion and at the same time denied their motion for
reconsideration.
• According to RTC they’ve found a probable cause to issue such warrant after examining
the NBI agent and the computer technician who visited Maxicorp.
• Maxicorp filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals seeking to set aside the
RTC’s order.
• The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s order denying Maxicorp’s motion to quash the
search warrants.
• Petitioners moved for reconsideration.
• The Court of Appeals denied petitioners’ motio.
• The Court of Appeals held that NBI Agent Samiano failed to present during the
preliminary examination conclusive evidence that Maxicorp produced or sold the
counterfeit products.
• Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
• WON there is a probable cause to issue search warrants.
• WON the search warrant are in nature of general warrants.

RULING:
YES.
• Probable cause means "such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances as will
warrant a cautious man in the belief that his action and the means taken in prosecuting
it are legally just and proper."
• Thus, probable cause for a search warrant requires such facts and circumstances that
would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
and the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched.
• In this case, both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz related to the RTC how they personally
saw Maxicorp commit acts of infringement and unfair competition. This, coupled with
the object and documentary evidence they presented, are sufficient to establish the
existence of probable cause.
• WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the instant petition.
 9. Bache and Co. v Ruiz

FACTS:
• On 24 February 1970, respondent Misael Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
wrote a letter addressed to respondent Judge Vicencio Ruiz requesting the issuance of a
search warrant against petitioners for violation of the National Internal Revenue Code
and authorizing respondent de Leon to make and file the application for the same.
• In the afternoon of the following day, de Leon and his witness, Arturo Logronio, went to
the CFI of Rizal and brought the necessary documents for the application for search
warrant. The Clerk of Court took first their depositions because Judge Ruiz was still
conducting a hearing. But after the session, Judge Ruiz was able to take Logronio’s oath
and signed the application. Thus, the issuance of Search Warrant No. 2-M-70.
• Three days after, which was on a Saturday, the BIR agents served the search warrant at
petitioner’s corporate office in Ayala, Makati. Petitioners’ lawyers protested the search
on the ground that no formal complaint, transcript or testimony was attached. The
agents nevertheless proceeded with the search and yielded 6 boxes of documents.
• On 03 March 1970, petitioners filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal praying that the
search warrant be quashed and be considered null and void. But respondent Judge
dismissed the petition. Consequently, the BIR made tax assessments against petitioners
based on the seized documents. Hence, this present petition.

ISSUE:
WON the search warrant was valid?
WON the corporation is entitled to protection against unreasonable search and seizures

RULING:
• NO. The Court found three (3) defects in the search warrant issued.
1. First, there was no personal examination of the judge.
2. Second, the search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.
3. Third, the search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized.

Hence, it is a clear violation of Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the RRC which states:
“Section 4.Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue
except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines. ”

• YES. The Court states, citing the case of Stonehill v. Diokno, the implied recognition on
the right of a corporation to object against unreasonable search and seizures.

In the Stonehill case, the petitioner were only the officers of the corporations whose office
documents, papers and effects were searched and seized. In the case at bar, the corporation to
whom the seized documents belong, and whose rights have thereby been impaired, is itself a
petitioner. On that score, petitioner corporation here stands on a different footing from the
corporations in Stonehill.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is granted. Accordingly, Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 issued
by respondent Judge is declared null and void;
 10. Central Bank v Morfe

FACTS:
• The First Mutual Savings and Loan Organization, Inc, the main purpose of which,
according to its Articles of Incorporation, is to encourage and implement savings and
thrift among its members, and to extend financial assistance in the form of loans, to
them.
• The Central Bank of the Philippines rendered an opinion to the effect that the
Organization falling within the purview of the Central Bank Act and such institutions
violate RA 337, should they engage in the lending of funds obtained from the public
through the receipts of deposits or the sale of bonds, securities or obligations of any
kind without authority from the Monetary Board.
• The Bank filed an application for a search warrant against the Organization in which the
latter is illegally engaged in banking activities without having first complied with the
provisions of RA 337.
• Then the said court, issued warrant.
• Forthwith, the Organization commenced a civil case, an original action for "certiorari,
prohibition, with writ of preliminary injunction and/or writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction to annul the aforementioned search warrant.
• Upon the ground that,
(a) said search warrant is a roving commission general in its terms
(b) the use of the word 'and others' in the search warrant . . . permits the
unreasonable search and seizure of documents which have no relation
whatsoever to any specific criminal act
(c) "no court in the Philippines has any jurisdiction to try a criminal case against a
corporation . . ."
• On the petition for said injunction, respondent Judge Morfe issued the order
complained of in favor of the Organization.
• The Bank moved for a reconsideration thereof, which was denied.

ISSUE:
WON there is an unreasonable search and seizure?

RULING:
Unreasonableness is, in the very nature of things, a condition dependent upon the
circumstances surrounding each case, in much the same way as the question whether or not
"probable cause" exists is one which must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in
given situations.

The writ of preliminary injunction filed by the respondent is ANULLED.

 11. People v Tudtud

FACTS:
• The Toril Police Station, Davao City received a report from a “civilian asset” named Bobong
Solier about a certain Noel Tudtud.
• Solier related that his neighbours have been complaining about Tudtud, who was allegedly
responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in their area.
• Relating to the report, the police conducted surveillance in Solier’s neighbourhood in Sapa, Toril,
Davao City.
• According to his neighbours, Tudtud was engaged in selling marijuana.
• Solier informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be back later that day
with new stocks of marijuana.
• About 8:00 pm, 2 men disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a carton marked
“King Flakes.” Standing some 5 feet away from the men, PO1 Desierto and PO1 Floreta observed
that one of the men fit Tudtud’s description.
• PO1Floreta and PO1 Desierto then approached the suspects and identified themselves as police
officers.
• PO1 Desierto informed them that the police had received information that stocks of illegal
drugs would be arriving that night.
• The man who resembled Tudtud’s description denied that he was carrying any drugs then said
“it was alright” and let them see the box which contained bundles of dried fish, one wrapped in
a plastic bag and another in newspapers.
• When the bundles were unwrapped, there contained marijuana leaves.

The police arrested Tudtud and his comapanion. They were charged with illegal possession of prohibited
drugs before the RTC of Davao City which convicted the accused.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Tudtud’s implied acquiescence (Tudtud’s statement of “it’s alright”) is considered a
waiver.

RULING:
• NO. The right against unreasonable searched and seizures is secured by Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the
Constitution.
• Appellants implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and is, thus, considered no
consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.
• Consequently, appellants lack of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a
waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and
seizure.

As the search of appellant’s box does not come under the recognized exceptions to a valid warrantless
search, the marijuana leaves obtained thereby are inadmissible in evidence. And as there is no evidence
other than the hearsay testimony of the arresting officers and their informant, the conviction of
appellants cannot be sustained.

Finally, there is an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable searches and seizures if the following
requisites are present:
• It must appear that the rights exist;
• The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right;
• Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

Here, the prosecution failed to establish the second and third requisites. Records disclose that when
the police officers introduced themselves as such and requested appellant that they see the contents of
the carton box supposedly containing the marijuana, appellant Tudtud said it was alright. He did not
resist and opened the box himself.

Acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights is not to be presumed. The fact that a person failed to
object to a search does not amount to permission thereto.

Appellants are ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence .

 EX PARTE JACKSON, 96 U.S. 727
TAGS: Reasonable searches and seizures; letters and sealed packages in the mail;
CASE: Habeas Corpus
FACTS:
This case is a petition for habeas corpus. It has its origins after the petitioner was
indicted, tried, and convicted for violation of a provision in the Revised Statutes of the US
prohibiting letters or circulars concerning lotteries from being carried in the mail. He was fined
for $100 and ordered to be imprisoned until he pays the fine. He then files this petition alleging
that the regulation is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

He argues that the power of Congress in “establishing post-offices and post-roads”

includes incidental powers, other than receiving, carrying, and delivering mail, such as the duty
to protect the mail through appropriate legislation. It also includes the duty to furnish adequate
facilities for the secure transportation & delivery of all letters & packages.

In the exercise of such power and duty, it has: (a) imposed reasonable rates of postage; (b)
Prohibited the putting in the mail-bags of any poisonous explosive articles in order to protect
the contents of the mail and the persons who will receive the mail and those who are involved
in the mail service; and (c) limited the bulk and weight of packages.

The petitioner argue that those are the only legitimate matters which are subject of
appropriate legislation or power of Congress; but Congress has exceeded its power in the
enactment of the statute by virtue of which the petitioner was indicted and imprisoned
because “it excluded mail-matters (or those which may be carried through mail) from the mail”.
They even cite as an example the attempt of Congress to pass a law prohibiting the conveyance
through mail of any publication which touches the topic of slavery as it incites slaves to revolt
against their masters. They argue that by the virtue of the opinions of congressmen regarding
the bill’s unconstitutionality, it never had been passed, which goes to show that the current
statute which they are assailing is unconstitutional as well.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Congress has the power to regulate the mail as to what should be
included and what should be excluded therein.

HELD:
Yes, it has such power. The power possessed by Congress embraces the regulation of
the entire postal system; and its right to determine what should be carried in the mails
necessarily goes with it the right to determine what should NOT be included.

In excluding carious articles from the mail, the object or goal of Congress is not to interfere with
the freedom of the press, but to refuse the facilities of the postal system to be used for the
distribution of matter deemed injurious to the public morals. This issue is not from the lack of
power of Congress to prescribe those regulations but from the necessity of enforcing them in a
manner consistent with the rights reserved to the people – which pertain to the right of the
people against unreasonable searches and seizures.

The Court states that there should be a distinction between the kinds of mail-matters: (a)
Mail-matters free from inspection, which are those letters and sealed packages; and (b) Mail
matters open to inspection, pertaining to those newspapers, magazines, and other printed
materials which are purposely left in a condition to be examined. The Court stated that sealed
packages and letters are fully guarded from examination and inspection, WITH THE
LONE EXCEPTION AS TO THEIR OUTWARD, EXTERNAL FORM AND WEIGHT, and that they should
be treated as if they are retained still by those who sent them. They can be opened and
examined only upon a validly issued warrant.
 Marcelo v De Guzman

FACTS
• At about 3:00 o'clock in the morning of June 21, 1966, Sgt. Alejandro Quirante who is a PC
officer of PARGO (Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations) applied with
Judge Jose C. de Guzman who is the presiding judge of the City Court of Quezon City, Branch III,
for a search warrant to search the premises of the KANEBO Laboratory at No. 55 Times St.,
Quezon City in connection with a criminal case whom the Kanebo Laboratory owned by
Marcelo is an accused.
• Attached to the application were the affidavits of one Bruno Goot and Leonardo Salome.
• Judge De Guzman issued the search warrant applied for agents of the PARGO, led by Capt.
Reynaldo San Gabriel and Sgt. Alejandro Quirante allowing them to proceed to the premises of
the KANEBO Laboratory, owned by appellee Lourdes Marcelo to seize various goods and
articles consisting of perfumes, essences, pomades, demi-johns, drums, packages of various
sizes containing bottles of perfume and pomade. They also seized certain commercial
documents and papers.
• On November 17, 1966, Marcelo filed a motion seeking to quash the warrant and to recover
the seized articles and documents.
• However, judge de Guzman denied the motion for lack of merit.
• Thereafter, the court issued that the search warrant no. 558 issued by Hon. Judge Jose de
Guzman is declared null and void, and the properties seized pursuant to said search warrant are
ordered to be returned to the lawful owner, the herein petitioner.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the search warrant issued by Judge De Guzman is valid. (NO)

RULING:
The court held that the search warrant issued by Judge De Guzman is null and void.

Judge de Guzman gravely abused his discretion in issuing the said search warrant. He acted
whimsically and capriciously when he ignored the explicit mandate that "a search warrant shall
not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined by
the municipal or city judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized"; and that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one
specific offense."

In this case, the affidavits of the two witnesses of the applicant do not clearly draw the offense
supposed to have been violated by the herein petitioner nor describe and identify the personal
things to be seized aside from the fact that it includes vague articles, such as, panel delivery
trucks, books of account and other papers relative to commercial transaction.

Furthermore, the said search warrant was issued by the respondent judge without ascertaining
the probable cause in connection with one specific offense, as there was no showing as to
when the specific offense was supposed to have been committed and as to under what
circumstances.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, search warrant no. 558 of the City Court of Quezon City issued by
Hon. Judge Jose de Guzman is declared null and void, and the properties seized pursuant to said
search warrant are ordered to be returned to the lawful owner, the herein petitioner.
 Worldwide Web Corp. v. People, 713 SCRA 18

TOPIC: EXAMINATION OF APPLICANT IN ISSUING A SEARCH

WARRANT/PROBABLE CAUSE IN ISSUING A SEARCH
WARRANT
Facts:
● The Police Chief inspector filed an application for a warrant before the RTC to search the office
premises of petitioner Worldwide Web Corporation (WWC). as well as the office premises of
petitioner Planet Internet Corporation (Planet Internet). The applications alleged that petitioners
were conducting illegal toll bypass operations, which amounted to theft and violation of
Presidential Decree No. 401 (Penalizing the Unauthorized Installation of Water, Electrical or
Telephone Connections, the Use of Tampered Water or Electrical Meters and Other Acts), to the
damage and prejudice of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT). s, PLDT
computed a monthly revenue loss of ₱764,718.09. PLDT likewise alleged that petitioners deprived
it of foreign exchange revenues, and evaded the payment of taxes, license fees, and charges, to the
prejudice of the government.
● The RTC then granted the application for search warrants filed. The warrants were implemented on
the same day by RISOO operatives of the National Capital Region Police Office. Over a hundred
items were seized.
● Petitioners then filed their respective motions to quash the search warrants, citing basically the same
grounds: (1) the search warrants were issued without probable cause, since the acts complained of
did not constitute theft; (2) toll bypass, the act complained of, was not a crime; (3) the search
warrants were general warrants; and (4) the objects seized pursuant thereto were "fruits of the
poisonous tree."
● PLDT filed a Consolidated Opposition to the motions to quash. The RTC granted the motions to
quash on the ground that the warrants issued were in the nature of general warrants. Thus, the
properties seized under the said warrants were ordered released to petitioners. PLDT moved for
reconsideration but its motion was denied. PLDT appealed. The CA reversed and set aside the
assailed RTC Resolutions and declared the search warrants valid and effective.
● Petitioners separately moved for reconsideration of the CA ruling. But the CA denied the Motion.
Hence, this petition to the SC.

Issue:

WON there is a probable cause to the issuance of the search warrant. (YES)

Ruling:
● Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution: The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.
● In the issuance of a search warrant, probable cause requires "such facts and circumstances that
would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the objects
sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched.
● There is no exact test for the determination of probable cause in the issuance of search warrants. It
is a matter wholly dependent on the finding of trial judges in the process of exercising their judicial
function. They determine probable cause based on "evidence showing that, more likely than
not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed" by the offender.
● A trial judge’s finding of probable cause may be set aside and the search warrant issued by him
based on his finding may be quashed if the person against whom the warrant is issued presents
clear and convincing evidence that when the police officers and witnesses testified, they
committed a deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth on matters that are
essential or necessary to a showing of probable cause. (CRUZ, pg 314) In that case, the finding
of probable cause is a nullity, because the trial judge was intentionally misled by the witnesses.
On the other hand, innocent and negligent omissions or misrepresentation of witnesses will not
cause the quashal of a search warrant.
● In the present case, the testimonies of Rivera and Gali that the test calls they conducted did not pass
through PLDT’s IGF are true. They neglected, however, to look into the possibility that the test
calls may have passed through other IGFs in the Philippines, which was exactly what
happened. Nevertheless, the witnesses did not commit a deliberate falsehood. Even Planet Internet
stated that the conclusion that the test calls bypassed all IGFs in the country was made "carelessly
and haphazardly
● On this score, the quashal of the search warrants is not in order. It must be noted that the trial judge
did not quash the warrants in this case based on lack of probable cause.. Hence, the petition is
denied. The CA Decision is hereby affirmed.