Koselleck, Arendt and The Anthropology of Social Experience PDF

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KOSELLECK, ARENDT, AND THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE

Author(s): STEFAN-LUDWIG HOFFMANN and Tom Lampert
Source: History and Theory, Vol. 49, No. 2 (May 2010), pp. 212-236
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Historyand Theory49 (May 2010), 212-236 © WesleyanUniversity
2010 ISSN: 0018-2656
KOSELLECK, ARENDT, AND THE

ANTHROPOLOGY OF HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE
STEFAN-LUDWIG HOFFMANN
ABSTRACT
Thisessay is thefirstattempt to compareReinhart Koselleck'sHistorikwithHannahAr-

endt'spoliticalanthropology andhercritiqueof themodernconceptof history. Koselleck
is well-known forhis workon conceptualhistoryas well as forhis theoryof historical
time(s).It is mycontention thatthesedifferentprojectsareboundtogether byKoselleck's
Historik, This can be shownthrough
thatis, his theoryof possiblehistories. an examina-
tionofhiswritings fromCritiqueand Crisisto hisfinalessayson historical anthropology,
mostof whichhave notyetbeen translated intoEnglish.Conversely, Arendt 's political
theoryhas in recentyearsbeen thesubjectof numerousinterpretations thatdo nottake
intoaccountherviewsabouthistory. By comparing theanthropological categoriesfound
in Koselleck'sHistorikwithArendt'spoliticalanthropology, I identify
similarintellectual
lineagesin them(Heidegger,Lowith,Schmitt)as well as sharedpoliticalsentiments, in
particular impulseof thepostwarera. More importantly,
theanti-totalitarian Koselleck's
theoryof thepreconditions of possiblehistoriesandArendt'stheoryof thepreconditions
of thepolitical,I argue,transcend theselineagesand sentiments by providingessential
categories for the of
analysis historicalexperience.
Keywords: ReinhartKoselleck,HannahArendt,
anthropology, conceptualhis-
experience,
tory,
politicaltheory
Whenwe, theuniversity of 1951, passionately

students tookup theassignment to
thenthisthinking
think, hadto be radicalas well.
at theendof radicalcatastrophes
-Ivan Nagel'
The intellectualfascination that Reinhart Koselleck's writingsexert, and that

place him among the great historiansof the past century,can be traced to his
understandingof the differencebetween language and history.Historyis always
more than language can grasp, and concepts always contain more than what oc-
curs historically- it is around the distinctionof language and historythat the
empirical works of Koselleck's conceptual history{Begriffsgeschichte) revolve.
Koselleck's own writingstylereflectedthisinsight.The metaphorsthathe coined
gained currencybecause of theirsuggestivesurplus:theSattelzeit,forthecentury
of nascent modernitybetween 1750 and 1850; Erwartungshorizontand Erfah-
derKrise:Überden Historiker
1. Ivan Nagel,"Der Kritiker ReinhartKoselleck,"Neue Zürcher
Zeitung(January 8-9,2005).
THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE 2 13
rungsraum, forthewideninggap betweentheUtopianpromiseand thespace of

experience typicalforthisperiod;or Zeitschichten,
so forthedifferent layersof
timeand experiencethataccruein everyhistorical concept.For Koselleck,con-
ceptualhistory was morethanmerelyphilosophy forhistorians, and he rejected
the
resolutely arguments of intellectualcompatriots such as Hans-GeorgGadam-
er,Hay den White, and Paul Ricoeur that historicalsources and therulesof their
interpretationwereindistinguishable from,forinstance,literary texts.Koselleck
notonlyorganizedand editedthe seven volumesof Geschichtliche Grundbe-
griffe,the most important postwar German lexicon in the humanities (nextto
theHistorisches Wörterbuch derPhilosophie);conceptualhistory as a historical
methodis inextricably tiedto hisname.
ForKoselleck,however, conceptualhistory was alwaysonlythepathandnever
thegoal ofhishistorical thinking. At the center ofhisthought, I willargue,stood
rathertheattempt to outlinea theory oftheconditions ofpossiblehistories, what
Koselleckcalleda Historik. Sincehistimeas an assistant professor in Heidelberg
duringthe1950s,he hadreflected aboutsucha Historikas a fundamental theory
of historicalwriting-and conceptualhistorywas, as he himselfwrote,onlya
kindof propaedeutic forthis.2For Koselleck,linguisticsourcesalwaysreferred
to a worldbeyondthetext,to theanthropological, pre-linguistic conditionsof
historical
experiences, which possessed theirown repetition structures.Theseex-
periencesareindeedlinguistically shaped,butnotexclusivelyso. Theyoccurre-
peatedlyin novelanduniqueforms, andgeneratenewhistories (Geschichten). In
orderto grasphowsuchhistories arise,historiography requires a kind of theoreti-
cal prehensionthatgoes beyondhistorical epistemology as ithas beenconceived
sinceDroysen.
Koselleckneverbrought thesereflections together intoa unified theory. His col-
lectionof essays(Zeitschichten) did bearthesubtitle"Studieson Historik."But
he was unabletocompletea systematic treatiseon histheory ofhistory, whichhe
talkedaboutas muchas hisplannedstudyon themoderniconography of violent
death,beforehisowndeathin2006. Thisis not,however, necessarily disadvanta-
geous,as HansBlumenberg has suggestedin a different context:"One can define
correctlyand boringlywhata theoryis, butit cannotthenmakedo or survive
without thatwhichithas receivedthrough definitions. Morecan be learnedfrom
perception and freevariation,which allow the central core toemerge."3 Following
hishabilitationthesisPreußenzwischenReform undRevolution (Prussiabetween
Reformand Revolution), publishedin 1967,and a shortvolumefortheFischer
Verlag'sworldhistoryserieson theage of Europeanrevolutions between1780
and 1848(written with
together François Furet and in
published 1968),Koselleck
dedicatedhimself tothelaboriousworkoftheGeschichtliche Grundbegriffe lexi-
con and recordedhis reflections solelyin a seriesof pointedessays,perhapsthe
2. ReinhartKoselleck,'"Space of Experience'and 'Horizon of Expectation':Two Historical
Categories,"in FuturesPast: On theSemanticsofHistoricalTime,transi.KeithTribe(New York:
ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1983), 256. Recentaccountsof Koselleck's writingsincludethe dis-
sertationby NiklasOlsen, BeyondUtopianismand Relativism:Historyin thePlural in the Work
of ReinhartKoselleck(Florence:EuropeanUniversity 2009), and Begriffene
Institute, Geschichte:
BeiträgezumWerkReinhartKosellecks,ed. H. Joasand P. Vogt(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2010).
3. Hans Blumenberg,Begriffein Geschichten(Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp, 1998), 193.
214 STEFAN-LUDWIG HOFFMANN
formofwriting mostsuitedto histheorizing. Theseessays- composedprimarily

on thebasisofinvitations andtributes thatKoselleckbegantoreceiveintheearly
1970s,andwhichincreasedafterhe becamean emeritus professor in Bielefeldin
1988andacceptedguestprofessorships in New York,Chicago,andParis- make
evidentthecontours ofhisHistorik.
Thethematic rangeoftheseessaysis breathtaking. Koselleck'suniquetheoreti-
cal approachallowedhimto exploreearlyon questionsthathisfellowhistorians
wouldbeginto discoveronlyyearslaterin thewakeofyetanother "turn"in his-
toricalwriting. Whether concerned withthetemporal andspatialconditions ofhu-
manexperience;theworkings of historiography, and
memory, dreams; legal the
andpoliticaltheory of civilsociety;or theiconologyof violentdeath,Koselleck
connectedsemanticand iconologicalfindings withhis historicalanthropology
in new and originalways.In theseessayswe can discerntheconceptualhisto-
rianReinhart Koselleck,who wentfarbeyondBegriffsgeschichte as a historical
method.
It mayappearsurprising at first
glancethatthebest-known Germanconceptual
historian the and
investigated prelinguistic extralinguistic conditions ofhistorical
experience.Furthermore, thepolitically existentialtoneof Koselleck'shistorical
anthropology, shapedin thefinalthroesof thecatastrophic upheavalsof thefirst
halfofthetwentieth century,has confused readers who came ofage intellectually
the
during stolid, uneventful years of the old Federal Republicof Germany. This
made thereceptionof Koselleck'sworkmoredifficult. In anycase, his Histo-
rik- in contrast to his methodological reflections on conceptualhistoryand his
theory ofhistoricaltimes- has beenlargelyignored.
In thisessay,I willinitiallyoutlinehowKosellecksoughttoworkoutthebasis
fora theoryof themetahistorical conditions of possiblehistories(not"history")
in repeatedly newattempts andvariations overthecourseofthreedecades.Only
by bringing thereflections on his Historikin thesediversearticlestogether is it
possibletodevelopfurther reference pointsandquestions.Second,I willexamine
thesubstantive proximity betweenKoselleck'stheoretical reflectionsandHannah
Arendt'spoliticalanthropology andhercritiqueofthemodernconceptofhistory.
This comparisonwithArendtis intendedto illuminate thepoliticalvalencesof
Koselleck'sHistorik.Finally,I attempt to demonstrate thattherelativeproximity
of Koselleck'sandArendt'sreflections on theanthropological conditions of hu-
manactionand suffering andthehistories emerging from them can be explained
notonlythrough a sharedstarting point- MartinHeidegger'sanalysisofDasein
or existence,and a critiqueof thephilosophy of history.Rather,Koselleck'sand
Arendt'shistoricalanthropologies are groundedin theirexistential understand-
ing of thepolitical in the wake of the catastrophic experiences of the 1940s. It
is thisconsciousnessof livingin an unprecedented present that induced Arendt
and Koselleck- onlyapparently paradoxically-to investigate repetitionstruc-
turesin history.Theirownexperiences ofrupture led bothofthemto a radicality
of thought, something thatconstituted thepointof departure fortheirrespective
anthropologies of historicalexperience.
The call fora noveltheoryof historycan alreadybe foundin Koselleck'sfirst

publishedtexts.In a 1961 reviewof workson thetheoryand methodology of
historiography entitled "Im Vorfeld einer neuen Historik" (In the Forefield of a
New Historik), Koselleckwroteapodictically: "The elementalintrusion ofpoliti-
cal events-and thereby also of philosophicaland religiousissues- pusheshis-
toriography anewtoreviewitsfoundations, thatis,toreviseuncritically accepted
presuppositions."4 For Koselleck these questionable presuppositions included the
of
concept history itself.
Not only a "revision of theview of is
history" necessary,
Koselleckcontinued, butalso a critiqueofthehistorical conditions ofhistoricism
and thephilosophyof history, bothof whichare implicatedin theemergence
of thecrisisof thepolitical.A newHistorik, he argued,mustreacttheoretically
to thiscrisis.Alreadyin his dissertation Critiqueand Crisis (submitted to the
University of Heidelbergin 1954), Koselleckhad tracedtheemergenceof the
philosophy ofhistory -somethingthathaddetacheditselffromconcretepolitical
experiences and had established a Utopianhorizonof expectations-back to the
enlightened sociabilityof Masoniclodgesand secretsocieties.5"Freedomin se-
cretbecamethesecretoffreedom": thissentence, whichreferred tothedisjuncture
of politicaland moralauthority on theeve of theFrenchRevolution, contained
in nuce Koselleck'sthesisin Critiqueand Crisis.Like Tocqueville,he viewed
themoralutopianism of theEnlightenment as dangerously dissociatedfromthe
politicalrealmproper.Masoniclodgesand theircultof secrecyembodiedmoral
critiquein novel social spaces beyondstatepolitics.This critique,untarnished
by therealitiesof politicalconflict, eventually led to a crisisof thepoliticaland
to itsreplacement bymorality and"history." In thepoliticalconstellations of the
eighteenth century Koselleck believed he had discovered the genealogy of the du-
alisticworldview oftheCold War.In theirUtopianself-conceptions, boththeEast
andtheWestinvokedtheforceof "history," whichcould,ifnecessary, be helped
alongbyviolence.As Jürgen Habermasnotedina reviewatthetime,thepolitical
anthropology underlying Critiqueand Crisiswas neverexplicitly thematized in
thebook,despitethefactthatitdetermined all ofthestudy'squestionsand,atthe
sametime,obstructed a number ofitsanswers.6
The pessimistic toneof Critiqueand Crisisdisappearedin Koselleck'swriting
in the 1960s. Instead,he concentrated on thequestionsthebook had raisedin
methodological and theoretical terms. Within theambitof reflections on theGe-
schichtliche Grundbegriffe lexiconamongtheHeidelbergstudygroupformod-
Koselleck,"Im VorfeldeinerneuenHistorik,"
4. Reinhart NeuePolitischeLiteratur
6 (1961), 577.
5. Reinhart
Koselleck,Critiqueand Crisis:Enlightenment
and thePathogenesisofModernSociety
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,1988).The originaldissertationof 1954 hadthemoreprecisesubtitle:
"Eine Untersuchung derpolitischenFunktiondes dualistischen
Weltbildesim 18. Jahrhundert" (An
intothePoliticalFunctionof theDualisticWorldView in theEighteenth
Investigation Century).
6. JürgenHabermas, VerrufenerFortschritt- verkanntesJahrhundert: Zur Kritik an der
Merkur14 (1960), 468-477.
Geschichtsphilosophie,"
2 16 STEFAN-LUDWIG HOFFMANN
ernsocialhistory, as well as his own workon his habilitation thesis,Koselleck's

thought focused in the 1960s and early 1970s on a methodological grounding
of conceptualhistoryin close associationwiththesocial history propagatedby
WernerConze. The historicalcategoriesof "temporalization," "politicization,"
"democratization," and "capacityto becomeideological"thatKoselleckdevel-
oped thereincorporated his previouscritiqueof thecollectivesingularscoined
between1750and 1850:intheSattelzeit, concretehistories cametobe conceived
as "history";individualprogressin particular domainsbecame"progressitself,"
andso on.7
Only withhis workon thefoundingcommittee of thereformuniversity in
Bielefeldin thelate 1960s,and thenwithhis appointment as a memberof the
history department there,did Koselleckreturn to hiscall fora newHistorik.In a
programmatic textin 1972,one yearbeforehis officialappointment at theUni-
of
versity Bielefeld, he summarized from hisown the
perspective reform goalsof
thenewhistory department. Againsta historical socialtheory basedon sociology
(forexample,theprogramof the"historicalsocial sciences"or the"historyof
society"),Koselleckwrotethatan as yetunveiledHistorikaims"at a metahistory
thatinvestigates notmovement butmobility, notchangein theconcretesensebut
changeability."8This,he argued,requiresa historicalanthropology thatfocuses
on themetahistorical conditions ofpossiblehistories:
Therearemanysimilar formal criteria
concerning historical
actingandsuffering, which
arebasically"timeless" acrosshistory
andservetounlock I am
history. thinkingsuchof
criteria
as: "masterandservant"; "friendandfoe";theheterogony ofpurposes; theshift-
ingrelationsoftimeandspacewithregard tounitsofactionandpotential power;andthe
substratum
anthropological forgenerationalchangeinpolitics.Thelistofsuchcategories
couldbeextended; they refer
tothefinitudethatsets in
historymotion, sotospeak,without
capturinginanywaythecontent ordirectionofsuchmovements.9
Koselleck'snewlyestablishedprofessorship in Bielefeldboretheprogrammatic
title:ChairforUniversalHistorywitha Focus on Historik.
In theearly1970s,history as a disciplinebecamea subjectof debate.Against
thetendency it intothesocial sciences,Koselleckfundamentally
to incorporate
reformulated thetheoretical
claimsofthediscipline.Alreadyin "WozunochHis-
torie?"(WhyStillHistory?), theconcludinglectureat theconvention of German
historiansin Cologne in 1970, Koselleckraisedthisquestionand thenoffered
hisownresponse.Insteadof merely"borrowing" theoryfromsociology,history,
he argued,had to determine categoricallywhat constitutedits specificobjectof
the
study:"Only temporal structures,andthat means thestructuresinherent inthe
7. ReinhartKoselleck,Introduction, in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, vol. 1 (Stuttgart: Klett,

1972),xvii;Koselleck,"Geschichte, Historie,"chap. 1, v-vii,in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, vol.
2 (Stuttgart:
Klett,1975), 593-595,647-718; Koselleck,"Fortschritt," chap. 1, iii-vii,in ibid.,351-
353, 363-423.See JanMarco Sawilla,"'Geschichte':Ein ProduktderdeutschenAufklärung? Eine
Kritikan ReinhartKosellecksBegriff des 'KollektivsingularsGeschichte,'"Zeitschriftfürhistorische
Forschung31 (2004), 381-428.
8. ReinhartKoselleck, "Über die Theoriebedürftigkeit der Geschichtswissenschaft," in
Zeitschichten:StudienzurHistorik(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2000), 299-300.
9. ReinhartKoselleck,The Practiceof ConceptualHistory:TimingHistory,SpacingConcepts,
transi.Todd SamuelPresneret al. (Stanford:Stanford University Press,2002), 2-3.
contextof eventsor in anycase demonstrable in them,can adequatelyorderthe

historical of as a
space experience separate domain ofresearch"-thusKoselleck's
plea fora theory ofhistorical times. "The formofhistory in general,andthereby
thehistoriesmadevisiblethrough it,is itsspecifictemporality At
(Zeitlichkeit)"10
thesametime,Koselleckalso pointedtotheurgency ofa historical anthropology,
whichhebelievedtohavebeenrecognized, forinstance, byFoucault.Onlyinthis
way,he argued,is it possibleto investigate something liketheorderof terror in
concentration camps.11
Koselleckunfoldedthesetheoretical issuesin a numberof essaysthatexam-
ined empiricalfindings spanning from antiquity to thepresent.In "Terrorand
Dream"(originally publishedin 1971),12forinstance,he showedhow theindi-
vidualdreamsfromtheearlyyearsoftheThirdReichcollectedbyCharlotte Be-
radttestifiednotonlyto theshock-like occurrence of terror, butalso constituted
formedmodesof enactingterror.
prelinguistically This,he thought, undermined
anthropologically thetraditional separation betweenresfictaeandresfactae,fic-
tionand historical reality.In anotherclassic essay "The Historical-Political Se-
manticsofAsymmetrical Counterconcepts,"13 Koselleck developed thethesisthat
sinceantiquity politicalentitieshavealwaysbeenconstituted andnegatedthrough
conceptsofinclusionandexclusion.According toKoselleck,whodrewherefrom
Carl Schmitt, concretefindings aboutthesemanticsof conceptualpairssuchas
Greekandbarbarian, Christian andheathen, humanandnon-human, or superhu-
manandsubhuman, presupposetheformalbasic structure offriendandenemy.
Koselleck'sattempt at an anthropologically grounded Historik becomespar-
ticularlyclearin his of
essay"'Space Experience' and 'Horizon of Expectation':
TwoHistorical Categories," whichwas also originally publishedinthemid-1970s.
Experienceandexpectations breakapartinmodernity: thiswas Koselleck'sthesis
in Critiqueand Crisis strippedof its polemicalbarb.The concreteexperience
incorporated intothe conceptualframeof expectationscontinually decreased,
whereashorizonsof expectations increasingly expanded."The lessertheexpe-
rientialsubstance,thegreatertheexpectations joined to it: thisis a formulafor
thetemporalstructure of themodern,to thedegreethatit is rendereda concept
by 'progress.'"14 Koselleck'stheoretical conclusionwas thatpreciselytheten-
sionbetweenthesetwoformalcategoriesmadepossibletheempiricalanalysisof
historicaltimes:
Theformal prospectofdeciphering
historyinitsgenerality
bymeansofthispolarity can
onlyintendthe and
outlining establishment
of the of
conditions and
histories,
possible not
Thisthenis a matter
itself.
thishistory ofepistemological whichassistinthe
categories
ofa history.
ofthepossibility
foundation Putdifferently,
thereis nohistory
whichcould
10. ReinhartKoselleck,"Wozu noch Historie?"in Über das Studiumder Geschichte,ed. W.
Hardtwig(Munich:dtv,1990),363, 365.
written
11. See theBielefelddissertation by a studentof Koselleck:Falk Pingel,Häftlingeunter
SS-Herrschaft: Widerstand, Selbstbehauptung und Vernichtungim Konzentrationslager(Hamburg:
Hoffmann undCampe,1978).
12. ReinhartKoselleck,"Terrorand Dream:Methodological Remarkson theExperienceofTime
duringtheThirdReich,"in FuturesPast,205-221.
13. ReinhartKoselleck,"The Historical-Political
Semanticsof Asymmetrical Counterconcepts,"
in FuturesPast, 155-191.
in FuturesPast,274.
14. Koselleck,"'Space of Experience'and 'Horizonof Expectation,'"
2 18 STEFAN-LUDWIG
HOFFMANN
be constituted oftheexperiences
independently andexpectations
ofactivehuman agents.
Withthis,however, is yetsaidabouta givenconcrete
nothing his-
orfuture
past,present,
tory.Thisformalistic is
property sharedbyour with
concepts numerous other
terms in
historical
science.15
According toKoselleck,theseincludethecategorical betweenmas-

distinction
terand slave,or friendandenemy,to whichwe willreturnin a moment.
Laterin
theessayhe wrote:
thesetwocategories
Accordingly, areindicative
ofa general
human onecould
condition;
saythattheyindicate
an anthropological condition
withoutwhichhistory
is neitherpos-
. . . Theconditions
siblenorconceivable. ofpossibility
ofrealhistory
are,at thesame
time,conditions
ofitscognition. Hopeandmemory, orexpressedmoregenerally,
expecta-
tionandexperience-forexpectation comprehendsmorethanhope,andexperience goes
deeperthanmemory- simultaneously constitute anditscognition [Experience
history
andexpectation
aretwocategories forthetreatment
appropriate ofhistorical
timebecause
ofthewaythattheyembody pastandfuture.16
Even ifthecollectionof essaysFuturesPast (originally
publishedin German
in 1979),whichcontainsthesetexts,is dedicatedto the"Semanticsof Historical
Time,"theidea of a Historikoutliningtheconditionsof historicalexperience
was alreadyevidentthereas well,exemplified on thebasisoftwoconceptsfrom
thetheory ofhistorical
times.At theendoftheessay"'Space ofExperience'and
'HorizonofExpectation,'" whichis also thefinalchapterofthebook,Koselleck
formulated theissuequiteclearly:
Itisevident
thatexperiences
canonlybeaccumulatedbecausetheyare- as experiences-
Theremustthenexistlong-term
repeatable. formalstructures
inhistorywhichallowthe
accumulation
repeated ofexperience History isonlyabletorecognize
whatcontinually
changes,andwhatisnew,ifithasaccesstotheconventions
within
which structures
lasting
areconcealed.
Thesetoomustbediscovered andinvestigated
ifhistorical is to
experience
betransformedintohistorical
science.17
It was theexploratorysearchforsuchcategoriesof a theoryof theconditions of
possible histories-his Historik-that would become Koselleck's primary focus
fromthispointon.
Thusmyfirst preliminaryconclusionis thatclaimsofan "anthropological turn"
in Koselleck'stheoreticalwritingsin the 1980s seem exaggerated.18Rather, what
is surprisingin retrospectis how consistently Koselleckpursuedthequestions
he hadpreviously formulated, and in doingso he modifiedhis theoreticalreflec-
tionsinrepeatedly newattempts beginning in theearly1970s. Hence, thevolume
Zeitschichten(2002),whichhe was stillabletoputtogether himself, was a collec-
tionofhis"studieson theHistorik"written overthecourseofthreedecades.
The theory ofhistorical
time,conceptualhistory, andreflection on theHistorik
arethusmorecloselyrelatedthanmighthaveinitially appeared. It was onlyon the
occasionofa colloquiuminhonorofHans-Georg GadamerthatKosellecksought
15. Ibid.,256.
16. Ibid.,257'-258.
11. Ibid.,275.
18. Kari Palonen,Die Entzauberung
der Begriffe:
Das UmschreibenderpolitischenBegriffe
bei
QuentinSkinnerundReinhartKoselleck(Münster:LIT, 2004), 307.
to developthecategoriesof hisHistorikmoresystematically. In his contribution

totheGadamerFestschrift entitled"Historik
undHermeneutik" (1985), as wellas
in severallateressays thatfurther modifiedhis theoretical
reflections, Koselleck
formulated morepreciselyhis own historical-anthropological approach.After
boththetotalizing explanatory claimsof philosophies history theoptimism
of and
of thesocial scienceshad becomehistorically obsolete,Kosellecksoughtin the
1980sand 1990sto sharplydistinguish hisowntheoretical approachfromphilo-
sophicalhermeneutics as wellas fromthe"linguistic turn"in thehumanities.
"Are theconditionsof possiblehistoryexhaustedin languageand texts?Or
are thereconditions thatare extralinguistic even whentheyare
or prelinguistic,
soughtlinguistically?" This was Koselleck'sinitialquestionin attempting to de-
lineatethedifference betweenHistorikand hermeneutics. "If thereare suchpre-
suppositions of historythatare neitherexhaustedin languagenorreferto texts,
thentheHistorikmusthave an epistemological statusthatcannotbe treatedas
a subclassof hermeneutics." This was thethesisthatKoselleckopposedto his
teacherGadamer.
incontrast
scienceHistorik,
As a theoretical toempirical is notconcerned
history, with
histories whose and
themselves, past,present, perhaps futurerealities
arethematizedand
investigatedby is
Historik
historians. ratherthedoctrineoftheconditionsof histo-
possible
thetheoretically
ries.Itinvestigates necessaryparameters thatmakecomprehensible why
histories howthey
occur, cantakeplace,as wellas whyandhowthey must beinvestigated,
represented,ornarrated.19
ForKoselleck,an irreducible differenceexistedbetweenpastrealityanditslin-

guisticcomprehension. Itwas thisdifferencethatdistinguished history fromother
scholarlydisciplines.His essay,"LinguisticChange and theHistory of Events,"
attempted todefine this
distinction more preciselyintheoreticalterms, identifying
thedifferent temporalstructures thatare incorporated intoeventsand thatgive
risetothem.Events,inthecourseofoccurring, havea different modeofexistence
fromlanguage,whichis spokenbefore,during,or afterward, Koselleckargued,
takingup his reflections from"Terrorand Dream.""Betweenlanguageand ac-
tion-and, one mightalso say,betweenlanguageand passion- thereremainsa
difference,even if languageis an act of speech,and even if actionand passion
aremediatedbylanguage."20 Thoughthestructures ofpossibleactioncontinueto
be presentonly in theirlinguisticform,"[nevertheless, theseelementary, natural
givensremain,howevermuchlanguagemayseekto effacethem."21
Thistalkofelementary, naturalgivensaimedneither ata metaphysical determi-
nationofhumannaturenorata Nietzschean eternalrecurrence.Rather, Koselleck
was searching forrepetition structuresthatoccurredhistorically in evernewand
differentforms."Everyaction,"Koselleckwrotein theintroduction to Zeitsch-
ichten,"andeveryuniqueconstellation carriedoutor enduredbyequallyunique
19. ReinhartKoselleck,"Historikund Hermeneutik," Studienzur Historik
in Zeitschichten:
(Frankfurt:Suhrkamp, 2000), 99. See also thereviewofZeitschichtenbyJohnZammito, "Koselleck's
Philosophyof HistoricalTime(s) and thePracticeof History," Historyand Theory43 (2004), 124-
135.
20. Reinhart Koselleck,"Linguistic ChangeandtheHistory ofEvents,"JournalofModernHistory
61 (1989), 650.
21. Ibid.,652.
humansalwayscontainsrepeatingtimelayers.These makepos-
and particular
and delimitopportunities
sible,condition, forhumanactionand simultaneously
of all individualcases is containedin their
unleashthem.. . . The presupposition
And"Was sichwiederholt"
repeatability."22 (ThatWhichRepeats),thefinaltext
publishedduring Koselleck's contained
life, thethesis
uniqueinspoken
thateverything language andinlivedhistory
is neither
conceivablenor
without
possible structures.
repetition . . . Thuswehavenotabandoned, butonlyamended
ourstatementthateveryutterance
andeveryactionis irreversible andunique.Theseare
whichstorewithin
structures,
repetition themselvesdiachronic andsyn-
presuppositions
chronie inorder
conditions tounleashanddelimit uniquesurprises.23
Amonghis different versionsand variationsof thistheme,therewere in par-

ticularthreeanthropological distinctions thatprescribed forKoselleckthebasic
figures of all possiblehistories:sooner or later,inside and outside',and above
and below.
Sooneror Later.The firstof thesedistinctions is thespanbetweensooneror
later,beingbornandhavingtodie,whichmakeseverylifeuniqueandatthesame
timepartofa generational experience.ForKoselleck,thetemporal dimensionof
humanexperienceis ineluctable;and thereference hereto his previously devel-
oped categories"space of experience"and "horizonof expectation" is evident.
Kosellecknow referseven moredirectlyto Heidegger'sanalysisof existence
(Dasein) andhiscategoriesofthrownness (Geworfenheit) andtheanticipation of
deathandhavingtodie,butalso supplements thesewiththepossibility ofdyinga
violentdeath."Whatever historical
manifestations arethematized overthecourse
of timein orderto investigate theshapesof possiblewarsand possiblepeaces
and theirartsand theircommonalities: Without thecapacityto violently shorten
thetimespanof others'lifepossibilities therewouldnotbe thehistories thatwe
all know."24Generativity as a biologicalparameter ofhumannaturealso includes
sexuality-which encompassesrelations betweenparentsandchildren, and,more
generally,between generations,relationsthat simultaneously underscore thefact
thathistorical experienceis notdirectly transferable fromone generation to the
next.25
Insideand Outside.Second,all possiblehistoriescannotescape thedistinc-
tionbetweeninsideandoutside,or,in theterminology of Carl Schmitt, between
friendand enemy.HereKoselleckdrewuponhis sharpcritiquein Critiqueand
Crisisofthe"hypocrisies" oftheEnlightenment, as wellas in hisessayon asym-
metricalcounterconcepts. Enlightened universalism claimsto be able to bridge
theboundary betweeninsideandoutsidethrough theintroduction oftheconcept
ofhumanity inthepoliticalrealm,butthis,Koselleckinsisted, onlyintensifies the
boundary even more: politicalopponentsare now excluded semanticallyfrom hu-
manity andbecome"non-humans." Whatinterests Koselleckhereevenmorethan
thispoliticalinsightderivedfromSchmitt is theformalstructure uponwhichitis
based.Plurality, as thefundamental condition ofhumanaction,meansinpolitical
22. Reinhart in Zeitschichten,

Koselleck,"Introduction," 13.
23. ReinhartKoselleck,"Was sichwiederholt,"Frankfurter Zeitung(July21, 2005).
Allgemeine
24. Koselleck,"HistorikundHermeneutik," 102.
25. Ibid.,107.
All humansarefellow
termsthatan insideandan outsidearealwaysestablished.
humans,but in terms
historical in quitedifferent
ways:26
Whetherin actualhistory Greeksfought barbarians
or Greeksfought Greeks, whether
andheathens
Christians fought eachother orChristians
foughtamong themselves,whether
themodernunitsofactionhaveconstituted inthenameofhumanity
themselves andcom-
batedtheir
opponents as non-humans, orwhether theunitsofactions
havecomprehended
as theclasssubjectinordertoeliminate
themselves theexistenceofclasses-empirical
initsdiachronic
extension successionalwayspresupposes theoppositional
pairoffriend
andenemy.Incategorical this
terms, is a formal
opposition to
open any andall substantive
content
andis thusa kindoftranscendental of
category possiblehistories.27
In "HistorikundHermeneutik," Koselleckstillincludedtheopposition between

thepublicandtheprivateas partof theinside-outside opposition.However,this
no longerappearedin his latertexts,thoughtheydid includethedis-
distinction
betweenvictorsandvanquishedas a formoftheinside-outside
tinction relation.28
Moreover, in his latertextsKoselleckalso differentiated
this formal distinction
in termsofconflict Now notonlythedemarcation
theory. of politicalentities(in
extremecases, enmity), butalso thetransgression of boundariesbecamepartof
theinside-outside relation:
Without contacts
andcontrasts, without
conflicts
andcompromises, withoutconsensus-
building of
processes thisor that kind,no of
community actioncouldexistorsurvive,at
leastinourcomplex . . . Theseinner-outer
society. demarcations forlifebecome
necessary
onlywhencontacts
threatening areblockedandcompromisesareobstructed,
whencon-
sensus-building
processesonlyserveone-sidedly tofuelconflict,
toincitecivilwars,to
engageinwarfare,
andtounleash massmurder.29
Above and Below. Finally,Koselleck believedthatthe distinction between

aboveandbelow,masterandslaveas Hegel andMarxhadcalledit,runsthrough
all social relationsin history.
This does notmeanthatfreedomand equalityare
unobtainable in thecourseof humanhistory. Social hierarchies,however,will
alwaysbe establishedanew.This is also true,accordingto thepoliticalturnin
Koselleck'shistorical anthropology, forall attemptsto establishequalitythrough
force:"Everyrevolution thathas alteredpowerrelationsin violentwayshas led
to theestablishment of new powerrelations.The legitimation maybe new; the
legalrelations maybe different,perhapseverbetter; butthereturn to reorganized
andlegallyregulated formsofdependence, ortheabove-belowrelationitself,has
neverbeenchangedbythisin anyway."30
In hislastpublishedtextKoselleckidentified thesethreeformaldistinctionsas
thebasisofhishistorical anthropology, butalso supplemented themwiththreead-
ditionalcategories:thegeographical andclimaticpreconditions that,independent
ofhumans, maketheirlivespossible;theinstitutions thatestablishtheexclusively
human-generated conditionsofpossiblehistories,forinstance, workandlaw; and
26. Ibid., 104.

21. Ibid., 103.
28. Koselleck,"LinguisticChange."
29. ReinhartKoselleck, "Feindbegriffe,"
in Begriffsgeschichten:
Studienzur Semantikund
Pragmatik derpolitischen
undsozialenSprache(Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp, 2006), 274.
30. Koselleck,"HistorikundHermeneutik,"109.
finally,theoccurrences themselves, whichcontaintheirownrepetition structures,

as indicatedbytheconceptofrevolution.31
Koselleck'sintention herewas nottoreduceall humanactiontothesebasican-
thropological conditions (thushisemphasisonpossible,notnecessary, histories).
Nor did he denythattheseconditionscould be determined onlythrough their
in
expression language(conceptualhistory was for him the method of empirically
verifying his theoretical categories).32On thecontrary, Koselleckbelievedthat
thefunction ofhisHistorikwas to theoretically incorporate historicalexperience
in sucha waythatitbecameusefulforfuture political actionas well as forprog-
nosticreasoning, an issuetowhichwe willreturn later.Thisalso markeda crucial
distinction fromHeidegger'sphilosophy, whichhad providedessentialimpulses
forKoselleck'sHistorik, especiallythe fundamental questionraisedin chapter5
of Beingand Timeaboutthetemporality and historicallyof existence.In con-
trastto Heidegger,Koselleckregardedtheplurality (Lowith's "being- with-one-
another")andtheconflict potentialofhumanstobe partofthebasic structures of
possible histories.33
Koselleckreadilyconcededthatin hisHistorikhe had utilizedcomponents of
politicaltheoryfromantiquity to Carl Schmitt. It wouldcertainly be possibleto
tracehermeneutically thegenealogiesof his historicaltheories.This wouldnot
mean,however,thatKoselleck'sHistorikdid notdescribethestructures of pos-
sibilityto whicheverydoctrineof understanding can onlyreact,as he countered
toGadamer.TheHistorik, accordingtoKoselleck,aimsatdisclosingtheoretically
howhistories can concretely emergeat all:
Thegeneralformaldeterminations
ofinnerandouter,
aboveandbelow,earlier and
orlater,
alsotheconcrete
determination
offriend
andenemy, ofgenerativity,
ofmasterandslave,
andofthepublicsphereandtheprivate arealwayscategorical
determinations
thataim
atwaysofbeing,whichmustindeedbe mediated bylanguagebutarenotsubstanti
vely
exhaustedinthismediation;
rathertheyarealso something Thustheseare
independent.
that
categories aimata wayofbeingofpossible which
history, first
provokesomething like
and
understandingcomprehension.34
Only in thisway,Koselleckargued,can historians achievea rationalordering

fromthechaosof historical findingsand also maintaina conceptof truth, which
first
makeshistory a branchof scholarship at all. "Historyitself,ifwe acceptthis
ideology-ladenterm,is irrational-rationalis at mostitsanalysis."35
Even morethanotherscholarlydisciplinesbased on textualexegesis,history,
Koselleckargued,mustmeasurethedifference betweenpastrealityandlanguage,
evenifthisrealityis itselfonlyconstitutedin language:
Thethingswhich,intheframework ofthegivensI havenamed, havegathered themselves
upintoreality
aremorethancanbe mastered bylanguage. Whenthefluctuating distinc-
tionbetween"inner"and"outer" hardensintothepassionate conflict
between friend
and
foe,whentheinevitability
ofdeathis preempted or
bykilling by when
self-sacrifice, the
31. Koselleck,"Was sichwiederholt."
32. Fora differentreading,see AngelikaEpple,"NaturaMagistraHistoriae?Reinhart
Kosellecks
transzendentale GeschichteundGesellschaft
Historik," 32 (2006), 201-213.
33. Koselleck,"HistorikundHermeneutik," 101.
34. Ibid., 113.
35. Ibid.
THE ANTHROPOLOGY
OF HISTORICALEXPERIENCE 223
relationbetween"above"and"below"leadstoenslavement andpermanent or
subjugation
toexploitationandclass struggle,orwhenthetensionbetweenthesexesleadstodegrada-
tion-in all thesecases therewillthenoccurevents,or chainsofevents,orevencataracts
ofevents,whicharebeyondthepale oflanguage,andto whichall words,all sentences, all
speechcan onlyreact.36
Koselleck demonstratedin his own workshow empiricallyproductivetheoppo-

sitionalpairs he consideredcategorical were forhistoricalanalysis- forinstance,
by examining of the political semantics of "nation" and "people," the memory
and experiencesof the two world wars, or the iconographyof death in the age of
democracy.37He showed this particularlyclearly throughthe example of histori-
ographyitself.The conditionsof possible historiesalso prescribethe possibilities
of historicalanalysis or narration.These conditionsare crucial fortheperspective
of a historian,Koselleck argued,no matterwhetherhe or she is "contemporaryor
born later" and thus an eyewitnessor a retrospectivenarratorof events,whether
he or she is situated"higheror lower" in social or political terms,whetheraffiliat-
ed withthe "winnersor losers," or "whetherhe belongs to the political,religious,
social, or economic entitywhose historyhe portrays,identifyinghimselfmore or
less criticallywithit,or whetherhe is looking on fromoutside."38
Only afterKoselleck had identifiedthecategoricaloppositionalpairsof his His-
torikdid he discover a similaranthropologyof historicalexperience in Goethe's
Farbenlehre(Theoryof Colors): "Withlightpoise and counterpoise,natureoscil-
lates withinher prescribedlimits,yet thus arrivesat one side and the other,at an
above and below, at a beforeand after,throughwhich all the varietiesand condi-
tionsof thephenomenaare presentedto us in space and time."39Koselleck under-
stood his theoryof the conditionsof possible historiesas consciously untimely,
removed fromthe scholarlyfashions of his era, which oftenlagged behind his
own methodologicalinnovations.In this,connectionscan be drawn most readily
to Karl Löwith's philosophical anthropology(and his critiqueof modernhistori-
cal thought40), and above all to a political thinkerwho, like Koselleck, strovefor
"historiesin the plural and against historyin the singular":Hannah Arendt.41
36. Koselleck,"LinguisticChange,"652.
37. Reinhart Koselleck,"Volk,Nation,Nationalismus, Masse," in GeschichtlicheGrundbegriffe,
vol. 7 (1992), 142-151,380-431; on the politicalsemanticsof above-belowand inner-outer see,
forexample,"Erinnerungsschleusen und Erfahrungsschichten:Der Einflußder beidenWeltkriege
aufdas soziale Bewußtsein,"in Zeitschichten, 266-272; and,through theexampleof politicalico-
nography:"Introduction," in Der PolitischeTotenkult: Kriegerdenkmäler in der Moderne,ed. R.
Koselleckand M. Jeismann(Munich:Fink, 1994), 9-20; "Kriegerdenkmäler als Identitätsstiftung
der Überlebenden," in Identität,
ed. K. Stierleand O. Marquardt(Munich:Fink, 1979), 255-276;
Zur politischenIkonologiedes gewaltsamenTodes: Ein deutsch-französischer Vergleich(Basel:
Schwabe,1998).
38. Koselleck,"LinguisticChange,"662. Koselleckhas developedthisargument in moredetailin
"Transformations of Experienceand Methodological Change:A Historical-AnthropologicalEssay,"
in ThePracticeofConceptualHistory, 76-83.
39. Zur Farbenlehre,in SämtlicheWerke,vol. 23/1,613, citedin ReinhartKoselleck,Goethes
unzeitgemäße Geschichte (Heidelberg:Manutius,1997),26. The Englishedition,TheoryofColours,
transi.CharlesL. Eastlake(London:JohnMurray,1840),xxxviii-xxxix, containsa shortenedversion
ofthissentencethatomitstheconceptualpairs.
40. Karl Lowith,Meaningin History(London: University of Chicago Press,1949), as well as
his essaysfromthe 1950s in Der Menschinmitten der Geschichte:PhilosophischeBilanz des 20.
Jahrhunderts, ed. B. Lutz(Stuttgart:
Metzler,1990).
41 . JacobTaubescoinedthisformulation withregardto Koselleckin "Geschichtsphilosophie und
II
Explicitreferences to Arendtare rarein Koselleck'swork.When she is men-

tioned,it is usuallyin connectionwithotherliberal,anti-totalitarian thinkers of
thepostwarera suchas RaymondAron,to whomKoselleckfeltpolitically close.
Still,in 1956,a yearaftertheGermanpublication ofArendt'sbookon totalitari-
anism, Koselleck invited her to Heidelberg give a lecture.Althoughfewcol-
to
leagues attended,manystudents, as he laterrecalled,came to the lectureand
discussedtheissueenthusiastically withArendtdeepintothenight.ForKoselleck
andotherHeidelbergstudents whohadreturned fromtheNazi warin theEast or
theSovietgulags,Arendt'sstudyof totalitarianism representedan importantdis-
covery:"HeideggerandLukács,Kojève andJaspersstilloperatedintherun-upto
thecatastrophe. Thiswas notthecase withArendt."42 Thereare,conversely,no in-
dications thatArendt ever read Critiqueand The
Crisis. pointsof contactbetween
Koselleck'sHistorikand Arendt'spoliticalanthropology, whichI will examine
morecloselyin thissection,can be explainedless fromthemutualreceptionof
eachother'sworksthanfroma sharedtheoretical starting point:Heidegger'sanal-
ysisof Dasein, and a critiqueof theconceptof history orientedaroundmodern,
anonymoussocial structures and processes,whether in theformof theMarxist
philosophy ofhistory or theAmericansocial sciencesofthepostwarera.43
For Arendt as well as Koselleck,history possessedno telosand no reason,but
rather was,accordingto a dictumbyGoethethatshe notedin herDenktagebuch
(ThinkingDiary),no morethan"a mixtureof errorand violence."44 Like Ko-
selleck, Arendt used Heidegger'sthought go beyondHeidegger.45 same
to The
also holdsforCarl Schmitt 's influence,as recentinvestigations havedemonstrat-
ed.46Anothersharedpointof contact,althoughless influential forKoselleck's
Historik:Bemerkungen zu KosellecksProgramm einerneuenHistorik," in Geschichte-Ereignisund

Erzählung, ed. R. Kosellecket al. (Munich:Fink,1973),490-499.
42. ReinhartKoselleck,"LaudatioaufFrançoisFuret,"SinnundForm49 (1998), 297.
43. Ira Katznelson,Desolation and Enlightenment: Political Knowledgeafter Total War,
Totalitarianism,and theHolocaust (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press,2003); Nils Gilman,
Mandarinsof theFuture:Modernization Theoryin Cold WarAmerica(Baltimore:JohnsHopkins
University Press,2003).
44. HannahArendt, Denktagebuch 1950-1973 (Munich:Piper,2002), 1,488.
45. ForKoselleckandHeidegger,see Taubes,Geschichtsphilosophie undHistorik;on Arendtand
Heidegger,see especiallyDana R. Villa,Arendtand Heidegger:TheFate ofthePolitical(Princeton:
PrincetonUniversityPress, 1996); Rahel Jaeggi, Welt und Person: Zum anthropologischen
Hintergrund der Gesellschaftskritik HannahArendts(Berlin:Lukas, 1997); as well as, in particular
on theinfluence ofHeideggeron Arendt'shistorical thinking, Annette Vowinckel,Geschichtsbegriff
undHistorisches Denkenbei HannahArendt(Cologne:Böhlau,2001).
46. See ReinhardMehring, Begriffsgeschichte,
"Begriffssoziologie, ZurFormder
Begriffspolitik:
Ideengeschichtsschreibung nachCarl SchmittundReinhart Koselleck,"in PolitischeIdeengeschicht
sschreibung im20. Jahrhundert. KonzepteundKritik, ed. H. BluhmandJ.Gebhardt(Baden-Baden:
Nomos,2006), 31-50;forArendtand Schmittsee, forexample,David Bates,"On Revolutions in the
NuclearAge: The Eighteenth Centuryand thePostwarGlobal Imagination," Qui Parle 15 (2005),
171-195;SamuelMoyn,"HannahArendton theSecular,"New GermanCritique35 (2008), 71-96;
and AndreasKalyvas,Democracyand thePoliticsof theExtraordinary: Max Weber,Carl Schmitt,
THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE 225
theorizing,was Karl Jaspers,withwhombothstudied,Arendtbefore1933 and

Koselleckafter1945.47Both regardedthe analysisof accumulatedconceptual
sediments as a methodological approachto pastrealities.Bothattempted through
dialoguewithtextsfromantiquity and theolderEuropeantradition of political
thought to comprehend thegenealogyof themodernexperienceof rupture and
thecatastrophes of thetwentieth century. Theirrespectivethinking was closer
to Herodotus, Thucydides,or Tocquevillethanto Hegel,Marx,or Parsons.And
bothdevelopedmetahistorical, anthropological categoriesthatwereintendedto
this
perspectivize rupture in traditionand simultaneously bridgeitcategorically.
As is wellknown,Arendt 's politicaltheoryis closelyconnectedto herhistori-
cal thought.48Preciselybecauseshedid notholdcontemporary historiography in
highregard- a disinclination thathistorians, withfew exceptions, continue to
reciprocate even her to the
today49- attempt comprehend politicalcatastrophes
ofthetwentieth centurybeganwithhistorical-genealogical questions.In TheOri-
gins of Totalitarianism(1951), writtenin the 1940s, Arendt attempted to show
thattotalitarianrulewas notonlya completely newformof government butwas
also basedon historicalexperiences thathadneverbeforeservedas thegroundof
politics.Like theterm"genocide,"coinedby RaphaelLemkinaroundthistime,
"totalitarianism"expressedconceptually a novelexperience.50 Accordingto Ar-
endt,thebasis of totalitarian rulewas terror,which constricted thespace of hu-
man action,causingfreedomto disappear;its centralconceptswere "history"
and "nature,"accordingto whoseostensiblelaws societywas to be organized.
RacismandMarxismintersected attheutopiaofthenewman.Bothwereoriented
notarounda concrete, experience-based butrather
reality, aimedto accelerateits
ideological transformation.Where thelaw-like extinction of certainclassestook
too longor,conversely, theperfect racerequiredan existential battlein orderto
continueitsevolutionary development, terrorhelped processalongby force:
the
"Terror makesmenconform to themovement ofhistory or nature."51
Arendtcontinuedthisdebateaboutthemodernconceptof historyin a series
of articlesand in hernotesin the 1950s (whichwerepublishedonlyrecently).
"The disasterthatcame intohistorythoughthedominanceof naturalscientific
HannahArendt(Cambridge, UK: CambridgeUniversity Press,2008).

47. See ReinhartKoselleck,"Jaspers,die Geschichteunddas Uberpolitische," in Karl Jaspers.
Denker,ed. JeanneHerschetal. (Munich:Piper,1986),291-302;Hannah
Philosoph,Arzt,politischer
Arendt, "KarlJaspers:CitizenoftheWorld?"in Men in Dark Times(New York:Harcourt, Brace &
World,1970),81-94.
48. See Claudia Althaus,Erfahrung Denken:HannahArendtsWeg von der Zeitgeschichte zur
politischenTheorie(Göttingen:Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,2000); Vowinckel,Geschichtsbegriff,and
Seyla Benhabib,TheReluctant Modernism ofHannahArendt(Lanham,MD: Rowman& Littlefield,
2003), 86-101.
49. An exceptionto this is Hans Mommsen,"Hannah Arendtund der Prozeß gegen Adolf
Eichmann,"in HannahArendt,Eichmannin Jerusalem:Ein Berichtvon der Banalitätdes Bösen
(Munich:Piper,1986),9-48.
50. See Anson Rabinbach,"The Challengeof the Unprecedented- Raphael Lemkinand the
Conceptof Genocide,"Jahrbuch des Simon-Dubnow -Instituts
4 (2005), 397-420;BenjaminAlpers,
Dictators,Democracy,and AmericanPublic Culture:Envisioningthe TotalitarianEnemy,1920-
1950 (ChapelHill: Universityof NorthCarolinaPress,2003), esp. chap.5.
51. HannahArendt,"The GreatTraditionand the Natureof Totalitarianism" [1953], Hannah
ArendtPapers,LibraryofCongress,Manuscript Division,p. 8.
thought," she wrotein herDenktagebuch, "lies notin theconcepts,butrather

in processthinking. Development, the
namely, unfolding of an originalgiven,is
a concessionof thenaturalsciencesto historical reality:Throughit one histori-
cized naturalprocesses(Darwin)and naturalized history."52For thisreason,she
also regardedthetraditional methodsand explanatory modelsof historiography
to be unusable."To forgetall causality,"she notedin thesummerof 1951; "[i]n
itsplace: theanalysisoftheelementsofevents.Centralis theeventin whichthe
elementshavecrystallized. The titleof mybook [is] utterlywrong;shouldhave
beencalled:The ElementsofTotalitarianism."53 In theGermaneditionpublished
in 1955,theterm"elements"was actuallyincludedin thetitle,alongwitha new
concludingchapter, "IdeologieundTerror:eine neue Staatsform" (Ideologyand
Terror:A NovelFormofGovernment), whichcontainedthetheoretical outlineof
her(neverwritten) sequelon Stalinism.54
Thus like Koselleck,Arendtalso consistently rejectedthemodernconstruc-
tionsof historyin Hegel and Marx,Spenglerand Toynbee(whose "challenge
andresponse"continueseventodayto inform mostderivatives of modernization
theory).In contrast tothetraditionofpremodern politicalthought, Arendtargued,
modernthought is a thinkingin processesofnatureor history:
The modernconceptof processpervadinghistory and naturealike separatesthemodern
age fromthepastmoreprofoundly thananyothersingleidea.To ourmodernwayofthink-
ingnothing is meaningful
inandbyitself,notevenhistory ornaturetakeneach as a whole,
andcertainly notparticular
occurrences in thephysicalorderor specifichistoricalevents.
Thereis a fatefulenormity in thisstateofaffairs. Invisibleprocesseshaveengulfedevery
tangiblething, everyindividualentity thatis visibletous,degrading themintofunctionsof
an over-allprocess.Theenormity ofthischangeis likelytoescapeus ifwe allowourselves
to be misledby suchgeneralities as thedisenchantment of theworldor thealienationof
man,generalities thatofteninvolvea romanticized notionofthepast.Whattheconceptof
processimpliesis thattheconcreteandthegeneral,thesinglethingoreventandtheuniver-
sal meaning, havepartedcompany.The process,whichalonemakesmeaningful whatever
ithappenstocarryalong,has thusacquireda monopolyofuniversality andsignificance.55
It is notwords,deeds,and events- theclassic themesof historiography

and
in
politics antiquity- that the
constitute objects of historical
thoughtin moder-
nity.
Since Hegel watchedNapoleonrideintoJenaand saw in himnottheemperorof France
northeconqueror ofPrussia,nottheson andnotthedestroyer orovercomer oftheFrench
Revolution, thatis, nothing
thatNapoleonactuallywas at thismoment, butrather "world
spiriton horseback"-sincethattimehistorians andhistoriography
havebelievedthatthey
are finishedwiththeinvestigationanddepictionof an eventonlywhentheyhavediscov-
eredthatwhichis functionally exponentialin it,namelythatwhichitselfis hiddenimper-
ceptiblybehindthevisibleandtheexperiential.56
52. Arendt, Denktagebuch, 1,415 (originalemphasis).

53. Ibid.,In thispassagethewords"ElementsofTotalitarianism"werewrittenin English.
54. Thischapterwas also includedin thesecondand thirdEnglisheditions.
55. HannahArendt, "The Conceptof History:Ancientand Modern,"in BetweenPast and Future
(New York:The VikingPress,1961),63-64.
56. HannahArendt,NaturundGeschichte,in ZwischenVergangenheit undZukunft: Übungen
impolitischen Denken(Munich:Piper,1994),1,50.
Thiscritiqueof themodernconceptof history, whichArendt-quitesimilarly

to Koselleck- identified notonlyin Marxismbutalso in thepositivist optimism
oftheAmericansocial sciences,led herto thequestionofthemetahistorical, an-
thropological conditions of historicalexperience. In theHuman Condition (1958),
particularly in chapter5, "Action,"Arendtunfoldedherhistorical-political an-
thropology, whichcan be understood as a theoretical responseto the problems
diagnosedinherstudiesoftotalitarianism. Arendtalso hadno interest in identify-
inga metaphysical humannature;shewantedto findcategoriesthatdisclosedthe
"humancondition," whichitselfstructured thepossibilities ofthepolitical- what
Koselleckcalledtheconditions ofpossiblehistories. She identified threesuchcat-
egories: natality and plurality, action and speech; and forgiving and promising .
and
Natality Plurality. How can totalitarianism's of
logic compulsion and fear
be interrupted? Thatis theexistential questionthatArendtraisedin thenewcon-
cludingchapter ofhertotalitarianism bookinthemid-1950s.LikeKoselleck(who
evenreferred atthispointdirectly toArendt57), sheturned toHeidegger'scategory
ofthrownness (Geworfenheit). Natality, to
according Arendt, is a basic condition
of humanexistence.In contrast to Heidegger,however,she did notbelievethat
humanliferushedfrombirthtodeath.Beingborn,Arendtargued,makespossible
theextraordinary, a newbeginning, andwiththisan evernewand spontaneously
emerging counterweight to ruleby terror and ideology."Initiumutessetcreatus
es homo,'thata beginning be made,manwas created,'saidAugustine. Thisnew
is
beginning guaranteed by each new birth; it is indeed every man."58
In theHumanConditionArendtreturned to thesefinalsentencesof thesec-
ond editionof theOriginsof Totalitarianism. Now in additionto "natalityand
mortality" Arendt included among the basic conditions of humanexistence"life
itself. . . and theearth"(in Koselleck,thegeographical, climatic,and natural
preconditions of possiblehistories)as well as "worldliness" and "plurality" (in
Koselleck,theconflict structures ofinside-outside andabove-belowrelations).59
ForArendt, theAugustinian-Christian conceptofthebeginning, whicheveryhu-
manwithout distinction is givenas a possibility through birth, realizedpoliti-
is
callyonlywithotherhumans.The factof humanplurality is manifested in two
as
ways, equality and as difference. "Human plurality is the paradoxical plurality
ofuniquebeings."60 Plurality thusmeansforArendta politicalmultiplicity, which
also impliesa sphereof consensus and conflictamongalways distinct and dif-
ferent individuals. This explainsas well Arendt'spolemicagainsta prepolitical
of
concept "humanity," a polemicsimilarto thatfoundin Koselleck.Againstthe
cosmopolitan illusion that all humans,simplybybeinghuman,arecitizensofthe
world,Arendt-who was herselfcompelledto be statelessformanyyears- re-
calledthatinordertobe able to actpolitically humansalwayshavetobelongto a
107.
57. Koselleck,"HistorikundHermeneutik,"
58. HannahArendt, rev.ed. (London:Allen& Unwin,1958),479
TheOriginsofTotalitarianism,
(HannahArendt, ElementeundUrsprüngetotalerHerrschaft
[Munich:Piper,2003], 979).
59. HannahArendt, TheHumanCondition(Chicago:University ofChicagoPress,1969), 11.
60. Ibid.,176.
concretepolitical entity."Nobody can be a citizenof the world as he is the citizen

of his country."61
This critiqueof an abstractconceptof "humanity"also explainsArendt'sskepti-
cism towardhuman rights;like Edmund Burke, she preferredthe rightsof state
citizenship.This does notmean thatArendthad an elitistdisdain fortheequalityof
naturalrights.62 Rathershe was unable to see how an appeal to "humanity"could
guaranteeand establishrightsas long as a worldstatedid notexist.And forArendt
such a world state would have been the most terribleformof tyrannypossible
because it would have put an end to all politics,which presupposes pluralityand
difference."Politics deals withmen,nationalsof manycountriesand heirsto many
pasts; its laws are the positivelyestablished fences which hedge in, protect,and
limitthe space in which freedomis not a concept,but a living,politicalreality."63
Actionand Speech. For Arendt,natalityand pluralityare therefore thebasic con-
ditionsof humanexistence. Both referto the centralconcept of her historical-po-
liticalanthropology:action. In contrastto workand production- thetwo activities
upon which, according to Arendt,modernsociety has been groundedin a politi-
cally disastrousway- action is played out directlyamong humans.Interhomines
esse (to be a humanamong humans) is, Arendtrecalled,synonymousin Latin with
being alive. Actionthuspresupposesplurality,but also natality:"[T]he new begin-
ninginherentin birthcan make itselffeltin the world only because the newcomer
possesses thecapacityof beginningsomethinganew, thatis, of acting."64
"It is in the natureof beginningthatsomethingnew is startedwhich cannot be
expected fromwhatevermay have happened before. This characterof startling
unexpectednessis inherentin all beginningsand in all origins."Arendtthus op-
posed the concept of the event to thatof process. Only in this way, she insisted,
can we understandhow somethingnovel can occur politically,somethingthathas
not merelybeen derived from"history.""The new always happens against the
overwhelmingodds of statisticallaws and theirprobability,which forall practi-
cal, everydaypurposes amounts to certainty;the new thereforealways appears
in the guise of a miracle. The fact thatman is capable of action means thatthe
unexpectedcan be expected fromhim,thathe is able to performwhat is infinitely
improbable."65Against a providentialconcept of "history"thatalways explains
away events retrospectivelyas the necessarycompletionof previous anonymous
processes and structuresand thus denies the momentof human freedom,Arendt
posited the eventfulpossibilityof action, which interrupted these processes and
structures.It is not, she insisted,the necessary laws of historyor naturethatact,
but ratherhumans themselves.66And the concrete results of this action are not
foreseeable, due in part to human plurality:"Hamlet's 'Our thoughtsare ours,
theirends none of our own,'" as Arendtnoted in herDenktagebuch.61
61. HannahArendt, "CitizenoftheWorld,"8 1.

62. As has beenarguedfrequently, forexample,by HaukeBrunkhorst,
HannahArendt(Munich:
Beck, 1999), 102.
63. Arendt, "KarlJaspers:Citizenof theWorld,"81-82.
64. Arendt, HumanCondition, 9.
65. Ibid.,177-178.
66. For a similarargumentsee Koselleck,"LaudatioaufFrançoisFuret,"299.
67. Arendt, Denktagebuch, I, 274.
Thus,thehumanconditionis realizedpoliticallynotin workand production,

but in actionand speech.Whatevertheconcreteinterests mightbe thatmove
humansto act and speak,it is crucialthattheseare inter-est, thatis, thatthey
generatean in-between andestablishrelationsthatbindhumanstogether or also
separate them from one "In
another.68 contrast to and
thinking producing, action
can onlybe donewiththehelpofothersandin theworld,"as Arendtlatervaried
thisthesisin "Freedomand Politics,"an essaythatwas centralto herwork."By
'actingin concert,'as Burkeused to say,thefreedomof beingable to makea
beginning is manifested as beingfree.. . . Throughthisbeingfree,in whichthe
giftof freedom, of beingable to makea beginning becomesa palpablereality,
theactualspace of thepoliticalemergestogether withthehistoriesthataction
engenders."69 It is thisexperience-based realityarisingfromactionand speech
thatArendtcalledthewebofhumanaffairs.
In a keypassageof theHumanCondition,whichis citedin fullhere,Arendt
explainedhow new and different thingsrepeatedly arisefromthebasic anthro-
pological conditions of historical
experience thatshe hadproposed-andthereby
also "histories"in theplural:
The realmof humanaffairs, strictlyspeaking,consistsof theweb of humanrelationships
whichexistswherever menlivetogether. The disclosureofthe"who"through speech,and
thesettingof a new beginningthrough action,alwaysfall intoan alreadyexistingweb
wheretheirimmediate consequencescan be felt.Together theystarta newprocesswhich
eventuallyemerges as theunique life story of thenewcomer affectinguniquelythelife
storiesofall thosewithwhomhe comesintocontact.It is becauseofthisalreadyexisting
web of humanrelationships, withits innumerable, conflictingwills and intentions,
that
actionalmostneverachievesitspurpose;butit is also becauseof thismedium,in which
actionalone is real,thatit "produces"storieswithor withoutintention as naturallyas
fabrication
producestangiblethings. Thesestoriesmaythenbe recordedindocuments and
monuments, theymaybe visiblein use objectsor artworks,theymaybe toldand retold
and workedintoall kindsof material.Theythemselves, in theirlivingreality,are of an
altogetherdifferentnature than thesereifications.They tellus more about theirsubjects,
the"hero"inthecenterofeach story, thananyproductofhumanhandsevertellsus about
themasterwho producedit,and yettheyare notproducts, properly speaking.Although
everybody startedhis lifeby insertinghimselfintothehumanworldthrough actionand
speech,nobodyis theauthoror producer ofhisownlifestory.70
Thusthemostoriginalproducts ofconcreteaims
of actionarenottherealization
andends,buttheunforeseeable historiesarisingfromthemthat"transition
from
as Paul Ricoeuraptlysummarized
actionto storyand history," Arendt'sconcept
As Arendtnoted:
ofhistory.71
In otherwords,thestories,theresultsof actionand speech,revealan agent,butthisagent
Somebodybeganitand is itssubjectin thetwofoldsenseof
is notan authoror producer.
theword,namelyitsactorand sufferer, butnobodyis itsauthor.Thateveryindividuallife
68. Arendt, HumanCondition,182.

69. HannahArendt, "FreiheitundPolitik, in ZwischenVergangenheit
undZukunft,225.
70. Arendt, HumanCondition,183-184.
71. Paul Ricoeur,"Action,Story,and History-On RereadingThe HumanCondition"in The
RealmofHumanitas:Responsesto theWritings ofHannahArendt,ed. R. Garner(Frankfurt:
Peter
Lang, 1989), 150.
betweenbirthand death can eventuallybe told as a storywithbeginningand end is the pre-

political and prehistoricalconditionof history,the greatstorywithoutbeginningand end.72
The historiesthattheactorsthemselves tellabouttheirmotivesanddeedsthus

cannotadd up to whatactuallyhappened.Onlythenon-participating historiogra-
or
pher "storyteller" is able to recognizeretrospectively the web of references into
whichtheactinghumanshavebeenspun.Thus,although like
Arendt, Koselleck,
did investigatethefundamental anthropological conditions thatarepresupposed,
as itwere,in all possiblehistories andthrough whichthelatteroccur,Koselleck's
HistorikwentbeyondArendt'snarrative conceptofhistory inthisparticular point.
Certainly bothagreethathistories can be analyzedconceptually or depictednar-
rativelyonlyafterthefact,so thatwe learntodeal withthemeaninglessness ofan
eventorto attribute meaning to it.Nevertheless, to
according Koselleck, per- the
spectivally fragmented, pluralist perceptions of theparticipants of an occurrence
containmorethancan be incorporated subsequently intoa singlenarration.73 His-
toriography must therefore ask which pastexperiences have been repressed, for-
or
gotten, silenced, and itmust be aware that itis "a of
only prehension imperfec-
tion"(ein Vorgriff aufUnvollkommheit) in thesensethatthesepasteventscould
be narrated meaningfully in completely different waysin thefuture.74
and
Forgiving Promising. For Koselleck, there is also an irresolvable hiatus
betweenthe"primary experiences" of those who participated in occurrences and
the"secondaryexperiences"of non-participatory observersor laternarrators, a
distinctionthathederivedfrombefore-after relations andthecategory ofnatality.
The experiences of warand genocide,forinstance,"fillthememory of thoseaf-
fected;theyshapetheirrecollections, flowlikea massoflava intheirbodies- un-
alterableand inscribed.By thismeasure,all theexperiencesof contemporaries
whowerenotinthecampsaresecondary, as arethoseofsubsequent generations."
While theseprimary experiences can be narrated-althoughthisis, Koselleck
insisted,a difficult undertaking- a collectivememory thatequallyconjoinsper-
petratorsandvictimscannotbe constructed fromthis.75
Arendtformulated a moredifferentiated positionhere.She arguedthataction
and speechamonghumanscreateas unintended consequencesnotonlyhistories
butalso andabove all powerand violence,whichin turnareinterwoven intothe
72. Arendt,HumanCondition,184.
73. Arendtwas also awareof thisproblem:"The sourcestalkand whattheyrevealis theself-
understanding as well as theself-interpretation
of peoplewho act and whobelievetheyknowwhat
theyare doing.If we denythemthiscapacityand pretendwe knowbetterand can tellthemwhat
theirreal 'motives'areor whichreal 'trends'theyobjectivelyrepresent-no matter whattheythem-
selvesthink-we haverobbedthemof theveryfacultyof speech."HannahArendt, "On theNature
ofTotalitarianism,"in Essaysin Understanding 1930-1954,ed. J.Kohn(New York:Harcourt Brace
& Company,1994),339.
74. ReinhartKoselleck,"Vom SinnundUnsinnderGeschichte," Merkur5 1 (1997), 326.
75. ReinhartKoselleck,"Formenund Funktionen des negativenGedächtnisses,"in Verbrechen
erinnern:Die Auseinandersetzung mitHolocaust und Völkermord, ed. V. Knigge and N. Frei
(Munich:Beck, 2002), 23-24. Once again Koselleckused a metaphor to makea theoreticalpoint:
experiencesare coagulatedlava (geronneneLava), writtenon the body thatcannotbe rewritten
by publicmemory.Hence his oppositionto theblurring of boundariesbetweendifferent historical
experiences,betweenvictimsand perpetrators, as exemplifiedby theBerlinNeue Wachememorial
siteoftheKohl era.
fabricofhumanaffairsandrelations.
The resultsof actionareunforeseeable and
humans
irreversible; do notknow what theydo when they act. But humans do
possessthepowerto forgive.
To avoidelevatingthepastintofixeddeterminants
of humanactionevenin herown historical-political
anthropology, Arendtintro-
ducedthecategoriesofforgiving
andpromising.
Incontrast
torevenge,whichis thenatural,automaticreaction
totransgression
andwhich
becauseoftheirreversibility
oftheactionprocesscanbe and
expected even the
calculated,
actofforgivingcanneverbe predicted;itis theonlyreaction
thatactsinanunexpected
wayandthusretains,though beinga reaction, oftheoriginal
something character
ofaction.
inother
Forgiving, words, is theonlyreactionwhichdoesnotmerely re-act
butactsanew
andunexpectedly,unconditioned bytheactwhichprovoked itandtherefore from
freeing
itsconsequencesboththeonewhoforgives andtheonewhois forgiven.76
The irreversibility
of whathas been done,and its resulting logic of actionand
violence, can thereforebe interruptedthrough forgiving. Conversely, thehuman
powerof promising offersa correctiveto theunforeseeability of theresultsof
future humanaction.Forgivingand promising are notabstractmoralmeasures,
butratherarisefromconcreteexperienceand are achievedin thebeing-together
ofhumans,the"publicspace"ofthepolitical.Forgiving andpromising arethem-
selvescommunicative actsthatenablenewhistories and memories. Theylead to
experience-based rulesandinstitutions thatincorporate theunforeseeable dimen-
sionsofpoliticalactions.
For Arendt,thesingularity of Nazi crimeslay preciselyin thefactthatthey
eludedthehumancapacityto forgive.For thisreason,thebureaucratic, factory-
like exterminationof EuropeanJews(in contrast, she argued,to the"old-fash-
ioned"crimesofStalinism)constituted "radicalevil."77The extermination camps
werenotonlysitesof atrocities; theyrepresented theirown,unprecedented order
of radicaldehumanization, in thattheystrippedthevictimsof theircapacityto
act and thusof beinghuman,and theyexemptedtheperpetrators fromall legal,
moral,orreligiousnormsthathumanshadcreatedforthemselves inthepast.Just
as "absolutegoodness"has no place in thedomainofhumanrelationsbecauseit
replacespoliticalactioncarriedoutthrough conflicts
andcompromises withpas-
sivepityforothers-a pitythateasilybecomesa finalactofviolenceintended to
redeemall suffering andall injustice-"radicalevil" is also a negationofthepo-
"Radicalevil,"Arendtargued,exceedsthedomainofhumanexperience:
litical.78
"All we knowis thatwe can neither punishnorforgive suchoffenses andthatthey
therefore transcendtherealmof humanaffairsand thepotentialities of human
power,bothof whichtheyradicallydestroywherevertheymaketheirappear-
ance."79 ArendtbelievedthatthetrialofAdolfEichmannin 1961 confirmed this
insight.There wereno of
categories morality or law derived from human experi-
encethatcouldbe usedtojudgeEichmann'sdeeds,andnotbecausehe was a par-
ticularly demonicperpetrator, as theindictmentin Jerusalem suggested. Arendt's
77. HannahArendt, "SomeQuestionsofMoralPhilosophy," inHannahArendt, Responsibilityand
Judgment,ed. J.Kohn(New York:Schocken,2003), 52-55.
78. This is Arendt'scritiqueof Rousseau,based on herreadingof Melville's BillyBudd; see
HannahArendt, On Revolution(London:Faber& Faber,1963),74-83.
misunderstood
frequently phrase"thebanalityof evil" meantnothingotherthan
in whosedeedsradicalevil is manifested."80
the"paradoxofa banalperpetrator,
Ill
Theexistential, polemicaltoneofArendt 's andKoselleck'shistorical-politicalan-

thropologies can be understood onlyfromtheirrespective historicalexperiences,
whichwere,of course,different fortheJewishémigréfromthoseof theyoung
soldierreturning fromthegenocidalwarin theEast. Howeversignificant thein-
fluenceofexistential philosophy ofthe 1920s may have beenfor Arendt,I find the
reduction of herthought to "politicalexistentialism" (MartinJay)or "politicized
existentialism" (Margaret Cano van) unconvincing.81 This is also trueof thesig-
nificance ofHeideggerandSchmitt forKoselleck'shistorical thought. Alreadyin
Critiqueand Crisis,Koselleckwas morean "enlightener of theEnlightenment"
(IvanNagel)thanmerelyan acolyteofCarlSchmitt, as Habermassuggested inhis
reviewofthebook.82 In itsexamination ofthedangersandhazardsofmodernso-
cieties,as wellas initsrhetoric ofdecline,Habermas 's ownTheStructural Trans-
formation of thePublic Sphere(originally publishedin 1962) owed as muchto
Critiqueand Crisisas to theHumanCondition P WhereasArendtarguedthatthe
riseof thesocial sinceantiquity had led to a declineof politics(and a disappear-
anceofpublic-political space),andKosellecklocatedthecrisisofthepoliticalin
thedialecticbetweenthepublicsphereand theprivatein theeighteenth century,
Habermasdiagnoseda degeneration oftheliberal-bourgeois publicsphereonlyin
thecourseof thenineteenth century with theadvent of modern masssociety.All
threeofthesestudiesshouldbe seenwithinthecontextoftheintellectual currents
of thepostwarera,whichmovedbetweentheexperienceof totalitarianism and
theapocalyptic of
expectation global nuclear war.84
Arendtand Kosellecksharedan anti-totalitarian impulse,whichin contrast
toHabermas-separatedthemfroma Marxist-influenced socialtheory.Thusthey
also becamereference for
points François Furet and other French intellectuals
80. Dana R. Villa, "Das Gewissen,die Banalitätdes Bösen undder Gedankeeines repräsenta-
tivenTäters,"in HannahArendtRevisited:"Eichmannin Jerusalem"unddie Folgen,ed. G. Smith
(Frankfurt:Suhrkamp, 2000), 247.
81. MartinJay/Leon Botstein,"HannahArendt:OpposingViews,"PartisanReview45 (1978),
368; MargaretCanovan,HannahArendt:A Reinterpretation ofHer PoliticalThought(Cambridge,
UK: CambridgeUniversity Press,1992), 190.
82. Habermas,"Verrufener Fortschritt," to learnfromsuch
477: "In any case we are thankful
cleverauthorshowCarlSchmitt, a specialistwhothinks thus,judgesthesituation
today."["Immerhin
sind wir dankbar,von so gescheitenAutorenzu erfahren, wie Carl Schmitt,ein so denkender
Spezialist,die Lage heutebeurteilt."]
This incriminatingfinalsentencewas omittedin thereprint
of
thereview:"ZurKritikan derGeschichtsphilosophie," inPhilosophisch-politische
Profile(Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp, 1981),435-444.Similarly, see thecritiquebyMichaelSchwartz, "LeviathanoderLucifer:
ReinhartKosellecks'KritikundKrise' Revisited,"Zeitschrift furReligions-und Geistesgeschichte
45 (1993), 33-57.
83. JürgenHabermas,The StructuralTransformation of thePublic Sphere:An Inquiryintoa
Categoryof BourgeoisSociety(Cambridge,MA: MIT Press,1989). On Koselleckand Habermas,
see AnthonyLa Vopa, "Conceivinga Public: Ideas and Societyin Eighteenth CenturyEurope,"
Journalof ModernHistory64 (1992), 79-116; on Arendtand Habermas,see Benhabib,Reluctant
Modernism.
84. See Bates,"On Revolutionsin theNuclearAge."
whobrokewithMarxismbeginning in the1970s.85 "We- at leasttheolderones

among us- have witnessed thetotal collapse of all establishedmoralstandards
in publicand privatelifeduringthenineteen-thirties and forties, notonly(as is
now usuallyassumed)in Hitler'sGermanybutalso in Stalin'sRussia,"Arendt
wrotein 1965.86The commonopponentherewas thephilosophy of historywith
itstotalizing explanatory claims,which,according to both Koselleck and Arendt,
hadbeentransformed politicallyin thetwentieth century intothetotalitarianidea
of history-making. Totalitarianruleand theideologicalconstructions of history
thatkeptitin motion(butalso theplanningandfeasibility ideologyof theWest-
ernsocial sciences)soughtto annultheconcrete, reality-based experiencesupon
whichthetradition of politicaltheoryhad been groundedsinceantiquity; these
attempts led both Arendt and Koselleck to the
investigate metaphysical conditions
ofhumanexistenceandofhistory itself.
The urgency in developingnewtheoretical categoriesofthepoliticalarosefor
Arendtfromhistorical experiences in thetwentieth century. She saw herselfcon-
fronted withthefollowing challenge: "Not only are all ourpoliticalconceptsand
definitions foran understanding
insufficient oftotalitarianphenomena butalso all
ourcategories ofthought andstandards ofjudgment seemtoexplodeinourhands
theinstantwe tryto applythem."87 This also explainshersharpcritiquein the
late 1960softheNew Left,which,she argued,soughtto comprehend thereality
ofthetwentieth centurythrough politicalcategoriesofthenineteenth for
century,
instance, an obsoleteconceptofprogress.88
ForArendt,thehistoricalexperiencesof herera represented an unbridgeable
rupture withthepast,whichshetracedgenealogically backto antiquity.Notonly
politics,sheargued,buthistory as wellhadbeenshattered. "Whatyouareleftwith
is stillthepast,buta.fragmented past,whichhas lostitscertainty ofevaluation,"
shewrote in her never
final, completed book The Lifeof the Mind?9 Arendt'sele-
giac,pessimistic tone,whichhas frequently irritated contemporary interpreters,
derivedfromthisconsciousness oflivingin an unprecedented present,whichshe
sharedwithTocquevilleand otherpoliticalthinkers who saw themselvesover-
whelmedbytheviolenceofhistorical events."Sincethepasthas ceasedto throw
itslightuponthefuture themindofmanwandersinobscurity"-thisTocqueville
citationwas a kindofleitmotif forArendt'spoliticalthought.90 Like Tocqueville,
she believedthatone of theconsequencesof thisrupture was thenecessityof
outlining a "newpoliticalsciencefora newworld,"of makinga newbeginning
85. MichaelScottChristofferson,"An Anti-Totalitarian

HistoryoftheFrenchRevolution:François
Furet's Penserla Révolution PoliticsoftheLate 1970s,"FrenchHistoricalStudies
in theIntellectual
22 (1999), 557-611; Samuel Moyn,"On theIntellectual Originsof FrançoisFuret'sMasterpiece,"
TheTocquevilleReview/ La RevueTocqueville29 (2008), 1-20.
86. Arendt, "Some Questions,"52.
87. HannahArendt,"Mankindand Terror,"in Essays in Understanding 1930-1954: Formation,
Exile, Totalitarianism(New York: HarcourtBrace, 1994), 302; similarly,see her replyto Eric
Voegelin'scritiqueof OriginsofTotalitarianism:HannahArendt, "A Reply,"ReviewofPolitics15
(1953), 76-84.
88. HannahArendt, On Violence(New York:Harcourt, Brace & World,1969),22-23.
89. HannahArendt, TheLifeoftheMind,vol. 1: Thinking (New York:Harcourt,1978),emphasis
in original.
90. Arendt, "The Conceptof History:Ancientand Modern,"77.
in orderto comprehend conceptually thisuniqueexperience,whichcould then

serveas a kindof guidepost.91 This was thereasonforherturnto premodern po-
liticaltheory, onlyapparently paradoxicalin lightofherthesisof an insurmount-
able breakwithtradition. The rupture, Arendtinsisted, is irreparable.We can only
searchtheoceanicfloorofthepastin order"topryloose therichandthestrange,
thepearlsandthecoralin thedepthsandto carrythemto thesurface."92
Although a number ofArendt'stime-bound diagnosesofcrisisnowseemdated,
thetheoretical questionsand categoriesthatshe developedto analyzetheseex-
periencesofcrisisdo not.93 Arendt'santhropology basedon historical experience
enabledherto recognizeproblemsof thepoliticalthatthesocial scienceshave
onlyrecently begunto address:thata laborsocietythatrunsoutoflaboris as po-
liticallycalamitousas thedeclineofthenation-state ina worldinwhichrights can
be
only guaranteed and
through among nation-states. Or thatdealing with geno-
cidal violencerequiresnewconceptsof law,justice,and memory. EvenArendt's
emphaticconceptoftheeventas an unforeseeable "miracle,"whichprovidesthe
possibility of a new beginning, appearstoday,twenty yearsaftertheSovietEm-
and
piresuddenly unexpectedly collapsed, less absurd thantheextrapolations of
ostensibleexpertsin the1970sand 1980sbasedon empiricaldata.94
Somethingsimilarcan be said of Koselleck.The existential, pessimistictone
of theinitialpostwaryearscolorshis historicalanthropology as well. Like Ar-
endt,Koselleckharboreda fierceskepticism towardthesupposedmachinations
ofreasoninhistory. Whatdistinguishes Koselleck'sconceptualhistory fromother
to a of
approaches history concepts is the way it connected semantic findingsto
political-anthropological hypotheses, such as that of the wideninggap between
experienceandexpectation as thetemporalstructure of modernity (and thecom-
plementary thesisof thecontinuously of
growingpower killing the"democ-
and
ratization of death"95), whichpresupposeda distinctive politicalanthropology.96
"Thereis no history without politicaltheory, whether itrefersin theAristotelian
tradition to constitutional structures or in a modernsenseto theopenfieldofpo-
liticalactionand suffering, or to bothat thesametime,"as Koselleckwrotein a
eulogyforFrançoisFuret,butalso describing his own position."Thuspolitical
theory becomesthepresupposition forandtheresultofhistorical knowledge."97
Koselleck'sHistorikshouldbe understood in termsofthisclaim.He regarded
his Historikas a theoretically reflective way of dealingwiththeradicalbreak
in tradition thatseparatedthepastand thefuture. In theprefaceto theGerman
paperbackeditionof theCritiqueand Crisisof 1973, Koselleckdescribedthe
specificchallengethathe faced.If theold toposof historiamagistravitaehas
91. Arendt, On Revolution,176.
92. HannahArendt, "WalterBenjamin1892-1940,"in Men in Dark Times,205.
93. Harald Bluhm, "Von WeimarerExistenzphilosophie zu politischemDenken," in Die
Entdeckung der Freiheit:AmerikaimDenkenHannahArendts, ed. W. Thaa and L. Probst(Berlin:
Philo,2003), 60-92.
94. See, forexample,AlexeiYurchak,"SovietHegemonyofForm:Everything Was ForeverUntil
It Was No More,"Comparative Studiesin Societyand History45 (2003), 480-510.
95. Reinhart Koselleck, DaumierundderTod, inModernität undTradition:Festschrift
fürMax
Imdahl,ed. G. Boehmet al. (Munich:Fink,1985), 176; "Kriegerdenkmäler," 267.
96. SimilarlyPalonen,Entzauberung derBegriffe,309.
97. Koselleck, LaudatioaufFrançoisFuret, 298.
dissolvedinmodernity,andhistory
can no longerprovidelessonsforlife(a thesis
thatKoselleckhadalreadyunfoldedin hiscontribution
to theFestschrift
forKarl
Lowithin 1967),thenwe needtoexplainthesignificanceofhistorical
experience
forthepoliticalpresent:
Todayhistorical
lessonscan no longerbe deriveddirectly fromhistory, butonlyindirectly
througha theoryof possiblehistories.... As soon as thestructures
of a historical
epoch
havebeen successfully identifiedin termsof theiranthropological
conditions,whichcan
be derivedfromconcreteindividualcases, theresultscan makevisibleexemplaryfind-
ings,whichcan also be relatedtoourownpresent. Forregardless
of itsuniqueness,a past
epoch- investigatedin terms of its structure-
can containmoments of that
duration still
reachintothepresentday.98
Koselleck'sHistorikidentified thesemoments ofduration notin "history,"but

in thestructures of repetition,theknowledgeof whichmakeshistoricalexperi-
encesagainaccessibleforpoliticalactionsin thepresent-and thereby properly
realignsthetoposofhistoriamagistravitaein a theoretically reflective manner."
Koselleck'sHistoriksoughtexperiential propositions, as theyare called in the
essay "Zeitschichten," "that were already available beforetherespectivecoex-
istinggenerations and whichin all probability will also continueto be effective
afterthecoexisting generations."Such experiential findingsaretheactualobject
of history,"per definition theexperiential science par excellence," as Koselleck
wrote.100Nothing can be learnedfrom but
"history," only from experientialprop-
ositionsthatcan be derivedtheoretically fromconcretehistories-the unique
words,deeds,and events,whichin turnpossesstheirown repetition structures.
The formalcategoriesfoundin Koselleck'swork- beforeand after,insideand
outside,aboveand below- stipulate conditions thatenableanddelimitall speech
andall action,without thereby determining thema priori.101
This also meansthata Historikcan formulate statements notonlyaboutthe
past,but also about the future.Although we cannot predictconcrete we
histories,
can makeprognosesabouttheconditions accordingto whichsuchhistories could
occur,as Koselleckdemonstrated in an essayon the"artofprognosis," whichil-
luminated thisdimension of hisHistorik.Historyis alwaysnewandrepletewith
surprises,especiallyforthoseaffected by it. "Nevertheless, if thereare predic-
tionsthatturnouttobe true,itfollowsthathistory is neverentirelynew,thatthere
are evidently longer-term conditions or even enduring conditions withinwhich
whatis newappears."102
"As moretemporallayersof a possiblerepetition enteredintotheprognosis,
themorelikelytheprediction was to turnouttobe correct. The morea prediction
referredto and reliedupon theincomparability and uniquenessof thecoming
98. ReinhartKoselleck,Kritikund Krise: Eine Studiezur Pathogeneseder bürgerlichen Welt

(Freiburg:Alber,1959),ix. (The Englishtranslation
containsa different
introduction).
99. On this point see also the conversationbetweenReinhartKoselleck and CarstenDutt,
"Geschichte(n)und Historik,"Internationale ßr Philosophie2 (2001), 257-271,esp.
Zeitschrift
270-271.
in Zeitschichten,
100. Koselleck,"Zeitschichten," 20 (emphasisin original).
101. Koselleck,"Was sichwiederholt."
102. Koselleck,"The UnknownFutureand theArtof Prognosis,"in ThePracticeofConceptual
History,135.
revolution, theless likelyit was to be fulfilled."103

This theoretical
distinction,
whichKoselleckdrewfromtheexampleof Christoph MartinWieland'spredic-
tionsin 1787aboutcomingrevolutions in Europe,also holdsforKoselleck'sand
Arendt 's respectiveanthropologies of historical
experience.Many- notall- di-
agnoses of crisisthatdescribed their own presentas uniqueand surpassingall
and
previousexperiences expectations have,froma contemporary perspective,
becomehistoricalthemselves. This is notthecase, however,withthetheoreti-
cal categoriesdevelopedby Koselleckand Arendt.Whoeverhas identified the
anthropological conditions of possible will
histories notbe entirely
surprisedby
whatthefuture holdsforus.
TranslatedbyTomLampert
Zentrum
fürZeithistorische
ForschungPotsdam
103.Ibid., 139-140.

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Wesleyan University

KOSELLECK, ARENDT, AND THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE

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KOSELLECK, ARENDT, AND THE

Thisessay is thefirstattempt to compareReinhart Koselleck'sHistorikwithHannahAr-

Whenwe, theuniversity of 1951, passionately

The intellectualfascination that Reinhart Koselleck's writingsexert, and that

rungsraum, forthewideninggap betweentheUtopianpromiseand thespace of

formofwriting mostsuitedto histheorizing. Theseessays- composedprimarily

The call fora noveltheoryof historycan alreadybe foundin Koselleck'sfirst

ernsocialhistory, as well as his own workon his habilitation thesis,Koselleck's

7. ReinhartKoselleck,Introduction, in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, vol. 1 (Stuttgart: Klett,

contextof eventsor in anycase demonstrable in them,can adequatelyorderthe

According toKoselleck,theseincludethecategorical betweenmas-

to developthecategoriesof hisHistorikmoresystematically. In his contribution

ForKoselleck,an irreducible differenceexistedbetweenpastrealityanditslin-

Amonghis different versionsand variationsof thistheme,therewere in par-

22. Reinhart in Zeitschichten,

In "HistorikundHermeneutik," Koselleckstillincludedtheopposition between

Above and Below. Finally,Koselleck believedthatthe distinction between

26. Ibid., 104.

finally,theoccurrences themselves, whichcontaintheirownrepetition structures,

Only in thisway,Koselleckargued,can historians achievea rationalordering

Koselleck demonstratedin his own workshow empiricallyproductivetheoppo-

Explicitreferences to Arendtare rarein Koselleck'swork.When she is men-

Historik:Bemerkungen zu KosellecksProgramm einerneuenHistorik," in Geschichte-Ereignisund

theorizing,was Karl Jaspers,withwhombothstudied,Arendtbefore1933 and

HannahArendt(Cambridge, UK: CambridgeUniversity Press,2008).

thought," she wrotein herDenktagebuch, "lies notin theconcepts,butrather

It is notwords,deeds,and events- theclassic themesof historiography

52. Arendt, Denktagebuch, 1,415 (originalemphasis).

Thiscritiqueof themodernconceptof history, whichArendt-quitesimilarly

concretepolitical entity."Nobody can be a citizenof the world as he is the citizen

61. HannahArendt, "CitizenoftheWorld,"8 1.

Thus,thehumanconditionis realizedpoliticallynotin workand production,

68. Arendt, HumanCondition,182.

betweenbirthand death can eventuallybe told as a storywithbeginningand end is the pre-

The historiesthattheactorsthemselves tellabouttheirmotivesanddeedsthus

Theexistential, polemicaltoneofArendt 's andKoselleck'shistorical-politicalan-

whobrokewithMarxismbeginning in the1970s.85 "We- at leasttheolderones

85. MichaelScottChristofferson,"An Anti-Totalitarian

in orderto comprehend conceptually thisuniqueexperience,whichcould then

Koselleck'sHistorikidentified thesemoments ofduration notin "history,"but

98. ReinhartKoselleck,Kritikund Krise: Eine Studiezur Pathogeneseder bürgerlichen Welt

revolution, theless likelyit was to be fulfilled."103

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