Social and Economic Conditions in Pre-Islamic Mecca

Author(s): Mahmood Ibrahim

Source: International Journal of Middle East Studies , Aug., 1982, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Aug.,
1982), pp. 343-358
Published by: Cambridge University Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/163677

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Int. J. Middle East Stud. 14 (1982), 343-358 Printed in the United States of America

Mahmood Ibrahim

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN

PRE-ISLAMIC MECCA

Mecca's existence depended primarily on its location near th

trade route in western Arabia which linked the surplus-pro
Yemen with Syria. The route branched near Ayla in the nor
Gaza on the Mediterranean and also to Egypt. Another route
Mecca to proceed in a northeasterly direction toward al-
eventually Sasanid Persia. The commercially advantageous loc
was enhanced further by the Zamzam waterwell which made M
stop in the trade of antiquity. Also the concept of the haram
and its center, the Ka'ba, made Mecca the object of pilgrimage
months. During these months, pilgrims/merchants traveled with
and property and went to Mecca to trade their commodities. N
area believed in the concept of haram; they were referred to
distinguished from those who adhered to the concept who w
muhrimun. Mecca in its early history had no political power t
was under the control of the Himyarites in Yemen who end
their hegemony over the surplus-producing regions in Arab
Bahrain, and Oman.'
Until the beginning of the fifth century A.D. Mecca was contro
of Khuzi'ah who had emigrated earlier from Yemen. This trib
power when Qusayy ibn Kilab gathered several clans to form
Quraish who quickly became the leading merchants of the c
Meccans were well situated for the development of a commer
remained secondary to the Himyarites and to the Lakhmids
whom attempted to spread and to maintain their influence o
regions of Arabia. Mecca's evolution in its earlier stage thus
shadow of these two leading commercial and political centers.
that the Meccans operated only locally, never venturing beyon
waiting instead for outside merchants to come in and sell the
Only then did the Meccans have anything to trade with the s
This limited exchange, however, was the genesis of merchant
An indication of this limited exchange was Qusayy's introd
governing institutions in Mecca. After he took over sole lead
al-Nadwa adjacent to the Ka'ba to be his residence and meeti
collective leadership of the Quraishi clans to deliberate. Mar
ceremonies also took place there. Some of the institutions st
0 1982 Cambridge University Press 0020-7438/82/030343-16 $2.50

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344 Mahmood Ibrahim

hijaba, responsibility for the upkeep of the Ka'ba (wilayat al-bait); siqaya,
providing water for the pilgrims; rifada, providing food for the pilgrims, which is
to be distinguished from rifada, the taxes collected for incidental purposes such
as blood money or covering of the Ka'ba; liwi', the standard of war, reserved
for the leading clan chief; and the 'ushr tax, collected mainly from non-Meccan
merchants who came to the city.3 Their common characteristic was that they
were oriented toward the internal dynamic of Meccan affairs. They were relevant
only inside Mecca since at this stage Meccan merchants rarely left the haram to
trade. Limited accumulation remained the lot of Meccan merchants until the
advent of Hashim ibn 'Abd Manaf ibn Qusayy.
The change in Mecca's fortunes was not without its historical relevance. By the
middle of the fifth century the Himyarites began to experience a series of intern
political crises. Their instability contributed to the disruption of production a
trade, especially in the north. This situation encouraged the Meccans to fill t
gap created by the departure of the Yemenis. Since the Meccans had n
supporting institutions for this new role, they had to devise some to carry them
and their capital outside of Mecca. It was at this juncture that Hashim introduced
Tlaf, an agreement between the Quraish and the tribes along the trade routes
provide Meccan caravans with safe passage and protection, khafara.
The circumstances that immediately preceded the introduction of this importan
institution are illuminating. Because of the restricted nature of their commercial
activity, Meccan merchants were constantly faced with the possibility of financia
disaster. Indeed, the Meccans had developed i'tifad (ritual suicide) as a respons
to this situation.4 When a merchant became bankrupt he committed i'tifad b
separating himself and his family from the rest of the clan and starving to death
rather than becoming a liability to relatives. Individual commercial ventures a
time of insecurity and poor business led many merchants to disaster and to t
disruption of developing merchant capital.
The destructive potential of i'tifad was recognized by Hashim. When
member of the Banul Makzuim was about to commit ictifad, Hashim interven
and declared to his fellow Quraishites that i'tifad was about to overtake them
that they were becoming weak and less numerous than the rest of the Ara
(presumably other Arab merchants). As a remedy, Hashim suggested that the
form parterships in carrying out their business enterprises.5 The partnershi
mu.daraba, allowed many merchants to pool their capital and form one hug
caravan that provided security for the small investor and mobilized Meccan
merchant capital on an unprecedented scale when those undertakings could
accommodated in the wider commercial exchange of western Asia. Having
changed the organizational nature of merchant capital, Hashim set out to secu
an outlet for it. This was accomplished by the institution of the ilaf.
The ilf, as defined earlier, was an agreement between the Quraish and th
tribal chiefs who lived along the trade routes that emanated from Mecca. I
return for safe passage and armed protection, khafara, the Quraish promised
carry and sell tribal products in the markets they visited. The Meccans woul
then return the investment and the profit to the tribal leader.6 The Tlaf, therefor
not only helped Meccan trade by providing mobility for its capital and by

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 Social and Economic Conditions 345

leaving caravan travel unmolested, it also encouraged development of th

economy by assuring a market for its products. A significant outcome o
arrangement was integration of the tribal economy within Mecca's eco
framework which enhanced the influence and prestige of the Quraish am
surrounding tribes. This relationship played an active role in attracting merc
and settlers to Mecca to participate in its developing economy.
Hashim was able to secure the ilaf with tribal chiefs along the trade r
Syria where he met with Byzantine leaders and convinced them that it w
their best interest to deal with the Quraish, tujjar al-'arab. Hashim argu
their cloth and leather was cheaper and of a better quality than that of o
He was undoubtedly referring to fine leather from Ta'if and from surro
tribes. Cloth was produced in great quantity in various cities in Yemen, espec
Najran and San'a. Yemen also exported fine leather which was produ
several localities, especially Sacda. Hashim then secured safe passage in Sy
Meccan merchants who began to visit Egyptian and Syrian marketplaces
Gaza (where Hashim eventually died) and Busra where wheat from the H
district was Mecca's principal import.
The precedent set by Hashim was followed by his brothers. Nawfal open
road to Iraq (he died in the vicinity of HTra on one of his business jou
'Abd Shams developed the trade with Abyssinia, and 'Abd al-Muttalib w
Yemen. Meccan merchants were also known to hire ships to carry their t
the Red Sea and beyond. Hashim's innovative approach gave Meccan mer
capital more mobility and Meccans the opportunity to participate in internat
commerce where they could reach additional markets and appropriate m
surplus wealth for accumulation in Mecca. The ability to finance, equip
organize huge caravans highlighted the increasingly significant role which M
merchants began to play in western Asia and which gave them a great m
advantage in ushering in an era of rapid social change.
As Mecca's relations with the outside world grew more complex, new
relevant institutions began to appear in order to further the interests of
merchants. In addition to the haram and the ilaf, the concept of hilf, al
was applied to suit Meccan purposes. The Quraish began to form alliances
distant tribes, allowing Meccan caravans to traverse new areas and to vis
markets. Those alliances, as with the Banu Tamim in eastern Arabia and w
the Kinda in central Arabia, were often cemented with marriage ties. T
alliances provided Meccan merchants with security in areas where the Tl
not apply. Tribes that were closer to Mecca could be integrated by the con
jiwar, neighborly protection.
Hilf and jiwar were not restricted to groups outside Mecca. The concept
also applied in Mecca where individuals began to form their own allianc
jiwar. If a merchant moved into Mecca, he would seek another merchan
equal-in order to form a hilf. As groups outside Mecca banded toget
form one tribe, groups within did the same. This was clear in the forma
the Banu Fihr where several clans banded together to become one tribe.
they became the Bani Fihr, they dissolved their hilf with the Banu CAdiy
were active in Meccan affairs.8 What is important to notice here is tha

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346 Mahmood Ibrahim

formation influenced the balance of power by increasing (or reducin

allies against another. Also, since one sought his equal, hilf formation
rudimentary means of class formation, especially among merchants.
Mecca's merchant dynamic began to influence the social structure as
complex set of social relations based on the ownership of merchant cap
to emerge. These relations began to challenge the existing ones based o
and clan affiliation. The wealthy merchants, who were often the sayyids of
respective clans, gradually formed a group with common interests as o
capital, eventually forming the top strata of society. Below them in soc
were the clan members who were free men and could engage in various ski
professions. Clan members provided the initial infrastructure for the deve
of merchant capital and the power of their respective clans, especially that
clan leader. The mawlfT (sing. mawla), loosely translated as clients, were
status and they could be clients of clan leaders or clan members. The m
Mecca were of Arab and non-Arab origin. References to non-Arabic s
mawall in Mecca suggest their recent arrival or purchase as slaves by
merchants. A mawla was often a manumitted slave who remained in the service
of his previous owner. A recognized set of acceptable methods for changing this
status existed whereby some wealth generated by the mawla passed to his master
in return for abrogating the wala', clientage. A mawla could then move up the
social ladder and become a haltf, ally. The lowest social status was that of the
qinn, slaves, and their offspring, the muwalladan. They also could be Arab or
non-Arab in origin as they were either captured in war, lost their freedom
because of debt (usually as a result of riba, usury), or were bought as slaves.9 A
slave was considered capital, of course, and the owner was taxed accordingly.
Slaves were employed by their owners to generate capital and as household
servants. Some slave women were forced into prostitution where the owner
would receive the income as in the case of the women qinn of the Banu Kalb
who employed them in the fairs of Dawmat al-Jandal.10 Another set of complex
regulations governed the relationship of the slave to his owner, specifically
inheritance rights and the acceptable methods by which a slave could obtain his
freedom. Slave owners also had at their disposal some socially acceptable
methods of freeing their slaves. Hakim ibn Hizam, a wealthy wheat merchant,
freed 100 slaves annually as a gesture of goodwill, sadaqa.'1
Social differentiation based on the ownership of capital increased as Mecca's
commercial dynamic grew and as capital was concentrated among wealthy
merchants. This differentiation was reinforced by the movement of tribesmen
into Mecca who were already polarized into rich and poor. The wealthy were
attracted to Mecca because they could invest their surplus wealth-usually
livestock (camels)-in Mecca's caravans. They were often merchants themselves
or clan leaders seeking their equals for alliance. The poor moved to Mecca
because they were often indebted to Meccan merchants. They were also forced to
leave their tribe lest they become a liability on its collective wealth."2 In addition
to alienating themselves from the tribe, the poor moved to an environment that
was already differentiated according to ownership of capital. This inward
movement exacerbated the eroding tribal and clan basis of social relations and

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 Social and Economic Conditions 347

resulted in many problems for Meccan merchants, such as the decline of th

influence on clan members and how to provide an adequate food supply f
growing dependent population.
Another important characteristic of the merchant economy was the prese
of a large service sector whose members performed services directly related to
maintenance of merchant caravans: porters, guides, guards, shepherds, vet
narians, servants, and entertainers. Thus, along with social differentiatio
diversified labor force came into being for the advancement of merchant capita
There were some who prepared food and sold it in the streets of Mecca. Ot
were the skilled and the professionals such as tailors, carpenters, arrow mak
smiths, and butchers who were often merchants themselves, especially those wh
dealt with cloth or the sale of oil, wine, wheat, and other imported foodstu
Finally, there were daily wage laborers who earned their livelihood by hi
themselves out in the various markets of Mecca, and those who were known
be bankrupt, yu'rafuna bil-iflasi, and had to depend on the charity of the
merchants for their support.13
Social and economic differentiation in Mecca, conditioned by the developm
of merchant capital, challenged the Meccans on several levels. On one leve
because of continued settlement, solidification of a class structure disrupted clan
based social relations. On another level, because of new alliances or the intro
tion of a dependant population, members of the merchant class found themselve
competing for power since the balance of power was constantly changing
essence, then, the wider concentration of merchant capital in Mecca result
the concentration of capital and power within Mecca's leadership which cau
the emergence of a single powerful voice rather than the collective leadersh
clan heads, as described below. On still another level, concentration of cap
necessitated the search for an adequate system of distribution of wealth as
institutions of siqaya, rifada, and sadaqa became no longer sufficient.
Mecca's growing population, especially the dependent sector, required from
merchants a greater expenditure of wealth. This seemingly unproductive expend
ture imposed further strains on clan ties. There is no better indication of
strain than the monopoly of foodstuffs implied in the term ihtikar (monop
whereby merchants hoarded and speculated in their commodities.14

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MECCA'S POWER

We have seen that Mecca had little power outside the haram area and that the
Meccan economy was dependent on its location on the trade routes in Western
Arabia. Meccan merchants did not leave the confines of the haram which
restricted their commercial activity. We have seen also that while Yemen and
HTra maintained a strong influence over the rest of Arabia, Mecca remained
merely a stopover in the caravan trade. But the introduction of the institution of
ilaf changed all that and Meccan merchants began to participate actively in
international commerce, traveling to Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Abyssinia.
They also began to visit the various markets inside Arabia. Meccans began to
form alliances with distant tribes increasing their commercial contacts as well as

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348 Mahmood Ibrahim

their influence among the tribes. Capital began to concentrate in M

the Meccan economy developed the power of the Meccan merchants also
increased.
As capital has to be concentrated before it can effectively expand, the Meccans
used their nascent power to facilitate the expansion of their surplus wealth which
simultaneously strengthened their capital and their political power. The clearest
example of this activity is seen in Mecca's relations with Talif, the nearest food
producing area and an important center for the production of wine and leather.
At a certain point in their rapid development, the Meccans felt strong enough to
challenge the dominant tribe of Ta'if, the Banu ThaqTf, especially in their
monopoly of the fertile land of WadT Wajj. The Quraish, it is said, demanded
that the Bani Thaqif give them the right to acquire property in WadT Wajj. The
Banu Thaqlf naturally resisted this encroachment on their fertile land which had
been developed by their ancestors and refused the Quraish's demand. In response,
the Quraish threatened that if they were not allowed to cultivate land in WadT
Wajj they would not allow the Banu ThaqTf access to the haram, and backed
their threat by mobilizing support among their allies. Exclusion from the haram
and the threat of military confrontation with the Quraish must have been too
much for the Banu ThaqTf to take and they were forced to consent to their
demands.15 Thereafter, the Quraish invested heavily in Ta'if so that by the
beginning of the seventh century almost every important Meccan merchant had
investments in the city.'6
To protect interests outside Mecca, the Quraish were involved in another show
of force, attesting to Mecca's growing power against her neighbors. This was the
battle of yawm Dhat Nakrf, a fierce confrontation with the Banu Laith who lived
in the Tihama region along the trade route to Najran and the rest of Yemen. The
confrontation was precipitated by the attack of the Banu Laith on the camel
herd of 'Awwaf, leader of the Banu al-Qara, an ally of the Quraish, specifically
the Banu Makhzim. 'Awwaf, who lost his son and thirty camels in the attack,
complained to his allies. The Quraish tried to solve the matter peacefully but
failed. The failure induced the Quraish to mobilize their allies and to attack the
Banu Laith in Dhat NakTf. It was perhaps a mismatch of forces and the Banu
Laith were terribly defeated forcing them to flee toward the haram area, suing
for peace. The Quraish did not inflict further violence against them but insisted
that they go into exile away from Tihama.'7
Those two examples reflect a Mecca that was more developed economically
and politically than the Mecca of Qusayy. Their capital increased after the Tiaf to
the extent that Meccan merchants began to invest their surplus wealth in land
reclamation at the expense of their neighbors in Ta'if. Mecca's power was also
felt by the Banu Laith who could have disrupted the flow of Meccan trade from
Yemen and would have reduced the Quraish's influence with their tribal neighbors
if the attacks were left unanswered. Mecca's political power thus increased with
the increase of its commercial activity and with the concentration of merchant
capital in the city.
But Mecca's development did not take place in a vacuum, and soon its
growing importance was noticed by the competing states of the Byzantines and

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 Social and Economic Conditions 349

the Sasanids. Through their allies, the Abyssinians and the Lakhmids, re
ly, the two powers attempted to spread their control to Mecca. The L
king Qubadh ordered his ally in central Arabia, al-Harith of the Banfu
extend his control to Mecca. Al-Harith, unwilling to incur enmity of th
and other tribes, refused, and Qubadh was too busy with other matters to
through with this attempt. HTra, however, continued to have a strong
over other parts of the Hijaz, especially Yathrib.'8
The Byzantines made two attempts. The first was through Abraha
already consolidated his control over Yemen. Abraha repaired the Ma'
and attempted to revive Yemeni trade by diverting commerce away fro
To this end, he constructed a church, the Qullays, in San'a, to compete
Ka'ba. But apparently the Qullays was no competition for the Ka'ba, a
Meccans continued to rival the Yemenis in commerce. Abraha therefore deter-
mined to destroy the Ka'ba. He set out with an army made up largely of Arab
tribes and proceeded north where he passed through Ta'if. This expedition was
carried out in A.D. 570, commonly known as the Year of the Elephant, reportedly
the year Muhammad was born. Abraha's army disintegrated near Mecca,
however; Abraha went back to Yemen and many of his Arab soldiers remained
behind to hire themselves out as shepherds to the Quraish.'9 The second attempt
had a more local flavor. It took place sometime after A.D. 575, the year the
Sasanids successfully expelled the Abyssinians from Yemen to install a Persian
garrison in San'a, the seat of Yemeni royalty. Seemingly in response to this
development, a Meccan by the name of 'Uthman ibn al-Huwairith attempted to
crown himself king in Mecca on behalf of the Byzantines. But 'Uthman was met
with considerable resistance which forced him to abandon the idea altogether.20
Mecca thus escaped any outside domination and continued to develop econo-
mically and politically, undeterred by outside forces which tried to control it.
Abraha's failure was considered a divine intervention, a momentous victory
for Mecca which gave the Ka'ba unprecedented prestige among the Arabs who
began to respect the haram and the rites of pilgrimage more than ever. The
Quraish, as a result, were revered as Ahl Allah, the people of God. Capitalizing
on this prestige, the Quraish devised the institution of hums (ra'yu al-hums) to
include those who lived in Mecca and the Quraish's closest allies, such as the
Banu 'Amir ibn Sa'sa'a. This favorable distinction was narrower than the
distinction of the Muhrimiin, those who respected the haram, which placed the
Quraish in a class by itself suggesting a further concentration of privileges,
influence, and wealth. According to the institution of hums, the Quraish argued
that in their reverence to the Ka'ba they should not leave Mecca to perform the
wuqaf (a pilgrimage rite) at 'Arafat. More significant is the Quraish's insistence
that pilgrims/merchants who entered Mecca could not bring food and cloth
from outside (presumably to preserve and enhance the sanctity of the city),
forcing them to buy Meccan cloth and Meccan food, which strengthened
Mecca's economy and worked to the advantage of the merchants.2' This advan-
tage was soon highlighted by the founding of the proverbial market of 'Ukz.22
'Ukaz, located at the edge of the haram area, was nurtured by the Meccans.
Merchants from all over Arabia came to the market. Poets came to recite their

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350 Mahmood Ibrahim

poetry. Arab royalty sent their agents with products to trade with
Livestock, horses, sheep, cows, and camels changed hands. Yemeni cloth,
swords, perfume, leather as well as various Egyptian, Syrian, Iraqi, and
Abyssinian wares were traded there.23 This market quickly grew to become the
most well-known pre-Islamic market. Mecca became increasingly relevant to
Arab merchants from all regions of Arabia, and to the rest of Arab society,
especially by placing tribal gods around the Ka'ba along with the Meccan
deities.
With 'Ukaz, the markets of Majna and Dhul-Majaz nearby, and with the
heightened prestige of the Ka'ba, Mecca's growth could not be stopped. The
Meccans reestablished their commercial ties with Yemen after the Abyssinians
were expelled. A Meccan delegation was well received by the new ruler, Dhui
Yazan, who gave them valuable gifts and safe passage for the merchants, many
of whom developed strong ties to the region. Soon after that, Mecca began to
compete with Hira itself for the domination of the Yemeni trade. This competition
came to a head in the Fijar wars (ca. A.D. 580) which were fought against Hira
and her allies in central Arabia. The wars, fought near the market of 'Ukaz,
were precipitated by an attack against the latima, annual trade caravan of the
Lakhmid king, of al-Mundhir while it was on its way to CUkaz. An ally of Harb
ibn Umayya, the most powerful Meccan merchant of his time, carried out the
attack. Mecca and her allies successfully defeated Hira and her allies which
insured Mecca's domination of the central Arabian trade routes, especially those
that connected Najd with Yemen.24 It was after this victory that Meccan
merchants began to isolate Yemeni merchants from the Haram.25 This no doubt
encouraged Meccan merchants to increase the volume of their trade and to
widen their connections. Mecca's victory in the Fijar wars also triggered the
decline of Hira and the loss of her political power over Arabia. Eastern Arabian
tribes were later able to defeat HTra and the Persian garrison which was
stationed in the city in the battle of DhO Qar (ca. A.D. 602). Thus with the
isolation of Yemeni merchants from the Haram and with the demise of Hira only
Mecca remained powerful enough to attract merchants and their capital to the
city, now also becoming the leading religious center in Arabia. By the end of the
sixth century and the beginning of the seventh Meccan merchants had advanced
by leaps and bounds, economically and politically, over the Meccan merchants
of the ilaf period some one hundred years before.

FACTIONAL CONFLICT AND THE RISE OF THE BANU UMAYYA

By all indications, Qusayy ruled Mecca alone after he defeated

He caused some of the Quraish to settle in the immediate vicini
where they became known as the Quraish al-Bataiih, as distingui
who remained on the outskirts, the Quraish al-Zawahir. Th
Qusayy, there was some concentration of power among clans wh
Ka'ba. Before Qusayy died he passed on all of the offices he ha
his eldest son 'Abd al-Dar, excluding 'Abd Manaf and 'Abd al-'U
Qusayy's action conforms to the concept of primogeniture, the sour
Qusayy singled out CAbd al-Dar because he had not attained the

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 Social and Economic Conditions 351

status of his younger brothers. It is not clear how long CAbd al-Dar wa
follow in his father's footsteps but some harmony must have existed for th
no reported disagreements within the clans of the Quraish al-Bata'ih, t
of power in Mecca. This arrangement did not prove satisfactory to Has
CAbd Shams, descendants of 'Abd Manaf. In all likelihood the Banu CAbd
Manaf began to accumulate more power and wealth after the introduction of
ilaf, especially since Hashim and 'Abd Shams were instrumental in developing it.
Sources report that when the Banfu 'Abd Manaf grew in number and felt
strong, they asked the Banui 'Abd al-Dar to hand over the keys of the Kacba. In
effect they wanted the office of wilayat al-bait, the most prestigious office in
Mecca. Abdallah ibn 'Abd al-'Uzza ibn 'Uthman ibn 'Abd al-Dar, who
retained the keys, refused to comply and give up the office. As a result, the clans
of Quraish split into two major factions: the 'Abd al-Dar faction known a
al-Ahlaf, and the 'Abd Manaf faction known as al-Mutayyabin. The Ahla
faction was made up of 'Abd al-Dar, Makhzim, Sahm, Jumah, and 'Adiyy
The Mutayyabun faction was made up of Hashim, 'Abd Shams, Zuhra, and
Taim. The two factions faced each other poised for war. The threat of military
confrontation prompted them to reach a compromise whereby the Mutayyabiu
received the offices of siqaya and rifada.26 CAbd Shams declined the offices in
favor of Hashim because he traveled constantly in pursuit of his trade.27 Th
Ahlaf faction retained the offices of wilayat al-bait, liwa', and Dar al-Nadwa.
The first major split in the ruling elite of Mecca thus took place and was
institutionalized by the passing of offices. It affords us a glimpse of the earlies
political maneuvering among the heads of the ruling clans.
The formation of the two factions could not be clan-based since members of
both sides were interrelated either through kinship or marriage. The two factions
were actually contending social forces each backed by an infrastructure of allies,
mawali, slaves, and other dependents. As seen from the nature of their formation,
the two factions were competing for a greater share of the political structure in
Mecca. Since this conflict was restricted to the top, between the leading
merchants/clan heads, it was an intraclass conflict among owners of merchant
capital, a conflict that was further concentrated among the Makhzum, the Banui
Hashim, and the Banu C'Abd Shams. Each clan represented a segment of
merchant capital in Mecca. With the increasing concentration of merchant
capital in Mecca, the three segments competed for a larger share of this capital in
an effort to become the dominant segment, the most powerful voice in Meccan
affairs.
Intraclass conflict in Mecca is documented through the institution of munifara.
Munafara (from the root NaFaRa) was essentially the competition for higher
honor and status based on wealth and strength. It involved two contenders who
appointed a hakam to judge between them. By documenting munafara we can
get a further look at Mecca's internal political dynamic and trace the development
of the strongest segment of merchant capital in the city.
An early controversy took place between 'Abd Shams and the Banfu 'Adiyy.
'Abd Shams owned a bukhtiyya, a rare she-camel. One day 'Abd Shams missed
it and could not find a trace of it. He offered a reward to anyone who had any
information about it (wa ja'ala dhawdan li man dallahu 'ali khabariha). A

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352 Mahmood Ibrahim

maternal relation of the Banui CAdiyy came forward with the infor
'Amir ibn 'Abdallah ibn 'Uwaij ibn CAdiyy had slaughtered the buk
that 'Abd Shams could find its skin in the man's courtyard. CAbd Shams
mobilized some supporters (fa kharaja CAbd Shams ff wuldihi wa nasin min
ahlihi) and headed for 'Amir's house where the informant's story was verified.
As it was considered an attack on his honor as well as his property, CAbd Shams
took 'Amir hostage, vowing to take all his wealth and to cut off his hand as
punishment. The Banfu CAdiyy interceded and requested that CAbd Shams be
satisfied with all of 'Amir's wealth and his exile. Agreeing to this compromise,
'Abd Shams confiscated CAmir's wealth and set him free. When 'Amir and his
family were about to leave the city, the Bani Sahm intercepted them and
allowed them to remain in the Sahmi quarters (wa anzaluhum baina azhurihim).
'Abd Shams did not object, and an alliance was formed between the Bani Sahm
and the Banf 'Adiyy which remained strong until the coming of Islam.28
The leadership of the Baniu 'Abd Shams passed to his son Umayya, the
eponym of the Banfu Umayya and later the Umayyads. Umayya became involved
in a dispute with the Banui Zuhra as a result of a disagreement about some rights
of passage. Umayya passed by the house of Wahb ibn 'Abd Manaf ibn Zuhra
(yamurru bihifa yukthiru) to Wahb's annoyance. When Umayya pas,ed once too
often, Wahb asked him to go another way (muriuruka 'alayya yu'dhTnTfa'ttakhidh
ghaira tarTqT tarTqan). Umayya refused the request, and an altercation followed
in which Umayya was injured. This was cause enough for Umayya to mobilize
his supporters who began to demand the exile of Wahb, a demand to which the
Banfu Zuhra seem to have acceded since some of them began to leave later that
night. Here again, other parties, the Banui Sahm and the Banui Jumah, interceded
and the matter was dropped. A compromise similar to that with CAbd Shams
may have been reached at this time for we are told that the Baniu Zuhra
remained in Mecca and that Umayya was able to confiscate some of Wahb's
property, namely a house that later came to be known as Dar Safwan (ibn
Umayya).29
Some observations on these two incidents are in order. First, leadership of a
clan passed from father to son as did that from 'Abd Shams to Umayya, which
concentrated rather than dispersed power and wealth. Second, some clan
members were so poor that they resorted to stealing, like 'Amir, or so weak that
they could be exiled, suggesting economic differentiation within the clan itself.
Third, the Banfu Umayya were involved in disputes against at least four clans
regardless of their factional affiliation. Fourth, each time the Banu Umayya won
they increased their influence over the affairs of Mecca by gaining morally and
materially over their adversaries.
The development of the power of the Banii Umayya continued at the expense
of other clans. A dispute between Harb ibn Umayya ibn 'Abd Shams and 'Abd
al-Muttalib, leader of the Banul Hashim, is very instructive since it is directly
related to commercial competition. Harb instigated the murder of a Jewish
merchant from Najran known as Udhaina. Udhaina was in the jiwar of CAbd
al-Muttalib and he traded in the region of Tihama. As part of his responsibility
in the jiwar, CAbd al-Muttalib had to find the perpetrator of the crime. When
'Abd al-Muttalib learned that Harb was responsible for Udhaina's death, the

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 Social and Economic Conditions 353

two appointed a hakam from the Banui 'Adiyy to judge between them.
hakam ruled in favor of CAbd al-Muttalib, which infuriated Harb who m
his supporters against the hakam. The Bani 'Adiyy, supported by the B
Sahm, stood by their man against Harb. Meanwhile, the clans of Hashi
Zuhra supported 'Abd al-Muttalib in favor of the ruling (but did not join
with the Banu 'Adiyy). Military conflict was averted again but it became
that a realignment of forces within the faction of al-Mutayyabin was d
munadama (close friendship, drinking companionship) between Harb and
al-Muttalib was lost forever as the Banfu Umayya and the Banfu Nawf
closer together on one side and the clans of Hashim, Zuhra, and Taim c
closer together on the other. From then on, the Banfu Umayya and th
Nawfal gradually emancipated themselves from their alliance with the
Hashim.30
The two-way division in the Mutayyabin faction was particularly evid
the munafara between 'Abd al-Muttalib and Nawfal. 'Abd al-Muttalib inherited
some land in Mecca known as al-Arkah. At a certain point, Nawfal ibn CAbd
Manaf, who was supported by the Banu Umayya, claimed the land and granted
it to one of his sons. 'Abd al-Muttalib, not being able to confront Nawfal by
himself, asked his supporters for aid but no one of high stature helped him
(fa'stansara qawmahufa lam yujibhu minhum kabTrun ahad).31 In search of aid,
'Abd al-Muttalib reportedly went to Yathrib and asked the Banfu al-Najjar for
help, although sources cast doubt on this connection. Instead, CAbd al-Muttalib
was forced to form an alliance with the opposition group in Mecca, the
Khuza'ah, who until then had been pushed into a subservient position. It is
reported that a group of leading Khuza'is held a council after this dispute, and
declaring that "time had healed what had been injured between us [Khuza'ah
and Quraish]," they decided to propose an alliance with 'Abd al-Muttalib in
order to support him. A delegation from the Khuza'ah approached 'Abd al-
Muttalib with the offer and he promptly agreed. Thereafter, delegations from
both sides met in Dar al-Nadwa and concluded the alliance which was sealed by
marriage.32 No one from the Baniu Nawfal or the Banu Umayya attended this
meeting or entered the alliance which stood independently from that of the
Mutayyabin faction. The influence of the Banui Umayya thus increased at the
expense of the Banu Hashim who, furthermore, for the first time were forced to
seek an alliance outside the tribe of Quraish against members of the Quraish.
The Banu Hashim were slowly edged out from the circle of the ruling elite as
their alliance with the Khuza'ah would imply.
Emerging as the strongest segment in the Mutayyabun faction, the Banu
Umayya began to confront the leader of the Ahlaf faction, the Banfu Makhzfim.
This competition was more cautious and took shape over a long period of time.
An early source of disagreement between the two clans was the Quraish's
relationship to the exiled Banii Laith. Three years after the Quraish caused their
exile, bloody fighting between them broke out again. Al-cAs ibn Wa'il and
Hisham ibn al-MughTra, from the Makhziim, gathered some supporters and
appealed to Sa'cd ibn al-'As, also known as Abfi Uhaiha, to extend his support
and that of the Banu Umayya against the Banfu Laith. Abu Uhaiha refused on
the ground that he was maternally related to the Bani Laith. He did not stop at

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354 Mahmood Ibrahim

that but harbored a member of the Baniu Laith, CAmr ibn CAbd al-'Uzza, a
fugitive who was sought by al-'As and Hisham. Having no support from the
Bani Umayya, the Makhzfumi force headed toward the Banfu Laith and when
they reached a place called al-Mushallal fierce fighting broke out, al-'As
reportedly was killed, and the Meccan force was routed. This defeat was
aggravated when the Laithi 'Amr, who was whisked out of Mecca when his
whereabouts became known, returned to kill other Quraishis near the city.
Fighting would have resumed had it not been for the insistence of Abui Uhaiha
who finally managed to bring the two camps to agree on a solution.33
Their role as peacemakers allowed the Banu Umayya to cultivate a stronger
position over the affairs of Mecca, this time in relation to the strongest segments
in the city, namely the faction of al-Ahlaf and the Banfu Hashim. This can be
seen in the confrontation between the Baniu Hashim and al-Ahlaf in the battle of
Yawm al-Ghazal in Mecca, which took place as a result of an attack on the
sanctity of the Kacba when a statue of a gazelle was stolen from it. At the
beginning of the confrontation, it seems that the Banui Umayya extended some
support to the Ahlaf faction which strengthened them against the Banfu Hashim.
After a while, such influential members of the Banu Umayya as Abfu Sufyan,
Abi Uhaiha, and 'Utba ibn Abi RablCa held a council and decided to withdraw
their support from the Ahlaf. This decision, coming at a critical moment,
changed the course of events, and the case of the Ahlaf faction began to weaken.
When an equilibrium was achieved, the Baniu Umayya forced the warring
factions to come to terms and agree on a solution to the conflict.34 Thus, the
Baniu Umayya were strong enough to play one faction against another and
impose on both factions conditions favorable to the Banfu Umayya; they were
able to attain the position of the dominant segment which could check disruptive
tendencies and would advance its own interests, the interests of the strongest
segment of merchant capital in Mecca.
This hegemonic role was translated into action immediately in the Fijar wars
against Hira and its allies. The circumstances of this confrontation are illuminat-
ing. The wars were instigated by al-Barrad ibn Qais ibn Rafi'. Al-Barrad had
been an ally (hallf) of the Banfu Sahm (Makhzfum faction) but he later switched
his alliance to Harb ibn Umayya. After that, he traveled to Yemen where he
remained for one year. Al-Barrad then went all the way to HTra where he offered
his services to al-Nucman ibn al-Mundhir who was preparing his annual latTma
(caravan) to the market of CUkaz. Al-Nu'man ignored al-Barrad and instead
employed 'Urwa ibn 'Utba from the tribe of Kilab. We are told that al-Barrad
tracked the caravan on its way to 'Ukaz and when it reached a place known as
Duwain al-Jarib, al-Barrad attacked CUtba in his leather tent and killed him.
Al-Barrad immediately sent word of his deed with Bishr ibn Khazim and
instructed him to inform only such influential Meccans as Harb ibn Umayya,
CAbdallah ibn Jadcan, Hisham ibn al-Mughira, and Nawfal ibn Mucawiya. This
quick communication allowed the Meccans to withdraw into the haram area
before their adversaries received news of the attack on Hira's caravan.
The connection between al-Barrad and the leader of the Baniu Umayya might
suggest that Harb had a foreknowledge of al-Barrad's plans. It is notable that
al-Barrad's immediate concern after attacking the caravan was to inform his ally

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 Social and Economic Conditions 355

and other influential Meccan merchants. If Harb chose not to confront H

would have simply disavowed his alliance with al-Barrad leaving him to
devices. But Harb and other Meccan merchants immediately began to p
for the impending battle. They pooled their resources to arm and feed
soldiers who gathered for the confrontation. It is said that Harb su
complete armor for a hundred persons, as did 'Abdalla ibn Jad'an. For
battle, the Meccans split into three formations: a center and two flanks.
the center was Harb ibn Umayya, one flank was led by cAbdalla ibn Jad
the other by Kariz ibn Rabi'a (another influential member of the Banfu Uma
Harb also appointed Bishr ibn Khazim leader of a contingent in the Me
army. Many other members of the Banfu Umayya, among whom w
Sufyan, participated valiantly in the battle which earned them the nickn
al-'Anabis. When Mecca's victory became apparent, 'Utba ibn Rabica (fr
Banu Umayya) called for a truce and proposed a formula for ending the c
He suggested that the dead be counted on both sides, and the side with th
dead would receive blood money for the difference. This compromise was
to, and Harb ibn Umayya guaranteed the money, giving his son Abu Suf
hostage. Some reports indicate that Harb paid all the blood money
reports suggest that Meccan merchants pooled some of their capital fo
blood money.35
The preponderant role played by members of the Banfu Umayya would sug
that the Meccan victory was really that of the Banui Umayya. Indeed,
position in Mecca has become so strong that they stood by themselves (w
Banfu Nawfal in the shadow) as an independent faction retaining H
Mutayyabiin. Thus, victory in the Fijar wars caused further alignments of f
within Mecca, to the advantage of the Bani Umayya. The remnant clans
al-Mutayyabun, Hashim, Zuhra, and Taim were driven to form their ow
the Hilf al-Fuduil, which was formalized in the house of 'Abdalla ibn Jad'an
who acted as a host rather than a participant. He did not join Hilf al-Fuduil, nor
did anyone from the Bani Umayya or from the Bani Nawfal.36 Hilf al-Fudul
was also independent of the alliance with the Khuza'ah formed earlier with
'Abd al-Muttalib. This might suggest that the Bani Hashim remained within the
framework of the economic and political structure in Mecca but with a lesser
status and with diminished power. This view of the position of Hilf al-Fuduil is
borne out by a variant understanding of the word fudul. This word was taken to
mean "virtuous," making this hilf an alliance of the virtuous, a definition
encouraged by the presence of Muhammad's clan as the principal power in the
hilf. The variant understanding of the word fuduil is "remnant, superfluous, that
which has no primary significance," which conveys more accurately the position
of Hilf al-Fudufl in Meccan affairs. In support of this understanding, it is said
that the Quraish considered members of this hilf to be out of their ranks (inna
Quraishan qdlat hadhafu.dulun minhum).37
Having eliminated the Banfu Hashim from power politics, the Banfu Umayya
concentrated on the Banf Makhzfm. Abf Sufyan and Abf Jahl, leaders of the
Banu Umayya and the Banfu Makhzfm, respectively, had been competing for
leadership in Mecca while Muhammad was preaching his new religion. It was
this competition that allowed Muhammad to challenge Meccan leaders as long

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356 Mahmood Ibrahim

as he could before he finally moved to Yathrib-Medina-in A.D. 622, the

beginning of the Hijra period. It was A.H. 2 and the Muslims had routed the
Meccans at Badr. It was a disastrous defeat for Mecca, especially for the Banu
Makhzfum, who lost Abi Jahl in the battle. Aggravating this loss, a member of
the Banu Makhzum attacked and killed Abul Uzaihir, leader of the Daws and an
ally of Abi Sufyan. YazTd ibn Abl Sufyan, in the absence of his father who was
attending to his business in the market of Dhul-Majaz, mobilized the Banfu
Umayya and their supporters to respond to the attack on his father's honor.
Receiving the news of the attack, Abuf Sufyan set out hurriedly for Mecca to find
an extremely tense situation. He took the liwa', the standard of war, which must
have passed to the Banu Umayya perhaps with the Fijar wars, and was able to
diffuse a volatile situation. Abui Sufyan called on influential members of his
clan to decide on a course of action. In the meeting, Abf Sufyan chose
diplomacy rather than war and his suggestions were carried out. He sent a
delegation with 200 camels (as blood money, twice the normal amount) to be
given to Abui Uzaihir's family as Abui Sufyan's responsibility to his hallf. This
gesture was accepted by the Daws who were left to settle their accounts with the
Banuf Makhzum. Thereafter, the Daws attacked the Makhzuimi caravans on
several occasions and many Makhzumi men were killed in retaliation for Abfu
Uzaihir. The Banil Makhzfum were finally obliged to pay an annual sum of
money (itiiwa, kharj) to the Daws.38 Thus, with Abfu Jahl dead and with their
economic interests threatened by the Daws, the Banu Makhzfum lost any power
they had in Meccan affairs. This left the field open for Abui Sufyan to assume
sole leadership (but no doubt assisted by others from his clan) of the city.
Indeed, it was Abiu Sufyan who led the Meccans against the Muslims in their
subsequent confrontations in Uhud and al-Khandaq. It was Abui Sufyan who
negotiated on behalf of the Meccans with Muhammad in A.H. 8. Intraclass
conflict in Mecca was thus characterized by the gradual emergence of the Banu
Umayya as the dominant force and as the strongest segment of merchant capital
in Mecca. The leader of the clan became the leader of the city.
In conclusion, it is possible to reconstruct an account of Mecca based on
historical events that set definite trends in its development. Clear links can be
established between Mecca's commercial development, the various institutional
innovations, and the development of its power. The reconstruction gives
historians the opportunity to theorize on the many aspects and relationships in
that social formation and a better understanding of the social, economic and
political developments that were taking place in Mecca on the eve of Islam. Such
clarity is necessary for a deeper understanding of the significance and relevance
of Islam and of many of the institutions that it provided for the Meccans.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES

NOTES

'The most detailed history of pre-Islamic Arabia may be found in Jawad 'Al, Al-M
Tarikh al-'Arab qabla al-Islam (10 vols.; Beirut, 1971); see also G. Levi della Vida, "P
Arabia," in N. Faris, ed., The Arab Heritage (Princeton, 1934), pp. 25-57; D. O'Leary,
Before Muhammad (London, 1927); S. Smith, "Events in Sixth Century Arabia," Bulleti
School of African and Oriental Studies, 16 (1954), 425-468.

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 Social and Economic Conditions 357

2Qusayy's transition to power might have been a gradual and peaceful one since he was married
the daughter of the leader of the Khuza'ah, Hulail ibn Hubshiyya. This transition took place a
time of Bahram Gur in Persia and al-NuCman ibn al-Mundhir in Hira, around A.D. 450. For m
details see Abui al-Walid M. ibn Ahmad al-Azraqi, Akhbar Makka, F. Wiistenfeld, ed. (Le
1857), reprinted as Vol. I of Akhbar Makka al-Musharrafa (Beirut, 1964), pp. 50-65; Ibn H
al-Baghdadi, Kitab al-Munammaq fi Akhbir Quraish, Khorshid Ahmad Fariq, ed. (Heyder
1965), pp. 31, 83-84; Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari, Ta'rTkh al-Rusul wa al-Muluk (Cairo, 1
1967), II, 256ff; AbO Mansur 'Abd al-Malik al-ThaC'libT, Thimir al-Qulub ft al-Mudaf w
Mansab, M. Abu al-Fadl Ibrahim, ed. (Cairo, 1965), p. 116.
3Mutahhar ibn Tahir al-MaqdisT, al-Bad' wa al-Ta'rTkh, C. Huart, ed. (Leiden, 1899), IV,
127; Tabari, Ta'rTkh, II, 260; AzraqT, Akhbar, p. 107.
4Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Qurtubi, al-Jdmi' li Ahkam al-Qur'an, (Cairo, 1967), II, 204ff.
5Ibid.
61bn Habib, al-Munammaq, p. 33; for a modern discussion of the Tlaf and further referenc
M. J. Kister, "Mecca and Tamim," Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orien
(1965), 113-163.
71bn Habib, al-Munammaq, p. 32.
8Ibid., pp. 331-332.
9E. Wolf, "Social Organization of Mecca and the Origins of Islam," Southwestern Journ
Anthropology, 7 (1951), 329-536; Shihab al-Din Ahmad al-Qastalani, Irshca al-Sari fi Sahl
Bukhadr (Cairo, A.H. 1304 [1886/7]), IV, 315ff; J. CAll, al-Mufas.al, VII, 46ff; H. Lammen
Mecque a la veille de l'hegire (Beyrouth, 1924), pp. 237ff; M. Rodinson, Muhammad (New
N.Y., 1974), p. 36.
10CAli ibn Ahmad al-Nisaburi, Asbab Nuzul al-Qur'an, A. Saqr, ed. (Cairo, 1969), pp. 326-328;
also (Cairo, 1968), pp. 211-212, 220.
"Al-QastalanT, Irshad, IV, 316.
21Ibn HabTb, al-Munammaq, p. 37. This relationship was brought out by M. Sahlins in Tribesmen
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1968), pp. 36ff.
'3For a breakdown of some of the occupations in Mecca and those who were engaged in them see
Ahmad ibn CUmar ibn Rusta, al-A laq al-Nafisa, M. J. De Goeje, ed. (Leiden, 1892), pp. 215-216;
CAbdallah ibn Muslim ibn Qutaiba, Kitab al-Macarif, T. 'Ukasha, ed. (Cairo, 1969), p. 575; Ibn
Hablb, al-Munammaq, pp. 52, 424; J. cAll, al-Mufassal, IV, 83.
14Azraqi, Akhbar, p. 363; Malik ibn Anas, Muwatta', A. CAllfish, ed. (Beirut, 1971), p. 451.
5Ibn Habib, al-Munammaq, pp. 28, 281.
'6Ahmad ibn Yahya al-Baladhuri, Futah al-Buldan, Salah al-Din al-Munajjid, ed. (Cairo, 1956),
p. 66; Baladhuri, Ansab al-Ashraf, M. Hamidullah, ed. (Cairo, 1959), I, 139, 142.
7Baladhurl, Ansab, I, 75; Ibn Habib, al-Munammaq, pp. 124ff.
'8M. J. Kister, "Al-Hira: Some Notes on Its Relations with Arabia," Arabica, 15 (1968), 145-169.
'9Azraqi, Akhbar, p. 97; for details on the Year of the Elephant see M. J. Kister, "Some Reports
Concerning Mecca from Jahiliyya to Islam," Journal of the Economic and Social History of the
Orient, 15 (1972), 61-93.
20Zubair ibn Bakkar, Jamharat Nasab Quraish, M. Shakir, ed. (Cairo, A.H. 1381 [1961/2]),
pp. 428-430; W. M. Watt, Muhammad at Mecca (Oxford, 1951), pp. 15-16; M. ibn Ahmad al-FasT,
Shifa' al-Gharam (Mecca, 1956), II, 108ff.
2"Ibn HabTb al-Baghdadi, Kitab al-Muhabbar, I. Lichtenstader, ed. (Beirut, 1943), p. 178; Clzz
al-DTn ibn al-Athir, al-Kamilftal-Ta:rTkh, C. J. Torenberg, ed. (Beirut, 1965), I, 452; al-FasT, Shift',
II, 41-42.
22Kister, "Concerning Mecca," p. 76.
23Abtu Al Ahmad al-Marzuqi, Kitab al-Azmina wa al-Amkina (Heyderabad, A.H. 1332 [1913/4]),
II, 165ff.
24Watt, Mecca, pp. 11, 14; Ibn Habib, al-Munammaq, pp. 185-211.
25Watt, Mecca, p. 15; Ibn Habib, al-Munammaq, pp. 45-49.
26M. Ibn cAbd al-Malik ibn Hisham, al-Sira al-Nabawiyya, T. A. Sacd, ed. (Cairo, 1974), 1, 120;
Ibn Habib, al-Munammaq, pp. 42, 222, 331, 332; Ibn al-AthTr, al-Kamil, II, 22; Watt, Mecca, p. 11.
271bn Hisham, STra, I, 120-121, 125.
281bn Habib, al-Munammaq, pp. 80ff.
29Ibid., pp. 40ff; Azraqi, Akhbar, p. 453.

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358 Mahmood Ibrahim

30Baladhuri, Ansab, I, 73; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, II, 15; Ibn Habib, al-Munammaq, pp. 9
3"Ibn Habib, al-Munammaq, p. 85.
3Ibid., p. 88; Baladhuri, Ansab, I, 69, 71; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, II, 11; for the doubt c
Banu al-Najjar connection see Tabari, Ta'rTkh, II, 248.
331bn Habib, al-Munammaq, pp. 130ff.
4Ibid., pp. 54, 64.
35See n. 24 above; Baladhuri, Ansib, I, 101.
36Ibn Habib, al-Munammaq, pp. 45ff, 217ff, 340ff; Watt, Mecca, p. 13.
371bn Habib, al-Munammaq, p. 341; see also a similar statement "hilf al-Fudul seceded
hilf of al-Mutayyabuin and the Ahlaf," p. 47; see also Ahmad ibn AbT Ya'qfub al-Ya'qiu
(Beirut, 1960), II, 18; Watt, Mecca, p. 6.
38Ibn HabTb, al-Munammaq, pp. 244ff; Baladhuri, Ansab, I, 135.

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