Today the descendants of immigrants from India in

Fiji outnumber the original Fijians. They are an

integral and vital part of Fiji's multi-racial population.
In this book, a sequel to the author's
, Dr Gillion deals with the very important
period when there were strikes, boycotts and
communal disputes as the Indian community
sought dignity, identity and a ccep ta nce
in its new home.

Australian National University Press C anberra

ISBN O 708112919
 This book was published by ANU Press between 1965–1991.
This republication is part of the digitisation project being carried
out by Scholarly Information Services/Library and ANU Press.
This project aims to make past scholarly works published
by The Australian National University available to
a global audience under its open-access policy.
 1HE FIJI
INDIANS

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 1HE FIJI
INDMNS

AUSTRALIAN N ATIO N AL UNIVERSITY PRESS C ANBERRA 1977

First published in Australia 1977.
Printed in Australia for the Australian National University Press, Canberra.
© K. L. Gillion, 1977.
This book is copyright. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of
private study, research, criticism, or review, as permitted under the Copy­
right Act, no part may be reproduced by any process without written
permission. Inquiries should be made to the publisher.
National Library of Australia
Cataloguing-in-Publication entry
Gillion, Kenneth Lowell Oliver.
The Fiji Indians.
Index.
Bibliography.
ISBN 0 7081 1291 9.
1. East Indians in Fiji. I. Title.
301.4519141109611
Southeast Asia: Angus & Robertson (S.E. Asia) Pty Ltd, Singapore.
Japan: United Publishers Services Ltd, Tokyo.
For Rachel
 Preface

This is a sequel to Fiji’s Indian Migrants: a history to the end of

indenture in 1920, which was published in 1962. There I wrote of the
immigration of 60,000 Indians to Fiji under the indentured labour
system, their recruitment in India, their lives on the plantations, their
settlement on the land or repatriation to India, the administration of the
system in India and Fiji, and its final abolition. This book does not
cover the same ground, but examines different problems.
The period 1920-1946 was an important one in the history of Fiji,
of the Fiji Indians, and of Indians overseas in general. In 1920 the
place of India in the Empire and the Indians in Fiji was undefined. The
indenture system had been abolished, but it was not known whether
further assisted Indian immigration would be possible and whether the
Indians already in Fiji would stay or return to India. If they stayed,
would they supplant the indigenous Fijians as the preponderant popula­
tion of the islands, and would the local European settlers be able to
hold their own against them, or would Fiji be transformed into an area
of Indian cultural, economic, and possibly even political dominance? In
the period the question of whether the Indian challenge could be con­
tained aroused intense anxiety and discord. The ‘Indian problem’ as it
was popularly known — though it could as well have been called the
European problem or the Fijian problem—was, in short, the principal
question of Fiji history at that time.
By 1947 a situation that had seemed open in 1920 was closed. The
majority of the Indian migrants had made Fiji their permanent home,
but further immigration had been restricted, first by India, then by Fiji.
India now counted for little in the colony’s affairs. The Fiji Indians had
been transformed from a collection of poor plantation labourers into a
diversified, though still primarily agricultural, community which was
racked by disunity and conflict. They had made a bid for equality with
the Europeans that was as unsuccessful in Fiji as it was in the other
parts of the Empire, except the sub-continent itself. The Fijians, though
now outnumbered by the Fiji Indians, had recovered from the popula­
tion decline that had for many years threatened their survival and had
seen the priority of their interests re-affirmed. Although the mainten­
ance of European power, prestige and privilege was still a primary issue,
the Fijians were becoming much more important in their own right as

vii
Preface

actors on the modern stage, and not just as supports for European
dominance. By the end of the period the social and economic separation
of the communities at the local level had been reinforced by differential
educational and political arrangements, and Fiji was firmly established
as one of the world’s clearest examples of the colonial plural society.
In 1946 the debate in the Legislative Council on ‘safeguarding the
Fijian race’ capped the new multi-racial order in Fiji.
The reader familiar with Fiji and its history will recognise many of
the issues treated in this book: the supremacy of sugar in the economy
of the colony and the corresponding power of the Colonial Sugar
Refining Company of Australia (CSR); the existence of a dominant
class of Europeans who looked upon Fiji as their home and had a
significant influence on colonial policy; the special position of the
indigenous Fijians as landowners living in a tribal society that was
largely outside the modern economy and was governed by a separate
administration; and the Indian challenge to the established order. The
reader looking for an anachronistic account of Fijian-Indian conflict
will be disappointed; the decisive conflict in the period under discussion
was between the Europeans and the Indians. Neither, of course, was a
homogeneous block. The government had not only a natural affinity
with the dominant white settlers and a prudent appreciation of the
importance of sugar in the economy of Fiji, but also a commitment to
the welfare of the Fijians, dating from the foundation of the colony,
that was reinforced by decisions taken elsewhere in the colonial empire
in the 1920s and 1930s. Another thread running through every chapter
in this book is disunity and conflict among the Fiji Indians themselves.
Events in Fiji were profoundly affected by world causes, as they still
are. Fiji’s economy and revenue, which determined important decisions
on the settlement of the Indians and their standard of living, were
dependent on the fickle market prices for its primary exports, notably
sugar. Changing economic conditions, the two world wars, and a
developing concern for the rights of labour and of colonial peoples, are
all relevant to the story. The availability of Indian labour, and then its
abrupt discontinuance, followed India’s evolving position in the British
Empire. The problems of the Fiji Indians were once matters of intense
public concern in India. Without the rise of the Indian nationalist
movement and its opposition to the export of cheap labour, Fiji would
have taken as many Indian immigrants as the economy demanded. In
the period covered by this book the Fiji Indians were seen in London,
in India, and in Fiji, as part of the much wider problem of ‘Indians

viii
 Preface

Overseas’, which was itself an aspect of the attempt to work out the
terms of a lasting relationship between Britain and India. The Indian
protest of the period was a response to an imperial ideal that contra­
dicted other ideals and promises.
Even if he wanted to, the historian could not relate everything in the
life of the community. Geographers and social anthropologists have
made admirable studies of the economy and social structure of the
F iji Indian rural settlements, and the reader who wishes to know more
of these matters is referred to their publications, cited in this book.
Much research remains to be done on the cultural history of the Fiji
Indians, and much of it will surely be done by students from Fiji itself,
as they explore and reconcile their Fijian and Indian heritage. In a
general history there must be many gaps and matters that deserve
longer treatment and books on their own. One of the purposes of this
work will have been achieved if it provokes further research.
Colonial Office records in London were open to 1946, but docu­
ments in Suva and New Delhi were not available to quite that date and
certain confidential papers were shown to me only on condition that
source references were omitted. But for the freer access to government
archives under the new 30 year rule, I would not have attempted a
sequel at this time.
This book has been published with the assistance of the Republic
of Nauru Fund of the Australian National University.
I am grateful to the University of Adelaide and the Australian
National University, my employers during the preparation of this book;
to the Australian Research Grants Committee and the Leverhulme
Trust which paid for research visits to Fiji and India respectively; to
the National Archives of Fiji in Suva, the National Archives of India
in New Delhi, the British Museum, the India Office and the Public
Record Office in London, CSR Limited in Sydney, the Australian
Archives and the National Library of Australia in Canberra, the
Library of New South Wales and the State Library of Victoria, for
access to documents; and to the Indian School of International Studies
and the Institute of Commonwealth Studies for hospitable affiliation
during visits to New Delhi and London. My research since 1949 on the
Indians in Fiji owes much to discussion, interviews, and friendship,
particularly with people in Fiji. If this story rings true, the credit is
theirs.
Suva,
October 1975.

ix
 Abbreviations
A.I.C.C. All-India Congress Committee
CO. Colonial Office
C.P. Paper of the Legislative Council of Fiji
C.S. Colonial Secretary, Fiji
C.S.O. Colonial Secretary’s Office, Fiji
C.S.R. Colonial Sugar Refining Company
CSR/G.M. CSR Company General Manager
conf. confidential
D C. District Commissioner
encl. enclosure
Fiji Debates Debates of the Legislative Council of Fiji
FTH Fiji Times and Herald
Govt India Government of India
1 .0 . India Office
1.0. /E . & O., or /I. & O.
or India Office proceedings
/J. & P., or /P. & J.
India E.P. or O.P. Emigration or Overseas proceedings of the
Government of India
Leg. Co. Fiji Legislative Council
mf. microfilm
no. number
Raju report Report of the Deputation of the Govern­
ment of India to Fiji, 1922
S.I.A. Secretary for Indian Affairs, Fiji
S. of S. Secretary of State
(for the Colonies or for India)
tel. telegram

x
 Contents
P reface vii

A b b rev iatio n s X

I The S ettin g 1

II The 1920 S trik e 18

III The Sadhu and th e C S R 47

IV Second T h o u g h ts 66

V N eg o tiatio n s 78

VI D harm a, D isp u te s an d E d u catio n 102

V II Com m on R oll 130

V III K isan s U n ite 157

IX W ar, Land, F ijian s 173

A p p en d ix The P o p u latio n o f F iji, 1921, 1936, 1946 199

N o tes 200

B ib lio g rap h y 217

Index 225
 I
The Setting
On 10 October 1874, the leading Fijian chiefs ceded Fiji to Queen
Victoria. Only five years later, following negotiations between the
governments of Fiji and India, the first Indian immigrants arrived
under the indentured labour system. Of all the achievements — or
failures — of the British colonial administration in Fiji, the bringing to
the country under government auspices of 60,000 Indians between
1879 and 1916 must be counted among the most important. When Fiji
became independent on 10 October 1970, the Fiji Indians, mostly the
descendants of those 60,000 immigrants, outnumbered the indigenous
Fijians, were an absolute majority of the total population, and, like the
other sections of that plural society, preserved a distinct and separate
identity.
The origins of this situation lay in the first years of British rule in
Fiji.1 Indian immigration was not something extraneous to government
policy towards the Fijian people, but a necessary condition of it. The
first governor of Fiji, Sir Arthur Gordon, was, for his time, more than
usually sensitive to the plight of native peoples abruptly exposed to the
challenge of western civilisation. He regarded Indian immigration as
a vital adjunct to a policy of shielding the Fijians from this challenge by
allowing them to retain many of their communal customs and evolve
slowly under a separate native administration, without either the oppor­
tunity or the necessity to work on the plantations of the white settlers.
Gordon established a system of native administration which embodied
Fijian tradition, but in a simplified, unified, codified, and less flexible
form; he insisted that the Fijians be left in their villages living in com­
munities under strict government control; he severely restricted the
engagement of Fijian labour by outsiders; and he stopped further
sales of Fijian land. But to sustain a modern administration, Fiji needed
some economic development, and that demanded land, capital, mar­
kets, and labour. Land was readily available, because Fiji was under­
populated and a declining Fijian population, reduced by measles and
other introduced diseases, had land to spare to sell — or, after sales
were prohibited — lease to European planters. Many of those planters
had been drawn to Fiji by the temporary cotton boom of the 1860s.
Then they tried various other crops, including sugar, coffee, bananas
and copra, but were crippled by lack of capital, expertise, and labour,
by debt, and by the high cost of freight, for Fiji was far from Europe

1
The Fiji Indians

and North America, and had to depend largely on the sparsely popu­
lated Australasian colonies. The planters clamoured for Fijian and
Pacific Island labour; they were denied Fijians by the paternalistic
colonial government, while the supply of the Pacific Islanders was
restricted because of government regulation of the traffic and the com­
petition of other recruiters offering better terms. Eventually a copra
industry employing Fijian and Island labour became viable and was to
remain an important, but not the predominant, sector of Fiji’s economy.
Sugar, Indian immigrant labour, and the expertise and capital of the
Colonial Sugar Refining Company of Sydney (CSR), which in 1880
was persuaded to extend its operations to Fiji, were the answers to
Fiji’s need for revenue. To Gordon, these had the great advantage that
development could proceed without drawing on Fijian labour and
dislocating Fijian society. In contrast to the demands of the impover­
ished planters, the CSR posed no immediate threat to his native policy,
because it was able to develop to the extent warranted by the size of its
markets without Fijian labour or excessive pressure on Fijian land-
holdings.
The subsequent history of Fiji was largely determined by those
decisions. Gordon intended his policy to be progressive, not static, but
in later years it became a new orthodoxy. The neo-traditional Fijian
way of life embodied in a separate Fijian administration and regula­
tions, and the restrictions on the engagement of Fijian labour and the
alienation of Fijian-owned land, removed any incentive for the Fijians
to move towards economic individualism and adaptation to the com­
petitive modern world. This course was questioned repeatedly over the
years of colonial rule: by European settlers, whose case was marred by
self-interest; by the occasional Fijian, whom authority could silence
and discredit; by visiting scholars and sometimes by missionaries; and
by various colonial service officers, including several governors. For a
time during the administration of Sir Everard im Thurn (1904-1910)
the system appeared to be in serious danger, and land sales were per­
mitted for a few years. In the end Gordon’s policy survived. There was
no great demand for Fijian labour as long as Indians were available;
the planters and the sugar companies already had enough land to sus­
tain the low level of development dictated by the shortage of capital,
transport problems, and Fiji’s isolation from large markets. If these
circumstances had been different, it can hardly be doubted that the
pressure for change in government policy towards the Fijians would
have been much stronger and very probably decisive. But the governors

2
 The Setting

could provide a modern administration and balance their budgets with

the revenue from sugar, which provided two-thirds of the colony’s
export income and directly or indirectly accounted for perhaps half the
colony’s revenue. The sugar industry was largely the preserve of one
company, the CSR, and it was worked by Indian labour.2
The indentured labour system was already well established in the
British Empire by the time the first Indian immigrants arrived in Fiji
in 1879. The demand for tropical commodities, such as sugar, tea,
coffee and rubber, in the centres of European civilisation had been met
by a colonial plantation economy requiring a steady supply of cheap
labour that was beyond the capacity or inclination of the local tribal
peoples to supply. The colonial planters and governments had turned
for labour, first to Africa, then to Asia. Coercion was necessary to
keep the labourers on the plantations because plantation work was
unattractive and in most colonies there were abundant opportunities to
earn a living elsewhere on the land. As the moral consciousness of
mankind progressed, slavery gave way to the temporary servitude of
indenture. The indentured labour system which Gordon had seen in
Trinidad and Mauritius and extended to Fiji was a state-regulated
scheme to meet the needs of the colonial planters for labour, while
affording safeguards against abuses in recruiting and ill-treatment on
the ships and plantations, and giving the migrants the opportunity
either to settle abroad or to return to India. Indentured labour emigra­
tion was operated for the immediate profit of the colonial planters,
encouraged by the metropolitan and colonial governments for the
development of the colonies and the balancing of their budgets, and
sanctioned by the prevailing belief in the ‘free’ movement of capital
and labour, which was assumed to be for the ultimate greater good of
the majority of individuals. But laissez-faire was tempered by pater­
nalistic care: the emigration of unskilled labour from India to distant
colonies was supervised by the Government of India, and contracts laid
down rights and obligations which were to be enforced by the colonial
governments.
Under the agreements signed in India, the emigrants bound them­
selves to serve for five years under an assigned employer, with penal
sanctions for breaches of labour discipline. They were then free to
return to India at their own expense or to stay in Fiji, and after another
five years they were entitled to an optional free return passage to
India. The Government of India thought the opportunity for perma­
nent colonisation was one of the few advantages indentured labour

3
The Fiji Indians

emigration offered to the people of India, and it would not have

accepted any scheme of emigration that provided for the compulsory
repatriation of those labourers whose indentures had expired. Gordon
did not pay much attention to the implications of permanent Indian
settlement in Fiji, but he did expect three-quarters of the Indians to
remain and so benefit themselves and the colony as small farmers,
tradesmen, etc., as they had done in the West Indies. About 40 per
cent of the immigrants did in fact return to India, though many of these
after many years residence in Fiji. The question of whether the Indians
were to be just a labour force and temporary sojourners, or a perma­
nent part of Fiji’s population with the rights and responsibilities of
citizenship, lay behind much of the controversy and struggle that will
be related in this book.

•Penang

V ITI LEVU

Fiji, showing main places mentioned in the book

The majority of the Indians who went to Fiji under the indentured
labour system embarked from Calcutta, and had been recruited in the
United Provinces, especially in the densely populated and very poor
north-eastern districts, but about 25 per cent were taken from the
M adras Presidency, the first of these in 1903 following the opening of
a second emigration depot in Madras. Most of the emigrants were
young men or women and they were physically fit enough to pass

4
 The Setting

medical examinations, because the colonies wanted workers, not

emaciated unfortunates. They were typical of the castes found in
Indian villages, the majority being of the middling to low agricultural
castes with a fair number of high-caste village people as well. The
colonial emigration agents in Calcutta and Madras paid their up-
country sub-agents by commission. The local recruiters watched for
isolated, lost, and gullible villagers, and these were more likely to be
found in towns than in their home villages; indeed the recruiters
avoided the villages lest they be beaten-up. Most of the recruits were
just looking for work or a way out of difficulties. They did not think
of themselves as emigrants bound for a land of better opportunity, and
they had little understanding of the forces that had driven them from
their villages and were to mould their future lives.
Not remarkably, the system never worked as it was intended. The
government safeguards in India and the colonies gave way to social
reality. The anticipated emigration of enterprising people anxious to
improve their prospects by going to the colonies became in practice the
collection by any means of stray, isolated, and credulous villagers who
had not the slightest idea of what their contracts would really mean:
the great distance from India, the relentless, clockwork pace of planta­
tion work under harsh discipline, the inability to change their employer,
the beatings, and the penal sanctions used to enforce their compliance
and even to prolong their indentures. In the early days the ‘mortality
was ghastly’; over the whole period many thousands were weakened
and broken by diseases such as hookworm; in the later years the pay
was insufficient to provide more than bare subsistence living. The re­
cruitment of a minimum proportion of 40 women to every 100 men,
insisted on by the Government of India in the hope that there could be
some normal family life in the colonies, became in the Indian social
context, where family groups do not normally emigrate, the collection,
often by bullying, or worse, of whatever miscellaneous, desperate,
unattached women could be found on the fringe of Indian society, and
their degradation in the filthy plantation lines where the labourers
were penned like animals. The immigrants who were lucky in their
plantation and overseer, and those who were unscrupulous, survived,
and some prospered, but many -others were brutalised. In India the
recruiters were able easily to evade the safeguards laid down by the
government and supposedly enforced by the overworked or indifferent
officers. In Fiji the provisions for government protection of the
labourers were often nullified by the inherent conditions of the planta-

5
The Fiji Indians

tion system and economy and the European dominative order. Planta­
tion discipline had to be maintained, many of the immigrants were
lazy and some were vicious, the rough young Australian overseers were
ignorant of Indian customs, ruled through their sirdars and used the
Indian women, the inspectors were mostly ex-overseers and were them­
selves part of the system of European dominance, the law courts
unconsciously favoured the articulate employer against the bewildered
or ignorant labourer.
Conditions were particularly bad in the late 1880s and 1890s, when
sugar prices were low; in the twentieth century they improved with
prosperity, experience, and reforms made in response to criticism.
Overall the system was a degrading one and it left behind it an unhappy
legacy in Fiji, not only the physical presence of the Indian population
and the various problems that brought in its train, but the survival of
the attitudes associated with indenture. The Europeans and Fijians
had learnt to despise the ‘coolies’, almost the only Indians they saw;
the Indians remembered the deceit, the slave-driving drudgery, and the
degradation and vice; the CSR, the planters, and Europeans generally
saw the Indians as a coloured labour-force to be kept under; while in
India Fiji had a worse reputation than any other colony.
One of the firm beliefs of Europeans in Fiji has always been that
the Indians were better off in Fiji than in India itself. In indenture days
they sought to justify bad conditions on the plantations by reference to
disease and starvation in India. It was, and indeed still is widely
believed that those who came to Fiji were of the lowest castes, used to
poverty and ill-treatment, and that they arrived in a diseased and
emaciated condition. That they were used to poverty is true, and there
were more deviants, people who had been in trouble with the police,
restless spirits, and fallen women, than a random sample of the Indian
village population would have included. But otherwise they were a
fair cross-section of village castes, including high-caste people. Some of
those were tricked into signing contracts by being promised non-
agricultural work, but it must be remembered, too, that in the areas in
which the North Indian migrants were recruited, agriculture was the
normal occupation of most people, including the high-castes. As for
the health of the migrants, the emigration agencies wanted physically
fit people, and the others were normally rejected by their medical
inspectors and by those of the Bengal and Madras governments. It is
likely that some disease was introduced into Fiji by the Indians,
especially hookworm, but some was brought in by Europeans also.

6
 The Setting

Any continuing public health problems in Fiji should have been

ascribed to social and working conditions in the colony.
The persistence of derogatory myths about the background of the
Fiji Indians is not surprising: it was part of the ideological under­
pinning of European dominance. The question of relative poverty is
more complicated. In the purely material sense, the immigrants, and
certainly their children, were probably better off at most times during
their history in Fiji than they would have been in India, and, except
for the terrible early days on the Rewa plantations, even their worst
times were not as bad as the widespread misery and death brought by
famine in India. But it must be remembered that those who died in
famines were mainly the lowest castes of agricultural labourers, who
had no resources whatever to fall back on if they lost their employment.
Life for most ordinary villagers in India provided the normal satisfac­
tions and dissatisfactions of the human condition, including a recog­
nised place in family and society. It was these that were lacking for
many in Fiji. Family life was unstable, wives were hard to find and
keep, the old social order had ceased to exist for the immigrants on the
day they were recruited. They had lost the respect, honour, hierarchy,
and warmth of belonging they had known in village India, and their
poverty was less bearable.
India, not Britain or Fiji, stopped Indians going to Fiji under the
indenture system. Humanitarian opinion in Britain, after a long interval
since the early days when Indians first replaced slaves on the planta­
tions in the West Indies and elsewhere, began to criticise the system in
the years before the first world war, but it was agitation in India that
brought about its abolition. Emigration had never been popular with
a large section of Indian opinion. In North India, it was disliked for
religious reasons: for centuries there had been a ban on crossing the
kala pani (black waters), which entailed risk of loss of caste. The North
Indian peoples looked inward, and there was no interest in foreign
lands where dharma (religious duty) was hard to observe. Admittedly
the depressed rural population of over-crowded Tamilnad, who went in
their millions for short periods to the plantations of Burma, Ceylon, and
the Straits Settlements, did not share these North Indian attitudes, nor
did the trading communities of South India, the commercially-minded
people of Gujarat, and the enterprising Punjabi Sikhs and Muslims with
their relative freedom from caste restrictions and their experience of
overseas military and police service. But in the land-locked United
Provinces, where the majority of the indentured labourers for Fiji

7
The Fiji Indians

were recruited, emigration was disfavoured by society. The emigration

agents complained of obstruction of their work by individual Indian
government officers, by the police, and by the public. The Government
of India and some of the provincial governments thought this attitude
to emigration should be changed and that more Indians should seek
economic advancement abroad as the people of other countries were
doing, but because they were watchful of the political dangers they did
not actively encourage emigration but merely tolerated and regulated
it.
In the decade before the first world war the criticism came to be
publicly voiced in India that the indentured labour system was not far
removed from slavery, inhumane to the individuals concerned, and
degrading to the people of India. Gandhi’s heroic struggles on behalf
of the Indians in South Africa were echoed in India by G. K. Gokhale
and, on his death, by M. M. Malaviya, two of the most prominent
Indian political leaders of the day. The Government of India came
under pressure from almost all sections of articulate Indian opinion,
expressed in the legislatures, the press, and the public associations.
The ‘moderates’ were even more concerned about the treatment of
overseas Indians than the ‘extremists’, because they had faith in
Britain’s good intentions and believed that India would one day be
associated on equal terms with the self-governing white dominions.
They wanted to improve India’s status in the Empire, including the right
of Indians to travel freely within it, and they saw the continuance of
indentured labour emigration as an obstacle to the acceptance of India
as a full and worthy partner. Confronted with India’s national awaken­
ing, the British government in India was more in need of local allies
than ever before. In 1915, during the Vice-royalty of Lord Hardinge,
who was especially sympathetic to this aspiration for national respect,
the Government of India recommended to London that the indentured
labour system be replaced by a less servile system of aided emigration.
In 1917 it suspended indentured labour emigration because of the
danger of popular disturbances and even mass civil disobedience,
organised by Gandhi, directed against further recruiting. It was grateful
for the excuse that labour was needed for the war effort in France and
Mesopotamia. The last ship for Fiji had already left in 1916.
Criticism of conditions in Fiji played a major part in the campaign
against the indenture system. The government and European settlers
of the colony thought that this was unjust, and indeed it was somewhat
fortuitous that Fiji had to bear the brunt of the attack. The book The

8
 The Setting

Fiji of To-day, by the Australian Methodist missionary, J. W. Burton,

had been published in 1910 and was later noticed in the press in India,
which also published letters from his colleagues, Miss Hannah Dudley
and the Reverend Richard Piper. Burton’s book attracted the attention
of Charles Freer Andrews, who had responded to Gokhale’s call for the
abolition of the indentured labour system as a cause to be taken up by
the people of India. Andrews paid the first of his three visits to Fiji in
1915, on that occasion in the company of the Reverend W. W. Pearson.
Their moderate but critical report, which was published in the Indian
press, drew attention to the moral evils in the labour lines. The charge
that the indenture system exposed Indian womanhood to degradation
was a particularly effective one in the Indian social context. The Hindi
journalist, Benarsidas Chaturvedi, began a lifelong interest in Fiji after
a repatriate from Fiji, Totaram Sanadhya, who was from the same
town, told him his story. Totaram’s account of his twenty-one years in
Fiji, which was ghost-written by Benarsidas, was published in 1914
and translated into several Indian languages. Again, it was Fiji, rather
than the West Indian colonies, that was in the spotlight.
Andrews made another visit to Fiji in 1917 and his second report
was more critical than the first. E. W. Knox, the aged general manager
of the Colonial Sugar Refining Company, had refused to see him on his
second visit to Sydney and this was later seen by other CSR executives,
the Council of Planters, and officials of the Fiji Government, to have
been particularly unfortunate for their case.3 Moreover, the company
refused to appoint matrons to its plantation hospitals. This experience
evidently embittered Andrews against the CSR, which he saw to be the
real power in Fiji. He did concede that Fiji was in principle an excellent
country for colonisation by Indian settlers, but Fiji still took the full
force of the attack against the indenture system and any scheme of
aided colonisation that might have replaced it. As Andrews wrote:
Now as things are, there is no hope for Fiji. It is throttled and
strangled by the C.S.R. Co. which has no morals. 1 went to the ut­
most possible limit of forbearance and patience and reasonableness
but when it came to spending money they found it easier and cheaper
for the time being to ignore my warnings.4
It is difficult to assess the justice of this singling out of Fiji for
especial opprobrium in India. No contemporary observer visited all the
colonies of Indian settlement apart from McNeill and Chimmanlal in
1913, whose report had not been particularly unfavourable to Fiji
except for the high murder and suicide rates. In addition to the dispro-

9
The Fiji Indians

portionate publicity Fiji had received, and Andrews’s personal ex­

perience of Knox, a further explanation of Fiji’s notoriety may be
suggested. The fact that an Australian company was the principal
employer of Indian labour in Fiji was not lost on educated Indian
opinion. Indian opinion was resentful of the exclusion of Indians from
the self-governing countries of the Empire and Australia was prominent
among these. But it was not so much a question of retaliation against
Australia through Fiji, as the Europeans in Fiji believed, but of India’s
national dignity and acceptance. Indian public opinion believed that
even educated and cultured Indians would never be accorded respect
while their countrymen were being sent overseas as coolie labour.
These aspirations were fully understood by the Government of India,
but not by Knox or the Europeans in Fiji, who execrated Andrews per­
sonally and did not realise how far their own views were behind those
of responsible Indian public men, the Government of India, and even
European businessmen in India. Knox was an old man of autocratic
temper whose ideas had been formed in the Australian colonies in the
days of unquestioned British authority in India. Fiji was even more
remote than Australia from the centres of great events and currents of
thought. The Australian press was essentially a provincial press, and
opinion in Fiji was even further behind. This lag made for tactlessness
and ill-judged and badly-timed actions and statements that contributed
to Fiji’s bad image in India.
In 1919 Fiji faced an economic crisis. For almost forty of the forty-
five years of British rule, the colony’s economy and modern adminis­
tration had rested on sugar and Indian labour. The last Indian
labourers had arrived in Fiji in 1916 and on 1 January 1920 the
remaining indentures were to be cancelled. Labour was essential to the
survival of the European planters, and the European community and
the government believed too that the colony would stagnate unless it
could increase its population. They were eager to secure the resump­
tion of large-scale immigration from India. The indigenous Fijians
were still regarded, at best, as irrelevant to the progress of Fiji, or, more
sadly, as a dying race. They had been declining in number and were
still largely outside the plantation economy and many Europeans
believed that the Indians were destined to become the future coloured
race of Fiji. But it was not until after 1916, when the supply of immi­
grants was immediately threatened, that there was talk of the advan­
tages to be gained by an increased permanent Indian population and
not merely a continued supply of immigrant labour for work on the

10
 The Setting

plantations. In 1919 J. M. Hedstrom, a leading colonist, declared in

the Legislative Council: ‘The colony is going to remain empty unless
it is going to be populated with East Indians’.5 Sir Cecil Rodwell, the
colony’s new governor, telegraphed London: ‘Fact is that these islands
are under-populated. They would carry population of 500,000 Indians.
If only half of this number could be introduced future of Colony would
be assured.’6
At the census of 1921, the total population of Fiji was recorded as
157,266. Europeans numbered 3878, part-Europeans 2781, Chinese
910, Fijians 84,475, and Indians 60,634, and the remainder were from
various islands in the Pacific.7 The Europeans included government
officers, planters and overseers, missionaries, lawyers, doctors, store­
keepers, clerks, shop assistants, and artisans. Their standard of living
was far higher than that of the other races, and they occupied the
commanding positions in the colony’s social structure. The majority of
them had been born elsewhere, particularly in Australia and New
Zealand, but a good number thought of Fiji as their permanent home.
In this respect Fiji was intermediate in type between colonies like
those of West Africa, where Europeans were few and transient, and
Kenya and Rhodesia where there was a substantial settled white popu­
lation. The European community was large enough to demand and
receive a voice in the government of the colony, even though there
was an official majority in the Legislative Council. But some had more
voice than others. The preponderant influence was exercised by a few
businessmen and lawyers in Suva (principally among them John Mayn­
ard Hedstrom, Henry Milne Scott, Henry Marks, all later knighted,
and Robert Crompton) and by the expatriate Colonial Sugar Refining
Company. For several decades ‘a main factor in the government of
Fiji was the influence wielded by a small oligarchy of local commercial
interests’.8 In 1937 a recently appointed governor, Sir Arthur Richards,
wrote to the Colonial Office:
As I begin to settle down here things take on a more solid shape.
It is a peculiar Colony— sui generis indeed. The presence of a
resident European population, their long isolation from the world
and the limitation even of recent contacts to Australia and New
Zealand has bred a particular insularity of its own. A few big men
have obtained a stranglehold on the place — they have won their
way to the top and mean to stay there. The under-dog is under-paid
and powerless. A few men control everything behind the scenes and
even Government has been run with a strong bias.9

11
The Fiji Indians

The part-Europeans, who included planters and skilled workers, had

on the average a lower standard of living than the Europeans and had
less influence on the affairs on the colony, though they were on the
electoral roll for the Legislative Council. The Chinese included arti­
sans, market gardeners, laundrymen, and shopkeepers; numbers of
them were resident in Fijian villages, and, unlike the Indians, some
had married Fijians. Most of the Fijians lived in recognised villages
outside the modern economy, though some took employment from
time to time as labourers on the plantations or wharves. They were
disciplined under the village system, quiescent, and still had more than
enough land. But for the influenza epidemic of 1918 they might have
registered a slight increase in numbers, after a previous steady decline.
The Indians were no longer an undifferentiated group of plantation
labourers, but a diversified community with varied aspirations and
interests. They were not only the bulk of the labour force, but were
now smallholders, planters, hawkers, small shopkeepers, clerks, and
artisans as well. Apart from the disproportion of the sexes, the salient
demographic fact about the Indian population was its youthfulness
which, together with the healthy climate and the widespread settlement
on the land away from the plantations, promised a very rapid increase
in numbers, provided they did not return to India, as most of them
were entitled to do at government expense. The majority, whether they
then knew it or not, were to spend the rest of their lives in Fiji. The
problems of the Indians included their poverty, illiteracy, rootlessness
and loss of standards, unstable family life, lack of leadership, difficulty
in acquiring land, the growth of divisions within the community, and
an undefined identity and sense of belonging and acceptance in Fiji.
Most of the Fiji Indians settled on the land and reconstituted a form
of Indian society, building on the cultural traditions and memories
which emigration and plantation life had weakened but not obliterated;
but the result was very different from the villages of North and South
India from which the immigrants had come. In Fiji there was a loose
pattern of settlement, as individuals took up plots wherever they could
obtain them, and built their homesteads. There were no recognised
villages like those in India but just localities. There was minimal
contact with the government, with Europeans other than the CSR
Company’s officers, and with the indigenous Fijians. Indian society in
Fiji, with its flexibility, openness, and looseness of hierarchy, was very
different from that of India itself. Differences were maintained between

12
 The Setting

major cultural categories like the North and South Indians and the
Muslims, but caste was now, except in preferred marriages, little more
than a cultural memory invoked by individuals to reinforce other
arguments about status. Physical characteristics and personality types
were different too. The Fiji-born Indian was taller, he was less con­
stricted by caste and custom, and he seemed more care-free. Fiji may
not have been a South Seas paradise for the Indian but the struggle
for existence was less than in the overcrowded and constricted villages
of the Gangetic Plain and South India. As Pearson, the first Secretary
for Indian Affairs, observed:
The Fiji born Indian and the old settler has in a strange way
absorbed something of the Fiji mentality. His temperament is more
equable than that of the home Indian of the same class. He is less
easily excited and takes a more tolerant and humorous view of
things. New arrivals from India fail to understand this. One of them
recently launched forth on a violent attack on the degrading cus­
toms of the Fiji Indians which has been received with some resent­
ment not unmixed with amusement. 10

At the same time, the Fiji-born Indian was more alone in the world
and had more need to struggle and more opportunity to advance him­
self than his Fijian neighbour had. New kinship ties were formed in
Fiji, and new patterns of association based on the requirements of
co-operation for cane-harvesting and school and temple building. The
social structure and economy of the Fiji Indian rural settlements have
been studied by social anthropologists and geographers, and the reader
who wishes to know more is referred to their published work . 11

A singular feature of the society of the British Crown Colony of

Fiji was the limited interaction between the Fijians and the Indians.
Those unfamiliar with Fiji may feel that writers who do not concen­
trate on Fijian-Indian relations are guilty of errors of omission and
judgment. But the documentary and oral evidence is clear for the
period covered by this book. Social contact between the Fijians and
the Indians was superficial and intermarriage exceptionally rare. The
Fijians were governed by a separate administration and legal system,
they lived in their own regulated villages, and were encouraged to
maintain a distinct Fijian way of life. By and large, the Fijians and the
Indians followed different religions, had different occupations, and
attended separate schools. This differentiation at the local level was

13
The Fiji Indians

later reinforced by separate institutions at the colony-wide level,

including separate political representation and separate associations. In
1930 a Fiji official summed it up:
Although it has not been the calculated policy of the Fijian Govern­
ment to keep the 3 races apart on the principle of divide et impera,
I believe that the Government has deliberately refrained, chiefly in
the interests of the Fijian race, whose interests in Fiji I assume
should be, like the interests of the Africans in Kenya, paramount,
from hastening in any degree the process of forming close ties
between the Fijian and the Indian.12
Separation did not imply conflict, however. Mindful of the experi­
ence of other countries, the outsider may again be inclined to question
the writer’s judgment. The historical record is clear. There were some
serious riots in the 1880s when Fijians, Pacific Islanders, and Indians
were employed on the same plantations and even lived in the same
labour lines,13 but there was no trouble where they lived apart, which
was to become the normal pattern. In 1926 the Acting Agent-General
of Immigration briefed the newly appointed Secretary for Indian
Affairs:
The relations which exist between the Indian and the Fijian will
interest the Secretary for Indian Affairs. They are remarkably
friendly. There is a mutual feeling of superiority — it is almost
amusing. The S.I.A. will have very few disputes, Indian v. Fijian,
placed before him. Difficulties in regard to land matters sometimes
arise, but, on the whole, seldom.14
It was stated in the annual report on the administration of Fiji for the
same year: ‘Fijians and Indians live side by side in perfect amity. They
do not intermarry and have practically no social relations with one
another, and disputes between members of the two races are rare.’15
The government files do show a few incidents of friction, such as
Indian protests about Fijians stealing cattle and killing animals. There
were reports of Fijians threatening Indians at times of intense political
discussion, and during the Indian strikes in 1920 and 1921 Fijians
were enrolled as auxiliary police. But these were the exceptions which
proved the rule. This is not to say there was mutual respect or liking.
The two races were markedly different in their customs, motivations,
and temperaments. The Indian stereotype of the Fijian was of an
irresponsible, childish, uncivilised fellow, or jungli, while the Fijian

14
 The Setting

learned to avoid the heathen and undersized Indian coolie, brought

to Fiji to work as a plantation slave. The self-esteem of each group
was bolstered by the presence of the other. There was little general
cordiality, but neither, in the absence of competition, was there overt
hostility or occasion for conflict.
This statement should, however, be qualified. The plural society
concept, though particularly apt for Fiji, should not be pushed too far.
British culture, as the dominant culture upheld by the government in
its laws and institutions, and as the culture of the rich and powerful,
had a pervasive influence on all communities in Fiji. There were some
ties between individuals across racial lines and they became more
common with increasing westernisation. There was, too, some exchange
between the Fijian and Indian cultures, though its precise nature is
difficult to assess and has yet to be studied by social anthropologists.
Indian bus and taxi drivers, boatmen, and storekeepers saw a good deal
of the Fijians, and relations between the Fijian landlords and their
Indian tenants brought cultural borrowing as well as friction. The
Indians, particularly the Fiji-born, imbibed some of the Fijians’ relaxed
attitude, and the Fijians could not fail to be influenced by the example
of individual enterprise and industry set by the Indian farmers. The
Fijians learnt many techniques from their Indian neighbours, particu­
larly in the cane-growing areas. The Fijians took to eating curry and
the Indians to drinking yaqona (kava). Indian popular religion in
Fiji incorporated some of the pre-Christian deities of the Fijians.
Gradually the Fijian stereotype of the kai Idia as a person who did not
count, became tinged with grudging respect for his agricultural and
commercial prowess and with fear of being dispossessed from the land.
The most important contacts occurred through land relations.
Swami Avinashananda, thinking no doubt of the landlords of his own
South India, remarked that the Fijians were the ‘Brahmins of Fiji’.16
In 1932 the retired first Secretary for Indian Affairs gave a sober
assessment of the relations between the Fijians and the Indians:

There is practically no intermarriage though over large tracts the

population lives in close proximity to the Fijian villages. Relations
are on the whole amicable. Most Indians can speak Fijian and quite
a number of Fijians know some Hindustani. The two communities
differ so widely in attributes that they seem in a way to supplement
each other. The Fijian landlord thrives on the rents of the Indian
tenantry and can on occasion get accommodation from his thrifty

15
The Fiji Indians

neighbour, who in turn at times gets some of his own back. As

landlords the Fijians are apt to be exacting and inconsiderate but
as they take more extensively to field cultivation they may be
expected to gain better understanding of where the shoe pinches for
the peasant farmer. Personality enters a good deal into relations.
I have met Fijian headmen who took a paternal interest in affairs of
his tenant neighbours and Indians who are widely respected by the
Fijians of their district. It has been said that Fijians despise the
Indians. There may have been some of this feeling in the past but
I do not think it is pronounced nowadays. On the whole I think it
can be said that relations are in most respects surprisingly good,
considering the widely different origins and qualities of the two
races. They only require moderate attention and guidance to remain
so.17

It was not with Fijian-lndian but with European-Indian relations that

the main difficulties arose.
The Ctown Colony of Fiji was a European dominated order —
politically, economically, and socially. In contrast to most of the other
places where Indians had been taken as indentured labourers, such as
Mauritius and the West Indies, there was in Fiji a vigorous indigenous
culture supported by entrenched landrights and a separate native
administration, and the Fijians were encouraged to preserve a distinct
Fijian identity. In time this would determine the political position of
the Indians in Fiji. But in 1920 the fact of European dominance was
more important and the problems of European-Indian relations more
pressing than those of Fijian-lndian relations. European dominance
was expressed in many ways: political, through the exclusion of Indians
from any voice in central or local government; economic, through the
power of Australian companies, notably the CSR, the exclusion of
Indians from many non-manual posts, and differential wage-rates;
educational, through separate schools and inadequate provision for
Indian education; social, through racial discrimination in social life, in
associations, and in public places; and ideological, through the uphold­
ing of British culture as the model and the downgrading of Indian
culture. Correspondingly, the challenge to European dominance was
to take many forms: political organisation, agitation, and boycott,
economic striving and occupational diversification, educational initia
tives, and the search for an Indian identity.
Before 1920 the relations between the Europeans and the Indians

16
 The Setting

were, with rare exceptions, understood on both sides to be those of

sahib and coolie, master and servant. Most of the Europeans regarded
the Indians as a labour force only and took no other interest in them.
In turn, the majority of the Indians in Fiji had come as boys or young
men from an India where the white man had been rare, remote and
respected, or they had been born in a Fiji where almost all Indians
were poor and uneducated. Although a surprising number of educated,
high-caste people had been drawn into the recruiter’s net, many of them
had returned to India. A few Indians had become well-off through the
planting of cane and money-lending to other Indians, but these people
explicitly upheld the existing order, as did the Christian converts.
Before 1920 racial relations between the Europeans and Indians in
Fiji were superficially amicable. In 1919 C. F. Andrews wrote: ‘The
social and racial treatment of Indians by Europeans in Fiji is far in
advance of that which I have witnessed in Natal and better than the
common experience in India itself.’18 During the influenza epidemic of
1918 much help was given by Europeans to Indian sufferers. But, as the
Government of India’s Deputation noted in 1922: ‘It is well to remem­
ber that the old spirit of tolerance was based on the admission of
white superiority. It was the tolerance of master and servant.’19 Nor
was this relationship accepted unquestioningly by all Indians. Some,
particularly the few with a little education, especially in the Suva-Rewa
area, resented the assumption of their inferiority, especially as white
sahibs were all too-present and too-human. More abrasive relations
soon came with the abolition of the indenture system and the growth
of political consciousness among the Indians.
On 1 January 1920 all remaining indentures were cancelled, and
Fiji faced a potentially disastrous labour shortage. The prospects for
a renewal of Indian immigration looked bleak in the light of India’s
awakening of national pride and Fiji’s poor reputation there. On 30
December 1919 an unofficial mission from Fiji arrived in India. It
came with Fiji Government blessing to try to secure the reopening of
emigration to Fiji. The planters were hoping for 5000 immigrants a
year. But while the mission was extolling the advantages Fiji offered
to Indian settlers and explaining that the mistakes of the past had been
greatly exaggerated by critics like Andrews, and in any case would
not be repeated, the fed-up Indians in Fiji erupted in strike and riot.

17
 n
The 1920 Strike
The strike and riots of 1920 were of great importance in the history
of Fiji: they threw the reality of the colonial system into sharp focus,
and they had an important influence on later European, Fijian and
Indian attitudes in Fiji, and on opinion in India.1 The origins of the
strike lay inside and outside Fiji. For the Indian labourers the cost of
living had greatly increased since before the war, while their wages
had not kept pace and were in fact close to the borderline of bare
subsistence. Almost all the rice and sharps consumed in Fiji were
brought from Australia, which itself imported rice from India. In 1919
there were prolonged shipping strikes in Australia, there was a wide­
spread failure of the rice crop in India followed by a prohibition on the
export of rice, and the Government of New South Wales banned the
export of sharps. The price of other imported goods had also risen.
It was widely believed by the Indians that the European merchants in
Fiji were profiting from the shortages. The Europeans thought that
the Indians were able, in some remarkable eastern way, to live com­
fortably on a pittance and even to become wealthy, as evidenced by
the gold and silver jewellery worn by their women. Indeed, they were
typically frugal, especially those who had been brought up in India,
many grew much of their own food, and in those days they had few
felt needs for consumer goods. But there was real economic distress
among the labourers in the Suva-Rewa area in 1919 and 1920. The
strike must be put in a wider social and political context also: the end
of indenture, the contemporary upsurge of nationalism and important
political events in India, and the beginning of political organisation
among the Indians in Fiji.
It is a truism that revolt is more likely to occur when the oppressed
are looking up and see hope of improvement than when they are hope­
lessly downtrodden. The cancellation of indentures provided that hope
for the Fiji Indians; it also lifted the lid from whatever resentment was
held against European dominance and its attendant irritations and
discourtesies. Using the analogy of the emancipated slave, the governor
wrote to London:
Though I do not consider that the Indians in Fiji have behaved in
a worse fashion than, under the same circumstances, members of
other races would have behaved — indeed in certain ways they have

18
 The 1920 Strike

shown a notable restraint — yet no good purpose could result from

concealing the fact that a certain swollen-headedness which is the
natural fruit of the new economic independence, makes the Indian
community, for employers and for Government alike, perilously
difficult to handle at the present time.2
It should be remembered, too, that most of the adult Indians in Fiji
had been born in India. They were not yet Fiji Indians, but Indians
who thought of themselves as sojourners. Few had made a conscious
decision to settle permanently in Fiji; many had simply put off return­
ing because of inertia, or because they thought they had not yet saved
sufficient money to take back, while others were not yet eligible for a
full passage, or had had their return delayed because of the wartime
shortage of shipping. The Indians emotionally identified with India,
not with Fiji which had treated them almost wholly as a labour force
and had made no other demands on them. They were even more ‘colon­
ial’ than the many Englishmen, Australians, and New Zealanders who
helped to make up the local European population. They followed
events and trends in India, just as the Europeans looked to their own
metropolitan centres. They were uneducated and illiterate, though not
uncultured in the wider sense, and were susceptible to rumour and
vulnerable to the demagogue. The scattered pattern of Indian settle­
ment, poor communications, and lack of official local government
institutions, indeed of any government interest in the Indians except as
indentured labourers or defendants in court, increased their isolation
from any cultural or political influences other than those provided by
their own memories of India and by rumour-mongers, malcontents, and
those with some education who took an interest in affairs and claimed
to have more knowledge of events in India than they did have in fact.
In the minds of the poor Indian labourers and farmers in Fiji, super­
stitious omens and far-fetched speculation were mixed with garbled
accounts of real happenings.
By 1920 tales of great events in India had reached Fiji. Some news
was published in the Fiji Times and Herald, some came in letters and
newspapers from India, and some through the few Indians who were
paying their own way to Fiji via Australia or New Zealand, including
previous residents returning to the colony. There was the news of the
promise of eventual home rule, the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, the
riots and the Amritsar massacre of April 1919, the dissatisfaction of
Indian Muslims over the treatment of Turkey, the Khilafat agitation

19
The Fiji Indians

and hijrat (exodus), and of Gandhi and his satyagraha (militant non­
violent protest). The Europeans saw the disturbances in Fiji in 1920
and 1921 as part of the malicious political campaign they were sure
was being waged against them by Andrews, Gandhi, and the agents
they had sent to the colony. Here they were exaggerating. There was
no conspiracy directed from India, and Gandhi sent no agents to Fiji;
but there was certainly a harmony of ideals between the Indians in
Fiji, those who came from India and assumed leadership of them, and
the Indian national movement. The Europeans and the government
were right when they said that Indian protest in Fiji had a political as
well as an economic dimension.
There had been no large-scale organised protest among the inden­
tured labourers, except in the mid 1880s when there were less strict
labour laws and a sympathetic official reception of grievances by the
Agent-General of Immigration, Henry Anson. Subsequently, there were
few recorded incidents of disorder, as compliance was generally
assured by severe plantation discipline, penal sanctions, and illegal
violence by the overseers and sirdars. Individual and small-scale pro­
test took the form of desertions, high suicide rates and murder of over­
seers. Among the Indians whose indentures had expired, combination
was hampered by geographical dispersion, lack of leadership and
education, and the return of many to India. By 1920 the political
organisation of the Indians in Fiji was as yet rudimentary, but there
were a number of leaders and two organisations, one on the north­
western side of Viti Levu and the other on the south-eastern side.
Since the disturbances of 1920 were confined to the Suva-Rewa area,
the south-eastern leadership and organisation will be considered in this
chapter, and the north-western in the next chapter.
The Suva-Rewa area was the longest-established area of Indian
settlement in Fiji. Suva was the capital of the colony and its principal
town and port. The sugar mill centre of Nausori, the principal town
on the Rewa, was twelve miles away by road, and Navua, another mill
centre, about thirty miles away by sea. There was a tendency for
educated Indians to be concentrated in Suva and Nausori, which
offered opportunities in teaching, law and government. Those who
sought to make a living at other than manual work, drifters, and those
awaiting repatriation to India, congregated in Suva. The governor
observed, too: ‘There has always been a tendency for malcontents and
bad characters to gravitate towards the south coast centres.’3 In the
south-east there was a higher proportion of North Indians than of

20
 The 1920 Strike

Southerners, who had been brought to Fiji only from 1903 onwards,
following the opening of the new sugar mill at Lautoka on the north­
western coast; political discontent with the British Raj was at that time
stronger in North than in South India.
In 1911 the British Indian Association of Fiji was formed by a group
that included J. P. Maharaj (a Suva storekeeper), Totaram Sanadhya
(a pandit on the Rewa), Babu Ram Singh (a Suva printer) and Ram
Rup. Following a severe hurricane that had brought much distress to
the Indians in the Suva-Rewa area, they discussed grievances such as
their lack of educated leadership and their dependence on European
lawyers. They wrote to Mahatma Gandhi, who was leading the struggle
for Indian rights in South Africa, to ask him to send a lawyer to help
the Indians in Fiji. Gandhi replied that he would send an English-
educated patriot when he found a suitable one and asked to be kept
in touch with conditions in Fiji. This correspondence was published
in Indian Opinion and noticed by a Gujarati lawyer in Mauritius,
Manilal Maganlal Doctor. Manilal was anxious to leave Mauritius,
where he could not earn a living, and decided, against Gandhi’s advice,
to go to Fiji.
In Mauritius, Manilal published a paper and agitated on behalf of
the Indian community. He angered the European community, and the
Mauritius Government passed a banishment order on him, though this
was disallowed. When he was in India in 1910 he spoke against the
indenture system, but he was discountenanced by Gokhale on account
of his personal failings.4 As Manilal was the only significant leader the
Indians in Fiji had before 1920, it was unfortunate that he was not
a man who commanded the general respect of government officers and
other Europeans who dealt with him, though it must be said in his
favour that anyone who questioned the established racial order in Fiji
would not have found relations with them easy, whatever his character.
Manilal emerges from the record as touchy, resentful, underhand, and
careless with the truth. His private life was irregular; he brought a
creole mistress with him to Fiji, and later an Indian wife arrived. His
wife, Jayakunvar, was the daughter of Dr Pranjivan Mehta of Ran­
goon. While engaged to Manilal, she lived in Gandhi’s ashram in South
Africa (Tolstoy Farm) and participated in civil disobedience move­
ments. Manilal also lived there for a short time but declined to take
part in the manual work which was part of the policy of the settlement.5
Neither Manilal nor his wife was an ‘agent’ of Gandhi's, as the govern­
ment suspected, but they certainly shared the aspirations of the new

21
The Fiji Indians

India. Manilal was an opponent of the indenture system, a champion

of Indian rights, including those of the poorer class, and an Indian
nationalist who prided himself on being a citizen of Baroda State, not
of British India.
Manilal arrived in 1912 and was enthusiastically welcomed by the
Indians in Suva. He set up a law practice and for several years made
no particular mark on the life of the colony. He defended Indians in
court, often for very low fees, and wrote letters and petitions for them.
The government was suspicious of him but occasionally consulted him
on Indian affairs. He sent reports to the press in India, suggesting that
traders, craftsmen, and professional men come to the colony. For a
time he was the editor of the English section of the first Indian paper
published in Fiji, the brief-lived monthly Indian Settler, in 1917. He
was one of several people to write against the indenture system and
he played only a minor role in the ending of it. He was himself an
employer of two indentured labourers and the government later treated
this as evidence that he was a hypocrite.6
Manilal did advance the political organisation of the Indians in Fiji.
At meetings in Suva, Rewa and Navua in 1916 and 1917 it was decided
to form an association ‘to further the well-being, political in particular,
of the Indian settlers in Fiji’. The Indian Imperial Association of Fiji
was inaugurated on 2 June 1918 at Mahant Pingal’s cottage near Flag­
staff, Suva. It is said that Manilal objected to the name ‘British Indian
Association’ because he was not a citizen of British India. The object
of the association was stated to be ‘to watch the interests of and to
assist in the general improvement of the Indian community in Fiji’.
In 1920 the secretary, Babu Ram Singh, claimed a membership of
eighty-seven, with a committee of twelve.7 Individuals from country
areas applied for membership, but there were no country branches.
The Indians at Ba expressed an interest, and Manilal was visiting them
when the strike broke out in Suva in January 1920. The Indian Imperial
Association of Fiji was not affiliated with any society in India. It
claimed to correspond with the Imperial Indian Citizenship Association
of Bombay, the Indian National Congress, and C. F. Andrews, but it
is likely that this correspondence was largely one-way — complaints
about conditions in Fiji and requests for assistance.
In 1919 Manilal fell out with the government. He had applied for
the lease of some Fijian land at Nausori on which he intended to build
an office, but had been refused because the land was in the Fijian
village and on the river-bank near a ferry approach which might need

22
 The 1920 Strike

to be diverted. He then made an irregular agreement with the Fijian

owners and started to erect the office. When he did not comply with
an order to depart, he was fined £10, in default one month’s imprison­
ment, and the fine was paid. Manilal was bitter about the incident and
involved his Indian Imperial Association. On 24 September 1919 a
meeting of the association resolved that it viewed the prosecution and
conviction of Manilal with ‘alarm, deep sorrow and profound indigna­
tion’, and noted that many European settlers had themselves acquired
land from the Fijians for presents of guns, match boxes, and illicit
liquor, and that the ‘local European clique’ did not want Manilal to
have an independent practice. But a subsequent letter to the Fiji Times
and Herald, signed ‘non-member’, complained that the Indian Imperial
Association was a ‘quasi-secret society’ consisting of Manilal, George
Suchit, Ram Singh, and about a dozen of their personal friends.8
Manilal and his Indian Imperial Association were never popular
with the government or the European community, and they positively
infuriated them when they sent this telegram to Andrews who had it
published in the Indian press:
The Government of Fiji is sending an official and the Bishop to
contradict Mr Andrews in India and to induce the renewal of labour
emigration to Fiji. In influenza epidemic the Indian mortality was
highest owing to lack of medical care. Indians were miserable. Many
who were left destitute occupied native Fijian land and were prose­
cuted. Mr Manilal, Barrister, was singled out and sentenced to one
month’s imprisonment, in spite of flaws in the procedure and evi­
dence, for building office on a native chief’s land with the consent
under the law professedly passed to protect Indians. No suitable
land is available.
Sydney strike has ruined banana growers. Flour not to be had.
Local rice is treble in price. People are unable to pay hut taxes
and rents. Outlook serious. Please represent the matter to the Indian
Government.9
The second paragraph of the telegram was true enough, but the Fiji
Government was annoyed by the appeal over its head to the Indian
Government, especially when it was hoping that the mission to India
would be able to bring about a resumption of Indian immigration.
Indeed, Ram Singh later told the government: ‘The object of our cable­
gram was to show that Fiji is unsuitable as it is to any further emigra­
tion from India, which we are prepared to prove by arguments from

23
The Fiji Indians

concrete examples ad libitum / 10 The first paragraph of the telegram

was a distortion of the facts. The telegram confirmed the Fiji Govern­
ment in its opinion that Manilal and the Indian Imperial Association
were not worthy of official recognition.
On 26 December 1919 the association organised a conference of
Indians in the Suva town hall. Manilal was chairman, did most of the
talking, and moved several resolutions, including one in favour of
self-government for India, another in sympathy with those who suffered
in the Punjab riots, and others calling for the cancellation of the
remaining indentures by the end of the year, the abolition of the
Masters and Servants Ordinance, a minimum wage to be fixed by law,
equal educational facilities, and permitting of repatriates to take sover­
eigns out of the country (the export of gold coin had been prohibited
in 1916, and this was a popular grievance, on account of the loss on
the exchange). The atmosphere at the meeting was emotional. There
were cries of ‘Hindu-Mussalman ki jai’, ‘Mahatma Gandhiji ki jai’, and
‘Mahatma Tilak ki jai’. No such gathering of Indians had taken place
in Fiji before. Indenture was over, freedom at hand. Now the Indians
would insist on their rights.11
On 29 December the Indian Imperial Association of Fiji sent a list
of requests to the government. They included: immediate cancellation
of indentures; repeal of the Masters and Servants Ordinance; improved
educational facilities; training of Indian medical officers as the Fijians
were being trained; permission for repatriates to take sovereigns with
them; establishment of a sugar-cane board; abolition of the hut tax and
hawkers’ licences; agricultural training and financial help for co-opera­
tive credit societies or agricultural banks; better pay for Indian skilled
workers such as locomotive drivers and those handling dangerous
machinery; worker’s compensation; better roads to Indian settlements;
easier acquisition of land, without distinction of race; better railway
and local steamship facilities, in place of the unsatisfactory deck pas­
sage arrangements for Indians; amendment of the Municipal Institu­
tions Ordinance to make it possible for most Indian ratepayers to vote
at municipal elections; and ‘that the political franchise should be open
to Indians and all Fiji Ordinances should be so amended as to enable
Indians to do most of the things permitted to be done by Europeans
only’.12
Rodwell ignored them. ‘Take no notice, for the present at any rate’,
he ordered.13 Instead, Manilal was asked if the account of the meeting
published in the Fiji Times and Herald was correct, and Ram Singh for
24
 The 1920 Strike

details of the Indian Imperial Association. The account was not strictly
accurate.14 Manilal claimed that his statements were ‘not only incor­
rectly reported but even mutilated, perverted and embroidered upon by
a handful of designing persons, who are pursuing a campaign of mis­
representation against me for their own ends, without even opening a
chance to reply’.15 He was referring to certain Indian Christians,
especially the Grant family, but it is possible that bad interpretation and
translation from Hindi to English were to blame. The Europeans were
angered by the newspaper report for its evidence of Indian assertive­
ness and the implication that the Indians were ungrateful for everything
that had been done for them during the epidemic. Manilal did refer to
government neglect of Indian interests, in contrast to European and
Fijian interests, as a cause of mortality during the influenza epidemic,
though he may merely have been referring to the policy to have the
Fijians living in villages with appropriate services, rather than dispersed
like the Indians. On receipt of Ram Singh’s letter, giving the requested
information, the Colonial Secretary noted: ‘We can afford to ignore
them.’16 He was mindful that the Fiji mission had already arrived in
India and was negotiating with the Indian authorities. But for Fiji, the
worst was yet to come.
On 15 January 1920 the Indian labourers employed by the Public
Works Department in Suva struck work after being told that in future
they would have.to work 48 hours per week, not 45. When they were
informed the next day they could return to work on the old terms, they
refused, saying: ‘We do not get enough to satisfy our bellies.’ In the
opinion of the Commissioner of Works: ‘The strike is nothing more or
less than a strike against the high prices of all Indian foodstuffs . . . All
deputations which I have seen have complained of the cost of living,
nothing else.’17 During the next week the strike became general among
the Indian labourers in Suva and on the Rewa. There were also strikes
at Navua and, briefly, at Levuka. No definite demands were put forward
but there was talk of a general demand for a daily wage of 5s. The
speakers at the strike meetings generally counselled respect for law and
order, there was no public talk against the government, but much re­
sentment was expressed against the merchants (largely Europeans) who
were blamed for the high prices and had undoubtedly been profiteer­
ing.18 Instances of intimidation of other Indians to strike were reported,
and the government enrolled twenty-four European special constables
as a precaution.
The first confrontation between the government forces and the

25
The Fiji Indians

strikers came at Nausori on 27 January, when a crowd of about 1000

sought the release of three Indians who were accused of intimidating
others. The leaders, Fazil Khan, Fateh Khan and Sarju restrained the
crowd, but at times violence looked possible.19 Police reinforcements
and a machine-gun section of the Defence Force were sent from Suva.
On 29 January at Toorak (an Indian location in Suva) a mob, confront­
ing a hotel manager who was said to have flogged an Indian servant and
used insulting language to passing Indians, was dispersed by a police
baton charge. Another crowd at Tamavua (a village on the outskirts of
Suva) was persuaded to disperse.
On 30 January the governor received a deputation headed by Mrs
Manilal and was given a statement of grievances that referred especially
to the high cost of living and the low wages and asked the government
to pay its labourers 5s. per day and appoint a commission to consider
the question of controlling prices. The governor had already decided
not to grant any increase until work was resumed but he announced
that he would appoint a commission to consider wages and the cost of
living. The government was well aware of the shortage of foodstuffs
and high prices, and on the same day it issued a proclamation that all
stocks of necessary commodities were to be declared.20 The commission
was formed the next day and it included one member nominated by the
Indians. But the strikers still did not return to work.
By now the strike had begun to look more serious. On 28 January
the European elected members of the Legislative Council called on the
governor to tell him that the ‘public’ were becoming alarmed, that the
attitude of the Indians was believed to be ‘largely racial’, and that there
were reports of a large and hostile Indian demonstration being planned
for Monday, 2 February. On Sunday morning Rodwell met the leading
citizens of Suva in the defence force club and counselled restraint and
non-interference with peaceable demonstrations. All available forces
stood by at daybreak the next morning, but there was no demonstration.
On the next day there were reports from the Rewa of concentrations of
Indians, talk of looting stores, and interference with the telephone lines.
In the governor’s words: ‘Trouble of a more or less serious nature
seemed inevitable and preparations were hurried forward.’21 The de­
fence force was mobilised, and orders given that the crossing of the
Rewa river by Indians in considerable numbers was to be prevented,
though the troops were ordered to exercise the greatest patience and
restraint.22 Two of the strike leaders, Bhagwati Prasad Sharma and
Fazil Khan, wrote to the police to protest against the sending of troops

26
 The 1920 Strike

to Nausori: 'One more reason why the Bishop of Polynesia and Mr

Rankine should God grant it, fail in their attempt to get out more
Indians from India to share our fate here.’23 That remark could hardly
have reassured the government that the strike was not ‘political’.
Racial feeling now became more evident. Indians working for
Europeans were called out on strike, but not those working for Indians.
Bands of hooligans intimidated those who would not give up their
work. An important part was played by Indian women, headed by Mrs
Manilal. She addressed meetings exhorting the strikers not to return to
work until a wage of 5s. per day was granted, and to prevent others
from doing so. She told them of her experience in South Africa, re­
minded them of Gandhi’s struggle there, and urged them to economise
by giving up smoking, cinemas and other luxuries. Groups of women
shamed men into supporting the strike.24 Wild rumours circulated
among the Indians: for example, that help would soon arrive from the
north-western districts or even from India.
On 5 February the Commission on Wages and the Cost of Living
held its first sitting and the governor issued a proclamation calling for a
return to work. He ignored a verbal request to go out to Nausori,
unofficially, accompanied only by the Agent-General of Immigration
and the Inspector-General of Constabulary, and attend a meeting of the
strikers at which no other European should be allowed to be present.
The governor wrote in his report:
The request was illustrative of the dictatorial attitude now being
assumed by the strike leaders . . . The proposal that the Governor
should make a journey of 14 miles, in order to parley in a clandestine
fashion with strikers, was one which I need hardly say I should not
have been prepared to entertain for a moment, and I regret that the
leaders did not put forward their request in writing and so afford me
an opportunity of telling them what I thought of the suggestion. Later
on I was shown the draft of an address which had been prepared to
be presented to me at the proposed meeting. It had very little to do
with the stated grievances, namely the cost of living and the rate of
wages, and consisted of a long resume of political complaints and
aspirations. It was in fact a clear proof that the economic grievances,
on which the leaders had induced the labourers to strike, had been
relegated to the background, and that the movement had been con­
verted into a political agitation. 1 may mention here that, at one of
the previous meetings at Suva above referred to, a resolution was
solemnly passed ordaining that, while all other Indian domestic ser-
27
The Fiji Indians

vants were to be called out under threats of beating, those in the

employ of the Governor, the Chief Justice and the Colonial Secretary
might be specially exempted.25
This statement exemplified the character of the political and social
order in Fiji, and revealed the gap between the assumptions of the
dominant Europeans and those of the Indians. In 1922 the Government
of India’s deputation mentioned this incident in its report:
We cannot but feel that this invitation was grievously misunder­
stood. The right of the humblest subject to approach the hakim
[ruler] has from time immemorial been the foundation of all govern­
ment in India. We do not think that there was any intention to be
dictatorial. It was scarcely possible for the people of the Rewa Dis­
trict to go to Suva; they would not have been permitted to go. Nor is
it surprising that they wished to see the Governor alone. They
feared that powerful influences were working against them; but if
only they could meet the Governor face to face, they still hoped for
redress. Their anxiety to place their grievances personally before the
Governor should, in our opinion, have been regarded as a mark of
confidence, not of disrespect.26
On 7 February, following an Indian meeting at Suva, a group of
Indians wrote to the government, asking for an immediate end to the
Masters and Servants Ordinance and, if an increase of wages to 5s.
could not be granted, for land grants and advances. A footnote to the
letter was in Manilal’s handwriting. The governor ruled: ‘This imper­
tinent letter appears to come within the same category as the one which
was addressed to me by Rewa Indians in the expectation that I would
attend a meeting of them there. This letter, like the other, may remain
unanswered.’27 The tone of Rodwell’s minutes and report on the strike
reflected his character: haughty, authoritarian, very conscious of his
dignity. The whole of his previous colonial service since 1900 had been
in South Africa.
By 11 February almost all the Europeans of military age were under
arms. Fijians in Rewa, Navua, and elsewhere were enrolled as special
constables; 200 from the Lau group were recruited by G. M. Hennings
and formed an auxiliary force that helped patrol the roads and protect
the bridges. The first serious collision occurred at Suva on 11 February.
A crowd of Indians with sticks tried to march into Suva to rescue Mrs
Manilal, whom they had heard, wrongly, had been arrested. They were

28
 The 1920 Strike

persuaded to disperse and two other crowds were also turned back.
But in Toorak, after a special constable tried to arrest an Indian
woman, the police were chased away by a mob. More police and the
military were called, the area surrounded, and 165 arrests made. On
the same day the telephone wires between Suva and Nausori were
broken and there was a confrontation at the Rewa bridge between an
Indian crowd and Fijian and European special constables with fixed
bayonets.
At an early stage Rodwell decided to call for military forces from
Australia and New Zealand. He wrote in his report on the strike:
Even if a sufficient force could have been organised locally it was
clear that the Indians would never believe in its sufficiency; and the
inevitable result of a collision between several thousands of Indians,
and a force which they believed they could over-power, although in
the end the armed force would probably have prevailed, would have
been a resort to rifle and machine-gun fire involving serious blood­
shed and damage to property.28
The Admiralty in London said that there was no ship available to
send to Fiji; and that in any case it was not the function of the navy
to maintain order in a colony unless troops were unavailable.29 The
Australian government agreed to send a warship. The sloop Marguerite
arrived on 14 February and was sent to the north-western coast of
Viti Levu ‘to overawe coloured population and reassure public’. Rod-
well expected a general strike of Indians throughout Fiji involving a
grave risk to European lives and property in the outlying coastal dis­
tricts.30 The New Zealand Government agreed to send troops but they
were late in leaving for Fiji:

Some delay occurred in getting coal for the vessel which took them
down, as the waterside workers here objected to coal a ship which
was being sent on what they regarded as a strike-breaking expedi­
tion, but they gave way when it was made clear that the men would
only be employed to protect Europeans — including women and
children — against excesses by rioting Indians.31
The New Zealand force of sixty troops with Lewis gun sections arrived
on 12 February and reinforced the police at Suva and Nausori. Up to
now the police had been exercising patience and restraint which was,
it seems likely, being interpreted by the European public as undue

29
The Fiji Indians

latitude towards the Indians, and by some of the Indians as weakness.

Rodwell was now in a position to take strong action. He telegraphed
London on 12 February that the Indian unrest was assuming the
character of a racial outbreak rather than a strike, that bloodshed was
inevitable, and that Indian agitators were trying to disaffect the Fijians.
The incident at the Samabula bridge occurred the next day. The
police and military held up a crowd of Indians who wanted to come
into Suva to obtain food and see those in custody. The police then
crossed the bridge and hustled the crowd. When a number of the Indians
resisted with sticks and stones, the police fired revolver shots in self-
defence, killed one Indian and wounded several. The strike came to
an end soon after this incident. On 15 February, T. E. Fell, the Col­
onial Secretary, went to Nausori, addressed some of the Indians, and
gave permits to a few Indian storekeepers to come into Suva to make
special purchases; and Badri Mahraj, the nominated Indian member
of the Legislative Council, warned a meeting at Nausori of the danger
into which they were being led by agitators. On the following day the
Indians were reported to be returning to work.
The strike was crushed. In the governor’s view:

As to the strike and accompanying disorders, the former was unjusti­

fiable and the latter were criminal and injurious to every interest.
The strikers have gained nothing which they could not have obtained
by representing their grievances to the Government in a constitu­
tional manner.32

Certainly the Cost of Living Commission found that the cost of living
had increased for Indians by 86 per cent since before the war. This
satisfied the government that some relief was necessary for Indian
wage-earners, but it was reluctant to increase wages because that would
put pressure on other employers to do the same, and it was not con­
vinced that the rise in prices would be permanent. Instead it reduced
the cost of living by subsidising the sale of imported rice and a scheme
for the planting of rice and other Indian foodstuffs. Indian labourers
employed by the government were given a temporary ration allowance,
unless they had advantages such as rent-free houses or land for cultiva­
tion.33 Subsequently the hut-tax and customs duties on essential food­
stuffs were abolished. It is possible, but not likely, that these measures
would have been taken even if the Indians had not gone on strike,
though the government had certainly been aware for some time of the

30
 The 1920 Strike

shortage of foodstuffs and the rise in cost of living, and had done
nothing. It is conceivable that if the Indians had presented a limited,
courteous request for an investigation solely into wages and the cost
of living that something would have been done, but it is doubtful
whether the CSR and other private employers would have agreed to
follow any lead by the government. In fact, however, Manilal and his
friends, flushed with what they saw as their victory over the indenture
system and aware of Fiji’s importuning of India for more labour, made
all their demands at once.
The government gave concessions on the cost of living, but did not
let down its guard. On 12 February the Legislative Council had passed
a special ordinance for the public safety, and regulations issued under
it restricted the movement of Indians and their holding of meetings.34
These regulations continued in force in Suva, Rewa, and Navua for
three months after the strike ended and were also applied in a limited
form in Nadi for a while. They led to harassment by the security forces
and complaints to the political officer who had been appointed as act
as a liaison between the government and the Indians. Madame Cabrie,
Manilal’s mistress, complained to the Secretary of State in London
about the breaking down of the door of her house on suspicion that a
meeting of more than seven Indians was being held there.35 The orders
applied to Indians only and created resentment and a feeling of humil­
iation among those who had been in no way associated with the strike.
Some leading Indian citizens on the north-western coast petitioned the
government against them:
On account of the high cost of living, and in order that their stom­
achs might be filled, certain refractory individuals of the three
districts [Suva, Navua, Rewa] committed acts of folly; and because
of this handful of malcontents thousands of innocent people have
been made to suffer . . . Good and bad are found in all classes and
in all countries.36
In prosecuting those who had committed offences during the strike,
the government enlisted the aid of H. M. Scott and R. Crompton, the
leading European lawyers in Suva. At first they found it difficult to
persuade any Indians, including policemen, to give evidence against
other Indians, but they were helped by several people styled by the
government as ‘loyal’ Indians (without quotation marks), especially
Christians. On 10 February a group of ‘loyal Indian British Subjects’
sent a letter to the government asking for protection against interfer-

31
The Fiji Indians

ence by political agitators; the letter was signed by Anthony, Peter and
John F. Grant, Ilahi Ramjan, Deoki, P. Raihman, and twenty-three
others. Later, a group of ‘loyal Indians’ (including the Grants, Ilahi
Ramjan and Badri Mahraj) asked the government to punish the
agitators responsible for the recent troubles, and pledged their help in
bringing them to justice. Evidence against the strike leaders was col­
lected by Dost Mohammed of Rewa, Anthony Grant of Suva, and
others.37
The government was appreciative of the assistance it received from
such people. After a group of thirty Punjabis handed in a memorial
expressing their loyalty to the Emperor and to the British Government
and their disapproval of the recent disturbances, the governor wrote
to the Secretary of State:
In the midst of the campaign of grievances and misrepresentation
which Manilal and other Indian agitators have been conducting
against this Government, it was a gratifying experience to converse
with a body of apparently well-to-do Indians who had no complaints
to make and whose sole desire apparently was to see the Governor
personally and assure him of their loyalty. Indians of this class may
be in a minority in Fiji, but I am confident that it is a very strong
minority and that much may be done by the maintenance of personal
contact between them and the Government.38
A prominent supporter of the government was Badri Mahraj, who
had in previous years defended the indenture system and criticised
Andrews. He sent a telegram to the Government of India, asserting
that the majority of the Indians in Fiji utterly disapproved of the strike,
and asking it to disregard the reports being sent by Manilal and the
Indian Imperial Association. He pressed the Fiji Government to take
action against Manilal,39 but it had been contemplating his deportation
for some months and did not need prompting.
On 27 March an Order was made under the Peace and Good Order
Ordinance, 1875, prohibiting Manilal, Mrs Manilal, Harapal Mahraj
(a Hindu priest) and Fazil Khan (a wrestler) from residing for two
years on Viti Levu or Ovalau, or within Macuata province on Vanua
Levu.40 Legally, this was not a sentence of deportation, but it amounted
to the same thing as the areas named were the main areas of Indian
settlement and the only places where Indians could earn a living in
Fiji. The government did not have sufficient evidence to ensure the
conviction of Manilal on a charge of sedition; indeed an official in the

32
 The 1920 Strike

Colonial Office noted ‘the evidence against Manilal is worthless’ .41 The
government regarded him as a seditious and dangerous agitator who
had stirred up the trouble that had led to the strike and riots, and it
was particularly incensed by the sending of dishonestly worded tele­
grams to Australia, India and London. The accusations which were
reported in the Indian press included such base charges as that Indian
women had been stripped naked and women and children outraged.
Certainly Manilal had stirred Indian discontent, and he was undoubt­
edly anti-British and against European dominance, but whether these
justified his exile from Fiji must remain a matter of opinion. He was
not in Suva when the strike began and he did not play any active part
in it. Mrs Manilal, Harapal Mahraj, and Fazil Khan, on the other
hand, were banished because they were the most important leaders
during the strike. Statutory declarations were obtained from various
Indians to the effect that Fazil Khan had said the Sultan of Turkey
had been degraded — a link with the Khilafat agitation in India. Fazil
Khan and Harapal Mahraj were also alleged to have urged the des­
truction of property. Manilal was stated to have prided himself on
being a citizen of Baroda State and not a brute subject, to have spoken
contemptuously of the Europeans and the government, to have encour­
aged the Indians to strike, and to have told them that if they would
follow him they would be governed from India (‘we are going to run
this place’).
Manilal was sent to Nukulau Island to await the next ship to New
Zealand. He then sent in a unseemly flood of accusations and com­
plaints. A petition to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, signed by
Manilal and others, denied the governor’s version of events and criti­
cised the European vested interests, the Fiji Times and Herald, and
the Grant family. Manilal complained of his accommodation and food
and rough treatment. ‘God save the Fiji Government from the retribu­
tion due to their underlings or their exploiters the capitalists’ he wrote
from ‘Imperialism University, Coolie Examination Hall, Nukulau’. In
another letter he observed:
I happened to read Red Europe by Frank Anstey, M.P., Melbourne,
during this my exile and I am profoundly affected and arrive at one
conclusion that the true place of every Indian must be in India and
that there is no hope of gaining anything from European civilization.
In India, we must fight tooth and nail this European civilization by
the revival of our old spiritual life; otherwise Indians will be swal-

33
The Fiji Indians

lowed up like the rest of the world in the abysmal chaos of capital­
ism or Imperialism, and God only knows, where that my [sic] lead.42
Manilal and the others left Fiji on 15 April 1920.
Wide support for Manilal was now shown, as the secretariat in Suva
received petitions in various languages, signed by thousands of Indians
from all over Fiji. Several of them were identically worded and were
undoubtedly inspired by Manilal’s friends in the Indian Imperial Asso­
ciation, but they did reflect the widespread sympathy for him and the
Indians’ general feeling that he was their only leader. A typical petition,
from 1500 Indians, read, in part:
We do not want to live in this country without a proper leader to
guide us and one who safeguards our interests. If it is contended
that he has committed any offence or broken any law of the country,
we do not see any reason why the Government prefer expelling him
from here rather than proceeding against him in a Court of Justice.
In the absence of a prosecution against him we are inclined to think
that it is because he might be an undesirable person in the estima­
tion of the European community and the Government of this country
in advocating our cause. In that case we do not see how any self-
respecting Indian can continue to live here any longer.
In his reply to that petition Rodwell stated, among other things, that
‘Manilal has been the worst enemy of Indian progress in Fiji. If the
petitioners knew all that the Government knows about him they would
rejoice at his departure’. If they wished to be repatriated, that could
be arranged, ‘malcontents are not wanted here’.43
The events of the 1920 strike signalled the beginning of the post­
indenture ‘Indian problem’ in Fiji: that is, the claim of the Indians to
complete equality of citizenship, a claim made first against the Euro­
pean dominated order, and later to be extended to the Fijians. The
strike was precipitated by economic grievances, but its implications
were more profound. Because the employers were Europeans and the
workers Indians, any major industrial dispute had racial overtones and
was likely to turn into a general challenge to the existing social and
economic order, and involve the government in the defence of that
order. The Europeans and the government were right in seeing the
strike as more than a non-political industrial disturbance but as a
challenge to unquestioned European dominance. But these implications
were seen and understood by only a few Indians, among them Manilal,
and his opponents (such as the Indian Christians) whose interests were

34
 The 1920 Strike

closely bound up with the maintenance of European dominance. The

majority were as yet confused and inarticulate. Those in the Suva-
Rewa area had been elated by the cancellation of indentures and the
conference in the town hall. They were left bewildered and insecure
by the collapse of the strike, the deportation of the only Indian public
figure they respected, and by the coldness, even hostility, that had been
displayed by the Europeans and government during the strike. They
had no one to turn to, no leaders of their own whom they could trust,
and not even a government which would act as ‘protector of the poor’.
There was a rush to leave Fiji as soon as possible.
Because of the shortage of shipping during the war and immediately
after it, the first repatriation steamer since 1916 did not leave Fiji
until 1920. There would, therefore, have been a considerable number
of potential repatriates even if there had not been a strike, but it is not
possible to say how many.44 In the years before the war about 800
had returned each year. The government estimated that it would have
been reasonable to expect 3200, or even 5000, in view of the general
upheaval caused by the war. It was customary for many people to
register their names but not turn up in Suva. Of those who were granted
passages by the first four ships after the war, 23 per cent did not go.
Then, too, many of those who elected to be repatriated did so with
the intention of returning to Fiji after visiting India. The fact remains
that by August 1920 11,369 had registered for repatriation, about 16
per cent of the Indian population. This number was obviously far
greater than normal. The Rewa correspondent of the Fiji Times and
Herald reported: ‘The “Rot” among the Indian population of the dis­
trict can safely be said to have set in properly, and there is a veritable
scramble to get away to India at any price.’45 Many of the Indians
sold their property and livestock at a fraction of its true value, often
to Europeans. Some, on failing to sell their cattle, drove them into the
bush.46
In part this desperation was an effect of the war, the interruption
of shipping, and the news of events in India. ‘The Indian has felt
himself shut off from his home country during the four years of the
war and thus fell an easy pray [sic] to certain agitators who thought
to alarm the planters and Government by the prospect of a labour
shortage’, wrote the district commissioner, Ba. Others disagreed. G. R.
Jordan, the immigration inspector at Ba, gave his opinion:

In some circles, the propaganda spread by unloyal and influential

35
The Fiji Indians

Indians is given as the cause for the seemingly unwarranted rush for
return passages. This propaganda, which it is needless for me to
here reiterate, has no doubt been the means of scaring a few of the
weaker type into leaving for India earlier than they intended so
doing, but that it is the cause of the general exodus and unrest, is
in my opinion not correct.
The root cause, he thought, was economic: ‘The rate of wages paid by
the Colonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd. and others, is inadequate
to allow the Indian labourer to enjoy a fair and reasonable standard
of living.’47 Most of those applying for repatriation were labourers with
little stake in Fiji, but others were farmers.48 The Indian farmer was
faced with high store prices, heavy debts, and low returns from the
cultivation of cane and other crops like bananas. A doubling of various
licence fees in 1920 and a new requirement that commercial books had
to be kept in either English or Fijian were unfortunately timed. After
the collapse of the strike and the banishment of Manilal, many, par­
ticularly in the Suva, Rewa and Navua areas, felt abandoned in a
hostile country, with no one to protect them. Most of the Indians, on
the Rewa at least, had completely lost confidence in the government.49
They had even less in the CSR Company.
Rumours spread like wildfire. There were stories that taxes were to
be increased. Some wanted to leave at once because they thought the
government intended to deprive them of their right to a full return
passage; this sounded plausible because the limitation of the repatria­
tion right of migrants who arrived after 31 May 1906 was now taking
effect. Or the opposite was believed: that the government proposed to
drive them all out of the colony. There were garbled accounts of the
constitutional changes in India; it was said that home rule was immin­
ent and that this would bring immense benefits. One rumour was that
there would be a general rising in India and that the killing of Euro­
peans there would lead to reprisals against the Indians in Fiji. There
was an even more alarming tale that when the Indians’ numbers had
been sufficiently reduced by repatriation the Fijians would have an
old-style feast of those who were left.50
One of the more irresponsible acts of Manilal and his friends was
to mislead people into believing they could migrate to British Guiana.
Before the strike, a notice posted throughout the Ba district, in Hindi,
Tamil and Telegu read:
Those who wish to go to Demerara will be paid at the rate of 5/-

36
 The 1920 Strike

per day and provided with free lodging and a piece of land will be
given for their own cultivation and we will be very happy— Euro­
peans and Indians will be treated as equal.
If anyone desire to go to their native place they can go. There
are Indians too in Demerara.
Post Box 19
22nd November 1919 Suva.51
The post box number given was that of the Indian Imperial Associa­
tion. The Indians who went to Suva to take up the offer were told
that the ships had not yet arrived. The association sent an absurd
telegram to the Governor of British Guiana: ‘Indians abandoning Fiji
thousands eager transmigrate Demerara state terms arrange ships.’52
On 23 February Manilal wrote to the police asking for permission to
hold meetings of Indians ‘and just explain to them the British Guiana
Colonization scheme and advise them to leave Fiji for better wages,
more congenial rule from Governments and better conditions
altogether’. He was refused. On 5 March he wrote to the governor to
say that he was not afraid of being deported, because he wanted to go
to a better colony anyway.53
Manilal was one Indian the government was glad to be rid of, but
it wanted to keep most of the others. The shortage of labour had
already reduced the output of the major sugar companies, and forced
many Europeans to give up their plantations. The government made
no special effort to overcome the shortage of shipping, arguing that the
colony could not afford to charter more ships and that one every
three months was the fastest rate at which repatriation could be handled
having regard to the staff and depot accommodation and the distances
from which families had to be brought — an explanation that did not
convince the Colonial Office.54 More positively, the Fiji Government
sought to counter the rumours which were circulating and being spread
by disaffected Indians. That was not easy. The psychological gap
between the aloof British administration and the credulous and sus­
picious Indians was epitomised by the report of one district commis­
sioner that some had read an official proclamation that warned people
against the British Guiana emigration scheme as a recommendation
that they should go there.55
As Rodwell noted on 24 June 1920:
At the moment there seems to be a gulf between the Government
and Local Indian opinion. On the one hand, the Government

37
The Fiji Indians

scarcely appear to secure as early and as reliable information about

the fluctuations of Indian opinion as is desirable. On the other hand,
Indians appear disposed to credit the Government with ridiculous
and impossible intentions.56
In 1920 the government’s ignorance of Fiji’s Indian population was
profound indeed. Apart from the police, the law courts, the collection
of taxes and licence fees, and the consideration of applications to lease
land, its main contact with them was through the Immigration Depart­
ment, which had been set up to deal with indentured labour. After the
abolition of the system the department was allowed to run down. There
was no local government specifically for the Indians, as there was for
the Fijians. The district commissioners and the police officers were
trained on the Fijian side of affairs, rather than the Indian, and
depended on their Indian clerks and interpreters, some of whom the
government suspected of disloyalty and of misrepresenting its inten­
tions. There were no senior European or Indian officers with experience
in India. Similarly, the Indians did not understand how the government
thought and functioned, and were distrustful of anything it did. There
was one Indian member in the Legislative Council, Badri Mahraj, but
as a government nominee, rich planter and erstwhile defender of the
indenture system, he lacked credibility among most of the Indians,
especially after the banishment of Manilal, for which he, together with
the Grant family, was held responsible.
The strike drew the attention of thoughtful Europeans to the need
to try to understand the Indians and make greater contact with them.
There was an acceleration of the development of government institu­
tions designed to deal specifically with Indian affairs. The governor
proposed to London that a new post of Adviser on Indian Affairs be
created to keep the government in touch with Indian opinion and
advise it on political questions, though it was not until 1926 that the
first Secretary for Indian Affairs was appointed. As a first step it was
decided in July 1920 to station an officer in the Suva, Rewa and Navua
districts, to travel about amongst the Indians, learn their doubts, and
answer their questions; and advisory committees, comprising govern­
ment officers and missionaries, were set up. The hut tax was repealed,
notices were printed in Indian languages, the searching of repatriates
by Fijians, rather than by Europeans or Indians, was stopped, the
licence fees were reduced, Indians who had served their term of inden­
ture were exempted from the requirement that commercial books had

38
 The 1920 Strike

to be kept in English or Fijian, the repatriation right of second-series

migrants was extended for another ten years, and discrimination in
admittance to the Suva Race Club was stopped.57 The government’s
new restraint was shown during the strike of 1921.
There was indeed a communication gap, but the Indians’ criticism
and resentment, though naive and foolish in particulars, was correct
in its premise that the government was upholding an established order
in which their interests were assigned a low priority. The strike of
1920 impelled the Europeans to make more explicit their conception
of European dominance, and it altered their perception of the Indians.
They now understood that the Indians would not be content to remain
a docile labour force. Doubts began to be expressed about whether a
renewal of Indian immigration would be wise, and whether the price
demanded by India might not be too high. The possibility of an Indian
insurrection was considered, and Rodwell told the Legislative Council:
‘The Government has recognised the immediate necessity of placing
the Police and Defence Forces upon a basis which will enable them to
deal promptly and effectively with any similar trouble in the future,
should it unfortunately arise.’58 The police were strengthened, Euro­
peans enrolled in rifle clubs, and a permanent machine-gun section of
the Defence Force established. Reorganisation of the force had already
been in train, but the Indian strike gave impetus to it. Rodwell told
Dixon, the CSR’s inspector, that he feared there would be a worse
Indian outbreak in which fire power would have to be used.59
The events of 1920 had repercussions outside Fiji also. The news
of the strike and the request for military assistance drew the attention
of people in Australia and New Zealand to ‘the Indian problem’ in
Fiji. The press in both countries occasionally published reports on the
colony’s affairs, and these were usually critical of the Indians. In turn
the Fiji Times and Herald, and Europeans from Fiji who regularly
visited Australia and New Zealand, reinforced apprehension about
Asian penetration of the South Pacific. In Australia and New Zealand,
the years following the war saw a renewed emphasis on security and
on ensuring that the islands of the South Pacific were reserved for
European, not Asian, expansion. In London, however, the news of the
strike had little impact. The Colonial Office approved of Rodwell’s
handling of the situation, but there was little information in the press.
Fiji was far away and there were serious international problems closer
to home. Almost a year later The Times commented: ‘We are entitled
to resent the veil of official secrecy with which the troubles in Fiji

39
The Fiji Indians

have been almost completely hidden from the people of this country.’60
It deplored the use of troops from a dominion and urged the British
Government to think of the consequences on relations with India.
Indeed it was in India that the strike had its most important overseas
repercussions.
Even in those years of turbulent events in India, remote Fiji had a
secure place in Indian political debate. The events of 1920 confirmed
the extremists in their hostility to all emigration from India, and the
moderates were persuaded that, whatever might be the position in
other colonies, Fiji was certainly unsuitable as a place for Indian
settlers. Andrews remarked: ‘There is very little public feeling about
the West Indian colonies, but Fiji is like a red rag to a bull.’61 Public
opinion was largely guided by his pronouncements. He drew on tele­
grams and letters from people in Fiji and he consulted Totaram San-
adhya and Benarsidas Chaturvedi, who also wrote to the press. The
Hindi language papers in the United Provinces, especially Partap, Aj,
and Bharat Mitra, took a particular interest, because the majority of
the Fiji Indians had come from there. Public associations, the Indian
National Congress, the Imperial Indian Citizenship Association of
Bombay, and the Marwari Association of Calcutta made representa­
tions to the Government of India, and it was also questioned in the
legislature.
In 1920 the Raj was faced with the task of containing extremist
agitation, ranging from revolutionary terrorism to Gandhian militant
non-violent protest, non-co-operation and civil disobedience, while at
the same time it sought the co-operation of other sections of Indian
political life in the working of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms which
were intended to be a stage on the path of India’s advance towards
self-government within the British Empire. On the subject of emigra­
tion, the Government of India had decided to be guided by Indian
opinion as expressed in the legislature, which would therefore be the
body to decide whether enrgration should be re-opened to Fiji. But
the treatment of Indians already living overseas was one which cer­
tainly concerned the executive branch of the Government of India,
and one on which it did not want to seem inactive, though it was con­
tinually reproached with that charge. Most of the Indians in Fiji and
other distant colonies had been taken there under a system of inden­
tured labour emigration that the Government of India had approved
and supervised. The majority were still entitled to return passages to
India. The public expected the Government of India to stand up for

40
 The 1920 Strike

their rights. Their treatment in the British colonies and the self-govern­
ing dominions was regarded as a test-case for the sincerity and prac­
ticability of Britain’s announced intention to make India a full and
equal partner in the British Empire.
Within the Government of India in 1920, questions relating to
emigration and the problems of Indians overseas were dealt with by
the Department of Commerce (or Revenue and Agriculture, or, later,
Education, Health and Lands). Its British and Indian officers corres­
ponded with the India Office in London, which communicated with the
Colonial Office, which in turn directed the Governor of Fiji. Occasion­
ally, the Government of Fiji wrote direct to the Government of India,
and on a number of occasions Knox of the CSR Company personally
addressed the Viceroy. The department in Delhi also considered repre­
sentations from the Indian public and prepared answers to questions
raised in the Imperial Legislature. It consulted Andrews and regarded
him, not only as the leading authority on Fiji, but as a key influence
on Indian opinion, including that of Gandhi. To the extent that the
Raj had an emigration policy after 1919, as distinct from just wanting
to placate Indian opinion, it was to encourage emigration to places
where Indians enjoyed the same rights as other classes of His Majesty’s
subjects, so as:
(a) to find an outlet for our surplus population, and open up a more
prosperous career for our depressed classes;
(b) to extend our commercial and economic influence;
(c) to give Indians a wider outlook on the world generally.62
It tried to improve the status of the overseas Indians by making repre­
sentations to the colonial governments but was reluctant to invite
rebuffs. Since it did not have a representative in Fiji, it was dependent
upon what it was told by the Colonial Office, press reports, and inform­
ation supplied by Andrews from his correspondents.
The unofficial mission which arrived from Fiji in December 1919
consisted of R. S. D. Rankine, the Receiver-General of the Colony,
and the Right Reverend T. C. Twitchell, Bishop in Polynesia, who
represented the Planters’ Association of Fiji. They presented a scheme
for assisted immigration that sought to overcome the principal argu­
ments against the old indenture system: the break-down in family life
and the compulsion to work for specific employers. The CSR sent its
own representative, Thomas Hughes, with a separate scheme. The
Colonial Office had already warned Rodwell that the mission’s task
The Fiji Indians

was hopeless because of the state of opinion in India.63 The mission

soon learnt of the difficulties. A parallel deputation from British Guiana
asked to negotiate first, lest Fiji’s reputation prejudice opinion against
British Guiana also. The Fiji mission met the Viceroy and high govern­
ment officials, Gandhi, and a committee set up by the Imperial Legis­
lature.
The government told the mission that Indian feeling was very bitter
and that it did not intend to move towards a resumption of emigration
to Fiji unless it were assured of substantial support from the unofficial
members.64 Rankine wrote of the meeting with Gandhi:
Our interview with him was quite friendly but it soon appeared that
he is strongly opposed to emigration generally and that we could
not rely on any assistance from him in obtaining consent to the
resumption of emigration to Fiji. He considered that from the worst
point of view the emigrant was sure to suffer by emigrating and it
is doubtful whether the material aspect of this question really inter­
ests him in any way. Mr. Gandhi apparently fully believed in the
picture painted by Mr. C. F. Andrews of the moral condition of
Indians in Fiji.65
On 21 February 1920 the British Guiana and Fiji Emigration Com­
mittee recommended:
I (a) that the Government of Fiji be asked to give guarantees
similar to those which the British Guiana deputation declared
that their Government was prepared to give; (b) that if the
Government of Fiji do give these guarantees the Government of
India should send a deputation similarly constituted to test the
scheme generally and specifically as to the question of the
adequacy of wages and;
II Subject to the above guarantees being given and to a satisfactory
report being made by the deputation this Committee would
recommend a favourable consideration being given to the Colon­
isation Scheme by the Government of India.66
Rankine then gave the following guarantees on behalf of the Fiji
Government:
Indians in Fiji are at present entitled to engage in professions, and
trade and commerce, and to acquire property on the same condi­
tions as other residents including Europeans. The Government of

42
 The 1920 Strike

Fiji undertakes that these rights will not be altered in any way to
the detriment of Indians as compared with other residents.
The Government of Fiji further undertakes that the existing Muni­
cipal rights enjoyed by Indians will not be altered, except in so far
as Municipal rights of other residents may be altered in the same
direction.
That the political rights now being extended to elect two Indian
representatives to the Legislative Council of Fiji will not be with­
drawn.67
The mission also promised that, as soon as it was known that further
immigration was assured, the Land Settlement Ordinance of 1915
would be put into force, enabling the Fiji Government to acquire, com­
pulsorily if necessary, land for Indian settlement, with an initial sum
of at least £100,000 envisaged for that purpose, and explained: ‘Land
settlement is one of the most important features of the Fiji scheme,
as the Government of Fiji is anxious not merely to introduce labourers
who will remain for a comparatively short period, but to secure further
permanent population, which is one of the greatest needs of the Col­
ony.’68 The Government of India, following the advice of the com­
mittee, expressed approval, but asked that, in addition, a general guar­
antee be given by ordinance that the position of the immigrants in their
new homes would in all respects be equal to that of any other class of
His Majesty’s subjects resident in Fiji; it would then appoint a deputa­
tion to visit Fiji to test the suitability of the proposed scheme of
immigration and, if their report were favourable, it would agree to the
resumption of emigration to Fiji.69
The mission’s work was quickly undone by the events in Fiji. As
news of the suppression of the strike reached India, the Government
of India came under pressure to institute an inquiry. Gandhi declared:
‘It is clearly a matter of terrorizing the present Indian population into
slavish submission to the white exploiters.’ He said that two of the
returned Indians had told him of the happenings under martial law,
and that if what they said was true, it was ‘a second edition of Amrit­
sar’, and he would advise the Indians in Fiji to return to India.70 He
urged the Government of India to have them repatriated and an inquiry
made into the banishment of the leaders. ‘Moderate’ opinion was just
as inflamed: Sir Dinsha Wacha, a Liberal leader, asked, ‘Is it possible
that the Bishop of Polynesia and his colleague were absolutely ignor­
ant of the facts? . . . Scratch the British Colonist and you find him a

43
The Fiji Indians

replica of the original slaveowner of Jamaica.’71 In London, H. S. L.

Polak, Secretary of the Indians Overseas Association, told the Colonial
and India Offices that the official statement from Fiji was at variance
with the facts he had received and asked for an inquiry.72 A public
meeting in Bombay, held under the auspices of various associations,
urged the Government of India to have the proposed deputation to
Fiji inquire into the riots, or, alternatively, to press for a commission
of inquiry like the Hunter Committee that had investigated the dis­
orders in India in 1919. The Government of India refused on the
grounds that the accuracy of the Fiji governor’s report on the riots
could not be questioned and that it had no jurisdiction over Fiji.73
It then decided to delay the sending of the proposed deputation because
public opinion would not have been satisfied with anything less than
an inquiry into the suppression of the riots. Gandhi had said that no
self-respecting Indian should serve on a commission to inquire into the
prospects of further emigration.74 To send a deputation just to inquire
into Fiji’s immigration scheme would have assured the rejection of that
scheme.
The reasons for the delay in sending the promised deputation to Fiji
were not appreciated in Suva or London. On 3 July 1920 Rodwell
told the Colonial Office that, after full discussion with the elected
members of the Legislative Council and representatives of the General
Council of Planters, the Fiji Government was willing to give the guar­
antee of Indian rights in Fiji, and that a provision for two Indian
elected members, which had been delayed because of the strike, would
proceed shortly.75 The Colonial Office was about to approve the enact­
ment of the proposed guarantee when the India Office recommended
a delay in sending deputations to Fiji and British Guiana, because of
developments in Kenya. The India Office thought that Indian public
opinion would be so incensed when it heard of Lord Milner’s proposals
for that colony that there would be little hope of having the other
emigration schemes accepted, but the Colonial Office was not con­
vinced that Kenya was relevant. Rodwell telegraphed to London:

It will be a bitter disappointment to me if, after two years of unre­

mitting effort to secure reconsideration immigration question, and
having with your support carried the matter so far, I have to admit
defeat at this stage . . . As to verdict of Committee, if it comes, I
am not optimistic, but continued uncertainty is paralysing, and the

44
 The 1920 Strike

sooner final decision, even though unfavourable, is reached, the

better.76
It was believed in London and Suva that India was using the possible
re-opening of emigration to Fiji to secure concessions elsewhere in the
Empire. At a meeting with the India Office in December, the Colonial
Office complained of the delay and pressed for an immediate settlement
of the Fiji question.77
For its part, the Government of India was becoming increasingly
critical of Fiji. In July the Viceroy pointedly asked the governor how
many people wanted to return to India and what arrangements had
been made to supply them with passages. When told in reply that only
half of the 10,164 then registered for repatriation were likely to go and
that ‘malicious persons’ had induced people to put their names down,
lest they lose their repatriation right altogether, the Government of
India told the Fiji Government that public opinion in India was greatly
exercised over events in Fiji, reminded it that only two more repatria­
tion ships were due to leave in 1920, and offered to inquire of shipping
companies in India.78 In December it asked why so many Indians were
registering their names for repatriation and selling their property at a
loss, as reported in the press, and was told in reply that propagandists
had promoted the exodus:
Although no documentary proof is available it is believed that these
propagandists are acting on instructions from Gandhi and that move­
ment is part of campaign which is being conducted by him and his
associates with object of retaliating against Fiji for denial to Indians
of rights claimed elsewhere. It is suggested that further object may
be to accumulate at Calcutta and other centres large numbers of
repatriates from different places, who, becoming short of funds and
being refused permission to return, will form an element of discon­
tent and of embarrassment to Government of India.79
The Fiji Government added that the present phase of unsettlement
appeared to be temporary and closely connected with the non-co-op­
eration movement in India, and it regretted that the repatriates who
wished to return to Fiji had not been allowed to do so (the emigration
of unskilled labour from India was still prohibited under the order of
1917), as their return would probably have had a reassuring effect.
This attempt to link Fiji with the Raj in a common struggle against
Gandhi and his ‘agents’ was wide of the mark. The Government of

45
The Fiji Indians

India had more respect for Gandhi and for India’s aspiration for
national self-respect than more old-fashioned colonials realised, and
it had no interest in helping the Fiji planters at the cost of losing allies
in India.

46
 Ill
The Sadhu and the CSR
There were a number of reasons why the strike of 1920 did not spread
from the Suva-Rewa area to the more important sugar districts of
north-western Viti Levu. Poor communications hindered the develop­
ment of a common political consciousness and organisation. There was
no town as large as Suva with its concentration of dissatisfied people.
For climatic reasons sugar cultivation was more profitable in the north­
west than in the Rewa and Navua districts. The cane-farmers and
labourers there had grievances too, but the CSR announced on 4 Feb­
ruary that it would give a bonus on cane prices and an additional
special grant on all land under proper cultivation. In his report on
the 1920 strike Rodwell wrote:
It is to be regretted that the concession was not made earlier. If it
had been, it is possible that the strike at Nausori, which has been
the chief cause of anxiety and expense to the Government, might
have been averted.1
Although the CSR was not as important in the social and economic
structure of the Suva-Rewa area as in that of north-western Viti Levu,
and was not given special attention by the strike leaders, the governor’s
comment expressed the truth that it was the company, more than the
government or other employers, that determined the Indian standard
of living in Fiji.
In 1920 Rodwell assessed the CSR’s role in Fiji:
Over half Fiji hangs the shadow of the Colonial Sugar Refining
Company. Your Lordship knows this Company and the extent of
its operations in this Colony and will remember that for twenty years
in the short history of Fiji there was almost no development of the
Colony’s resources other than made by this Company; that its enter­
prise and organising power enabled the sugar industry of Fiji stead­
ily to progress through the long years of low prices when the sugar
industries of the West Indian Islands as steadily failed; that through­
out a half — and that the richer half — of the main island of Fiji
there is scarcely an acre of cultivated land which this Company
could not claim to have brought into cultivation; that this Company
is by no means the conscienceless monopoly that its opponents
allege; that at the present time, when the world price of sugar has

47
The Fiji Indians

soared to an unexampled height, this Company has shown (at the

expense of Fiji) an almost unbusinesslike contempt of gain in fixing
the price of sugar in New Zealand, and has acquiesced (though only
under strong pressure from myself) in the retention of a very low
charge for raw sugar consumed locally; that this Company has for
many years and in many respects realised in no niggardly spirit its
public and charitable obligations as the first industrial concern of
Fiji.
But your Lordship also knows that, among the parties in India
who are hostile to the emigration of Indians to Fiji, the name of
this Company is anathema; that this Company, during the last five
critical years, has, in reliance on private sources of information in
India, acted in ways which have considerably embarrassed the Gov­
ernment; that this Company has on every occasion gambled on the
hope that the Government of India would not ultimately pay serious
regard to the popular hatred of the system of indentured immigration
as against the demands of the sugar producing Colonies, and has
as uniformly lost; that in its relations with Indians already settled
in the Colony the Company has mistimed resistance and concession
alike.2
The CSR had been the economic mainstay of Fiji. By using modern
scientific methods it had been able to survive in Fiji and sell its sugar
in competitive markets. Its management was competent and experi­
enced. Several of its officers had travelled widely and were informed
about sugar industries elsewhere and about the conditions in India
that affected emigration. Those in Fiji had more contact with the local
Indians than the government officials. In the sugar-growing areas of
Viti Levu and Vanua Levu the company was a powerful force in the
lives of the Europeans and Indians. It had a reputation for dictatorial
methods. ‘Company ka raj’ said the Indians, and many Europeans, too,
believed the CSR was the real ruler of Fiji. It would be more exact to
say that it had a predominant position in the power structure of the
colony but it shared power with other interests: the well organised,
modern colonial administration, which had a special interest in the
government of the Fijians; the European planters, especially the copra
planters; the European mercantile houses; and the missions, especially
the Methodist Mission. Not all matters interested the CSR, but the
government gave it a respectful hearing on those that did, because it
provided, directly or indirectly, most of the colony’s revenue.

48
 The Sadhu and the CSR

By 1920 the CSR had invested some three million pounds in Fiji.
It had much larger interests in Australia, and a refinery in New Zea­
land also, and because it operated in three countries and more than
one Australian state, and had been the target of political attack in
Australia, it had an interest in obfuscation, and had acquired a repu­
tation for financial secrecy to match its justly acquired reputation for
sound management. The profits the company derived from Fiji were
slight until the end of the nineteenth century; indeed had the fall in
sugar prices in the 1880s been foreseen it might not have invested in
Fiji in the first place. Thereafter they were only moderate, until the
bumper profits during the war and the immediate post-war years. Those
bumper profits would have been even higher if the company, without
consulting the Fiji Government, had not agreed to sell sugar to New
Zealand at a lower price than it would have fetched elsewhere, in the
hope of retaining the New Zealand market after world sugar prices
fell to pre-war levels, as the company was certain they would. In 1920,
73-3 per cent of Fiji's output of raw sugar went to New Zealand.3
In 1920 the CSR operated mills at Nausori (since 1882), Rarkwai
(1886), Labasa (1894) and Lautoka (1903). There were two other sugar
companies in business in Fiji: the Vancouver-Fiji Sugar Company at
Navua, and the Melbourne Trust Company at Penang. The industry
was still primarily organised on the plantation system. The sugar com­
panies had once grown most of the cane on their own plantations, but
from 1909 onwards the CSR had leased 450 to 1000 acre estates to
private European planters, usually former overseers. It was thought
that this decentralisation would be more efficient, give more scope for
individual initiative, and allay criticism of the company’s power. Some
of the planters were very successful, others were failures, a large num­
ber were moderately successful. The company also bought cane from
European and Indian planters and small Indian growers who cultivated
land held freehold or leased from the European, Fijian or Indian
owners. The European planters were driven out by the shortage of
labour after the cessation of Indian immigration and their estates were
resumed by the CSR.
On north-western Viti Levu the CSR dominated the lives of the
European planters and Indians alike. There were more Indian cane-
growers than on the Rewa but the majority of them were heavily in
debt. There was a high turnover in land holdings. Many had paid
inflated prices for their land in 1915, 1916 and 1917, but had then
been hit by poor harvests in 1918 and 1919. Some of the growers were

49
The Fiji Indians

prosperous and employed Indian labour themselves. The CSR had

encouraged the growth of a class whose interests were not identical
with those of the labourers. Those of more character, energy, enter­
prise, intelligence, or unscrupulousness, were rising to the top. W. P.
Dixon, the company’s inspector, described the position:
Now most of the leading men — those who have been successful —
owe their success mainly to the adoption of their methods of squeez­
ing the actual growers either as zemindars, storekeepers or money
lenders, or frequently all three combined. Many of them have also
been working on money borrowed from the European lawyers or
storekeepers at extravagant rates of interest, and are themselves in a
tight place as a result of two successive bad years. It is they who
have enlisted all the growers in the I.C.P.A. and placed themselves
at the head of it, and are now making the demand for a higher price
for cane. They, and the European money lenders have an absolute
strangle-hold on their fellows and it is to them mainly that any
benefit derivable from a higher price would go. These men are also
the leaders of the local Indian society — the Aryan Sumaj . . . To
summarise.
European growers are rapidly falling away. Indian growers are
hopelessly bankrupt and in hands of the philistines.4
In late 1919 there was talk of strike. One was narrowly averted when
the CSR tried to change the system of payment for cane and then
prudently withdrew the proposal. On 28 September 1919 the Indian
Cane Growers Association was formed by a group of the richer Indian
planters, including Ramgarib Singh and Randhir Singh, with a Euro­
pean, Theodore Riaz, as their leader and spokesman. Riaz was a
former overseer and lessee of land which he used to sub-lease to Indians
before the CSR resumed it. He was very anti-company, self-educated,
a theorist, and inclined to be rather self-important, flattering himself
unduly on his influence over the Indians, but they were using him as
much as he was using them. He prepared an ambitious scheme for
co-operative stores and an agricultural bank which he hoped the CSR
would finance as well as grant an increased price for cane; the com­
pany declined to finance the scheme and this undid his influence. The
Indian growers refused to plant more cane until they were given a
higher price. The company’s announcement of concessions saved the
situation in February, though it refused to guarantee the same terms
for future years because the New Zealand contract was for one year

50
 The Sadhu and the CSR

only. On 15 October 1920 there was a sharp fall in the world price of
sugar, as the company had long predicted, and three days later it
announced that the bonus paid for land under cane in 1920 would not
be continued in 1921.5 This greatly increased the discontent among the
Indian growers, especially the smaller ones, who were now more likely
to seek common cause with the labourers.
In 1920 the labourers on the north-western side were restive. They
were organised by N. B. Mitter, the Bengali headmaster of the Andrews
School at Nadi, who formed the Indian Association of Fiji, which had
sections at Ba, Lautoka, Nadi, and Nadroga. In contrast to Manilal,
Mitter was conciliatory, dignified, and moderate, but he was just as
active in the cause of Indian rights and came under suspicion of the
government officers and police, the CSR, and Badri Mahraj, who sent
reports to the authorities. They believed that he was playing a double
game: in public saying nothing that could lead to action against him,
in private poisoning the mind of the Indian public in Fiji and in India
against the existing order in Fiji. In retrospect his essential moderation
does not appear in doubt. He made representations to the government
on Indian questions, but also embarrassed it by sending reports to
India. He organised meetings at Nadi during the period of the strike
in Suva, but did not co-operate with Manilal and the strike leaders. In
fact he claimed, with exaggeration, that his association prevented the
spread of the strike to the north-western side.6
Mitter was particularly concerned about the Indian wage-earners,
and on 17 October 1920 he formed the Fiji Indian Labour Federation
at a meeting at Lautoka that was attended by a thousand people from
various parts of Fiji. He chaired the meeting and was elected president
and general secretary. A number of resolutions were passed. The CSR
was rebuked for being ‘hostile towards our interests and aspirations’,
insults by its local managers were deplored, and a final petition was
to be sent to the general manager in Sydney asking for a rise in wages
to 5s. per day for ordinary labour and 10s. per day for skilled labour.
The Federation resolved that the Masters and Servants Ordinance was
‘the last stain of the indenture system, meaning semi-slavery, and it is
degrading to any man on earth. It is selling one’s natural freedom
that has been given to him by his Creator’. It was also resolved that
the Federation would maintain friendly feelings and co-operation with
the Indian planters and that the Indian labourers should first of all
seek employment under them; after meeting their demand the surplus
labour would accept work under sympathetic and kind European

51
The Fiji Indians

masters. The Federation decided to oppose lawfully any kind of emi­

gration from India to Fiji until all the grievances and disabilities of the
Indians had been fully remedied. Mitter had already written to the head
office of the CSR in Sydney to complain about the arrogant behaviour
of its local officers and threatened a general strike unless wages were
increased.7
The CSR refused to discuss labour problems with Mitter and other
‘agitators’ who were not its employees, or to increase wages, on the
grounds, stated to the government, that they were lower in Java, a
main competitor in the sugar market, the world price of sugar was still
falling, the demand for higher wages was politically inspired, and the
company was trying to extend cane cultivation by Indian growers, who
already numbered more than 3000 (as against 6000 labourers) and it
did not want to increase their labour costs. The government disagreed
with the decision, because it was afraid that the refusal of the employers
to grant better conditions would lead to another costly outbreak, or
drive many Indians back to India. Rodwell thought the last possibility
‘would go far to ruin Fiji for many years to come’, and wrote: ‘Politic­
ally the Colonial Sugar Refining Company has made mistake after mis­
take. Its Directorate appears to be entirely lacking in political sense.’8
He was still reluctant to interfere publicly in industrial matters, but he
urged the company to meet the labour representatives in open inquiry
and try to remedy any legitimate grievances. He advised it not only
to increase wages, but also to sell food and clothing to the labourers
at low prices, which Knox refused to do because it would mean com­
peting with the local storekeepers. Fell, the Colonial Secretary, sug­
gested to the company’s attorney in Fiji that ‘more of the human touch'
was needed and that ‘we must all recognise that a new era has come’.9
Within the CSR, too, Knox was regarded as old-fashioned by some
of the senior officers. W. P. Dixon urged him to be more conciliatory in
such matters as encouraging co-operative farming, supplying cheap
provisions, and having a cane contract with a sliding price dependent
upon the market.10 He wrote: ‘With the knowledge amongst the Gov­
ernment officials and the general public that the Company will this
year make enormous profits, it is surely desirable to avoid antagonising
the officials in whose hands our future so largely lies’.11 Knox agreed
not to increase the local price of sugar for consumption in Fiji, as he
had intended, but on the rest he was adamant. He was convinced that
the survival of the sugar industry in Fiji was in jeopardy, that the
international price would fall to pre-war levels, that the Indians in Fiji

52
 The Sadhu and the CSR

already enjoyed better conditions than Indians anywhere in the world,

and that any trouble was politically inspired from India. He telegraphed
Rodwell: ‘Fiji labour conditions so greatly superior to Indian we can­
not think any discontent can possibly arise therefrom. Latest letters
from our Managers all assert positively discontent shown wholly politi­
cal or racial not economic.’12 He would make no concessions that
would cost money—which was in the shareholders’ immediate interests,
certainly — and he rejected pleas that he adopt a more conciliatory
tone towards the Indians.
The long-awaited great Indian strike began at Ba on 11 February
1921. It was not ordered by Mitter, who, having been ignored by the
CSR, had already lost his influence among the Indian labourers, but
was the almost spontaneous action of a large number of men who had
despaired of attaining redress. However, it may be called the Sadhu’s
strike, because the leadership was soon assumed by this remarkable
person.
Sadhu Bashishth Muni was the strangest public figure in the modern
history of Fiji. Mystery surrounded him during his short stay in the
colony; tales of miraculous deeds circulated then and still do today;
the Government of Fiji knew next to nothing about him but deported
him in the belief that he was an agent of Gandhi’s; the Government
of India could find out little about him from its sources of intelligence;
and other people in India interested in Indians overseas, such as Benar-
sidas Chaturvedi, were equally at a loss to explain his presence in Fiji,
though they were certain he had not been sent by Gandhi. His pass­
port, issued in Calcutta on 23 May 1919, described him as the son of
Jaganath, born in Banaras in 1888.13 It is not certain from what region
or community he came, but he was probably a Hindustani and a Sana-
tani (orthodox Hindu). He spoke English and Hindustani fluently. He
arrived in Fiji about May 1920 via Australia, and was said to have
spent several months there and to have had contact with the Australian
labour movement. It is probable that his mission was an individual and
idealistic one, to help the Indians in the far-off Fiji Islands, whose
plight he had read about in the newspapers; but possibly he was just
an adventurer.
The Sadhu first came to the attention of the Fiji Government in
November 1920, when it received reports of his educational work in
the Rewa, Navua and Lautoka Indian settlements. At Lautoka he
doubled the attendance at the Natabua Indian School by walking
through the settlement one evening to talk to the Indian parents. At

53
The Fiji Indians

Navua a big school bare (Fijian building) was put up while he was
there and 100 boys enrolled to study Hindi. He wanted the children
to be proud of their Indian heritage, and was indignant that Indians
should have to send their children to Christian schools. He donated
Hindi books to the schools. He said that his was a religious, not a
political, mission, and refused to expound any political views. He told
a government officer that he strongly disapproved of the condition and
treatment of Indians in Fiji, but that he had urged them to work
through constitutional methods. The government sent several messages
to him to come to Suva to talk about educational problems but he did
not respond.14 Unlike most of the other sadhus, he refused to accept
alms.
In the first week of January 1921 the Sadhu convened a meeting at
Wailailai, Ba, to pay respect to the memory of B. G. Tilak, the great
Indian national leader, who died in August 1920. It was attended by
3000 Indians from the north-western districts. He asked all Brah­
mins present to shave their heads and beards as a sign of mourning,
and this was done on the spot. He dissociated himself from the move­
ment to induce people to return to India, which he said had been
caused by troublemakers who used his name without authority, and
collected money for works that would never be carried out. He advised
people not to sell their property at low prices in order to return to
India. That was a surprise to some of the Europeans in Ba who had
been prophesying that the long-awaited strike would begin after the
Sadhu revealed his true identity at the meeting.15
The government still did not know what to make of the Sadhu. The
governor and several of his officials suspected that he might be an
agent of Gandhi’s, but on the other hand he seemed to have a good
influence. On 11 February S. S. Lord, the resident inspector of immi­
grants at Lautoka, reported: ‘Politically, the atmosphere is too quiet
to be healthy’, but he went on to say about Bashishth Muni:
So far as I am able to ascertain the influence of the ‘Mystery Man’
generally spoken of as ‘The Sadhu’ which is very considerable, is
for the good. So far as can be gathered his advice to the people is
sound and healthy. He appears to be a Brahmin of exceptionally
high caste. He has been responsible for the undoing of Mitter and
his followers.16
On the same day the great Indian strike began.
The strike of 1921 lacked the drama of its predecessor in 1920.

54
 The Sadhu and the CSR

There were no riots or ostentatious military preparations. The main

events may be briefly related. The strike spread to all the sugar dis­
tricts of Viti Levu, except Rewa and Navua, and to Labasa. The gov­
ernment took measures to protect life and property, including the
enrolment of Fijian special constables; it privately urged the CSR to
make concessions, which the company belatedly did; it arranged for a
commission, which the company objected to and the Indians boycotted;
it passed an order against intimidation, and it deported Bashishth
Muni. The strike lasted six months and was remarkably peaceful.
It soon became obvious that this was no ordinary industrial dispute.
Under the Sadhu’s leadership the strike, which had begun for higher
wages, was transformed into a sustained boycott, not only of the CSR,
but of other European employers. He called out domestic servants and
the workers at Penang, even though they had no stated grievances
against the Melbourne Trust Company. The European cane-planters
saw the strike as a struggle for racial and political supremacy, and
extravagant rumours circulated among them, just as they did among
the Indians. The chairman of the Ba-based Cane Growers Association
of Fiji wrote to the government:
The main feature of their policy is undoubtedly ‘EQUALITY WITH
EUROPEANS’, to say nothing of the Non-co-operation propaganda
which is being worked to the uttermost by the agents of Gandhi.
Though a few may return to work, there is apparently no reason to
doubt that the Indian labourer in Fiji has become a thing of the
past.17
The Sadhu's far-ranging objectives were shown when the CSR, having
agreed to receive a deputation from the strikers, was presented on 18
March with a list of sixteen demands. The first read:
The employer should provide the employee with a good house and
a separate bath room. The house should be furnished with bedding
(that is pretty), with mosquito netting and mattress, one table, two
chairs and should also contain a dining room.18
The employer was also to provide free medicine, schools, and five
acres free of rent on which the labourer could plant foodstuffs. There
was to be a five day working week, with six hours work per day, and
a wage of at least 12s. a day. The Sadhu had indeed been influenced
by the Australian labour movement. Three of the demands were more
political: those calling for the return of Manilal, the release of ‘those

55
The Fiji Indians

innocent strikers who are rotting in Suva gaol’, and the punishment of
the larrikins ‘who played foul with the Suva strikers and made them
slaves’. The government believed that the demands had been deliber­
ately framed in extravagant terms to prevent a settlement. A less
machiavellian explanation for the curiously worded and, in the context
of European dominance in Fiji, fantastic, demands may be suggested:
Bashishth Muni was utterly lacking in political and economic under­
standing and realism. It was said by various people that he was an
educated man, but it is more likely that he was not at home in a
modern setting. He was, moreover, arrogant, and intolerant of those
who disagreed with him.19
Rodwell believed that the strike was directly associated with the non-
co-operation movement in India. He was convinced now that Bash­
ishth Muni was an emissary of Gandhi’s, thought his anti-British pro­
paganda was more pernicious than Manilal’s, and feared that even the
Fijians could be affected by it. It is reasonably certain that the Sadhu
had not in fact been sent by Gandhi, and it is unlikely that any other
organisation had sent him. But it is clear from his political style that
he had been influenced by the Mahatma’s example and expression of
a truly Indian identity for the new India, even if he lacked his prac­
ticality, political shrewdness, and conciliatory arts. The Government
of India’s deputation stated in its report in 1922:
It seems almost certain that Bashishth Muni was an Indian of the
School which regards Mr. Gandhi as the embodiment of the national
ideal. Wherever we have gone we have been welcomed with cries
of ‘Mahatma Gandhi ki jai’, a piquant experience for a deputation
from the Government of India. He was also, like Mr. Gandhi, an
advocate of non-violence. If we may attempt to analyse the objects
of his mission, we should say that it was to rebuild the national
spirit in the degenerate Indians in Fiji; to teach them to be proud
that they were Indians, just as the English in Fiji are proud that they
are English, just as the Australians are proud that they are Aus­
tralians. It is perhaps inevitable that any such teaching should have
crude and aggressive manifestations; and with the Sadhu it appears
to have taken the form that it was an indignity for an Indian to work
for a European. This may seem to be a fantastic and dangerous
doctrine, but the converse, we believe, would be understood and
approved by many Europeans in Fiji. We may, however, be over­
stating the Sadhu’s position. It would perhaps be more correct to

56
 The Sadhu and the CSR

say that he regarded it as an indignity for an Indian to receive less

than the European rate of wages for the same work. We have been
told that Bashishth Muni spent some time in Australia on his way
to Fiji, and was in touch with labour movements there. If this is
correct, it is not difficult to realise his point of view. In Australia,
and also in New Zealand, it is insisted that an Indian should receive
the European rate of wages, in order that there may be no unfair
competition with the European worker. But a demand for ‘equal pay
for equal work’ is not non-co-operation .20
Gandhian influence was shown in various ways. Bashishth Muni
stressed non-violence, self-sufficiency, and Indian self-respect. Al­
though the strike lasted for six months, no breach of the peace was
reported, there were only a few cases of intimidation and those were
without violence. The Indians were said to be almost too courteous to
the Europeans. Bashishth Muni advised them to dissociate themselves
from the Europeans and their economy, and live on the land with their
fellow Indians, and gather food from the forests. He established food-
depots and his followers doled out a meagre ration on request. He said
that supplies would be adequate for six months. His abundant funds
interested the government but they did not manage to discover any
sinister overseas source for them; credit from Indian storekeepers,
including V. M. Pillay, was probably the chief source. At his meetings
the Sadhu reminded the Indians of their heritage, solemn oaths were
sworn, and potential back-sliders were kept in line by ridicule or by
threats that their names would be sent to India for publication in the
press as traitors to the Indian cause. Some freely confessed their guilt.
One sirdar expiated his by standing on one leg with an arm in the air.
Although many of the strikers were sceptical of the Sadhu’s demands,
many others regarded him almost as a supernatural being. It was
widely believed that he could be in several places at once, a legend
fostered by his wide travel in Fiji. In any case, it was thought that he
had great power over events, human and supernatural, and that it would
be best to obey him.
The government appointed a commission to inquire into the strike,
despite protests from the CSR that there should not be any inquiry
until the strikers returned to work. The company’s manager at Ba
complained about this ‘weakness’ to the governor’s representative in
the strike areas:
This action will be at the expense of future relations between Indian

57
The Fiji Indians

employees and their employers, and the discipline which is sine qua
non between master and man in all classes and races, and the respect
which an ignorant Asiatic race should have for the Government will
possibly go by the board.21
He earned Rodwell’s swift rebuke. The CSR attorney in Fiji was told:
The references to ‘ignorant Asiatics’ and to ‘discipline between
master and man’ would alone suffice to lay the Company open to
the charge that the atmosphere of the indenture system still prevails
in the minds of the Directorate and of the local Management . . .
Failing a radical change in the policy of the Directorate, as well as
in the methods and the outlook of the local Management, towards
the Company’s Indian dependants, His Excellency despairs of suc­
cess in the strenuous efforts which he has been making, with the
support of the Colonial Office, to secure the renewal of immigration
from India.22
The Indians, however, declined to give evidence before the commis­
sion. Bashishth Muni was arrested on 23 March while he was on his
way to the Rewa, presumably to spread the strike to the south-eastern
districts. He was deported under an ordinance of 1917 which gave
power to deport any person who had been resident for less than two
years and who, in the opinion of the Governor-in-Council, was danger­
ous to peace and good order or was causing unrest in the colony. The
Sadhu expressed no surprise at his arrest and accepted it with good
grace, or so it was said. The Indians knew better. Two days before
his arrest, Government House in Suva was struck by lightning and
burnt to the ground, an event which soon passed into popular mythol­
ogy.
The Sadhu’s arrest did not end the strike, which continued until the
middle of August. It was said that he had exacted an oath from the
strikers to stay out for six months. But many were tired of the pro­
longed strike: their resources were at an end, they were disturbed by
the news of the suffering of recent repatriates to India, and were heart­
ened by the announcement that C. F. Andrews and a commission were
coming from India. In the last months verbal intimidation of waverers
became more frequent and three of the strike leaders were gaoled for
it. The CSR was anxious to harvest the cane now that the crushing
season was at hand and was worried that it might lose the New Zea­
land market. In June it announced concessions, including the supply-

58
 The Sadhu and the CSR

ing of cheap provisions. With their cane ready to harvest, the smaller
growers gave up the strike, and from July onwards, many Indian
labourers were returning to work.
During the strike the widening social divisions among the Indians
in Fiji became more apparent, as in the strike the previous year. The
events of 1921 helped to create ill-feeling along the connected lines
of class and sect. Some had become rich through farming, buying and
selling of land, or money-lending, and were employers themselves.
Religious differences were becoming more important as the unsophis­
ticated folk religions and easy tolerance of indenture days were replaced
by a more self-conscious search for group identity and status. Apart
from the Christians, who were important only in Suva, and the Mus­
lims, who as yet lacked any developed organisation or militancy, the
main division in 1921 was between the Sanatanis who formed the bulk
of the Hindu population but were loosely organised, and the more
militant Arya Samajists. The Arya Samaj was monotheistic and rejected
the multiplicity of gods and elaborate ceremonial of orthodox Hindu­
ism, it favoured social reform, including widow remarriage and the
education of girls, and it opposed child marriage and the complex caste
system. Calling oneself an Arya Samajist gave legitimacy to the facts
of life in Fiji, where knowledge of ritual was minimal, caste restric­
tions barely existed, and inter-caste marriage was frequent. The dom­
inant European culture was pervasively influential and it was advan­
tageous to come closer to European social norms through ‘social
reform’. The Arya Samaj tended to appeal to the more prosperous and
upwardly mobile. While Bashishth Muni was a Sanatani, many of his
opponents among the cane-planters, including Badri Mahraj, were Arya
Samajists, and many Indians held them responsible for his deportation
and the failure of the strike.
In one important respect the strike of 1921 was a seminal event in
the history of Fiji. Even more than its predecessor it hastened the
emerging accord between the Europeans and the Fijians. Both in 1920
and 1921 the government and the European community generally were
worried that Indian agitators might succeed in turning the Fijians
against the established order and so convert the trouble into a general
anti-European conflict. In retrospect, this does not appear to have been
likely, though at first many Fijians in the sugar areas were inclined to
sympathise with the Indians’ demand for higher wages, and some took
the opportunity to ask for them for themselves. Some of the Indians
from the plantations were accommodated in Fijian villages, but later

59
The Fiji Indians

they were sent away.23 The CSR had previously ignored the Fijians
but now began to pay a little attention to them. During the strike it
tried to recruit Fijian labourers at higher wages than it paid the Indians
even though they were less efficient, except for work on the wharves
and sugar mill floor. It was helped by a government order that relaxed
restrictions on their engagement, and by some Methodist missionaries,
who believed, with many other Europeans, that the Fijians’ survival
required the stimulus of active participation in economic life as indi­
viduals. The Fijians were not enthusiastic in this role. They did not
like the Kabani ni Suka. One government officer at Ba wrote:
There is a general feeling amongst the natives that they are being
exploited by the Government for the C.S.R. Co., and a dormant
resentfulness seems to exist. I experienced the greatest difficulty in
getting native special constables for the C.S.R. Co’s estates and it
was not until I asserted my influence as Roko that they consented
to do so. The natives are decidedly anti C.S.R. Co., and they do not
conceal the fact.24
The Provincial Commissioner, Ba, reported: T have appealed to their
loyalty to the British Government who have always done everything
they can for the Fijians, notwithstanding much adverse criticism from
many white people who advocate taking their lands away from them’.25
It was for political reasons mainly, rather than any need of their
services, that the government deployed Fijian police in the area affected
by the strike. Forty Fijian policemen were sent to Ba, and 250 Fijians
from Bau were enrolled as special constables and posted to the strike
area to protect Indians who wanted to return to work. The Government
of India’s deputation wrote in its report in 1922:
Fijians and Indians have always held aloof from one another. The
Fijians, being landowners, looked down upon the Indians as lab­
ourers; and it is a coincidence that the word ‘coolie’ in the Fijian
language means dog. The Indians, on their part, regarded the Fijians
as ‘junglies’. The use made of Fijians as special constables during
the past two years has tended to increase their contempt for the
Indians whom they were called upon to repress. At the same time,
the Indians have been irritated against the Fijians.26
Among the European settlers, some of whom were genuinely concerned
for the Fijians, and others who merely recognised that it was the
Indians who posed the greater threat to themselves, the argument began

60
 The Sadhu and the CSR

to be heard that European dominance was necessary to protect the

Fijians against the Indians. The Deed of Cession was interpreted as a
request for protection, not just by Britain, but by the European settlers
in Fiji. In the 1921 census report it was noted that the decline of the
Fijian population had probably been arrested.27 The same year saw
the beginning of an explicit accord between the Europeans and the
Fijians before the advancing Indians.
Towards the end of 1920 the Government of India came to the
belief that conditions in Fiji were not as the Fiji Government made out.
It was concerned by the exodus, the reports of dissatisfaction and fear,
and the low living standards disclosed in the report of the Commission
on Wages and the Cost of Living. Indian public opinion was asking
for an inquiry, the Indians in Fiji for help, and the Fiji Government
for fulfilment of the promise to send a deputation to inquire into the
Fiji mission’s colonisation scheme. In January 1921 the Government of
India decided, with Andrews’s approval, to send a deputation to inquire
into the conditions of the Indians already settled in Fiji and if possible
compose the differences between them and the Fiji Government. The
examination of Fiji’s colonisation scheme was to be a secondary con­
sideration.28
So far, the Government of India had been able to take a strong line
with Fiji, conscious that it was dealing with a minor colony. One official
noted in April 1921: The Fiji Government and Mr Knox evidently
think that the repatriate question has given them a tactical advantage.
But when they find that it is the Government of India they have to
deal with and not the Home Government I have no doubt they will
climb down.’ They thought the Fiji Government and employers were
living in the past, with quaint ideas on political economy. One wrote
of the Fiji Government’s decision to try to lower prices instead of
raising wages: ‘Living out of the world, they seem to think that they
are unaffected by world causes.’ Another wrote of the deportation of
Bashishth Muni: ‘They seem to have elementary ideas as to the rights
of labour.’ Taking their lead from Andrews, they believed that the
Government of Fiji was the prisoner of the CSR Company. They
thought that Fiji’s request for more immigrants gave them a trump
card in negotiating improvements in the status of Indians already there.
An official minuted in April 1921: ‘We have, of course, got the Gov­
ernment of Fiji in the hollow of our hand.’29
The Government of India was, however, embarrassed by press
reports in late 1920 that recent repatriates were destitute and dying in

61
The Fiji Indians

Calcutta and asking to be returned to Fiji and the other colonies.

Hundreds from Fiji and British Guiana were living in misery in the
Matiabruj area in Calcutta. They were crowded in huts, malaria ridden,
without regular work or food or medical relief, and preyed on by
unscrupulous people. They lived in hope of returning to the colonies.
Recent repatriates sent letters to Fiji, begging for help to return30 —
a tragic comment on a system that had been established and tolerated
for years without regard to the facts of Indian society. In indenture
days, no one in authority gave thought to those who returned from the
colonies. The Fiji Government had fulfilled its part of the contract and
its agent had no further responsibility for them once they left the depot
in Calcutta on the day their ship arrived. The Indian officials assumed
they would return to their home villages and settle down to their old
life, the meagre capital they brought would do a little to alleviate rural
poverty, and others might be stimulated to follow their example and
‘seek their fortune abroad’.
For many the reality was different. Some never left Calcutta, they
were cheated and robbed; others were shunned in the villages they
had left more than ten years before, their relatives were dead or
unfriendly, especially to those who returned without money, or their
land had passed to others, they could not find marriage partners for
their children, or they fell victim to unaccustomed heat and disease.
They drifted back to Calcutta, where there were special difficulties in
1920 and 1921. It is likely that the misery that came to light from
1920 onwards was not the genera! experience of the repatriates in
earlier years. It is true that the problem was not noticed till 1920,
because it had not been a subject of official interest before and came
to the attention of the Indian public and charitable organisations only
after interest in Indians overseas had been aroused by the campaign
against the indenture system. But in Calcutta in 1921 there was a
commercial depression, high food prices following a famine, and a
shortage of casual employment. Previously those who were medically
fit could enlist for a further term of indentured service, an outlet that
was now denied them. The new public interest taken in their fate had
aroused their expectations. Also, it would appear, though no firm
evidence is available, that in selecting repatriates in 1920 and 1921
the Immigration Department in Suva gave preference to those who said
they wanted to return to Fiji.
The Fiji Government and planters had only one interest in the
problem of the unhappy repatriates who had voluntarily chosen to

62
 The Sadhu and the CSR

leave Fiji at government expense. Fiji needed labour and many of the
repatriates were able-bodied. The Government of India and the Indian
public were quick to see the point and were suspicious of proposals to
help the repatriates return to Fiji. The Fiji Government and planters
hoped that the accounts of the suffering of the repatriates, published
in the Fiji press and widely circulated in the colony, would induce
others who intended to return to have second thoughts, and silence
those who were denigrating Fiji in comparison to India. The Fiji
Government repeatedly reminded the Government of India that Fiji
could not be as bad as it had been painted if recent repatriates wanted
to return there after a brief experience back in India.
In August 1920 the Fiji Government offered to pay return passages
to Fiji and arranged to send 200 by a ship sailing in October, but the
Government of India refused to let them go unless at their own expense.
Rodwell ordered publicity given to this refusal, and he enlisted the
aid of the Colonial Office to put pressure on the Government of India
through the India Office, which then asked the Government of India
for a report on the condition of the repatriates, observed that their
return to Fiji would check the exodus from the colony, and remarked
that its attitude in preventing their return was ‘incomprehensible’.31 In
March 1921, in response to this pressure and the embarrassing evidence
of suffering among the repatriates, the Government of India relaxed
its policy so as to permit Fiji to pay for the return of those who had
been born in Fiji, special cases such as those with families or property
still in Fiji, and near relatives of people in those categories. One official
explained the reason for the restriction to those categories:
It was thought desirable to bring pressure on Fiji in order to induce
them to improve the wages of Indians and their political status, and
to make them realise the strength of public feeling in India. The
conditions under which Indians were required to live in Fiji were
regarded as insanitary and cruel. Their savings were insignificant.
Labour emigrating with the assistance of the Colonial Government
would not be really free nor could it safeguard its own interests. It
was undesirable to pre-judge the recommendations of the deputa­
tion.32
On 2 April 1921, 245 repatriates left for Fiji.
Meanwhile, C. F. Andrews and Benarsidas Chaturvedi made inde­
pendent inquiries into the plight of the repatriates in Calcutta, and in
April 1921 the Indian Emigrants’ Friendly Service Committee was

63
The Fiji Indians

formed, with official and non-official members, to help by housing them

in an old emigration depot, finding employment, and providing medical
care. A public appeal raised a small amount, and the St John Ambul­
ance, Y.M.C.A., Vhatia Volunteer Corps, and GuzeratVolunteerCorps
gave help. From April to October 1921, about 6500 repatriates were
met on arrival, and 2000-2500 passed through the depot.33 The Gov­
ernment of India assigned the committee the additional task of decid­
ing applications for return to the colonies, and the committee was not
very strict about whom it allowed to return. By 5 May there were 342
more awaiting passage and the number was growing daily. The Gov­
ernment of India asked Fiji about transport arrangements for them
and offered its assistance in chartering a ship. At this time, Fiji took
the opportunity to try to limit the number of future repatriates from
Fiji to 800 per annum and to insist on their being guaranteed sub­
sistence in India before they were allowed to leave Fiji, but the Colon­
ial Office was cool towards this attempt of the colony to evade its
obligation, and, in any case, the Government of India refused to agree,
on the ground that it might be challenged as a breach of the agreements
under which the emigrants went to Fiji. But it did agree to a further
relaxation of policy on the return of repatriates: the Emigrants’ Friendly
Service Committee was directed to allow all those who had been in
Fiji before to return at Fiji Government expense, if they offered them­
selves at the depot in Calcutta, but those orders were not to be made
public nor was there to be any active recruiting. The Fiji Government
arranged to charter a second ship.34
Bashishth Muni’s last recorded appearance was in Calcutta. He tried
to talk to the repatriates in the depot at Matiabruj to persuade them
not to return to Fiji, but was refused admittance. He sat for some time
on the road opposite the depot, but had no influence on the repatriates,
who reproached him for having misled them in Fiji about conditions in
India. He then sat dharna (hunger-strike) on the open space in central
Calcutta, called the work of the Emigrants’ Friendly Service Commit­
tee coolie-recruiting, and publicly cursed Andrews.35
In June Andrews had one of those frequent changes of front that
were so distracting to the government. Like Gandhi he readily changed
his mind as the circumstances and the information available to him
changed. He had already consented to the departure of one shipload
of repatriates for Fiji, because, as he later explained to Gandhi: T
could not see them dying here before my eyes.’36 Then he was stung by
Bashishth Muni’s public accusation that he was a coolie-recruiter. He

64
 The Sadhu and the CSR

learnt that the local agent of the CSR Company, which was, he believed,
‘the virtual ruler of Fiji’, was chartering a second ship and had offered
a donation to the Emigrants’ Friendly Service Committee. He con­
tinued to receive reports of the strike, which was still in progress in
Fiji, and feared that the repatriates would be used as strike-breakers.37
In June he decided that no further ship should go to Fiji, and the
committee refused the CSR money. The Government of India bowed
to the potential public pressure that Andrews could invoke and agreed
that another ship should not be sent for three months. After the Gov­
ernment of Fiji protested to London, the Secretary of State for India
sent a personal telegram to the Viceroy, who replied that the decision
had been taken so as not to prejudice the future reopening of emigra­
tion to Fiji, which, together with the CSR, bore a very bad name in
India. But the repatriates continued to clamour to be allowed to return
to the colonies and rejected offers from various individuals and organ­
isations to provide land and work for them in India. By October the
number in the depot had increased to nearly 1000. Finally, the Gov­
ernment of India permitted 887 to embark for Fiji on a second ship
on 15 October 1921 and closed the depot.38
The Fiji Government had made its point. As the news from Calcutta
reached the colony towards the end of 1920, doubts arose in the minds
of intending repatriates. Many did not believe the stories and dismissed
them as propaganda. Certainly the Europeans, the press, and the
government were quick to make capital out of the reports, and warn
people of what lay ahead of them if they were so foolish as to return
to India. The reports seemed to confirm what they had always said:
that the Indians were better off in Fiji than in their own country. This
was undoubtedly true of many of the repatriates, for whom it had
indeed been folly to return to India. In 1921 the arrival of the first
ship to bring re-immigrants at Fiji’s expense brought convincing evi­
dence. Some Indians spoke contemptuously to them, but others heard
them out and put off their proposed return to India. The panic to
leave was checked. The Government of Fiji was now in a stronger
position to talk to India, and the European community was fortified
in the belief that the local Indians were very well treated — for Indians
— and were lucky to be in Fiji at all.

65
 IV
Second Thoughts
Between 1920, when the mission from Fiji had importuned India to
allow more Indians to come to Fiji, and 1922 when the long awaited
Indian deputation finally arrived, there was a major shift in European
attitudes towards Indian settlement in Fiji. The strikes had shaken the
confidence of the government and European community that large-
scale Indian immigration would be in the best interests of the colony.
They now realised that India’s price for a resumption of immigration
would be high. There had also been a change in the economic climate.
The hope of a rapid post-war advance was dispelled by the fall in the
prices of tropical produce to pre-war levels and by the labour shortage
that followed the cessation of Indian immigration. Many of the Euro­
pean planters were forced to give up, particularly the sugar-planters
whose land was reverting to the CSR and going out of production.
It is always risky, but not always without benefit in historical under­
standing, to speculate on what might have happened. If there had been
no strike in 1920 it is possible that an Indian deputation would have
been sent to Fiji without undue delay, that the Indian Legislature would
have agreed to a resumption of emigration to Fiji, and that the colony
would have made greater concessions to secure it. In May 1921 Fell
wrote:

The Government of Fiji has been prepared to accept, in the main,

the terms of the Government of India and to continue negotiations
for renewed free immigration on these lines. It is possible that the
Government of Fiji would have eventually accepted the terms of
the Government of India in toto, and would have introduced legis­
lation guaranteeing the status of the Indian in Fiji.1

In 1920, a former governor, im Thurn, living in retirement, gave his

opinion of the likely future of Fiji, as the free immigration of Indians
replaced the indenture system: ‘As in other colonies, they will in time,
and probably in no long time, take over the colony and acquire con­
siderable wealth. Fiji will become an East Indian settlement.’ As for
the Europeans: ‘They should in most cases be able, though not without
difficulty, gradually to assume their places as representing European
influence in an East Indian community.’2 However, it should be
remembered that in 1920 the Europeans still did not know India’s

66
 Second Thoughts

price. They still thought of India just as a source of cheap labour,

believed that Whitehall could order the Government of India to ‘turn
on the tap’, and did not realise that any scheme of emigration accept­
able to India would have been prohibitively expensive to the industries
of Fiji. It is inconceivable that they would have voluntarily relinquished
their position of dominance.
Any concessions to India would more likely have been made at the
expense of the Fijians, not the Europeans. They could have included
greater access to Fijian land and an advancement of some of the
Indians to a position of junior partners with the Europeans in the
government and economy. Im Thurn’s governorship had already seen
inroads into Gordon’s policy of protection of the Fijians. In May 1921
the Council of Planters asked that colonisation should take precedence
over other aspects of immigration, and that any liability to provide
return passages should be avoided in future schemes. ‘Land settlement
and bona fide colonisation of the vast unoccupied and unproductive
lands of the Colony should be consummated with the utmost dispatch’.
They argued that, since the Fijians would benefit from the rise in land
values, ‘it would not be at all out of place for the Fijian, as the chief
landowner of the Colony, to contribute substantially and directly
towards this scheme of colonisation’.3 In London, a Colonial Office
official minuted after a visit by the Bishop in Polynesia:
On this question of political rights he said quite frankly that, in his
opinion, Fiji would become, in time, a purely Indian Colony. The
Fijian was going to the wall — he liked the Fijian who, until he
was spoilt, was one of Nature’s gentlemen, but he would not work
and there was no turning back the hands of the clock — it was very
sad and deplorable, but there it was and there was no way of getting
over it. (The Bishop evidently has little sympathy for the Fijians’
disinclination to work and he rather good humouredly took the
Colonial Office to task for having assisted to make the natives idle
by our land policy.)4
For some time the smaller planters had favoured the introduction
of labour from some other country as an alternative to Indian labour.
They would have clutched at any straw: Chinese, Japanese, Javanese,
and even Negroes from the West Indies were mentioned as possibilities.
In November 1920 the Legislative Council passed a motion urging the
introduction of Chinese labour, but Rodwell was unable to accept it;
he knew that the home government would not approve, because of

67
The Fiji Indians

Australian and New Zealand opposition and because it might have

been harmful to the welfare of the Fijians. He nevertheless wrote to
London that the ‘fundamental question is now regarded by planters
as being one of population and not of labour . . . Whether, in our
anxiety to preserve his morals, we are justified in denying the Fijian
an opportunity of racial admixture which alone could arrest his physical
decay, is a matter for serious reflection’.5 In August 1921, when he was
on leave in England, he told the Colonial Office that Fiji could easily
carry half a million people:
The ultimate aim is to secure a greatly increased coloured popula­
tion for the Colony, preferably by introducing East Indian settlers,
of whom the majority will become small cultivators but a surplus
will be available for agricultural employment on the estates of the
sugar companies and of European and Indian planters.6
Rodwell suggested that Chinese could also be brought, and Australian
objections disregarded:
Generally it cannot be said that Australia, by her treatment of Fiji
has established any great claim to be considered in the matter. So
far from deriving from Australia the benefits which a comparatively
small and struggling Colony might expect from so powerful a neigh­
bour, Fiji has been subjected, in practically every matter of common
interest, to a policy of pin-pricks. The attitude of Australia has been
in marked contrast to that of New Zealand, in whom Fiji has found
in recent years an unfailing friend.7
But the Colonial Office still refused to consider Chinese labour for Fiji.
The Fiji Government did its best to secure a resumption of Indian
immigration, both because the sugar companies and planters were
clamouring for it and because it thought Fiji needed more labour and
an increased population which would probably have to be Asian, but
it was more realistic in its assessment of the difficulties in the way than
were the sugar companies and planters. Rankine wrote from India
cautioning Fiji against making concessions to India:
If emigration is renewed and continued will there be demands for
political rights of such a nature that the Indian vote would eventu­
ally control the Government of Fiji as it will control presently that
of India and as it is expected to control that of British Guiana? If
so, can these demands be acceded to without sacrificing the interests

68
 Second Thoughts

of the Fijians, by whom the Colony was ceded to Great Britain, or

the rights of others, to whose work and enterprise or investment of
capital the present position of Fiji is in no small measure due?8
By the end of 1920 Rodwell was dubious whether any more conces­
sions should be made to India, and even about extending the franchise
to the Indians in Fiji. There was an element of wishful thinking, even
insincerity, about the Fiji Government’s attitude. It was willing to
express readiness to meet the demands from India, but it had no real
intention of making fundamental changes — as if words alone were
likely to satisfy the Government of India and Indian public opinion.
This can be clearly seen in the proposed ordinance to guarantee the
equal status of Indians in Fiji.
The British Guiana and Fiji Colonisation Committee of the Imperial
Legislative Council had reported that no scheme of emigration of
Indians to either of those colonies should be approved unless it were
certain that the position of the immigrants in their new homes would
in all respects be equal to that of any other class of His Majesty’s sub­
jects resident there.9 The Fiji Government agreed to give such a guar­
antee. The form of words chosen by the committee echoed a statement
made in 1875 by Lord Salisbury, then Secretary of State for India,
who, following an approach by the West Indian planters, had proposed
to the Government of India that there should be a change in policy:
instead of merely tolerating and regulating emigration to the colonies,
the authorities in India should actively encourage it, in the interests
of the Empire as a whole, including India with its myriad poor. The
Government of India rejected the proposal, for the reasons that emigra­
tion could have only an infinitesimal effect on India’s population prob­
lems and, more important, official encouragement of it would be
impolitic, given the widespread popular suspicion of the motives of the
foreign rulers. Salisbury’s despatch contained the following passage:
Above all things we must confidently expect, as an indispensable
condition of the proposed arrangements, that the Colonial laws and
their administration will be such that Indian settlers who have com­
pleted the terms of service to which they agreed, as the return for
the expense of bringing them to the Colonies, will be in all respects
free men, with privileges no whit inferior to those of any other class
of Her Majesty’s subjects resident in the Colonies.10
These words were to be repeated many times in the history of Indians

69
The Fiji Indians

abroad. They came to see them as a charter. Just as the Fijians had
their Deed of Cession, so the Indians in Fiji stood by ‘Lord Salisbury’s
promise’.
The Fiji Government did draw up a draft ordinance to guarantee
the equal status of Indians but never enacted it. In any case, it would
have been meaningless as a guarantee of Indian rights in Fiji. Informed
observers noted that it was intended just to soothe opinion in India.
Dixon wrote to the head office of the CSR that he had been told by
the Fiji Attorney-General that the ordinance simply guaranteed exist­
ing rights, that Indians ‘shall be equal’ merely meant ‘are equal’, and
that there was nothing in the ordinance to place the Indians in the
future on the same plane as the Europeans. He concluded: ‘To a lay­
man it seems mainly legal casuistry.’11 And an official of the Colonial
Office recorded what the Bishop in Polynesia, then visiting London,
told him: ‘He said that he thought it was largely eye-wash put in at the
last moment to satisfy the scruples of Mr. Sarma.’ The official added:
T am not altogether happy on the point and am not at all sure that
the general guarantee may not give our successors trouble in the future;
but if the local Government are prepared to give it, it is hardly for
us to object.’ Another official gave as his opinion: ‘it is merely a piece
of shop window dressing’.12 The Government of India found the draft
ordinance not altogether satisfactory and asked that it be held over
pending the visit of its deputation to Fiji.13 The removal of minor
instances of legislative discrimination between Europeans and Indians
was not really what the Government of India and Indian opinion meant
by an equal position for Indians with all other classes of His Majesty’s
subjects. What India wanted for her people abroad was social accept­
ance by the Europeans, economic equality with them, and a substan­
tial share in political power. As Fiji was not willing to concede these,
the draft ordinance was indeed window-dressing.
The most important areas of Indian rights in Fiji in 1920 were (and
still are) those relating to the holding of land and to political representa­
tion and power. When the Government of India suggested that the
words ‘to acquire and’ be added before the words ‘to hold lands’ in
clause 1, the Colonial Office told the Fiji Government: ‘It would be
desirable that the terms of clause 1 should be carefully considered from
the point of view of its effect on the special position of the natives
of Fiji in regard to the land.’14 For over a century — even before ces­
sion — the land problem has been Fiji’s most sensitive political issue.
In Fiji land is the ultimate prize. Since the time of Sir Arthur Gordon

70
 Second Thoughts

— apart from a brief interlude during the governorship of Sir Everard

im Thurn (1904-1910)— the Fijians have enjoyed a generous construc­
tion of the terms of the Deed of Cession, especially with respect to the
land. That was fortunate for them, because without the land they would
have had nothing. Apart from those areas acquired by European settlers
before cession and confirmed by the Land Claims Commission, and
apart from a small area of Crown land and a small area alienated
between 1905 and 1908 when sales were permitted, the land of Fiji
remained the property of the Fijian people. Indians, like Europeans,
have had to lease it from them, and the restricted availability, admin­
istrative inconveniences, and insecurity of leases have troubled several
generations of Indian farmers. The proposed guarantee of equal rights
to the Indians was certainly not intended to affect the position of the
Fijian landowners; at the most it assured the Indians the same limited
right of access to the land as Europeans enjoyed (though the Indian
was more restricted in the area he could hold than the European).
Where land was concerned, equality of status did not imply equality
with the Fijians.
The Colonial Office and the Fiji Government were similarly cautious
when it came to political power. The guarantee of equal rights had
never been intended to mean that the Indians could, by weight of
numbers, control the Legislative Council of Fiji. Although there were
seven European members, it was intended to have only two Indian
members at first, on a separate roll, though the possibility of a later
increase to three was envisaged. In January 1921 a Fiji Government
commission made recommendations on the details of the proposed
Indian franchise.15 The Government of India asked that this be held
over until its deputation had reported, because it was now inclined to
the opinion that a common roll would be preferable in Fiji, as it would
be in Kenya, even though, with the same qualifications for Europeans
as for Indians, few Indians would be eligible for the franchise or for
election. Throughout the Kenya negotiations the Government of India
had pressed for a common roll. One official explained why:
Undoubtedly this is the right principle to fight for, for it is only in
this way that we can secure the end in view, namely, the welding
together of Indians and Europeans in a Colony into one single
community. As long as separate arrangements are made for the
election of Indian and European Members of Council and as long
as there are separate electoral rolls, we differentiate between the two

71
The Fiii Indians

and keep up racial feeling.16

The Colonial Office thought the franchise was no business of the India
Office, still less that of the proposed deputation. However, the Com­
monwealth Prime Ministers passed a resolution at their Conference in
1921 which the Colonial Office acknowledged had some bearing on the
position of Indians in Fiji and other colonies:
The Conference, while reaffirming the Resolution of the Imperial
War Conference in 1918, that each Community of the British Com­
monwealth should enjoy complete control of the composition of its
own population by means of restrictions on immigration from any
of the other Communities, recognizes that there is an incongruity
between the position of India as an equal member of the British
Empire and the existence of disabilities upon British Indians lawfully
domiciled in some other parts of the Empire. The Conference
accordingly is of the opinion that in the interests of the solidarity of
the British Commonwealth, it is desirable that the rights of such
Indians to citizenship should be recognized.
In transmitting this resolution to the Fiji Government, the Colonial
Office noted that the Government of India would undoubtedly try to
use it to claim an equal franchise for Indians and Europeans in Fiji,
as it was already claiming for Kenya, and advised:
A similar proposal will probably be put forward for Fiji; and you
should therefore consider carefully what measures can safely be
taken to give effect to it should circumstances render it necessary
to accede to it. You will, of course, realise that the Resolution,
although it contemplates placing the Indians on a complete equality
as regards the franchise, is not intended to make any substantial
alteration in the distribution of political power, and does not entail
swamping the electorate with Indian voters. It will in fact be neces­
sary to draw any legislation which may have to be passed in such
a manner, (e.g. by the disqualification of all electors who are unable
to write English or by any other methods which can be applied to
the whole of the electorate), as to ensure that that wholly unintended
result shall not occur.17
The government and the European settlers grew more and more
cautious about making concessions to India. They were wearied by the
long delay in sending the promised deputation, and they believed that

72
 Second Thoughts

the Government of India had postponed it unreasonably, at the instiga­

tion of Andrews, and that Fiji had been unfairly singled out, not
because of its own sins, but because India was using Fiji’s request for
more Indian immigrants as a lever to secure concessions elsewhere in
the Empire. In 1921 an anti-Indian agitation developed in Fiji, similar
to the more advanced movement among the white settlers in Kenya.
Just as the Indians in Fiji drew comfort from the knowledge that their
struggle for racial equality was being fought in other parts of the
Empire too, so the white settlers of Fiji looked to other colonies,
especially Kenya. It seemed to the proponents of ‘White Fiji’ that they
were in danger of being offered up by the British Government as a
sacrifice to Indian nationalism, that Whitehall might grant the Indians
in Fiji substantial concessions at their expense, as had been proposed
in Kenya.
In 1921 the European settlers demanded variously that, at the very
least, there should be no further concessions to the Indians, or even
that those already in Fiji be deported, that immigration should be
encouraged from China, Japan or Java instead, that the restrictions
on the engagement of Fijian labour be relaxed, and that settlers from
Britain be brought out and settled as farmers. Riaz was prominent in
this anti-Indian agitation, and put up a scheme for a European co-oper­
ative sugar society. More restrained objection to making any further
concessions to India or the Indians already in Fiji was expressed by
others, including the European elected members of the Legislative
Council. Some European opinion, including the missionary, Richard
Piper, the newspaper Pacific Age, and some government officers,
thought that the troubles with the Indians were almost entirely due to
justified economic grievances, especially the CSR’s hard financial policy
and its old-fashioned, tactless way of treating cane-growers and
workers, and they were critical of many of the private European
planters, especially the ‘hot-heads’ at Ba. The senior government
officers, including Rodwell and Fell (colonial secretary, and acting
governor when Rodwell was on leave), held similar opinions of the
company and European planters, but they, especially Rodwell, were
less than enthusiastic about the Indians. Their sympathies naturally lay
more with the Europeans than the Indians, and they also felt a par­
ticular responsibility for the Fijians. The Europeans, whatever their
deficiencies, were the local representatives of the dominant race and
culture, they provided the social leadership, and they had the capital
and managerial skills that sustained the modern economy and the col-

73
The Fiji Indians

ony’s revenues. On important matters, including Indian immigration,

the governors consulted and were largely guided by the leading Euro­
peans: the elected members of the Legislative Council, the Mayor of
Suva, Robert Crompton (a leading solicitor), the missions, the Council
of Planters, and the sugar companies, especially the CSR.
In January 1922, shortly before the arrival of the Indian deputation,
the acting governor reported to London on the attitude of the Euro­
peans and Fijians. lie said that if India demanded equality of franchise,
then it was probable that European and Fijian opinion would prefer
instead to have no further Indian immigration or a reversion to nom­
ination for all the members of the Legislative Council. Of the Fijian
chiefs he wrote:
They are showing concern and would be likely to regard any con­
cession to Indians in the direction of equality of franchise with Euro­
peans as a danger to the future status of the Fijian race and as a
breach of faith on Deed of Cession. The Fijians are not ripe for
franchise themselves and I do not consider that elected representa­
tion would benefit their race. European feeling will support Fijians
that risk of future political ascendancy of Indians would be a breach
of faith and will probably unanimously oppose any concession in
the direction of equality of franchise. The situation may become
awkward.18
Many of the European settlers were afraid that Whitehall would
sell them out to India, and they told the Fijians of their fears. Govern­
ment officers tried to scotch rumours that Britain would let the Indians
become the rulers of Fiji and take the Fijians’ land away, but the doubts
remained. Some European agitators deliberately tried to stir up the
Fijians against the Indians. One wrote to a chief suggesting that he
‘endeavour to permeate the whole of the Fijian race with the fixed idea
that the granting of the franchise and equal status to the Indians in
Fiji, would mean the ultimate loss of all their lands and rights, and
later their final extinction from the face of the earth’.19 Such words
were falling on increasingly receptive ears. Although there had been
negligible overt hostility between the Fijians and the Indians, the
limited contact between them meant that there were no bridges in times
of crisis. For some years the Fijians had been restive, not so much
with the Indians as with the Europeans. The major protest movement,
led by Apolosi Nawai, against the whole colonial, chiefly, missionary,
and European commercial order, in the period 1914-17, showed that

74
 Second Thoughts

Fijian passivity could not be taken for granted. Even the chiefs felt
that the government was not paying as much attention to Fijian inter­
ests as before, as instanced by the recent abolition of the post of
Secretary for Native Affairs, the increasing decentralisation of the
administration under European district commissioners, not senior
Fijian officials, the periodic attempts to induce the Fijians to part with
control of their unused land, and the poor living conditions of Fijian
labourers on the plantations where, since the end of Indian immigra­
tion, they were being employed in larger numbers than before. The
Fijians looked on the visit of the deputation from India with concern.20
A voice that would count with the British Government was that of
the CSR, and that meant its chairman, E. W. Knox. In 1921, though
he was 74 years old, he still ruled the company, carried the board with
him, and disregarded the advice of his senior officers in Fiji who, in
turn, criticised him to the Fiji Government. Today his name is a leg­
end in the O’Connell Street office in Sydney. The explanation of his
power in the company lay not only in his long experience and his
inheritance of authority as the son of Sir Edward Knox, its founder,
but also in his single-minded devotion to the pursuit of profit for the
shareholders. Fiji and its people, white or brown, did not interest him
in the least: he wanted cheap labour. In concentrating on India, he was
more realistic than the private European planters, because he was
aware of the political objections, especially in Australia and New Zea­
land, to the recruiting of Chinese or other non-British labour. But he
did not understand the political situation in India, and could not see
that Whitehall was not in a position to order the Government of India
to supply him with a few thousand coolies at pre-war rates. He thought
the difficulty in reopening emigration was wilful obstruction and a clear
breach of the Viceroy’s stated intention in 1916 to replace the inden­
ture system with another system of state-aided emigration.21 ‘Lord
Hardinge’s promise’ became as much an idee fixe with him as ‘Lord
Salisbury’s promise’ was for the colonial Indians.
Knox blamed Whitehall even more than he did the Government of
India. He seriously believed that the British Government intended to
destroy his Australian company’s operations in Fiji. He asked why the
British-owned plantations in Ceylon and Malaya were able to obtain all
the coolies they needed, while Fiji could not, though it offered Indians
(so he thought) the best living conditions they enjoyed anywhere in the
world, better than in those colonies and certainly better than in their
own country. He saw it as great injustice. As he expressed it: ‘We must

75
The Fiji Indians

maintain that the action of the British Government has been unfriendly,
though prepared to alter that opinion when evidence is forthcoming
that Australian capital sunk in Fiji is to be regarded as entitled to
British protection equally with the English investments in the Colonies
above named.’22 He did not understand that the movement of people
from South India to Ceylon and Malaya was more like temporary
labour migration than that to distant Fiji could be. Although Knox
wanted more Indian immigrants to work on the CSR’s plantations for
low wages, he was not interested in the other aspects of the Indian
question.
The Sadhu’s strike had been settled in time for the crushing season
of 1921, but further trouble lay ahead. Knox was determined to have
a show-down with the government and the Indians. He was vindicated,
in his own mind, by the fall in the international price of sugar and
the need to compete with the low-wage areas of Java and Mauritius.
He decided to reduce the wages of the company’s labour once the
1922 cutting season was over, even if it precipitated another strike and
regardless of the effect on the deputation from India. He asked the
Fiji Government to remove the export tax on sugar that had been
imposed during the war, which it refused to do, not only because the
colony needed the revenue, but because everyone knew that the CSR
had recently earned vast profits from Fiji and thought it should pay
a fair share of taxation. Knox threatened that unless there was a satis­
factory solution of the Indian labour problem, that is, unless Whitehall
ordered India to provide him with more cheap labour, the CSR would
withdraw from Fiji and so bankrupt the colony. Rodwell and Fell were
aghast, fearing further industrial trouble and the end to any possibility
of a renewal of Indian immigration once the deputation made an
unfavourable report. They remonstrated with Knox, to no avail. Per­
haps, as some thought, he was really trying to teach the government a
lesson for having criticised him, and the Indians one for having dared
to demand rights for labour and even to strike.
The CSR told those European planters who were leasing land from
the company:
It will be, to us, a matter for great regret if the tenants, after con­
sideration of the facts stated above, come to the conclusion that
they should give up their plantations; but we cannot feel surprise if
such be their decision, for the unfriendly attitude of the British
Government during the past five years does not justify the hope that

76
 Second Thoughts

the welfare of the Colony or of those who have made investments

there will receive consideration at their hands.23
Fell, then the acting governor, took grave exception to this ‘offensive’
statement and told the manager at Nausori that if such a statement had
been made by an Indian, his company would probably have regarded
it as a seditious and disloyal utterance. He asked the Colonial Office
for permission to demand an apology, and if one were not received,
for permission not to correspond with Knox or recognise his position
in any way, but London thought this would be unwise.24
In a secret despatch in October 1921 Fell reported on Knox’s threat
to shut down in Fiji. He estimated that, directly or indirectly, the
colony could lose perhaps half its revenue, and the sugar industry
could not be replaced in the short run by any other. Although at that
stage he thought the company was bluffing, he suggested that the
government counter any further industrial crisis or threat to close down
by a threat to nationalise it in the interests of the Empire.25 Rodwell,
then on leave in England, was also in favour of expropriating the CSR,
but the Colonial Office thought this was beyond the financial capacity
of the Fiji Government and impracticable because of the labour diffi­
culties and the depressed sugar market.26 But the Office did take
Knox’s threats seriously. J. M. Green, its principal expert on Fiji,
described Knox as ‘an irascible autocrat of 75, notorious for his
methods of dealing with strikers and business opponents. He might
welcome the chance given by the collapse of the sugar market for
teaching the Government of Fiji a lesson.’ He expressed the opinion
that Fiji had been more successful than any other part of the world in
creating a prosperous Indian peasantry, but noted that the CSR, though
efficient, had been ‘less happy in dealing with human than with
mechanical and chemical elements’ and that it had made super-profits
and had enormous reserves.27 Clearly, the company was in a powerful
position.
The year 1922 opened very unpropitiously. As Fell wrote to Lon­
don: ‘The immediate prospect of this Colony as regards the sugar
industry could not be more gloomy.’ The Vancouver-Fiji Sugar Com­
pany announced that it had decided to withdraw from Fiji altogether.
And, more important, Knox laid it on the line: unless the British
Government permitted more Indians to go to Fiji ‘the ruin of the
sugar industry in your Colony is imminent’.28

77
 V
Negotiations
It was not until 1922 that India sent the deputation to Fiji that had
been promised early in 1920. First it was delayed by the Government
of India because of the effect on Indian opinion of the suppression of
the strike of 1920 and the proposals on Indian rights in Kenya. The
Fiji Government asked for it to be further delayed because of the strike
of 1921, and because when in January 1921 the Government of India
did offer to send a deputation, it was to be with the primary object of
inquiring into the condition of the Indians already in Fiji and compos­
ing the differences between them and the Fiji Government, and only
secondarily to examine Fiji’s colonisation scheme. The Fiji Govern­
ment was alarmed by the Government of India’s insistence that the
deputation should be composed of persons whose report would com­
mand confidence among the Indian public, but was reassured when
told that no one connected with the non-co-operation movement would
be included. Finally it was agreed that the terms of reference of the
deputation would be:
(1) to enquire into the condition of Indians now resident in Fiji and
to ascertain the causes of discontent:
(2) to advise whether or not, having regard to all the circumstances
of the case, Fiji offers a suitable field for Indian colonization. It will
be understood that it is not the intention of Government of India that
the Committee should interfere in the domestic affairs of the Colony.
Its function will be to collect first hand information regarding the
conditions of Indian life in Fiji. It will report to the Government of
India, and its report will furnish material for decision by the Indian
legislature whether Indian colonization in Fiji should be permitted
under the new Emigration Bill.

The terms were later extended:

so as to enable them to ascertain whether Fiji is suitable for settle­
ment by Indian officers and soldiers, whether the requisite land is
available, and if so, on what terms land-grants can be arranged.1
In June 1921 it was announced that a deputation would be coming
to Fiji. But the Government of India was finding it difficult to select
suitable personnel. In January 1921 it had been provisionally agreed in

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 Negotiations

a discussion with Andrews that the deputation would comprise

Andrews, Benarsidas Chaturvedi, and G. L. Corbett, I.C.S. Then
Andrews wrote that he would prefer to go to Fiji in an unofficial
capacity, and that Benarsidas, being shy and not a public man, would
rather go as a helper than as a full member. Andrews sent a telegram
to Mitter, advising the Fiji Indians to await his arrival; this was
intended to hearten them and check the exodus. The Government of
India was keen to have Andrews go at the same time as the deputation,
because of his prestige among the Fiji Indians and the weight of his
authority with opinion in India, including that of Gandhi, on all
matters affecting Indians overseas, particularly those in Fiji. The Fiji
Government was also happy to have Andrews again, though Knox was
furious at the idea. Andrews was busy at Santiniketan, where Rabind­
ranath Tagore wanted help in setting up university classes, and he was
reluctant to be away from India at a time of such tension in Indo-
British relations, because he believed that he could act as a bridge
between Gandhi and Britain. The Government of India further delayed
the departure of the deputation to suit his wishes, but then Andrews
received an invitation to visit East Africa which everyone recognised
was a more important test-case for the treatment of Indians in the
Empire. It was then intended that the Fiji deputation consist of Srini­
vasa Sastri, India’s distinguished and persuasive statesman, Pandit
Hirday Nath Kunzru, his colleague in the Servants of India Society, and
G. L. Corbett, of the I.C.S., with G. S. Bajpai as secretary. But Sastri
was chosen to represent India at international conferences, and Kunzru
withdrew because Sastri’s long absence meant that his own services
would be needed by his society. In the end the deputation comprised
B. Venkatapatiraju Garu (a member of the Indian Legislative
Assembly, chosen, among other reasons, because he was a South
Indian of non-Brahmin caste) as president, Pandit Govind Sahai
Sharma (a member of the U.P. Legislative Council), G. L. (later Sir
Geoffrey) Corbett, and Lieutenant Hissamuddin Khan, who was added
because of a policy recommendation that deputations going to the
colonies be accompanied by an officer of the Indian Army to investigate
the possibility of acquiring land there for the settlement of Indian
returned soldiers.2
The substituted members did not carry the personal authority of
Andrews or Sastri, and the Government of India soon decided that it
had made unwise choices in Raju and Sharma. Corbett did most of the
effective negotiating and drafting of correspondence and wrote the final

79
The Fiji Indians

report. Although he was very sympathetic to the Indian point of view,

he was discreet in public. Sharma did most of the talking. Hissamuddin
said little but made a good impression on all he met, on account of his
courtesy and military bearing and his announcement that he had no
interest in politics. On their way to Fiji Raju and Sharma gave inter­
views to the Australian press and were misreported. Sharma was quoted
as saying that the Indians in Fiji were ‘practically slaves there’; he
had, in fact, been speaking of the indenture period. But the newspaper
reports seemed to confirm the worst suspicions of the CSR and the
Europeans in Fiji that this was not to be an objective inquiry like that
of McNeill and Chimmanlal, but another onslaught in the style of
Andrews. The Governor of Victoria sent the press clippings to the
Government of India, which then reminded Raju of the need for
greater tact if the deputation’s mission was to be successful.3
Sharma was the first of the deputation to reach Fiji, on 21 January
1922. He was booked into the Grand Pacific Hotel in Suva and made
himself accessible to all. Hundreds of Indians came to the hotel, singly
and in small groups, and he heard their grievances privately. After the
others arrived, the deputation visited all the cane-growing areas on
Viti Levu and Vanua Levu, the islands of Rabi and Taveuni where the
chief product was copra, Levuka, and isolated Indian settlements on
Vanua Levu. Their tour was comprehensive and they did not leave
Fiji until 3 April. They talked with Fell and Rodwell, with Dixon (the
CSR's Fiji inspector), and with many other Europeans, including
employers and missionaries. And they listened to the Indians of Fiji:
‘Finally, from the date of our arrival, when we were welcomed by
deputations from all parts of Fiji until the day of our departure, we met,
almost hourly, Indians of every class and occupation.’4
There were two particularly dramatic incidents during the deputa­
tion’s visit. One was when they rescued some labourers who they heard
were being held against their will on Lever Brothers’ plantation on
Rabi Island. Those particular unfortunates had signed contracts under
the Masters and Servants Ordinance, and each time a boat failed to
arrive on the exact day on which their terms expired, they were com­
pelled to sign another contract. Fiji Indian legend has it that after the
deputation arrived at the island, Hissamuddin drew himself up to his
full military height and abruptly put the manager sahib in his place.
The other incident was at Nadi where Sharma spoke to 6000 assembled
Indians. It was reported in the press that he told them to burn the
CSR in effigy. What actually happened, apparently, was that, confronted

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 Negotiations

by such a large group of despondent Indians, and intending to empha­

sise that the deputation had nothing to do with the company and that
the Indians need not work for it if they did not want to, he had advised
them to put unpleasant things behind them by burning them in the
Holi fire, as it was then the time of the Phagua (Holi) festival. But the
Government of India thought Sharma’s and Raju’s conduct ‘most
injudicious and unbecoming’; they were thought to have allowed their
‘zeal to outrun discretion’.5 Corbett later defended them in a letter to
R. B. Ewbank, who had succeeded him as the deputy secretary hand­
ling emigration matters in Delhi:
Raju and Sharma made two or three indiscreet utterances in Fiji
under, it must be admitted, severe provocation. These indiscretions
might have passed almost unnoticed, had they not been magnified
and advertised by the Colonial Sugar Refining Company and others,
in what they believed to be their own interests. On the other hand,
I myself on scores of occasions heard Raju and Sharma give Indians
in Fiji good sound advice. Let’s look at the results. When I reached
Fiji at the end of January 1922, I found the Government almost
panic stricken. They were expecting that the cut in wages threatened
by the Colonial Sugar Refining Company would lead to widespread
disorders, and that there would be a renewed demand for wholesale
repatriation. Neither happened. Don’t let this fact be obscured by
anti-deputation propaganda.6
While the deputation was in Fiji the campaign for ‘a white Fiji’
continued, with almost daily attacks on Indians in the pages of the
Fiji Times and Herald, including a series of articles by Riaz. A letter
under the heading ‘A White Fiji’, signed ‘Southern Division’, deserves
to be quoted here because it was the occasion for government action
and was taken with such seriousness by the deputation that they
appended it to their report. After insulting the Indian Army, the letter
concluded:
I would venture to say that 99 per cent of the Europeans in Fiji
and the Fijians are loyalists and the handing over of Fiji to evil­
smelling, treacherous, non-educated, garlic-eating Indians would be
one of the greatest crimes in the history of the British Empire, and
an event which would possibly meet with some opposition.7
Fell, the acting governor, apologised to Raju, to the Viceroy of India,
and to Lieutenant Hissamuddin for the slight on the Indian Army.

81
The Fiji Indians

He told the editor that the publication of such material was discour­
teous and ill-timed. He thought of legislating to prevent newspapers
promoting ill-feeling and racial discord, but was advised that there was
no precedent within the British Empire. The Executive Council res­
olved that restrictive or suppressive legislation was undesirable, but
steps should be taken to influence the press to adopt a moderate tone
regarding racial questions. The editor of the Fiji Times and Herald,
T. W. A. (later Sir Alport) Barker, apologised and dissociated himself
from that particular letter, but the attacks on Indians continued in his
newspaper.8
On 18 February, while the deputation was visiting Vanua Levu, the
CSR announced that, on account of a fall in the international price of
sugar and conditions less favourable than before the war, it would lower
the price paid for cane to pre-war levels, and reduce wages from 2s.6d.
per day (including bonus) to ls.6d., though it would provide sugar
and sharps to its employees at lower prices. The deputation immediately
told the governor and CSR that this action would probably result in
a strike and a widespread demand for repatriation. They asked that
it be postponed, at least until Corbett could talk to Knox in Sydney.
The company replied that the decision was irrevocable.
The deputation were shocked. They considered that Is. 6d. per day
was below a living wage, while it would probably cost at least 14s. to
grow the ton of cane for which the company would pay 10s. They
stated in their report:
Labour regarded the action of the Company as equivalent to a
lock-out and refused to work on the reduced wage. This had been
anticipated by the Company, and we recognise the shrewdness with
which the moment for the cut was chosen. It was expected that the
presence of our deputation in Fiji, if it did not secure acquiescence,
would at any rate prevent disorders. The crushing season had just
ended, and the Company could continue to carry on shorthanded
for the next few months. The resources of the Indian labourers had
been exhausted by two prolonged strikes in the last two years, and
by the rush for repatriation, when thousands sold their property at
far less than its real value, so as to be ready for the ship which
never came.9
The company was also relying, Corbett believed, on the absence of
sufficient alternative work in Fiji, on the Indians’ knowledge of the
difficulties repatriates faced in India, and on Andrews’ advice to

82
 Negotiations

Indians in the colonies to stay where they were. Corbett thought the
company had miscalculated, however: during 1921 the Indians had
learnt the possibility of living on the land and there was now a rush
for new leases, and, secondly, there was a widespread demand for
repatriation even though the Indians in Fiji had heard of the problems
faced by the repatriates in India.
The deputation’s report went on:
The position in which we were now placed, was extremely difficult.
It was not perhaps understood with what hopes our deputation had
been awaited by the Indian community . . . It was imperative that we
should at once dissociate ourselves from the Company’s action. If
we had failed to do so, all confidence in our mission would have
been destroyed, and despair might have provoked the most serious
consequences. Our immediate duty was to encourage and advise the
thousands of Indians who crowded round us. We felt bound also
to approach the Fiji Government with suggestions for meeting the
situation . . . Briefly, we impressed upon the Fiji Government that
the Indians in Fiji should either be given opportunity to earn a
decent livelihood there, or be provided at once with the free pas­
sages to India to which the great majority are legally entitled.10
The deputation broke off negotiations with the company and Corbett
cancelled his trip to Sydney. He said he did this because Dixon had
told him that the only scheme the company could usefully discuss
would be some assured scheme of supplying fresh labour on a basic
wage of Is. 6d. per day. Knox, however, denied that the company had
ever remotely suggested any guarantee of a supply of labour, and
protested to the Viceroy of India about the deputation’s ‘bias’.11
Before leaving Fiji the deputation telegraphed the Government of
India asking it to press for the repatriation to India of those Indians
who were entitled to return passages and wished to go; for the pro­
vision of land for those willing and able to settle as independent
farmers, and of work for unemployed Indians, either on the projected
trunk road or on some other public works; and for the setting of a
minimum living wage by the Fiji Government. The Government of
India trusted Corbett’s judgment and asked the India Office to press
for the implementation of these preliminary recommendations.12 The
deputation also suggested that the Government of India advance money
to defray the cost of repatriation, leaving the question of liability until
later. At the Colonial Office, Green noted:

83
The Fiji Indians

This strikes me as a most dangerous proposal. If India is to take

over the duty of financing Fiji, the next step is obviously to take
over the control of administration. The appearance of a vote for Fiji
in the Indian budget gives exactly the opportunity for discussing
Fijian domestic affairs. We are aware that the Indians in Fiji con­
template ultimate transfer to India.13
Fell proposed that India should be asked to pay for all repatriation
in excess of the normal number, for which provision had already been
made in the colonial estimates. Green noted: ‘We must put a stop to
this at once. The Colony has undertaken a perfectly definite liability.’14
He observed that the illiterate Indians who went to Fiji knew nothing
about the statute of limitations, average numbers returning per year,
and such matters. Fell was told that Fiji would have to discharge its
liability to repatriate the Indians, if necessary by borrowing, but he
was to make clear to the deputation that the inability to deal promptly
with the unexpected flood of applications could not be regarded as a
breach of faith or contract.15
The Government of India had supported Corbett so far, but it was
unenthusiastic about the recommendation for wholesale repatriation.
The distressed repatriates in Calcutta had been a problem in 1921,
and there were still people, including 150 from Fiji, clamouring to be
sent back to the colonies. There was a wider consideration also: if the
Indians in Fiji were repatriated, the Government of India’s policy of
encouraging Indian colonisation of the Empire’s open spaces would
have failed. One officer in Delhi wrote:
We know from other sources that the policy of a White Pacific
(without Asiatics) is being pushed forward in Australia and New
Zealand. We should not play into the hands of this party by being
parties to the removal of the Indians from Fiji.16
Accordingly the deputation were urged to be cautious about encourag­
ing repatriation.17
The Fiji Government had long looked forward to the arrival of the
deputation, whose visit promised to settle the question of Indian
immigration, one way or another, once and for all. Fiji was faced with
a financial crisis, depressed prices for its exports, the threat of the
closure of the sugar industry, and the possibility that the colony would
be called upon to meet its liability for the repatriation of tens of thou­
sands of Indians. But the Fiji Government was inclined to be much

84
 Negotiations

more cautious in its dealing with India than it had been two years
before. It was annoyed by the vacillation of the Government of India
over the sending of the deputation, the return of the repatriates in Cal­
cutta, and Indian political representation, and disturbed by its deferring
to Andrews and to Indian nationalist opinion about emigration. It had
noted the less sympathetic line now being taken in London over the
extension of rights to Indians in Kenya, had been reminded by the
Colonial Office about the special position of the Fijians in regard to
the land, and had been told that the Imperial Conference resolution
was not intended to alter the distribution of political power, in short
that it did not mean much. Local European agitation against making
concessions to India had reached the Fijians also. While the Indian
deputation was in Fiji, the chairman of the Methodist Mission wrote
to Fell to express his concern at the Fijians’ lack of confidence in the
government and their apparent feeling that it cared more for the
Indians than for them . 18 The senior government officers and the lead­
ing European settlers had reached agreement that regardless of the
economic consequences, Fiji would pay no large price for more Indian
immigrants, certainly not anything that could lead to the ending of
European dominance. Very soon after the deputation reached Fiji, Fell
decided that the prospects for further supplies of labour from India
were hopeless. He treated the deputation with courtesy but with reserve,
though he did put forward proposals to London to try to meet some
of their suggestions. He asked for an imperial loan, for relief work to
be provided on the projected road around Viti Levu, and for permis­
sion to offer the Indians the right to commute their return passages
for grants of cash or land . 19
Fell also remonstrated with Dixon and Farquhar, the company’s
local executives, about the cut in wages and Knox’s attacks on the
British Government. Reporting on these discussions to London, he
wrote:

The Company demands freedom from existing export and future

direct taxation, and it charges this Government with failure to pro­
vide a labour supply. The difficulties in the latter connexion have
been largely due to the Company’s own methods in the past, to their
dealings with indentured labourers, and to their lack of sympathy
to labour generally. With regard to taxation, it is probably true that
there is no country in the world where an industry so prosperous
as the Colonial Sugar Company has been so lightly taxed.

85
The Fiji Indians

He suggested that Knox, taking the fall in sugar prices as an oppor­

tunity, had decided on a lock-out of Indian labour in order to bring
the Indians to heel and teach the government a lesson, and concluded:
It has been more and more impressed upon my mind that it is not
in the best interests of any Colony that its prospects and revenue
should be largely dependent upon one dominant industrial concern
and, however difficult the interval, I feel that reconstruction on
sounder lines, even if it should involve the termination of operations
by the Colonial Sugar Refining Company, may have its advantages
for Fiji in the distant future.20
The Colonial Office had never had any hope that India would con­
sent to reopen emigration to Fiji and it had no inclination to make
concessions to her, but it was more concerned by the threat to the
financial stability of one of the colonies as represented by Knox’s threat
to withdraw from Fiji and the alarming reports from Fell. It decided
to take direct action. Winston Churchill, the Secretary of State for the
Colonies, sent Knox a conciliatory telegram, urging him to suspend
action affecting the future of the sugar industry in Fiji and to discuss
the matter personally with Rodwell, then on his way back to Fiji, or
with Churchill himself in London. Knox then met Rodwell in Sydney
in March 1922 and told him that the ruin of the Fiji sugar industry was
close at hand. In turn, Rodwell told Knox it was absurd to blame the
British Government for India’s attitude and pressed him to accept
Churchill’s invitation, which he agreed to do.21
Knox arrived in London in May 1922, accompanied by Dixon.
Churchill was busy with the problems of Ireland but Wood, the Parlia­
mentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, asked him to see
Knox personally: ‘He is an obstinate old man but he has come all the
way from Australia to discuss Fiji problems, and unless we can get
something settled, Fiji will be in a very poor way.’22 After three weeks
they did get to see Churchill: ‘Dixon and I went this afternoon to keep
our appointment with Mr Churchill at 4.15. After waiting 20 minutes
we were admitted and he met us at the door with a cigar in his mouth.’23
They were told to come back the next day for a half-hour appointment.
The autocrat of O’Connell Street had met his match. Rather absurdly,
he had taken legal advice and been assured that the Crown had the
power to disallow the Indian Emigration Act of 1922, which regulated
the emigration of unskilled labour from India. He asked the Colonial
Office to have the Government of India overruled in accordance with

86
 Negotiations

Lord Hardinge’s ‘pledge’ of 1916 and to meet its obligation to protect

colonial industries. Churchill and Wood told him flatly that it was
not politically practicable for the home government to coerce India in
such an important matter; it would be almost as unreasonable for an
Indian to expect it to coerce Australia on a matter of immigration.
Instead the Colonial and India Offices urged Knox to offer higher
wages to the labour already in Fiji and if necessary carry on without
profit while the sugar industry was reorganised to replace the planta­
tions by small farms.
Knox and Dixon were in London for three months and for much of
that time they felt they had come in vain. But the Colonial Office knew
that the collapse of the sugar industry would have serious consequences
for Fiji and would be represented in Australia and New Zealand as a
breach of faith on the part of the British Government. For forty years
the sugar economy based on Indian labour had supported a modern
administration and a level of services for the people of Fiji which, if
not impressive by the standards of, say, Hawaii, was nevertheless more
than many tropical countries could afford. The company’s announce­
ment of a reduction in wages and cane prices in 1922 had been fol­
lowed by the immediate disappearance of a very large part of the
already scanty labour force, the cessation of planting of cane by the
Indian growers, and the reversion of much of the cane land to bush.
Alarming telegrams continued to arrive from Fiji. A deputation of
substantial Indian cane-growers told Rodwell that, failing better cane
prices and assurances as to the future, they proposed to abandon sugar­
cane cultivation and they asked for government assistance to establish
them in another industry, preferably cotton.24 The officials in London
were impressed by Knox’s stubbornness if not his political sense (‘an
obstinate and impracticable old man’ wrote Wood to Winterton at the
India Office).25 They finally came to the rescue. They were aided by
Knox’s discovery that the assurance given by Churchill in the House
of Commons in February, that the imperial preference for West Indian
sugar would be continued for ten years, applied to Fiji too. Then a
settlement was reached after the Colonial Office offered to remove the
Fiji export duties on sugar for one year, without prejudice to the
future.26
On 1 August 1922, the Colonial Office, after the discussions with
Knox, put before the India Office definite proposals for concessions
by Fiji, conditional upon the resumption of Indian emigration to Fiji.
The letter described the seriousness of the situation:

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The Fiji Indians

But the unfortunate delays, for which Fiji is in no way responsible,

have brought about a state of affairs in the Colony which can only
be described as disastrous. Nearly half the sugar land has already
gone out of cultivation, and, in spite of severe retrenchment, the
Colony has a heavy and increasing deficit. A point has in fact been
reached where, unless sufficient labour can be obtained to tide over
a period of transition from the plantation system to production by
settlers on their own holdings, the industry and administration of
the islands must without procrastination be reorganised on new
lines, a change which will, it is feared, ruin a large number of the
Indian farmers and necessitate the repatriation to India of a con­
siderable proportion of the Indian population.27
Knox agreed to increase cane prices and pay the Indian labourers the
equivalent (including bonuses and rations) of a wage of 2s. 9d. per day.
The Fiji Government would acquire more land for Indian settlement,
make provision for two Indian representatives on the Legislative Coun­
cil as promised before, with a likely increase to three, and appoint
a committee to report on the removal of any minor disabilities on the
Indians in Fiji.
These proposals met with a cool reception in Delhi. The Viceroy
replied that it would be hopeless to recommend them to the Indian
Legislature, and insisted that the Fiji Government should first remove
the existing major disabilities on the Indians resident in Fiji, or at
least accept their removal in principle and unconditionally. The Gov­
ernment of India went on to ask for a guaranteed minimum wage,
embodied in law, with an impartial tribunal. It suggested that there
should be equal communal representation on the Legislative Council,
on an elected basis, of Europeans, Indians, and Fijians, and in muni­
cipalities a ward system based on a common electoral roll without
educational qualifications; while these suggestions were being con­
sidered three seats on the Legislative Council should be granted
immediately. Fiji’s proposals for land settlement were acceptable, sub­
ject to certain conditions laid down by the deputation.28
Rodwell was swift to take exception to the counter-proposals:
Present atmosphere is very unfavourable to any counter-suggestions
such as those contained in your telegram. It is felt that continued
prohibition apart from economic effect places undeserved stigma on
Colony which has offered one concession after another and has
received no acknowledgement beyond request for more. Majority of

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 Negotiations

Colonists would rather see sugar industry closed down and whole
Indian population repatriated than accept proposals exceeding in
principle those referred to in paragraph 1. Any attempt to override
public opinion might lead to serious rupture between Government
and European community who would have support of Fijian natives.
Anti-Indian agitation here once started would probably be strongly
backed by certain sections in Australia and New Zealand and would
in my opinion be beginning of end of Indian settlement in Pacific.
I regard Deputation’s suggestion respecting Fijian franchise as
being outside terms of reference and breach of undertaking not to
interfere in domestic concerns. Publication of any such proposal
might have most mischievous results.29
He did, however, offer one more concession: if the Government of
India would agree to lift the prohibition on emigration to Fiji, the
number of new immigrants should be limited in the first instance to
10,000 plus dependants, and when that number had been reached the
whole question of ‘status representation etcetera’ should be further
considered after an inquiry and report by a Royal Commission. In a
further telegram to London Rodwell gave as his personal opinion that
if the Government of India would accept the proposals, the atmosphere
of mistrust of India, generated in Fiji by the delays and by the pro­
posals of the deputation, would be dispelled within four or five years,
extensive development would then take place, and the colony could
reasonably be expected to make further concessions to the Indians.30
The Government of India was still not impressed. It did not agree that
Fiji had made any substantial concessions beyond promises. In a des­
patch to London it expressed agreement with the deputation that the
welfare of the Indians already in Fiji should be unconditionally assured
before further emigration could be considered.31
Meanwhile, the CSR kept up independent efforts to revive immigra­
tion from India, through its roving ambassador, Thomas Hughes, and
its commercial agents in India. It concentrated on Madras because of
its long-standing preference for South Indian labour and because the
political difficulties were less there. The Madras Government favoured
emigration as a way of relieving the congested labour market in South
India. In 1922 Hughes met the Governor of Madras, and the com­
pany’s agent, D. G. McConechy, approached Indian political leaders,
and reported to Sydney that he had enlisted the co-operation of a South
Indian member of the Emigration Committee in Delhi. He again sug-

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The Fiji Indians

gested that the Indian politicians be financially bribed to agree to a

renewal of emigration to Fiji, a proposal already rejected by Dixon.
In March 1923 he reported to Sydney that he had been to Delhi but
that the officials there did not favour emigration, as did those in
Madras, and were appeasing the Indian members of the legislature.
He was told there that the Government of India would not bargain on
the question of wages; they would have to be increased before any
resumption of emigration to Fiji could be considered. He advised the
company to make the increase.32
In 1922 the company’s offer of higher wages had been conditional
upon the Government of India agreeing to a resumption of emigration
to Fiji. But as the Indian growers were still not planting the new sea­
son’s cane, Knox telegraphed Rodwell in March 1923 that, even though
no reply had yet been received from India, the company would pay
more for cane, on condition that the government abolished the export
duties on sugar and molasses. Rodwell, citing a recent big rise in the
international price of sugar, appealed to him to go further by making
a larger increase in the cane price and raising wages as well. He
warned Knox:
On the other hand consequences of attempting to drive too hard a
bargain may be disastrous. It should be borne in mind that apart
from any pecuniary sacrifice which you may demand Colony will
be called upon as part of any agreement with India to make political
concessions which cost your Company nothing but mean a great
deal to European public here. Up to the present I have had public
opinion behind me in my endeavours to arrive at settlement which
will ensure rehabilitation of sugar industry. There is however grow­
ing feeling that Colony may be paying too high a price both pecun­
iarily and politically for sake of continuance of your Company’s
enterprise. I do not exaggerate in stating that unless situation is
carefully handled this feeling may develop into one of bitter hostility
towards Company culminating in open denunciation at public meet­
ings and in Legislative Council. My hand would then be forced and
I should be reluctantly compelled to inform Secretary of State that
relations between this Government and Company had broken down
and that further negotiation with India was useless.
Knox then agreed to guarantee the increased cane prices for the 1924
and 1925 crops also, and to implement the London proposals on
wages.33 At the same time the Fiji Government agreed to abolish the

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 Negotiations

export duties, and the company agreed not to claim any refund in
respect of the 1922 crop.34
The remission of the export duties on the 1922 crop was a delicate
issue. The Colonial Office had promised Knox that duties would not
be charged on the 1922 crop but they had in fact been charged; the
Fiji Legislative Council would have been asked to vote a refund if the
company had not agreed to forgo it. The elected members angrily pro­
tested against the action of the Secretary of State in promising taxation
relief to the CSR without consulting the Legislative Council of Fiji.35
This is not the place to go into the details of the row; sufficient to note
that it brought out the resentment the European community had of
Whitehall and the CSR, of the huge profits made by the company
in the period 1916-21, of the light taxation it had paid, and of its
short-sighted attitude towards the treatment of Indian labourers. They
even contrasted the remission of taxation to the company with the
proposal to impose a new tax on the poor Indians.
In July 1923 the Fiji Government introduced legislation to provide
for an ungraduated poll-tax, called the residential tax, of £1 to be
paid annually by all non-Fijian adult males between 18 and 60. In
justification, it pointed out that whereas most Europeans paid income
tax, and the Fijians a direct government tax and a provincial rate, the
Indians were not contributing their fair share of taxes, despite the fact
that a very high proportion of government business, in the last few
years more than half, was devoted to Indian affairs. The tax was to
be accompanied by improved medical facilities for the Indians. The
measure was explained to the Indians in advance in Rajdut, the gov­
ernment’s Hindi language newspaper, but it aroused general opposition
among them. Mass meetings of protest were held, and telegrams were
sent to the Colonial Office and to the Government of India, which
tried to have the tax dropped. Badri Mahraj, the nominated Indian
member of the Legislative Council, resigned his seat in protest (he was
renominated in 1926); he did not oppose the tax in principle but
argued that it should apply to voters only, not to the labourers, who
could not afford it. To the Indians the tax was further evidence of
discrimination: certainly many of them were very poor; they already
paid customs duties and various licence fees; and there was an historic
aversion in India to paying direct taxes. The building (‘hut’) tax which
had been in force from 1911 to 1920 had been resented far more than
the unseen indirect taxes. Even the CSR opposed the introduction of
the residential tax, on the ground that it could cause an upheaval

91
The Fiji Indians

among the Indians and criticism in India which would prevent immi­
gration being resumed.36
But the Fiji Government was now quite reconciled to the probability
that there would be no early renewal of immigration from India. Rod-
well believed that the time for making bargains and offers had passed,
and the elected members of the Legislative Council agreed with him.
The Colonial Office passed on a request from the Government of India
that the new tax be deferred but it was brought into force after Rodwell
expressed the fear that if the Indians escaped direct taxation, the
Fijians might refuse to pay their taxes and in that case would receive
Indian support, and he cited a letter from Ratu Epeli Ganilau, the
Roko Tui Ra, protesting the unfairness of the existing situation.37
In August 1923 Rodwell went on to the offensive against India. He
noted:
It is my considered opinion that the time has come for a complete
reversal of policy on the part of the Fiji Government. I have long
held the view that the surest way of securing a change of the Indian
attitude towards Fiji would be for Fiji itself to embark upon an
anti-immigration policy — not perhaps a policy of complete pro­
hibition but at any rate one of regulation and restriction. I have felt,
however, that such a policy should only be adopted as a last resort,
when further negotiation with India proved to be hopeless, as I
am now reluctantly driven to believe it to be.38
He instanced the recent resumption of Indian immigration to Mauritius
on terms that were so favourable to the immigrants that Fiji could not
possibly accept them (and in fact the Mauritius experiment in 1923-4
of introducing free immigrants proved to be a failure and was not
repeated), and the recent decision to restrict Indian rights in Kenya,
which he thought would be certain to provoke retaliation against Fiji.
He argued that Fiji needed labourers, not storekeepers, clerks and
artisans who would, moreover, compete with the developing Fijians.
He proposed to London that Fiji be given the power by legislation to
impose restrictions on the immigration of skilled workers. In a draft
ordinance the words of the Indian Emigration Act of 1922 were copied,
to bring home to the Government of India that the game of prohibition
was one which two could play. The Colonial Office saw that the meas­
ure was primarily intended as retaliation against India and asked for
it to be deferred.39
Rodwell also proposed to defer the chartering of the 1923 repatria-

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 Negotiations

tion ship but this, too, was rejected. He argued that the Government of
India was morally in the wrong in insisting on repatriation at the
expense of Fiji when originally this had been part of a scheme of con­
tinuous immigration that had been stopped by India. He proposed to
counter the agitation against the residential tax that was accompanied
by demands for ships and threats of mass repatriation, which he
regarded as bluff, by stating that ships would be made available on
the understanding that any applicant who then failed to go should
either be compulsorily repatriated or lose his right to further repatria­
tion, or alternatively by restricting the right to one change of mind only.
The Colonial Office was critical of these attempts to limit the statutory
return right, and insisted that, in any case, no change should be made
before the discussions with the Colonies Committee of the Government
of India, which were to be held as suggested by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru
at the Imperial Conference of 1923,40
The Colonies Committee was in London from April to July 1924.
The committee of five (two Europeans and three Indians) was chaired
by Mr Hope Simpson. On Fiji, it had been instructed by Delhi to press
for greater political representation of Indians than that proposed, pre­
ferably on a common roll; a revision of municipal representation; the
withdrawal or graduation of the residential tax; the immediate appoint­
ment of an agent of the Government of India in Fiji; and the publica­
tion of the report of the 1922 deputation, without which it would be
idle to consider the reopening of emigration to Fiji. If the Colonial
Office were receptive to those proposals, the Committee was to pro­
ceed to the question of a minimum wage, the opening up of more land
for Indian settlers, better facilities for repatriation, and various other
suggestions made by the deputation to Fiji. The Colonies Committee
was soon put straight. J. H. Thomas, the new Secretary of State for
the Colonies, declared himself a whole-hearted believer in the para-
mountcy of native (not European or Indian) interests in Kenya and
the other colonies. The Colonial Office emphatically rejected the pro­
posal for a common roll, complained about the deputation’s report,
extolled Fiji’s achievement in promoting Indian prosperity as being
better than that of any other colonial government, and said that Fiji
no longer expected or desired the reopening of emigration from India.41
The decision that Fiji could do without further Indian immigrants
(which deprived the Government of India of most of its bargaining
power) was made in both London and Suva. The Colonial Office had
long believed that India should be held at arm’s length, but it had not

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The Fiji Indians

pressed this view on Fiji, British Guiana, and Mauritius, because it

knew the white settlers would only blame Whitehall for their difficul­
ties. They were left to discover for themselves that India would no
longer provide them with cheap labour, as British Guiana and Maur­
itius soon learnt. By March 1924 even the CSR had given up hope that
India would, at least in the short run, agree to renew emigration to
Fiji on acceptable terms; it thought the terms offered by British Guiana
and Mauritius were ‘fantastic’ and ‘preposterous’.42 The governor had
already consulted the Executive Council, the elected members of the
Legislative Council, the Mayor of Suva, the CSR, and Robert Cromp­
ton, and he knew that the Fijian chiefs were also against making con­
cessions to the Indians.43 It was not difficult for the Colonial Office
and the Fiji Government to agree on proposals that India would have
to accept because it no longer had the hold over Fiji which that colony’s
hope of renewed immigration had once provided.
The most important issues were those of political representation and
the demand for the appointment of an agent of the Government of
India in Fiji. The Government of India had pressed for a common
electoral roll, or alternatively for the same number of seats for the
Indians as for the Europeans. Both proposals were rejected: the Indian
community in Fiji was to be represented by three elected members.
It was agreed (though not without dissent among them) that the num­
ber of European elected members was to be reduced from seven to
six, with three Fijian members, so making the European representation
equal to the non-European. A committee was set up to consider Indian
representation on the Suva Municipality. The appointment of an agent
was refused by the Colonial Office and the Fiji Government, not only
because such a person might have proved embarrassing to the colonial
government and a possible source of friction, but also because they
believed that the Indians in Fiji should be encouraged to think of
themselves as citizens of Fiji and look to the Fiji Government and
their own leaders rather than to India, and because they objected to
the intrusion of the Government of India into colonial affairs. How­
ever, a new Fiji Government post of Secretary for Indian Affairs was
to be created and there could be occasional visits of representatives
of the Government of India to examine and report upon specific ques­
tions. There was to be an economic inquiry committee to look into
the condition of the Indians in Fiji. In March 1926 the India Office
told the Government of India that the Colonial Office’s proposals on
Fiji should be accepted, that it would not feel justified in supporting

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 Negotiations

a demand for further concessions, that India had been consulted as a

matter of courtesy only, and that responsibility for the proposals rested
with the Colonial Office and Fiji; Delhi’s responsibility was limited to
concurring in them; the decisions were quite independent of any pro­
posal for renewed immigration and therefore the Indian Legislature
need not be consulted.44
The report of the Indian deputation of 1922 was never published.
Even while the deputation was still in Fiji, Knox took strong exception
to publication of the future report, on the grounds that Raju and
Sharma were prejudiced before their arrival in Fiji and that the inquiries
were not conducted in a proper manner and were one-sided. He urged
these views on the Government of India by letter and telegram, and
on the Colonial Office and India Office during his visit to London.45
His opinion was shared in London. The report was typed at the India
Office, which at once took the view that it should be edited before
publication, because it contained passages and expressions which
reflected on the Fiji governor, particularly on his handling of the
strikes and disturbances and the accuracy of some of his published
statements, and because, by exacerbating ill-feeling, it would destroy
any hope of a favourable settlement with Fiji. In a telegram to the Gov­
ernment of India, the Secretary of State for India went on to say: T
cannot recall any instance in which a Deputation sent by a British
Government has criticised the administrative actions of another British
Government to which it was officially accredited.’46 A suggested list
of deletions of objectionable passages was prepared in London and
sent to India. The Government of India agreed that the report needed
editing before publication, but pointed out that the deletion of passages
would produce difficulties with the Indian Legislature, which would
insist on seeing the full report; it would be better to have the deputa­
tion revise it themselves. There were lengthy negotiations between the
officials in Delhi and Raju, Sharma and Corbett, who had since been
appointed to a post in the Central Provinces.
Corbett defended the report as within the deputation’s terms of
reference and as a presentation of the full facts of recent events in
Fiji. He told Ewbank he knew it might be embarrassing, but a separate
report from his colleagues would have been even more embarrassing,
could not have been suppressed or censored, and would have put an
end to all possibility of future Indian colonisation of the Pacific. He
explained: ‘Indian colonisation in the South Pacific, in my opinion,
opens up possibilities of far-reaching importance not only for India,

95
The Fiji Indians

but also in the settlement of the great problem of the future relations
of the white and coloured races.’47 Raju proved difficult, but to ensure
publication, he agreed to some alterations in the report, and eventually
an agreed list was prepared. The Government of India was under
pressure from public opinion, expressed by questions in the legislature,
to publish the report as it had indicated in the Council of State that
it would, and it was afraid that it would be leaked by Raju or Sharma.48
In July 1923, after hearing of the introduction of the residential tax,
the Government of India telegraphed the India Office for approval
to publish the final amended version 49
The Colonial Office received a copy of the report in May 1923 and
vehemently opposed publication. In minutes and letters Green and
Masterton-Smith, the Permanent Under-Secretary, condemned it as an
unfair, prejudiced, disguised attack on British administration in Fiji
by a deputation that had exceeded its terms of reference. Green wrote:
The only result of publication would be ill-feeling and racial bitter­
ness. For more than six years the bait of immigration has been
dangled before Fiji, which has granted concession after concession
and got less than nothing in return. No doubt the Indian Government
will be willing to continue the sport; but the Government and Euro­
pean community of Fiji seem to have learned their lesson and to
be ready gladly to agree that no more Indians should go to Fiji.
And we certainly do not wish to repeat our blunder anywhere else
in the Pacific.50
Masterton-Smith wrote to the India Office objecting to the ‘malevolent
character of the report’ and to ‘a partisan document in which every
possible ingenuity is exercised in misrepresenting and blackening a
British Government and Legislature’; publication would arouse a storm
of protest in Fiji and it would be necessary to publish a defence.51 In
October these views were pressed at a meeting with the India Office,
and as a result the Secretary of State for India (Lord Peel) sent a
private and personal telegram to the Viceroy (Lord Reading) urging
him to give up the idea of publication, citing the arguments of the
Colonial Office that publication would exacerbate European feeling in
Kenya and would make it impossible in the future for any colonial
administration to receive a deputation of inquiry from the Government
of India. In November, a face-saving formula was arrived at: the report
would not be published yet, but instead would be submitted to the
Colonies Committee of the Government of India.52

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 Negotiations

In November 1923 the Government of India sent a copy of the

report to Rodwell for his personal and confidential information. He
kept it under lock and key in Government House. The report con­
firmed his opinion of the deputation. He wrote to Green:
Of the Deputation as finally constituted I should say that at least
three out of the four members if not directly connected with the
Non Co-operation movement, were at least in sympathy with Gandhi
. . . Corbett, garlanded with flowers and listening with emotion to
the enthusiastic cries of ‘Mahatma Gandhi ki jai’ presents to my
mind a contemptible rather than a ‘piquant’ picture.53

In March 1926, following the negotiations with the Colonial Office,

the India Office told the Government of India that a definite decision
should be taken and announced not to publish the report, and to this
Delhi agreed, on the understanding that the proposed economic
enquiry committee would be so constituted as to command confidence
in India as well as in Fiji (in fact the committee was never appointed).54
A version of the correspondence between the Colonial and India Offices
was published in Fiji and India in 1927, with certain passages omitted
with no indication that cuts had been made. All references to the
report of the 1922 deputation were deleted for fear that they could
lead to a revival of the demand for publication; also, incidental refer­
ences to the position of Indians in Kenya in case they led to a demand
for the publication of further correspondence about Kenya; and com­
plaints by the Government of India about the residential tax and the
level of Indian wages in Fiji because they could lead to a renewed
agitation for the removal of that tax and for legislation to prescribe a
minimum wage.55 Following the publication of these papers, Raju
made a statement to the press in which he described the decisions about
Fiji as unsatisfactory and disclosed other grievances mentioned in the
deputation’s report which had not been dealt with in the published
correspondence. On 1 February 1927 the Government of India
announced that, in the best interests of the Indian community in Fiji,
the deputation’s report would not be published, and on the next day
it disallowed a motion by Pandit H. N. Kunzru in the Imperial Legis­
lative Assembly for the adjournment of the House to discuss the
inadequacy of the representation proposed for Indians on the Fiji
Legislative Council as a matter of grave public importance. In antici­
pation of further criticism, the Government of India asked London

97
The Fiji Indians

what action the Fiji Government proposed to take on the rest of the
deputation’s recommendations.56
The Colonial Office thought these further questions intolerable and
told the India Office that practically all of them were internal matters
which should properly be raised by the Indian member of the Legis­
lative Council of Fiji and considered by the new Secretary for Indian
Affairs, J. R. Pearson.57 They were whittled down to one issue: the
draft declaratory ordinance about equal rights for Indians in Fiji which
had been drawn up seven years before as a condition of the Govern­
ment of India agreeing to send a deputation to Fiji. The views of the
new governor, Sir Eyre Hutson, were invited. He gave his opinion that
questions of discrimination should be dealt with piecemeal, not by a
declaratory ordinance; moreover, it would be extremely impolitic to
recognise the Indian claim to equality with the Europeans, because it
would disturb the feeling of security which existed in the minds of the
Fijians. He went on:
To quote and to apply the statement issued by His Majesty’s Gov­
ernment in 1922, when dealing with the specific question of Indians
in Kenya, I submit, that, primarily, this Colony is a Fijian territory,
and that the interests of the Fijian race must be regarded as para­
mount and that, if and when those interests and the interests of the
immigrant races, whether European or Indian, should conflict, the
former should prevail.58
He urged that there should be no special legislation to change the status
of the Indians until the time came to repeal the Native Regulations to
accord the Fijians equal status with the Europeans, and that would
not be for many years to come. His view was accepted in London.
By 1927 India had lost the battle for a major say in the affairs of
Indians overseas, including those in Fiji. Indian public opinion, if not
as volatile and vociferous as in the years immediately before and after
the abolition of the indenture system, was still interested in their prob­
lems, and at sessions of the Imperial Legislative Assembly and the
Council of State in inter-war years questions were asked about the
condition of overseas Indians, many of them with specific reference
to Fiji. From 1927 onwards the leading officials concerned with the
question were themselves Indians. G. S. Bajpai (later knighted), who
had succeeded Ewbank as the principal official concerned with Indians
overseas, had been to Fiji as secretary to Sastri on his brief stopover in
1922. His tone was far more cautious than Corbett’s and reflected

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 Negotiations

more scepticism about the grievances of the overseas Indians and

whether the Government of India could do much for them. Ideas of
Indians colonising the empty spaces of the Empire or of being equal
partners with the Europeans in its development, which had been cur­
rent during and immediately after the Great War, were now seen for
the illusions they were. The Empire did not want more Indian immi­
grants, except as cheap labour, and the most the Government of India
could expect was to negotiate slight improvements in the condition of
those already overseas. Bajpai wrote the epitaph on the negotiations
with the Colonial Office: ‘Let us hope that Mr. Pearson and the Indian
representatives in the Fiji Legislative Council will be able to secure
more tangible benefits for the community than we have. If we have
not succeeded better, it has not been for want of trying.’59
It had been decided in London and Suva not to make any substan­
tial concessions to India or to the local Indians, but Fiji was still short
of labour and the immigration fund was still in existence. There were
still press reports of repatriates clamouring to return to Fiji. In May
1926 Alport Barker moved in the Legislative Council that the Fiji
Government should bring them back, and this was accepted as the
unanimous expression of the opinion of the elected members. The
government was loth to approach India after the rebuffs it had
received, and the CSR was doubtful of the economic value of old
repatriates.60 But the Government of India was still embarrassed by
the repatriates in Matiabruj, who again numbered about 600 to 800,
mostly from Fiji. In 1926 their desperation to return to the colonies
was reported on by S. A. Waiz of the Imperial Indian Citizenship
Association. The Indian officials were more critical. In their view, the
repatriates were discontented mainly because they had known better
days in the colonies; economically they were no worse off than the
lowest class of unskilled labour in all large towns in India, but they
were often ostracised and cut off from the benefits of the caste system.
Bajpai thought the Imperial Indian Citizenship Association’s view
‘somewhat hysterical’.61 But the stranded repatriates remained an
embarrassment. The Viceroy himself visited the locality and directed
that they be helped to return to the colonies, if necessary at Govern­
ment of India expense, and that inquiries be made in other areas to
ascertain the numbers of those living in a distressed condition. The
officials persuaded him that that would be imprudent, because it would
arouse false hopes and lead to a flood of applications and an indefinite
public liability. C. F. Andrews agreed with Bajpai that it would

99
The Fiji Indians

be politically unwise to finance re-emigration. Instead, the Government

of India approached the Governor of Fiji.62
Sir Eyre Hutson was unenthusiastic, but the Legislative Council
voted £10,000 from the immigration fund to bring back people from
India. In 1928 an officer of the Fiji Government went to India to
select the re-emigrants. The Government of India, sensitive to the
political implications, was adamant that there was to be no up-country
recruiting. Only six people were taken from the Madras Presidency
and eighteen from the United Provinces. Lists of names were sent by
friends in Fiji, but the time allowed for tracing them was short and in
many cases addresses were incorrect. The balance of the 350 re­
emigrants was collected from the distressed repatriates in Calcutta, as
the Government of India intended.63
Hutson then urged Fiji to forget about further assisted Indian immi­
gration, because no permanent or economic scheme could be devised
that would satisfy both India and Fiji. He recommended that the
immigration fund should be used to preserve the Fijian race as the
future labour supply of the colony, and specifically for improved sani­
tation and a medical campaign among the Indians and, especially, the
Fijians. But his proposal was rejected by a select committee of the
Legislative Council. The CSR, which had been the largest contributor,
objected to the use of the fund for purposes other than immigration
while it still had hope that some way would be found to bring labour
from India to tide over the next ten or twelve years before the labour
shortage was taken care of by the natural increase in the population.
It offered to make a financial contribution to Fijian infant welfare
instead, and this was accepted, the balance being provided from general
revenue. The Legislative Council decided to try to bring back more
repatriates.64
In January 1929 the Fiji Government asked if the district authorities
in India would assist in tracing the repatriates from Fiji. The Govern­
ment of India agreed, after being assured by the Madras and U.P.
Governments that there was no political danger. Lists of names were
sent, including those nominated by Indians in Fiji in 1927 and recent
repatriates considered suitable for return. Most were not traceable;
the Government of Madras reported that nine persons, some with
families, were willing to return, and the U.P. Government could find
only one.65 Then the Fiji Government dropped the idea, because of
the worsening economic situation, doubts about whether the British
preference for Fiji sugar would be continued, and its concern about

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the recent influx of free migrants from Gujarat and the Punjab, almost
all males. At the same time there was a marked slackening of the
demand for repatriation from Fiji. The late 1920s had seen a great
improvement in the economic and social conditions and general con­
tentment of the Indians in Fiji, following the restoration of stability in
the sugar industry around the CSR tenant-farmer system.
From 1920 to 1922 it had seemed possible that a very large pro­
portion of the Indian people in Fiji would return to India. Thousands
were waiting for repatriation, the Government of India was pressing
for ships to be provided for them, the talk at the highest levels in Fiji
was of the collapse of the sugar industry and the wholesale repatria­
tion of those Indians — the majority — who were entitled to return
passages. Yet by 1929 there were not enough applicants to fill even
one annual repatriation ship. Increasingly, those claiming repatriation
tended to be old people who wanted to see their birth places again
and die on Indian soil, and would not be dissuaded by relatives or the
Immigration Department, or others who were merely taking advantage
of the free passage in order to visit the land of their fathers. Those
who returned found the India of the isolated a strange and often dis­
agreeable place — hot, unhealthy, dirty, greedy, and very hard. They
had become accustomed to the different conditions of life in Fiji, and
the Fiji-born children had never known any other. Those who could
afford to return to Fiji counted themselves lucky to be back, and many
who could not still suffered in Matiabruj. In 1929 the Fiji Government
was begged to arrange passages on behalf of 650 stranded repatriates
‘with starvation and death staring us full in the face’; it replied that
nothing could be done. In Delhi Bajpai minuted, callously it may be
thought: ‘These people seem dead to all sense of national honour,
otherwise they would never have approached the Government of Fiji
in the way they have.’66 They were left to their fate, the last victims
of the indenture system.

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 VI

Dharma, Disputes and Education

In the 1920s the Fiji Indians were rapidly becoming a more diversified
and complex community. Differences within the community, some of
them dating from indenture days and others the result of more recent
history, became more obvious and productive of open tension and
conflict. The differences appeared along many planes: education,
occupation, income, area of residence in Fiji, India-born/Fiji-born,
Gujarati and Punjabi recent immigrant/Fiji Indian, North Indian/
South Indian, Tamil/Telegu, Christian/Hindu/Muslim, orthodox Mus-
lim/Ahmadiyya, orthodox Sanatan Dharm Hindu/Arya Samajist. A
variety of local and overseas influences and expectations impinged
upon the emerging community, and the search for respect, or roots, or
identity, took many forms. A far from united Indian community con­
fronted the local European settlers, the CSR, and the Fijians in com­
petition for political, economic, social and cultural power and privilege.
In Fiji the Indians were exposed to a confusing array of cultural
pressures. In the colonial plural society there was no expectation that
they conform to a common culture as was the case with immigrants
to other new lands. They had no incentive or opportunity to become
Fijian villagers. Generally the Europeans wanted to keep them in their
assigned place as labourers and menials, and did little for their educa­
tional advancement and knowledge of European culture beyond the
requirements of law and order. It should, however, be remembered that
British culture was the dominant culture in Fiji. Even those, such as
the Arya Samajists, who railed against it were receptive to its appeal,
worked within its institutions, and sought to gain admittance to the
European educational system and society. To a large extent, they were
not initiating, but responding, positively or negatively, to the domin­
ant Europeans. In the long run the culture of the Fiji Indians, though
recognisably Indian, was to become just as western or modern as
Indian. India was far away, in indenture days the immigrants were
without traditional leaders and teachers, few educated people had come
to Fiji and some of those had returned to India, and only a handful
of people arrived from India in later years to serve as leaders and keep
the Fiji Indians in touch with life in the motherland and these too
often brought dissension, not cultural unity. Yet, although the inten­
sity of the influences from India was not great, they came at a critical
time in the history both of India and of the Fiji Indians. The Indian
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 Dharma, Disputes and Education

communities in Mauritius and the West Indian colonies were longer

established, better integrated in their local environment, not as recep­
tive to influences from India, and less vulnerable. An infant Indian
community in Fiji, struggling out of its indentured past to find identity
and respect, turned for help to an India which was awakening to
national pride, political agitation and communal conflict. The influ­
ences from India were often modern adaptations to the challenge of
British rule and western civilisation rather than traditional Indian
culture.
Indian society in Fiji before 1920 was not entirely undiversified.
Almost all the immigrants passed through the hands of the CSR or a
few other employers as indentured agricultural labourers, but there
were exceptions. Some had been employed as sirdars over the others,
or had been engaged on non-agricultural work as clerks, domestic
servants, sugar mill workers, or engine-drivers. Some had come to the
colony as free immigrants, notably Punjabi agriculturists and Gujarati
shopkeepers or artisans. Some had been brought by the government
under contract as interpreters or policemen. There was the odd teacher,
doctor, Hindu pandit, and Muslim maulvi. The indentured labourers
themselves were of very diverse background. Although the majority
were of the ordinary agricultural and village menial classes of the
United Provinces and Madras Presidency, this covered a great diversity
of castes, customs, languages and dialects. There were high caste
people and untouchables, Hindus and Muslims. There were occasional
educated people and artisans. Despite the unifying and brutalising
tendencies of plantation life, cultural diversity did exist and this was
the base for the reconstitution of a complex Indian community, res­
ponsive to a variety of cultural influences.
Some further diversification, even among those who had been
plantation labourers, had taken place before 1920. A few Indians had
acquired a rudimentary education in mission schools. Some had taken
to a new occupation such as hawker, shopkeeper, boat-man, mechanic,
taxi-driver and transport operator. Others had become prosperous
cane-growers; some of these employed indentured labour themselves
and lent money to other Indian farmers. Many of the more prosperous
people were of the high castes; some of these had been made sirdars
by the employers; even the indenture system had not erased all traces
of the old order. Although religious harmony was the rule in indenture
days, the Muslims held to their faith, established religious societies,
and built mosques. Totaram Sanadhya described the activities of a

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The Fiji Indians

number of Hindu sadhus (holy men) and sects before 1914.1 The
appeal of the Arya Samaj to the more prosperous, and the emergence
of a small community of Indian Christians, have been noted in previous
chapters in the context of the industrial and political unrest at the
time of the end of the indenture system.
The abolition of the indenture system and the strikes of 1920 and
1921 had been big events in the life of the Fiji Indians. But following
the enforced departure of Manilal, the deportation of Bashishth Muni,
the visit of the deputation from India, and the agitation over the resi­
dential tax, the interest of the leading Fiji Indians turned from indus­
trial and political action to religious and social questions. This may
be attributed to the greater prosperity of the community and the suc­
cess of the CSR tenant-farmer scheme. In 1929 political agitation was
resumed, and in 1937 industrial agitation, with the formation of the
first successful farmers’ union, but in the late 1920s the Indians quar­
relled more among themselves than with the European establishment
of Fiji.
There was some political activity at that time, though the leadership
was poor and the organisations ephemeral. Manilal’s Indian Imperial
Association of Fiji collapsed after his departure. The agitation against
the residential tax was intense and widely supported but soon died
down. Babu Ram Singh did try to revive Manilal’s organisation as the
Indian Association of Fiji, with a fairly representative committee,
including Ilahi Ramjan as president, Ram Singh as secretary, and Deoki
and Ratu Ram Samujh as vice-presidents, and stated objects that
included the moral, social, educational and political uplift of the
Indians. It made representations to the Secretary of State for the Col­
onies about the residential tax and proposed an address of welcome to
a visiting Special Service Squadron that contained political remarks
which the government insisted on expunging. The government regarded
the Indian Association as representative only of the discontented urban
‘babu’ (English educated) class and declined to recognise it in any
way; it died a natural death.2 Another organisation, this time on the
western side of Viti Levu, was the Young Men’s Indian Association of
Lautoka (president C. Chattur Singh, secretary Ramsamujh Prasad).
In 1926 it asked for an Indian member to be nominated again to the
Legislative Council and Badri Mahraj was so nominated in 1926.3 On
other occasions the Indians combined for temporary and specific pur­
poses, such as the presentation of petitions and addresses, including
one to the governor in 1926, and another to L. S. Amery, the Secretary

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of State for the Colonies, on his visit to Fiji in 1927. The petitions
asked for better educational and medical facilities, greater representa­
tion on the Legislative Council than the three members envisaged,
longer terms of leases for land and simplified leasing regulations, mini­
mum wage and worker’s compensation, and the abolition of the resi­
dential tax. Significantly, the address of December 1927 included this
statement: ‘Most of us regard Fiji as our permanent home’ — a measure
of how the Indian community had settled down in Fiji only a few
years after the disorders following the end of indenture.4
In the middle years of the decade a number of new Indian organisa­
tions were formed. In 1924, following the refusal of the Suva Y.M.C.A.
to admit Indians, even Indian Christians, the Indian Reform League
was founded by A. W. McMillan, who had been sent to Fiji by the
New Zealand Y.M.C.A., and a number of modern-minded Indians.
Several Fiji Government clerks and interpreters — M. S. Buksh, W.
M. Caldwell and S. S. Chowla — were prominent in the League, and
other leading members included J. F. Grant, Ilahi Ramjan, and
Deoki.5 The majority of the members were Indian Christians and it
soon acquired a sectional, though nominally non-political, character.
It encouraged cricket and other organised sports that did much for the
new generation and provided a link between the races in Fiji; it pressed
for social reform, including changes in the marriage law; it provided
service to the people, including volunteer nurses during the typhoid
epidemic of 1925. Its counterpart was the Stri Seva Sabha (Women’s
Service League), founded in 1934, which carried out social work and
pressed for social reform.
The first major religious conflict in Fiji to emerge in the 1920s was,
not surprisingly, that between the Hindus and the Muslims. Of the
immigrants who came to Fiji, 14-6 per cent were Muslims, the great
majority of them from North India. In indenture days the distinction
between the Hindus and Muslims was there, of course, and the Mus­
lims managed to maintain their sense of religious identity more than
many Hindus. But the Hindus and Muslims did live and eat together,
they intermarried, and they joined in each other’s celebrations. The
principal festival of the Indians in indenture days was muharram (usu­
ally called in Fiji the tazia, after the bamboo and tinsel structure
representing the mausoleum erected over the grave of the martyred
Imam Husayn). In India the tazia was a Shia sectarian addition to the
month of fasting and prayer enjoined by Islam. It was a noisy, colour­
ful festival, and in Fiji an occasion for general frivolity without much

105
The Fiji Indians

religious import. For many years the celebration in Suva was organ­
ised by a Chamar (a low Hindu caste) and degenerated into a mixture
of merry-making and casual observance of Muslim rites by non-Mus­
lims. Muslim protests caused the government to ban it after 1930,6
and to ban an attempted revival in 1940. The tendency was for relig­
ious observance to become more standardised. In place of the many
sadhus and diverse eclectic observances of indenture days, certain
festivals came to be prominently recognised. Among these, Ramlila
and Holi were pre-eminent among the Hindus, Diwali was observed
by the Gujaratis especially, the South Indians had their Maha Devi
festival and associated firewalking, and the Muslims Id-ul-Fitr and
Bakr-Id.
Even before 1920 there had been signs of increasing differentiation
between the Hindus and the Muslims. Heightened Muslim conscious­
ness found expression in the formation of Islamic societies in various
centres to build mosques and teach Arabic and the principles of Islam.
In 1926 a central body, the Fiji Muslim League, was formed and an
annual general conference of Muslims initiated.' In the 1920s this
trend towards greater Muslim self-consciousness and organisation led
to conflict with the Hindus, who were undergoing a similar transform­
ation. This trend was not just a reflection of the growing complexity
of the local Indian community, but parallelled and owed much to
similar processes in India, where the 1920s saw mounting communal
tension that derived more from modern politics, organisation and mass
communication than from traditional religion. The Fiji Indians, seek­
ing identity in their new found freedom, reached out to India for
exemplars, and it was the more modern communally-minded type of
person and association that was ready and organised to provide them.
Government officers deplored these influences from India, and so did
many of the Fiji Indians themselves. Some effort was made to keep
them out, but with limited success. It is noteworthy how the organisa­
tional names, books and issues that aroused tension in Fiji followed
those in India itself.
The first important breach between the Hindus and the Muslims in
Fiji occurred before the arrival of the preachers from India, who then
did much to widen it. In December 1926 the Hindus of Suva and
Rewa held a meeting to protest against the granting of a licence for a
slaughter-house at Koronivia to Inayat, a Muslim butcher, in partner­
ship with a European. The matter aroused intense public controversy,
and the Hindus were also offended by the public selling of beef by

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Muslims elsewhere. Then came the news of the assassination by a

Muslim of Swami Shradhanand, a prominent Hindu leader in India.
Hindus made threats against Muslims, especially in the Suva-Rewa
area which was to be the locale of most of the tension between the
Hindus and Muslims in subsequent years.8 The Hindu Maha Sabha
was established in Suva with the aim of uniting the Hindus of Fiji and
was controlled by the Arya Samajists, who were more militantly anti-
Muslim than the more tolerant orthodox Sanatanis.
Early in 1927 Pandit Srikrishna Sharma, from Etawah, U.P., who
had been sent for by the Arya Samajists, arrived in Fiji. In India he
had been an Arya Samajist preacher, though he had also been involved
in nationalist agitation and had been tried and convicted during a
satyagraha about the national flag. He soon stirred up controversy in
Fiji by the public denunciations of Christianity and Islam that accom­
panied his preaching and singing. He toured the colony under the
patronage of the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha of Fiji (Arya representative
society), stirring up communal feeling while urging Hindus to eschew
European customs and collecting funds for an Indian girls’ boarding
school. He was soon joined by two other Arya Samajist arrivals: Kun-
dan Singh Kush, a school teacher brought from India, and Kunwar
Bachint Singh, a Punjabi school teacher who had been in Singapore.
Other leading Arya Samajists in Fiji included Badri Mahraj and his
son Raghvanand (a government clerk), both of whom the government
warned off becoming involved in communal agitation, B. L. Hiralal
Seth, a storekeeper and cane-grower, and Randhir Singh, a rich cane-
grower. The Gujarati commercial community, most of whom were
recent immigrants to Fiji, also provided support for the Arya Samaj
and the Hindu Maha Sabha. But the leading champion of Hinduism,
and the Arya Samaj in particular, was Pandit Vishnu Deo.
Vishnu Deo was the most important Indian leader in Fiji for more
than two decades. He was born in Fiji, unlike most of the other leaders
of his time. After attending the Marist Brothers’ school, he took a post
with the government as a clerk. He then became an accountant and
commission agent, drawing much of his business from the Gujarati
community in Suva. But most of his energy was spent on his political
career and the welfare of the Indian community — as he saw it. He
owed his political position in Fiji to his reputation as a friend of the
poor and an uncompromising champion of Indian, and especially
Hindu, interests, as well as to his skill in debate and talent for the
rough and tumble of politics. Although he had not visited India, he

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The Fiji Indians

was inspired by the ideal of a renascent Hindu India and saw the cause
of the Fiji Indians as involved in the cause of the freedom of Indians
everywhere. He was a dedicated Arya Samajist and a consistent critic
of Islam, Christianity and orthodox Hinduism. His work for the Arya
Samaj included managing schools and editing the papers Fiji Samachar
and Vaidik Sandesh. In 1932 Dr McGusty, the Secretary for Indian
Affairs, praised Vishnu Deo as an interesting character, genuinely
concerned for the social well being of the Indians, and a reasonable
advocate of their cause. He observed, correctly, as time was to show:
‘His quick mind, strong personality and undoubted qualities of leader­
ship will always make him a powerful influence in Indian politics in
the Colony.’9 In 1933 Bajpai in Delhi gave another assessment: ‘It is
regrettable that Mr Vishnu Deo wastes the ability and prestige with
which he is credited on questionable activities which can only discredit
him and the Indian community generally.’10
Overt communal conflict within the Indian community in Fiji
reached a peak in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Vishnu Deo
announced that he was protecting the chastity of a Muslim girl under
13 from some leading Muslims of Lautoka, Ba and Nadi.11 In an
address of welcome to Pandit Amichand, a new teacher from India,
the Arya Samaj leaders, in the vituperative tone they then used, claimed
that the Indian Reform League consisted of ‘Jai Chands’ (traitors)
who were leading the Indians to be ashamed of Indian culture and
encouraging them, under the guise of physical culture and refinement,
to take up dancing, drinking, meat-eating and profligacy. Chowla and
other government servants then sued Ram Singh, the printer and pub­
lisher of the Fiji Samachar, for libel, and the suit was withdrawn after
he apologised.12 The Arya Samajists also tried to seize control of the
Samabula Indian school in Suva by packing the committee. But Mus­
lim and Christian parents objected to the employment of Kundan Singh
Kush as a teacher and took their children away. The school was taken
over by the government as part of a program of educational expansion
and it re-opened with a headmaster who was a qualified teacher, a
Christian. The Arya Samajists protested at the passing over of Kundan
Singh, but the Fiji Muslim League, the Madras Maha Sangam, and
the Indian Reform League approved.13
Further unpleasantness in the Suva-Rewa area was associated with
the militant activities of the Hindu Sangathans, or local Hindu societies.
In some places where Muslims were few in number they were ostra­
cised, boycotted and threatened, and pressure was put on them to give

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up beef-eating and become Hindus. Hindus who showed friendship to

Muslims were punished. The salutation ‘salaam’, hitherto used in Fiji,
was replaiced by ‘Ram, Ram’, a specifically Hindu greeting. The Mus­
lims did not suffer in silence.Those who renounced Islam were taunted,
cattle were killed ostentatiously, meat was carried about openly, a
calf-skin was put in a Hindu’s well, Hindus were stopped from throwing
soil into the graves of their Muslim friends. There were petty assaults
and court cases. 14 The breach was not general and the boycott move­
ment was not supported by the Arya Samajists on the western side of
Viti Levu, but the old easy relations had gone forever. Both sides
complained to the government. The Hindus asserted that the trouble
was caused by the growing habit of beef-eating among the Muslims
(more of whom could now afford it) and by greater Muslim exclusivity
in their feasts and festivals; the Muslims said that the real reason for
the trouble was not Inayat’s butchery or beef-eating, but the fact that
the Hindus and the Muslims were fighting in India . 15 There was truth
in both these claims. A more diversified Indian community was turning
to the past customs of its homeland and being caught up in its present
turbulence.
The Arya Samajists directed their attacks against Christians and
orthodox Hindus as well as Muslims. On the Rewa they even tried to
convert some Fijians, but the government warned the Fijian officials
to keep their people away from them. The opposition to the Arya
Samaj found a curious champion in Dr Hamilton Beattie, a wealthy
and philanthropically minded Scottish doctor, who set out to improve
the status of the Indian community and become a leader of it. He
acquired the Pacific Press and published a new paper, Vriddhi (later,
Vriddhi-Vani), a weekly edited by J. H. Waller (a printer who had once
lived in Calcutta) and Pandit Durga Prasad (actually a Christian).
Vriddhi reported items of interest to the Indians, including regular
news about the religious controversies, it dispensed advice, and it
criticised the Arya Samajists. For instance, it recommended the book
Rangila Rishi (‘a rake as a saint’) by Pandit Madhavacharya Sastri,
which attacked the character of Swami Dayananda, the founder of the
Arya Samaj, and together with its parallel anti-Muslim volume Rangila
Rasul (‘the prophet as a rake’) was proscribed in British India. Beattie
was generally regarded as a well-meaning intruder who stirred up
trouble without having the authority he wanted. Naturally the Arya
Samajists called on the people to boycott him and his paper . 16
For the first few years the Arya Samajists, with advocates like Vishnu

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The Fiji Indians

Deo and Srikrishna Sharma and ample financial support from rich
adherents, had almost all their own way in polemics against the less
organised Sanatanis. However, in December 1930, Pandit Ramchandra
Sharma was brought to Fiji by the Sanatanis. He made a good impres­
sion by the good humoured moderation that accompanied his dis­
courses on traditional Hinduism, his singing and his playing on the
harmonium. He opened meetings of the Sanatan Dharm association to
Muslims, Christians and others, and was called a ‘Jai Chand’ by the
Samajists. Another Sanatani preacher from India was Pandit Murarilal
Sastri. The two criticised the Arya Samaj, the Hindu Maha Sabha and
the Sangathan movement for causing dissension. The Sanatanis were
now able to more than hold their own in debate, but the Arya Samaj
had a newspaper, the Fiji Samachar. In 1931, in an attempt to score
points over the orthodox Hindus, the Arya Samaj published Fiji men
Arya Samaj se Shastrarth (Religious Debate in Fiji with the Arya
Samaj), in part a vivid account of the sex life of various deities, taken
from the Purana. Vishnu Deo and Babu Ram Singh were prosecuted
and pleaded guilty to publishing an obscene work.17 Because of his
conviction, Vishnu Deo was disqualified from standing as a candidate
for the Legislative Council, with political consequences that will be
considered later.
One group that tried to stand apart from these conflicts was the
South Indian community. Although some Madrasis were drawn into
the Sangathan movement, they were dissuaded by their fellows from
becoming too involved. A quarter of the immigrants had embarked
from Madras. They included Tamil, Telegu, Malayalam, Kannada and
Hindustani speaking people. The majority were Tamils from crowded
districts such as North Arcot and Chingleput who were accustomed
to the temporary migration of agricultural labour to Burma, Ceylon,
and Malaya. Unlike the North Indians, they had no prejudice against
overseas travel, and they maintained closer ties with their homeland.
They came to Fiji later than the North Indians, and many were inden­
tured to the lately established plantations on north-west Viti Levu. On
plantations where they were isolated, they suffered greatly from lone­
liness and home-sickness, and many committed suicide. They were
discriminated against by the northerners, but they had closer relations
with the Fijians and were regarded as better workers by the CSR and
other employers. As with the northerners, their search for cultural
identity was in part a reflection of events in India, where Tamil and
Telegu regional nationalisms were asserting themselves in the inter-

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war years.
The South Indian leaders in Fiji included the merchants M. N.
Naidu and V. M. Pillay, Sadhu Kuppuswami, several government
interpreters, and Doctors C. M. Gopalan and A. D. Sagayam. Local
associations called Sangams were started. In 1926 a central body was
formed, the Then India Sanmarga Ikya Sangam, generally called simply
the Sangam, a loose association of local groups with a centre at Nadi.
In 1927 the South Indians in Suva, Rewa and Navua established the
Madras Maha Sangam; the name was changed to the Then India Vali-
bar Sangam (South Indian Young Men’s Society) in 1936.18 The South
Indians saw education as the key to the survival of their languages
and culture in Fiji. Schools were established in the name of the Sangam
and managed by local committees. South Indian languages were taught,
and the government eventually allowed these to be used as the medium
of instruction for Madrasi children in registered grant-aided schools.
For its first decade the Sangam was not particularly concerned with
political or economic matters, but with cultural identity and prestige.
Later the South Indian community became involved in the political and
industrial conflict that will be discussed in the next chapters.
Although the South Indians were a category distinct from the north­
erners, they came from various ethnic groups in India and these divis­
ions found expression in Fiji also. Again, direct influence from India
was important. In 1937 Swami Avinashananda of the Ramakrishna
Mission arrived in Fiji, in response to a long-standing request from the
Sangam for the Mission to send someone to undertake educational
and social work. He did not stay long but was followed in 1939 by
Swami Rudrananda, who was to become an important leader of the
South Indians and the cane-farmers generally. Under the Swami’s
guidance the Sangam became more tightly organised and centrally
directed from Nadi. In 1937 the Then India Sanmarga Ikya Sangam
was registered as a company, and A. D. Patel, a Gujarati lawyer,
became its general manager. The government agreed to subsidise the
Sangam’s schools and orphanages and the bringing of teachers from
South India. Of the first two brought, one was a Tamil and the other
a Telegu, but increasingly the organisation took on a more explicit
Tamil flavour. Tamils were in the majority and the two Ramakrishna
Mission swamis were both Tamils. There were too few Malayalam
and Kannada speaking people to withstand the Tamil predominance
in the Sangam, but the Telegus were better placed to do so. Dissatis­
faction with the increasing central control of the schools from Nadi

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The Fiji Indians

and with Tamil ascendancy found expression in the formation of the

Dakshina India Andhra Sangam (South Indian Andhra Society) by
Tataiya and Veeranna, of Penang, Ra, in 1941, with the objects of
promoting the study of the Telegu language and literature and preserv­
ing Telegu culture in Fiji. Again, events in Fiji parallelled those in India
where the Telegus looked forward to the formation of a separate
Andhra State. Another source of friction within the Sangam was the
resentment at the way Swami Rudrananda used his growing power to
identify the organisation with the Ramakrishna Mission, which was
not specifically a South Indian organisation.19
Although the Muslim community presented a more united front to
outsiders than the Hindus, it was not immune to sectarian conflict of
an analogous type to the Arya Samajist/Sanatani conflict among the
Hindus. When the Fiji Muslims appealed to their homeland for help it
was not the traditional, orthodox Sunni Muslims who responded, but
the modern missionary type, in this case the Ahmadiyya sect of Lahore,
regarded as heretical by the orthodox. In the communal conflict in
India in the 1920s the Ahmadiyyas were prominent as vocal cham­
pions of Islam against the Arya Samajists and were also active in
proselytising abroad. Several Fiji Indian Muslims were converted to
Ahmadiyya ideas by Muhammad Abdulla, headmaster of the Hidayat-
ul-Islam school at Nausori. Prominent Ahmadiyyas included Muham­
mad Tawahir Khan, a garage proprietor, transport operator and elec­
tricity contractor of Lautoka, the Sahu Khan family of Suva, and X.
K. N. Dean. In 1933, in the name of the Fiji Muslim League, they
brought out an Ahmadiyya preacher, Mirza Muzaffar Beg, after secret
negotiations that angered the older orthodox Muslims. But they were
not able to secure control of the League, and formed their own organ­
isation, the Ahmadiyya Anjuman Ishaat-i-Islam. Disputes over the
control of mosques and schools continued for some years, accompan­
ied by violence and police intervention on occasion. The orthodox
were more numerous, but the Ahmadiyyas had able, educated and
wealthy leaders. Muzaffar Beg also angered the Arya Samajists, who
protested that they had no champion since the government had refused
to allow Srikrishna Sharma to return to Fiji after a visit to India and
had also refused entry permits to other known Arya Samajist preachers.
But the government did not take sides in these religious and sectarian
disputes, and it applied the same treatment to Muzaffar Beg after his
return to India.20
For a few years after 1934 the controversy between the Ahmadiyyas

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 Dharma, Disputes and Education

and the orthodox Muslims died down, but rows within the Muslim
community continued over personalities and political ambitions rather
than doctrines. The Punjabi brothers, Said Hasan and Muhammad
Hasan, both lawyers and Sunnis, won for themselves positions of
leadership in the Muslim community and respect from the government.
But they were unable to control the Suva branch of the Muslim League,
and their political ambitions were challenged by the Sahu Khan family,
who formed the Muslim Association in 1938, with other Ahmadiyyas
and some Sunnis as well.21 There was further trouble after the arrival
of an orthodox teacher, Aziz Ahmed, in 1938, and there were quarrels
over the possession of the Lautoka mosque in 1939, but the details
need not detain us here. Enough has been said to indicate the pattern
of sectarian conflict, exacerbated by personal and political rivalries
and the activities of preachers and teachers from India, as the Indian
community in Fiji struggled to educate its children and find dignity and
acceptance in its new land and links with its past in India.
There were many other organisations formed by the Fiji Indians in
our period, some of them ephemeral, others longer lasting. There were
professional associations like the Fiji Teachers’ Union, unions like the
Indian Motor Drivers’ Union, commercial organisations like the Indian
Chamber of Commerce, and communal organisations like the Sikh
Gurdwara Committee, the Samyukt Gujarati Mandal, the Kabir Panth
Maha Sabha, the Arya Young Men’s Association, the Indian Christian
Society of Fiji, the Young Men’s Muslim Association, and the Sanatan
Dharm Rishikul Maha Sabha. The negative aspects of the sectarian
conflicts should not obscure the facts that most of these organisations
did useful work in education, social service, and relief during natural
disasters, and that they provided the Indian community in Fiji with
organisation, where virtually none had existed before, training in par­
ticipation and leadership in a modern setting, and channels of com­
munication with the government.
But even after making allowance for the benefits, it was unfortunate
that the Indian community could not stand together, that it was not
better led, and that it had so much bad advice from narrow-minded
though admittedly well-meaning people. Sectarian conflict weakened
the Indians’ claim to respect, enabled wedges to be driven between
them by self-interested parties, and threw up the wrong type of leaders,
who used sectional conflict to promote their own interests. Most Fiji
Government officers had no knowledge of Indian languages, and often
the Indian clerks and interpreters were themselves involved with sec-

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The Fiji Indians

tional organisations and did not command the full confidence of either
the government or the Indians. The Fiji Government had refused to
accept an agent of the Government of India in Fiji; neither Pearson,
the first Secretary for Indian Affairs, nor McMillan, the Inspector of
Indian schools, enjoyed much respect, particularly from the Arya
Samajists; and there was no Indian in the colony of sufficient stature
to act as a leader of all. The administration, particularly Sir Murchison
Fletcher (governor, 1929-1936), was not above taking advantage of
the conflict. To its credit, the Government of India firmly advised the
Fiji Government against granting requests from the Fiji Muslim League
that the Muslims be given separate political representation and recog­
nition of Muslim personal law, though this differential treatment
existed in India itself. And if communal bodies in India provided the
wrong type of inspiration and leadership for the Fiji Indians, there was
at least one friend who gave them good advice. Benarsidas Chaturvedi,
pursuing a lonely concern for the interests of the Indians abroad,
publicly criticised those who dissipated the energies of the Fiji Indians
in religious quarrelling.22 In consequence, he fell from favour with
Vishnu Deo and the Fiji Samachar, which instead began to praise
another champion of the overseas Indians, Bhawani Dayal Sannyasi,
whom the Fiji Government refused permission to come to Fiji. Of
course, not all missionaries from India engaged in polemics, while
some who arrived full of fervour soon settled down to teaching and
quiet service to their people.
Another source of division within the Indian community was that
between those already in Fiji and the newcomers, who were mainly
Punjabis and Gujaratis. There had been a small number of Punjabi free
migrants, even before 1920. They were more willing to travel abroad
on their own initiative than the people of Bengal or the United Pro­
vinces, in part because of their freedom from caste restrictions, and
experience in military and police service. They were accustomed to
migrating to make money and return to their home villages, and this
became a tradition in heavily populated districts. Economic pressure
was not unique to the Punjab, but there it operated within a cultural
context that sanctioned overseas migration. Many went to Fiji in the
late 1920s, following the closing of other countries to them. Most of
them were from the Jullundur, Ferozepore, Hoshiarpur, and Ludhiana
districts of central Punjab. Jullundur district, which provided the
majority, was troubled by rising population, diminishing size of hold­
ings, increasing agricultural indebtedness, declining water-level, and

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 Dharma, Disputes and Education

lack of canal irrigation. There was a shortage of women and bride

prices were high. Most of the migrants were young, unmarried, Jat
Sikhs who had to negotiate loans for their passages on the security of
their shares in the land. In 1928 their passages were being arranged by
Saiyed Wali Mohammad and Ganga Singh of Karnana, tahsil Nawa-
shahr, Jullundur. Wali Mohammad had been in Australia and Ganga
Singh had been a storekeeper in Ba. It was said that they charged
about Rsl50 a head, in addition to the steamer fare, for arranging
passports and the journey to Calcutta. Chain migration followed, as
successful Punjabis in Fiji wrote to fellow villagers and sent remittances
home. The Punjab Government estimated that the total amount re­
mitted from Fiji to Jullundur in 1928 was at least a million rupees. In
Fiji, the young Sikhs took to a variety of occupations and acquired a
reputation for being hard workers and tough bargainers. They were
the backbone of the road-gangs, worked as artisans in Suva, cut and
sold fire-wood, set up as market gardeners and yaqona cultivators
between Suva and Rewa, and many went to the cane districts, where
there were several wealthy Punjabi planters.23
In contrast, the other main group of Indian migrants in this period,
the Gujaratis, became traders and artisans, rather than agriculturists
and labourers. Like the Punjabis, the Gujaratis were more inclined to
go overseas in search of fortune than most of the Indian peoples.
Gujarat, which is astride the old trade routes from the Arabian Sea to
Central and Northern India, has a long history of commercial and
industrial enterprise, and Gujarati traders have long been accustomed to
travelling overseas. As the colonial powers established their type of
commercial order throughout the world, Gujaratis followed in their
wake. Like the Punjabis, a few arrived in Fiji before the first world war,
but the immigration did not gather pace until the late 1920s. The 250
who arrived on the direct steamer from India in 1930 included 57
whose occupation was given as tailor, 43 as hawker, 29 as jeweller, 26
as laundryman and 25 as barber.24 The Gujarati immigrants to Fiji
came from a variety of places, including Saurashtra and Kaira district
in central Gujarat, but the majority of them were from Surat District
and the adjoining Baroda State, especially Navsari town. They were of
various castes, but principally Khatris, Darjis and Patels. In Fiji the
Gujaratis often had to take to new occupations. The great majority
were Hindus, including some Arya Samajists, but there were a few
Muslims. Gujarati migration to Fiji was chain migration, and those
who became established sent for kinsmen. They became the shop-

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The Fiji Indians

keepers, tailors, jewellers, shoemakers, laundrymen, and barbers of the

colony, and in time largely ousted the local Europeans and the ex-
indentured and Fiji-born Indians from the retail commerce of Fiji,
though the Chinese were just as successful in business and the large
European firms retained their positions at the top. The Gujaratis were
skilful in craft and business, hard-working, frugal, clannish — and
unpopular with other Indians. Normally they brought their business
partners and assistants from India and did not employ locals. Most of
the assistants were employed on four or five year contracts, and
because of an over-supply of migrants had to accept employment for
a few shillings a month and their keep — conditions which the locals
would not accept — though sweatshop conditions were tempered by
paternalism and kinship solidarity.
Until 1930 there was still a labour shortage in Fiji and free migrants
were welcomed by the Fiji Government and European planters, even
though they did not intend to stay permanently. It was thought that
transients, who should be encouraged by a regular steamer service
between Fiji and India, could tide over the labour needs of the colony
until these could be met from the natural increase of the Indians
already in Fiji and from the entry of more Fijians into the labour
market. The Fiji Times and Herald wrote: ‘Fiji does not require per­
manent settlers of the Indian type. Her lands and her climate are for
Europeans who can employ what labour they require.’25 In a letter to
Bajpai, Pearson stressed the government’s responsibility towards the
Fijians and the need for caution in encouraging permanent Indian
immigrants; it now preferred a regular flow of enterprising temporary
immigrants who would come out for a few years to improve their
prospects in life and return to their homes.26 But this attitude changed
as an increasing flow of young Sikhs poured on to an overcrowded
and depressed labour market in 1930. On the repatriation steamer
which arrived from Calcutta in February 1930 there were 347 Punjabi
and 250 Gujarati migrants, and others were coming via Australia.27
In 1930 the Fiji Government imposed restrictions on immigration. It
asked the Government of India to refuse passports to anyone wishing
to go to Fiji unless he was accompanied by his wife, or produced
evidence that he was a resident of Fiji, or the consent of the Fiji Gov­
ernment had first been obtained.28
In the 1930s the Fiji Government further restricted immigration,
giving as reasons the worsening economic situation, the risk of unem­
ployment and discontent among the Gujarati and Punjabi immigrants,

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 Dharma, Disputes and Education

the competition with local Indians and the emerging Fijians, and the
excess of male immigrants at a time when a disproportion of the sexes
still survived from indenture days. From 1931 onwards Indian immi­
gration was limited to 500 to 700 a year. In the issue of permits,
preference was given first to family groups and then to agriculturists,
and an attempt was made to limit the number of traders and artisans
to the colony’s actual requirements. There were still more male immi­
grants than female, but the restrictions did redress the balance to some
extent. The majority of the immigrants were still Gujaratis and Pun­
jabis. The regulations were evaded by various subterfuges, and were
tightened in 1935 by the introduction of a system under which Fiji
passports were issued only to bona fide residents, defined as Fiji-born
Indians, those brought in under the indenture system and still resident
in Fiji, and those who had lived in Fiji for ten years and also had
business interests or employment of a permanent nature there. All
others, whether new immigrants or not, needed a landing permit. The
Indian Association of Fiji and the Indian Chamber of Commerce pro­
tested against these restrictions, and their protests were taken up with
the Government of India by the Imperial Indian Citizenship Associa­
tion and the Indian Merchants’ Chamber of Bombay. The Government
of India told London that it was not satisfied that the new restrictions
were justified, and it re-affirmed that only in exceptional circumstances
should Indians be denied entry to a British colony. In the late 1930s
the Fiji Government proposed to go even further in restricting Indian
immigration. In 1938 the Executive Council decided to set an annual
quota of 350 Indian immigrants, exclusive of the wives and minor child­
ren of residents, but the matter was held over until after the war.29
In December 1937 an official committee on immigration heard
evidence from the public. There was a conflict of opinion among the
Indians. Some wanted travel between Fiji and India to be as unres­
tricted as it was to the British Commonwealth countries from which
most of the Europeans in Fiji came, but some favoured a quota system
with preference to agriculturists, and others asked that there be no
further Indian immigration. A. D. Patel chaired a conference of Indians
at Lautoka that pressed the first view, which was the most generally
held. But 200 Indians at Ba signed a petition asking that immigration
be stopped ‘in the interests of those already settled here, their offspring
and for the good of the Colony as a whole’. The petition went on:
There are certain undesirable types of Immigrants; Fiji is full with

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The Fiji Indians

such. These men refuse to admit in their social circle which in itself
creates bad feeling; there is nothing but these traders refuse to
employ local borns in services; they refuse to teach them any form
of trade; they refuse to spend in Fiji; their God is money and their
interest in Fiji merely matter of £ S P . . . Our troubles date from
far back, and it dates back from the days when professional men
arrived amongst us. Our party feelings and religious troubles come
from India.30
The petition reflected the growing feeling against the Gujarati money­
lenders and the sentiment that Fiji should be for the Fiji-born.
Similar attitudes were evident during the 1937 election campaign,
when Chattur Singh made effective use of the fact that he was Fiji-born
in order to defeat his Gujarati opponent, A. D. Patel, in the north­
western Indian division. Chattur Singh and his brother, Parmanand
Singh, together with Ayodhya Prasad and Siri Ram, organised a secret
body, called the Nawa Jawan Sainik (New Youth Army). It was com­
posed largely of Fiji-born Indians, and it excluded Gujaratis, Punjabis
and even Madrasis. The associated Indian Trading Company was an
unsuccessful effort to supplant the Gujarati storekeepers. The land­
lord of a store building expelled his Gujarati tenant and formed the
Rakiraki Indian Farmers Store Company. The anonymous commander-
in-chief of the New Youth Army made a press attack on the Samyukt
Gujarati Mandal, a Gujarati social organisation.31 However, the agita­
tion, though it reflected widespread attitudes, was mainly occasioned
by the election campaign, and it soon died down, though anti-Gujarati
feeling remained latent and was expressed again during the war when
there was profiteering by Gujarati storekeepers. In later years the
Gujaratis steadily consolidated their hold on retail commerce and
became the richest Indian group in Fiji. In recent years they have
become much more settled in the colony, and have used some of their
considerable wealth on the welfare of others — especially on educa­
tion.
As the general contentment of the community improved, the Fiji
Indians looked to the future of their children in Fiji and wanted formal
education for them. The Christian missions had schooled the Fijians,
but had done less for the Indians, though they had made a start in
1898. In the days of the indenture system most of the Europeans
thought that it would have been unnecessary, and self-defeating, to
provide schools for the Indians, who had been brought to Fiji to serve

118
 Dharma, Disputes and Education

as an unskilled labour force. This view did not go unchallenged and

the 1909 Education Commission and various missionaries protested
against it. The Indian work of the Methodist Missionary Society of
Australasia, the largest mission in Fiji, was predominantly in the
educational field, and the Anglican and Roman Catholic missions
maintained schools also. They made few converts, but many non-
Christian leaders of the Indian community received their formal educa­
tion in Christian schools.
There were other formidable problems besides the indifference or
hostility of the European community. There was little on which to
build except the keenness of the Indian parents and their willingness
to sacrifice for their children. The parents were themselves illiterate
and there were few educated Indians in Fiji, especially qualified
teachers. The Indians were poor, the missions were already heavily
committed to the education of the Fijians, the government faced seri­
ous financial difficulties in the early 1920s because of the crisis in the
sugar industry, and in any case had always left most of the work of
education to the missions. It was implicit government policy to keep
the races separate and, even apart from the problem of language, it
was not considered appropriate for Indian children to be admitted to
schools for the Fijians or to the few European schools. There was
no system of Indian local government and no educational rating system.
There was the need to find competent school managers. One of the
most serious problems of all related to the lack of social cohesion of
the Indian community in Fiji. The Fijians, who lived in villages under
a communal system, found it easier to co-operate to establish schools,
build school-houses from local materials, pay the teachers almost
entirely in kind, and keep up enthusiasm and contributions under the
guidance of the Christian missions, which provided training for the
teachers. The Fijians largely paid for their own education and it was
relatively easy to organise them to do so. But Indian settlement was
scattered, there were no recognised villages and no shared local tradi­
tions or established institutions, and labour and building materials
had to be bought. The Indians were divided by language and religion
and in the 1920s became more conscious of these differences. It is not
surprising that progress in providing Indian schools lagged well behind
the growth in population.
In 1931 it was estimated that of 16,200 Indian children 6-14 years
of age, 4402 were attending school (3440 boys and 962 girls). They
were being taught in 68 schools by 165 teachers (30 of them Euro-

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The Fiji Indians

peans), of whom 76 were trained and 89 untrained. The government

managed 7 of those schools, the Methodist mission 11, the Roman
Catholic mission 7, the Anglicans 2, the Seventh Day Adventists 2,
Muslim associations 2, South Indian associations 4, the Arya Samajists
3, the CSR 3, and others 2. Twenty-five others were classified as
‘general’; in 8 of those Arya Samaj influence predominated, in 9 ortho­
dox Sanatan Dharm influence, and in the case of the remaining 8, the
local Indians were said to be without any strong religious leanings.
Slightly different figures given elsewhere for 1931 show that of 4530
Indian pupils, 500 were being taught in government schools, 1800 in
Christian mission schools, 120 in schools managed by the CSR, 100
in Muslim schools, and 2010 in schools conducted by other Indian
societies and committees.32
Behind these statistics, though not clearly shown by them alone, is
a story of inadequate government aid to Indian education compared
to that given to the Europeans and Fijians; high-quality mission school­
ing in central places; extensive Indian voluntary effort, particularly by
the Arya Samajists; much low grade schooling in local schools con­
ducted by faction-ridden committees and untrained teachers; attend­
ance by many Indian children for three or four years only; attempts
by the Muslims and South Indians, where they were in sufficient num­
bers, to retain their cultural identity and the teaching of Urdu, Tamil
and Telegu; a lag in education for girls; fragmentation and duplication
of effort, particularly in the towns and more populous centres; the
neglect of remote areas where there were often no Indian schools at
all; and the reinforcement of the pluralistic pattern of Fiji society,
with separate schooling for the Europeans, the Fijians and the Indians.
The policy of providing separate schools for the Fijians and the
Indians was not seriously questioned in Fiji by any of those involved
in education: the government, missions, Indian societies, parents, and
teachers. Some of the leading Indians did object to the exclusion of
Indian children from the European schools, including the Suva
Grammar school. Until 1929 no education was available for them in
Fiji above primary level. Badri Mahraj was the first to send his sons
to New Zealand for secondary schooling, others followed, and later
the Fiji Government gave overseas scholarships. From 1925 to 1936
a number of children were sent to Arya Samaj institutions in India for
higher education, and this helped to keep alive Indian culture in Fiji.
The government and the local Europeans took it for granted that, in
the context of the European dominated order, it would be inappro-

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 Dharma, Disputes and Education

priate to admit Indian children to their schools. Differences in customs,

backgrounds and languages were the rationale for this discrimination,
as it was in the case of the separate schools for the Fijians and Indians.
As most of the Fijian schools were village schools, integrated into the
Fijian social structure and Fijian Christianity, it was simply more
convenient to set up separate schools for the Indian children. Although
there were a few multi-racial schools, the different patterns of settle­
ment, government, economic life, religion, recreation and associations
were generally reinforced by Fiji’s school system.
The debate about Indian education in Fiji concerned rather the
question of government aid, the type of education to be imparted, and
the medium of instruction. The 1909 Education Commission had
recommended that the government do more for Indian education by
providing assistance to the missions and to the employers of inden­
tured labour and by establishing government schools. By 1917 a Board
of Education and a Superintendent of Schools had been appointed and
provision made for grants-in-aid. Andrews spent much of his time on
his second visit in 1917 in setting up schools and recommending the
value of education for the Indians in Fiji. He felt that the government
should do more to help Indian initiative in the educational field. By
1919 the government was assisting seventeen schools for Indian child­
ren, and in the same year a government school was opened at Natabua,
Lautoka.
From 1923, following the end of the post-indenture political and
industrial troubles, the Indians began to show a much keener interest
in the education of their children, and there was much private initiative
in trying to set up schools. Indian organisations, including the Indian
Reform League, asked the government for aid to Indian education,
and in 1925 the new governor, Sir Eyre Hutson, proposed to London
that there be a commission into education in Fiji. He pointed out that
the government could not with safety allow the Indians to grow up
without education, noted that they wanted other schools besides those
run by the Christian missions, and commented: ‘This aspiration of a
people who adhere to the great Faiths of the East is one which com­
mands my sympathy.’33 In 1926 there was no high school for Indians,
and no teacher training other than that provided by the Methodist
and Roman Catholic missions. The Education Commission of 1926
received submissions from a variety of Indian associations, represent­
ing several religious and linguistic groups. It recommended that more
Indian schools be provided, education be adapted to Fiji rural condi-

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The Fiji Indians

tions, a secondary school be established, and teacher training provided

in Fiji by the government. It proposed that an education rate be levied
on Indians to provide funds for education and introduce a measure
of local government in the Indian districts. It noted that the missions
could not be expected to carry the whole burden of educating the
Indian population, even apart from the religious problem, and saw
no alternative to either a system of government schools or the exten­
sion, under strict regulation, of the system of grants-in-aid.34 A full­
time Director of Education was appointed in 1927; A. W. McMillan
became Inspector of Indian Schools; a secondary department and
teacher training facilities were attached to Natabua; and a few schol­
arships were provided for secondary schooling in New Zealand. How­
ever, progress was delayed, first by disputes over policy and the opposi­
tion of the European leaders in Fiji, and then by the economic depres­
sion from 1931 onwards.
The first Director of Education, John Caughley, who had held the
same post in New Zealand, was critical of the mission and private
Indian schools and favoured government schools. He said that at least
100 more schools, each accommodating 100 pupils, were needed to
meet the needs of the Indian children aged 6-10 years, and asked
that 13 schools be established in 1929. But Hutson wanted government
schools to be tried on a small scale at first. He proposed that the
thirteen schools be established over a five year period commencing in
1930, and this was accepted by the elected members of the Legislative
Council, though not discussed in open council. It was understood that
these government schools were to be an experiment. Figures given to
the council showed that in 1928 the government spent £7639 on the
education of 870 European children, £12,195 on 16,000 Fijians, and
£5040 on 3500 Indians at school. Of children aged 5-14 inclusive,
91-5 per cent of the Europeans were attending school, 80 per cent of
the Fijians, and 17-5 per cent of the Indians. Over all Europeans 5-14
years of age, the government spent £8 per head on education, over all
Fijians 12s. and over all Indians 5s.35
In 1929 Hutson left Fiji, and the acting governor, A. W. Seymour,
decided, on the advice of Caughley and Pearson, to hasten the provis­
ion of schools for the Indians. In a message to the Legislative Council
he proposed that six boys’ and three girls’ schools be set up by the
government in 1930. He observed that progress since 1909 had been
meagre; the need was pressing and action could not be delayed until
a reasonable rating system had been worked out. In an annexed state-

122
 Dharma, Disputes and Education

ment Caughley observed: ‘No one can help noticing the eagerness,
amounting to a kind of hunger, for education among the Indians of
Fiji.’36 Pearson, who helped draft Seymour’s message, thought that
education for Indians was fast getting out of hand, boys were being
crammed in English far too soon, nothing but a literary education was
being given, schools were becoming centres of factional strife, and the
people, left to their own devices, were becoming subject to nationalist
influences from India. In his view, the system needed stabilising by
having government schools as models.37
The European elected members were shocked by Seymour’s mes­
sage. In 1929 there was heightened political tension between the Euro­
pean and Indian leaders following the elections of that year and the
subsequent walk-out of the newly appointed Indian members of the
Legislative Council. The European members asked that the proposals
be deferred. They said they agreed that provision was needed for Indian
education, but they doubted whether government schools would be
successful and asked that the experiment be tried on a smaller scale
first; in any case, the proposals should first have been submitted to the
Board of Education. When Seymour refused to back down, his rela­
tions with the European elected members deteriorated rapidly and they
asked that their protest be referred to the Secretary of State. They
objected to a temporary incumbent, on the eve of the arrival of a new
governor, trying to push through an educational program which had
been drastically altered from one that had been agreed with the previ­
ous governor. The Indians rallied to Seymour’s support and condemned
the European elected members at a meeting in the Suva Town Hall.
After the arrival of Sir Murchison Fletcher, the European elected mem­
bers petitioned for Seymour’s removal from Fiji and refused to serve on
any committee of which he was chairman, alleging that he had been
discourteous towards Hedstrom, the senior elected member. Personal
differences, Seymour’s tactlessness, and constitutional issues were
undoubtedly involved, but there were more fundamental questions.
The Secretary of State agreed not to press for larger expenditure in the
existing estimates, but told the elected members that he thought the
three extra schools they were proposing were not adequate, and
instructed Fletcher to make an early inquiry into the matter and submit
supplementary estimates.38
To Seymour and the Indians, the real issue was European opposition
to the education of the Indians — though this was publicly denied by
the European members and by Fletcher in his despatches to London.

123
The Fiji Indians

Seymour wrote to London: ‘It is my settled opinion that Indian educa­

tion has been deliberately shelved for the past 6 years. The European
members thought they could shelve it in this Budget also. They seem
to think Education even in the vernacular is bad for Indians.’39 He
claimed that the CSR was behind the opposition to Indian education;
but the European members hardly needed prompting on this matter
or on questions touching their constitutional rights and dignity. In the
Colonial Office, one official noted: ‘Fiji is on its way to becoming a
little Kenya — the unofficials are not yet too stout to be dealt with —
we must make sure that they don’t become so — on no account must
Mr Seymour be thrown to the wolves.’40 Whitehall was only too pleased
to snub the elected members. The European members were told in
reply to their petition for Seymour’s removal: ‘His policy of endeav­
ouring to remedy past neglect of Indian education, which appears to
be the gravamen of the charges against him, is one which commends
itself to Lord Passfield’ (the new Labour Party Secretary of State).41
Over the next few years the Colonial Office and its Advisory Committee
on Education in the Colonies, in agreement with the Government of
India, repeatedly complained to the Fiji Government about the dis­
parity between the educational facilities provided for the Indians and
those available to the Europeans and Fijians, and particularly about
the lower proportion of Indian than of Fijian children attending
school.42
In November 1929 and only four days after his arrival in Fiji,
Fletcher held a meeting on educational policy, attended by representa­
tives of various interests, including four Indians. There was general
agreement that there should be separate education for the Europeans,
Fijians and Indians, that the Indians should provide schools of their
own, to be managed by local committees and supervised by the Board
of Education, and that the Indians should be taxed to pay up to half
the cost of elementary education for their children. Fletcher set out
to implement this policy. The grant-aided school continued to be the
norm, though the government did take over three existing schools and
build three new ones to serve as models. The government concentrated
on improving standards, and relied on private initiative to set up new
schools.43 However, it was unable to meet the demand for grants. A
system of rating for Indian education was provided for by ordinance
in 1930 but for various reasons was not introduced: there were admin­
istrative difficulties, the return to be had from a rate would have fallen
far short of requirements, it might have reduced voluntary Indian

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 Dharma, Disputes and Education

contributions, it would have been difficult to devise a fair system, poor

people would have found it hard to pay, a rate would have implied
that all could go to school.44 Expansion was further retarded by the
high standard of school building demanded before grants were given,
and by the shortage of teachers. The government dragged its heels on
drawing up a program for the establishment of new schools and the
acceleration of teacher training, though urged to do so by the Colonial
Office. After his visit in 1936, A. I. Mayhew, the Colonial Office’s
principal educational adviser, gave his opinion that although Indian
education had been greatly improved since 1929, ‘Indian education in
quality and quantity in all its aspects and grades is still considerably
below the level of Fijian education’ 45 It should be noted, however, that
the statistics did not tell the full story; many of the schools in Fijian
villages were of a very low standard indeed.
Shortage of funds, aggravated by the depression and World War II,
undoubtedly had much to do with the slow progress in Indian educa­
tion, but Fletcher, who was governor for six critical years from 1929,
was clearly unsympathetic to Indian political and educational aspira­
tions, and in this he was one with the European elected members. He
wrote in 1936:
The Colonial Office have not in my time evinced the smallest interest
in Fijian education . . . The Indian community are far wealthier
than the Fijian community, and therefore better able to help them­
selves in the matter of education. The Indian always clamours
loudly, when he wants anything. The Fijian never defends his needs
. . . It is necessary to beware lest under Govt, of India — Colonial
Office — local Indian pressures we act unfairly by the Fijians and
give the Indians more than their share.46
Not that Fletcher thought that true education was being neglected. Soon
after his arrival he wrote to London:
I may here pause to examine the charge, which is being made against
this Colony, that next to nothing is being done to promote Indian
education. If education connotes a scholastic training in English on
European lines, the charge is true. If, after the modern fashion, the
test is the counting of heads, then Fiji can at least claim that 5-63
per cent of its Indian population are students, as compared with
3-47 per cent in India. If however there is a wide definition: if
education includes those methods which are designed to inculcate

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The Fiji Indians

discipline and an orderly habit of life, teaching the people to adjust

themselves to their environment, so that they may find contentment
and progress within that environment: then Fiji can point to an
achievement which few can emulate. I refer to the achievement of
the Colonial Sugar Refining Company, and 1 claim no credit for
the Government. When it is realised that some seventy per cent of
the Indian population depends directly or indirectly upon the Com­
pany, it cannot be said that education in its true sense is neglected
in Fiji.
In short, the Indians were to be kept in their place as farmers and
labourers. Fletcher was quite explicit on the point: the Indian in Fiji
‘almost without exception, has no prospects at all apart from the
land’.47
It followed, in Fletcher’s analysis, that education should be in the
vernacular, not in English. The Education Commission in 1926 had
recommended that, where suitable teachers were available, a simple
course of reading and speaking English should be introduced at an
early stage, and that English should also be used as the medium of
instruction at an early stage. This was already the practice in most
Fiji schools for Indians. Hindustani was the medium of instruction in
the lower primary grades, and English in the upper and secondary
grades and in the teachers’ training schools. Fletcher was opposed to
the teaching of English in the primary schools and tried to arrest this
trend. He told London: ‘The indiscriminate teaching of English will
lead the people away from their present contentment.’ ‘Very costly and
very tragic mistakes’ made elsewhere in the tropics were to be avoided;
an educated urban, unemployed, discontented, and disloyal class was
not to be created in Fiji. In his view of the Indian, ‘the mainspring of his
demand for education is his determination to get away from the land’.48
There was some validity in this analysis. Indian parents did want educa­
tion in the English language which they saw as opening up better
prospects for their children and that is why they were prepared to send
them to Christian schools, where a high standard of English was main­
tained. They did not send their children to school to learn to do manual
work that could be done at home. Agricultural courses and schools
such as those of the CSR and the Seventh Day Adventists that empha­
sised agricultural training were not well patronised by Indians. Yet
the few non-manual jobs were still usually reserved for Europeans:
in 1930 the Fiji public service employed no more than forty Indian

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 Dharma, Disputes and Education

clerks, interpreters, messengers, and assistant treasury officers; the

business firms employed few Indians in clerical capacities and even
the shop assistants were still nearly all Europeans.
The Colonial Office took a broader view. Its Advisory Committee
on Education in the Colonies stressed the advantages in spreading a
knowledge of English as a second language: a higher standard of educa­
tion, the bringing together of the races, and the avoidance of a situa­
tion where the Fiji Indians looked to India for all their ideas and
policy; English was destined to be the lingua franca of the Pacific; if
all were taught English, there would be no gap between a small English
educated class and the rest of the Indian population; English could
be taught in such a way as to be useful in all occupations.49 Fletcher
did not succeed in arresting the trend towards teaching English in the
schools. Most schools taught some English from an early stage and
used it as the medium of instruction in the higher grades.
The question of the medium of instruction was complicated by
cultural diversity among the Indians. The education ordinance of 1929
provided for the medium of instruction in primary schools to be Hindu­
stani in the Nagari script. The government tried to keep up Hindustani
standards in the schools, and books, magazines, and films from India
reinforced the trend towards a more correct form of the language than
the old Fiji-bat of the plantations. The militant Arya Samajists wanted
a more sanskritic form of Hindi than that propagated by McMillan
in his Hindustani Handbook, school journal, and teachers’ examina­
tions. On the other hand, the Muslims objected to the teaching of the
Nagari script, and in 1931, in response to their requests, the govern­
ment permitted the use of the Urdu script for Muslim pupils in regis­
tered schools. Urdu and Arabic were taught in religious schools, which
did not have to be registered under the Education Ordinance. Simil­
arly, Tamil and Telegu were taught as additional languages in schools
run by South Indian organisations, and the government agreed to their
use as a medium of instruction. But Hindi still became the common
language of the Fiji Indians.
Education is an important subject but it has not been possible to
give more than a general treatment here. Several points emerge.
Schooling was rightly seen, by those who asked for it and those who
opposed it, as the key to the future of the Indians in Fiji: the oppor­
tunity for them to enter non-manual occupations and compete with
the Europeans. Most of the Fiji Indian leaders concerned themselves
with the establishment and management of schools; the European

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The Fiji Indians

leaders recognised Indian education as a threat and tried to block it.

The administration, particularly Fletcher, was apprehensive that too
much schooling, particularly in the English language, would increase
social and political discontent and give the Indians an added advantage
over the less ambitious Fijians that could prove awkward in the future.
The European settlers and the government were able, with the help
of the depression and the war, to slow the Colonial Office’s impetus
for faster progress in closing the gap. Although the Christian missions
and the government’s professional educationists, who were mainly from
New Zealand, did excellent work, particularly in keeping up standards,
the initiative for the education of the Fiji Indians came mainly from
the people themselves. Apart from the mission schools, the typical
school was established by local residents, who formed a committee,
appointed a manager who was often a prominent local figure such as a
solicitor, built a schoolhouse, and sought recognition from the Educa­
tion Department, which would approve the facilities, post and super­
vise a teacher, approve a curriculum, and make a grant-in-aid. The
committee had a continuing responsibility for providing the running
costs of the school, but enthusiasm was difficult to maintain and the
work and financial support, as usual, devolved on to a few people.
The school committee was one of the few associations in Fiji Indian
rural society, and the forum not only of general aspirations but also
of disputes of a personal and sectarian kind.
A later governor, Sir Philip Mitchell, wrote in criticism of the educa­
tional policy hitherto followed in Fiji:
No one seems to have given much attention to the broad question
of the kind of education suitable for Fiji. The approach has rather
been to consider how the education given elsewhere, most commonly
in the United Kingdom or New Zealand, can be provided in increas­
ing quantities for the people of these Islands. Moreover, at least in
the official attitude to education, racialism has been accepted as
inevitable and all educational arrangements have been made on the
assumption that the races must be educated separately .50
Of course, it was but natural for the conventional British educational
wisdom of the day to be applied to a Crown Colony, and there is
nothing unique about educational inequality or white privilege. What
is singular about Fiji was the maintenance, largely because it was the
easy course, of a tripartite school system that was only rarely ques­
tioned — as it was by Mitchell, and by C. F. Andrews on his visit in

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 Dharma, Disputes and Education

1936 — from the standpoint of inter-racial understanding and future

national solidarity. In 1944 in a special report on education commis­
sioned by the government, F. B. Stephens from New Zealand recom­
mended that there should be more multi-racial schools in the larger
centres and that the government should take over all the schools.
Although it imposed stricter control over the schools, the government
did not take his advice on multi-racial schools.51 As a visitor from
India noted in 1937: ‘What a contrast between Fiji and Hawaii! The
different races are kept apart practically at every stage of education
in Fiji.’52

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 VII
Common Roll
‘Honour’ is the refrain of the overseas Indians. The indenture system
was hated in India more because it was seen as a symbol of national
degradation than because of the suffering it caused. The deputation of
the Government of India in 1922 listed izzat (honour) — with pet
(livelihood), insaj (justice), and ‘shipping’ — as one of the four main
grievances of the Indians in Fiji. By crossing the waters and disregard­
ing caste custom, the migrants had failed to observe dharma (religious
duty), and those who returned to India were soon reminded of it.
Those who stayed in Fiji were conscious, too, that they were disliked
by the Europeans and Fijians, especially by the former whose con­
tempt was more freely expressed and — in the context of European
dominance — more important. To most Fiji Indians, preoccupied with
livelihood and family, izzat was a background problem but to the
emerging leadership it was supremely important. Specific economic
grievances attracted followers, but what moved the leaders was (after
taking self-interest for granted) more often than not a resentment of
the inferior position assigned to Indians in the European dominated
order.
In 1929, the governor, Sir Murchison Fletcher, put his finger on
that need for recognition and respect:
I believe that the point of view of the Indian in all parts of the world
is largely coloured by his resentment that, no matter what his stand­
ing is in terms of culture and of wealth, the European persists in
ignoring his social existence, but, be this as it may, the important
point with the local Indian is, not constitutional forms, but a deter­
mination that he shall get what the European has got, and that he
shall be granted an all-round equality of status.1
Throughout our period the majority of the Europeans in Fiji were
unwilling to concede to the leading Indians the respect they longed for.
They excluded them from their clubs and schools, did not invite them
to their homes, and reminded them in various ways that they were
the sons of indentured labourers and fortunate to be in Fiji at all.
Understandably, those who aspired to respect within the European
dominated order tended to react to this treatment with a touchy resent­
ment that itself became part of the problem. There were different paths
to izzat. Some sought it in a non-political attempt to recreate dharma
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 Common Roll

in Fiji through a revival of ritual or in reformed religion. Most wanted

modern education for their children. A few saw the full acceptance of
western ways, even the Christian religion, as the answer. Others looked
for respect, not primarily from the Europeans in Fiji, but from India
and its national movement, and they played to a gallery outside the
colony. Some, of course, combined several approaches or used them
at different times. The co-operators and the non-co-operators, the
collaborators and the protestors were often the same people.
In 1929 the Fiji Indians could look back on fifty years of their
history in Fiji. The Crown Colony was only five years older. The hard
work of the Indians had made Fiji’s modern administration and econ­
omy financially viable. The indentured labourers had suffered, some
of them appallingly, but many of them and particularly their descend­
ants had later found a modest and secure living and contentment in
Fiji, though manifestly they were still not on equal footing with the
Europeans. It was with mixed feelings that the people of the colony
faced the prospect of celebrating the jubilee of the arrival of the first
Indian settlers.
In Suva an Indian committee was set up to organise a celebration.
The government was asked to proclaim a public holiday but the lead­
ing Europeans were opposed to this and the Executive Council unani­
mously advised the acting governor against it. But, as on the education
question, Seymour did not disappoint the Indian community. Fie pro­
claimed 15 May as a public holiday and bank holiday and as a day
of rejoicing. The contempt and opposition of many Europeans to this
decision found expression in the Fiji Times and Herald. Moreover,
not all the Indian leaders agreed that the day should be celebrated.
Vishnu Deo and some of the other Arya Samajists wanted it to be
observed by mourning. Others, particularly on the western side of Viti
Levu, said that while they could not bring themselves to celebrate the
anniversary with rejoicing, they were opposed to recrimination and
morbid dwelling on the past; their idea was to mark the occasion with
consultations about future progress. On 12 May, at a meeting at Lau-
toka, it was decided to fast and pray on the day and organise a Fiji
Indian National Congress. Two days later, Dr Beattie in Suva formed
a body with the same name. The Suva celebrations passed off unevent­
fully and the extensive police precautions proved to be unnecessary.
On the evening of 14 May, old immigrants recounted their experiences
in the Suva Town Hall; most were inarticulate in the strange surround­
ings but some provided tall stories of their loved ones being eaten by

131
The Fiji Indians

the locals in the early days. On the next day there was a procession
of floats through Suva to Albert Park, where Seymour spoke to the
crowd. Happily, the event was largely a children’s day and an affirma­
tion of encouragement and hope for the future. In the rival camp, a
black flag was displayed from the Arya Samaj office and the indenture
system was burnt in effigy. Neither function attracted much attention
from the public at large.2
Later in the year the Fiji Legislative Council assembled, still with
an official majority, under new letters patent that provided for three
Indian members elected on a separate roll. There were literacy and
property qualifications for the franchise and only 1404 registered
Indian voters in all. No big issues were presented to the Indian voters
in the elections in September, the question of the separate electoral
roll was scarcely mentioned, and there was no hint of the troubles that
were to follow. In the southern electoral division, Vishnu Deo, draw­
ing on his reputation as a champion of Hinduism and on canvassing
by Arya Samajist supporters, defeated his Christian opponent, John F.
Grant. In the north-western division, Parmanand Singh of Ba was
returned, and in the eastern division, James Ramchander. The elections
for the Indian seats were uneventful and unexceptionable from the
standpoint of race relations, but this was not the case for the European
seats. Some of the Europeans had all along mistrusted the extension
of the franchise to the Indians. European resentment had already found
expression in criticism of the Indian Jubilee celebrations and opposi­
tion to the granting of a public holiday on that day. The reduction in
the number of European seats from seven to six meant that one of
the leading Europeans would have to lose his seat in the council. In
the election campaign, two of the candidates, Sir Henry Scott and
Henry Marks, made bitter attacks on Indian aspirations. Pearson, the
Secretary for Indian Affairs, wrote to Stewart at the India Office about
the speeches:
I happened to hear portions of one and was amazed at the way
racial prejudices were worked upon and cheers raised from the
audience at successive gibes against the Indians. The general attitude
was that Indians were not wanted except as labourers and small
farmers and must be kept in their place. If they did not like it they
could clear out and make room for a more docile set of plantation
workers.
Pearson observed that the speakers were appealing to the racial pre-

132
 Common Roll

judices of the poorer people on the European electoral roll, including

the part-Europeans — in short, those who feared Indian competition.
He ended on a more hopeful note:
I rather think that a good deal of the talk is discounted by moder­
ates both European and Indian as mere election hysteria and that
the principals are a little repentant now. Anyhow, there is a strong
body of European opinion which deplores the outburst and is quite
willing to give the Indians a fair chance.3
The Indians in Fiji voted on a separate electoral roll, but those in
Kenya were still demanding a common roll and being supported by
the Government of India and by organisations interested in Indians
overseas, such as the Imperial Indian Citizenship Association in Bom­
bay and the Indians Overseas Association in London. Early in 1929,
Chattur Singh of Ba, Parmanand Singh’s brother, was travelling over­
seas and met H. S. L. Polak, the Secretary of the Indians Overseas
Association and the leading lobbyist in London for Indians abroad.
Polak later wrote:
At the beginning of this year, an Indian gentleman from Fiji came
to see me and we discussed the whole of this question at length, and
I explained to him the harm that I knew would result both to Indians
overseas and India generally, if the Fiji Indians alone, under a mis­
apprehension of fact, or a misunderstanding of principle, were to
accept a communal franchise based upon racial considerations. He
assured me that upon his return to Fiji he would discuss the matter
in that light with his countrymen there, who he felt sure did not
know that they would be rendering a disservice to their motherland
and to the cause of their brethren abroad, by accepting a type of
franchise fraught with so much peril to Indian welfare and dignity.4
More important in determining the stand of the Fiji Indians than
Chattur Singh was Shiwabhai Bhailalbhai Patel, who had come to Fiji
in 1928 at Polak’s suggestion, to practise law and help organise the
Indian community. He had been with Gandhi in the Kaira satyagraha
in 1918, then in Rangoon, then in London. After Dr Beattie wrote to
Polak about the problems of the Indians in Fiji, the latter suggested
that S. B. Patel go to Fiji. At first he was reluctant, but Gandhi urged
him to go to help the Indians there. He was met at the Suva wharf
by both Beattie and Vishnu Deo, who were opposed to each other,
and soon learnt the reality of local dissensions. He wrote to Polak of

133
The Fiji Indians

the mean and petty quarrels between the Arya Samajists and the Indian
Reform League and said he would proceed with caution and moder­
ation because the Europeans were suspicious and he had to outlive
the reputation of Manilal as an agitator. Mahadev Desai, Gandhi’s
secretary, with whom S. B. Patel corresponded, wrote that he had
spoken to Totaram Sanadhya, then living in Gandhi’s ashram, who
had advised S. B. Patel not to take sides in the quarrels in the Indian
community nor to let the government think he intended to carry on
Manilal’s work.5 S. B. Patel did, in fact, work quietly. He saw educa­
tion as the most pressing need of the Indian community, and in addi­
tion to his law practice, he managed schools. He eschewed the lime­
light that was enjoyed by others more temperamentally suited to public
politics, such as his close associate, Ambalal Dahyabhai Patel, also a
Gujarati, a younger man whom he had known as a law student in
London and who came to Fiji in 1929 to practise law and to help the
Indian community. Nevertheless, S. B. Patel played a very important
political role in Fiji in 1929. He explained in a letter to Polak:
The Letters Patent were out in May last and the election was fixed
for the first week in September. The registration of voters was
finished in May, for which registration only one month was given.
It was all new here, especially to the Indian settlers. When the
Letters Patent were issued Ambalal (Patel, a professional colleague)
and I considered the position and felt that the election should be
proceeded with, as without preparation the people could not have
been prevented from registering their votes, notwithstanding the
invidious and humiliating racial discrimination which they did not
realise. We accordingly decided to wait until after the election.
We had begun discussing the question of the common franchise
with leading people even before the election. After the election,
therefore, we got seriously busy and convened a Round Table Con­
ference of all parties of the Indian community and, on the 13th
October, it was held at Lautoka under my chairmanship. We subse­
quently held a further conference with leading people in Suva and
Levuka. The three Indian members of the Legislative Council
accompanied us, and we decided upon our plan of action . . ,6
Although the common roll agitation was inspired from abroad, par­
ticularly by Polak, it was not directed from abroad. The most important
figure in the subsequent campaign was Vishnu Deo, not S. B. Patel or
A. D. Patel. Other leaders included Hiralal Seth and Randhir Singh.

134
 C om m on Roll

The principal Fiji-born leaders were Arya Samajists. The Arya Samaj
attracted a high proportion of the ambitious, educated, and wealthy,
and accustomed them to combination in a modern setting, and it was
not surprising that those same people should have been prominent in
political affairs. But they were not acting as the ‘Arya Samaj Party’, as
the government misleadingly called its opponents.
Informal contacts were more important in the common roll agitation
than formal organisation, though there was a brief attempt at the latter.
In 1929 Vishnu Deo wrote to Jawaharlal Nehru. He asked for a copy
of the constitution of the Indian National Congress, saying that the Fiji
Indians were contemplating the establishment of a Congress in Fiji.
Jawaharlal gave his blessing to that project but declined an invitation to
write an article for the Vaidik Sandesh, saying he could not afford the
time.7 The two congresses, formed by Vishnu Deo and Dr Beattie on
12 and 14 May respectively, existed separately for several months.
Then on 13 October, at the round-table conference of Indians at
Lautoka, the delegates from Beattie’s Congress made common cause
with the others and resolutions were passed in the name of an un­
divided Fiji Indian National Congress. Beattie’s influence, which had
never been as great as he imagined or hoped, was now eclipsed. On 7
November the two bodies were formally amalgamated at a meeting in
the Suva Town Hall and new office bearers were appointed.
S. B. Patel wrote to Polak:
We have decided upon the lines of future work. We have a National
Congress of Fiji. The unity and solidarity among the Indian settlers
here today are as they never were before. All sections stand united in
one demand for the common franchise. We are all coming closer
together day by day. We intend organising provincial and district
congresses in all important quarters, and passing resolutions demand­
ing the common franchise, in every Congress committee. We intend
to take up the work of educating the masses for political conscious­
ness.8
But the unity of which S. B. Patel wrote was illusory. Early in 1930,
after floods and storms on the Rewa, the Fiji Indian National Congress
collected funds and distributed relief, but the non-Hindu members pro­
tested that only friends of Vishnu Deo’s faction received any help, and
resigned.9 The Fiji Indian National Congress was a poor imitation of its
counterparts in India and Africa and really existed in name only.
Benarsidas Chaturvedi pointed to the difference: ‘We [presumably the

135
The Fiji Indians

friends of the overseas Indians] were in favour of better organisation

and thorough preparation before the commencement of the struggle’.10
Some days before the Legislative Council met, the Indian leaders
decided upon their plan of action: to ask searching questions about the
treatment of the Indian community, then to move a motion for the
acceptance of the principle of a common roll, and after it was defeated,
to resign their seats. S. B. Patel wrote to Polak:
After deciding upon this plan of action, I suggested that we should
meet the European elected members and other leading persons in
Government and outside. There was general agreement with my
suggestion and I was deputed to meet the Europeans. I had long
discussions with Sir Henry Scott, Sir Maynard Hedstrom, Mr Barker,
of the Fiji Times and Herald, and Mr J. P. Bailey [sic] and the Sec­
retary for Indian Affairs, Dr MacGusty [sic] (who was acting in the
absence of Mr J. R. Pearson on leave). I said to them in brief: ‘It is
the recognition of the principle of the common franchise for all His
Majesty’s subjects in the Colony that we are looking for. We stand
for the Colony as a whole and not for any one section of it. We do
not wish or desire to dominate. We do not want to see the Fijian
suffer. His interest in the Colony is paramount and we want to
maintain it and help him towards the achievement of elective
representation in place of nomination. We do not want to predom­
inate. We do not want any special or lower franchise qualifications.
All we want is the recognition of the principle of common and
equal rights. We should not mind if we had only 100 Indian
voters, provided we had a common franchise. We should not even
mind if a European represented us, so long as he was elected on a
common ticket. If the common franchise were created there would
not be much friction among the races in the political field and we
should be pulling together for the good and welfare of Fiji as a
whole, instead of pulling against each other. The good and well being
of Fiji would depend upon the harmonious co-operation of all the
races in the Colony’. The Europeans quite appreciated my arguments
and the strength of them, but with them, as it is with us, it is the
question of the Empire and the Kenya problem. Sir Maynard Hed­
strom told me frankly that the Kenya Europeans have fought and
were fighting their battle for them to keep the Indians off the common
roll, and the Fiji Europeans would have to keep themselves in line
with the Kenya Europeans and fight tooth and nail. I thereupon told

136
 Common Roll

him that, in that event, he must appreciate our desire also to join the
Kenya Indians in this fight for the common franchise . . . Please
assure our friends of the Kenya deputation that we, in Fiji, are
wholeheartedly in support of their fight for the common franchise,
not only in Kenya and Fiji but in all the other colonies of the
British Empire, and we shall stand by them through thick and thin.11
The Legislative Council met in solemn mood. The government and
the European members had failed to dissuade the Indian members,
and they knew what was to come.12 S. B. Patel stayed in Suva with
Vishnu Deo and sat in the gallery behind him. For three days the Indian
members, especially Vishnu Deo, asked long lists of questions which
detailed Indian grievances, both colony-wide and local. Many subjects
were covered. There were the matters that had been discussed with the
Government of India, such as the appointment of an agent of the
Government of India and an economic inquiry commission, the resi­
dential tax, the proposed declaratory ordinance on the status of Indians
in Fiji, and other questions such as difficulties over the leasing of land,
racial discrimination in the Suva swimming baths, the public perfor­
mance of labour by Indian prisoners and mental patients, educational
and medical facilities, aid to destitutes, co-operative credit, the govern­
ment officials’ ignorance of Hindi, the absence of public holidays on the
occasion of Hindu and Muslim festivals, repatriation rights and the
conditions on the repatriation ships, workers’ compensation, and the
racial composition of the police force. The questions were orientated to
the problems of the Indians alone and expressed a strong sense of
grievance. Some showed a decided lack of proportion. Several sharply
worded replies were drafted in the secretariat but discarded. In the end
the government gave patient factual replies that conceded nothing but
avoided provocation.13
Then, on 5 November, Vishnu Deo moved that the council endorse
the view that political rights and status granted to Indians on racial lines
were not acceptable to them, and that the Indians should be granted a
common franchise along with other British subjects resident in Fiji.
In the debate that followed the European members were more provoca­
tive than the government had been. Hedstrom claimed, inaccurately,
that most of the Indian immigrants had come from the Calcutta streets,
and Scott said that the only change that could possibly be made would
be for Fiji to abolish elections and revert to the nominative system. The
motion was defeated and the Indian members, the only ones to vote for

137
The Fiji Indians

it, resigned.14 Their action was approved by a meeting of Indians in the

Suva Town Hall, and lengthy cables were sent to India and London.
A blow had been struck for the cause of Indians overseas, but at what
cost?
Gandhi readily gave his approval. He congratulated the three mem­
bers on their patriotic spirit in resigning as a protest and said they
should not reconsider their decision until a common franchise had been
obtained.15 Polak, who had all along been against the acceptance of the
communal franchise in Fiji, wrote to Wedgwood Benn at the India
Office:
It is quite clear that the issues in Kenya and Fiji cannot be separated.
The same principles are involved in each case. I venture to think that
the matter has been considerably simplified by the fact that now
nowhere throughout the British Empire can it be alleged that the
Indians are parties to separate electorates, but that, on the contrary,
everywhere they stand by the principle of the common franchise as
symbol of equal citizenship.16
Public opinion in India was predictably sympathetic, and a meeting
of the Standing Emigration Committee of the Indian Legislature and of
party leaders asked the Government of India to have the question of the
Fiji franchise re-opened. But that government had, after all, accepted
the communal franchise with three elected Indian members. Bajpai
minuted that the members would probably seek re-election and ‘act in
a manner that will enable them to continue to bask in the sunshine of
Gandhiite goodwill’.17
In November writs for a new election were issued, but no nomina­
tions were received. On 27 December Fletcher called a conference of
Indian leaders and asked them to co-operate. He explained his view that
the communal franchise was best for a heterogeneous population and
that it did not imply that any group was inferior. A. D. Patel, who
was already emerging as an able spokesman for the community, said
that the franchise on racial lines was unacceptable to the Indians, not
in the best interests of Fiji, and likely to lead to racial trouble, and that
acceptance of it would damage the cause of Indians in other colonies.
He assured the governor that the Indian political bodies would continue
to co-operate with the government and give it advice on the welfare of
the Indians in Fiji. This assurance was carried out. Although the
government consistently referred to the boycott of the Legislative
Council as ‘non-co-operation’, the Indian leaders fully co-operated with

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the government in other matters and in turn were consulted by it. On

the day after the conference the Indian leaders wrote to the governor
that they could not participate in elections under the communal fran­
chise since this implied inferiority of status; it was the principle that
was important, not the number of Indian members; they were not
asking for manhood suffrage or for a lower qualification for Indian
voters or for Indian domination in the Council.18 It was obvious, how­
ever, that with the Indian population increasing in numbers, education
and wealth, and in Fiji’s plural society, where people were likely, for
the foreseeable future, to vote along racial lines, a common roll with­
out reservation of seats for each race would have led eventually to an
Indian majority in the Legislative Council, and that, of course, is why
it was unacceptable to the other communities.
The boycott of the Legislative Council widened the growing divisions
within the Indian community. The majority knew and cared little about
common roll, though they were still willing to give tacit support to the
leaders who were fighting for Indian interests and honour in Fiji. But
some, like Dr A. D. Sagayam, a South Indian doctor who had come to
Fiji in 1925, were quietly critical of the course being followed by
Vishnu Deo and the others. John F. Grant, who was one of those who
signed the letter of 28 December, later told McGusty he had acted
under pressure and against his real convictions.19 The most serious
breach in the Indian community was, however, that between the Hindus
and the Muslims, and, understandably, Fletcher was quick to exploit it.
Even before the elections the Muslims in Fiji were moving towards
political separatism, in line with the trend in India. In 1927 the second
annual conference of the Muslims in Fiji asked the government to safe­
guard their interests when political privileges were extended to the
Indians.20 After the elections in 1929, a meeting of Muslims of Suva,
Rewa and Navua passed a resolution that deplored the use of religious
appeals by the Hindus in the recent election, assured the government of
Muslim loyalty, and dissociated the Muslim community from uncon­
stitutional measures for the attainment of Indian aspirations. But the
Muslim leaders were evidently holding back from a final breach, and
the resolution was not sent to the government until January 1930. On
5 January 1930 another meeting elected a ‘Provisional Committee for
the Attainment of Muslim Political Rights’ and authorised it to press
for separate political representation. The committee asked that the
Muslims be allowed to elect their own representative in one separate
constituency, though they conceded that a common roll was a legitimate

139
The Fiji Indians

aspiration to be achieved by evolutionary stages, provided seats were

reserved for minorities.
The secretary of the Fiji Muslim League, X. K. N. Dean, then wrote
to the government:
The idea of a Hindoo voting for a non-Hindoo (or even an unmilitant
Hindoo) candidate, though he may be much superior to his Hindoo
opponent, was considered as nothing short of apostasy. The credu­
lous Hindoos are mere tools in the hands of the Arya Samajists who
ostensibly champion the Hindoo cause but really aspire, as has been
proved in this Colony and elsewhere, for something beyond the
realm of their religion. The bulk of the Hindoos are carried away by
the charms of the music of the Arya Missionary (Pundit Sree Krishna
Sharma) whose harmonium acts as a magic wand to their less intel­
ligent minds. Note. Although this letter was written on the 18th
October last it has been withheld from dispatch until now for the
purpose of further studying the Hindoo mentality.21
Fletcher grasped the opportunity to weaken the hold of the advocates
of common roll by widening the existing divisions among the Indians.
He wrote to London that it would be useful for the government to have
the views of each important section of the community, that the Mus­
lim could not expect consideration from the Hindu, and that he was
‘the more loyal and more law-abiding citizen’.22 He proposed that one
of the three existing Indian seats be turned into a Muslim communal
constituency. The Government of India objected, because it could not
be justified in terms of relative numbers, because it would create a
permanent state of friction between the two communities, and because
the Government of India still adhered to the principle of a common
electoral roll in the colonies and its case would be weakened by
acceptance of separate Muslim representation. An additional complica­
tion was the Indian Round Table Conference in London, where the
question of communal representation in India itself was a major issue.23
No further action was taken on Fletcher’s proposal.
Like Rodwell ten years earlier, Fletcher saw a rather too direct
connection between Indian discontents in Fiji and nationalist agitation
in India. He wrote:
The articulate element, in a very small minority, has little real
understanding of or interest in the shibboleths which it is instructed
to voice. I regard the local politician as the uninformed tool of an
extraneous organisation which is dangerously seeking opportunity
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to use the Colony for the purposes of its world-wide attack upon the
British Raj.24
But in 1931 Jawaharlal Nehru, writing on behalf of the Indian National
Congress, gave only a lukewarm reply to Chattur Singh’s appeals for
help for the Fiji Indians in their fight for the common roll:
Rest assured that our countrymen overseas are always present in
our minds. We shall gladly be of service to you wherever you are.
We feel however that ultimately the battle of India’s freedom as well
as the freedom of our countrymen abroad must be fought in India.
We are concentrating all our energies on this fight here and when
freedom comes to us you will certainly profit by it.25
Indeed, the Congress, with pressing issues at home, took relatively
little interest in the problems of Indians overseas; more concern was
shown by public associations, members of the legislature, and private
individuals, of whom the most noteworthy was Benarsidas Chaturvedi.
But India was not forgotten in Fiji. The majority of the leaders of
the Fiji Indians in the period covered by this book identified themselves
with Indian nationalism and expected the independence of India to
bring benefits to the overseas Indians. Sympathy was shown in many
ways: pictures of Gandhi and Nehru, resolutions and messages of sup­
port, financial contributions, avid reading of political news from India,
and even the direct participation in agitation in India by Fiji-born
Indians, including some of those who had been sent to Arya Samaj
schools in India. One incident which particularly offended local
European opinion was a meeting of the Hindu Maha Sabha in Suva
where resolutions were passed expressing sorrow at the execution in
India of the terrorists Bhagat Singh and Sukhdeo.26 The Fiji Govern­
ment, in liaison with the Government of India, kept a watch on these
activities. In 1930 it set up an intelligence committee; police officers or
district commissioners were appointed as intelligence agents. Letters
were opened and read, and publications held up in the post office and
destroyed if thought to be seditious. They included certain publications
from India and, especially, from Indian nationalist groups in the United
States. The Inspector of Indian Schools and the District Commissioners
also watched for possible seditious instruction in the schools.
From the standpoint of the Fiji Government most of the Indian
nationalist activity in Fiji was comparatively harmless, but it confirmed
their opinion that the local Indian leaders were inspired from outside
the colony and were pursuing extraneous interests. The Europeans,

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The Fiji Indians

Fijians, and government officers had little understanding of India’s

historic progression towards independence in alternating and complex
co-operation and non-co-operation with the Raj. A. D. and S. B. Patel
and the Gujarati shopkeepers and artisans were recent immigrants to
Fiji and were particularly suspected. Many of the Gujaratis came, not
from British India, but from Indian states, especially Baroda. The area
of Gujarat that provided most of the emigrants to Fiji was one of
particularly intense nationalist agitation. They had deep affection for
Gandhi, himself a Gujarati, and when news reached Fiji that he had
been arrested in 1930 the Gujarati shopkeepers closed their doors in a
hartal (stopping work as a protest). In Fiji politics they provided sup­
port for the Patels and Vishnu Deo.
The Gujaratis were discreet but not so some of the Sikhs, who were
also recent immigrants. In 1932 Ghadr party agents were corresponding
with revolutionaries abroad and collecting money for them. The leaders
were Shiv Singh, Kuldip Singh and Santa Singh. British rule in India
was criticised in speeches at a public meeting of 300 Sikhs at Ba. The
Fiji Government intercepted letters from Ghadr party headquarters in
San Francisco instructing the Fiji agents to collect funds, form societies
to spread revolutionary propaganda among the Sikhs, and send
recruits to be trained in Berlin and Moscow before being posted for
service in India. Some did go from Fiji for training, though letters from
the agents in Fiji deplored the poverty of the local Sikhs, their lack of
education and, to some extent, their lack of interest in the party’s
aims.27 Clearly the Raj was in no great danger from the Fiji Indians.
Only a few individuals went beyond vicarious identification with India’s
national awakening, and they were closely watched by the government.
While he castigated the extremists, Fletcher had the sense to see that
all the Indian community could not be allowed to remain outside the
body politic. In the 1920s the gap between the administration and the
Indians had been improved to some extent. Hindustani was given a
place in the government cadets’ examinations and gradually a know­
ledge of colloquial Hindustani spread among other government officers,
as more of their work came to be concerned with the Indians, who
were increasingly seen as permanent residents and not as temporary
sojourners in the country. In 1926 the new Secretary for Indian Affairs
assumed a general responsibility for Indian affairs. The first Secretary,
J. R. Pearson, did not give satisfaction, at least not to Fletcher, who
thought him too old and lacking in initiative and drive.28 He was cer­
tainly unable to stop sectarian conflict or to mollify Vishnu Deo and

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his party, but he did put forward various proposals to help the Indians,
particularly the farmers for whom he, as an old ICS officer, felt more
sympathy than for the urban educated classes, and he sought to have
the Europeans treat the Indians with greater courtesy and respect. In
the tone of a paternalistic ICS officer, he wrote:
We cannot keep the population down to one dead level. Gradation
must come and it is for us to see that with it comes a sense of respon­
sibility and a sense of obligation to the authority that has conferred
it.29
Although he shared this opinion, Fletcher did not reappoint Pearson
in 1932 but instead made Dr V. W. T. McGusty, who had acted in
Pearson’s absence on leave, Secretary for Indian Affairs, in addition to
his post as Chief Medical Officer. McGusty proved, with his tactful
good humour, more popular than Pearson, both with the government
and with the Indians.30
The Secretary for Indian Affairs had less and less to do as repatria­
tion dwindled and the government established other contacts with the
Indians through the district commissioners, the Indian advisory com­
mittees, Indian members of the Legislative Council, and local boards.
In any case, important questions were decided by the colonial secretary
or the governor. The value of the office lay more in providing a channel
of communication at the senior level in Suva between the government
and the leaders of the Indian community, and in reassuring Indians with
specific grievances that there was some officer in Suva who would listen
patiently to their troubles, in the tradition of personalised Indian
government. The correspondence of the Secretary for Indian Affairs
often related to matters that were important only to individuals; for
example, requests for the tracing of relatives. As a later governor put
it, Dr McGusty was almost a family solicitor on Indians’ behalf.31
Another useful function of the office was in providing a direct channel
of communication between Suva and New Delhi, through the demi-
official letters written by Pearson and McGusty to Bajpai and other
Indian officials. However, the Fiji Government had other calls on its
funds and it was anxious to see the Indians settle down in Fiji, be
governed by the ordinary administration applying to all non-Fijians,
and not look to India for help. Successive governors sought to phase
out the office, though the Colonial Office argued that that would be
unwise as it would strengthen India’s case for an agent in Fiji.32 The
office was finally abolished in 1945 on McGusty’s retirement.

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The Fiji Indians

Periodically, especially at times of political trouble, there was disf

cussion within the government about the possibility of establishing
some form of Indian local government to foster co-operation under
official auspices, bring the government closer in touch with Indian
opinion, and get its own message across. In 1930, McGusty proposed
that village headmen be appointed. This had already been tried by
several inspectors of immigrants, but had been unsuccessful because it
was difficult to obtain suitable men who would act impartially. Where
an outstanding man was looked on as the leader of his settlement, it
was because the others were his tenants or debtors; and there was sec­
tional rivalry between North and South Indians and Muslims. Alter­
natively, panchayats (councils) were suggested. These bodies already
existed in many areas, and there had been sporadic official attempts to
foster them because they were indigenous Indian institutions. But the
social conditions which made them work in Indian villages did not exist
in the Indian localities in Fiji: it was hard to find suitable men who
commanded general respect and there was no dominant caste to enforce
compliance. It was decided instead.to set up Indian Advisory Com­
mittees in the districts, and the first was established in Rewa in 1930.
Unlike the bodies of the same name in 1920, they comprised prominent
local Indians, who met with the District Commissioner and gave their
opinion on issues affecting their people. In 1934 there were advisory
committees in eight districts and they were working well.33 They dis­
cussed such problems as water supply, store licences, fire brigades,
crematoriums, immigration, compassionate allowances, location of
post offices, education, control of motor traffic, taxi-stands, dispen­
saries, roads and bridges, harassment by Fijians of an Indian who had
given evidence in a cattle killing case, CSR tenancies, renewal of leases
of Fijian land, gambling, sexual immorality, straying wives, and
occasionally, wider political issues.34
In another move to give Indians recognition and responsibility,
Fletcher appointed them to the district road and sanitary boards. In the
case of the Ba Road Board, this was over the opposition of the local
Europeans. They were also appointed to the township, education, hos­
pital and lunatic asylum boards, and minor racial discriminations were
removed from the statute books. In 1933 the first Indian Justice of the
Peace was appointed. Some of these actions can, of course, be inter­
preted in an unfavourable light. Those appointed, sometimes men with
inferior qualifications, were grateful for government favour, and basked
in their new position while the extremist leaders were not appointed or

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refused to be ‘bought’. But these changes showed that Fiji had advanced
a long way since 1920, and that the Indians were now clearly regarded,
by the government at least, as a permanent part of the population and
more than just a labour force.
Nevertheless, Vishnu Deo and the other leaders continued their
boycott of the Legislative Council in defence of the principle of com­
mon roll. In 1932 elections were held for the new Council. The Fiji
Samachar declared:
Remember Mahatma Gandhi’s instructions to continue ceaseless agi­
tation until equal status be granted. For the sake of your country,
your nationhood, and most of all, for the preservation of your
dignity, let no candidates be nominated for the election to the
Council.35
However, one was nominated: Narbahadur Singh, the editor of
Beattie’s paper Vriddhi-Vani and a Christian. Rather than see him
returned unopposed, Vishnu Deo, who was himself disqualified because
of his conviction for obscene publication, put up K. B. Singh, who had
been in communal conflict in the Suva-Rewa area and was expected to
be a loyal supporter. No candidate was nominated for the eastern con­
stituency, but a South Indian, Muniswamy Mudaliar, also presumed to
be a supporter of common roll, was nominated for the north-western
Indian seat in order to provide a seconder for another common roll
motion. Vishnu Deo, who was by now acting more on his own initia­
tive and less on the Patels’, intended that one of the members would
move the motion, the other would second it, and then both would
resign when it was defeated. At this stage there was no disagreement
among the Indians on the principle of common roll: even Beattie’s
group supported it, and the Muslims did, too, provided there was
reservation of seats for Muslims. The only disagreement was on
whether it was to be achieved by working within the council or by
boycott. Common roll was more a talisman than a considered political
objective.
On 14 October 1932 the two new Indian members moved a new
common roll motion that made reference to the British White Paper
of June 1930, which accepted that in colonies where there was a
mixed population a common roll was an object to be aimed at and
attained. They were being shepherded and tutored by Vishnu Deo, and
as on the previous occasion the motion was preceded by a long list of
questions, mostly drafted by him. They related to education, land, im-

145
The Fiji Indians

migration restrictions, repatriation, the number of Indians in govern­

ment service, the demand for the appointment of an agent of the
Government of India, the proposed economic enquiry commission,
and other matters that affected the Indians. The government gave
detailed replies to some of them, but Fletcher described others as
untrue, misleading, and designed to appeal to the Indian National
Congress and to inflame the Indians against the Europeans. He said
that there was about them ‘a stale odour of envy, hatred, malice and
uncharitableness’.36 He appealed to the Indians to co-operate, and the
two members then withdrew their motion on the assurance that the
record of the debate would be sent to the Secretary of State. These
events were not all they seemed. McGusty had prior negotiations with
Vishnu Deo, who was aware that the two members wanted to keep
their seats. He agreed to frame a non-provocative motion and for the
members to remain in the council while the record of the debate was
sent to the Secretary of State; when the anticipated unfavourable reply
was received, the question of whether the members should then resign
would be referred to the Indian public.37
The common roll was a lost cause, just as it was in Kenya and in
India itself. The question of a common roll for Fiji was discussed in the
Colonial Office, but there was no real possibility of it being introduced
there if it had been rejected for Kenya. In 1930 Whitehall was con­
sidering common rolls with reservation of seats for each race (the cross­
voting system) for both Kenya and Fiji, but the idea was dropped. The
Labour Government had approved of the common roll in principle and
showed more sympathy with the Indian case than the Conservatives,
but the knowledge of white settler power in Kenya, and the doctrine of
the paramountcy of native interests, strengthened the hands of the per­
manent officials in the Colonial Office in their opposition to the Indian
demands in both places.38 The Government of India, under pressure
from public opinion, did try to re-open the question of the common
roll in Fiji, but they were told by London that any consideration of
Fiji at that time might prejudice their case for Kenya.39 Then in 1931
the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Closer Union in East Africa
said it would be impracticable to have a common roll under present
conditions. In February 1933 the Fiji Legislative Council was told the
same.40
That reply had been anticipated in Fiji. Vishnu Deo had intended the
two members to resign as soon as it was received. Mudaliar refused to
resign. K. B. Singh did resign, stood again, and was re-elected with

146
 Common Roll

Vishnu Deo's support, but then, contrary to his instructions, took his
seat at the session of July 1933 and evaded the common roll issue by
tendering a motion too late to comply with the provisions about due
notice. Vishnu Deo and the other leaders were furious at this betrayal
of their cause. Public meetings denounced the two members. As they
could not expect to be returned again by the Indian electorate, their
only political future now lay with the government, which was already
directing their performance in the council. They were rewarded by
being made Justices of the Peace. On 23 March 1934 Singh introduced
another motion for common roll. Only the two Indian members voted
for it, but the intended effect was that another motion on the subject
would be inadmissible for twelve months and therefore could not be
immediately moved by those returned in the next elections.41
On 1 January 1934 the All Fiji Indian Conference, organised by
Vishnu Deo’s party, and chaired by S. B. Patel, was held at Lautoka.
Resolutions asked for better land tenure and for a common roll, and
Singh and Mudaliar were condemned for remaining in the council.
This conference was preceded by a meeting of the Arya Samajists at Ba
and was facilitated by the opening of the long-awaited road from Suva.
On 7 January a rival meeting, chaired by John Bairangi, a Fiji-born
South Indian Christian, asked the two Indian members to stay in the
council and continue co-operation with the government.42 Vishnu Deo’s
party included the ablest Indians in Fiji and could command majority
support from the electorate but was politically frustrated because of its
adherence to the principle of the common roll to be attained by boycott.
Vishnu Deo and his friends were isolated still further when in 1933
the Indians in Kenya abandoned non-co-operation.
The common roll issue now became joined to another: in a counter­
attack Fletcher decided to do away with elections altogether, firstly for
the Suva Municipal Council, which already had a common roll. It is to
the history of this question that we now turn. All Indian ratepayers
had once enjoyed the right to vote in elections for the Suva Municipal
Council, but in 1915, in order to preserve European control, a literacy
test in the English language had been introduced for electors, and this
effectively excluded Indians from election. The Government of India
objected at the time, and later, during the negotiations with the
Colonial Office in the 1920s, asked that Indian languages be admitted
also, and that a ward system of voting be introduced. The Fiji Govern­
ment agreed to set up a committee to look into the question of Indian
representation on the Suva Municipal Council and it reported in 1928.

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The Fiji Indians

The majority report by the unofficial European and Fijian members of

the committee submitted that the existing system was equitable and
that no change in the franchise was necessary. A minority report by
the three Indian members submitted that Hindustani, Tamil and Fijian
should be admitted as qualifying languages and that two seats should
be reserved for Indians until sufficient Indians were qualified as voters
to ensure them of representation, and claimed that the municipality was
not carrying out its obligations to the Indian ratepayers with respect to
roads and lighting and was discriminating against Indians by refusing
them admission to the public baths and library. Another minority
report by Pearson, the Secretary for Indian Affairs, was intermediate in
position; he recommended that only Hindustani be added to English
as a qualifying language, that Suva be divided into wards, and that the
residential and property qualifications be raised. The government ap­
pointed a commissioner to inquire into the Indian grievances; he held
them justified in part only. In a letter to the government, Sir Henry
Scott argued that the admission of Indian languages would mean
Indian domination and would be inequitable to the Europeans who
paid three-quarters of the rates, that few if any European candidates
would stand, and the government might then have to take over control
of the municipality. Pearson pleaded for concessions ‘from the imperial
point of view’ and because there were dangers in not having a safety
valve.43
As a compromise, the governor, Sir Eyre Hutson, recommended to
London that two Indians be nominated to the Municipal Council, but
the Government of India repeated its request that Hindustani and Tamil
be admitted and asked that the property qualification not be raised.
The Colonial Office agreed with the Government of India and pointed
out that there were many people capable of taking an intelligent part in
municipal affairs who did not know English, that Indian languages had
been admitted for the Legislative Council elections, and that compara­
tively little had been done to assist Indians to learn English; moreover
the reform of the municipal franchise might be a good way to test the
operation of a common roll on a safe scale.44
These were good democratic arguments but the new governor, Sir
Murchison Fletcher, had other ideas that were based in part on his
service in Hong Kong. He submitted that the admission of Indian
languages as qualifications would lead to Indian domination of the
Municipal Council, to European withdrawal from it, and to Fijian
resentment; any institution that was controlled by popular vote would

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be run on racial lines. He recommended that the Municipal Council

be replaced by a government-controlled board on the model of the
Hong Kong Sanitary Board. The Colonial Office was unenthusiastic,
but Fletcher, supported by Hedstrom and Scott, pressed on with his
attempt to do away with democracy in Suva. He proposed that there
be a board of seven members, four of them government officials, and
three of them elected by the Europeans, Fijians and Indians on separate
rolls, though he would not mind if these three were appointed too. The
proposal was referred to the Government of India, which, rather than
further prolong the non-representation of the Indians, reluctantly con­
curred on condition the Fiji Indians were agreeable. On 13 October
1933 Fletcher told the Legislative Council that the choice was between
a common roll for the municipality, or central government control,
which he favoured.45
On 28 March 1934 the Legislative Council agreed to government
control of the municipalities in Fiji. At first the two Indian members,
Singh and Mudaliar, opposed the change, stating their objection to
representation, nominated or elective, on a communal basis, but later
the same day they reversed their position, giving as reasons that the
debate had shown that the European and Fijian communities would
never agree to any proposals that might lead to Indian domination; the
Indians would at least have some representation under the new system.
Two of the European members opposed the change to government
control, and one of them, Barker, the Mayor of Suva, began an agita­
tion against Fletcher’s proposals. Fletcher told London that Barker
was inclined to be obsessed with the dignity and importance of the
office of mayor, and he denigrated his supporters:
The European and half-caste community contains a not unsubstantial
element, known as the Beach, whose immediate reaction to a Govern­
ment proposal is to oppose it. In the present instance the unthinking
do not require much persuasion that the Government proposal is a
cloak for Government encroachment upon the people’s privileges.46
He claimed that the only alternative to his proposal could be one to
add Fijian, five Indian languages and perhaps Chinese and Samoan, as
qualifying languages. Such a move would be bitterly opposed by the
Europeans, who would be supported by the Fijians. The Colonial
Office approved the change to government control though Ramsay
MacDonald, the Secretary of State, did not like it and thought it should
be given up as soon as possible.47 Barker made a last-ditch attempt to

149
The Fiji Indians

stop it. He held a referendum of the Suva ratepayers; the great majority
of those who voted, including an absolute majority of those on the
electoral roll, voted against the change. The Suva Council then deputed
him to go to London to put a case before the Secretary of State. He
asked the Legislative Council to delay the introduction of the measure
but his proposal was defeated,48 and Suva and Levuka passed under
government control. On 1 January 1936 the Suva Municipal Council
was replaced by a Town Board of seven official members and six
nominated unofficial members (two Europeans, two Fijians and two
Indians).
But direct government control of the towns was only part of
Fletcher’s design. In 1933, before he left London, where he was on
leave, he had discussed the Fiji franchise with the Colonial Office. He
told them he was in favour, not only of government control of the
municipalities, but also of government nomination of all the members
of the Legislative Council, with equality of unofficial seats for the
three races. As well as the familiar reasons, that the Indians were per­
sisting in their demand for common roll, that only through nomination
could eventual Indian control be averted, and that Indian control
would be resisted by the Fijians, there was a new one: that the European
electoral roll was being so swamped by part-Europeans that Europeans
of standing might not be elected in future. The Colonial Office would
not commit itself in advance, but it authorised Fletcher to pursue his
idea, provided the initiative was seen to come from the unofficial mem­
bers and not from the government. The answer to the question why the
officials in London were prepared to consider putting the clock back
in Fiji lies, I believe, not just in Fletcher’s arguments, but in the times.
In 1933 democracy was on the defensive in the western world. One
Colonial Office official minuted, flippantly perhaps, T wish we could
abolish elections everywhere’.49
On his return to Fiji, Fletcher held discussions on his proposals, at
first in private. He explained that the public initiative for the abolition
of the elective system would have to come from the elected members
themselves. The leading European elected members, Hedstrom and
Scott, were ready. They had for some time contemplated nomination
as the only alternative to common roll and eventual Indian domination,
and they now conceded that the Indians should have the same number
of seats as the Europeans, which they had previously opposed. Before
making their position known publicly, they prudently asked for an
assurance in advance that the Secretary of State would approve the

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change, but when the Colonial Office would not agree, they decided to
go ahead anyway.50 Fletcher then tried to build up wider support for
his proposal.
In 1933 the Council of Chiefs had agreed to support government
control of the Suva and Levuka Councils, and had also resolved:
This Council records its strong and unanimous opinion that Fiji
having been ceded to Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and
Ireland, Her Heirs and Successors, the immigrant Indian population
should neither directly nor indirectly have any part in the control
or direction of matters affecting the Fijian race.51
The Young Fijian Society (Viti Cauravou) passed even stronger reso­
lutions against Indian political aspirations. One read in part: ‘It is our
desire to remain united with the Europeans but not with the Indians.’52
When the issue of nomination of members of the Legislative Council
first came to a vote in the Council on 21 May 1935 the Fijian members
did not take part in the debate or vote on the motion, but later, after
consultation with the other leading chiefs, they fully supported the
proposed change, arguing that democracy was unsuited to conditions in
Fiji.53
The two Indian members, Singh and Mudaliar, readily agreed to
support the abolition of the elective system. Whatever their private
reasons (harsh words were said by Vishnu Deo’s party, and an official
in New Delhi described their action as ‘political opportunism of the
worst type’) they could argue with truth that a common roll was un­
attainable and that the governor’s proposal would at least give the
Indians the same number of seats as the Europeans. In a petition, sub­
mitted through K. B. Singh, 399 Indians asked for nomination and an
equal number of seats for the three races.54 The Muslim League also
supported the nominative system. One of their arguments had a topical
ring:
‘Democracy’ has been put to the most crucial test the world over and
it has been definitely proved that ‘Government of the people, by the
people, for the people’ is only a high-sounding phrase and that the
man in the street who happens to be a voter, often sailing with the
wind, has no more right to determine the fate of a nation than the
man at the wheel. Many progressive nations have therefore taken
up to dictatorships and even free England has had to coalesce itself
into a National Government.55

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The Fiji Indians

But most Indian opinion was against nomination. On 9 December

1934 the Indian Association of Fiji, a less controversially named suc­
cessor to the defunct Indian National Congress of Fiji, was formed ‘to
safeguard and further the political rights of the Indian community in
Fiji’.56 A. D. Patel was president and Vishnu Deo, secretary. When it
became generally known that Fletcher proposed to proceed with the
change, there was an outcry. A deputation, headed by A. D. Patel and
Vishnu Deo, waited on the governor. Patel told him that equal represen­
tation on a communal basis was now acceptable to the Indians and that
the demand for a common roll would not be pressed while it was so
clearly unattainable.57 Petitions against nomination were signed by
thousands. Fletcher said he had the support of the South Indian com­
munity, but was unable to sustain that claim when M. N. Naidu, Dr
Gopalan, and other leaders of the T.I.S.I. Sangam and Madras Maha
Sangam organised public meetings and forwarded petitions repudiating
the two Indian members and supporting the Indian Association’s oppo­
sition to nomination. The Indian Association sent letters and telegrams
to the Government of India and to Polak, who in turn made representa­
tions to the India Office.58
In mid 1935 Fletcher was back in London again and pressed his pro­
posals. He argued that the circumstances were particularly favourable
for a change and would not recur, as in the next elections the Indian
extremists would be returned to the council and revive the common roll
issue. He asked for an understanding that the Secretary of State was not
definitely opposed to nomination. The Colonial Office was favourable
on the whole. The Permanent Under-Secretary minuted: ‘It may be the
last chance of preventing the domination of the country by a democracy
of half-castes.’59 But although it agreed to prolong the life of the exist­
ing council for up to a year, it still refused to commit itself until it had
more information on local attitudes in Fiji and until the India Office
had been consulted. In the Legislative Council on 21 May 1935 three
of the six European members (T. W. A. Barker, J. P. Bayly and W. E.
Willoughby Tottenham) had in fact voted against nomination. On his
return to Fiji Fletcher held wider discussions, making no secret of his
own opinion. The CSR, the heads of the Anglican, Methodist and
Roman Catholic Missions in Fiji, E. G. Theodore of the new gold­
mining industry, Burns Philp and Company, and the Bank of New
South Wales, all gave their approval to nomination.60 When another
vote was held in the Legislative Council on 14 November 1935, only
Barker and Bayly were still opposed.

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 Common Roll

In Septenber 1935 the Government of India told London that the

change would be a retrograde step that would lead to a renewal of
serious agitition among the Fiji Indians who were now willing to
co-operate under the communal franchise. On 18 March 1936 it
accepted a resolution in the Council of State that reflected strong public
feeling in Irdia against the proposed move. One member, P. N. Sapru,
observed: ‘Our izzat is involved in this.’ The Government of India told
London: ‘Sibstitution of nomination for election will have the most un­
fortunate repercussions on Indian opinion in this country’. Bajpai had
no illusions that the Government of India could have much influence
over the Colonial Office, but it was at least trying to satisfy Indian
public opinon. It held Vishnu Deo at arm’s length, making only per­
functory replies to the pleas from Fiji. In the end Vishnu Deo wrote,
despairingly ‘The Indian community in Fiji looked to the Government
and people of India for ready assistance but in vain.’61 Actually the
Government of India was doing all it could, but had little bargaining
power.
The Indians in Fiji also turned to their old friend, Charles Freer
Andrews. Ii 1936 while on a trip to Australia and New Zealand to
conduct unversities’ missions at the invitation of the World Student
Christian Federation, he visited Fiji too, at the invitation of the Indian
Association of Fiji. He was warmly welcomed by the Indians, and, with
his captivaing personality, generosity of spirit, and truly Christian
character, vas well received by the Europeans also. He was delighted
by the improvement in conditions since his last visit:
The aboition of indenture has made such a change in the general
conditior of the people, that it is hard to recognize the Indians of
to-day a; the same community which I saw under the miserable
conditiors of indenture in 1915 and 1917. The improvement which
has folloved economic freedom, has quickened the whole life of the
Indian prople and made them independent in such a manner that
they are now rapidly becoming peasant proprietors and tenant
farmers. Mrove all, the home and family life of the Indian people has
amazingly advanced.62
He took ip with the government the questions of the franchise,
education, particularly of girls, and the insecurity of tenure of the
Indian farners leasing land from the Fijians. But, as always, he was
concerned vith building bridges between the races, and told the Indians
that they must remember that Fiji belonged to the Fijians, and that they

153
The Fiji Indians

were there as guests.63 On the franchise, he suggested various com­

promises, including a scheme, which he put forward without consulta­
tion with the Indian leaders in Fiji and later withdrew, that was similar
to the one finally devised, quite independently, by the Colonial Office.
Andrews was in no way responsible for the final decision.64
In the end it was Barker and Bayly who saved the franchise in Fiji,
and the irony is that they were hardly friends of the Indians. Ram
Chandra, Bajpai’s successor in New Delhi, observed: ‘What will really
help the Indians is the lack of unanimity amongst the Europeans them­
selves and the clear indication that a large section of the European com­
munity is against nomination.’65 As an opponent of the government
on the municipal issue, Barker was likely to lose his seat on the Legis­
lative Council if nomination replaced election. Fletcher sought to
discredit him as an ambitious ‘beach’ politician whose influence was
inflated by his own newspaper, the Fiji Times and Herald. But Fletcher
did concede that if a referendum were held, as Barker asked, a major­
ity of the electors on ‘the so-called European roll’ would vote for the
retention of the existing system.66 In May 1936 Barker and Bayly
put their case in person at the Colonial Office. They stressed that the
democratic rights of taxpayers were being taken away without refer­
ence to them in an election, and that Fletcher had openly taken sides,
while professing to be impartial. Eventually in June 1936 the Secretary
of State decided he could not wholly support Fletcher, as a very strong
case was required before electoral rights were taken away, and there
was a sharp division of opinion within Fiji. He imposed a compromise.67
In the new Legislative Council there were to be sixteen official mem­
bers and fifteen unofficials, five from each of the main races. Three of
the European and three of the Indian representatives were to be
elected, and two Europeans and two Indians nominated; the nominated
members would enable representation of minority interests. The Fijians
were to be chosen as before, by the governor from a panel submitted
by the Council of Chiefs. Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy of India, was
consulted on the plan and, after discussing it with his Indian advisers,
agreed that it was satisfactory from the Indian point of view.68 By
then Fletcher had left Fiji but Juxon Barton, the Colonial Secretary
and acting governor, who had recently come from Kenya, where he
had spent all his previous colonial service, and made no secret of his
racial opinions, took a last ditch stand against the proposals. He pro­
tested that they would be regarded as an Indian victory, would result
in domination of the European roll by part-Europeans, and might

154
 Common Roll

upset the Fijians. He proposed that the part-Europeans be put on a

separate roll and given the same number of representatives as the
others.69 But the Secretary of State’s decision was final, and it was
announced in Fiji in July 1936.
Vishnu Deo then wrote an emotive letter to the Government of
India accusing it of letting down the Fiji Indians. He declared: ‘the
Government of India must do something to protect the rights of the
Indians settled here as otherwise Fiji will become in all respects South
Africa.’ An official in New Delhi deplored his sense of proportion and
form, and the Government of India ignored him.70 When the Legis­
lative Council met for the first time under the new system, there was
a further instance of that lack of a sense of timing that has so often
weakened the Indian cause in Fiji. The three elected members (includ­
ing Vishnu Deo whose disqualification had been removed as a gesture
of conciliation towards the Indian community and a recognition of
his political abilities and public support) objected to the governor’s
decision to list the five Indian members in order of precedence accord­
ing to age, thus giving precedence to a nominated member, Said Hasan.
They claimed that the elected members should have precedence over
the nominated members. They absented themselves from the council
on the first day, and then left on the second day after the governor
(Sir Arthur Richards) told them to withdraw until they could take the
oath of allegiance. The Indian Association sent telegrams of complaint
to London and India, but the Government of India urged them to
attend the council in the larger interests of the Indian community.71
The three members soon thought better of their action, apologised,
took their seats, and thereafter fully co-operated in the work of the
Legislative Council. In 1946 an Indian (the nominated member, K. B.
Singh) was appointed to the Executive Council.
What did the agitation for a common roll and the boycott of the
council achieve for the Fiji Indians? A common roll was not a prac­
tical possibility: it would have been bitterly resisted by the Europeans
and Fijians, and the colonial government would not have imposed it
on them. The agitation was initially inspired from abroad, was resented
by the Europeans and Fijians, led to Fletcher’s counter-attack, and
increased the anti-Indian feeling that had been showing some signs of
abatement by 1929 — though it must be acknowledged that Indian
competition with the Europeans and part-Europeans, and eventually
with the Fijians, would have produced resentment in any case. The
boycott accelerated the granting of equality of Legislative Council

155
The Fiji Indians

seats for the Fiji Indians, but in retrospect it was probably a mistake
from the standpoint of their long-term interests and adjustment in the
Fiji body politic. Still, it was undeniably an affirmation of awakened
self-respect and pride, an important if futile gesture against the
colonial order and against racial prejudice in the name of the liberal
principles that Britain herself had enunciated.

156
 VIII
Kisans Unite
Even while the leaders of the Fiji Indians were fighting for equality of
political status with the Europeans, there were those who saw other
serious problems ahead. The typical Fiji Indian was a cane-farmer with
little interest in the Legislative Council, that ‘circus on top of what is
really happening’, as A. D. Patel and Swami Rudrananda put it to
the writer in 1956. The importance of the communal and sectarian
quarrels among the Indian people should not be exaggerated either,
however significant they were as efforts towards self-definition and
evidence of growing differentiation within the community. What con­
cerned the Indian farmer most was access to land, the future of his
children, debt, cane prices, and the power the CSR still had over him
more than fifteen years after the end of the indenture system. In 1937
the governor, Sir Arthur Richards, writing to London about the need
to restrict immigration, referred to Fiji’s economic problems, its remote­
ness from markets and dependence on the imperial preference for the
viability of its sugar industry, the growing population pressure, par­
ticularly in the sugar districts, and the need to settle the question of
the use of Fijian-owned land and protect the communal Fijians from
premature competition with the highly individualistic Indians, lest race
relations suffer.1 It is to the problems of the Indian farmers and their
relations with the CSR and Fijians that we must now turn.
The success of the company’s tenant-farmer scheme was the main
factor in the growth of a prosperous and stable Indian community in
Fiji. That Fiji provided a better living than India for most of its people
— in the material if not necessarily in the cultural sense — was due
less to colonial institutions than to the natural environment, but it was
fortunate for Fiji and for the Fiji Indians that the advantages of land
and climate were not wasted. They did not fall back into an economy
of subsistence agriculture, eking out an aimless and impoverished
existence on tiny plots. That, rather than Gandhian mutual aid as
evidently envisaged by Sadhu Bashishth Muni, would have been the
outcome of a final breakdown in the relations between the Indians and
the European dominated order represented by the CSR, as had seemed
likely in 1922. The company’s announcement in April 1923 of higher
wages, and cane prices guaranteed for three years, was the beginning
of a rapid recovery in the Fiji sugar industry.
A few years later, Dixon, who all along had been more pragmatic
157
The Fiji Indians

and less pessimistic than Knox, proudly wrote in vindication of the

policy he had pressed:
The effect was immediate and far-reaching. The whole >f the people
concerned were galvanised into vigorous effort. The iidustry took
on a new lease of life and the confidence that was sooi engendered
by the improved outlook warranted the development (f a vigorous
and progressive policy, which in the space of two yeirs has prac­
tically re-established our business, and if maintained will place it
on a firmer footing than it was before.2
Three factors were, he thought, important in that remarkable improve­
ment: the indirect effect of the British preference; the company’s supply
to the Indians of cheap food and clothing which enabled it to keep
wages down so that it could compete in the world sugar market; and
the policy of leasing company lands to Indian small farme-s. The inter­
national market and the British preference set a price for sugar that
was too low to make the plantation system viable, yet wa; just enough
to provide an incentive for the CSR to continue in Fiji <nd buy cane
from the Indian growers. The events of the previous few /ears left the
CSR with a monopoly of sugar milling; of the two independent mills,
that at Navua was closed permanently in 1922, and thit at Penang
was bought by the CSR in 1926. Under the shield of the British pref­
erence, it was able to guarantee the payment of the caie bonus for
several years ahead, relieving the farmers from anxiety alout investing
in clearing and planting. The failure of the rice crop in 1923-24 and
the difficulties in the way of acquiring Fijian land and of developing
any alternative cash crop — lack of knowledge, and marketing and
transport problems — helped to drive the Indians back into sugar
cultivation under the control of the CSR, though as farmers rather
than plantation labourers. The company’s monopoly of milling, its
tenant-farmer scheme, and the government’s restrictions on the leasing
of Fijian land, checked the growth of a class of large Indian land-
owners, a process which had been under way towards the end of the
indenture period.
The sugar industry would not have been viable without close super­
vision over the growers. Although they would happily work on their
own farms, using family labour, the company’s problem was how to
maintain productivity. For many years it had bought cane from inde­
pendent growers, known as contractors, to whom it gave advice and
assistance, but the cane sugar yields were generally lower on their land

158
 Kisans Unite

because of the lack of close supervision by company overseers— though

it is true that the company owned or leased the most fertile land. The
CSR had long-standing doubts about the reliability of the Indian when
working on his own. The stereotype ambitious and industrious Indian
was far from the image held by the company’s managers, who had
repeatedly argued that most of the Indians in Fiji would, if paid higher
wages or given a higher price for their cane, simply do less work and
keep their living standard just above subsistence level. Nor was the
CSR alone in this view. Other Europeans in Fiji often contrasted the
Indians unfavourably with the Chinese and with themselves, though
not, of course, with the Fijians. Even Rodwell, who was critical enough
of the CSR, gave as his opinion of the Indians in Fiji: ‘the great major­
ity of them are too lazy to do an honest day’s work’.3 The company
feared that the Indians would neglect the land and the growing cane
and bring about low yields, and it also believed that it would be diffi­
cult to get individual farmers to combine for group work like the
harvesting of the cane.
The CSR tried various alternatives to the plantation system before
finally settling on the tenant-farmer scheme.4 As early as 1891 Knox
suggested that some land be leased to ex-indentured Indians for grow­
ing cane, and the experiment was tried from the next year, though the
company’s officers in Fiji were sceptical. The scheme was not a suc­
cess and was discontinued; of the 2500 independent Indian cane-
growers in 1921 only a small number leased their land from the com­
pany. Instead, from 1909 onwards, the company leased many of its
estates to experienced European planters, usually ex-overseers, and
from 1916 onwards this scheme was extended to Indian planters,
though with smaller areas. Under another scheme, in force from 1912
onwards, the company subdivided some of its estates and leased them
to Indians grouped in what were called ‘settlements’ of 10-15 tenants,
each of whom had about 4 acres. The company undertook to provide
the horse-work at stated rates and each tenant was to do the hand­
work on his farm, but a system of gang work developed, the company
paying daily wages and debiting each tenant’s account with the wages
for the work done by the gang on his holding. The company regarded
the experiment as a failure, because the tenants had no responsibility
yet earned more than their less fortunate fellows who were ordinary
labourers. The shortage of labour that followed the cessation of immi­
gration under the indenture system spelled the end of those European
and Indian planters who employed large bodies of labour. In 1921

159
The Fiji Indians

Knox proposed to bring the settlement scheme to an end and to use

paid labour to work the estates, including those recently resumed from
the planters.5 The problem, of course, was that local labour was in
very short supply.
The CSR did make some effort to recruit Fijians, but at no time
did it see them as more than a supplement to its Indian labour force.
In 1927 Dixon noted:
The employment of Fijians as a supplementary labour force has
undoubtedly been an important factor in enabling us to carry on
and in discouraging the Indians from further trials of strength, but
the Fijian, though greatly improved, is by no means a satisfactory
worker, and is moreover uncertain as regards numbers available.6
The Fijian lacked diligence in routine field labour and cost more than
the Indian because of the hearty rations provided. In any case, there
were few Fijians available for plantation work because they had little
incentive to leave the villages except to earn money for specific pur­
poses such as the building of a church or the purchase of a boat, and
because of the continuing existence of communal obligations and their
enforcement by government regulations.
The Indian tenant-farmer scheme provided the way out. Knox and
other company officers were doubtful whether Indian small farms were
practicable, but this course was urged on the company by the Fiji
Government, the Colonial Office, and by G. L. Corbett. Within the
company, the main proponent of the scheme was W. P. Dixon, who
clashed strongly with Knox on the point.7 But with India closed, the
Indians reluctant to work for the company, and the estates reverting to
bush, it was decided to give the scheme a trial. Indians were settled
on small farms of 8-12 acres (generally 10 acres) on 10 year leases.
The farms were divided into four equal parts where sugar-cane was
grown in rotation with leguminous crops. Dixon was soon vindicated.
In 1927 he noted: T he time has come for a recognition of the fact
that we cannot hope to grow cane as cheaply as we can buy it.’8 The
scheme was extended as quickly as was consistent with prudent selec­
tion and supervision of the tenant-farmers. The company insisted on
very close control. It was fortunate from its own point of view that
it was dealing with a people who were used to the hard conditions of
the indenture period, when the word of the kolambar (overseer) was
law.9 The new generation grew up in the company’s hard school, as
good farmers, the economic mainstay of Fiji.

160
 Kisans Unite

The tenart-farmer scheme meant a good deal less than freedom for
the farmer. To him, the CSR was an all-powerful and all-knowing
zamindar. As Kunzru wrote in 1938: T had no idea till I went to Fiji
of the enornous power wielded by the C.S.R. Co. Its tenants are no
better than labourers and completely under its thumb.’10 The company
owned the :>est land and decided who should have leases on it; a
tenant did n)t have the automatic right to pass on his farm to his widow
or children. The CSR had a monopoly of sugar milling in Fiji and was
able to impose conditions on all the growers. Disobedience meant
eviction for a tenant, and for a contractor it meant that his cane would
not be bought. The farmers had to submit without question to the
company’s cecisions at every turn. They had to cultivate their cane to
the satisfacton of the company, they were restricted in the other crops
they could grow and the stock they could keep, they had to provide
labour in the cane-cutting gangs and in the mill. While the CSR had no
reason not t) be fair within the rules it established, the wise farmer did
not argue wth the sector overseer or the sirdar who had his ear. At its
best the coirpany was paternalistic. It gave expert advice to the farmers;
it sold food, clothing, fertiliser, and building materials at low prices to
compensate for the low wages and cane prices, and disregarded the
protests of tie European storekeepers; it gave the tenants loans at a low
interest rate it subsidised and managed Indian schools and contributed
to festivals and the building of mosques; it organised agricultural
shows that provided useful instruction, ploughing competitions, and
entertainment and merry-go-rounds for the children. Few other Euro­
peans in Fij had as much contact with and knowledge of the Indians
as the officers of the CSR, and in the last analysis they did more for
them than he government or the missions. However, this was not
generally appreciated by the farmers, who saw the irksome restrictions
and heard tie orders that reminded them of the hated indenture system,
and did not understand the reasons for them. The CSR, secure in its
power and conscious of its own rectitude and agricultural and technical
efficiency, dd not think it worthwhile, or even appropriate or wise, to
take the farmers into its confidence or treat them with civility and
respect.
At first al went well. Those who were allotted 10 acre farms found
themselves far better off than they had been before as plantation
labourers. For most of them, families were small, needs and obligations
were few ard social cohesion weak. The 10 acre farms were designed
to be worked by one man with his wife and children. But a decade

161
The Fiji Indians

later, adult sons and their wives were living with parents on the same
small areas. Farms were much sought after, and not enough new land
was being brought into cultivation to meet the demand. The farmers
wanted a higher standard of living than before: shoes, European-style
clothing, furniture, corrugated-iron houses, motor-bus and taxi trans­
port, education for their sons, elaborate weddings for their daughters,
and entertainment with kin and neighbours. Cane-farming is seasonal
work, and many preferred to take their higher standard of living in the
form of leisure. Some paid for substitutes in the cane-cutting gangs
rather than do the work themselves. Soon, most of the farmers fell into
debt.
Debt was one of life’s major problems for the Indian farmer in Fiji,
as it is for farmers elsewhere. First he borrowed to obtain a lease of
land that he could nominally call his, and so win freedom from wage
labour. To obtain a lease, large premiums were often paid to the Euro­
pean, Fijian, or Indian holders of the land. Then the farmer borrowed
more to build a house, to buy seed, implements, and household pos­
sessions, and for support for the first year. Hurricanes, floods, and
expensive weddings brought more recourse to the lender. The farmer
would borrow from other Indians or from Europeans at interest rates
as high as 60 per cent per annum.11 The CSR’s tenants paid only 5 per
cent interest, but the company would only lend on security and for
approved purposes, and the farmers had recourse to promissory notes
given to outside money-lenders. In the early days few of the tenant
farmers were in debt, but as time passed their standard of living and
their expenses increased while their incomes remained constant. Early
surpluses were used to pay deposits on the acquisition of further areas
of land (often placed in the names of wives, sons or other family
members). As the people became more settled in the country, their
expenditure on weddings and religious celebrations increased. A few
bought motor vehicles or tried to set up as storekeepers. Not all were
energetic and prudent. Those who engaged substitutes for the cane­
harvesting gangs found that they had to pay increasingly high wages
and bonuses to the few Indians who offered themselves as wage labour.
Debt became a problem for the tenants of the CSR, as for other
farmers. Europeans and Indians, including lawyers, storekeepers, and
the bigger farmers, became rich by lending money. Most of the money
was not lent by persons whose primary business was money-lending. In
1930 the problem was most acute in the Ba and Tavua areas where
there was a large area of cane land leased from the Fijians rather than

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 Kisans Unite

the CSR, and there were a number of prominent farmer-money-lenders,

especially Punjabis.12
The Fiji Government had long recognised the existence of the prob­
lem of Indian rural debt and discussed the possibility of remedial action.
In 1932 an ordinance was passed, along the lines of legislation in
India, which gave the courts the power, in any suit for the recovery of
a loan, to reopen the transaction where the interest was excessive or
the transaction substantially unfair. But this was largely ineffective,
because the law was easily evaded by verbal understandings and false
book-entries and the debtor could seldom afford to apply to the court
for relief. The Gujarati storekeeper, who became predominant in
storekeeping in the 1930s, lived on credit himself and granted very
easy credit to others. Not all the borrowers would repay as promised,
even if they could. But the lender would take a promissory note against
the book debts before he supplied to the farmer, and, just before the
harvest, would sue and obtain from the court a garnishee order on the
monies held by the company on the customer’s account, and repeat the
process year after year. The lender filled a needed role in rural society
— at a price— and as elsewhere it has proved difficult, if not impossible,
either to eliminate him or to impose any real control over his activities
other than that provided by the market-place.
Pearson, the first Secretary for Indian Affairs, who had spent his
Indian Civil Service career in district administration, argued, not only
for the regulation of money-lending, but also for the establishment of
co-operative credit societies, which he thought would do even more to
improve the conditions of the small farmers and foster a much-needed
spirit of co-operation among them. He was disappointed by the
response from his official colleagues, and wrote to India:
Over cooperation I have not progressed much. It is very difficult to
get officials and others here to grasp even the elementary principle
of joint responsibility or understand the needs of the small farmer.
I was disappointed to find that some information I had asked for
about progress in other Indian colonies had simply been pigeon­
holed on receipt without my seeing it, with a note on the file that the
time was not ripe for such developments here. Other matters such
as local organisation are held up in much the same way . . ,13
The Fiji Government continued to take no interest in fostering co-oper­
ative credit schemes, believing them to be toe complicated and too
expensive.14 Experience elsewhere in the Empire supported its judg-

163
The Fiji Indians

ment. The farmers remained dependent on the Gujarati money-lenders,

the European and Indian lawyers, the richer of their own kind, and
the CSR Company. In the cane areas the company still loomed larger
than the government.
As the indenture system receded into the background, the new
generation of Fiji-born Indians was more disposed to question the
company’s system. Since the period of 1919-21 there had been little
combination among the cane-growers and labourers, and the CSR had
been able to treat with individuals separately. The political leaders of
the Indian community, including Vishnu Deo and A. D. and S. B.
Patel, were not cane-growers themselves and had not shown much
concern for the problems of the farmers, who in their turn did not
worry about the common roll agitation or racial discrimination in
urban areas. At the Indian Conference held at Lautoka on 1 January
1934, a Planters Association was formed, but this was incidental to
the political preoccupations of the organisers of the conference. S. B.
Patel explained to the CSR’s Lautoka manager that the association
had not been formed with the intention of attacking the company, but
to procure better conditions for the leasing of land and renewal of
leases and the lowering of fees.15 The association did not survive; like
the Indian Cane Growers Association of 1919, it had no permanent
fund, no recognised office, and no systematic membership.
Late in 1937 the first moves were taken on the north-western coast
for the formation of the Kisan Sangh, or ‘Farmers’ Association’. The
initiator was Ayodhya Prasad, who had first come to Fiji in 1926 as
a schoolteacher. On a visit to India he noted the vigorous farmers’
movements in the U.P. and other provinces. A Fiji Government officer
remarked after a meeting with him in 1941:
Throughout his discourse his hostility to the Company was evident
but it was also apparent that he was speaking with real conviction.
There is no arrogance about him, but rather a fanatical sincerity.
It is he who conceived and built up the Sangh. It is he who, but for
restraints imposed on him by other more cautious members of the
Central Board, would probably have taken direct action long before
this, and it is evident that he is impatient with the caution of his
colleagues.16
Ayodhya Prasad wrote a vivid account of the formation and early
struggles of the Kisan Sangh.17 The campaigns for the 1937 elections
and the formation of the New Youth Army had aroused interest among

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the local farmers. The inaugural meeting of the Kisan Sangh was held
at Wailailai, Ba, on 28 November 1937 and was attended by 600
delegates from Rewa to Sigatoka. Among the other leaders were Padri
Mehar Singh of Tavua, and Parmanand Singh and Ramcharan Singh
of Ba. Padri Mehar Singh spoke at length on the grievances of the
cane-planters: the heavy burden of debt, the irksome CSR restrictions
on cultivation even by those who were not its tenants, the deduction
of money for labour, cane-cutting, tramlines and transport. Resolu­
tions were passed asking for greater freedom to cultivate, for proper
written statements to be provided, for the CSR to provide its own
labour for the mills. It was also ‘resolved that the CSR Company
should see that its overseers do not insult us — we are no more inden­
tured men’. At a subsequent meeting at Lautoka in December 1937
it was resolved to approach the CSR with a list of grievances. The
company ignored them.
The CSR Company’s refusal to treat with the Kisan Sangh or even
to acknowledge its letters was only one of the problems the new union
faced. Many of the farmers were apathetic and afraid of the company,
and for this reason the Kisan Sangh concentrated on the contractors,
who could not be evicted and were not as closely watched as the
tenants. Sectarian, communal and personal rivalries hindered the efforts
to mobilise the farmers, just as they had in the strike of 1921 and the
common roll agitation. This time the major division was between the
North and South Indians. There was an economic dimension to this
as well as a cultural one, as the South Indians, who had come to Fiji
later, tended to be poorer than the North Indians, among whom there
were some rich planters. The leaders and advisers of the Sangam,
especially M. N. Naidu, A. D. Patel, and Swami Avinashananda, told
the South Indians to concentrate on the educational, social and cul­
tural advancement of their community and the preservation of their
South Indian identity through the Sangam, to save their funds for that
purpose, and not to become embroiled in conflict with the powerful
CSR, at least until the Kisan Sangh had shown it could stand up to
the company. Some of the leading members of the Kisan Sangh were
Arya Samajists who had shown contempt for South Indian customs
and languages, and others were distrusted for different reasons. Some
of the Punjabi farmers stayed aloof because of Chattur Singh’s advo­
cacy of immigration restrictions during the election campaign and the
immigration committee’s inquiry in 1937. A. D. Patel had been
defeated in the 1937 elections by Chattur Singh, whose relatives at Ba

165
The Fiji Indians

were prominent in the Kisan Sangh, and he refused to become its legal
adviser. Then, too, there were the usual personal factions, bickering,
and accusations of misappropriation of funds.
During 1938 the Kisan Sangh set out to enlist the farmers. Ayodhya
Prasad was the secretary and most active spirit, and a rich Muslim
businessman, M. T. Khan of Lautoka, was made president. A Euro­
pean lawyer, D. C. Chalmers, became legal adviser. Following Gandhi’s
example, Ayodhya Prasad and his associates went to the people.18
They travelled through the cane-growing areas in a car and lived in
a tent. The CSR overseers ordered them off their land and deterred
many a prospective member. At first the response was slow but mem­
bership steadily increased. In areas where the Sangh was strong, moral
pressure and physical intimidation were sometimes used against those
who did not wish to join, including many South Indians. In 1938 the
Kisan Sangh was able to attract members, establish a permanent
organisational structure and financial base, and win the respect of
government officers, if not yet of the CSR.
Early in 1939 there was talk of a possible strike against the CSR.
Grievances were aired at meetings on the north-west coast, and the
leaders urged the farmers to stand up to the company and not be afraid.
The Kisan Sangh sent a letter to the company asking for various
changes in the system of purchasing cane. Reflecting the Indians’ deep
distrust of the CSR and their growing resentment of its autocratic
procedures, the Kisan Sangh asked that the farmers be provided with
written accounts and be allowed to have representatives at the weigh­
bridge. It also asked for more secure sub-leases for the company’s
tenants; for permission to grow food-crops on the holdings; for the
10 acre blocks to be increased to 16 acres, as the former was said
to be too small an area on which to practise the company’s mandatory
four-field rotation system; for an end to compulsory labour on the
tramlines and in the mills; and for the payment of a flat rate for each
ton of cane instead of the p.o.c.s. (percentage of pure obtainable cane
sugar) system, which worked against the interests of those whose cane
was harvested early or late in the season. The CSR still refused to
treat with the Kisan Sangh, on the stated ground that the leaders were
not cane-growers and certainly not company tenants, with whom its
relations were its own business.
The government was afraid there would be serious trouble. In April
1939 the governor, Sir Harry Luke, saw Sir Philip Goldfinch of the
CSR in Sydney and urged him to make concessions, and in May, Luke

166
 Kisans Unite

received a deputation from the Kisan Sangh, though as a body of

men rather than an organisation. The company did make some con­
cessions in 1939 in response to this intervention and the evidence of
growing support for the Kisan Sangh among the farmers. It agreed to
give written accounts (as it had once done), it allowed a small area
of land for food-crops, it tried to hire more Fijian labour so that there
would be less need to compel farmers to work in the mills and on the
tramlines, and it agreed to consider various other suggestions. But it
still refused to recognise the Kisan Sangh. In July Goldfinch visited
Fiji and talked to the Indians, though as cane-growers, not as repre­
sentatives of the farmers’ organisation. At the end of the year a gen­
eral meeting of the Kisan Sangh, attended by about 500, decided that
the farmers would not plant cane until the company granted them
acceptable written contracts.
Fiji appeared to be heading towards a major breakdown in the sugar
industry. Many farmers were not planting, sometimes because of
pressure from bully-boys, and some cane was ploughed in. There was
burning of cane, and some assaults, but these ceased after the local
district commissioner spoke to M. T. Khan. The government was
impressed by the discipline and restraint shown by the Kisan Sangh
and the wide support it commanded among the farmers, and deplored
the attitude of the CSR in not negotiating or even behaving civilly
towards it. The government recognised, even if the company preferred
not to, that although there were political and sectarian aspects to the
movement, and some hot-heads among the members, the Kisan Sangh
was the most successful, organised and broad-based combination the
Fiji Indians had yet achieved, and could not be ignored. Yet Goldfinch
telegraphed the CSR attorney in Fiji in words reminiscent of Knox’s
twenty years earlier:
Would remind you my statement to him [Luke] Suva we consider
if he convinced we are acting fairly Government should not interfere
or attempt role of intermediary which fatal future Fiji. We will
continue conduct our own business with our growers and will not
deal through any third party. We regard this vital and must main­
tain at all costs . . . Only assistance we require firmness dealing with
dangerous political agitation supported by intimidation and
violence.19
The impasse highlighted the fact that there was in Fiji at that time
no law governing the registration of trade unions or the settlement of

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The Fiji Indians

industrial disputes. Back in 1930, under a Labour government, the

Colonial Office did ask that trade union legislation be enacted in all
colonies, but Sir Murchison Fletcher argued that it would be inappro­
priate for Fiji, where there were few wage-earners, the Fijians still
lived in a communal society, and the Indians were mostly peasants,
and that unions would be used by disloyal agitators. After the Colonial
Office pressed the matter, Fletcher passed on a letter from the CSR,
in which it threatened to stop buying cane, as it was entitled to do,
without notice, under a clause in its cane purchase conditions, ‘in the
event of legislation being passed limiting its freedom of action in the
matter of buying crops to be grown on the said land or otherwise
affecting the conditions under which it carries on its operations’. The
company’s attorney in Fiji reminded the government — as the com­
pany was never backward in doing — that the result would be the
immediate collapse of the sugar industry, a disaster for Fiji.20 He was
not exaggerating. The CSR rightly took the credit for the fact that the
depression of the 1930s had a relatively slight impact on Fiji, except
on the copra planters, because the company continued to pay the
same wages and cane prices throughout the period. Goldfinch wrote
to a later governor in words that some could well consider patronising
but which merely expressed the reality of economic power: ‘These
are not altogether easy times, but Fiji has so far steered through fairly
well, due largely I think to this Company’s policy during the depres­
sion of keeping the economics of the country on an even keel.’21 The
Colonial Office did not insist on trade union legislation being enacted
then, but said the matter was to receive further consideration in the
event of wage-earners showing any disposition to form unions.22
In fact, before the Kisan Sangh, there had been little interest in
forming unions. In the past most of the skilled workers had come
from Australia and New Zealand. They had refrained from introduc­
ing unionism because of the relatively high wages, good living condi­
tions and other privileges Europeans enjoyed in Fiji and did not want
to share with others. Although European skilled workers received
higher wages than non-Europeans, it was not until the late 1930s that
they were supplanted by part-Europeans, Chinese and Indians. The
unskilled workers were Indians and Fijians, but the Fijians were mostly
temporary rather than permanent members of the modern labour
force. What initiative there had been for the formation of unions had
come from the Indians. Manilal, Mitter and Bashishth Muni had all,
in various ways, shown an interest in the problems of labour, but their

168
 Kisans Unite

efforts did not lead to any lasting organisations. In June 1930, a time
when there was unemployment and disgruntlement among newly-
arrived Punjabi immigrants, Vishnu Deo and K. B. Singh formed the
ephemeral Fiji Bharatiya Mazdur Sangh (Indian Labour Union of Fiji)
at a meeting attended by 140 Punjabis, 80 of whom were enrolled.23
In 1934 the Suva Motor Drivers’ Union and the Indian Motor Drivers’
Union applied to the government for registration under the British
Trade Union Act of 1871, and were told it did not apply to Fiji.
In January 1938 there was a dispute at the CSR Company’s Lautoka
mill over a proposed alteration in the method of paying wages. Chattur
Singh persuaded the strikers to return to work and advised them
against the formation of a labour union. But on 3 April 1938 the
Mazdur Sangh (Workers’ Union) was formed at Lautoka. Mangal
Singh was the principal organiser, and there were Fijian, as well as
Indian members. The Mazdur Sangh asked the CSR for an increase
in wages and for the institution of sick pay. The company ignored it,
just as it did the more formidable Kisan Sangh.24 There was another
brief strike of labour at Lautoka in August 1939, but the men agreed
to return to work at the request of the Kisan Sangh. The Mazdur
Sangh, which in 1944 became the Chini Mazdur Sangh (Sugar Workers’
Union), lacked influential leadership; it was to be many years before
non-farmers’ unions became a strong force in Fiji’s affairs. The inter­
ests of the farmers and the wage-earners were not, of course, identical,
and the typical Indian was a farmer, rather than a labourer. But the
questions of trade union legislation and the peaceful settlement of
industrial disputes were relevant to them both. In 1938 the Kisan
Sangh asked the government to enact trade union legislation so that
it could be registered. The governor, Sir Arthur Richards, said he
thought Fiji needed a labour department, while the Colonial Office
was anxious that the development of trade unions should be guided
by the government.25
By 1940 the question of industrial legislation was very much to the
fore. Under the United Kingdom Colonial Development and Welfare
Act (1940), support for schemes involving the employment of local
labour was conditional upon the existence of trade union legislation.
Even in the darkest days of the war, there was a feeling that the post­
war empire must reflect new ideals of service and welfare. Moreover
there had been labour trouble in Mauritius and Trinidad in 1937; the
Colonial Office was concerned that there could be similar problems in
Fiji and was disturbed by Luke’s reports of the dispute between the

169
The Fiji Indians

CSR and the Kisan Sangh. An official in Whitehall correctly observed:

‘The Company’s attitude, as disclosed in these papers, is about as
reactionary as can possibly be imagined. It is the attitude of British
employers in this country when the Trade Union movement was in its
infancy.’26 In 1940 the Fiji Government appointed an industrial rela­
tions officer, Stuart Reay, who had been sent to Mauritius, Northern
Rhodesia and other places in Africa, to study industrial legislation and
problems. He returned in early 1940 at the time of the trouble between
the CSR and the Kisan Sangh, and later wrote to London:
The uncompromising attitude of the Colonial Sugar Refining Com­
pany towards the growers’ organisation led me to propose tentatively
compulsory arbitration legislation on the lines of the Mauritius
Ordinance (1938) though I was somewhat nervous about this as the
Company may have shut down in order to coerce Government, a
threat it has more than once in the past held over Government’s
head.27
The dispute between the CSR and the Kisan Sangh was settled in
April 1940 without a shut-down of the mills and without industrial
legislation. The Fiji Government urged restraint on both the parties.
On 28 March the Executive Council resolved that arbitration legisla­
tion on the lines of the Mauritius law should be introduced. On 6 April
1940 there was a break-through when the company’s officers met a
deputation of cane-growers. They were not formal representatives of
the Kisan Sangh, and M. T. Khan and Ayodhya Prasad were not among
them, but six of the seven had been deputed by the Kisan Sangh. The
CSR made a number of concessions. There were to be contracts for
the purchase of cane for the next ten years, with provision for an
increase in the price if the price of sugar was increased in that period,
and the company agreed to provide cheaper fertilisers, and let the
farmers grow second ratoons where justified, and be represented at the
weighbridge. In effect, the company had recognised the principle of
collective bargaining, even though it had not yet recognised the Kisan
Sangh. On the same day, the Kisan Sangh advised the growers to sign
the contracts and the dispute was over. The government then decided
not to legislate for compulsory arbitration, but instead for conciliation
and arbitration on the less severe lines of the Trinidad ordinance, and
for the registration of trade unions. The CSR and the Australian gold­
mining interests at Vatukoula were still opposed to all labour legisla­
tion on principle.28

170
 Kisans Unite

The CSR had reason to be concerned at the increasing power of the

Kisan Sangh. By July 1940, according to its president’s books, of
5918 cane-growers from Nadroga to Ra, 4245 had joined and signed
a printed declaration of faith, and 1780 of these were financial mem­
bers.29 It had won concessions from the CSR and brought Goldfinch
to Fiji. The farmers no longer had to work in the mill, there were ten
year contracts, checks on weights, and a new system of paying for
cane to replace the p.o.c.s. system. The first issue of its weekly news­
paper Kisan appeared on 7 February 1941. Its editor, B. D. Laksh-
man, a Fiji-born Indian who had studied in India, was elected to the
Legislative Council in 1940 with the support of M. T. Khan and the
Kisan Sangh. The government was impressed by the wide support,
discipline, non-political character, and essential moderation of the
Kisan Sangh, and was concerned that the CSR might be out to smash
it in a confrontation that would be disastrous for the colony.
There was a further trial of strength in 1941. In March the company
offered three year, instead of ten year, leases to seven allegedly unsatis­
factory and quarrelsome tenants at Rakiraki. The Kisan Sangh argued
that this was an attempt to keep the growers in a state of nervousness
and subservience, and organised protest meetings. When the tenants
refused to sign, eviction proceedings were started on instructions from
the head office in Sydney. Luke remonstrated with the company and
pressed it to recognise the Kisan Sangh. The possibility of the immedi­
ate enactment of labour legislation was mentioned. The CSR gave in,
and on 23 May 1941 there was an historic meeting between King-
Irving of the CSR, M. T. Khan and B. D. Lakshman. A week later, a
conference attended by five CSR officers and thirty-seven representa­
tives of the Kisan Sangh reached accord on the terms of the harvesting
agreement for 1941. Luke then suggested to London that the proposed
industrial legislation be held over until after the war. The Colonial
Office insisted on enactment, to bring Fiji into line with other colonies,
but allowed a suspending clause to provide that the ordinances not be
brought into operation until notified by the governor.30 They were
passed in December 1941 and brought into operation the following
year.
The Kisan Sangh had achieved much in a few years but was now
at the peak of its power. It had been accorded recognition by the
company, with which it negotiated harvesting agreements on behalf of
the growers. Through the election of its nominees as sirdars it con­
trolled most of the cane-harvesting gangs, one of the most important

171
The Fiji Indians

institutions of Fiji Indian rural society. But it had made enemies. The
Indian politicians had seen their influence eclipsed by the leaders of
the Kisan Sangh. The elections of 1940 had demonstrated the import­
ance of the union as a political base. M. T. Khan and Ayodhya Prasad
were now powerful men, and the Kisan Sangh was beginning to be
regarded with jealousy by others, including A. D. Patel and Vishnu
Deo. Chattur Singh broke with the organisation in 1940 and even
tried to have the government declare it to be illegal until the end of
the war. It had not won the hearts of many South Indians, though it
probably had the majority of them enrolled as members by 1941.
There was increasing resentment, particularly among the poorer South
Indian and Fijian cane-farmers, at the high-handedness of Kisan Sangh
officials, sirdars and bully-boys, their financial levies, and mismanage­
ment of funds. The critics saw their chance.
On 15 June 1941 the first convention of a new farmers’ organisation,
the Akhil Fiji Krishak Maha Sangh (All Fiji Farmers’ Union), was
held at Nadi. The founder of this body was Swami Rudrananda, and
its main advocates were A. D. Patel, the Sangam leaders, and in the
Suva-Rewa area, Vishnu Deo. More than a thousand people attended
the convention, including hundreds of dedicated Kisan Sangh members
who tried to prevent the formation of the new body, arguing that A.
D. Patel and the Swami were dividing the farmers just when they had
the CSR down and by the throat.31 The supporters of the Maha Sangh
retired into the schoolhouse to form their new union, and violence was
forestalled by the police. It soon attracted most of the South Indian
farmers. Vishnu Deo helped form branches on the Rewa. Bitter accus­
ations of financial corruption and political opportunism were aired in
the pages of the Kisan, the Fiji Samachar (Vishnu Deo’s paper), and
the Dinbandhu (the organ of the Maha Sangh). Once again in the
history of the Fiji Indians, communalism, factionalism, pettiness and
personal political ambition had triumphed over unity and statesman­
ship.

172
 IX
War, Land, Fijians
In the years from 1936 to 1946 the place of the Indians in Fiji was
settled for at least three decades ahead. They passed the indigenous
Fijians in numbers, but the constitutional arrangements of 1936 ruled
out a common roll and established that, notwithstanding their numeri­
cal ascendancy, they would not be allowed to become the rulers of Fiji.
They remained outsiders in the land of their birth while the Fijians,
aided by the events of the war years, particularly the contrast between
the Fijian and the Indian war effort, and the sugar dispute of 1943,
confirmed their claim to have their interests treated as paramount in
what was once their country exclusively. Fijian interests were pro­
tected by legislation that put the corner-stone on the institutional
framework of Fiji’s plural society, as the Fijians came to terms with
the European settlers before the advancing Indians. The period also
saw the final exclusion of India from the affairs of Fiji.
In the years before the war Fiji received three visitors from India in
response to the appeals of the Fiji Indians for assistance from their
homeland. A few months after C. F. Andrews in 1936, there was
Kodanda Rao, secretary of the Servants of India Society. He was fol­
lowed in 1938 by Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru, who was the president
of the society and a member of the Council of State in New Delhi.
The visitors were shepherded by Vishnu Deo and A. D. Patel and
acquainted with the grievances of the Fiji Indians, principally those
relating to political representation, access to Fijian land, the CSR’s
treatment of its tenants, immigration restrictions, education, and the
appointment of an agent of the Government of India.
Kodanda Rao and Kunzru were more critical of conditions in Fiji
than Andrews. Rao was publicly discreet, but Kunzru was not. He
told the CSR’s Lautokä manager that its closely supervised tenants were
living in ‘slavery’, and the government that the tenants were being
disgracefully exploited. Addressing the Rotary Club in Suva, he ‘gave
it hot to the Europeans and criticised their racial arrogance in Fiji’.
He presided over an All-Fiji Conference, organised by the Indian
Association, where resolutions were passed about Indian grievances in
Fiji: land relations, education, immigration restrictions, medical facil­
ities, labour legislation, and racial discrimination in the public service.
The old requests for the appointment of an agent of the Government
of India and for an economic inquiry were repeated. Kunzru spoke to
173
The Fiji Indians

the conference of the need for better security of tenure, and for educa­
tion, particularly of girls, and of the duty of the Indians to work for
the advancement of the Fijians. He later wrote to Kodanda Rao:
I was afraid that my remarks on the last point might not be liked
by the Indians but I am glad to say that they met with approval.
I was told that in referring to the duty of the Indians towards the
Fijians I broke new ground and that my countrymen agreed with
me in toto. I referred to these subjects at every meeting I addressed
and invariably asked the Indians not to let the Christians alone have
the privilege of serving the Fijians.1
But the time was past when visitors from India, however well-mean­
ing, could have any say in the affairs of Fiji. The Fiji Indians would
have to make their own terms with the other peoples of Fiji, and they
would have to make them not on the basis of patronage of the Fijians,
but on terms of equality with them, at best, and in the realisation that
they could not supplant the Europeans.
Just before the Pacific war there was a temporary aligrment between
the Fijians and the Fiji Indians at the political level. In 1937 there
was a Legislative Council debate concerning a proposed reorganisation
of the public service which included a provision that there be separate
rates of pay for Europeans and non-Europeans in the junior division
for posts carrying the same title and similar duties. Tie Fijian and
Indian members of the Legislative Council later submitted a joint
petition against the provision. Ratu J. L. V. Sukuna, :hen the only
Fijian leader able to operate in the western political stvle, at least in
the Legislative Council, had personally been offended cS well by the
racial prejudice being displayed by Barton, the Colorial Secretary.
At that time, though not so much in later years, Europeans were not
always careful to distinguish between Fijians and Indians in their
expression of racial contempt. Following the debate on public service
reorganisation the Fijian members ‘generally made a practice of voting
against the Government’. Sir Harry Luke wrote to London of what he
described as the growing Indian influence over the Fi ians and the
latters’ emancipation from their almost automatic acceptince of Euro­
pean guidance.2 In 1942 a new governor, Sir Philip Mtchell, noted:
There is an underlying rather nasty touch of racialkm about the
place and I think it is true that Fijians and Indians ire beginning
to feel that on colour grounds they ought to make common cause
against the Europeans. Even Ratu Sukuna seems to me to be inclin-

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 War, Land, Fijians

ing to colour consciousness; he was, I am told, free of it entirely

until he heard — call him a — .3
The significance of this alignment between the Fijian and Indian coun­
cillors should not, however, be over-estimated as Luke and Mitchell
surely did over-estimate it. The objection of the Fijians was to their
being put in the same category as the Indians, and the public service
re-organisation affair was no more than a short interruption of a long­
term trend towards the political alliance of the Europeans and the
Fijians.
Before Japan went to war in the Pacific, Fiji had been little affected
by the second world war. Apart from the lower price for copra, some
shortages and rises in prices, and some unemployment, the everyday
life of the people of Fiji was not much altered. There were appropriate
expressions of loyal sentiment, and some of the Europeans went over­
seas to join the forces. But the war in the Pacific had important effects
on Fiji. Bases were built for tens of thousands of American and New
Zealand servicemen. Through their service in the army, the war
brought the awakening of the indigenous Fijians much closer, and it
greatly increased the respect held for them by the Europeans. On the
other hand, the war raised new questions about the place of the Indians
in Fiji. Although they emerged from the period stronger in numbers,
more prosperous, and more orientated towards Fiji than India, they
were still isolated from the other communities, and the institutions and
sentiments of a plural society had taken even firmer hold.
The Fijian people are rightly proud of their contribution in the
Pacific war. The hierarchical and communal Fijian way of life was
well suited to providing a quick response to the call for volunteers
made by the government and the chiefs. The Fijian officials told the
young men to go off to war, and they were ready enough to do so.
Thousands of Fijians served in the forces, saw action in Bougainville
and the Solomons, and earned high praise from allied commanders.
There vas no reason to doubt the loyalty to the Crown expressed by
the Fijian chiefs and echoed by most of the people. Outsiders may be
sceptical, but analogies drawn from other colonies do not properly
convey the reality of this sentiment in Fiji. In ideal terms Fijian loyalty
was an extension of the principle of hierarchy embodied in traditional
Fijian society and reinforced by Fijian Christianity. Practically it was
an acknowledgment that colonialism was far from oppressive to the
Fijians: they had been left with more than enough land for their needs

175
The Fiji Indians

and their culture had been respected and honoured, even though
altered and standardised as the approved ‘Fijian way of life’. Thanks
to Indian immigration, they had not had to work on the sugar planta­
tions. It was for good'reasons that indigenous Fijian protest was a
rare event in the history of the crown colony of Fiji.
The Fijians have no need to be reminded — though they often have
been — of the disparity between their war effort and that of the Fiji
Indians. The difference between the responses of the two communities
was a reflection of Fiji’s divided society. The response of the Fiji
Indians was a legacy of Fiji’s past, of the colonial plural society and
its lack of concern for national integration. Although most of them
had been born in Fiji they did not yet feel much emotional identifica­
tion with Fiji. They were outsiders still. Any national sentiment they
felt was for India, not Britain or Fiji. Most of the leaders of Indian
opinion in Fiji thought that, while India was still enslaved and they
were denied racial equality in Fiji, it was not really their war but one
in defence of imperialism and European dominance. But it would be
going too far to assert, as some Fiji Europeans have done, that the
Indian leaders were deliberately sabotaging the war effort, consciously
following Gandhi’s non-co-operation movement or the radio propa­
ganda of Subhas Chandra Bose and his Indian government in exile.
Some people probably did have sentiments of disloyalty but they kept
them carefully hidden during the war. For the great majority, it was
indifference, rather than positive disloyalty.
There were, too, important practical circumstances, related to Fiji’s
plural society, that conditioned the different responses of the Fijians
and Indians. The majority of Fijian young men were not permanent
wage-earners or independent farmers and could leave their villages
more easily than the Indian farmers could leave their farms. There
was little surplus labour in the cane areas; many Indians were already
working on military projects and were happy to do so provided they
could return to their farms each day and have time off for rice planting
and other necessary work; and there were complaints of recruiting
interfering with the supply of labour in the sugar industry. The Fijian
village system lent itself to directed and organised recruitment more
than the dispersed Fiji Indian settlement pattern and individualistic
social structure. The Fijian value system emphasised physical prowess
and traditions of warfare, unlike that of the majority of Indians in
Fiji. In any case, the government did not really want the Indians as
soldiers, only as labourers. But when all that has been said, the fact

176
 War, Land, Fijians

remains that, at the height of the Pacific war, the leaders of the Fiji
Indians cavilled and pursued grievances and organised a breakdown
in the sugar industry.
Indians had in fact been allowed to join the Fiji Defence Force in
1934 as part of Fletcher’s policy of giving them greater recognition
and opportunity to participate in the general life of the colony and
encouraging them to regard Fiji as their permanent home. The forma­
tion of the Indian platoon was opposed by Hedstrom and Scott, the
leading European unofficial members of the Legislative Council. After
the outbreak of the European war the force was called out for active
service, but the Indian platoon was offered lower pay than the Euro­
peans. When the Indians objected to the discrimination, the New
Zealand military authorities pressed strongly for the disbandment of
the platoon on the grounds that its work was unsatisfactory and that
its dissatisfaction could be disturbing to the rest of the army. The
Indians were then given the opportunity to be discharged, which they
accepted rather than accept the discrimination.4 There was little call
for manpower until the entry of Japan into the war and the need for
labour for construction work for the allied bases. At first the district
commissioners reported a mixed response from the Indians to the
appeals for the ‘Fiji Bombers Fund’ and the ‘Red Cross Fund’ but this
was in part because of a lack of news about the war and poor organ­
isation, and the later response was better; in 1943 the Fiji Indians’
‘Fighter Fund’ was over-subscribed. An Indian Reserve Motor Trans­
port Section was organised and worked well.
On 1 May 1942 the governor called a conference of representative
Indians to consider how the Indian community could be more closely
involved in the war effort. The conference unanimously passed a num­
ber of resolutions, the first two of which read:

1. This conference while appreciating the change of attitude exhib­

ited by the Government in inviting the members of the Indian
community to this conference for discussing ways and means
for the furtherance of the War Effort of this Colony, feels itself
bound to express the opinion that a further assurance should be
given by the Government that the policy of political and econ­
omic discrimination against non-European races in this Colony
would be abandoned.
2. In the event of the Government proposing to enlist Indian
Troops for:

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The Fiji Indians

(a) Fighting Battalions

(b) Pioneer Battalions
(c) Reserve Pioneer Battalions
(d) Other Units including Medical Corps,
such enlistment, in the considered opinion of this conference,
would be acceptable to the Indian community if the Govern­
ment recruits on a voluntary basis and offers the same terms of
service (including pay, allowances, pensions and other privileges)
as those offered to European Troops.5

In August 1942 the Legislative Council approved the introduction

of compulsory national service; it was not in fact brought in, but
remained in reserve as a threat. In November the government opened
recruitment of Indians for the Fiji Labour Corps (military) but the
response was poor. In May 1943 the government appealed for 1000
Indian volunteers for labour service and threatened to obtain that
number by compulsion if they were not forthcoming. M. T. Khan and
K. B. Singh were commissioned as officers and tried to raise recruits
without interfering with the sugar industry; but in all less than 300
Indians served in the military forces. Some of the other Indian leaders
were not so helpful to the government. Vishnu Deo’s paper, the Fiji
Samachar, published a serial record of another meeting of the Central
Indian War Committee in November 1942 at which most of the
speakers took the view that Indians could not be expected to enlist
unless they were paid the same as Europeans. The government res­
ponded by removing Vishnu Deo from the war committees on which
he was serving, and by suspending the publication of the Fiji Samachar
for six months. The government also decided to set up an Indian
Civilian Labour Force and the Indian members of the Legislative
Council, including Vishnu Deo, agreed to co-operate in recruiting vol­
unteers for that body; although 331 were enlisted, the Force was
reduced in size after three months because they were no longer needed
following a reduction in the American forces’ demand for labour. In
1944 K. B. Singh approached the government with a proposal to raise
a token unit of fifty Indians for combat overseas in the Indian Army or
elsewhere, but the British Government said it would be impracticable
except on the basis of individual enlistment in the Indian Army; any­
way, K. B. Singh was unable to obtain any volunteers.6
The Indian response to the call to assist with manpower can be
explained in various ways, as has been attempted above, but, like the

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 War, Land, Fijians

common roll agitation, it was probably a mistake from the standpoint

of the overall interests of the Indian community in Fiji, as some of
them have recognised. The Europeans and Fijians thought that to
pursue grievances at such a critical period in the war was disloyalty at
worst, unhelpfulness and selfishness at best. The Fiji Government’s
Information Officer reported in 1943:
A new spirit has arisen among Fijian soldiers. They are becoming
very critical of the Indian community, whose contribution to the war
effort shows up in a very poor light when compared with that of
the Fijians . . . Fijians are becoming increasingly resentful of the
fact that Fijians are serving in large numbers in the war and Indians
are not. Economic fear enters here also when Indians are seen to be
trying to buy land with war profits or to lease land left vacant
because the native owners are in uniform.7
Among the Europeans, resentment against profiteering Gujarati shop­
keepers tended to be transferred to other Indians. Because of the large
number of allied servicemen in Fiji, Indian artisans, bootmakers, dom­
estic servants, tailors, and washermen refused to accept work from
civilians or accepted it only at higher rates of pay. Europeans and part-
Europeans resented the increasing employment of Indians as clerks
and in other occupations once predominantly held by Europeans.
The economic effects of the war were nowhere felt more keenly than
in the sugar-cane districts of north-west Viti Levu, where the main
allied bases were located. The cost of living and the cost of growing
cane soared. The Indian farmers and their families could earn more
money doing laundry and supplying vegetables and services to the
American and other forces than by growing cane or working in the
sugar mills. The attitudes and living standards of the allied servicemen
aroused the expectations of the Indian farmers and made them more
critical of the local order. Towards the end of June 1943, 600 Indian
and Fijian workers went on strike at the Ba and Lautoka mills, pre­
venting their opening for the crushing season. They asked for a large
increase in pay and assistance in obtaining scarce essential commodities
at reasonable prices. On the previous day Vishnu Deo had addressed
the workers on the subject of national service and had persuaded a
number to hand in their names for the Civilian Labour Force at better
pay than they were getting from the CSR. The Director of National
Service held a conference with the representatives of the workers and
they agreed on terms for settlement. The CSR rejected the terms but

179
The Fiji Indians

the government then appointed an arbitration tribunal which made a

similar award, and this was accepted by both parties.8 The mill workers’
strike was important because, by delaying the opening of the mills, it
gave more time for agitation to develop among the cane-farmers.
In 1940 the CSR and the farmers had agreed on a contract for the
purchase of cane for the next ten years that included provision for an
increase in the price of cane if there was a rise in the price of sugar,
and under this formula it had in fact been increased. In 1941 there
were difficulties for the Fiji sugar industry because of the shortage of
shipping, and in 1942 because of the military incursions in the cane
areas. In March 1943 the Kisan Sangh asked the company to increase
the price of cane above the agreed formula and was refused. In April
the Kisan Sangh asked the government to ask the British Government,
which now had control of Empire sugar prices, to pay more for sugar,
and these representations were passed on to London. In June the Maha
Sangh told the government that unless the price of cane were raised
to at least double the pre-war level the farmers would have to give up
sugar-cane cultivation. In July the Kisan Sangh asked for the appoint­
ment of a commission to inquire into the price of cane and threatened
direct action if one was not appointed within a month. On 19 July
Mitchell met representatives of the Kisan Sangh and Maha Sangh and
was told that the farmers probably would not cut their cane at the
existing price. He agreed to the appointment of a commission, but
stressed that any decision for an increase in the price of sugar depended
on London, though he would support it if they could make out a case.
He pointed out, however, that there was no time for a reply to be
received from London before a great part of the cane would be worth­
less for cutting. He said it was their cane and their decision whether
or not to cut it, but he advised them to do so.
On 21 July the commission was appointed to inquire into the
demand for an increase in the price of cane. The unions (the Kisan
Sangh, the Maha Sangh, and the newly formed Rewa Cane Growers’
Union) then asked for a court of arbitration, which would have been
able to make a binding award, and declined to appear before the com­
mission which, after further sessions at which no evidence was pre­
sented, was closed. The government announced it would protect
farmers who wanted to cut their cane, and extra police and troops were
sent to the cane districts. At the end of July some of the farmers
began cutting their cane in defiance of majority opinion. An order
was made prohibiting the holding, without police permission, of meet-

180
 War, Land, Fijians

ings of twelve persons or more in the neighbourhood of Ba, where a

large number of farmers wanted to cut their cane. Another order con­
fined the Maha Sangh leaders, A. D. Patel and Swami Rudrananda, to
within five miles from their homes and required them to report to the
police daily. On principle they refused to report, and were twice
prosecuted, fined the first time, and sentenced to imprisonment the
second time (reduced to a fine on appeal). These actions gave them
added prestige as fighters for the farmers’ cause. Several others were
convicted of endeavouring to stop the cutting of cane and the manu­
facture of sugar which had been declared in 1940 to be an essential
service, but their appeals were upheld on the ground that, since it was
not the legal duty of the farmers to cut their cane, it could not be an
offence to try to persuade them not to cut it. The Defence Regulations
were soon amended to make it an offence. Persuasion gave way to
arson, as cane-fields were set alight. Some aimed to ruin the cane of
others, but some fired their own cane in the hope of getting it to the
mill quickly (burnt cane has to be harvested within four days). Threats
and fear pervaded the cane areas. A remarkable quantity of arms,
including automatic weapons and grenades, had been acquired by gift,
purchase, or theft from American servicemen. An American was con­
victed of trying, at Indian instigation, to burn down the court-house
at Nadi and to burn cane, a reminder that there were some people
who were prepared to go to extremes.9
The voice of the CSR was like one from the past history of Fiji. A
telegram from Sydney to London expressed head office’s ‘misgivings
as to attitude of local authorities’ as ‘agitators have had free hand to
foment trouble’. For his part, Mitchell reported to London:
The Company opposes any increase in wages and cane prices because
it is convinced that pre-war conditions will return including the
dumping of Javanese and other sugars, and all the other objection­
able features. That is to say that we must manage the present and
plan for the future in terms of the lamentable past. If we consent
to let such assumptions be made they will prove to be right in the
event, for the confusion and colonial misery due to previous market­
ing conditions were due at least as much to fatalistic acceptance of
starvation prices and wages as inevitable as to any other single
cause even including self-interest.
And in another telegram:
Farmers here are seeing more and more clearly that real substance

181
The Fiji Indians

of their case is standard of living. Company takes its stand on the

assumption that world price level is uncontrollable and omnipotent
and would be a charge ranking prior to producers standard of liv­
ing. Unless I have misunderstood the papers your department makes
the same assumption as the Company. Since officially the two con­
ceptions are fundamentally opposite and irreconcilable, no solution
can be expected from price fixing machinery or any other palliative,
but only at the best a succession of armistices. 10

That was, of course, the crux of the matter. The sugar industry of Fiji
was part of a world-wide system of providing cheap tropical produce
to the industrialised west. The imperial preferences granted by Britain
and Canada, which supplanted New Zealand as the main market for
Fiji sugar, enabled the Fiji sugar industry to survive in the inter-war
years, but they made possible only a meagre standard of living for the
colonial farmers. The CSR can be criticised — and was certainly
criticised in private by the Fiji Government and the Colonial Office —
for its arrogance and financial secrecy (entirely its own business, in
the company’s view), but it was in truth not making more than a mod­
est return on the capital it had invested in Fiji .11 Whatever the com­
pany’s motives for being so secretive, they did not include the need to
conceal any vast profits being extracted from Fiji. Understandably, the
farmers did not believe it, they wanted a higher standard of living,
and they did not have to grow cane while more money could be made
elsewhere under wartime conditions.
As usual, the trouble was complicated by personal political ambi­
tion, factionalism, and communalism. The militancy of A. D. Patel
and Swami Rudrananda upstaged the leaders of the Kisan Sangh, M.
T. Khan, Ayodhya Prasad, and B. D. Lakshman, who lost control of
most of their members to a rival faction headed by a Punjabi, Mehar
Singh, which supported the line taken by the Maha Sangh. Anti-Muslim
propaganda was used against the Kisan Sangh. The South Indians
rallied to their Swamiji. The Punjabis were among the most determined
and feared of the anti-cutting forces. The Gujarati community, which
financed the election campaigns of both Vishnu Deo and A. D. Patel,
because it wanted friends in the Legislative Council, was suspected
by some of being behind the Maha Sangh and the strike, because A.
D. and S. B. Patel were Gujaratis and because the Kisan Sangh had set
up the Kisan Co-operative Store to provide cheap provisions for the
farmers and reduce their dependence on the Gujarati storekeeper-

182
 War, Land, Fijians

money-lenders. Others believed that the strike could not be dissoci­

ated from the wider movement of Indian nationalism. Certainly it was
part of the story of Indian struggle against European dominance in
Fiji. There were various motives involved. The key figure was A. D.
Patel with his complex ambitions for himself and his people.
In August a deputation, headed by Lakshman, asked the government
to reconstitute the sugar inquiry commission, but a big gathering of
members of both Sanghs resolved not to cut their cane until they
received the increase in price for which they were asking, and to boy­
cott any new commission. A. D. Patel told the governor that the
farmers would harvest their cane if the government would buy it at
a fair price, an offer which was rejected as impracticable.12 In Sep­
tember the British Ministry of Food approved an increase in the price
of sugar from all colonies, but most of the farmers thought it insuffic­
ient. The leaders were evidently determined on a fight to the finish
with the CSR and the right wing of the Kisan Sangh. Militant meetings
resolved that the plant cane should be ploughed in, though in fact this
was only implemented by most in a token way. The reconstituted sugar
inquiry commission, which was boycotted by the militants, concluded,
on the basis of rather inadequate evidence and the assumption of a
very low standard of living for the Indian farmers, that the increase
in the price of cane since 1939 had kept pace with the increases in
the cost of living and in the volume of production, and that no further
increase was justified. Even the right wing of the Kisan Sangh was
dismayed by the report and asked the government for a Royal Com­
mission composed of people from outside Fiji. The Maha Sangh, the
Rewa Cane Growers’ Union, and the left wing of the Kisan Sangh
asked for a court of arbitration, or the nationalisation of the sugar
industry, or a sugar industry control board to determine the price of
cane and subsidise it if the cost of production exceeded the cost of
living. Meanwhile most of the cane remained uncut, and the burning
continued.
In December 1943 the Legislative Council debated the dispute.
Mitchell appealed to the Indians to show a more patriotic spirit. Laksh­
man asked for a Royal Commission, and Vishnu Deo for a court of
arbitration or a permanent control board; both proposals were
defeated. K. B. Singh (now a nominated member) condemned the
rivalry among the Indian leaders: ‘When the elephants fight the grass
is trampled.’ Two distinguished Fijian leaders, Ratu Sukuna and Ratu
Edward Cakobau, criticised the war effort of the Indians, accused them

183
The Fiji Indians

of trying to hold the colony to ransom, and asked the government to

requisition the cane so that the Fijians could cut it.13 Some Europeans
called for the deportation of those leaders not born in Fiji, that is
A. D. Patel and Swami Rudrananda especially, and some Indians
signed petitions supporting the idea.14 The government, mindful of pos­
sible repercussions in Britain and India, was more cautious. The acting
governor later observed that an editorial in the Fiji Times and Herald
reflected ‘the views of those many Europeans who advocated deporta­
tion of “agitators” and who see dispute as another chapter in story
of gradual assumption by Indians of political and economic power
which they consider should properly be concentrated in hands of white
minority’. For their part the Indian militants sent telegrams appealing
for support from the old friends of the overseas Indians, Polak, Kunzru,
and the Imperial Indian Citizenship Association, and also to the Sec­
retary of State for the Colonies and to the Ramakrishna Mission in
India.15
By the end of the year most of the uncut cane was spoilt, and the
dispute was still deadlocked. But when A. D. and S. B. Patel and
Swami Rudrananda approached Ratu Sukuna, Mitchell authorised him
to negotiate with them. On behalf of the farmers, they re-iterated that
although they would not sell the cane to the company at the existing
price, they would sell it to the government if it would, through a price
fixing board, be responsible for the payment of a fair price, but the
government still would not agree to any general formula that would
imply that its intervention had put an end to the existing cane pur­
chase agreement. When they offered to harvest the cane in return for
cutting expenses only, in order to prove to the democratic world that
the farmers had no wish to impede the war effort, Sukuna replied that
they had been impeding the war effort for five months by refusing to
continue production of an essential commodity.16
A. D. Patel and the Swami could hold out no longer. In January
1944 Sukuna visited Nadi and spoke to a gathering of farmers. He
delivered a message from the governor advising them to harvest their
cane and telling them that he and the Secretary of State wanted their
standard of living raised. Sukuna spoke of the war and added a threat
that those who were leasing Fijian-owned land might find it difficult
in the future. The farmers resolved to resume planting, without com­
mitting themselves to the future harvesting of the cane. There was a
rush to the mills with what was left of the season’s crop. Of an estim­
ated crop of 824,801 tons, only 434,168 tons were harvested, and

184
 War, Land, Fijians

101,499 of that was burnt cane; the sugar content was very low. The
farmers lost at least £1,000,000 in income from cane at the very time
they lost their added income from the allied forces who were moving
on from Fiji. Because of the neglect of planting, it was several years
before the quantity of cane harvested reached pre-war levels. During
the dispute more than a thousand fires were reported to the police,
including sixteen cases involving houses, and there were eleven derail­
ments on the CSR railway.17 Many of the farmers were left confused,
disillusioned, and impoverished.
The confrontation now became one between the governor and the
CSR. Like previous governors, Mitchell complained to London about
the company’s intransigence and secrecy. In February 1944, without
consulting him, the CSR served notice on fifty-six tenants and con­
tractors, all of whom had been leaders of the anti-cutting faction, that
it would not buy cane from them in future. Mitchell told London that
this action had increased the bitterness of the farmers and the influ­
ence of A. D. Patel; he would not tolerate evictions in wartime and
would use his emergency defence powers if necessary. Appropriate
regulations were in fact drafted and the CSR was threatened with their
introduction. Mitchell predicted that, unless there was either an
immediate showdown with the CSR to force it to disclose its accounts,
or the Ministry of Food paid an extra bonus to the farmers, there
would be arson, violence or even bloodshed in the next cane-cutting
season; the farmers simply did not trust the company and believed it
to be making huge profits.18 In words reminiscent of Rodwell’s and
Fell’s more than twenty years before, he told London:

Whichever course is adopted and whatever the law may be the

Company will use with the investigation every means of obstruction
and evasion and may when it realises you mean business threaten to
close down in Fiji altogether as they have at intervals threatened
to close the Nausori mill. They may even mean it this time. But the
intolerable situation which their recalcitrant attitude has created
cannot be allowed to continue nor can any Government or S. of S.
in the year 1944 sit down under a refusal, by a Company enjoying
a monopoly of processing an essential food crop — to disclose any
information whatsoever either of its receipts or its costs of produc­
tion. I must ask that it should be kept continuously in the forefront
of consideration of this matter that the whole dispute centres around
the blunt refusal of the Company to disclose to you, to me, to the

185
The Fiji Indians

growers or presumably to the Ministry of Food any information

whatsoever about their costs and receipts. Whether when this inform­
ation has been forced (as it must be forced) out of these obstinate
and disingenuous men it will be possible to reach a lasting peaceful
solution I do not know. Unless there is a pronounced change in
heart I doubt it for unhappily race and economic division coincide
and there is now on both sides bitter racial intolerance. But the
plain fact is, however much it may be muffled by smoke screening,
that the Company having for years defied this Government has in
fact now defied the S. of S. If you are not prepared to grasp that
nettle then the short range consequences will be grave loss and
serious disturbances here and the end the ruin of the industry and
the Colony. There are too many desperate men on the farmers’ side
and they are too well financed for the dispute to end by capitula­
tion once more to the Company.19

The British Government refused to grant a bonus for Fiji sugar

because that would have constituted special treatment for one colony,
and would have meant satisfying Fiji farmers at the expense of the
British consumers, but it agreed to send Professor C. Y. Shephard of
the Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture, Trinidad, to report on the
sugar industry in Fiji. The Colonial Office telegraphed Mitchell that it
hoped that his inquiry would lead to an established and sustained
influence by the government in the affairs of the sugar industry. It told
the CSR representative in London that it regretted the eviction notices
and the company then withdrew them. The farmers hailed the
announcement in March that Shephard was being sent out, and all the
parties to the dispute gave him full co-operation, though the Indian
leaders were pre-occupied with the coming elections, and factional
quarrelling and retaliatory burning of cane continued even during
Shephard’s visit in June 1944. Mitchell wrote to London that the
events of the past year had thoroughly shaken up the CSR, which was
now more co-operative.20 In his report Shephard, who was given full
access to its accounts, praised the company for its efficiency, gave his
opinion that it had been receiving an unattractive return on its capital,
and recommended the retention of the existing method of assessing the
price of sugar-cane, stricter controls over the transfer of Fijian leases,
and the establishment of a sugar board to advise the government.
The farmers’ unions, the 1943 strike, and Shephard’s visit inaugu­
rated a new era in the history of the sugar industry: the old company

186
 War, Land, Fijians

hands were told by head office to mind their manners or were succeeded
by new men, :he overseer became the field officer, and more normal
commercial relations replaced those of the explicit dominance reminis­
cent of indenture days. The cane areas simmered down for some years.
The sugar board was not set up until 1961, following another serious
breakdown in the industry.21 In 1970 after yet another dispute and an
award by Lord Denning, who had been appointed to arbitrate, the CSR
announced that it would withdraw from the Fiji sugar industry— as it
had so often threatened to do in the past.
The sugar dispute of 1943, taken in conjunction with the enlistment
records of the respective communities, reinforced the existing pre­
ference of the local European settlers and the majority of government
officers for the Fijians over the Indians. This preference had many
roots, some psychological and social and some political. The introduc­
tion of Indian labour had made it possible for the Fijian to stand aside
from the competitive pressures of the modern world and to retain that
special charm and dignity that impresses locals and visitors alike. The
Fijian was not a threat to the interests of the Europeans nor as ready
to come forward with grievances as the Indian. A perceptive explana­
tion of the European preference for the Fijian was given in 1942 and
1943 by a Colonial Office official who had served on secondment in
Fiji in 1939-40:

The high regard in which the Europeans hold the Fijians is, of
course, due to the unsophisticated natural charm of the Fijians as a
people, and to the fact that they have as yet attained no conception
of politics, and thus are quite content to continue to serve in various
very useful but comparatively menial ways — in short they give no
trouble. The Indian is disliked and feared by the Europeans princi­
pally because he is politically conscious and is aiming at placing him­
self on a level with Europeans, and also because he is commercially
astute and is apt to undercut Europeans in their own line of business
owing to his lower standard of living.22
There is at present among most Fiji Europeans, and especially
among administrative officials, a tendency to favour the Fijians as
opposed to the Indians. The Fijians are superficially a much more
attractive people, their relations with Europeans are much easier
since they are not afflicted with the characteristic Indian inferiority-
cum-persecution complex; and, of course, the country is theirs and
they naturally have, in view of the conditions under which it was

187
The Fiji Indians

ceded to the British Crown, first claim on the attentions of Govern­

ment. Moreover, the Fijians are somewhat backward politically, and
the position of European officials towards them is roughly that of the
guardians of attractive, promising, but not yet quite fully developed
children. The result of all this is the to my mind quite lamentable
tendency among officials, especially the junior men, to be excessively
philo-Fijian, and to regard the Indians as aliens, interlopers, and in
general, nuisances who cause 90% of the trouble in the Colony:—
the Indian passion of petty-litigation, and unnecessary petitioning, is
necessarily one of the principal curses of the Indian officials’ life.23

During the war there were two major legislative acts which, though
they did not arouse controversy at the time and related more directly
to the Fijians than to the Indians, were to have important effects on the
future of Fiji and the position of the Fiji Indians. They were the Native
Land Trust Ordinance of 1940 and the Fijian Affairs Ordinance of
1944. The Indian leaders did not realise at the time that these acts
constituted an entrenchment of the interests of the Fijians. With the
educational system, they underpinned Fiji’s enduring racial separation
and plural söciety.
The majority of the Indians who came out of the indenture period
found a place on the land, as tenants of the Fijians. The latter retained
the ownership of most of the land of Fiji, they clung to their rights,
and perforce the majority of the Indians had to become their tenants.
It was estimated in 1931 that 5000 acres were held by tenants of the
Crown, 31,000 acres by tenants of the CSR, and 60,000 by tenants of
the Fijians (divided about equally between sugar and non-sugar land);
as well, an unstated but smaller area was held freehold or under lease
or sub-lease from others, presumably private Europeans.24 There were
a few government settlements for Indians but the government had little
suitable land in accessible areas. As Pearson wrote to Bajpai: ‘Between
you and me the different “advertisements” of land available strike me
as somewhat disingenuous.’25 The Indian Land Settlement Ordinance
of 1916 provided for the appointment of a board to acquire land on
which to settle Indians, but this remained largely theoretical. In 1915,
at the suggestion of the governor, the Council of Chiefs had agreed that
all available Fijian lands not required by the Fijians for their own use,
and all Fijian lands then the subject of lease, should be surrendered to
the government to be leased or otherwise dealt with on behalf of the
owners. Thousands of acres were surrendered, but it was mostly poor

188
 War, Land, Fijians

land, unsuitable for settlement. Much more good, unused land was not
surrendered. So it became necessary to seek the surrender of definite
areas, as specified by applicants.26
The government was happy to see the Fijians lease their unused
lands to Europeans or Indians, but was concerned that Indian settle­
ment should be controlled. Haphazard leasing of small areas would
have made it difficult to lease large areas to others with capital to
develop them, especially European planters, and it would have led to
a spread of settlement, making it difficult for the administration to
maintain contact with the Indians and control their possible impact on
the Fijians. There was specific discrimination against Indians in the
Native Lands (Leases) Regulations of 1915 made under the Native
Land Ordinance of 1905. Not all provinces were open to general
agricultural settlement by Indians. In effect the Indians were excluded
from the greater part of the windward side of the Fiji group, further
widening the separation of the communities in the colony’s plural
society. Settlement was also discouraged in certain districts not freely
accessible to district officers: Indians could secure new leases there
only in exceptional circumstances, though some did acquire existing
freehold or sub-leases from Europeans, and store-site leases were
freely granted. Second, the regulations provided that leases to Indians
were as a rule to be limited to 10 acres, though this was not strictly
enforced in practice. Third, leases to Indians were limited to 30 years
and ordinarily in practice to 21 years, whereas Europeans were allowed
up to 99 years. In 1933 the second and third discriminations were
removed from the regulations and replaced by rules of general appli­
cation.27
It was a persistent grievance of the Indians that it was hard to
obtain leases without paying high premiums, and that the procedures
were cumbersome and expensive. In theory, the applicant selected the
land he wanted, ascertained its Fijian name and the name of the land-
holding group which claimed it, and then lodged an application with
the government, which invited the owners in their District Council to
place the land at its disposal for leasing. The practice was rather dif­
ferent. The Indian had first to negotiate with the Fijian owners who
took their loloma (gift) before they would consent to lease the land,
and further payments were necessary to assure the renewal of the lease.
Ejectments were not common, because the Fijians could rarely afford
to pay compensation for improvements, but the threat of them gave
rise to considerable uncertainty.28

189
The Fiji Indians

In the mid 1930s the land problem was coming to seem to some of
the more perceptive observers of the Fiji scene to be the most important
that Fiji faced. The European planters and the CSR had enough land
already, including the most accessible and the best agricultural land in
Fiji, most of it as freehold. For years the Indians had complained
about difficulty in obtaining land without vexation and insecurity. On
the other hand, the Fijians appreciated the value of their land to
themselves, as well as to others; they jealously guarded what they had
left despite repeated efforts by successive governors to induce them to
surrender control to the government. Fijian loyalty was freely expressed
and sincerely meant, but it was grounded on self-interest and trust in
British protection and the established interpretation of the Deed of
Cession. In the 1930s they were becoming more aware of their
economic weakness. Their numbers were on the rise just as were the
Indians’, the land was needed for their children, and they wanted to
grow more cash crops.29 In some cases, when they could afford to pay
compensation for improvements, they were refusing to renew leases
when they came up for renewal. Sometimes the land was then used for
their own cultivation, but often it reverted to bush. A large number of
21 year leases were shortly to come up for renewal, because they had
been taken out at a time when many immigrants were finishing their
terms of indenture.
In October 1933 the Legislative Council accepted a proposal by K.
B. Singh that the land question be investigated by a committee, with a
view to lessees being given greater security of tenure. Later in the same
year Vishnu Deo and his friends also began to canvass support on this
issue, and committees were formed in several districts.30 The CSR also
asked the government to impose stricter controls over leases, in order
to eliminate bribery, blackmail and frivolous non-renewals. The CSR’s
local inspector, F. C. T. Lord, in an internal company memorandum
which was passed on by Sir Philip Goldfinch to the Colonial Office,
recommended that if the government did not act, the company should
use a ‘big-stick’ against ‘dog-in-the-manger’ Fijian landowners by
refusing to buy cane from them where an Indian tenant had been
unjustifiably turned off the land. He pointed to the growing unrest
among Indian farmers and wrote: ‘It is not to be expected that the
Indian community will submit meekly to seeing their fellows being
gradually eliminated from the cane-farming industry by a process of
attrition.’ The company was encouraging the Fijians to be cane-farmers
too but it could not be indifferent to the destruction of the tenant-

190
 War, Land, Fijians

farmer system, which depended on the Indian farmer. Although Gold­

finch assured the Colonial Office that the company would not use a
‘big stick’ on the Fijians without consulting the governor, these com­
plaints from the CSR provided far more effective pressure for a change
in the system than the Indians themselves were able to apply.31
In 1936, Barton, the acting governor, held informal discussions with
some of the leading Fijians, then referred the land question to the
Council of Chiefs. At Sukuna’s urging, that body passed a resolution
asking the government to assume control of all native land not required
for immediate use and to administer such land in the best interests of
the Fijians. The resolution was then referred to the Provincial Councils
and a majority of them upheld it. The new governor, Sir Arthur
Richards, wrote to London in 1937:
The land question lies at the heart of Fiji’s future. If it is not solved
in this generation there will infallibly be trouble . . . I have made
speeches to Fijian assemblies in every province throughout the
country, frankly stating the problem, pointing out that they have five
times as much land as they can use, now or in the future, and that
they are free to choose, but if they insist on holding back land they
cannot hope to use the future of the country must be troubled. I
have also pointed out what the Indians have done to bring prosperity
to their country. People tell me that I have the confidence of the
Fijians and anyway the name of the King’s Representative is still
something to conjure with here. The Fijians trust the King and will
take from the Governor what they would take from no one else.
Perhaps with Sukuna’s help I may be able to solve the problem.32
He stressed the delicacy of the question and the need to proceed
slowly, without interference from the Government of India, as that
would surely alarm the Fijians.
The Government of India had begun to be concerned about the Fiji
land question in 1935, following publicity in the press. Dr Sagayam,
who had returned to India that year, published an article pointing to the
urgency of the land question. He wrote to C. F. Andrews:
Unfortunately the political leaders have not put it on the foreground,
probably because it is more spectacular to fight for political rights
and it creates better impression in India. But the masses are chiefly
interested in the land question and they begged me when I left to do
what I can for them. The anti-Indian forces in Fiji are now scared

191
The Fiji Indians

over the political demands of the Indians and are using the Fijians
to cut the Indians out by debarring them from owning land. And
what is the use of franchise to Indians when they have to be con­
tinuously threatened with expulsion for not having any land to settle
on.33

Following representations from the Imperial Indian Citizenship

Association, the Government of India asked the India Office for infor­
mation and suggested that it might wish to send an officer to Fiji to
report on the land question. But the Fiji Government and the Colonial
Office were afraid that any hint of interference from India would
prejudice the Fijians against the proposed changes. They refused to
accept suggestions from the Government of India for the appointment
of an Indian agent in Fiji with experience of land tenure and agricul­
ture, or for an independent commission to be sent from Britain, or for
local Indian representation on the proposed Native Land Trust Board.
In fact the Government of India had little say, but it was assured that
the local Indian community would be fully consulted.34
In the event the historic Native Land Trust Bill of 1940 was passed
unanimously by the Fiji Legislative Council, in a friendly atmosphere
and with very little discussion, and the Government of India
acquiesced. Under the ordinance the control of all Fijian-owned land
was vested in a board, Fijian reserves were to be proclaimed following
inquiries to be conducted by Ratu Sukuna assisted by local advisory
committees, on which Indians would be represented, and all land not in
the reserves was to be available for leasing by the board. During the
debate, Vishnu Deo and K. B. Singh expressed the hope that the pro­
posed regulations would be administered liberally.35 But within a few
years, Indian complaints were revived, as some Indian farmers were
ejected from the areas demarcated as Fijian reserves as their leases
expired—though the policy was to cause as little disturbance as pos­
sible to Indian farmers in the cane areas. The land remains close to the
heart of Fiji’s Indian— or Fijian— problems.
The second important piece of legislation directly concerning the
Fijians that was enacted during the war was the reorganisation of the
Fijian administration in 1944. In itself this was not a major administra­
tive innovation, but it was significant because it represented a buttress­
ing of the separate Fijian administration and consequently the rein­
forcement and continued creation of Fiji’s plural society through the
acceptance of separate institutions at the national level. In 1915 the

192
 War, Land, Fijians

decision had been taken to decentralise the Fijian administration and

place control in the hands of European district commissioners. Under
this system government in Fiji began to look less and less like indirect
rule than it had in the early days of colonial rule, and senior Fijians
played very little part in it. The 1944 ordinance established a more
centralised system and gave Fijians a much more important place in
government. The post of Adviser for Native Affairs became the more
senior post of Secretary for Fijian Affairs, to which Ratu Sukuna was
appointed. The Native Regulation Board became the Fijian Affairs
Board, the Fijian members of the Legislative Council were appointed
to it, and finances were centralised.
Later, the new system of Fijian administration was criticised by
visiting experts for its unresponsiveness to greater demands for faster
Fijian economic development, and it has since been modified. At the
time it seemed to its architects, Sukuna and Mitchell, to be a progres­
sive move that would involve and train the Fijians in modern govern­
ment. The Fijian Affairs Bill was passed unanimously. The Europeans
were generally favourable to the change, though some of them were
critical, seeing it as a perpetuation of chiefly rule, which would, in
their view, have otherwise have died a natural death — an argument
with a long history among European settlers in Fiji.36 Sukuna, on the
other hand, stressed the continuing prestige and influence of the chiefs
and elders in Fijian society, as evidenced by the Fijian war effort.37
The Indians, including the Indian members of the Legislative Coun­
cil, took little interest in the change. The bill seemed to concern the
Fijians only, and in general the Indian politicians had not previously
involved themselves with questions that did not directly touch the
Indians. At that time, the Indian leaders — and the European, too,
for that matter — did not realise the political potential and growing
strength of the Fijians, who were united with, rather than simply
‘under’ their chiefs. The new centralised Fijian administration, headed
by Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna, who was able to command respect in both
the traditional and modern contexts, made even sharper the contrast
with the Indians, who were increasingly fragmented by class, faction
and organised religion and were a ‘community’ in the broadest sense
only.
The most perceptive observations about the changes were made in
the Colonial Office, where there were misgivings. Their first reaction to
the proposed reorganisation was to tell Mitchell that it ‘seems to us
inevitably to place further emphasis on communal lines of future

193
The Fiji Indians

constitutional reforms’.38 He replied that the political aspect should not

be exaggerated: the proposals were about local government and were
not a great change from the existing system, except that they would
give the Fijians direct authority and responsibility, and that would
forestall the emergence of irresponsible nationalism or racialism. He
added that in a generation or two all race differentiation ought to dis­
appear in Fiji; in the meantime all races would gain experience in the
field of local government and the general level of education would be
raised.39 The Colonial Office did not persist with its objections: cus­
tomarily, the man on the spot was allowed to make many of the im­
portant decisions on policy. The opinion prevailed that Fiji should
‘work out its own salvation’ in its own time. Typically, the Colonial
Office seemed more worried by the financial proposals. But broader
misgivings remained. One official minuted: T feel so strongly that the
development of separate Fijian institutions in this way is retrograde and
mischievous, in that it can only tend to the strengthening of com­
munal separateness and the intensification of communal problems for
the future.’40
During and after the war a section of the European community con­
tinued to oppose government control of the Legislative Council and the
Suva Town Board. In 1943 the Legislative Council considered pro­
posals by Alport Barker for constitutional changes, including provision
for an unofficial majority and six elected members from each of the
three main races. The European and Fijian members did not support
him, while most of the Indians asked for a common roll, and the
Muslim nominated member wanted two seats to be reserved for the
Muslims on a separate electoral roll.41 A memorial from the European
Electors’ Association in 1946, asking for the creation of an unofficial
majority of elected members, was rejected by the Colonial Office, after
it was unfavourably reported on by the governor, Sir Alexander
Grantham, who gave as his opinion that there was little likelihood of
the Indians abandoning their aspiration for a common roll. He went on:

In the meantime, so long as the Europeans are moving in the

general direction in which those aspirations point, the Indians will
travel cheerfully with them but with their minds set on a much longer
journey. It is certainly in this light that the Fijians would view the
establishment of an unofficial majority. They would regard it as one
more step in the Indian march to power and one more retreat from
the obligations assumed by the Crown under the Deed of Cession . . .

194
 War, Land, Fijians

The Electors’ Association plainly sees in the ‘emancipated’ Fijian a

powerful bulwark against the rising tide of Indian numerical strength
and Indian political ambition. The Europeans, being too few in
number to fight their own battles with certainty of victory, are to call
the Fijians to their aid. The two races, co-operating to dominate
the unofficial majority in the Legislative Council, will be able to
keep the Indian colossus in check. Of all the futures that one could
envisage for the Fijian none could be more disastrous than that in
which his function would be to provide a last line of defence against
the growing power of his Indian neighbour. It is apparent that there
can be only one solution of the Indian problem in Fiji, and that is
the reconciliation of Indian aspirations and interests with those of
other races in the Colony, and particularly those of the Fijian. Any
effort to divide Indians and Fijians permanently into two hostile
camps will do grave harm to both races, but the worst sufferers, in
the long run, must be the race which is in the minority. If the Fijian,
in his present state of development, were suddenly given a vote and
pitchforked headlong into the political arena, he would immediately
become the plaything of mutually antagonistic forces, from whose
collision it is far better that he should stand aside.42

On 16 July 1946 a cathartic Legislative Council debate on ‘safe­

guarding the Fijian race’, generally known as the ‘Deed of Cession
debate’, brought into the open the racial tensions in Fiji, and in par­
ticular the European, part-European, and Fijian dislike and apprehen­
sion of the Indians. Resentment had been growing over the Indians’
contribution to the war effort, the cane dispute, the Indians moving
into jobs previously held by Europeans, and their purchase of property
with money acquired during the war. The Stephens Report on Educa­
tion, which had recommended the establishment of multi-racial schools,
put European dominance further in question. The Europeans asked if
their children had a ‘future in Fiji’, and the part-Europeans ‘what
about us?’. Sir Raghunath Paranjype, the High Commissioner for India
in Australia, visited Fiji in 1946, made controversial statements on
education, the land system, and the residential tax, and in so doing
revived the old exaggerated belief that India had too much say in the
affairs of Fiji and that the Europeans, part-Europeans, and Fijians
were in danger of being sold short by Whitehall. The Indian population
now outnumbered the Fijian and was increasing faster. Fiji did indeed
seem to be becoming ‘Little India of the Pacific’.43

195
The Fiji Indians

A European elected member, A. A. Ragg, moved:

That in the opinion of this Council the time has arrived— in view of
the great increase in the non-Fijian inhabitants and its consequential
political development— to emphasize the terms of the Deed of Ces­
sion to assure that the interests of the Fijian race are safeguarded
and a guarantee given that Fiji is to be preserved and kept as a Fijian
country for all time.
During the debate that followed the European unofficial members
and the Fijian members spoke of a threat of Indian domination, the
swamping of the Fijians by the rapidly increasing Indian population,
Indian political agitators, the respective war records of the Fijians and
Indians, and possible future conflict over land. The Indian members,
who spoke against the original motion, stressed the part the Indians
had played in building up Fiji, asserted that they had been promised
equal citizenship in the Empire, denied that they were in any way a
threat to the Fijians, and challenged the claim that the Deed of Cession
made the local Europeans, as distinct from the British Crown, trustees
for the Fijian people. An impressive speech was made by A. D. Patel,
who had at last entered the Legislative Council in 1944, having gained
prestige from his stand during the sugar dispute and support from the
Maha Sangh and the South Indian community. The government
speakers took an intermediate position. The motion was carried un­
animously after it had been amended to a more innocuous form:
That in the opinion of this Council the Government and the non-
Fijian inhabitants of this Colony stand by the terms of the Deed of
Cession and shall consider that document as a Charter of the Fijian
people.
The governor, Sir Alexander Grantham, later reported to London:
While the final outcome of the debate, in unanimity and the recog­
nition by the Indian Members of the sanctity of the Deed of Cession
and the paramountcy of the interests of the Fijians (a position always
accepted by the Europeans), — was a happy one and should be
reassuring to the Fijians, the speeches during the debate of some of
the Unofficial European Members of Council, foreshadowing the
complete dominance of the Colony by the Indians, brought to a
head the latent fears of the Fijians regarding the possibility of such
an eventuality. The meeting of the Fijian Affairs Board was held

196
 War, Land, Fijians

only three days after the debate in Legislative Council, and the flesh
of the Fijian members of the Board was made to creep still further
by Sir Henry Scott, the Legal Adviser to the Board, and a firm
believer in ‘the Indian menace’.44
The Fijian Affairs Board passed a strong resolution:
After a full discussion the Fijian Affairs Board unanimously
resolves:—
That this Board views with alarm:
(a) the inroads now being made by the Indians of the Colony into
the Fijian life.
(b) the influence which the Indians are attempting on the everyday
life of the Fijians.
(c) the influence which the Indians are attempting on the economic
life of the Colony with which the Fijians are so closely
associated.
Further that the attention of the Government be drawn to this serious
state of affairs especially in view of the numerical superiority of the
Indians so that the Fijians may be protected from su6h domination
and that the Administration be requested to adopt a firm attitude
towards the Indians in order that the interests of the Fijian race
remain pre-eminent in the Colony.45
The Board asked that the resolution be laid before the King and this
was done after Grantham reported to London: ‘The members of the
Board, and in fact the whole Fijian people, are anxious that you should
be aware of their fears vis-a-vis the Indians, and that the paramountcy
of their interests is not overlooked in London.’46 But the Fijians had
no real cause for concern that their interests would be neglected in
favour of the Indians. When Fiji became independent in 1970, it did
so under a constitutional system that gave power, not to the Indian
majority, but to the non-Indian minorities, including the Fijiarfs them­
selves.
In the period covered by this book the Indians failed to achieve
equality with the Europeans in Fiji, let alone replace them as the domi­
nant group. They failed for a number of reasons, imperial and local:
the stopping of immigration from India and the withdrawal of India
from the Empire; world economic conditions, Fiji’s remoteness from
markets and relatively low level of economic development, which made
it unnecessary to make substantial concessions to India as the price of
further immigration; the low economic status of the Fiji Indians and

197
The Fiji Indians

the neglect of Indian education; the revival of the Fijians, and the
enunciation of the doctrine of the paramountcy of native interests in the
Empire which really served to justify continued European dominance
and the exclusion of the Indians from power. The Indian case was not
helped by disunity within their community. The fact that there was
little interaction between the Fijians and the Indians, and the con­
tinued and not misplaced Fijian trust in the colonial government’s
concern for their interests, made it impossible for the Indian leaders to
enlist Fijian support, as the Europeans were able to do so successfully.
The Indians still held to the illusion that they would be admitted as
equal partners in the development of the Empire. When all was said
and done, the Empire was, after all, the British Empire.
But if the Fiji Indians had not achieved the full acceptance and
equality they wanted, they had still gone a long way. Their history since
1946 would record, among other things, their population growth until
they became an absolute majority of the total population of Fiji, and
their economic diversification and educational and political advance;
the continual struggles of the cane-farmers against the CSR until that
company finally decided to withdraw from Fiji; the continuing worry
over the land; the divisions and quarrels among themselves; the moves
that led to Fiji’s political independence; and the emergence of the
Fijian people into the modern world and into a position of power in
their country once again. Their history would also show how, thus far,
despite tensions, increasing contact, economic competition and mount­
ing economic difficulties, the Fijians and Indians continued to live
warily side by side in peace in a still plural society and polity. And it
would show how the Indians continued to adapt to the land to which
their great grandparents came under such unhappy circumstances. If
they were not yet Fijians, they were certainly the Fiji-Indians.

198
 Appendix
The Population of Fiji
1921 1936 1946
C h in e s e 910 1751 2705
E u ro p e a n s 3878 4028 4594
P a r t- E u r o p e a n s 2781 4574 6142
F ijia n s 8 4 ,4 7 5 9 7 ,6 5 1 1 1 7 ,4 8 8
I n d ia n s 6 0 ,6 3 4 8 5 ,0 0 2 1 2 0 ,0 6 3
O th e rs (m o s tly Is la n d e rs ) 4588 5373 9246

T o ta l 1 5 7 ,2 6 6 1 9 8 ,3 7 9 2 5 9 ,6 3 8
(1 9 4 6 c e n su s re p o r t, C .P . 3 5 / 4 7 )

199
 Notes
CHAPTER I
1 For the general history of Fiji in the nineteenth century, see: R. A.
Derrick, A History of Fiji; P. France, The Charter of the Land; J. D.
Legge, Britain in Fiji, 1858-1880; D. A. Scarr, The Majesty of Colour.
For the Fijian people, see especially: Report of the Commission of
Enquiry into the Natural Resources and Population Trends of the Colony
of Fiji 1959 (C.P. 1/60); C. S. Belshaw, Under the Ivi Tree; R. R. Naya-
cakalou, Leadership in Fiji; B. H. Quain, Fijian Village; G. K. Roth,
Fijian Way of Life; M. D. Sahlins, Moala; O. H. K. Spate, The Fijian
People: economic problems and prospects (C.P. 13/59); R. F. Watters,
Koro.
2 The history of the indenture period is treated in Gillion, Fiji’s Indian
Migrants', a history to the end of indenture in 1920.
3 Rodwell to C.O., 22 August and 24 October 1919; CSR F.4.0.10,
folder 2.
4 Andrews to Rankine, 17 May 1920 (source cannot be published).
5 Fiji Debates, 1 July 1919.
6 Tel., Rodwell to C.O., 20 February 1919.
7 C.P. 2/22.
8 J. W. T. Barton, memorandum for Lord Hailey’s committee on
post-war colonial problems, C.O. 83/235, file 85038, 1942.
9 Richards to Dawe, quoted in minute by latter, 24 April 1937, C.O.
83/218, file 85197.
10 Pearson to Bajpai, 24 January 1928, India O.P., April 1928, B.28.
11 A. G. Anderson, Indo-Fijian Smallfarming; R. M. Frazer, A Fiji-
lndian Rural Community; C. Jayawardena, ‘The Disintegration of Caste
in Fiji Indian Rural Society’, in L. R. Hiatt and C. Jayawardena (eds.),
Anthropology in Oceania; A. C. Mayer, Peasants in the Pacific; R. G. Ward,
Land Use and Population in Fiji.
12 Memo, by A. A. Wright, ‘Indian Education in Fiji’, 25 June 1930,
end. C.O. to Fletcher, no. 211, 9 December 1930.
13 C.S.O. 2839/82; 2141/83; 150/84; 1405/84; 1701/85; 2577/87.
14 Source cannot be published.
15 Fiji annual report, 1926.
16 FTH, 14 June 1938.
17 J. R. Pearson, ‘A Survey of the Position of Indians in Fiji’, Septem­
ber 1932, end. C.O. to Seymour, 9 December 1932.
18 Modern Review, May 1919.
19 Raju report (I.O./I. & O. 2247/22).

CHAPTER II
1 The strike is generally described in the Governor’s report, Rodwell
to C.O. no. 66, 12 March 1920 (C.P. 67/20); the Raju report; and Benar-
sidas Chaturvedi, Fiji ki Samasya.
2 Rodwell to C.O., 19 August 1920.
3 Rodwell to C.O., no. 66, 12 March 1920.
4 Minutes on tel. Rodwell to C.O., 18 March 1920, C.O. 83/150;
India E.P., August 1921, F.13; D. Napal, Manilall Maganlall Doctor.
201
Notes

5 Gandhi, Collected Works, vol. XI, 169-71.

6 C.S.O. 5087/20; Rodwell to C.O., no. 206, 28 July 1920.
7 C.S.O. 710/20.
8 Rodwell to C.O., no. 25, 22 January 1920, C.P. 67/20.
9 Associated Press of India, Lahore, 7 October 1919, C.S.O. 8595/19.
10 Ram Singh to C.S., 22 January 1920, C.S.O. 710/20.
11 C.S.O. 44/20; Benarsidas Chaturvedi, Fiji ki Samasya; FTH, 30
and 31 December 1919, 2 January 1920.
12 Ram Singh to C.S., 29 December 1919, C.S.O. 8590/19.
13 C.S.O. 8590/19.
14 C.S.O. 90/20.
15 Manilal to C.S., 7 January 1920, C.S.O. 90/20.
16 C.S.O. 710/20.
17 C.S.O. 513/20.
18 C.S.O. 764/20; Rodwell to C.O., conf., 7 April 1919.
19 C.S.O. 967/20.
20 C.S.O. 819/20.
21 Rodwell to C.O., no. 66, 12 March 1920.
22 C.S.O. 973/20.
23 C.S.O. 975/20.
24 C.S.O. 765/20.
25 Rodwell to C.O., no. 66, 12 March 1920.
26 Raju report.
27 C.S.O. 1066/20.
28 Rodwell to C.O., no. 66, 12 March 1920.
29 Admiralty to C.O., 6 and 16 February 1920, C.O. 83/154.
30 Rodwell to Governor-General, Australia, secret, 28 January and 4
February 1920, Australian Archives, Prime Minister’s Department, CP
447/3, SC 37/1.
31 New Zealand correspondent, The Round Table, vol. X, 704-5; see
also Holland papers, P5/3.
32 Rodwell, address to Leg. Co., 5 May 1920, C.P. 21/20.
33 Rodwell to C.O., no. 93, 5 May 1920; C.P. 46/20; Fiji annual
report, 1920.
34 Rodwell to C.O., no. 54, 4 March 1920.
35 C.O. to Rodwell, 26 May 1920.
36 Petition from M. N. Naidu, R. M. A. Saraswati, A. J. C. Patel, B.
L. Hiralal Seth and 51 others, 8 April 1920, C.S.O. 2693/20.
37 C.S.O. 1064/20, 1682/20, 4210/20, 4619/20, 5437/20, 5702/20.
The ringleaders and the more violent were charged with common law riot,
bridge-breaking, wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm and
assault; forty-eight of those were convicted and variously sentenced to
from six months’ to five years’ imprisonment, and nine were acquitted.
Nine persons were charged and convicted of unlawful assembly under the
Public Safety Ordinance of 1920, and variously sentenced to from nine
months’ to twelve months’ imprisonment. The rest were charged with
unlawful assembly; 135 of those were convicted and variously sentenced

202
 Notes

to from two weeks’ to one month’s imprisonment, and nine were acquitted.
There were several women among those convicted.
38 Rodwell to C.O., no. 83, 10 April 1920.
39 C.S.O. 1269/20; tel. Rodwell to C.O., 18 March 1920.
40 Rodwell to C.O., no. 74, 8 April 1920.
41 Minute on I.O. to C.O., 1 June 1920, C.O. 83/154.
42 Rodwell to C.O., no. 75, 8 April 1920; Manilal to C.S., 2 and 10
April 1920, end. Rodwell to C.O., no. 117, 8 May 1920.
43 Rodwell to C.O., no. 117, 8 May 1920.
44 Some paid their own fare back, which they were entitled to do at
any time after completing their period of five years’ labour under inden­
ture. The majority could not afford to do this and, in any case, after spend­
ing another five years in the colony they were eligible for a passage to
India at government expense. This right could be exercised at any time
by those who arrived before 31 May 1906, and also by their children,
whether they were born in Fiji or in India, and whether or not they were
accompanying their parents. Certain restrictions of the repatriation rights
were made by the Fiji Government in 1906 — the right of future (’second-
series’) immigrants was to be exercised within two years after it accrued,
and children were to be granted passage only if they were under twenty-
four if born in India or twelve if born in Fiji. In fact the time limit for
second-series immigrants was extended on several occasions and finally
expired in September 1958.
45 Rodwell to C.O., 19 August 1920; FTH, 17 July 1920.
46 C.S.O. 8231/20; 561/21.
47 C.S.O. 5176/20; 270/21.
48 C.S.O. 5755/20.
49 Rewa correspondent, FTH, 17 July 1920.
50 C.S.O. 6364/20; 321/21; 562/21.
51 Source cannot be published.
52 C.S.O. 2134/20.
53 C.S.O. 1264/20; 1534/20.
54 Tel. Rodwell to C.O., 24 December 1920, C.O. 83/153.
55 C.S.O. 4689/20.
56 C.S.O. 4672A/20.
57 C.S.O. 5835/20; tel. Rodwell to C.O., 21 July 1920.
58 C.P. 21/20.
59 Dixon to CSR/G.M., 4 May 1920, CSR 251 C/D.
60 The Times Trade Supplement, 5 February 1921.
61 Andrews to Gourlay (Bengal Government), June 1921, India E.P.,
October 1921, A.6-63.
62 Minute by G. L. Corbett, 10 January 1921, India E.P., May 1921,
A .1-12.
63 Tel. C. O. to Rodwell, 15 March 1919.
64 Rankine to Rodwell, 13 January 1920, C.S.O. 2436/20.
65 Rankine to Rodwell, 15 February 1920, C.S.O. 3625/20.
66 Surendra Nath Banerji, chairman, British Guiana and Fiji Emigra-

203
Notes

tion Committee, to Sir George Barnes, Commerce and Industry Member,

21 February 1920 (C.S.O. 5917/20).
67 Rodwell to C.O., no. 181, 3 July 1920.
68 Fiji mission to Govt India, 15 March 1920 (C.O. to Rodwell, no.
222, 12 August 1920).
69 Govt India to Bishop in Polynesia, 19 March 1920 (Rodwell to
C.O., no. 181, 3 July 1920).
70 Young India, 9 and 22 September 1920; Bombay Chronicle, 14
July 1920 (reprinted in Gandhi, Collected Works, vol. XVIII, 255, 277,
37-41).
71 Gandhi to Barnes, 12 June 1920; Wacha to Barnes, 29 May 1920;
India E.P., January 1921, A .1-64.
72 Polak to C.O., 4 October 1920 (C.O. to Rodwell, no. 303, 28
October 1920); Polak to I.O., 18 January 1921 (C.O. to Rodwell, no. 69,
18 February 1921).
73 Govt India to J. B. Petit, secretary, Imperial Indian Citizenship
Association, 31 August 1920, India E.P., January 1921, A.1-64; India E.P.,
March 1922, F. & I. 2-110.
74 Young India, 22 September 1920 (reprinted in Collected Works,
vol. XVIII, 277).
75 Rodwell to C.O., no. 181,3 July 1920.
76 C.O. to Rodwell, 20 August 1920; C.O. to I.O., 28 September and
23 October 1920; tel. Rodwell to C.O., 18 October 1920; India E.P.,
March 1922, F. & I. 2-110.
77 Minute of 20 November 1920 on I.O. to C.O., 17 November 1920,
C.O. 83/154.
78 Ends. Rodwell to C.O., no. 216, 31 July 1920.
79 Tel. C.S. to Govt India, 24 December 1920, C.S.O. 6364/20.

CHAPTER III
1 Rodwell to C.O., no. 66, 12 March 1920 (C.P. 67/20).
2 Rodwell to C.O., 19 August 1920.
3 For the history of the CSR in Fiji, see Colonial Sugar Refining
Company, South Pacific Enterprise; C.Y. Shephard, The Sugar Industry of
Fiji.
4 Resume of Dixon’s letters, late 1919, ‘General Situation’, CSR 251
C/D.
5 C.S.O. 1148/20; 1515/20; 7389/20.
6 FTH, 11 August 1920.
7 Mitter to C.S., 1 November and 8 December 1920, C.S.O. 7793/20;
Mitter to CSR, 20 October 1920, CSR F.4.O., folder 2.
8 Rodwell to C.O., 19 August and 18 November 1920.
9 C.S. to Farquhar, 28 September and 26 November 1920, ends. Fell
to Green, 30 December 1920, C.O. 83/153.
10 ‘Measures within the Company’s Power for Meeting the Present
Situation in Fiji’, 24 September 1920, CSR 251 C/D.
11 ‘Note on Price of Sugar for Local Consumption’, 27 July 1920, CSR
251 C/D.

204
 Notes

12 Tel. Knox to Rodwell, 9 November 1920, CSR F.4.0./10.

13 India E.P., May 1921, A.39-52.
14 C.S.O. 8228/20.
15 C.S.O. 343/21.
16 Source cannot be published.
17 H. J. Thomas to C.S., 20 March 1921, C.S.O. 1552/21.
18 Fell to C.O., no. 280A, 18 October 1921 (the official report on
the strike).
19 Benarsidas Chaturvedi, Fiji ki Samasya, 280-2.
20 Raju report.
21 Allen to Kane, 30 March 1921.
22 C.S. to Farquhar,6April 1921.
23 C.S.O. 2235/21;3139/21.
24 C.S.O. 4583/21.
25 C.S.O. 2679/21.
26 Raju report.
27 C.P. 2/22.
28 India E.P., June 1921, A.30-31; tel. Viceroy to I.O., 27 January
1921, India E.P., March 1922, F. & I. 2-110.
29 India E.P., March 1922, F. & I. 2-110; May 1921, A.39-52; June
1921, A.30-31.
30 C.S.O. 8263/20. For an account of the repatriates, see also Gillion,
Fiji’s Indian Migrants, 190-7.
31 Rodwell to C.O., no. 262, 27 September 1920; C.S.O. 7036/20;
Viceroy to I.O., 12 August 1920 (C.O. to Rodwell, no. 251, 4 September
1920); tel. Rodwell to C.O., 19 January 1921; I.O. to Viceroy, 25 January
1921, J. & P. 482/21.
32 Minute to R. B. Ewbank, 21 May 1921, India E.P., October 1921,
A.6-63.
33 India E.P., July 1922, B.32-49.
34 Tel. Govt India to Governor, Fiji, 12 May 1921; tel. C.S. to Govt
India, end. Fell to C.O., no. 232, 19 August 1921; tel. Govt India to C.S.,
2 June 1921, C.S.O. 3237/21; minutes on tel. Fell to C.O., 7 June 1921,
C.O. 83/157.
35 Englishman, 10 June 1921; Statesman, 11 June 1921.
36 Andrews to Gandhi, 21 June 1921, typescript from Gandhi Smarak
Sangrahalaya Samiti, held at Santiniketan.
37 Andrews to Gourlay (Bengal Govt), c. June 1921, India E.P.,
October 1921, A.6-63.
38 Tels. Fell to C.O., 31 July 1921; Montagu to Reading, 11 August
1921; Reading to Montagu, 19 August 1921; Fell to C.O. no. 232, 19
August 1921 (C.O. 83/157); India E.P., July 1922, B.32-49.

CHAPTER IV
1 C.S.O. 2904/21.
2 ‘The Fiji Islands’, The Times Trade Supplement, 25 May 1920.
3 Southwell-Keely to Rodwell, 19 May 1921, C.S.O. 3068/21; also 20
May 1921, C.S.O. 2999/21.
205
Notes

4 Minute of 13 August 1920 on Rodwell to C.O., conf., 1 July 1920,

C.O. 83/151.
5 Rodwell to C.O., no. 363, 20 December 1920.
6 Rodwell, ‘Chinese Labour for Fiji’, encl. Rodwell to C.O., 18 August
1921, C.O. 83/159.
7 Ibid. Rodwell was referring to trade restrictions.
8 Rankine to Rodwell, 5 April 1920, encl. Rodwell to C.O., conf., 1
July 1920.
9 India E.P., January 1921, A.1-64.
10 I.O. to Govt India, 24 March 1875, India E.P., February 1880,
A.4-29.
11 Dixon to CSR/G.M., 20 June 1921, CSR 251 C/D.
12 Minutes of 13 August 1920 on Rodwell to C.O., no. 181, 3 July
1920 (C.O. 83/152) and of 15 May 1920 on Report of British Guiana and
Fiji Colonisation Committee (C.O. 83/154).
13 Govt India to I.O., 27 October 1921, India E.P., March 1922,
A.14-21.
14 C.O. to Rodwell, no. 48, 4 March 1922.
15 C.P. 1/21.
16 India E.P., March 1922, A.14-21.
17 C.O. to Fell, conf., 27 August 1921.
18 Tel. Fell to C.O., 11 January 1922.
19 J. J. Ragg to Roko Tui Tailevu, 23 November 1921, encl. Fell to
C.O., conf., 23 December 1921.
20 C.S.O. 6741/21.
21 Knox to C.S., 14 February 1922, encl. Fell to C.O., conf., 24
February 1922.
22 Knox to Acting C.S., 14 December 1921, encl. Fell to C.O., conf.,
7 January 1922.
23 Fell to C.O., conf., 19 December 1921.
24 Tel. Fell to C.O., 26 November 1921, C.O. 83/158.
25 Fell to C.O., secret, 11 October 1921, C.O. 83/158.
26 Rodwell to C.O., conf., 9 December 1921, C.O. 83/ 159.
27 ‘Present Position of the Sugar Industry in Fiji’, 30 December 1921,
C.O. 83/158.
28 Fell to C.O., conf., 19 December 1921; Knox to Fell, 11 January
1922, C.O. 83/160.

CHAPTER V
1 Raju report.
2 India E.P., March 1922, F. & I. 2-1 10; September 1921, F. & I. 3.
3 Private and personal tel. B. N. Sarma to Raju, 30 March 1922, India
E.P., May 1922, F. & I. 39.
4 FTH, 23 and 24 January 1922; Raju report.
5 India E.P., August 1922, A.1-35.
6 Corbett to Ewbank, 12 February 1923, India O.P., May 1924,
A.1-16.
7 FTH, 1 March 1922.

206
 Notes

8 C.S.O. 1409/22; Fell to C.O., conf., 20 March 1922.

9 Raju report.
10 Ibid.
11 Tels. Garu to Viceroy, 14 March 1922, and Knox to Viceroy, 22
March 1922, India E.P., August 1922, A .1-35.
12 Tels. Garu to Viceroy, 16 and 27 February 1922, and Govt India
to I.O., 8 June 1922, India E.P., August 1922, A .1-35.
13 Minute on tel. Fell to C.O., 16 February 1922, C.O. 83/ 160.
14 Minute on tel. Fell to C.O., 17 February 1922, C.O. 83/160.
15 Tels. C.O. to Fell, 22 February and 6 March 1922.
16 Minute by R. B. Ewbank, 3 February 1922, India E.P., August
1922, A .1-35.
17 Tel. Viceroy to Garu, 8 March 1922, India E.P., August 1922,
A.1-35.
18 Small to Fell, 14 March 1922, end. Rodwell to C.O., conf., 25
May 1922.
19 Tels. Fell to C.O., 17 and 28 February 1922.
20 Fell to C.O., conf., no. 1, 22 February 1922.
21 Tel. Churchill to Governor-General of Australia, 2 March 1922,
Rodwell to C.O., conf., 8 April 1922, C.O. 83/160; notes on interviews
between Knox and Rodwell, CSR F.4.0/10.
22 Memo, of 30 May 1922, on Fell to C.O., conf., 20 March 1922,
C.O. 83/160.
23 Note by E. W. Knox, 16 June 1922, CSR F.4.0/10 doc. 8.
24 W. P. Dixon, ‘Crisis in the Fiji Sugar Industry 1920/ 1925', CSR mf.
251 C /D ; tel. Rodwell to C.O., 21 June 1922.
25 Wood to Winterton, 21 June 1922, C.O. 83/163.
26 C.O. 83/161 and 83/163; notes on Knox’s and Dixon’s discussions
in London, 1922, CSR F.4.0/10, doc. 8.
27 C.O. to I.O., 1 August 1922, India E.P., November 1922, B.l.
28 Tel. Viceroy to I.O., 4 December 1922, India E.P., April 1923,
A .1-15.
29 Tel. Rodwell to C.O., 12 December 1922.
30 Tel. Rodwell to C.O., 13 December 1922.
31 Govt India to I.O., 15 March 1923, India E.P., April 1923, A.1-1 5.
32 Correspondence in CSR U .1.0.5.
33 Tels. Knox to Rodwell 21 and 28 March 1923, and Rodwell to
Knox, 25 March 1923, end. Rodwell to C.O., no. 121, 11 May 1923; tel.
Rodwell to Knox, conf., 25 March 1923.
34 Tel. Rodwell to C.O., 30 March 1923.
35 Tel. Rodwell to C.O., conf., 6 January and 2 February 1923, and
minutes on C.O. 83/164; C.P. 12/23; 13/23; 14/23.
36 Rodwell to C.O., no. 53, 13 February 1923; conf., 8 March 1923;
no. 102, 21 April 1923; 26 July 1923; conf., 8 August 1923; C.S.O.
5350/22; Fiji Debates, 20 July 1923.
37 Rodwell to C.O., conf., 9 January 1924, and tel. 7 January 1924.
38 Source cannot be published.
39 Rodwell to C.O., no. 252, 4 October 1923, and tel., 26 November

207
Notes

1923; tel. C.O. to Rodwell, 29 November 1923; minutes, C.O. 83/ 166.
40 Rodwell to C.O., conf., 9 May 1923, tel. 18 October 1923, conf.,
17 December 1923; C.O. to Rodwell, 14 February 1924 and tel. 19 July
1923; note by Rodwell, 29 March 1924 (C.O. 83/171).
41 Secret brief of instructions to president, Colonies Committee, India
O.P., May 1924, B. 10-11; papers submitted to C.O. by Colonies Committee
(C.O. to Fell, 23 March 1925); minutes of meetings, India O.P., September
1924, B.8-9; Ewbank to Bhore, 2 July 1924, India O.P., August 1925,
A .1-14.
42 CSR/G.M. to McConechy, 17 March, 14 and 24 April 1924, CSR
U.l.0.5.
43 Tel. Rodwell to C.O., conf., 14 June 1923.
44 I.O. to Govt India, 31 March 1926, India O.P. May 1926, A.48-51.
45 India O.P., May 1924, A. 1-16; C.O. 83/163; Knox to Irwin, 21
December 1926, India O.P., March 1927, B.124.
46 Tel. I.O. to Govt India, 6 August 1922, India O.P., May 1924,
A.1-16.
47 Corbett to Ewbank, 12 February 1923, India O.P., May 1924,
A. 1-16. Corbett had discussed possible Indian emigration to the Solomon
Islands with Lever Brothers.
48 Tel. private and personal, Reading to Peel, 4 September 1923,
I.O./I. & O. 2247/22.
49 Govt India to I.O., 21 July 1923, India O.P., May 1924, A .1-16.
50 Memo, of 15 June 1923, C.O. 83/167.
51 Masterton-Smith to Hirtzel, 18 August 1923, C.O. 83/167.
52 Tel. Peel to Reading, 19 October 1923, I.O./I. & O. 2247/22,
India O.P., May 1924, A .1-16.
53 Rodwell to Green, 7 January 1924, C.O. 83/167.
54 India O.P., May 1926, A.48-51.
55 Published as C.P. 15/27; correspondence in C.O. 83/175 and 176.
56 Tel. Govt India to I.O., 4 February 1927, India O.P., March 1928,
A. 5-15.
57 C.O. to I.O., 24 March 1927, I.O./E. & O. 6008/26.
58 Hutson to C.O., conf., 19 September 1927.
59 Note of 6 June 1927, India O.P., March 1928, A.5-15.
60 Fiji Debates, 27 and 31 May 1926; Knox to Hutson 21 September
1927; Lord to CSR/G.M., 23 September 1926, CSR Nausori private
inwards.
61 India O.P., November 1926, B.31-42.
62 India O.P., February 1927, B.84; June 1927, B.60-61.
63 Fiji Debates, 21 October 1927; C.P. 93/27; Report by Judd, C.P.
41/28; India O.P., April 1928, B.29-105, and October 1928, B. 106-124.
64 C.P. 71/28 and 99/28; C.S.O. 4579/29; Pearson to Bajpai, 5
January 1929, India O.P., August 1929, B.8-16. The immigration fund was
closed in 1934.
65 C.S.O. 4579/29; India O.P., August 1929, B.8-16, and June 1930,
B. 84-96.
66 Tel. J. Brijbasi Singh to Fiji governor, 9 December 1929, and letter

208
 Notes

to S.I.A., 12 December 1929; Tel. Daud to C.S., 18 October 1930, C.S.O.

2536/30; minute by Bajpai, 8 May 1930, India O.P., May 1930, B.3.

CHAPTER VI
1 Unpublished manuscript (courtesy of Benarsidas Chaturvedi). For
religious observances in indenture days, see Gillion, Fiji’s Indian Migrants,
and for later years, see Mayer, Peasants in the Pacific.
2 Fell to C.O., no. 132, 30 May 1924, conf., 1 August 1924; C.S.O.
1.483/24.
3 Hutson to C.O., conf., 28 September 1926.
4 Petition of January 1926, CSR 252/C/D ; address of 24 December
1927, C.O. 83/180.
5 FTH, 29 October 1925 and 26 March 1928.
6 C.S.O. 1113/30.
7 C.S.O. 4791/26; FTH, 4 January 1928.
8 C.S.O. 5550/26; FTH, 2 May 1927; J. R. Pearson, ‘Sectional
Friction in the Indian Community’, end. Fletcher to C.O., conf., 23
September 1930.
9 Memo, on the Indian political situation, 18 October 1932, end.
Fletcher to C.O., conf., 20 October 1932.
10 Minute of 29 December 1933, India O.P. 330/33.
11 FTH, 15 November 1927.
12 FTH, 26 March 1928.
13 FTH, 31 January, 4 and 7 February 1928, and 25 February 1929;
C.S.O. 3928/27 and 1140/29.
14 C.S.O. 531/30; 1577/30; 1774/30.
15 Hindus of Rewa to C.S., 27 February 1930; Abdul Karim and
others to D. C. Rewa, 27 February 1930 (C.S.O. 531/30).
16 Vriddhi, August 1931; manager, Nausori mill to CSR/G.M., 12
February and 4 March 1929, CSR Nausori private inwards; C.S.O.
2600/30.
17 FTH, 15 February and 9 March 1932.
18 FTH, 7 May 1926, and 7, 17 and 24 January 1928; Subramani M.
Mudaliar (ed.), A Quarter of a Century.
19 Oral information; government files; FTH, 14 May 1937 and 14
June 1938; Fiji Samachar, 25 July 1941.
20 Based on oral information and government files.
21 FTH, 21, 22, 24 and 26 November 1938.
22 Vriddhi, August 1930.
23 J. R. Pearson, ‘Further Information about Punjabi Immigrants’,
December 1928 (India O.P., January 1930, B.4-8); Govt India to C.S.,
5 December 1929, C.S.O. 6026/29; Darling, Rusticus Loquitur, and The
Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt; see also Gillion, Fiji’s Indian
Migrants.
24 C.S.O. 6026/29.
25 FTH, 29 January 1929.
26 J. R. Pearson, ‘Policy with regard to Indian Immigration’, January
1929, end. Pearson to Bajpai, 5 January 1929, India O.P., August 1929,

209
Notes

B. 8-16.
27 C.S.O. 6026/29.
28 Acting C.S. to Govt India, 6 June 1930.
29 Indian Association of Fiji to Imperial Indian Citizenship Associa­
tion, 30 August 1935; Patel to Bajpai, 22 May 1936; Govt India to C.S.,
1 April 1936; Govt India to I.O., 3 December 1936 and 27 January 1938
(India O.P. 247/35); Richards to C.O., no. 78, 14 April 1937; C.S.O.
51/68.
30 Petition from P. Anand Singh and others, 23 December 1937
(S.I.A. Immigration file); C.S.O. 51/102/2.
31 Manager, Lautoka to CSR/G.M., 9 November 1937, CSR mf. 246;
FTH, 22 November and 1 December 1937.
32 C.S.O. 28/10/1; Fiji Debates, 7 October 1932 (reply to K. B.
Singh).
33 Hutson to C.O., no. 274, 11 November 1925.
34 Report, C.P., 46/26.
35 Message 13 of 1928 (C.P. 92/28); Hutson to C.O., no. 337, 1
December 1928; Fletcher to C.O., no. 101, 14 March 1931; Fletcher to
C. O., secret, 16 March 1931. The figures must be taken as approximate
only; census figures are for ages 5-15 inclusive, but the Education
Ordinance of 1929 defined the school age as 6-14.
36 Message 18 of 1929 and annexed statement (C.P. 113/29).
37 Minute of 28 May 1930, C.S.O. 564/30.
38 Tel. Seymour to C.O., 7 November 1929; C.O. to Seymour, 12
November 1929 (C.P. 120/29); Fletcher to C.O., no. 388, 5 December
1929; Fletcher to C.O., secret, 24 April 1930; Fletcher to C.O., no. 101,
14 March 1931.
39 Seymour to Ellis, 18 November 1929, C.O. 83/183, file 63811.
40 Minute by W. D. Ellis, 28 January 1931, C.O. 83/191, file 73878.
41 Fletcher to H. M. Scott, 14 March 1930, end. Fletcher to C.O.,
secret, 24 April 1930.
42 C.O. 83/188; 83/194; 83/197; 83/211; 83/218.
43 Fletcher to C.O., no. 48, 15 February 1930, and no. 79, 9 April
1930.
44 Acting Director of Education to C.S., 8 June 1938, C.S.O. 28/169.
45 Mayhew report.
46 Minute of 8 April 1936, C.S.O. 28/10/1.
47 Fletcher to C.O., no. 48, 13 February 1930.
48 Ibid.
49 C.O. 83/188, file 73811.
50 Note ‘Education in Fiji’, n.d., C.O. 83/235, file 85090.
51 Report on Education in Fiji, C.P. 18/44; Plan of Development for
the Educational System in the Colony of Fiji, C.P. 27/46; Fiji Debates,
19 November 1946.
52 Kunzru to Kodanda Rao, 24 November 1938, India O.P. 84-11,
1938.

210
 Notes

CHAPTER VII
1 Fletcher to C.O., secret, 25 September 1930.
2 C.S.O. 2513/29; 2601/29; Seymour to C.O., no. 197, 1 June 1929;
FTH, 13 May 1929.
3 Pearson to Stewart, 2 October 1929, I.O. E. & O. 6008/26.
4 Polak to Wedgwood Benn, 7 December 1929, India O.P. 276/32.
5 Mahadev Desai to S. B. Patel, 21 February 1928 (shown to me by
S. B. Patel).
6 Patel to Polak, 31 October 1929, extract included in letter from
Polak to Wedgwood Benn, 7 December 1929, India O.P. 276/32.
7 V. Deo to J. Nehru, 18 January 1929, J. Nehru to V. Deo, 1 March
1929, A.I.C.C., F.D.15.
8 Patel to Polak, 31 October 1929, op. cit.
9 McGusty, acting S.I.A., memo, .on the Indian Political Situation, 29
January 1930, end. Fletcher to C.O., conf., 1 February 1930; Fiji Sama-
char, 14 and 22 March 1930.
10 Benarsidas Chaturvedi, ‘Indians Abroad', c. 1930.
11 Patel to Polak, 31 October 1929, op. cit.
12 Memo, by McGusty, 28 December 1930, end. Fletcher to C.O.,
conf., 2 January 1930.
13 Fiji Debates, 30 October, 1 and 5 November 1929; C.S.O. 5143/29;
5193/29.
14 Fiji Debates, 5 November 1929.
15 Gandhi to Congress, Lautoka, 14 November 1929, Collected Works,
vol. XLII, 166.
16 Polak to Wedgwood Benn, 7 December 1929, India O.P. 276/32.
17 Minute of 11 December 1929, India O.P. 272/32.
18 Report on conference, S. B. Patel and others to Fletcher, 28 Decem­
ber 1929, end. Fletcher to C.O., conf., 2 January 1930.
19 McGusty, ‘Recent Changes in the Indian Political Situation’, 16
January 1930, end. Fletcher to C.O., conf., 1 February 1930.
20 FTH, 4 January 1928.
21 X. K. N. Dean, sec. Fiji Muslim League to acting C.S.; 18 October
1929; Petition of 8 January 1930; end. Fletcher to C.O., conf., 2 January
1930.
22 Fletcher to C.O., conf., 5 February 1930.
23 Fletcher to C.O., conf., 24 September 1931; Govt India to I.O., 4
April 1932, India O.P. 276/32.
24 Fletcher to C.O., conf., 1 February 1930.
25 Nehru to Chattur Singh, 9 April 1931, A.I.C.C., F.D.15.
26 FTH, 6 and 11 August 1931.
27 Fletcher to C.O., secret, 1 June and 26 October 1932, and 14
November 1933; Seymour to C.O., secret, 29 May 1933.
28 Fletcher to C.O., conf., 29 October 1931.
29 J. R. Pearson, ‘A note prompted by certain ebullitions of anti-Indian
feeling in the hope of suggesting an alternative to a policy of “keep under”
or “clear out” ’, October 1929, S.I.A. miscellaneous unregistered files.

211
Notes

30 India O.P., March 1932, B.100-101; India O.P. 23/34; Mitchell to

C.O., conf., 3 June 1943.
31 Mitchell to C.O., conf., 3 June 1943.
32 C.O. 83/218, file 85179; tel. most secret and personal, C.O. to
Mitchell, 11 January 1944, C.O. 83/237, file 85262.
33 C.S.O. 553/30; Fiji annual report 1934.
34 S.I.A. files ‘Indian Advisory Committees’.
35 Fiji Samachar, 9 July 1932.
36 Fiji Debates, 14 October 1932.
37 S.I.A. reports on the Indian political situation, 18 October 1932,
and 7 November 1933, end. Fletcher to C.O., conf., 20 October 1932, and
9 November 1933; McGusty to Bajpai, 14 November 1933, India O.P.
330/33.
38 Minute on C.O. 83/188, secret files 73812 and 73812A.
39 Tels., private and personal, Viceroy to S. of S. for India, 27 Sep­
tember 1930; S. of S. to Viceroy, 9 October 1930, India O.P. 276/32.
40 Address by Seymour, 21 February 1933, C.P. 1/33.
41 Fletcher to C.O., secret, 5 May 1934.
42 FTH, 9, 10 and 26 January 1934.
43 C.P. 38/29; C.P. 39/29; H. M. Scott to acting C.S., 7 February
1928; memo, by S.I.A., 24 April 1928, C.S.O. 3603/27.
44 Hutson to C.O., no. 96, 2 April 1929; Govt India to I.O., 12
December 1929, India O.P., December 1929, B.29-30; C.O. to Fletcher,
secret, 6 June 1930.
45 Fletcher to C.O., secret, 25 September 1930, 13 May 1931 and 17
November 1932; C.O. to Fletcher, secret, 17 January 1931; Govt India
to I.O., 10 March 1932, India O.P. 273/32.
46 Fletcher to C.O., secret, 7 May 1934.
47 Minute by Jones, 7 May 1936, C.O. 83/213, file 85072.
48 Fiji Debates, 8 November 1935.
49 Minutes on files 93397 (C.O. 83/197), 18438 (C.O. 83/202), and
18460 (C.O. 83/203).
50 Fletcher to C.O., secret, 24 October 1933 and 5 May 1934; tel.
C.O. to Fletcher, secret, 2 August 1934.
51 Report, C.P. 8/34.
52 Extract from report of 11th meeting of the Young Fijian Society,
Suva, end. Fletcher to C.O., no. 213, 13 September 1934.
53 Letter from D. Toganivalu, P. E. Cakobau, and J. L. V. Sukuna to
acting C.S., 5 November 1935, Fiji Debates, 6 November 1935.
54 K. B. Singh and M. Mudaliar to Fletcher, 15 April 1934, end.
Fletcher to C.O., secret, 5 May 1934; minute by K. P. S. Menon, 29 July
1935, India O.P. 151/35, part 1; Fletcher to C.O., 7 March 1935.
55 Fiji Muslim League to Fletcher, 4 March 1935, end. Fletcher to
C.O., 7 March 1935.
56 FTH, 12 December 1934.
57 Notes on interview, end. Fletcher to C.O., 7 March 1935.
58 FTH, 1 October and 16 December 1935; president T.I.S.I. Sangam

212
 Notes

to C.O., 12 December 1935, India O.P. 151/35, part 2; Vishnu Deo to

Polak, 3 June 1935, Polak to Butler, 13 May 1936, I.O. L/P & J/8/227;
Polak to C.O., 12 June 1935, C.O. 83/210, file 85038.
59 Minute by Sir J. Maffey, 6 June 1935, C.O. 83/210, file 85038.
60 Fletcher to C.O., secret, 14 December 1935.
61 Govt India to I.O. 30 September 1935 and 9 April 1936; minute
by Bajpai, 19 December 1935; Vishnu Deo to Bajpai, 12 March 1936,
India O.P. 151/35.
62 Statesman, 10 December 1936.
63 CSR manager, Lautoka, to CSR/G.M., 19 May 1936, CSR mf. 246.
64 C.S.O. 51/46; C.O. 83/215, file 85179; India O.P. 151/35, part 2.
65 Minute of 14 December 1935, India O.P. 151/35, part 2.
66 Fletcher to C.O., 29 November and 14 December 1935.
67 C.O. 83/212, file 85038.
68 Tel. Linlithgow to Zetland, private and personal, 14 July 1936,
India O.P. 151/35, part 2.
69 Tel. Barton to C.O., secret, private and personal, 1 July 1936, I.O.
L/P & J/8/227.
70 Vishnu Deo to Govt India, 4 August 1936, and minute by G. S.
Bozman, 4 September 1936, India O.P. 151/35, part 2.
71 C.O. 83/219, file 85229, 1937; India O.P. 151/35, part 2.

CHAPTER VIII
1 Richards to C.O., no. 78, 14 April 1937.
2 ‘Crisis in the Fiji Sugar Industry 1920/1925’, CSR mf. 251 C/D.
In 1925 the CSR itself cultivated 52 per cent of the area under cane,
European planters 7 per cent, Indian and Fijian tenants of the company
10 per cent, and Fijian and Indian contractors 31 per cent. In 1933 the
CSR cultivated 9 per cent, European planters 1 per cent, tenants 51 per
cent, and contractors 39 per cent. In 1938 the CSR cultivated only 4 per
cent, there were no European planters, and tenants cultivated 52 per cent
and contractors 44 per cent (Shephard report, 38).
3 Rodwell to C.O., conf., 8 August 1923.
4 See Gillion, Fiji’s Indian Migrants, 99-100; Shephard report, 8-9.
5 Knox to Fell, 23 September 1921, end. Fell to C.O., secret, 11
October 1921.
6 W. P. Dixon, ‘Our Fiji Business’, 2 March 1927, CSR 252/C/D.
7 CSR, ‘Mr W. P. Dixon — chief architect of the small farm system
in Fiji’.
8 CSR 252/C/D.
9 Kolambar is Fiji bat for ‘overseer’. The derivation is obscure. It is
possibly a corruption of ‘call number’, a reference to the dawn musters
during indenture days.
10 Kunzru to Kodanda Rao, 8 November 1938, India O.P. 84-11.
11 J. R. Pearson and Badri Mahraj, Fiji Debates, 18 October 1927.
12 C.S.O. 1098/26; 1135/30. In 1938, 1825 writs for the recovery
of debt were issued against Indians, and 181 against Fijians (F.51/86).

213
Notes

13 Pearson to Bajpai, 29 May 1929, India O.P., October 1929,

B.111-113.
14 Minute by McGusty (S.I.A.), 13 March 1933, C.S.O. 51/13/1.
15 Manager, Lautoka, to CSR/G.M., 17 January 1934, CSR mf. 246.
16 Source cannot be published.
17 Kisan Sangh ka Itihas. Details below are from government records.
18 Ayodhya Prasad, op. cit., 115.
19 Luke to C.O., conf., 7 February 1940; C.O. 83/233, file 85360;
tel. Goldfinch to King-Irving, end. King-Irving to Luke, 31 January 1940.
20 Fletcher to C.O., conf., 22 April 1931; C.O. to Fletcher, conf., 19
December 1931; Lord to Fletcher, 4 May 1932, end. Fletcher to C.O.,
conf., 6 May 1932.
21 Quoted in Luke to C.O., conf., 7 February 1940.
22 C.O. to Seymour, conf., 7 March 1933.
23 C.S.O. 1835/30.
24 CSR mf. 246, Lautoka private inwards 1933-; FTH, June 1938.
25 Richards to C.O., conf., 15 July 1938; C.O. to Luke, secret, 29
October 1938.
26 ‘Labour in Fiji, with special reference to the Sugar industry’, C.O.
note, c. April 1940, C.O. 859/28, file 12259/3D.
27 Reay to Orde Browne, 29 April 1940, C.O. 859/28, file 12259/3D.
28 Luke to C.O., no. 124, 24 April 1940.
29 Reay to Hibbert, 6 October 1940, C.O. 859/28, file 12259/3D.
30 Luke to C.O., conf., 31 July, 4 September, 11 and 12 December
1941; C.O. to Luke, conf., 20 August, 25 Odober and 16 December 1941.
31 FTH, 21 June 1941; Fiji Samachar, 27 June 1941; Kisan, 20 and
27 June 1941.

CHAPTER IX
1 CSR Lautoka to CSR/G.M., 28 October 1938, CSR mf. 246; report
by D. C. Western, C.S.O. 51/102/6; Kunzru to Kodanda Rao, 8 November
1938, India O.P. 84-11, 1938.
2 C.P. 2/37; Luke to C.O., conf., 2 March 1940, and secret, 19 April
1940.
3 Mitchell to Gater, secret, 14 August 1942, C.O. 83/237, file 85416.
Deletion is mine.
4 Fletcher to C.O., conf., 17 August 1932; tels. Fletcher to C.O., secret,
27 July 1934, and C.O. to Fletcher, 31 July 1934; Fiji Debates, 17 October
1934; Luke to C.O., secret, 29 May 1942.
5 FTH, 12 May 1942.
6 Fiji Information Reports for October-December 1942 and January-
March 1943, C.O. 875/6, file 6281 11D, 1943; tel. Mitchell to C.O., secret,
25 January 1943; Fiji Debates, 14 and 17 May, 20 August, 17 and 22
December 1943; tels. Mitchell to C.O., secret, 30 May and 30 June 1944,
and C.O. to Mitchell, 12 June 1944.
7 Fiji Information Report, March-September 1943, C.O. 875/6.
8 Tels. Mitchell to C.O., secret, 4 and 17 July 1943.

214
 Notes

9 ‘Dispute in the Sugar Industry', C.P. 16/43, 25 August 1943; tel.

Mitchell to C.O., secret, 2 October and 6 November 1943.
10 Tels., CSR/G.M. to CSR/London, 23 July 1943; Mitchell to C.O.,
secret, 3 August and 3 December 1943, C.O. 83/238, file 85460.
11 Shephard report, 29-30, 49. The company calculated a loss in the
years 1930-1934, and a profit on total assets in Fiji of 0.9 per cent in 1935,
1.1 per cent in 1936, 1.9 per cent in 1937, 0.4 per cent in 1938, 3.0 per
cent in 1939, 4.0 per cent in 1940, 4.8 per cent in 1942, and a loss in 1943.
12 Tels. Mitchell to C.O., secret, 1 and 6 September 1943.
13 Fiji Debates, 21 and 22 December L943.
14 Tel. Mitchell to C.O., 5 January 1944.
15 Tel. Rankine to C.O., 21 March 1944. Nevertheless Mitchell tried
to have Rudrananda recalled by the Ramakrishna Mission after intercepted
letters revealed that it had replied to his appeals for help by rebuking him
for engaging in political activities, which were strictly forbidden by the
order; but the Government of India declined to approach the Mission as
the Fiji sugar industry was about to be investigated by an independent
expert (Marhavananda, Belur Math, to Rudrananda, 24 October 1943,
end. Mitchell to C.O., conf. no. 7, 19 January 1944; Banerjee tb Gilchrist,
5 July 1944), C.O. 83/243, file 85460.
16 Tel. Mitchell to C.O., 5 January 1944; Fiji Debates, 23 February
1944.
17 Tels. Mitchell to C.O., 8 and 11 January and 3 February 1944.
18 Tels. Mitchell to C.O., 16, 18 and 28 February 1944.
19 Tel. Mitchell to C.O., secret, 28 February 1944.
20 Tels. C.O. to Mitchell, secret, 2 March 1944; Stanley to Mitchell,
private and personal, 2 March 1944; Mitchell to C.O., 21 March 1944,
and secret, 21 June 1944; Mitchell to Stanley, 23 May 1944, C.O. 83/242,
file 85460/1944.
21 See Mayer, Indians in Fiji, for this and other post-war developments.
22 Minute by Trafford Smith, 10 August 1942, C.O. 83/238, file 85466.
23 Minute by Trafford Smith, 4 September 1943, C.O. 83/237, file
85262.
24 J. R. Pearson, ‘Land Tenure for Indians’, 17 October 1931, C.S.O.
1366/30.
25 Pearson to Bajpai, 24 January 1928, India O.P., April 1928, B.28.
26 Note by Commissioner of Lands, 6 October 1925, C.S.O. 4627/24.
27 Memo, by Commissioner of Lands, 7 March 1933, C.S.O. 51/13/1.
28 Pearson to Ram Chandra, 27 June 1931, India O.P., February 1932,
B.149.
29 C.S.O. 1366/30.
30 Fiji Debates, 26 October 1933; C.S.O. 51/102/10.
31 CSR memo, for Governor of Fiji, 23 February 1934; Fiji Inspector
to CSR/G.M., 30 August 1934; C.O. 83/207, file 38470; CSR, R.3.0.2.
32 Richards to Creasey, 7 September 1937, C.O. 83/216, file 85044.
33 Sagayam to Andrews, 16 June 1935; also article in Hindu, 22 June
1935 (India O.P. 187/35).

215
Notes

34 Govt India to I.O., 9 August and 2 July 1936, India O.P. 187/35;
C.O. to Luke, 23 September 1939; C.O. to I.O., 4 June 1940, encl. C.O.
to Luke, conf., 6 June 1940.
35 Fiji Debates, 22 February 1940; Govt India to I.O., 24 June 1940,
encl. C.O. to Luke, 4 July, 1940.
36 Mitchell to C.O., no. 47, 16 July 1943; Mitchell to Gen:, personal
and conf., 29 November 1943, C.O. 83/241, file 85231/1944: quarterly
report, Fiji information office, October-December 1944, C.O. 83/241, file
85231/1944.
37 Quoted in tel. Mitchell to C.O., 20 March 1944.
38 Tel. Gater to Mitchell, personal and conf., 30 September 1943,
C.O. 83/235, file 85038/1943.
39 Tels. Mitchell to Gater, personal and conf., 4 and 13 October 1943,
C.O. 83/235, file 85038/1943.
40 Minute by Caine, 26 February 1944, C.O. 83/241, file 85231/1944.
41 Luke to C.O., secret, 19 April 1940, C.O. 83/235, file 85038/43;
Fiji Debates, 26 August 1943.
42 Memorial from European Electors’ Association, 2 April 1946,
Grantham to C.O., secret, 10 May 1946, C.O. 83/239, file 85038/46.
43 The title of a book by an American, J. W. Coulter, published in
1941, and the heading over a letter to the editor, Fiji Times and Herald,
10 March 1945, which prompted further correspondence.
44 Grantham to C.O., no. 104, 28 August 1946.
45 Resolution of 19 July 1946, encl. Grantham to C.O., no. 115, 19
September 1946.
46 Grantham to C.O., no. 104, 28 August 1946.

216
 Bibliography
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available in several different archives; for example, copies of the despatches
between the Governor of Fiji and the Secretary of State for the Colonies
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Howlett, R. A. The History of the Fiji Military Forces 1939-1945, Suva
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Mayhew, A. I. Report on Education in Fiji, Suva, 1937.
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Minute Papers and Files
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223
 Index
Abdulla, Muhammad, 112
Africa, 8, 11, 17, 21, 27, 79, 135,
145-6, 155, 170; see also Kenya
Ahmadiyyas, 112-14
Akhil Fiji Krishak Maha Sangh,
172, 180-7, 196
Americans, 141, 175, 179, 181
Amichand, Pandit, 108
Andrews, Charles Freer, 9-10, 17,
20, 22, 23, 32, 40-2, 58, 61,
63-5, 79, 99, 121, 128, 153-4,
173, 191
Apolosi Nawai, 74-5
Arya Samaj, 50, 59, 102, 104,
107-10, 112-15, 120, 127, 131-5,
140, 141, 147, 165
Australia, 10, 11, 16, 18, 19, 23,
29, 33, 39, 49, 53, 55-7, 68, 75,
80, 84, 87, 89, 152, 168, 170,
195; see also Colonial Sugar Re­
fining Company; Gold-mining
industry; Knox, E. W.; Mel­
bourne Trust Company; Gold­
finch, Sir Philip; Theodore, E.
G.
Avinashananda, Swami, 15, 111,
165
Aziz Ahmed, 113
Bairangi, John, 147
Bajpai Sir Girja Shankar, 79, 98-9,
101, 108, 138, 143
Barker, Sir Thomas William Al­
port, 82, 99, 136, 149-50, 152,
154, 194
Barton, C. J. J. T, 154-5, 174, 191
Bayly, John P., 136, 152, 154
Beattie, Dr Hamilton, 109, 131,
133, 135, 145
Bhawani Dayal Sannyasi, 114
British Guiana, 36-7, 42, 44, 62,
68, 94
Buksh, Mirza Salim, 105
Burton, Rev. John Wear, 9
Cabrie, Madame, 21, 31
Cakobau, Ratu Edward T. T.,
183-4
Caldwell, W. M., 105
Canada, 182; see also Vancouver-
Fiji Sugar Company
Cane-Growers Association of Fiji,
55
Caste, 5, 6, 7, 13, 54, 59, 62, 99,
103, 115, 130, 144
Caughley, John, 122-3
Chalmers, Douglas C., 166
Chaturvedi, Benarsidas, 9, 40, 63,
79, 114, 135-6, 141
Chinese, 11, 12, 67-8, 73, 75, 116,
159, 168
Chini Mazdur Sangh, 169
Chowla, S. S., 105, 108
Christians, Indian, 17, 25, 31, 34,
59, 105, 108-10, 118, 131, 132,
145, 147
Colonial Office: approves Rod-
well’s handling of strike, 39;
warns Rodwell renewal of Indian
immigration impossible, 41-2;
negotiates with India, 44-5, 83-4,
87-9, 93-9; attitude to repatria­
tion rights, 64, 83-4, 92-3; re­
fuses to agree to Chinese labour,
68; reminds governor of Fijian
land rights, 70-1; attitude to
franchise, 71-2, 150-4; opinion
of CSR, 77, 170; negotiates with
CSR, 86-8; presses for education
of Indians, 124-5, 127-8; against
appointment of Indian agent in
Fiji, 94, 143; attitude to labour,
169-71; role in cane dispute,
186; misgivings about Fijian
Affairs Ordinance, 193-4.
Colonial Sugar Refining Company:
enters Fiji, 2; relations with
Andrews, 9-10, 79; relations
with Indians, 36, 77, 161; rela­
tions with Fijians, 59-60, 160-7,
190-1; power in Fiji, 11, 31,
47-50, 61; profits, 49, 52, 76-7,
85, 214; reputation in India, 65;
wants more Indians, 65, 75-7;
threatens to close down in Fiji,
76-7; taxes paid, 76, 85, 90-1;
225
Index
cuts wages, 81-3; negotiates with
Colonial Office, 86-8; negotiates
in India, 89-90; makes conces­
sions, 90-1; acknowledges
strength of opinion in India, 94;
doubtful about return of re­
patriates, 99-100; tenant-farmer
scheme, 101, 104, 153, 157-62,
188, 213; and education, 120,
125-6; relations with Kisan
Sangh, 164-72; again threatens
ruin of colony, 167-8; attitude
to labour legislation, 168-71;
labour strikes, 179-80; dispute
with farmers, 180-7; criticised
by Mitchell, 185-6; Shephard
report, 186; withdrawal from
Fiji, 187; attitude to land ques­
tion, 190-1
Copra, 2, 168, 175
Corbett, Sir Geoffrey Latham, 79-
85, 95-7, 160
Council of Planters, 67
Crompton, Robert, 11, 31, 74, 94
Dakshina India Andhra Sangam,
112
Dean, X. K. N., 112
Debt, 50, 162-5
Deo, V., see Vishnu Deo
Deoki, 32, 105
Dinbandhu, 172
Disease, 1, 5-7, 17, 23, 25, 105
Dixon, W. P„ 50, 85-7, 90, 157,
160
Education, 16, 19, 53-4, 102, 111,
118-29, 134, 141, 173-4, 195
Equal rights for Indians, proposed
guarantee, 43, 69-72, 98
European Electors’ Association,
194
European-Indian relations, 6, 16-
17, 21, 25-30, 34-5, 39, 55, 57,
73-4, 102, 120-1, 127-9, 130-3,
144, 155, 173-5, 179, 187-8,
194-8
226
Fell, Thomas Edward, 30, 52, 66,
73, 74, 77, 80-2, 85-6, 185
Festivals, 105-6
Fiji Bharatiya Mazdur Sangh, 169
Fiji Indian Labour Federation, 51-
3
Fiji Indian National Congress, 131,
135
Fiji Muslim League, 106, 112-14,
140, 151
Fiji Samachar, 108, 110, 114, 145,
172, 178
Fiji Times and Herald, 19, 24-5,
33, 35, 39, 81-2, 116, 131, 136,
154, 184
Fijians: cession, 1, 61, 69-71, 74,
151, 195-6; administration, 1-2,
67, 98, 175-6, 188, 192-4; rela­
tions with Europeans, 10, 59-61,
74, 121, 129, 173-5, 179, 187-8,
194- 8; relations with Indians,
12-16, 34, 56, 59-61, 74-5, 92,
94, 120-1, 129, 144, 148-9, 151,
153-4, 155, 157, 174-5, 188-98;
relations with Chinese, 12, 68;
population numbers, 1, 12, 61;
labour, 2, 12, 67, 73, 160, 167-
8, 169; used as special con­
stables, 14, 28-9, 55, 60; land­
holders, 2, 14-16, 23, 70-1, 67,
85, 188-92; attitude to conces­
sions to Indians, 74-5, 94, 148-
51, 154-5; protest, 74-5, 92;
taxes, 91-2; interests stated to
be paramount, 93, 136, 195-8;
Legislative Council representa­
tion, 88-9, 94, 154, 194-5; Arya
Samaj attempts to convert, 109;
education, 119-22, 124, 125;
Viti Cauravou, 151; cane-
farmers, 172; war effort, 174-6;
attitude to 1943 strike, 183-4;
Native Land Trust Ordinance,
190-2; Fijian Affairs Ordinance,
192-4; Deed of Cession debate,
195- 7; see also Apolosi Nawai;
Cakobau, Ratu E. T. T.; Gani-
lau, Ratu Epeli; land; Sukuna,

Ratu Sir J. L. V.
Fletcher, Sir A. G. Murchison,
114, 123-8, 138-56, 168
Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand,
8, 20, 21, 40-6, 53-7, 64, 97,
133-4, 138, 141-2, 145, 166,
176
Ganilau, Ratu Epeli, 92
Garu, B. Venkatapatiraju, 79-85,
96
Ghadr party, 141-2
Gokhale, Gopal Krishna, 8, 9, 21
Goldfinch, Sir Philip H., 167, 171,
190-1
Gold-mining industry, 152, 170
Gopalan, Dr Chambadan Mana-
kadan, 111, 152
Gordon, Sir Arthur Hamilton, see
Stanmore, Lord
Government, relations with Indians
at local level, 19, 37-9, 113,
143-5
Grant, Anthony, Peter and John
F., 25, 32, 33, 105, 132, 139
Grantham, Sir Alexander W. G. H.,
194-7
Gujaratis, 7, 21, 64, 100, 107,
115-18, 134, 142, 163-4, 179,
182-3
Hardinge of Penshurst, Baron, 8,
75, 87
Hasan, Muhammad, 113
Hasan, Said, 113, 155
Hawaii, 87, 129
Hedstrom, Sir John Maynard, 11,
123, 136-7, 149-52, 177
Hindu Maha Sabha, 107, 110, 141
Hindu-Muslim relations, 24, 103,
105-9, 112-14, 139-40, 144
Hughes, Thomas, 41, 89
Hutson, Sir Eyre, 98, 100, 120,
148
im Thurn, Sir Everard, 2, 66, 67,
71
Immigrants, Indian: areas of ori­
Index
gin, 4, 103, 110, 114-15; castes,
5, 6, 103; sex proportion, 5, 117
Immigration, Indian: wanted by
Fiji Government and Europeans,
1, 10-11, 17, 68, 89; Fiji mission
to India, 17, 23, 41-3; return of
repatriates, 62-5, 99-101; change
of mind by Fiji Government and
Europeans, 66, 93-4; restriction
proposed, 92; restriction, 116-18,
165, 173; see also Indenture sys­
tem
Imperial Conference: 1921, 72;
1923, 93
Imperial Indian Citizenship Asso­
ciation, 22, 40, 99, 117, 133,
184, 192
Inayat, 106, 109
Indenture system, 3-10, 17, 18,
130-1, 153, 160-1
India, Government of: attitude to
emigration, 3-4, 7-10, 41, 90;
opinion of Fiji, 8-10, 40-6; nego­
tiates with mission from Fiji, 42;
deputation to Fiji, 17, 28, 43-4,
63, 78-85, 88, 130; negotiates
with Colonial Office, 44-5, 83-4,
87-9, 93-9; deputation’s report
suppressed, 93, 95-8; relations
with Fiji, 42-6, 61-5; loses in­
fluence on treatment of Indians
overseas, 98-9; attitude to com­
mon roll, 88, 93, 94, 138, 151,
153-5; attitude to land question,
191-2
Indian Advisory Committees, 38,
144
Indian Association of Fiji: 1920,
51; 1924, 104; 1934, 117, 152,
155
Indian Cane Growers Association,
50, 164
Indian Imperial Association of Fiji,
22-5, 32, 34, 37
Indian Motor Drivers’ Union, 113,
169
Indian National Congress, 22, 40,
135, 141, 146
227
Index
Indian Reform League, 105, 108
Indian Settler, 22
Indians Overseas Association, 44,
133
Java, 52, 67, 76, 181
Jordan, G. R., 35-6
Kenya, 11, 14, 44, 71-3, 85, 92,
93, 96-8, 124, 133, 136-8, 145-7
Khan, Fateh, 26
Khan, Fazil, 26-7, 32, 33
Khan, Lieutenant Hissamuddin,
79-85
Khan, Muhammad Tawahir, 112,
166-7, 170-2, 182
Khilafat agitation, 19, 33
Kisan, 171-2
Kisan Sangh, 164-72, 180-7
Knox, Edward William, 9, 10, 41,
52-3, 75-7, 79, 83, 85-7, 95, 159,
160, 167
Kundan Singh Kush, 107, 108
Kunzru, Pandit Hirday Nath, 79,
97, 161, 173-4, 184
Kuppuswami, Sadhu, 111
Lakshman, Brahma Dass, 171,
182-3
Land, 1-2, 15-16, 23, 43, 49, 67,
70-1, 75, 78, 85, 88, 93, 105,
144, 147, 153, 157, 158, 173-4,
188-92, 195-6, 198
Languages, 15, 126-7, 147-9
Legislative Council: European re­
presentation, 11; part-European,
12; Indian nominated member,
38, 91; proposed Indian elected
representation, 43, 44, 69, 71-2,
88, 93-4, 105; Fijian representa­
tion, 88-9; European members
protest against concessions to
CSR, 90-1; and against Sey­
mour, 123-4; elections in 1929,
132-4; common roll question,
134-40, 145-56; constitution,
154-5, 173, 197; Fijians voting
against government, 174-5; pro­
228
posals for changes, 194-5; Deed
of Cession debate, 195-7
Luke, Sir Harry Charles, 166-7,
169, 171, 174-5
McGusty, Dr Victor William
Tighe, 108, 136, 143, 146
McMillan, A. W„ 105, 114, 122,
127, 141
Madras Maha Sangam, 108, 111,
152
Maha Sangh, see Akhil Fiji Kris-
hak Maha Sangh
Maharaj, Harapal, 32
Maharaj, J. P., 21
Mahraj, Badri, 30, 32, 51, 59, 91,
104, 107, 120
Manilal, Mrs Jayakunwar, 21, 26,
27, 28, 32
Manilal Maganlal Doctor, 21-38,
51, 56, 134, 168
Marks, Sir Henry, 11, 132-3
Mauritius, 3, 16, 21, 76, 92, 94,
103, 169-70
Mazdur Sangh, 169
Melbourne Trust Company, 49, 55,
158
Methodist Mission, 48, 85, 119,
121, 152
Milverton, Baron, 1 1-12, 155, 157,
169, 191
Mitchell, Sir Philip E„ 128, 174-5,
180-6, 193-4
Mitter, N. B„ 51-3, 168
Mohammed, Dost, 32
Money-lenders, see Debt
Mudaliar, Muniswamy, 145-7, 151
Muni, Sadhu Bashishth, 53-9, 61,
64, 157, 168
Municipal franchise, 23, 43, 88, 93,
94, 147-50
Muslims, 7, 13, 59, 103, 105-10,
112-14, 115, 127, 139-40, 145,
151, 194
Muzaffar Beg, Mirza, 112
Naidu, M. Narainswamy, 111, 152,
165

Nawa Jawan Sainik, 118, 165
Nehru, Jawaharlal, 135, 141
New Zealand, 11, 19, 29, 39, 48-
50, 57, 58, 68, 75, 84, 89, 120,
122, 128-9, 168, 175, 177
Pacific Age, 73
Pacific Press, 109
Panchayats, 144
Paranjype, Sir Raghunath, 195
Part-Europeans, 11, 12, 149-50,
154-5, 168, 179, 195
Patel, Ambalal Dahyabhai, 111,
117-18, 134, 138, 142, 152, 157,
164, 165-6, 172, 173, 181-5, 196
Patel, Shiwabhai Bhailalbhai, 133-
7, 142, 147, 164, 182, 184
Pearson, J. R., 15-16, 98, 99, 114,
116, 122-3, 132-3, 142-3, 148,
163, 188
Pillay, V. M., 57, 111
Pingal, Mahant, 22
Piper, Rev Richard, 9, 73
Polak, Henry S. L., 44, 133-8, 152,
184
Population, 1, 4, 5, 11-12, 68, 100,
195-8, 199
Prasad, Ayodhya, 118, 164-6, 170,
172, 182
Prasad, Pandit Durga, 109
Prasad, Ramsamujh, 104
Punjabis, 7, 32, 100, 114-16, 118,
163, 169, 182
Ragg, Amie A., 196
Raghvanand, B., 107
Raihman, Peter, 32
Rajdut, 91
Raju report; see Garu, B. Venka-
tapatiraju; India, Government of
Ram Rup, 21
Ram Singh, Babu, 21-5, 104, 108,
110
Ramakrishna Mission, 111-12, 184
Ramchander, James, 132
Ramjan, Ilahi, 32, 104, 105
Rankine, Richard Sims Donkin, 17,
23, 41-3
Index
Rao, Kodanda, 173
Reay, C. Stuart de C., 170
Repatriation to India, 3-4, 19, 35-9,
43, 45, 61-5, 82-5, 92-3, 99-101,
203
Residential tax, 91-3, 97, 104, 195
Rewa Cane Growers’ Union, 180-7
Riaz, Theodore D., 50, 73, 81
Richards, Sir Arthur F., see Milver­
ton, Baron
Rodwell, Sir Cecil Hunter, 11, 20,
24-30, 32, 34, 37-9, 47-8, 52, 56,
58, 63, 67-8, 73, 86, 89, 90,
92-3, 97, 140, 159, 185
Roman Catholic Mission, 107, 120-
1, 152; see also Christians, Indian
Rudrananda, Swami, 111-12, 157,
172, 181, 182, 184, 215
Sagayam, A. Devi, Dr, 111, 139,
191-2
Sahu Khan, family, 112-13
Salisbury, Lord, 69-70, 75
Sanadhya, Totaram, 9, 21, 40, 103,
134
Sangam, 111, 152, 165, 172
Sangathan movement, 108, 110
Sannyasi, Bhawani Dayal, 114
Sarju, 26
Sastri, V. S. Srinivasa, 79, 98
Scott, Sir Henry Milne, 11, 31,
132-3, 136-7, 148-52, 177, 197
Secretary for Indian Affairs, 14,
38, 94, 98-9; see also McGusty,
Dr V. W. T.; Pearson, J. R.
Seth, B. L. Hiralal, 107, 134
Seymour, Alfred W., 122-4, 131-2
Sharma, Bhagwati Prasad, 26
Sharma, Pandit Govind Sahai, 79-
85, 96
Sharma, Pandit Ramchandra, 110
Sharma, Pandit Srikrishna, 107,
110, 112, 140
Shephard, Professor C. Y., 186
Sikhs, 7, 114-16, 142, 182
Singh, C. Chattur, 104, 118, 133,
141, 165
Singh, Kuldip, 142
229
Index
Singh, Kunwar Bachint, 107, 145-
7, 151, 155, 169, 178, 183, 192
Singh, Mangal, 169
Singh, Narbahadur, 145
Singh, Padri Mehar, 165, 182
Singh, Parmanand, 118, 132-3, 165
Singh, Ramcharan, 165
Singh, Randhir, 50, 107, 134
Singh, Santa, 142
Singh, Shiv, 142
Siri Ram, 118
South Indians, 7, 13, 21, 89, 110-
12, 127, 144, 152, 165, 172,
182, 196
Sport, 105
Stanmore, Lord, 1-3, 70
Stephens, F. B., 129, 195
Stri Seva Sahha, 105
Suchit, George, 23
Sugar, 1,51, 180-2; contribution to
export income and revenue, 2-3,
47-8; market, 49, 58, 182;
imperial preference, 87, 100,
158, 182; see also Colonial Sugar
Refining Company; Melbourne
Trust Company; Vancouver-Fiji
Sugar Company
Sukuna, Ratu Sir Joseva Lalabalavu
Vanaaliali, 151, 174-5, 183-4,
191-3
Suva Motor Drivers’ Union, 169
Tamils, 7, 110-12, 127
Tataiya, 112
Telegus, 110-12, 127
230
Then India Sanmarga Ikya Sangam,
111, 152, 172
Then India Valibar Sangam, 111,
152, 165
Theodore, Edward Granville, 152,
170
Trade Unions, 51-3, 167-71
Twitched, Right Rev, T. C., 17, 23,
41-3, 67, 70
Vaidik Sandesh, 108, 135
Vancouver-Fiji Sugar Company,
49, 77, 158
Veeranna, 112
Vishnu Deo, Pandit, 107-10, 114,
131, 132-9, 142, 143, 145-7, 152,
153, 155, 164, 169, 172, 173,
178, 179, 182, 183, 192
Viti Cauravou, 151
Vriddhi and Vriddhi-Vani, 109, 145
Waiz, S. A. 99
Waller, J. H„ 109
West Indies, 3, 9, 16, 47, 67, 69,
87, 103, 169
Willoughby Tottenham, Major W.
E„ 152
Young Fijian Society, see Viti
Cauravou
Young Men’s Christian Association,
64, 105
Young Men’s Indian Association,
104
Dr Gillion is a Senior Research Fellow in the Department of Pacific and
Southeast Asian History at The Australian National University. He has served
in the New Zealand Department of External Affairs and taught history at the
Universities o f Western Australia and Adelaide.
Dr Gillion first visited Fiji in 1949 and has subsequently spent several periods
doing research there and in India. He is the author of F iji’s Indian Migrants
(1962) and Ahmedabad: A Study in Indian Urban History (1968).

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