978470

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ABSXXX10.1177/0002764220978470American Behavioral ScientistMihailidis and Foster

Article
American Behavioral Scientist

The Cost of Disbelief:

2021, Vol. 65(4) 616­–631
© 2020 SAGE Publications
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DOI: 10.1177/0002764220978470
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Media Cynicism

Paul Mihailidis1 and Bobbie Foster2

Abstract
In the United States, and around the world, journalism and public information exist
across broken media architectures. Citizens are at the mercy of those eager to take
advantage of platform infrastructures in which access, quality, and diversity varies so
wildly. Increasingly, politicians are taking advantage of these platform architectures
to position people against one another. The result is a fracturing of belief, where
truths splinter and trust erodes. Our digital environments are at the center of this
fracturing, and our social and civic cohesion is at risk. What has resulted is a rampant
cynicism, which is reflected in an intentional disengagement from the information
infrastructures that provide civic cohesion. This is buoyed by an erosion of local
news environments, which has further disconnected communities or forced them to
rely on large scale digital media companies. This article will detail three areas eroding
public trust and engagement—distributed propaganda, hijacking of local news, and
reifying polarization—and their contributions to growing cynicism toward our current
civic and political environments. It will unpack the frame of cynicism to articulate
a lack of willingness to participate in civic processes that are seen as inclusive and
reach beyond differences. The essay will pivot to the concept of civic-mindedness to
promote an approach to combat the cynicism that has engulfed our political and civic
infrastructures.

Keywords
civic media, polarization, activism, media literacy, civic participation

1
Emerson College, Boston, MA, USA
2
University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA

Corresponding Author:
Paul Mihailidis, Emerson College, 120 Boylston Street, Boston, MA 02116, USA.
Email: paul_mihailidis@emerson.edu
Mihailidis and Foster 617

Introduction: Fracturing Civic Ecosystems

Amid a global pandemic that has caused unprecedented harm and death, upended
global economies, and further exposed the stark inequities in the United States and
much of the world, civic and media infrastructures continue to fracture. The institu-
tions that provide oversight of public functions—local governments, nonprofits, and
news organizations—have all come under increasing scrutiny, criticism, and pressure.
Doubts exist about local governments’ ability to facilitate effective responses to the
pandemic, as their resources are diminishing, and uncertain futures constrain their
capacity to act effectively. Vulnerable populations are further hurt by vast unemploy-
ment and violence. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor and Statistics, in July 2019,
unemployment rates for Americans with disabilities were 7.6%. This doubled after the
global pandemic to 14.3% (U.S. Bureau of Labor and Statistics, 2019). According to
the U.S. Bureau of Labor and Statistics (2019), unemployment is also higher among
Black or African Americans, which reported rates of unemployment double that of
White Americans in 2018 and 2019. In 2018, hate crimes hit a 16-year high according
to data published by the FBI. In particular, violence motivated by racism against
Latinx populations increased. The same data revealed that crimes targeting property,
such as vandalism of a victim’s home or business were down, while physical assaults
had risen over the years (Hassan, 2019).
For some time now, the institutions that anchor democracy were weakening within
the United States. Progressively lower local election turnout rates in many regions and
increasing distrust in civic institutions overall have trended for decades (Fullerton &
Borch, 2008; Pew Research Center, 2019). These fractures are the result of a conflu-
ence of factors including increased partisanship, an influx of financial investment and
influence over election cycles, and the introduction of new media technologies
enabling greater reach of both communication and divisions within the American elec-
torate. These trends have gutted local news outlets of their economic foundations, and
core readerships. They have also contributed to increasing cynicism by Americans
toward all branches of Government, including the Supreme Court, which in theory,
should be untouched by partisanship (Hamilton, 2019).
David A. Lieb (2017) reported 42% of state representatives ran unopposed in the
fall of 2016. Uncontested races have gradually increased over the past several decades
(Lieb, 2017). In the 2018 midterm elections, The Cook Political Report only consid-
ered 68 of the 435 races to be highly competitive (Berkowitz & Esteban, 2018). The
rest of the seats were either uncontested or favored heavily for one party to win. Within
the United States, 36 states and the District of Columbia have laws that allow indi-
vidual unopposed offices to be declared elected without appearing on a ballot (Lindell,
2017). The United States, operating a two-party system, has become increasingly
partisan. Within the past few decades, “winner-take-all” elections have eroded
complexity in political systems and reduced news coverage and public conversations
to “either-or” decisions. Gerrymandering, winner-take-all election laws, and the
“declared elected” statues for uncontested offices are part of a dysfunctional demo-
cratic process that is increasingly driven by hyperpartisan fracturing. Voter ID laws
618 American Behavioral Scientist 65(4)

and prohibiting citizens with felony convictions from voting are also part of the con-
tinued suppression of voters from marginalized groups, causing more significant frac-
turing within representative democratic processes.
Media institutions have undergone dramatic changes over the past few decades,
contributing to increasing public distrust and cynicism. Local news has been disap-
pearing rapidly in the wake of digital platforms that extract community resources
without investing in local information infrastructures. A report by the University of
North Carolina’s School of Media and Journalism found that 1,300 communities
across the United States lost all local news coverage in 2018 (The Expanding News
Desert, 2018). Rubado and Jennings (2019) found that the loss of dedicated local
journalists has negative consequences for the quality of city and state politics.
Looking at 11 local papers within California, they found evidence suggesting sharp
declines in newsroom staffing reduced political competition in mayoral races (Rubado
& Jennings, 2019). Research has also found a correlation between the loss of local
news, low voter turnouts, and less informed publics overall (Filla & Johnson, 2010;
Rubado & Jennings, 2019). Looking at data from the Public Policy Institute of
California on the designated market area of news coverage and voter-turnout, Filla
and Johnson (2010) found lower voter-turnout in areas with little-to-no local news
outlets. Studies have shown that regional news and media outlets tend to cover stories
related to large cities or national politics, leading to a lack of coverage and engage-
ment with hyperlocal politics (Althaus & Trautman, 2008). Local news sources are
especially valuable for increasing voter-turnout within marginalized groups.
Obeholzer-Gee and Waldfogel (2006) found that Latinx voter turnout increased
between 5 and 10 percentage points in media markets where local Spanish-language
television news was available. Panagopoulos and Green (2011) also found local non-
partisan Spanish-language radio advertisements increased voter turnout in the 2006
congressional elections.
Beyond the growth of news deserts, hundreds of local media sources were pur-
chased by large investment firms (The Expanding News Desert, 2018). According to
Marc Tracy (2019) at The New York Times, failing print media still made more than
$25 billion in 2019. Many of the papers that still exist are owned by hedge funds, such
as Alden Global Capital, which owns MediaNews Group that buys up local newspa-
pers and news sources (Tracy, 2019). Many of these local papers are bought at bargain-
basement prices, and productivity can be slashed to maximize profits (The Expanding
News Desert, 2018). In other words, newspapers become “specters” of what they once
were, lacking in-depth investigative reporting and local political news coverage.
Hedge-fund owned local media markets have also become increasingly partisan. The
Sinclair Broadcasting Group made headlines in 2018 after the company asked anchors
of local media affiliates to read the same message calling attention to the “one-sided
news coverage” exemplified by other media outlets (Chang, 2018; Wagner, 2018).
According to Chang (2018), the Sinclair Broadcasting Group is among the most influ-
ential media companies within the United States. It boasts ownership of nearly 200
local television stations in roughly 100 media markets across the country (Chang,
2018).
Mihailidis and Foster 619

The fracturing of civic ecosystems is a threat to democracy. While there is no single

attribute to this fracturing, it is clear that digital platforms and the erosion of local
media ecosystems play a significant role. The COVID-19 pandemic has introduced
new opportunities for further partisan control of elections by calling into question the
use of technology for remote voting and casting doubt about media coverage of the
virus. States, such as Georgia, experienced election chaos during their primaries early
in the 2020 election cycle after cutting polling places and requiring in-person voting
(Edelman, 2020). Ahead of the Kentucky primaries, the state slashed the number of
polling places, especially in counties and cities where the majority of voters are Black
(Merica et al., 2020). The fracture lines begin to deepen further with the introduction
of disinformation surrounding both the virus and changing election mandates.
The outcomes of these challenges are particularly harsh on marginalized and under-
served communities. Their fundamental rights and ability to participate in a democ-
racy are further compromised by a lack of information ecosystems in their communities
(Carpentier, 2011; Dahlgren, 2018; Jengelley & Clawson, 2018). The result has per-
petuated existing inequities, not only economic but civic and social. In this article, we
address the factors contributing to rampant media cynicism in the United States. The
elements we outline below-distributed propaganda, hijacking of local news, and the
resulting reifying polarization collectively lead to a civic ecosystem in dire need of
repair. With Americans losing trust in institutions that support democratic norms,
including but not limited to media, public health, and social welfare, we must inter-
rogate the cost of disbelief.

Approaching Rampant Media Cynicism

It is not without reason to focus on media systems as the locus of civic fracturing. They
are meant to be anchors for fact, truth, and information that upholds democratic pro-
cesses. The present moment, however, highlights how fractured media ecosystems are,
and the impact that this fracturing has had on civic cohesion, and trust in public institu-
tions. It is been well documented that trust in public institutions, and in particular
media institutions, has been in steady decline (Pew Research Center, 2019). These
declines align with the growth of mobile technologies, connective platforms, and
social networks as abundant sources of daily information and ever intrusive spaces for
designed engagement and interaction.
A 2020 report by the Knight Foundation and Gallup found that citizens’ trust in
media and news in grave peril. A majority of Americans surveyed believe that media
are at the core of the political divisiveness that exists today (“American Views 2020:
Trust, Media, and Democracy,” 2020). Bias has increased significantly, and as a result,
the report found that people revert back to only 1 to 2 news outlets that they have
comfort with, constraining their exposure to a diversity of ideas, viewpoints, and opin-
ions. At the same time, the report found that people—particularly young people—who
receive almost all of their news online are less likely to be informed about happenings
in their communities. (“American Views 2020: Trust, Media, and Democracy,” 2020).
While the report finds that citizens still believe in the intent of media to provide
620 American Behavioral Scientist 65(4)

necessary information for functioning democracy, the reality is that media is seen as a
key contributor to civic fracturing in the United States. With less trust in news and
media in the United States than ever before (Brenan, 2019), rising cynicism toward
media and the resulting movement toward isolated single media outlets can exacerbate
an already polarized, divisive, and unhealthy civic infrastructure.
Cynicism toward media outlets is not necessarily new. For decades or even centu-
ries, news media and citizens have had unsteady belief in each other. The Gallup Poll
started measuring trust in media in the United States in 1972, the same year investiga-
tive journalists broke the Watergate scandal in Washington, DC. At that point, 68% of
Americans said they trusted the news media; however, that number has dwindled,
hitting an all-time low in 2016, according to Gallup. Distrust in the media in the United
States is partisan-based. According to Gallup’s 2019 report, 69% of Democrats said
they trusted the news, and only 15% of Republicans said they believed the news.
Recently, the Pew Research Center asked Americans to evaluate their trust in 30 spe-
cific news sources ranging from cable news to talk-radio. The report found a stark
difference between the number of sources trusted by Republicans and Democrats, with
Republicans saying they distrust 20 of the 30 outlets provided. Partisan cynicism
toward the news media has created a symbiotic relationship between right-wing
extremists and conservative news media outlets. Breitbart, a fringe conservative web-
site, drove news coverage for other conservative-leaning outlets during the 2016 elec-
tion (Benkler et al., 2017). Benkler et al. (2017) argue Breitbart set the tone for media
coverage in other conservative-leaning news outlets, such as Fox News, during 2016.
This allowed right-wing activists connected to groups like the Alt-Right to drive politi-
cal commentaries and dictate which news stories got the most airtime or attention on
social media and cable news (Benkler et al., 2017).
These determinants for how news is distributed and received, supported by algo-
rithms of large digital platforms, leads to a more rampant form of cynicism toward
media. The rampant cynicism represents a departure from skepticism, distinguished
by Jackson and Jamieson (2007), who wrote,

The skeptic demands evidence, and rightly so. The cynic assumes that what he or she is
being told is false [ . . . ] too many people mistake cynicism for skepticism. Cynicism is
a form of gullibility—the cynic rejects facts without evidence, just as the naïve person
accepts facts without evidence. And deception born of cynicism can be just as costly or
potentially as dangerous to health and well-being as any other form of deception. (p. 175)

Rampant media cynicism, we believe, is a product of three factors—distributed pro-

paganda, the hijacking of local news, and reifying polarization—that collectively con-
tribute to fracturing existing civic infrastructures and exacerbating media cynicism.

Distributed Propaganda
While mainstream media has traditionally maintained a central space in our civic
dialog, the rapid expansion of internet subcultures and information-rich aggregators
Mihailidis and Foster 621

has changed this relationship. In This is Not Propaganda, Peter Pomerantsev

(2019) writes,

The grand vessels of old media-books, television, newspapers, and radio-that had
contained and controlled identity and meaning, who we were and how we talked with
one another, how we explained the world to our children, talked about our past, defined
war and peace, news and opinion, satire and seriousness, right and left, right and wrong,
true, false, real, unreal–these vessels have cracked and burst, break up the old architecture
of what relates to who, who speaks to whom and how magnifying, shrinking, distorting
all proportions, sending us into disorienting spirals where words lose shared meanings.
(p. xii)

The continued upending of traditional media ecosystems has opened up vast new
spaces for how people find and use information, engage in dialog, and participate in
public life. While traditional mainstream media structures and norms were in no way
perfect, this specific technological moment offers new emerging forms of media per-
suasion that we refer to as distributed propaganda: where manipulative communica-
tion practices nuanced, immersive, and embedded into the platforms that support
dominant information norms of digital culture.
Distributed propaganda builds on the work of Benkler et al. (2018), who in their
book Networked Propaganda: Manipulation, Disinformation and Radicalization in
American Politics, define propaganda as follows: “communication designed to manip-
ulate a target population by affecting its beliefs, attitudes, or preferences to obtain
behavior compliant with the political goals of the propagandist.” (p. 29). What differs
from the mass media age, where modes for the creation and distribution of information
carried significant transaction costs, is that contemporary propaganda practices
embody the platforms’ properties. They are pervasive, abundant, and assume the prop-
erties of networks: distributed, peer-driven, embedded in sophisticated algorithms and
masked as credible. Benkler et al. (2018) call this networked propaganda, which
“come[s] not from a single story or source but from the fact that a wide range of out-
lets, some controlled by the propagandist, most not, repeat various version of the pro-
pagandist’s communication” (p. 33).
Networked propaganda is pervasive through the properties it embodies: it is dis-
tributed with and thrown participatory networks. It contains elements of spreadable
culture-decentralized networks of individuals with common pursuits and shared ide-
ologies who repurpose information to further advocate an agenda (Jenkins et al.,
2018). While groups organize certain messages with clear intent and strategy, spread-
able messages are sustained by online communities, who use and are used by the
algorithms of extraction that make social networks so powerful. Benkler et al. (2018)
write that these networks sustain a powerful feedback loop, further justifying the
propaganda through its consistent movement between mainstream media, politicians,
and internet subcultures. The distributed elements embedded within consistent feed-
back loops also make it difficult “to adopt a consistently truth-focused strategy with-
out being expelled from the network and losing influence in the relevant segment of
the public” (Benkler et al., 2018, p. 33).
622 American Behavioral Scientist 65(4)

Andrejevic (2020) describes propaganda in an era of information overload as

“disorganized.” Disorganized propaganda does not try to assert, sustain and control an
organized narrative, but rather to allow platforms to spread information, and to use the
organizing principles of the web to “prevent any sustainable counter-narrative to
emerge,” (p. 22). Andrejevic (2020) continues, “When President Donald Trump’s
administration repeats palpably false stories—about the size of the inauguration
crowd, for example—the goal is not to replace one narrative with another, but to sow
doubt that renders all narratives suspect.” (p. 22). Disorganized propaganda, in this
context, distorts any cohesive truth. Platforms are tools for spreading information,
with little regard for its veracity or accuracy. The organization is simply to obfuscate
fact and truth, by sowing doubt, continuous and relentlessly. Disorganized propaganda
supports Harry Frankfurt’s (2009) text on the phenomenon of “bullshit,” which he
describes as follows:

speech intended to persuade without regard for truth. The liar cares about the truth and
attempts to hide it; the bullshitter doesn’t care if what they say is true or false, but rather
only cares whether their listener is persuaded. (p. 56)

Distributed propaganda works as pervasive bullshit in democracy today. From the

notable cases of Pizzagate and Pepe the Frog in 2016 to more recent forms of distrib-
uted propaganda to mislead the public about COVID-19, and cast doubt on police
brutality in the United States, distributed propaganda works to make all truth suspect.
Distributed propaganda is hard to detect, because it is not organized and controlled,
but lurks in the internet subcultures that use platforms who prioritize speed over depth,
sensationalism over rigor, and distraction over clarity. The result is an overall reluc-
tance to believe in media systems, which exist in the same platforms that seed distrib-
uted propaganda, and as a result are judged by the same metrics as the propagandists
themselves, leading to a conflation of what is credible, what is not, and how to deci-
pher the truth in an ecosystem that continues to pull users from source to source with-
out time for reflection, contemplation or depth. And existing alongside news media in
platforms are propagandists, bots, and trolls who move to distribute information across
user domains, further confusing an already complicated and disorganized space.
A natural human reaction is to refute content, distrust without much reflection, and
fall back on the familiar media outlets that often support existing ideologies and
beliefs. Cynicism builds toward the media in particular, as the platforms themselves
are usually absolved of responsibility for the media’s faults. Interest groups exploit
this cynicism by targeting local media outlets with increasingly sophisticated distrib-
uted propaganda that creates confusion around who to trust and what is real.

Hijacking of Local News

While the growth news desserts in the United States have been well-documented in
recent years, a new threat has emerged in past years—the hijacking of local news by
various interest groups. As previously stated, what is left of local newspapers has
Mihailidis and Foster 623

become a target for investment firms and larger corporations; however, other groups
are beginning to fill the void of local news with propaganda and disinformation.
According to Mahone and Napoli (2020), hundreds of hyperpartisan groups disguise
themselves as local media outlets, further polarizing smaller communities, and local
elections. More than 400 partisan media outlets, often funded by government officials
and Super PACs, have started to fill in the information gaps left by drying news deserts
(Mahone & Napoli, 2020). According to Bengani (2019) at Tow Center for Digital
Journalism, at least 450 of these disguised news sites have emerged ahead of the 2020
election. Many of these hidden news websites wear convincing nonpartisan names and
mimic the look-and-feel of other local news sources, such as “East Michigan News”
or the “Hickory Sun” but are aimed at promoting partisan talking-points during the
election cycle (and possibly long after). They are owned by shell companies or orga-
nizations tied to specific political agents (Bengani, 2019). Even the shell companies
take names that might, at first glance, appear legitimate within the vast swathe of
companies and investment firms buying up local sources, such as Metric Media that
supported many pop-up sites in Michigan (Bengani, 2019). These sites do not employ
local reporters but instead rely on aggregated data from official federal government
statistics websites and popular news plug-ins, such as GasBuddy.com, which reports
on regional gas prices. These sites are known for low-cost, partially automated news
generation—also referred to as “pink slime” news sites (Bengani, 2019).
“Pink slime” local news sources further muddy the waters of an already confused
and overwhelming media ecosystem. Glassner (2020) writes that replacing local
news outlets is a mixed bag of news start-ups, consolidated local newspapers, and
Facebook groups. And now, hyperpartisan political sites masked as local news.
Websites such as Nextdoor have emerged to bring small communities together to
share aggregated information such as trash-pickup days or lost-and-found items. Still
those sites lack local news reporting, especially on salient social and political issues
closely tied to the communities. Neighborhood Facebook groups also pose a serious
threat to citizens. The mechanics of Facebook make it challenging to track page and
group administrators—and while some local interest groups advertise as an a-political
space, they may not be. According to Nina Jankowicz and Cindy Otis (2020), Facebook
groups fuel the “COVID-19 infodemic.” Jankowicz and Otis (2020) argue that the
same features Facebook relied on to battle disinformation after the 2016 election—
community and privacy—have been exploited by several bad actors including foreign
governments, politicians, conspiracy theorists, and internet trolls out for a good laugh.
A fractured local media ecosystem, especially without the investigative power once
shared by healthy local newspaper competition, has left local-and-state politics open
to further manipulation by outsiders. Local and state governments draw considerable
attention because they hold more power than the average citizen acknowledges.
State legislatures have effectively driven the national conversation around several
critical social issues including, abortion and the so-called Religious Freedom bills that
seek to provide businesses the right to deny service based on religious convictions. In
response to Bret Kavanaugh’s nomination to the Supreme Court, 10 states passed
highly restrictive abortion bills, and four more states were working on similar
624 American Behavioral Scientist 65(4)

“heartbeat” legislation. Inversely, three states passed abortion protections (Levenson,

2019). Harrington et al. (2019) documented 23 ways in which activists and lobbyists
were seeking to restrict access to abortion on a state-by-state basis. After the Supreme
Court ruled in favor of marriage equality in 2015, several states drafted and passed
legislation protecting individual business owners’ religious freedom to deny service to
LGBTQIA (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer or questioning, intersex, and
asexual or allied) couples and individuals. According to Time, 19 states adopted the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act bills (Johnson & Steinmetz, 2015).
With many states suffering from the politics of Gerrymandering, low civic engage-
ment, and little-to-no local news coverage, super PACs, corporations, and other polit-
ical lobbyists can more easily influence local-and-state leaders especially when
money is needed for elections. Ye Hee Lee and Narayanswamy (2018) reported the
2018 midterm elections were among the most expensive races to date. After elections,
local legislators continue to be targeted by special interest groups. With no local news
to adequately cover their activities, many lawmakers turn to corporations and lobby-
ing groups for more support. According to an investigative report by the Center for
Public Integrity, USA Today, and the Arizona Republic, many legislators use “model
bills” or prewritten legislation by special interest groups (O’Dell & Penzenstadler,
2020). The report found nearly 10,000 bills were directly copied from specialized
interest websites, and more than 2,100 were signed into law (O’Dell & Penzenstadler,
2020). This form of legislation-by-copy-paste does not stop at tax breaks for busi-
nesses and other corporate interests—it can have a more insidious nature. Taylor
(2018) reported that Project Blitz, run by Christian Nationalist groups, poured reli-
giously conservative legislation initiatives into many state governments through sim-
ilar “model-bill” methods. Socially conservative laws such as the ones designed by
Project Blitz target many vulnerable groups, such as women and anyone identified
within the LGBTQIA community (Taylor, 2018). The constant targeting of marginal-
ized groups can breed more cynicism toward the democratic process. Not only are a
person’s interests not represented within state-and-local organizations, but they are
actively persecuted by the same legislative processes that, in theory, provide them
civil rights. And with no local news ecosystems to cover such local actions, citizens
are left to social networks, word of mouth, and pop-up hyperpartisan sites to con-
sume, share, and engage with news. There is little to no presence from local journalists
in these spaces.
The ultimate cost of hijacked local news ecosystems is further diminished trust in
news media and more polarized local debates that often conflate national politics with
salient social issues within the community. As political actors capitalize on the open
market for local news, citizens increasingly associate local news with hyperpartisan
coverage. And as distrust is deepened by partisan divides, “pink-slime” news sites will
only further push citizens toward news sources that agree with their politics, or worse,
push them away from anything that resembles local news sources entirely. Rampant
cynicism results from the conflation of local-and-state politics that can maneuver more
freely without the oversight-journalistic or civic-to hold their power in check.
Disenfranchised voters are left with insurmountable apathy toward a system that lacks
Mihailidis and Foster 625

checks and balances—and that now are supported by local media who are also con-
trolled by some of the same special interest groups and political parties.

Reifying Polarization: The Cost of Disbelief

The combination of distributed propaganda and hijacking of local news has forced
citizens to pull together their reality piecemeal. As citizens search for meaning and
reliable sources within platforms designed to provide content that confirms and sup-
ports their existing media diets, their information ecosystems become more homophi-
lous and siloed. Bessi et al. (2016) found that Facebook users in Italy were exposed
primarily to information from peers, supporting homophily within the social network.
Bowyer and Kahne (2019) found that youth in the United States share information in
homophilous networks motivated to support existing dialogues or viewpoints rather
than to promote accuracy or dialog. Networks prioritize, support, and promote
homophilous information structures to keep their users engaged and reify the condi-
tions for polarization.
In Why We’re Polarized, Ezra Klein writes of integrating our political identities
with a range of other central identities. Writes Klein (2020), “our partisan identities
have merged with our racial, religious, geographic, ideological, and cultural identities.
Those merged identities have attained a weight that is breaking our institutions and
tearing at the bonds that hold this country [The United States] together.” (p. xxiii).
Among the range of social, civic, economic, and political factors that Klein uses to
support his premise, digital media infrastructures play a central role in the current
climate of polarization. Klein offers a range of insightful evolutions in online media
that contribute to more “identitarian norms.” Klein believes that the internet’s main
impact on politics and media is a shift from access to political information, to interest
in political information. As the information ecosystem opened up and offered an
“explosion of choices . . . it’s expressed itself in polarized media that attaches to politi-
cal identity, conflict, and celebrity.” (p. 147). The convincing argument that Klein puts
forth is that journalism, in such a climate, has reoriented itself to keep viewers with
them by framing a majority of coverage around “why your side should win, and the
other side should lose” (p. 147). Contributing to this infrastructure is the growth of the
audience engagement metric to assess the impact of coverage. Klein sees this shift as
necessitating an identitarian approach to media, where people will stay engaged with
information that affirms and reaffirms their ideologies, viewpoints, and worldviews.
Journalism, and media, have succumbed to the information norms of the giant plat-
forms that traffic their content. As a result, media contributes to, and often incites,
stabilizes, and infuses, polarization across our society.
Polarization, at its worst, reduces the complexity of society and promotes ideas,
theories, and conspiracies that provide attainable and relatable responses to painful
realities and unjust social norms. The norms of our current technologies allow these
narratives to exist in homophilous subcultures that promote an ideology, conspir-
acy, and doubt to communities looking for self-verification and comfort of like-
minded citizens.
626 American Behavioral Scientist 65(4)

Andrew Marantz (2019) details these emergences of these realities in Antisocial:

Online Extremists, Techno-Utopians, and the Hijacking of the American Conversation,
where he articulates how “a few disruptive entrepreneurs, motivated by naiveté and
reckless techno-utopianism, build powerful new systems of unforeseen vulnerability
. . . [and] exploited those vulnerabilities to hijack the American conversation” (p. 6).
Marantz argues that the hijacking of the American conversation developed through a
complex web of politicians, entrepreneurs, and “edgelords” who used emerging tech-
nological spaces to reframe how people interact, consume, express, and understand the
world. The result is a breakdown of the norms by which we ask civic society to func-
tion, fueled by information landscapes that persist in seeding and reseeding homophi-
lous information spaces where like-minded individuals collaborate to justify their
beliefs, regardless of the broader needs of society or democracy.
The QAnon conspiracy subculture’s growth is a strong example of how such norms
can become a space of conformism, belonging, and support, where facts and reality are
not the priority. QAnon, which is a loose network of individuals who worked across
internet subcultures, reflects what journalist Adrienne LaFrance (2020) sees as “not
just a conspiracy theory but the birth of a new religion” (p. 30). She writes,

[QAnon] is much more than a loose collection of conspiracy-minded chat-room inhabitants.

It is a movement united in mass rejection of reason, objectivity, and other Enlightenment
values. And we are likely at the beginning of this story than the end. (p. 30)

LaFrance details the growth and impact of QAnon in our current political time to high-
light just how vast and established this network has become. While it is impossible to
tell how many people follow QAnon, LaFrance (2020) writes that “at least 35 current
or former congressional candidates have embraced Q” (p. 32), and U.S. President
Donald Trump repeatedly retweets or mentions posts of QAnon. The expansion of
such online subcultures may not be that new or surprising. However, what is new is the
integration of such subcultures into the political mainstream and their establishment as
credible information sources alongside mainstream media. In August 2020, Marjorie
Taylor Greene, an outspoken QAnon supporter, won the house primary in Georgia,
thanking QAnon along the way.
Polarization is reified in society as we continue to prioritize faith over reason, allow
misinformation to proliferate in the name of free-market innovation and freedom of
speech, and where our public institutions have suffered to persist in such a climate.
Bratich (2008) believes that robust communities that share in the practice of doubt-
ing reality, are responses to “conjunctural moments of political destabilization, with a
particular emphasis on unruly populism and political confusion.” (p. 25). This seems to
track closely with our current political moment. The cost of disbelief is located where

public discussions have intertwined a form of thought (irrational conspiracy theories)

with a form of political activity (extremism). In doing so, knowledge is presented as
inherently dangerous, certain styles of dissent are disqualified, and new forms of consent
are forged. (Bratich, 2008, p. 25)
Mihailidis and Foster 627

Our current climate of disbelief, supported by three emerging phenomena—

distributed propaganda, hijacking of local news, and reifying polarization—has cre-
ated an environment of disbelief, one where institutions are under attack, we struggle
to care for and with one another, and we are beset by information infrastructures that
continue to incite, inflame, and divide.

A Note on Confronting Disbelief: Persistent Civic

Mindedness
In June 2020, President Trump scheduled a rally in Tulsa, Oklahoma—his first since
the Coronavirus pandemic surged in the United States earlier in the year. The rally’s
timing had drawn criticism, not just because of the clear threat of the virus but because
it was initially scheduled on Juneteenth, a day celebrating the end of slavery, as global
protests drew attention to police brutality against Black Americans. The reelection
campaign bragged about the projected crowd size that would meet the president at the
rally. But when the day came, the numbers were less than stellar. Before the rally,
Lorenz et al. (2020) reported that citizens, mostly young people, used the video-sharing
app TikTok to organize a mass “buyout” of the rally seats to inflate the number of
expected attendees. By reserving rally seats, TikTok communities were able to increase
the projected numbers in the news media and provide a visual of an empty stadium in
the following 24-hour news cycle following the rally (Lorenz et al., 2020). On the one
hand, this shows a very sophisticated understanding of news media, TikTok’s trending
algorithms, and the importance of crowd-sized visuals to President Trump. On the
other hand, TikTok is known for being among the worst violators of user-privacy.
Months later, President Trump signed an executive order banning the use of TikTok.
While the stated reason was the privacy-violations, media speculation (and conspiracy
theories) focused on Trump’s visible disappointment after the Tulsa rally tying the
executive order to a personal vendetta against TikTok communities (Brown, 2020).
This example shows the potential power of online communities to advocate in
response to political acts of division and hate. Protests in support of equity and rights
for marginalized communities are bringing more people together around shared causes.
Online, affinity groups are abundant. Many use the technologies to connect and support
each other around shared interests and purposes (Ito et al., 2018). These groups are not
overtly political but do significant work to bring people together in collaboration,
shared interests, and solidarity. There is reason to believe that citizens committed to
care, equity, and justice can push back against the trends we have laid out above.
This article has presented an argument to support a problem we see in the United
States’ civic ecosystem. It’s a problem that has emerged from decades of political,
economic, and social inequities. The resulting growth of distributed propaganda,
hijacking of local news, and the reifying cycle of polarization exist at the intersection
of policy and politics.
We believe that the rebuilding of trust in civic society in the United States neces-
sitates a commitment to persistent civic-mindedness. This term emerges from research
628 American Behavioral Scientist 65(4)

that shows engagement in local communities increases civic engagement (Barthel

et al., 2016; Carpentier, 2011; Wihbey, 2015). Engagement in local communities
necessitates attention to our surroundings, physical and mediated. Civic-mindedness
in physical areas emerges from a space of care and solidarity with others to better the
community. It is born not from national concerns, but from supporting those in our
immediate vicinity and using care for one another to build inclusive commitments to
local politics, state politics, and beyond.
Civic-mindedness in media spaces embodies media literacies “that combat the cur-
rent crises of trust and engagement necessitate a type of soulful engagement: a com-
mitment to be in relation with others, to experience co-liberation and focus on a civic
standpoint.” (Mihailidis et al., 2020, p. 239). Such media literacies are persistent in
their pursuit not only of deconstructing media messages, but a rigid skepticism and
willingness to engage, outside of the spaces that design for homophily, and alongside
the local media ecosystems that support communities of care, and solidarity. Media
literacies have long been seen as necessary competencies to both protect people from
media effects and empower them to be more meaningfully engaged in their communi-
ties. In this regard, media literacies have been unable to keep pace with the media
evolutions we see today.
To confront rampant media cynicism will take more than mere media reforms. It
will take a commitment, structurally and in practice, to support communities, resource
marginalized groups, and reform policies that have enabled digital media giants to
sustain and spread disbelief. The cost of disbelief plays out in the divisions we see in
our communities and societies today. Civic-mindedness is a first step in a long path
back to care for one another and to media systems that work to build transparency,
bring truth to power, and support the needs of communities that lack resources to par-
ticipate effectively in civic life.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship,
and/or publication of this article.

Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of
this article.

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Author Biographies
Paul Mihailidis is an associate professor of civic media and journalism and assistant dean in the
school of communication at Emerson College in Boston, MA, where he teaches media literacy,
civic media, and community activism. He is founding program director of the MA in Media
Design, Senior Fellow of the Emerson Engagement Lab, and faculty chair and director of the
Salzburg Academy on Media and Global Change.
Bobbie Foster is a PhD candidate at the University of Maryland, College Park in the Philip
Merrill College of Journalism. Her research sits at the intersection of digital culture and polic-
itcs, with a focus on cultural heritage rhetoric in Internet memes. She teaches media literacy,
journalism history, and women and gender in the media.