Lawrence B. Peabody-Afghanistan Security-Nova Science Publishers (2009) PDF

AFGHANISTAN SECURITY
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AFGHANISTAN SECURITY
LAWRENCE B. PEABODY
EDITOR
Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

New York
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Peabody, Lawrence B.
Afghanistan security / Lawrence B. Peabody.
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Includes index.
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1. National security--Afghanistan. 2. Internal security--Afghanistan. 3. Afghanistan--Armed
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CONTENTS
Preface vii
Chapter 1 Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional
Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion
of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain
Capable Afghan National Security Forces 1
GAO
Chapter 2 Afghanistan: Post-War Governance,
Security, and U.S. Policy 49
Kenneth Katzman
Chapter 3 Report on Progress toward Security
and Stability in Afghanistan 111
Chapter 4 United States Plan for Sustaining the
Afghanistan National Security Forces 179
Chapter 5 U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan Police
Forces Face Challenges and Need a Coordinated,
Detailed Plan to Help Ensure Accountability 215
Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.
Index 231
PREFACE
Politically, the Afghan central government is relatively stable. The post-Taliban transition
was completed with the convening of a parliament in December 2005; a new constitution was
adopted in January 2004, successful presidential elections were held on October 9, 2004, and
parliamentary elections took place on September 18, 2005. The parliament has become an
arena for factions that have fought each other for nearly three decades to peacefully resolve
differences, as well as a center of political pressure on President Hamid Karzai, who is
running for reelection in 2009. Major regional strongmen have been marginalized. Afghan
citizens are enjoying personal freedoms forbidden by the Taliban, and women are
participating in economic and political life. Presidential elections are to be held in the fall of
2009, with parliamentary and provincial elections to follow one year later.
To help stabilize Afghanistan, the United States and partner countries are deploying a
53,000 troop NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that now commands
peacekeeping throughout Afghanistan, including the restive south. Of those, over 23,000 of
the 34,000 U.S. forces in Afghanistan are part of ISAF. The U.S. and partner forces also run
regional enclaves to secure reconstruction (Provincial Reconstruction Teams, PRTs), and are
building an Afghan National Army and National Police. The United States has given
Afghanistan over $23 billion (appropriated, including FY2008 to date) since the fall of the
Taliban, including funds to equip and train Afghan security forces.
In: Afghanistan Security ISBN: 978-1-60692-149-4
Editor: Lawrence B. Peabody, pp. 1-52 © 2009 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.
Chapter 1
AFGHANISTAN SECURITY:
FURTHER CONGRESSIONAL ACTION MAY BE
NEEDED TO ENSURE COMPLETION OF A DETAILED
PLAN TO DEVELOP AND SUSTAIN CAPABLE AFGHAN
NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES *
GAO
ABBREVIATIONS
ANA Afghan National Army
ANCOP Afghan National Civil Order Police
ANP Afghan National Police
ANSF Afghan National Security Forces
AWOL absent without leave
CM capability milestone
CSTC-A Combined Security Transition Command— Afghanistan
EU European Union
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO non-commissioned officer
June 18, 2008

Congressional Committees
Since 2002, the United States, with assistance from the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and other coalition nations, has worked to develop the Afghan
National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP)—collectively referred to as the
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)—to provide security for Afghanistan. The goal of
*
Excerpted from GAO Report GAO-08-661, dated June 2008.
2 GAO
these efforts is to transfer responsibilities for the security of Afghanistan from the
international community to the Afghan government. From 2002 to 2008, the United States
provided about $16.5 billion to train and equip the Afghan army and police forces. In 2005[1]
and 2007,[2] we found that the training and equipping of the army and police had made some
progress, but that the Department of Defense (Defense) and the Department of State (State),
the agencies responsible for implementing these efforts, lacked detailed plans and cost
estimates for completing and sustaining the ANSF. We concluded that, without capable and
self-sustaining Afghan army and police forces, terrorists could again create a safe haven in
Afghanistan and jeopardize efforts by the United States and the international community to
develop the country. Since 2005, security in Afghanistan has deteriorated significantly.
Attacks by armed opposition groups have grown across Afghanistan, with numerous attacks
directly targeting the ANA and ANP.
Because of broad congressional interest in this issue, we performed our work under the
authority of the Comptroller General of the United States.[3] In this review, we (1) analyzed
U.S. plans for developing the ANSF and identified the extent to which these plans contained
detailed objectives, milestones, future funding requirements, and sustainability strategies; (2)
examined the progress made and challenges faced in developing the capabilities of the ANA;
and (3) examined the progress made and challenges faced in developing the capabilities of the
ANP.
To address the objectives of this engagement, we reviewed Defense and State planning,
funding, and evaluation documents related to the U.S. efforts to establish, train, and equip
Afghan army and police forces. We discussed these efforts with Defense and State officials in
Washington, D.C.; Kabul, Afghanistan; and the U.S. Central Command in Tampa, Florida,
and with private contractors implementing U.S. programs. In Afghanistan, we viewed Afghan
army and police training facilities and equipment warehouses and met with officials from the
United States, the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior, NATO, and the United Nations.
We are currently performing separate reviews on the accountability of equipment provided to
the ANSF and U.S. efforts to reform the Afghan Ministry of Interior and National Police.
Consequently, we do not assess these issues in depth in this report. See appendix I for a
complete description of our scope and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from March 2007 through June 2008 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan
and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis
for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
The Departments of Defense and State have not yet developed a coordinated, detailed
plan for completing and sustaining the ANSF. We recommended in 2005, and reaffirmed in
2007, that the plans should include clearly defined objectives and performance measures,
milestones for achieving these objectives, future funding requirements, and a strategy for
sustaining the results achieved. Additionally, in 2008, Congress mandated that the Secretary
Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action… 3
of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, provide a long-term strategy and
budget for strengthening the ANSF, and a long-term detailed plan for sustaining the ANSF. In
2007, Defense provided GAO a document that, according to Defense officials, met GAO’s
2005 recommendation.[4] However, this 5-page document does not provide sufficient detail
for effective planning and oversight. For example, while the document includes some broad
objectives and performance measures, it identifies few long-term milestones, no intermediate
milestones for judging progress, and no sustainability strategy. Further, even though Defense
and State are partners in training the ANP, the Defense document does not describe the role
of State or other key stakeholders. Moreover, State did not participate in the development of
the Defense document and has not completed a plan of its own. In January 2008, the
Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan (CSTC-A) completed a field-level
plan for ANSF development, which includes force goals, objectives, and performance
measures. However, this field-level plan is not a substitute for a coordinated Defense and
State plan with near- and long-term resource requirements. Without a coordinated, detailed
plan, it is difficult for Congress to assess progress and conduct oversight on the extent and
cost of the U.S. commitment needed to develop capable and sustainable ANSF. This is
particularly important given the recent calls for further increasing the size of the ANSF and
the potential costs, currently estimated at approximately $2 billion per year, of sustaining the
ANSF for years into the future.
The United States has provided over $10 billion to develop the ANA since 2002;
however, less than 2 percent (2 of 105 units) of ANA units are assessed as fully capable of
conducting their primary mission. Thirty-six percent (38 of 105) are assessed as capable of
conducting their mission, but require routine[5] international assistance, while the remaining
ANA units (65 of 105 units) are either planned, in basic training, or assessed as partially able
or unable to conduct their primary mission. Building an Afghan army that can lead security
operations requires manning,[6] training, and equipping of personnel; however, U.S. efforts to
build the ANA have faced challenges in all of these areas. First, while the ANA has grown to
approximately 58,000 of an authorized force structure of 80,000—nearly three times the
19,600[7] Defense reported in 2005—the ANA has experienced difficulties finding qualified
candidates for leadership positions and retaining its personnel. Second, while trainers or
mentors[8] are present in every ANA combat unit, less than half the required number are
deployed in the field. Defense officials cited an insufficient number of U.S. trainers and
coalition mentors in the field as the major impediment to providing the ANA with the training
to establish capabilities, such as advanced combat skills and logistics, necessary to sustain the
ANA force in the long term. Finally, ANA combat units report significant shortages in
approximately 40 percent of critical equipment items, including vehicles, weapons, and
radios. Some of these challenges, such as shortages of U.S. trainers and equipment, are due in
part to competing global priorities, according to senior Defense officials. Without resolving
these challenges, the ability of the ANA to reach full capability may be delayed.
Although the ANP has reportedly grown in number since 2005, after an investment of
nearly $6 billion, no Afghan police unit is assessed as fully capable of performing its mission.
Similar to the effort to build the ANA, development of a national Afghan police force that is
fully capable requires manning, training, and equipping of police personnel—all areas in
which the U.S. continues to face challenges. First, less than one-quarter of the ANP has police
mentors[9] present to provide training in the field, evaluate police capability, and verify that
police are on duty. According to Defense officials leading the effort in Kabul, the shortage of
4 GAO
mentors is the primary obstacle to building a fully capable police force. Second, the ANP has
not received about one-third of the equipment items Defense considers critical and continues
to face shortages in several types of equipment, including vehicles, radios, and body armor. In
addition, Afghanistan’s weak judicial system hinders effective policing and rule of law, and
our analysis of status reports from the field indicates that the ANP consistently experiences
problems with police pay, corruption, and attacks from insurgents. Recognizing these
challenges, Defense began a new effort in November 2007 to train and equip the Afghan
police; however, the continuing shortfall in police mentors may put this effort at risk.
To help ensure that action is taken to address our recommendation from 2005 and the
recently enacted mandate under the 2008 Defense Authorization Act, Congress should
consider conditioning a portion of future appropriations for development of the ANSF on the
completion of a coordinated, detailed plan, including development of a strategy for sustaining
the forces.
In commenting on a draft of this report, State expressed concerns about conditioning
future appropriations on the completion of a detailed plan and highlighted ongoing
coordination efforts with Defense as well as certain operational changes, many of which
occurred after the completion of our fieldwork in August 2007. Defense disagreed that
Congress should consider conditioning a portion of future appropriations on completion of a
coordinated, detailed plan and stated that current guidance provided is sufficient to implement
a successful program to train and equip the ANSF. Defense also disagreed with our
conclusion that progress is difficult to assess without a detailed plan. While we acknowledge
that changes may have occurred since August 2007, Defense and State have yet to develop a
coordinated, detailed plan for completing and sustaining the ANSF. Furthermore, while
Defense produces various documents that report on the current status of the ANSF, these
documents do not contain intermediate milestones or consistent end dates necessary to
determine if the program is on track to achieve its desired results within a set time frame.
Therefore, we maintain that without a coordinated, detailed plan for the development of the
ANSF, ensuring oversight and assessing progress of the program is difficult.
BACKGROUND
Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, the United States, several allies, and
Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance forcibly removed the Taliban regime from Afghanistan for
providing a safe haven to al Qaeda terrorists. After years of conflict and Taliban rule, the new
Afghan government inherited a state with limited capacity to govern; an economy dominated
by the narcotics trade; constraints on economic development due, in part, to resource
limitations and mountainous terrain (see figure 1); a poorly developed infrastructure with few
roads and little household access to power and running water; and weak national security
forces.
In April 2002, the United States and other donor nations met in Geneva, Switzerland, to
help Afghanistan address threats to its security. At the Geneva conference, the donors
established a security reform strategy for Afghanistan: the United States would lead the
training of the Afghan army and Germany would lead the police reconstitution effort.
However, due, in part, to Afghanistan’s pressing security needs and concerns that the German
training program was moving too slowly, the United States expanded its role in the police
training effort. As we reported in 2005, according to cognizant German officials, Germany
viewed its role in the police sector as one of advising and consulting with donors and the
Afghan government rather than as the major implementer or funding source.
Source: GAO.
Figure 1. Mountainous Terrain in Afghanistan.
The Role and Development of the Afghan National Army
In 2002, the international community endorsed the decision of the Afghan government to
create an ethnically balanced and voluntary ANA force of no more than 70,000.[10] In 2006,
this vision was reaffirmed by the Afghan government and the international community
through its integration into the Afghanistan National Development Strategy[11] and
Afghanistan Compact,[12] documents that articulated economic, social, and security priorities
for Afghanistan. These documents also set the end of 2010 as the timeline for the
establishment of the ANA. In February 2008, citing increased security challenges, the Afghan
government and its international partners endorsed a 10,000-person increase in the force
structure of the ANA from 70,000 to 80,000.[13]
The strategic role of the Afghan Ministry of Defense and the ANA is to defend and deter
aggression against Afghanistan, support and defend the Afghan Constitution, defeat the
insurgency and terrorism, and support Afghanistan’s reconstruction and reintegration into the
regional and international community, among other things. To accomplish this, the army’s
current force structure includes (1) Ministry of Defense and general staff personnel, (2)
6 GAO
sustaining institutions, (3) intermediate command staff, (4) combat forces, and (5) Afghan air
corps personnel. Combat forces form the basic operational arm of the ANA and are divided
into five corps, located in different regions of Afghanistan. A corps contains 1 or more
brigades. A typical brigade consists of approximately 2,800 personnel: three light infantry
battalions (with approximately 650 personnel each), one combat support battalion (with
approximately 500 personnel), and one combat services support battalion (with approximately
350 personnel). (See app. II for additional details on the force structure and functions of the
ANA.)
U.S. efforts to establish the army are led by Defense, in partnership with the government
of Afghanistan. The Defense-staffed CSTC-A oversees the Afghan army’s training, facilities
development, assessment, and equipment provision. Under CSTC-A is Task Force Phoenix, a
joint coalition task force responsible for training, mentoring, and advising the Afghan army at
the Kabul Military Training Center and elsewhere in the country (see figure 2).
Source: GAO.
Figure 2. ANA Commando Training Facility Outside of Kabul.
Reconstitution of the Afghan National Police Force
The reconstitution of the ANP began in February 2002 when donor nations agreed to
establish a multiethnic, sustainable, 62,000-member professional police service committed to
the rule of law. In May 2007, the Afghan government and its international partners approved
an interim increase in the number of police forces from 62,000 to 82,000, to be reviewed
every 6 months. The Afghan government and international community set the end of 2010 as
the timeline for the establishment of the ANP force.
In addition to enforcing the rule of law, the role of the ANP is to protect the rights of
citizens, maintain civil order and public safety, support actions to defeat insurgency, control
national borders, and reduce the level of domestic and international organized crime, among
other activities. The force structure for the police includes Ministry of Interior headquarters
and administrative staff, uniformed police personnel, and several specialized police units.
This report primarily focuses on U.S. efforts to build the uniformed police, the largest
component of the Afghan police force. (See app. II for further details on the force structure
and functions of the ANP.)
U.S. efforts to organize, train, and equip the ANP are directed by Defense, through
CSTC-A, with support from State, which provides policy guidance to the effort and oversight
of civilian contractors implementing police training courses. The primary U.S. contractor
involved in the police training effort is DynCorp International, which provides police training
courses in criminal investigation, physical fitness, and weapons and survival skills, and
civilian mentors to assist in developing the Afghan Ministry of Interior and the police forces
it administers. Germany leads efforts to train commissioned and noncommissioned Afghan
police officers at the Kabul Police Academy (see figure 3).
Source: GAO.
Figure 3. Trainees Attending a Class at the Kabul Police Academy.
U.S. Support to Train and Equip Afghan National Security Forces
The United States provided $16.5 billion from fiscal years 2002 through 2008 to support
the training and equipping of the Afghan army and police (see table 1). Slightly over 45
percent (approximately $7.6 billion) of the funding was provided in fiscal year 2007, in an
effort to accelerate the training and equipping and enhance the capabilities of the ANSF.
These figures do not include certain operational costs, such as the personnel costs for U.S.
8 GAO
servicemembers assigned to the training and equipping mission. (See app. I for further details
on our methodology.)
Table 1. Defense and State Support to Train and Equip Afghan

Army and Police, Fiscal Years 2002-2008
Dollars in millions
Assistance FY FY FY FY FY FY FY 2008
a b
program 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 request Total
Afghan $76.9 $362.7 $723.7 $1,736.6 $767.1 $4,884.2 $1,721.7 $10,273.0
c
Army
Afghan 25.5 5.0 223.9 837.9 1,299.8 2,701.2 1,105.6 6,198.8
Police
Total $102.4 $367.7 $947.6 $2,574.5 $2,066.9 $7,585.4 $2,827.3 $16,471.8
Source: GAO analysis of Defense and State data.
Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.
a
Fiscal year 2008 includes approximately $1,450 million that has been appropriated (approximately $1,108 million for the
ANA and approximately $342 million for the ANP) and approximately $1,378 million that has been requested
(approximately $614 million for the ANA and approximately $764 million for the ANP).
b
Totals include funding from a variety of Defense and State sources. Fiscal years 2007 and 2008 figures include Afghan
Security Forces Funding, Defense Counternarcotics funding, International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
counternarcotics funding, and International Military Education and Training funds.
c
Funding for the Afghan Army includes detainee operations.
Other Donor Support
More than 40 nations and international organizations have also provided funds,
equipment, or personnel to support U.S. efforts to train and equip the ANSF. As of March
2008, non-U.S. donors have provided about $820 million in support of efforts to develop the
ANSF: approximately $426 million was provided to supplement efforts to train and equip the
Afghan army and about $394 million in support of the Afghan police. Over 15 nations
contribute mentors to the army, providing approximately one-third of the personnel who
assist in training ANA units in the field. The EU has provided 80 mentors to assist the police
at the ministerial, regional, and provincial levels out of approximately 215 pledged.
Additionally, the United Nations Development Programme administers the Law and Order
Trust Fund for Afghanistan, which provides reimbursement to the Afghan government for
police salaries. Approximately 80 percent of international donations for the ANP have
supported programs through the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (about $311
million of about $394 million).
Prior GAO Recommendations and Congressional Mandate
We previously identified the need for detailed plans to complete and sustain the ANSF.
In June 2005, GAO reported that the Secretaries of Defense and State should develop detailed
plans for completing and sustaining the ANSF that contain clearly defined objectives and
performance measures, milestones for achieving stated objectives, future funding
requirements, and a strategy for sustaining the results achieved. Our report recommended that
the Secretaries provide this information to Congress when the executive branch requests
funding for the Afghan army or police forces. Although Defense and State generally
concurred with this recommendation, both suggested that existing reporting requirements
addressed the need to report to Congress their plans for completing and sustaining the Afghan
army and police forces. Our analysis of Defense and State reporting to Congress determined
that the departments did not have the detailed plans we recommended to guide the
development of the ANSF and to facilitate congressional oversight. As a result, in our 2007
report, we reiterated the need for Defense and State to develop such plans.
Following our reports, in 2008, Congress mandated that the President, acting through the
Secretary of Defense, submit reports to Congress on progress toward security and stability in
Afghanistan, including a comprehensive and long-term strategy and budget for strengthening
the ANSF. Reports must be submitted every 180 days after that date, through the end of fiscal
year 2010.[14] The first such report was due by the end of April 2008, but has yet to be
provided to Congress. In addition, Congress also mandated that Defense submit reports on a
long-term detailed plan for sustaining the ANSF. Reports must be submitted every 180 days
after that date, through the end of fiscal year 2010.[15] The first such report was due by the
end of April 2008, but has yet to be provided to Congress.
THE DEPARTMENTS OF DEFENSE AND STATE HAVE NOT

DEVELOPED A COORDINATED, DETAILED PLAN FOR
COMPLETING AND SUSTAINING THE ANSF
Defense and State have not developed a coordinated, detailed plan for completing and
sustaining the Afghan army and police forces, despite our recommendation in 2005 and a
mandate from Congress in 2008 that such a plan be developed. Defense provided GAO a 5-
page document in January 2007 that, according to Defense officials, is intended to meet
GAO’s recommendation. However, it does not include several of the key elements identified
in our recommendation and does not provide a sufficient level of detail for effective
interagency planning and congressional oversight. Although CSTC-A has developed a field-
level plan in Afghanistan that integrates the Afghan government’s interest, this represents
military planning and is not a coordinated Defense and State plan with near- and long-term
resource requirements. Without a coordinated, detailed plan containing the elements
identified in our 2005 recommendation, as noted earlier, congressional oversight concerning
the extent and cost of the U.S. commitment to train and equip the ANSF is difficult, and
decision makers may not have sufficient information to assess progress and allocate defense
resources among competing priorities.[16]
Defense Document Is Limited in Scope and Detail
As of March 2008, neither Defense nor State had developed a coordinated, detailed plan
for completing and sustaining the ANSF that includes clearly defined objectives and
performance measures, milestones for achieving stated objectives, and a strategy for
10 GAO
sustaining the results achieved, including transitioning program responsibility to Afghanistan.

In January 2007, Defense provided us a 5-page document that, according to Defense officials,
is intended to meet GAO’s 2005 recommendation for detailed plans to complete and sustain
the ANSF. Although Defense and State are partners in training the ANP, the Defense
document does not describe the role of State or other key stakeholders. State also did not
contribute to the development of this document and has not developed a plan of its own. In
addition, U.S. military officials responsible for the effort to build the ANSF were not familiar
with the document at the time of our visit to Kabul in August 2007—over 6 months after we
received the document from Defense officials in Washington.
The 5-page document that Defense developed in response to our 2005 recommendation is
limited in scope and detail. For example, although the document provides some broad
objectives and performance measures for training and equipping the ANSF, it identifies few
milestones. Further, these milestones are not consistent with long-term milestones identified
in field documents generated by U.S. military forces operating in Afghanistan and do not
include intermediate milestones for judging progress in the medium term. The document
provides no mechanism for measuring progress over time against established baselines, other
than monthly status reports from the field. These status reports, while useful in identifying
month-to-month progress in unit capabilities, use baselines that generally go back no more
than 18 months. As such, it is difficult to identify progress since the start of the program and
the effect that various factors, such as additional resources, have had on training and
equipment availability, as discussed in prior GAO work.[17]
High-Level Plan Lacks Focus on Sustainment Funding
Defense’s 5-page document, in response to our 2005 recommendations, does not provide
a detailed strategy for sustaining the ANSF. Defense currently estimates that no additional
money, beyond the approximately $16.5 billion provided between fiscal years 2002 to 2008,
is needed to complete the initial training and equipping of a 70,000-person army force and an
82,000-person police force. If the force structure grows, Defense officials acknowledged that
budgetary requirements likely would also increase. In February 2008, the Afghan government
and its international partners endorsed an increase in the force structure of the ANA by
10,000. A Defense official stated that increasing the force structure by 10,000 additional army
personnel will cost approximately an additional $1 billion.
In addition, Defense estimates that approximately $2 billion a year will be needed for the
next 5 years to sustain the ANSF—$1 billion for the Afghan army and $1 billion for the
police.[18] This is based on a 152,000-person end-strength—70,000 ANA and 82,000 ANP.
Defense officials estimate that increasing the ANA force structure by 10,000 will cost about
$100 million annually to sustain. By comparison, in 2005, Defense and State estimated the
cost to sustain an ANA force of 70,000 and an ANP force of 62,000 would total $600 million
per year. This sustainment estimate, however, did not include the cost of sustaining
capabilities such as airlift, which is currently being developed for the Afghan army.
Defense expects the sustainment transition to begin in fiscal year 2009. According to U.S.
military officials in Afghanistan and the recently approved CSTC-A Campaign Plan, U.S.
involvement in training and equipping the ANSF may extend beyond a decade. However,
neither Defense nor State has identified funding requirements or forecasts beyond 2013.
As noted earlier, the United States has been a major contributor to this mission, providing
approximately $16.5 billion between fiscal years 2002 and 2008 to train and equip the forces.
At present, Afghanistan is unable to support the recurring costs of its security forces, such as
salaries and equipment replacement, without substantial foreign assistance. An international
task force studying the effects of increasing the size of the ANP noted that by 2012, if the
Afghan Ministry of Finance assumed responsibility for police salaries, the salary costs for an
82,000 police force could total nearly 9 percent of the Afghan government’s budget—a cost
that could mean large cuts in other programs, such as education, health, and other social
services, according to the task force.
U.S. officials stated that until Afghan revenues increase substantially, the international
community would likely need to assist in paying sustainability costs, including some salaries.
However, despite what U.S. military officials in Afghanistan stated, Defense officials in
Washington have not indicated how long and in what ways the U.S. government expects to
continue assisting the ANSF. In a briefing on the U.S. approach to sustaining the ANSF,
Defense and State officials stated that sustainment costs will be transitioned to the
government of Afghanistan commensurate with the nation’s economic capacity, and that the
United States and the international community will need to assist Afghanistan in developing
revenues and capacity to sustain the army and police. For example, Defense and State
officials stated that greater revenues could be obtained by improving border management,
noting that customs duties generate more than half of Afghanistan’s revenues. These officials,
however, did not identify any other ways to improve revenues for the security sector nor did
they identify whether this information is being incorporated into a broader plan for
developing and sustaining the ANSF when we inquired about such a plan.
CSTC-A Plan Provides Guidance for Field-Level Operations,

but Is Not a Substitute for a Coordinated State and Defense Plan
Since GAO reported in 2005, field-level planning for the training and equipping of the
ANSF has improved. In January 2008, CSTC-A completed a field-level plan for ANSF
development, and an operations order with further detail on the development and execution of
the fiscal year 2008 ANSF force generation program. The Campaign Plan for the
Development of Afghan National Military and Police Forces (Campaign Plan) is a military
plan.[19] It provides field-level goals, objectives, and capability milestones for the
development of the Ministries of Defense and Interior, including Afghan army and police
forces. With a new emphasis on quality training, the plan extends the time frames for ANSF
development beyond those reported in our 2005 report.[20] However, while this military plan
provides needed field guidance, it is not a coordinated Defense and State plan with near- and
long-term resource requirements.
When we last reported in 2005, Defense had not fully implemented or been able to reach
agreement on criteria for assessing an Afghan army unit’s readiness to operate without
training assistance. Since that time, Defense has developed criteria—called capability
milestones (CM)—to assess army and police progress in manning, training, and equipping the
forces. Units are assessed against four capability milestones that range from CM1 to CM4. A
unit, agency, staff function, or installation rated at CM1 is fully capable of conducting its
primary operational mission but may require assistance from the international community in
12 GAO
certain situations. For instance, a combat unit capable of operating at CM1 is fully capable of
planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations at the battalion level;
however, coalition support may be required for certain capabilities, such as close air support,
medical evacuation, or indirect fire support.[21] By contrast, a unit, agency, or staff function
rated at CM4 has been established but is not yet capable of conducting its primary operational
mission and can only undertake portions of its mission with significant assistance, and
reliance on, international support. The table below provides descriptions of the capability
milestones, as identified in the CSTC-A Campaign Plan.
Table 2. Capability Milestones for Afghan National Security Forces
Capability
milestone Description
CM1 The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is capable of conducting primary
operational mission(s). Depending on the situation, units may require specified
assistance from the Coalition or international community.
CM2 The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is capable of conducting primary
operational mission(s) with routine assistance from, or reliance on, international
community support.
CM3 The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is capable of partially conducting
primary operational mission(s), but still requires assistance from, and is reliant on,
international community support.
CM4 The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is formed but not yet capable of
conducting primary operational mission(s). It may be capable, available, or
directed to undertake portions of its operational mission but only with significant
assistance from, and reliance on, international community support.
Source: Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National Military and Police Forces—Interim,
January 29, 2008.
The Campaign Plan identifies three key phases in the development of Afghan army and
police forces: fielding/generating forces, developing forces, and transitioning to strategic
partnership. Table 3 describes these phases and their corresponding milestones. It is not clear
from the Campaign Plan whether the milestones are based on an ANA force structure of
70,000 or 80,000. If based on 70,000, the milestones would likely need to be revisited.
Table 3. Description of Key Phases in the Training and Equipping of the ANSF
Campaign phase Description Milestone date

Phase 1: Field/Generate Army and police forces are manned, have completed Complete by
Afghan National individual training, and are equipped to 85 percent or mid-2010
Security Capability better.
Phase 2: Develop Afghan and Coalition forces will jointly plan, Complete by
Afghan National coordinate, and conduct operations. Coalition forces will the end of
Security Capability partner with army and police units to assist in the 2011
development of capabilities necessary to achieve CM1.
Phase 3: Transition to The Afghan government will assume the lead Extends
Strategic Partnership responsibility for its own security needs, with continued beyond 2019
engagement by the international community. CSTC-A
will have completed its current mission and should
transition into a security assistance organization.
Source: CSTC-A, Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National Military and Police
Forces—Interim, January 29, 2008.
Milestone dates for the accomplishment of certain objectives have been extended beyond
those reported earlier. For example, our 2005 report states that Defense officials estimated
that basic training for 43,000 ground combat troops would be accomplished by the fall of
2007. However, the Campaign Plan extends this date to mid-2010. According to the CSTC-A
Commander, given resource constraints and the new emphasis on fielding quality forces,
certain deadlines for the fielding, generation, and development of Afghan forces have had to
be extended.
In addition to capability milestones, personnel and equipment requirements have also
been established since our last report. In 2005, we noted that documents identifying personnel
and equipment requirements for the Afghan National Security Forces were not complete.
However, since that time, the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior, assisted by CSTC-
A, have completed personnel and equipment requirements, known as Tashkils.[22] The
Tashkils list in detail the authorized staff positions and equipment items for the ANA and
ANP. Moreover, ANA Tashkils have been converted into an electronic force management
database by the U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency, which provides
standardization and consistency given frequent CSTC-A personnel rotations. Agency officials
expect that the ANP Tashkils will also be converted to a similar system.
FEW AFGHAN ARMY UNITS ARE CAPABLE OF LEADING

OPERATIONS AND EFFORTS TO DEVELOP THEIR
CAPABILITY FACE SEVERAL CHALLENGES
The United States has invested over $10 billion to develop the ANA since 2002, but less
than 2 percent (2 of 105 ANA units rated) are assessed at CM1—full operational capability.
Building an Afghan army that can lead its own operations requires manning, training, and
equipping army personnel; however, U.S. efforts to build the Afghan army have faced
challenges in all of these areas. First, while the ANA has increased in size and basic recruiting
is strong, the ANA has experienced difficulties manning the army, such as finding qualified
candidates for leadership positions and retaining personnel. Second, the insufficient number
of U.S. trainers and coalition mentors in the field is a major impediment to providing the
ANA with the follow-up training, including in areas such as advanced combat skills and
logistics, needed to sustain the force in the long term. Finally, ANA combat units report
significant shortages in approximately 40 percent of items defined as critical by Defense,
including machine guns and vehicles. Some of these challenges, such as shortages of mentors
and equipment, are due in part to competing global priorities, according to senior Defense
officials. Without resolving these challenges, the ability of the ANA to reach full capability
may be delayed.
More Troops Trained, but Very Few ANA Units

Rated as Having Capability to Lead Operations
Defense planning calls for the development of an 80,000-person ANA force structure that
includes Ministry of Defense personnel, sustaining institutions, and infantry forces capable of
14 GAO
accomplishing its mission with limited assistance from the international community. As of
April 2008, Defense reports that approximately 58,000 army personnel received training and
were assigned to the ANA. The chart below details the number of ANA forces authorized
compared with the number currently assigned (see table 4).
Table 4. Afghan Ministry of Defense and ANA

Force Structure, as of April 2008
Forces Authorized Trained and assigned Percent assigned

Ministry of Defense/ General Staff 3,185 2,596 82
Sustaining institutionsa 2,001 1,679 84
Intermediate commandsb 16,169 13,511 84
Combat troops 56,127 37,866 67
Afghan Air Corps 3,000 2,141 71
Total 80,482c 57,793 72
Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense and Afghan Ministry of Defense data.
Note: As discussed later in this report, the number of troops trained and assigned is greater than number
on-duty due to attrition, absenteeism, leave, and battlefield casualties.
a
Sustaining institutions include Military Intelligence Regional Offices, Communications Support
Element, Acquisition Agency, Installation Management Department, Military Police Company
(Kabul Area), and Detainee Operations.
b
Intermediate commands include Headquarters Support Brigade and the logistics, training, recruiting,
and medical commands.
c
The 482 positions above 80,000 account for the Afghan National Guard Force.
Since we reported in 2005, more personnel have been trained and assigned to the ANA.
Specifically focusing on combat troops, Defense reports that 37,866 combat troops have been
trained and assigned to the ANA as of April 2008, compared with 18,300 troops in March
2005. Although this represents more than a twofold increase in the amount of combat troops,
it is approximately 5,000 forces less than Defense had predicted would be trained by fall
2007. Moreover, new positions have been added to the ANA’s structure since our 2005
report, including an expanded Afghan air corps[23] and the ANA force structure has
increased to 80,000.
While more troops have received training, as of April 2008, only two ANA units—out of
105 rated—are assessed as CM1—fully capable. Thirty-six percent of ANA units (38 of 105
rated units) are assessed at CM2 and are capable of conducting their primary mission with
routine international support. The remaining ANA units are less capable. Thirty-one percent
(32 of 105 rated units) are CM3—capable of partially conducting their primary mission, but
reliant on international support; 11 percent (11 of 105 rated units) are CM4—formed but not
yet capable; and 21 percent (22 of 105 rated units) are not yet formed or not reporting (see
table 5).[24]
While few ANA units are rated as fully capable, Defense officials stated that ANA troops
had performed well in combat situations.[25] Personnel assigned to mentor the ANA that we
interviewed in Afghanistan praised the efforts of Afghan troops, and U.S. and Afghan
officials stated they were pleased with the development of the army to date.
The expected date when the ANA will gain the capability to assume lead responsibility
for its own security is unclear. As of April 2008, monthly reports provided by CSTC-A show
the expected date of full ANA capability as March 2011.[26] However, this date does not
account for shortfalls in the required number of mentors and trainers. Thus, Defense officials
cautioned that currently predicted dates for the achievement of a fully capable Afghan army
are subject to change and may be delayed.
Table 5. Defense Assessment of ANA Capabilities, as of April 2008
Army units CM1Fully CM2Capable CM3 CM4Not Unit Not Formed

Capable with Support Partially Capable or Not
Capable Reportinga
Corps 1 3 1 0 0
headquarters (5)
Brigade 0 6 5 1 2
headquarters (14)
Combat battalions 1 18 15 6 9
(49)
Combat support 0 11 8 3 11
and combat
services support
battalions (33)
Air Corps 0 0 1 0 0
headquarters (1)
Air Corps 0 0 2 1 0
squadrons (3)
Number of ANA 2 (2%) 38 (36%) 32 11 22 (21%)
units (105) (31%) (11%)
Source: GAO analysis of Defense data.
Note: Percentages in the table may not add to 100 due to rounding.
a
An ANA unit that is categorized as “not formed or not reporting” is either a planned unit or a unit in basic training.
Development of a Capable Army Faces Challenges in

Manning, Training, and Equipping the Force
U.S. efforts to build the ANA have faced challenges in manning the army, such as
recruiting for leadership positions and retaining personnel; shortfalls in the number of U.S.
trainers and coalition mentors deployed with ANA units in the field to assist in developing
capable ANA forces; and shortages of critical equipment items.
Afghan Army Faces Difficulties Reducing Absenteeism, Recruiting

Qualified Candidates for Leadership and Specialist Positions,
and Retaining Personnel
Although the ANA has grown in numbers, it faces manning challenges, including
absenteeism, recruitment of leaders and specialists, and retention of personnel.
First, although approximately 32,700[27] combat personnel received training and were
assigned to one of the five ANA corps, the number of combat troops on hand is less than
those trained and assigned due to attrition, absenteeism, scheduled leave, and battlefield
casualties.[28] As of February 2008, Defense reported that about 20 percent of combat
personnel assigned were not present for duty (see figure 4).
16 GAO

Note: This figure includes approximately 32,700 ANA combat personnel assigned to the five ANA
corps, as well as civilians serving in support roles for the ANA.
Figure 4. Comparison of ANA Corps Personnel Assigned to a Unit to the Number On Hand, as of
February 2008.
Although some of those absent from the army may have scheduled their absence or been
killed in duty, Defense assessment reports from November 2007 to February 2008 show
between 8 and 12 percent of combat unit personnel were absent without leave (AWOL), with
AWOL rates as high as 17 percent for soldiers in one ANA corps. For the ANA to achieve
sustained growth, a senior Defense official stated that AWOL rates should be no higher than 8
percent. Officials attributed these absences to a variety of causes, such as soldiers leaving
their units to take their pay home and the lack of significant penalties for such absences. To
address these issues, the Afghan Ministry of Defense, assisted by CSTC-A, has initiated
programs to allow soldiers to transfer their pay to family members and to facilitate the deposit
of ANA salaries directly into soldiers’ bank accounts. CSTC-A officials stated these
programs should reduce AWOL rates.[29]
Second, although basic recruiting is strong, the ANA is experiencing difficulties finding
qualified candidates for leadership and specialist positions. Defense reports that recruiting
goals for ANA infantry positions have been met, despite adjustments to increase ANA
training output by 6,000 soldiers annually. However, CSTC-A noted shortfalls in the number
of candidates available for non-commissioned officer (NCO) and specialty skill positions,
such as logistics and medical support. Between November 2007 and February 2008, ANA
manning levels for NCOs ranged between 50 to 70 percent of the authorized number. NCOs
provide a vital link between senior officers and soldiers and can provide leadership to ANA
units in the field, according to a senior Defense official. Officials attributed the shortage to
the low level of literacy among ANA recruits. CSTC-A is attempting to address this shortfall
by promoting NCOs from within ANA ranks and implementing new programs to target
literate recruits. CSTC-A expects to have greater than 90 percent of the ANA’s authorized
NCOs staffed by summer 2008. The ANA is also experiencing difficulties manning specialist
positions such as logistics, medical support, and engineering. Although the ANA has
developed courses to train military specialists, the current Afghan army is comprised
primarily of infantry forces. This is, in part, because ANA recruits learn basic infantry skills
first. However, this focus is also due to difficulties identifying candidates who are suitable for
advanced training. According to Defense officials, without suitably trained support personnel,
the ANA will need to rely on coalition forces to provide support services.
Third, the ANA is facing challenges retaining personnel. A typical ANA contract lasts for
3 years. At the end of a contract, ANA personnel are given the opportunity to re-enlist with
the Afghan army. Between March 2006 and February 2008, just over half of those combat
personnel eligible to re-enlist opted to do so, as shown in table 6.[30]
Table 6. Re-Enlistment Rates for ANA Combat Personnel,

March 2006 to February 2008
ANA unit Number eligible Number who did Number Percent re-
to re-enlist not re-enlist re-enlisted enlisted
Kabul Military 474 239 235 50
Training Center
201st Corps 2,554 731 1,823 71
203rd Corps 1,319 554 765 58
205th Corps 963 523 440 46
207th Corps 1,037 864 173 17
209th Corps 730 401 329 45
Total 7,077 3,312 3,765 53
U.S. and Afghan officials attributed these re-enlistment rates to a variety of factors, such
as stationing soldiers away from their families, the rapid pace of ANA military operations,
and the higher salaries offered by private companies and insurgent groups looking to recruit
trained Afghan soldiers. To address these factors, a senior Defense official stated that the
Ministry of Defense and CSTC-A are discussing the implementation of several programs such
as allowing re-enlisting soldiers greater choice in determining where they will be stationed
and increasing re-enlistment bonuses. Without the ability to retain trained personnel, ANA
units will continue to lack experience and thus may be delayed in reaching their ability to lead
security operations. For instance, in November 2007, the capability assessment of the ANA’s
209th corps in northern Afghanistan lowered the rating of one of its battalions from CM2 to
CM3 when the battalion failed to retain approximately half of its NCOs. Further, the
assessment noted that progress developing the capability of this battalion could be delayed
nearly a year.
Shortage of U.S. Embedded Trainers and Coalition

Mentors Delaying Advanced Skill Training for the ANA
Although some U.S. embedded trainers or coalition mentors are present in every ANA
corps, the ANA is experiencing shortages in the number of these required[31] personnel to
assist in its development. According to CSTC-A’s Campaign Plan, after an ANA unit is
18 GAO
fielded, either an embedded training team (comprised of U.S. personnel) or a mentoring team
(comprised of coalition personnel) should be assigned to the unit.[32] These teams are
responsible for developing the skills of ANA army units from initial fielding until the unit has
developed the capability to assume lead responsibility for its security mission. As the ANA
unit builds capability, embedded trainers and mentors guide and assess the units and provide
them with access to air support and medical evacuation.
Shortages exist in the number of embedded trainers and mentors fielded. For instance, as
of April 2008, the United States has fielded 46 percent (1,019 of 2,215) of Defense’s required
number of embedded trainers. Officials attributed these shortfalls to competing U.S. priorities
for Defense personnel, including the war in Iraq. CSTC-A has submitted requests for
additional forces to act as embedded trainers to assist the ANA; however, the request has been
deferred. As of April 2008, members of the international community assisting in this effort
have fielded 32 out of 37 mentor teams promised, although the number of international
mentors in the field is smaller than the number of U.S embedded trainers. Approximately one-
third of personnel in the field assisting ANA unit development are coalition mentors, while
two-thirds are U.S. personnel.[33]
Without adequate training or mentoring, the ANA’s ability to take the lead in security
operations may be delayed. First, Defense officials have cited an insufficient number of
embedded trainers and coalition mentors deployed with units in the field as the major
impediment to providing the ANA with the training it needs to establish the capabilities
necessary to sustain the force in the long term, such as maneuver skills in battalion-level
operations, intelligence collection, and logistics. Without these skills, smaller ANA units
cannot operate collectively at the battalion level, must rely on the coalition for support tasks,
and cannot assume the lead for their own security. Secondly, as ANA units achieve greater
levels of capability, embedded trainers and mentors are responsible for assessing and
validating their progress. CSTC-A’s Campaign Plan states that the validation process is
intended to improve collective training of ANA units; however, without adequate numbers of
U.S. embedded trainers and coalition mentors, this validation will be slowed. CSTC-A
officials stated that this delay in validation would lengthen the amount of time it will take the
ANA to achieve full capability. Moreover, Defense officials noted that, as the number of
ANA units fielded increases, the number of U.S. embedded training and coalition mentoring
personnel needed also rises. For instance, when we visited Afghanistan in August 2007,
Defense officials stated 73 U.S.-embedded training and coalition mentoring teams were
needed to assist the development of the ANA; however, Defense officials projected that by
December 2008 103 teams would be needed. Without additional training and mentoring
personnel to meet this increased need, delays in ANA development will likely be exacerbated.
Critical Equipment Shortfalls Remain Due to Changing

Procurement Plans, Competing Global Priorities, and Production Limitations
Since we reported in 2005, new equipment plans for the ANA have been implemented
and the ANA has received more equipment items. In 2005, Defense planned to equip the
Afghan army with donated and salvaged weapons and armored vehicles. However, much of
this equipment proved to be worn out, defective, or incompatible with other equipment. In
2006, Defense began providing some ANA forces with U.S. equipment. Further, as security
deteriorated, equipment needs changed and Defense planned to provide more protective
equipment, such as armored Humvees, and more lethal weapons, such as rocket-propelled
grenades.
In support of these efforts, approximately $3.7 billion was provided between fiscal years
2005 and 2008 to equip the ANA.[34] As of February 2008, CSTC-A reports that the ANA
combat forces are equipped with 60 percent of items defined as critical by Defense, a 7
percentage point increase since August 2007.
Despite these advances, shortages exist in a number of equipment items defined as
critical by Defense. For instance, of 55 critical equipment items for ANA combat forces,
CSTC-A reports having less than half of the required amount on hand for 21 of these items.
Types of critical equipment items with significant shortfalls include vehicles, weapons, and
communication equipment (see table 7).
Although shortfalls exist for certain items defined as critical by Defense, such as NATO-
standard machine guns, this does not necessarily mean that the ANA is unequipped. Defense
officials stated that while ANA forces wait to receive NATO-standard weapons, Eastern bloc
substitutes will be used. However, several ANA combat corps reported shortages in these
items as well. For instance, each month between November 2007 and February 2008 at least 2
of 5 ANA corps reported shortages in Eastern bloc anti-tank weapons and 1 of 5 ANA corps
reported shortages in Eastern bloc light machine guns. Moreover, shortfalls in items for which
no Eastern bloc substitute is being used, such as communication equipment and cargo trucks,
were reported in every ANA combat corps in February 2008.
Defense officials attribute these shortfalls to a variety of factors, such as competing
global priorities for equipment, production delays, and delayed receipt and execution of fiscal
year 2007 funding, among other reasons. As equipment orders are filled, ANA units may not
be the top priority to receive certain equipment items. CSTC-A officials said that U.S.
soldiers currently in combat have first priority to receive some of the equipment that is also
requested for the ANA, while security forces in other nations, such as Iraq, may also be
higher priority than the Afghan army. When U.S. forces or other nations have higher priority
to receive equipment, CSTC-A officials noted that ANA orders are delayed. Officials at the
U.S. Army Security Assistance Command also stated that Iraq may be a higher priority than
Afghanistan, while a senior official from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)
stated that other nations, such as Georgia and Lebanon, may also receive higher priority.
Furthermore, production delays for certain equipment items may contribute to equipment
shortfalls. For instance, CSTC-A officials stated that due to production delays, certain
equipment items, such as NATO-standard heavy machine guns and mortars, were not
currently available and would not likely be delivered until 2009 or 2010. Similarly, Defense
officials in Washington, D.C., stated that production limitations were responsible for some
equipment shortages, particularly in the case of NATO-standard mortars. Additional factors
cited as contributing to equipment shortages included delayed receipt and execution of fiscal
year 2007 funding, accelerated fielding of ANA units, and difficulties distributing equipment
to the field.
20 GAO
Table 7. Critical Equipment Items for ANA Combat Forces with Less Than Half the
Required Amount On Hand, as of February 2008
Number Number on Percent of required

Item required hand on hand
Vehicles and generators
15-Kilowatt Generator 40 19 48
Excavating Vehicle 120 56 47
M872A4 Semi-trailer 316 82 26
30-Kilowatt Generator 75 16 21
Armored Humvee 4,580 469 10
Dump Truck 60 5 8
Humvee Ambulance 710 0 0
Eastern bloca weapons
DsHK 12.7 mm Heavy Machine Gun 576 175 30
NATO-standardb weapons
M500 Shotgun 525 116 22
M224 60mm Mortar 68 15 22
M203A2 40mm Grenade Launcher 2,851 527 19
M16A2 Semi-automatic Rifle 53,287 6,018 11
M249 Machine Gun 3,584 162 5
M240B Machine Gun 2,013 81 4
M24 Sniper Rifle 1,544 12 1
M2 .50 cal Heavy Machine Gun 576 0 0
M252 81mm Mortar 30 0 0
Communications technology
High-Frequency Vehicle Mounted 1,031 501 49
Radio
Omni-Directional Antenna Mast 503 180 36
Very High-Frequency Vehicle 200 71 36
Mounted Radio
Field Switch Board 752 202 27
34 Between fiscal years 2005 and 2008, funds were provided to support the training and equipping of
the ANA through a variety of budget accounts, with the majority provided through the Afghan
Security Forces Fund (ASFF). ASFF funding allocations are reported to Congress in four
categories: equipment and transportation, infrastructure development, sustainment activities, and
training. The $3.7 billion figure represents the amount of ASFF funding directed toward equipment
and transportation for the Afghan army.
Note: Equip ment requirements are defined in the ANA’s Military Table of Equipment, known as a
Tashkil.
a
Eastern bloc equipment generally refers to equipment developed by the Soviet Union and produced in
Eastern bloc countries.
b
NATO-standard refers to NATO approved standardization processes applied to equipment, which can
include production codes and equipment specifications. According to NATO’s Logistics
Handbook, the aim of standardization is to enhance the Alliance’s operational effectiveness and to
improve the efficient use of available resources.
One method to help address shortages while western equipment is delayed is through
increased equipment donations from the international community. CSTC-A is currently
seeking additional contributions, particularly of Eastern bloc equipment, such as the basic
soldier assault rifle. Between 2002 and March 2008, over 40 non-U.S. donors provided
approximately $426 million to assist in the training and equipping of the ANA. Eighty-eight
percent of this support has been in the area of equipment; however, the value of equipment
donations is determined by the donor, according to CSTC-A officials. The quality of this
donated equipment has been mixed (see figure 5), and delivery of some donations has been
delayed due to limited funds to pay for shipments into Afghanistan.
Figure 5. Rifles of Variable Quality Donated to the ANSF.
To address quality issues, NATO and CSTC-A have established procedures to verify that
international donations comply with current needs for the ANA and, if necessary, verify the
condition and completeness of equipment. Furthermore, to defray the cost of shipments into
Afghanistan, a NATO-administered trust fund has been established to support the
transportation of equipment into Afghanistan. However, Defense officials stated that the
amount of money in the trust fund, which they estimated to be approximately $1 million, is
limited and may not support the transportation of a large number of donations. Additionally,
CSTC-A has also set aside funding to transport donated goods when required.
The development of capable ANA forces may be delayed by shortages in equipment, as
units cannot be certified as fully capable in equipment unless they have 85 percent or more of
their critical equipment items. CSTC-A anticipates that all ANA brigades will be equipped to
at least 85 percent of requirements for critical equipment items by December 2008; however,
according to Defense’s March 2008 monthly status report, expected dates for achieving CM1
in equipment were pushed back for 12 of 14 combat brigades by between 1 to 7 months due,
in part, to delayed delivery and distribution of items such as vehicles and weapons. Moreover,
shortages in equipment items may hinder training efforts, since having certain equipment
22 GAO
items on hand, such as trucks, may be necessary to teach ANA personnel logistics and
maintenance skills.
SEVERAL CHALLENGES IMPEDE EFFORTS TO IMPROVE

CAPABILITY OF AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE FORCES
Although the ANP has reportedly grown in number since 2005, after an investment of
nearly $6 billion, no police unit is assessed as fully capable of performing its mission.
Development of an Afghan police force that is fully capable requires manning, training, and
equipping of police personnel. However, the United States faces challenges in several areas
related to these efforts to build a capable police force. First, less than one-quarter of the ANP
has police mentors present to provide training in the field and verify that police are on duty.
Second, the Afghan police have not received about one-third of the equipment items Defense
considers critical, and continue to face shortages in several categories of equipment, including
trucks, radios, and body armor. In addition, Afghanistan’s weak judicial system hinders
effective policing, and our analysis of status reports from the field indicates that the ANP
consistently experiences problems with police pay, corruption, and attacks, including by
insurgents. Recognizing that these challenges hamper ANP development, Defense began a
new long-term initiative in November 2007 to reconstitute the uniformed police—the largest
component of the Afghan police. However, the continuing shortfall in police mentors may
pose a risk to the initiative’s success.
No Police Units Are Rated as Fully

Capable of Performing Their Mission
Defense defines a fully capable 82,000-person ANP force as one that is able to
independently plan, execute, and sustain operations with limited coalition support.[35]
However, Defense reporting indicates that, as of April 2008, no police unit was assessed as
fully capable of performing its mission (see table 8).[36] Furthermore, among rated units,
about 96 percent (296 of 308) of uniformed police districts and all border police battalions
(33 of 33), which together comprise about three-fourths of the ANP’s authorized end-
strength, were rated at CM4—the lowest capability rating.[37] Six of the remaining 12
uniformed police districts were rated at CM2, and the other 6 at CM3. Overall, Defense
assessed approximately 4 percent (18 of 433 units rated) of police units as partially capable
and about 3 percent (12 of 433 units rated) as capable of leading operations with coalition
support.
According to Defense reporting as of April 2008, the expected date for completion of a
fully capable Afghan police force is December 2012—a date that conflicts with the Afghan
government and international community benchmark of establishing police forces that can
effectively meet Afghanistan’s security needs by the end of 2010.
Table 8. Defense Assessment of ANP Capabilities, as of April 2008
Police units CM1Fully CM2Capable CM3 CM4Not Unit Not

Capable with Support Partially Capable Formed or Not
Capable Reportinga
Uniformed 0 6 6 296 57
Police Districts
(365)
Border Police 0 0 0 33 0
Battalions (33)
Civil Order 0 6 2 2 10
Police Battalions
(20)
Counter 0 0 10 3 2
Narcotics Police
Units (15)
Number of ANP 0 12 (3%) 18 (4%) 334 69 (16%)
units (433) (77%)
a
A uniformed police district that is categorized as “not formed or not reporting” has not been rated by Defense. A civil
order police battalion or a counter narcotics police unit that is categorized as “not formed or not reporting” is a
planned unit or in training.
Growth of Police Force Is Difficult to Quantify

Defense reporting indicates that, as of April 2008, nearly 80,000 police had been assigned
out of an end-strength of 82,000 (see table 9).[38] This is an increase of more than double the
approximately 35,000 we previously reported as trained as of January 2005.
Table 9. Afghan Ministry of Interior Forces, as of April 2008
Number authorized Number assigned Percent assigned

Ministry of Interior Headquarters 6,015 5,237 87
Uniformed Police 44,319 42,969 97
Border Police 17,970 12,213 68
Auxiliary Police 0 9,318 N/Aa
Civil Order Police 5,365 1,523 28
Criminal Investigative Division 4,148 2,815 68
Counter Narcotics Police 3,777 2,265 60
Customs Police 0 623 N/Aa
Counter Terrorism Police 406 411 101
Standby/Highway Police 0 2,536 N/Aa
Total 82,000 79,910 97
Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense and Afghan Ministry of Interior data.
a
The auxiliary police, customs police, standby police, and highway police are no longer authorized.
Despite this reported increase in police manning, it is difficult to determine the extent to
which the police force has grown. As we noted in May 2007, the Afghan Ministry of Interior
produces the number of police assigned and the reliability of these numbers has been
questioned. A Defense census undertaken since our May 2007 report raises additional
concerns about these manning numbers. Specifically, Defense conducted a census to check
the reliability of ministry payroll records and reported in September 2007 that it was unable to
verify the physical existence of about 20 percent of the uniformed police and more than 10
24 GAO
percent of the border police listed on the ministry payroll records for the provinces surveyed.
Because Defense’s census did not cover all 34 Afghan provinces, these percentages cannot be
applied to the entire police force. Nonetheless, the results of Defense’s census raise questions
about the extent to which the ANP has grown since our 2005 report.
Shortage of Police Mentors Hinders Training,

Evaluation, and Verification of Police on Duty
According to Defense officials, the shortage of available police mentors has been a key
impediment to U.S. efforts to conduct training and evaluation and verify that police are on
duty. Police mentor teams in Afghanistan consist of both civilian mentors, who teach law
enforcement and police management, and military mentors, who provide training in basic
combat operations and offer force protection for the civilian mentors. As we reported in 2005,
international peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor have shown that field-
based training of local police by international police mentors is critical to the success of
similar programs to establish professional police forces. Such training allows mentors to build
on classroom instruction and provide a more systematic basis for evaluating police
performance.
Defense reporting indicates that, as of January 2008, less than one-quarter of the ANP
had police mentor teams present. DynCorp, State’s contractor for training and mentoring the
police, was able to provide about 98 percent (540 of 551) of the authorized number of civilian
mentors as of April 2008. However, as of the same date, only about 32 percent (746 of 2,358)
of required military mentors were present in country. Due to this shortage of military mentors
to provide force protection, movement of available civilian mentors is constrained—a serious
limitation to providing mentor coverage to a police force that is based in more than 900
locations around the country and, unlike the army, generally operates as individuals, not as
units.[39] Moreover, a knowledgeable CSTC-A official stated that additional civilian mentors
would not help to address the shortfall in military mentors because they could not be
deployed to the field without military mentors to provide protection. According to Defense
officials, the shortfall in military mentors for the ANP is due to the higher priority assigned to
deploying U.S. military personnel elsewhere, particularly Iraq.
While the United States and the EU have taken steps to provide additional police
mentors, the extent to which these efforts will address current shortfalls is unclear. In January
2008, Defense announced that approximately 1,000 Marines would be sent to Afghanistan in
the spring of 2008 on a one-time, 7-month deployment to assist in the training and
development of the ANP.[40] However, this temporary deployment will neither fully nor
permanently alleviate the underlying shortage of military mentors for the ANP, which stood
at over 1,600 as of April 2008. In June 2007, the EU established a police mission in
Afghanistan with the objective of providing nearly 200 personnel to mentor, advise, and train
the Ministry of Interior and ANP. According to State, the number of EU personnel pledged
has subsequently increased to about 215. However, State figures indicate that the EU had
staffed about 80 personnel as of February 2008—less than 40 percent of its pledged total.
Moreover, State officials said that restrictions in the EU mandate limit the extent to which its
personnel are permitted to provide field-based training.
Defense, State, and DynCorp officials all identified the continuing shortfall in police
mentors as a challenge to U.S. efforts to develop the Afghan police. Specifically, the mentor
shortage has impeded U.S. efforts in three areas:
• Field-based training: Senior Defense officials, including the commanding general of

CSTC-A, stated that the ongoing shortfall in police mentors has been the primary
obstacle to providing the field-based training necessary to develop a fully capable
police force. In addition, State has reported that a significant increase in mentoring
coverage is essential to improving the quality of the police through field-based
training. DynCorp officials also acknowledged the shortage of mentors to be a
challenge to providing necessary training.
• Evaluation: According to a knowledgeable CSTC-A official, the shortage of police
mentors is a serious challenge to evaluating the capability of the police and
identifying areas in need of further attention. Defense recently introduced a monthly
assessment tool to be used by mentors to evaluate police capability and identify
strengths and weaknesses. However, CSTC-A identified extremely limited mentor
coverage of the police as a significant challenge to using this tool to generate reliable
assessments. As of February 2008, police mentors were able to assess only about 11
percent of uniformed police districts using this new tool.
• Verification of police on duty: The shortage of available police mentors has impeded
U.S. efforts to verify the number of Afghan police on duty. For example, as of April
2008, Defense could not verify whether any police were reporting for duty in 5 of
Afghanistan’s 34 provinces due to the lack of mentors. Furthermore, although
Defense has planned to conduct monthly surveys to determine how many police are
reporting for duty in selected districts, a knowledgeable CSTC-A official stated that
mentors are not available to conduct surveys. However, a random sample of 15
police districts conducted by the United Nations found fewer than half of authorized
police reporting for duty.
Without sufficient police mentors present to conduct field-based training and evaluation
and verify police manning, development of fully capable, fully staffed Afghan police forces
may continue to be delayed.
Efforts of Civilian Mentors Complicated by Dual Chain of Command

Although DynCorp has been able to provide nearly all of the authorized number of
civilian mentors, DynCorp stated that the activities of these mentors have been complicated
by a dual chain of command between State and Defense.[41] According to a 2005 interagency
decision, Defense is responsible for directing the overall U.S. effort to train and equip the
Afghan police, while State is responsible for providing policy guidance and management of
the DynCorp contract. According to DynCorp, this dual chain of command has affected its
efforts in multiple ways, such as by producing conflicting guidance and complicating
reporting, placement of personnel, the use of facilities, and training and mentoring activities.
Police Continue to Face Difficulties with Equipment Shortages and Quality

Between fiscal years 2005 and 2008, Congress made available $5.9 billion to support the
training and equipping of the ANP. At least $1.3 billion of that amount, or 22 percent, has
been directed toward equipment purchases.[42] Although equipping of the police has
improved in recent months, shortages remain in several types of equipment that Defense
considers critical.[43] Since our August 2007 visit to Afghanistan, the percentage of critical
ANP equipment on hand has grown from 53 to 65 percent as of February 2008. This
26 GAO
improvement includes increased totals of items on hand, such as rifles and grenade launchers.
Further, Defense anticipates the ANP will be equipped with 85 percent of critical equipment
items by December 2008. However, as of February 2008, shortages remained in several types
of critical equipment, such as trucks, radios, and body armor. Defense officials cited several
factors that have contributed to these shortages. First, according to CSTC-A officials,
equipment shortages are due to competing priorities, particularly the need to equip U.S. forces
deployed to operational situations and security forces in Iraq. Second, CSTC-A attributed the
specific shortage in body armor to the inability of two supplying contractors to deliver the
requested items on schedule. Third, Defense officials cited additional causes of equipment
shortages such as delayed receipt and execution of fiscal year 2007 funding and instances
where CSTC-A did not provide equipment orders in a timely manner. Defense officials and
documentation also indicated that distributing equipment to police in the field once it is
procured is challenging due to the unstable security situation, difficult terrain, weather
conditions, and the remoteness of some police districts. In addition, Defense officials
expressed concerns with the quality and usability of thousands of weapons donated to the
police. For example, officials estimated that only about 1 in 5 of the nearly 50,000 AK-47
automatic rifles received through donation was of good quality.
Our analysis of weekly progress reports produced in 2007 by DynCorp civilian police
mentors provides additional evidence of equipment-related challenges and other logistical
difficulties.[44] Specifically, 88 percent (46 of 52) of weekly reports contained instances of
police operating with equipment of insufficient quality or quantity or facing problems with
facilities or supplies. For example, the reports include several cases where Afghan border
police are inadequately equipped to defend their positions on the border or face insurgent
forces. Recognizing this shortcoming, CSTC-A has planned to equip the border police with
heavy machine guns, which it expects to arrive in the fall of 2008. In addition, 81 percent (42
of 52) of weekly reports contained examples of limited police ability to account for the
equipment provided to them.[45] In July 2007, CSTC-A initiated efforts to train the police in
basic supply and property accountability procedures.[46] According to CSTC-A, equipment is
no longer being issued to police districts unless the districts’ property officers are first trained.
For example, more than 1,500 trucks have been on hand and ready for issue since late 2007
(see figure 6), but the Afghan Minister of Interior has delayed distribution of these vehicles
until adequate accountability procedures and driver training are established in the target
districts. Similarly, as of February 2008, about half of the approximately 17,000 machine
guns on hand had not been distributed to the police.
Source: GAO.
Figure 6. Trucks Awaiting Distribution to ANP.

Police Face Problems with Weak Judicial Sector, Pay, Corruption, and Attacks
Establishing a working judiciary in Afghanistan based on the rule of law is a prerequisite
for effective policing. However, in 2005 and 2007, we reported that few linkages existed in
Afghanistan between the Afghan judiciary and police, and the police had little ability to
enforce judicial rulings. According to State, much of Afghanistan continues to lack a
functioning justice system. In addition, according to CSTC-A, the slow rate at which the rule
of law is being implemented across Afghanistan inhibits effective community policing.
Our analysis of DynCorp’s weekly progress reports from 2007 indicates that police in the
field also face persistent problems with pay, corruption, and attacks.[47]
• Pay problems: 94 percent (49 of 52) of weekly reports contained instances of police
experiencing problems with pay. These include numerous examples of police who
have not been paid in several months and multiple cases of police who quit their jobs
as a result of pay-related problems, thereby potentially leaving their districts more
vulnerable to insurgent forces. Our prior work found that one cause for the corrupt
practices exhibited by many Afghan police is their low, inconsistently paid salaries.
Furthermore, according to State, the Ministry of Interior’s traditional salary
distribution process afforded opportunities for police chiefs and other officials to
claim a portion of their subordinates’ salaries for themselves. To minimize skimming
of salaries, CSTC-A is instituting a three-phase program to pay all salaries into bank
accounts via electronic funds transfer by December 2008. According to Defense,
electronic funds transfer had been implemented in 12 of 34 provinces as of August
2007. The government of Afghanistan also has decided to increase police salaries to
achieve pay parity with the Afghan army.
• Corruption: 87 percent (45 of 52) of weekly reports contained instances of
corruption within the police force or the Ministry of Interior. These include multiple
examples of police personnel providing weapons or defecting to the Taliban and
several cases of high-ranking officials engaging in bribery or misconduct. Moreover,
State documentation notes that one branch of the ANP, the highway police, was
disbanded in early 2007 because it was notorious for corruption. However, DynCorp
weekly reporting indicates that several thousand highway police were still working
and being paid by the Ministry of Interior as of September 2007. The ministry, in
conjunction with CSTC-A and the United Nations Assistance Mission in
Afghanistan, is currently engaged in an effort to reform and streamline the ANP rank
structure according to several criteria, including evidence of previous corruption
amongst ANP officers.[48]
• Attacks: 85 percent (44 of 52) of weekly reports contained instances of attacks
against the police. These include numerous cases where police are targeted by
suicide bombers or with improvised explosive devices. According to DynCorp,
insurgent attacks against the ANP have increased due to greater involvement of the
ANP in counterinsurgency operations and the perception that the police are a more
vulnerable target than the Afghan army and coalition forces. DynCorp weekly reports
do include several instances where police were able to successfully fend off attack;
however, they also contain multiple cases of the dangerous working conditions that
police face causing difficulties in retaining or recruiting personnel.
28 GAO
New Initiative to Reconstitute Police Has Begun,

but Limited Mentor Coverage a Risk Factor
Recognizing several of the challenges faced by the ANP, Defense began a new initiative
in November 2007 to train and equip the Afghan uniformed police. Defense documentation
that outlines this initiative acknowledges that the Afghan police lack capability, have been
inadequately trained and equipped, and are beset by corruption. To target these and other
challenges, Defense introduced the Focused District Development plan in November 2007 to
train and equip the uniformed police—those assigned to police districts throughout the
country who comprise over 40 percent of the intended ANP end-strength of 82,000.
According to Defense, reforming the uniformed police—the immediate face of the Afghan
government to citizens at the local level—is the key to the overall reform of the ANP.[49]
Under the Focused District Development model, the entire police force of a district is
withdrawn from the district and sent to a regional training center to train together for 8 weeks
and receive all authorized equipment while their district is covered by the Afghan National
Civil Order Police (ANCOP), a specialized police force trained and equipped to counter civil
unrest and lawlessness (see figure 7).[50] The police force then returns to its district, where a
dedicated police mentor team provides follow-on training and closely monitors the police for
at least 60 days. Defense expects to be able to reconstitute about 5 to 10 districts at a time for
the first year of Focused District Development, with each training cycle lasting about 6 to 8
months. Overall, according to State, it will take a minimum of 4 to 5 years to complete the
initiative.
Source: GAO.
Figure 7. Afghan National Civil Order Police Trainees in Kabul.
State documentation indicates that no districts had completed an entire Focused District
Development cycle as of March 2008.[51] Until an entire cycle is completed, it will be
difficult to fully assess the initiative. However, limited police mentor coverage may
complicate efforts to execute this new program. Defense documentation identifies sufficient
police mentor teams as the most important requirement for successful reform. However,
according to the commanding general of CSTC-A, the ongoing shortfall in police mentors
available to work with newly trained district police will slow implementation of the initiative.
In addition, a senior Defense official stated that unless the mentor shortage is alleviated, the
number of police mentor teams available to provide dedicated training and monitoring will
eventually be exhausted. Moreover, according to DynCorp, civilian mentors have an
important role in Focused District Development—particularly in providing district-level
mentoring—but are not accompanying military mentors into districts that are considered
unsafe. Given that one selection criterion for districts is location in unstable areas of the
country where better policing might improve the security situation, it is unclear how often
civilian mentors will be able to participate in district-level mentoring. Defense documentation
also identifies sufficient equipment availability as a requirement for successful reform.
According to Defense, adequate equipment is currently on hand to support the Focused
District Development initiative. However, given current shortfalls in various ANP equipment
items, it is unclear if having sufficient equipment on hand for the initiative may lead to
increased equipment shortages for elements of the ANP, such as the border police, that are
not currently being targeted through the initiative.
CONCLUSION
Establishing capable Afghan national security forces is critical to improving security in
Afghanistan and the U.S. efforts to assist foreign allies and partners in combating terrorism.
To date the U.S. has invested billions of dollars in this effort and estimates that billions more
will be required to build and sustain the ANSF beyond the existing forces—few of which
have been assessed as fully capable of conducting their primary mission. As such, measuring
progress and estimating long-term costs are particularly important given that U.S. officials
estimate that this mission could exceed a decade. The recommendations in our 2005 report
called for detailed Defense and State plans that include clearly defined objectives and
performance measures, milestones for achieving these objectives, future funding
requirements, and a strategy for sustaining the results achieved, including plans for
transitioning responsibilities to Afghanistan. In 2007, Defense provided a 5-page document in
response to our recommendation. However, this document included few long-term
milestones, no intermediate milestones for judging progress, and no sustainability strategy. In
2008, Congress mandated that Defense, in coordination with State, submit reports on a
comprehensive and long-term strategy and budget for strengthening the ANSF and a long-
term detailed plan for sustaining the ANSF. Defense has yet to provide these reports. As such
it remains difficult to determine if U.S. efforts are on track and how much more they will cost
to complete. Until a coordinated, detailed plan is completed, Congress will continue to lack
visibility into the progress made to date and the cost of completing this mission—information
that is essential to holding the performing agencies accountable. Consequently, we believe
that future U.S. investments should be conditioned on the completion of a coordinated,
detailed plan for developing a capable ANSF.
30 GAO
MATTER FOR CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION

To help ensure that action is taken to facilitate accountability and oversight in the
development and sustainment of the ANSF, and consistent with our previous 2005
recommendation and the 2008 congressional mandate, Congress should consider conditioning
a portion of future appropriations related to training and equipping the ANSF on completion
of a coordinated, detailed plan that, among other things, includes clearly defined objectives
and performance measures, milestones for achieving these objectives, future funding
requirements, and a strategy for sustaining the results achieved, including plans for
transitioning responsibilities to Afghanistan; and the timely receipt of the reports mandated by
sections 1230 and 1231 of Pub. L. 110-181, the first of which are already late.
State and Defense provided written comments on a draft of this report. State’s comments
are reproduced in appendix III. Defense’s comments, along with GAO responses to selected
issues raised by Defense, are reproduced in appendix IV. The agencies also provided us with
technical comments, which we have incorporated throughout the draft as appropriate.
State appreciated GAO’s views on how to improve efforts to develop the ANSF, which it
considers critical to long-term sustainable success in Afghanistan. State expressed concerns
about conditioning future appropriations on the completion of a detailed plan. In addition,
State highlighted ongoing coordination efforts with Defense as well as certain other
operational changes, many of which occurred after the completion of our fieldwork in August
2007. For example, while we note that civilian mentors are not accompanying military
mentors into districts that are considered unsafe, State notes in its comments that civilian
police mentors are now deployed with their military counterparts to all ongoing Focused
District Development districts and that all efforts are made to enable the deployment of
civilian police in support of the program.
We acknowledge State’s concerns and appreciate its efforts to coordinate with Defense.
However, we believe that a coordinated, detailed plan that clearly identifies the various
agencies’ roles would be beneficial, given the continuous turnover of U.S. government staff
in Afghanistan. We believe a coordinated, detailed plan with intermediate milestones is also
important particularly in light of the new Focused District Development initiative for ANP
training, which will entail considerable resources and time to complete. Further, intermediate
milestones would provide policymakers with more information regarding the transition to a
normalized security assistance relationship, as discussed by State in its comments.
Defense disagreed that Congress should consider conditioning a portion of future
appropriations on completion of a coordinated, detailed plan to develop the ANSF, and stated
that current guidance provided by State and Defense to the field is sufficient to implement a
successful program to train and equip the ANSF. Defense noted that the 5-page document it
provided to GAO in January 2007 articulated goals for the size, capabilities, and requirements
for the ANSF, and reflected an approach approved by multiple agencies—including State.
Defense also cited a number of other documents it considers to be part of the effort to develop
the ANSF. Furthermore, Defense disagreed with our conclusion that, absent a detailed plan,
progress in developing the ANSF is difficult to assess, and stated that monthly progress
reports and communication with Congress provide legislators with the information needed to
assess the program and allocate resources.
We do not believe that the 5-page document provides a strategic-level plan for the
development of the ANSF. The document does not represent a coordinated Defense and State
plan for completing and sustaining the ANSF with sufficient detail and transparency for
Congress and others to make informed decisions concerning future resources. This 5-page
document, which Defense now refers to as a “Strategic Vision” and which CSTC-A officials
were unaware of at the time of our review, does not identify or discuss the roles and
responsibilities of the Department of State, Defense’s key partner in training the ANP. This is
an element that one would expect in a strategic planning document for ANSF development.
Furthermore, the document contains just one date--December 2008, by which time the
152,000 person ANSF would be completed. Defense’s document lacks any other intermediate
or long-term milestones by which progress could be measured. While the U.S. role in training
and equipping the ANSF could exceed a decade, according to CSTC-A representatives,
neither the 5-page document nor the documents identified by Defense in its comments to
GAO constitute a sustainability strategy. For example, while Defense states that the
international community will need to sustain the ANSF for the “near-term” until government
revenues increase in Afghanistan, the document lacks further detail regarding the expected
time frames for increasing government revenues, as well as a definition of “near-term.” As
such, it remains unclear how long Defense and State expect to support the ANSF.
Furthermore, we maintain that, without a coordinated, detailed plan, assessing progress in
developing the ANSF is difficult. While Defense produces various documents that report in
detail on the current status of the ANSF, these documents do not contain intermediate
milestones or consistent end dates necessary to determine if the program is on track to
achieve its desired results within a set timeframe. For additional details, refer to GAO
comments that follow appendix IV.
APPENDIX I: OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

To analyze U.S. plans for developing and sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces
(ANSF) and identify the extent to which these plans contain detailed objectives, milestones,
future funding requirements, and sustainability strategies, we reviewed planning documents
from Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, including draft and CSTC-A-approved versions of the Campaign Plan
for the Development of Afghan National Military and Police Forces (Campaign Plan); a
planning document provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense; and a Defense
briefing on ANSF sustainment. We evaluated these documents to determine the extent to
which they contain the four criteria previously recommended by GAO and discussed them
with cognizant Defense officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. We also spoke with officials from the U.S. Central Command and State’s Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs to discuss their contribution to the
Campaign Plan. In addition, while in Kabul, we discussed the Campaign Plan with officials
from Embassy Kabul; the commanding general of CSTC-A and other CSTC-A officials; and
the Afghan Minister of Defense. Finally, we examined the Afghanistan Compact and
Afghanistan National Development Strategy to gain familiarity with documents developed by
Afghanistan and the international community. The information on foreign law in this report
32 GAO
does not reflect our independent legal analysis but is based on interviews and secondary
sources.
To determine the progress made and challenges faced by the United States in building the
Afghan National Army (ANA), we reviewed monthly assessment reports produced by Task
Force Phoenix and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as documents obtained from several other
Defense offices and agencies, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense, CSTC-A, the
Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and the U.S. Army Force Management Support
Agency. In addition, we met with the following officials to discuss the progress made and
challenges faced by the United States in building the ANA:
• In the Washington, D.C., area, we met with officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency,
the U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency, the Defense Intelligence
Agency, and State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs.
• In Kabul, Afghanistan, we met with personnel mentoring the army; officials from
CSTC-A, including its commanding general; Task Force Phoenix; Embassy Kabul;
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; MPRI; and the Afghan Ministry of Defense,
including the Minister of Defense. We also visited an equipment warehouse and
army training facilities. Moreover, we interviewed officials based in Afghanistan by
telephone, including several CSTC-A representatives.
To determine the progress made and challenges faced by the United States in building the
Afghan National Police (ANP), we reviewed monthly assessment reports produced by Task
Force Phoenix and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as documents obtained from several other
Defense offices and agencies, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense, CSTC-A, the
Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and the U.S. Army Force Management Support
Agency. In addition, we met with the following officials to discuss the progress made and
challenges faced by the United States in building the ANP:
• In the Washington, D.C., area, we met with officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency,
the U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency, the Defense Intelligence
Agency, State’s Bureaus of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
and Political-Military Affairs, and DynCorp International.
• In Kabul, Afghanistan, we met with U.S. police mentors; officials from CSTC-A,
including its commanding general; Task Force Phoenix; Embassy Kabul; the United
Nations; DynCorp International; MPRI; and the Afghan Ministry of Interior,
including the Minister of Interior. We also visited an equipment warehouse and
police training facilities. Further, we interviewed officials based in Afghanistan by
telephone, including representatives of CSTC-A, DynCorp International, and the
United Nations Development Programme’s Law and Order Trust Fund for
Afghanistan.
Additionally, we asked State to provide weekly progress reports produced by DynCorp

International for 2005, 2006, and 2007. To identify challenges faced by the police, we
conducted a content analysis to categorize and summarize the observations contained in these
reports. Specifically, we independently proposed categories, agreed on the relevant

categories, reviewed reports, and categorized the observations contained therein. Instances
discussed in more than one report were only categorized and counted the first time they
appeared. To ensure the validity and reliability of this analysis, we reconciled any differences.
Once all differences were reconciled, we analyzed the data to identify the challenges most
often discussed. Because State did not provide us a complete set of reports for 2005 or 2006,
we were only able to perform this analysis on 2007 reports.
To determine the reliability of the data we collected on funding, mentors, equipment, and
ANSF personnel numbers and capability, we compared and corroborated information from
multiple sources and interviewed cognizant officials regarding the processes they used to
compile the data.
• To determine the completeness and consistency of U.S. and international funding

data, we compiled and compared data from Defense, State, and other donor countries
with information from cognizant U.S. agency officials in Washington, D.C. We also
compared the funding data with appropriations and authorization legislation,
congressional budget requests, and reports to Congress to corroborate their accuracy.
Additionally, we compared the funding data with our May 2007 Afghanistan report.1
Differences between table 1 in this report and the funding chart presented in our May
2007 report are due to the following factors:
• Certain funds were removed, such as those provided to support a protective detail for
Afghanistan’s President, because agency officials later clarified that these dollars did
not support efforts to train and equip the ANSF, while certain funds were added, such
as those used to provide support for counter narcotics police, because agency
officials later clarified that these dollars supported efforts to train and equip the
ANSF.
• For fiscal years 2007 and 2008, totals printed in May 2007 included budget requests.
Subsequently, some of these requested totals changed, such as the allocation of
money in Defense’s 2008 Global War on Terror request and Defense’s support of
efforts to train and equip Afghan counter narcotics police.
Although we did not audit the funding data and are not expressing an opinion on them,
based on our examination of the documents received and our discussions with cognizant
agency officials, we concluded that the funding data we obtained were sufficiently reliable for
the purposes of this engagement.
• To determine the reliability of data on the number of military mentors, we

corroborated figures in unclassified progress reports against classified mentor
requirements and discussed Defense progress reports with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
We checked the reliability of data on the number of civilian mentors by comparing
Defense and State figures for consistency and speaking to State officials. Finally, we
assessed the reliability of data on European Union police mentors by comparing
Defense, State, and European Union data and checking for inconsistencies. Based on
these assessments and interviews, we determined that these data on mentors were
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this engagement.
34 GAO
• To assess the reliability of equipment data, we compared different lists of equipment

on hand to corroborate their accuracy and interviewed cognizant officials by
telephone to discuss shortages of equipment and procedures for keeping track of
equipment provided to the ANA and ANP. Based on these comparisons and
discussions, we concluded that the equipment data provided to us were sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of this engagement.
• To assess the reliability of ANSF capability figures, we spoke with officials from
CSTC-A, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and State to discuss the processes by which these
data are generated. Additionally, while in Kabul, we attended the monthly meeting
during which Defense officials discuss and determine ANA capability figures.
Moreover, we requested after-action reports to evaluate the capability of ANA troops
in the field. However, Defense officials were not able to provide us with this
documentation. To evaluate the reliability of ANSF personnel numbers, we spoke
with officials from CSTC-A and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Overall, based on our
discussions with cognizant officials, we concluded that ANSF capability and ANA
personnel data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this engagement.
However, based on concerns expressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and highlighted in
our prior work, as well as the results of the census conducted by Defense, we note in
this report that the number of ANP reported as assigned may not be reliable. Because
Defense relies on the number of ANP reported as assigned as a measure of progress
in building the ANP, we include this figure in our report as evidence that the ANP
appear to have grown in number over the last 3 years. However, we also note that
due to concerns about the reliability of the figure, it is difficult to quantify the exact
extent to which the ANP has grown.
We conducted this performance audit from March 2007 through June 2008 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan
and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis
for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives.
APPENDIX II. STRUCTURE OF THE AFGHAN

NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES
The Afghan National Security Forces are comprised of the Afghan National Army and
Afghan National Police. The structure of these organizations is described below. (See table 10
for the Afghan army and table 11 for the Afghan police.)
Combat forces comprise 70 percent of the ANA’s personnel and are divided into five
corps, located in different regions of Afghanistan. Each corps contains a number of brigades,
most of which consist of five battalions: three light infantry battalions, one combat support
battalion, and one combat services support battalion. The exception is the quick reaction force
in 201st corps, which is comprised of one infantry battalion, one mechanized infantry
battalion, and one armored battalion, in place of the three light infantry battalions. Each corps
also includes one battalion of the National Commando Brigade (see figure 8).
Table 10. Structure of the Ministry of Defense and Afghan National Army
Component Description
Ministry of Defense and Department of the Afghan government responsible for developing, fielding, and
General Staff ensuring the operational readiness of the ANA. The Ministry of Defense
develops strategic plans for the defense of Afghanistan. The General Staff
implements Ministry of Defense policies and guidance for the ANA.
Sustaining Institutions and Sustaining institutions and intermediate commands support the Ministry of
Intermediate Commands Defense at an institutional level and include facilities installation and
management, acquisitions, logistics, communications support, regional military
intelligence offices, detainee operations, medical command, ANA training and
recruiting commands, military police, and the Headquarters Support and Security
Brigade, an ANA unit that performs specialist tactical and ceremonial missions.
Combat Forces Operational arm of the ANA, comprising about 70 percent of the total personnel.
Combat forces are divided into five corps, with responsibility for different
regions of Afghanistan.
Afghan Air Corps The air corps provides support for Afghan army and police forces. Once trained,
it will perform missions such as presidential airlift, medical evacuation, training,
and light attack.
Source: GAO analysis of Defense documents.
Table 11. Structure of the Ministry of Interior and Afghan National Police
Ministry of Interior Department of the government of Afghanistan responsible
for the protection of the country’s international borders and
the enforcement of the rule of law
Afghan Uniformed Police Police assigned to police districts and provincial and
regional commands; duties include patrols, crime
prevention, traffic duties, and general policing
Afghan Border Police Provide broad law enforcement capability at international
borders and entry points
Afghan National Civil Order Police Specialized police force trained and equipped to counter
civil unrest and lawlessness
Criminal Investigative Division Lead investigative agency for investigations of national
interest, those with international links, and those concerned
with organized and white-collar crime
Counter Narcotics Police of Lead law enforcement agency charged with reducing
Afghanistan narcotics production and distribution in Afghanistan
Counter Terrorism Police Lead police and law enforcement efforts to defeat terrorism
and insurgency
Standby Police/Highway No longer authorized
Police/Auxiliary Police/Customs
Police
The ANP currently consists of six authorized components under the Ministry of
Interior. The uniformed police, the largest of these six components, report to the police
commanders of each Afghan province. Provincial commanders report to one of five
regional commanders, who report back to the Ministry of Interior. The other five
authorized components of the ANP all report directly to the ministry (see figure 9).
36 GAO
Note: The dashed lines in figure 8 depict the organizational relationship between ANA Corps and
battalions of the National Commando Brigade. Each ANA Corps contains a battalion of the
National Commando Brigade. These battalions are controlled from the Commando Brigade
Headquarters. However, each ANA Corps has the responsibility to provide housing and
administration to the Commando battalions located within its Corps.
Figure 8. Structure of the ANA Combat Forces.
Figure 9. ANP Chain of Command.

APPENDIX III: COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

38 GAO
40 GAO
APPENDIX IV: COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the end of this
appendix.
See comment 1.
42 GAO
See comments 2,3,4,5,6.

The following are GAO’s comments on Defense’s written response, dated May 27, 2008,
to the draft chapter.
GAO COMMENTS
1. Defense states that its document establishes quantitative and qualitative measures to
assess ANSF development. While the 5-page document contains some qualitative measures to
assess ANSF development, it contains only one milestone date, December 2008, when,
according to the document, the ANSF will have achieved initial independent operating
capability. However, this one milestone is not consistent with dates contained in monthly
reports that track manning, training, equipment, and capability, which have fluctuated. While
the monthly updates are useful in providing the status of ANSF capability, each monthly
report is a snapshot in time without consistent baselines that would facilitate an assessment of
progress over time. For example, even though the United States began funding and training
the ANA in 2002, the February 2007 report that was provided to GAO as an attachment to the
5-page document uses three different baselines for assessing the ANSF—July 2005 for the
number of trained and equipped Afghan army and police, June 2006 for the status of the ANA
battalion Training and Readiness Assessments, and the first quarter of 2007 for the status of
ANA and ANP embedded training teams and mentors. However, the report does not refer
back to 2002 in measuring progress. Similarly, the Training and Readiness Assessments that
are provided on a quarterly basis to congressional oversight committees are also snapshots in
time.
2. Defense maintains that the CSTC-A milestones are consistent with those in the 5-page
Defense document. We disagree. The three phases and associated time frames of ANSF
development are articulated differently in the 5-page document and the CSTC-A Campaign
Plan. For example, Phase III in CSTC-A’s Campaign Plan—Transition to Strategic
Partnership—is not identified as a phase in the 5-page document.
Defense also contends that differences between the two documents are due to
developments in the security environment. While this may be true, absent a detailed plan with
specific time frames, it is difficult to assess the extent to which deteriorating security delayed
ANSF development.
3. Defense notes that until government revenues increase in Afghanistan, the
international community will need to sustain the ANSF and that such international support is
required for the “near-term.” Moreover, Defense states that, where appropriate, it supports
efforts to increase government revenues in Afghanistan. However, in the absence of further
detail regarding the expected timeline for increasing government revenues—or the definition
of “near-term”—it remains unclear how long the United States will need to support the
ANSF. As we note in our report, the United States has been a major contributor to this
mission—investing about $16.5 billion to develop the ANSF. Furthermore, current costs to
sustain the force are estimated to be at over $2 billion annually. Given that the Afghan
government is currently unable to support the recurring costs of its security forces and that
U.S. officials estimate this mission could exceed a decade, additional clarity on the estimated
length of time and amount of money needed to complete this mission, and the potential for
Afghan financial contributions, could assist in conducting oversight of the program.
44 GAO
4. Defense states that the 5-page document received by GAO was a longer articulation of
a plan approved by State. However, although Defense and State are partners in training the
ANP, the fact remains State did not participate in the development of the 5-page document
Defense provided to GAO, nor has State developed a plan of its own. Defense’s 5-page
document does share basic end-strength and capability information with two slides on ANSF
development approved by the Principals Committee for ANSF Development. However, these
slides do not themselves constitute a coordinated plan and do not contain elements, such as
intermediate milestones, identified by GAO in our 2005 recommendation and agreed to by
Defense and State as needed.
5. Defense contends that the role of State in ANSF development is articulated in
documents other than the 5-page document provided to GAO. However, while State’s role
may be discussed elsewhere, the 5-page document provided to us by Defense does not
describe the role of State or other key stakeholders. If, as stated, Defense intends this
document to provide strategic-level guidance for the development of the ANSF, including in
it an articulation of the roles and responsibilities of partners and key stakeholders could assist
in implementing and coordinating the program’s efforts. For instance, we note in our report
that the dual chain of command between State and Defense has complicated the efforts of
civilian mentors assisting with the program.
6. We maintain that, without a detailed plan, assessing progress in developing the ANSF
is difficult. While Defense produces various documents that report in detail on the current
status of the ANSF, these documents do not contain consistent baseline data, intermediate
milestones, or consistent end dates necessary to determine if the program is on track to
achieve its desired results within a set time frame. For example, after 6 years and a U.S.
investment of about $16.5 billion in the program, Defense status reports show that, as of April
2008, less than 2 percent (2 of 105) ANA units and no ANP units (0 of 433) are rated as fully
capable and the estimated completion date of these forces is March 2011 and December 2012,
respectively. Defense asserts this is impressive, particularly for the ANA. However, without
interim milestones against which to assess the ANSF, it is difficult to know if this status
constitutes progress or will allow Defense to meet its currently projected completion dates.
Moreover, the completion dates cited by Defense do not constitute firm goals and have
shifted numerous times during the course of our review. For instance, in monthly Defense
reports dated June 2007, November 2007, and May 2008, completion dates for the ANA
fluctuated from December 2008 to September 2010 to March 2011. Likewise, over the same
period, completion dates for the ANP fluctuated from December 2008 to March 2009 to
December 2012, with a 3-month period when the completion date was reported as “to be
determined.” Moreover, as we note in our report, Defense officials stated that completion
dates contained in its monthly status reports did not account for shortfalls in the required
number of mentors and trainers and, therefore, could be subject to further change.
Defense also states that it only began to support independent operations capability for the
ANA in 2006. While it is true that planned capability for the ANA was upgraded in 2006,
absent a detailed plan, it is unclear the extent to which this planned capability upgrade should
be expected to affect the timeline for the development of individual ANA units. Had Defense
implemented GAO’s 2005 recommendation to produce such a plan, it might be able to
provide more clarity on the relationship between planned capability upgrades and program
timelines. Moreover, even though planned ANA capability was upgraded in 2006, prior to
that time, the U.S. invested nearly $3 billion to develop the ANA and reported approximately
20,000 troops trained as of May 2005. Absent a plan with performance measures, such as
planned capability, linked to intermediate milestones and end dates, it is difficult to assess the
results achieved by this financial investment.
REFERENCES
[1] GAO, Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress,
but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined, GAO-05-575 (Washington, D.C.: June 30,
2005).
[2] GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing Afghanistan: Key Issues for
Congressional Oversight, GAO-07-801SP (Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2007).
[3] 31 U.S.C. 712(3).
[4] GAO-05-575.
[5] International assistance may include logistics support, intelligence collection, or
operations planning.
[6] In this report, the term manning includes recruitment of personnel, assignment to duty,
promotion, and retention.
[7] As we reported in 2005, the number 19,600 consisted of 18,300 combat troops and
1,300 personnel assigned to sustaining commands (GAO-05-575).
[8] In this report, U.S. military personnel who train Afghan army units in the field are
referred to as trainers and coalition personnel who train Afghan army units in the field
are referred to as mentors.
[9] In this report, personnel who train Afghan police in the field are collectively referred to
as mentors. U.S. military personnel who train Afghan police in the field are referred to
as military mentors, while contractors who train Afghan police in the field are referred
to as civilian mentors.
[10] The agreement occurred in December 2002 at the Bonn II donor conference near Bonn,
Germany.
[11] Afghanistan National Development Strategy: An Interim Strategy for Security,
Governance, Economic Growth & Poverty Reduction, Volume One, Islamic Republic
of Afghanistan, 2006.
[12] The Afghanistan Compact, The London Conference on Afghanistan, January 31-
February 1, 2006.
[13] Along with increasing the force structure to 80,000 in February 2008, the Afghan
government and its international partners also approved an additional 6,000 ANA
personnel to account for personnel in training or otherwise not assigned to units.
[14] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. 110-181, sec. 1230.
[15] Pub. L. 110-181, sec. 1231.
[16] GAO has previously reported on the need for agencies to take a more strategic approach
to decision making that promotes transparency and ensures that programs and
investments are based on sound plans with measurable, realistic goals and time frames,
prioritized resource needs, and performance measures to gauge progress. See, for
example, GAO, Force Structure: Restructuring and Rebuilding the Army Will Cost
Billions of Dollars for Equipment but the Total Cost Is Uncertain, GAO-08-669T
46 GAO
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 10, 2008). GAO concluded in this report that until the Army
provides a comprehensive plan for its modular restructuring and expansion initiatives,
which identifies progress and total costs, decision makers may not have sufficient
information to assess progress and allocate defense resources among competing
priorities.
[17] GAO-05-575.
[18] Sustainment of the ANSF covers items such as salaries, equipment replacement,
operations and maintenance costs, logistics support costs, and training for replacement
soldiers and police.
[19] The elements of a campaign plan are laid out in Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operations
Planning, December 26, 2006.
[20] In 2005, we reported that Afghan combat troops would complete basic training by the
fall of 2007. The Campaign Plan has identified mid-2010 as the date when basic
training for all ANSF forces would be completed.
[21] In previous planning documents, CM1 is known as “independent operating capability.”
A senior U.S. military official in Afghanistan stated, however, that “full operational
capability” is a more accurate description since Afghan army and police forces may
require coalition support under certain circumstances.
[22] Afghan Tashkils are similar to the Military Table of Organization and Equipment
(MTOE) found in the U.S. military.
[23] When we reported in 2005, the air wing planned for the Afghan army was to provide
secure transportation for the President of Afghanistan. The currently planned air corps
will provide support such as medical evacuation and light attack, in addition to
presidential airlift.
[24] As shown in table 5, CSTC-A provided us with the capability rating for 105 army units.
[25] ANA units have participated with coalition forces in counterinsurgency operations,
assisted in the rescue of hostages, and provided security for peace talks and local
events, among other activities.
[26] While most of the ANA is projected to reach full capability before March 2011, the
Afghan air corps, an important element to providing increased independence to Afghan
forces, is not expected to achieve full capability before this date.
[27] The 32,700 figure represents the number of ANA combat forces trained and assigned to
one of the five ANA Corps as reported by CSTC-A on February 20, 2008.
[28] Defense officials said that because the ANA lacks a death benefit system, soldiers who
have died may remain on the payroll so that their families receive compensation.
[29] Since its implementation, the electronic salary payment program has become more
widely used among ANA personnel–increasing from 2 transactions in February 2006 to
4,227 transactions in July 2007.
[30] CSTC-A documents place ANA re-enlistment rates into three categories: (1) greater
than 65 percent; (2) 50-65 percent; and (3) less than 50 percent.
[31] The requirement for the number and types of U.S. embedded trainers needed to assist in
the development of the ANA and U.S. military mentors to assist in the development of
the ANP is defined in detail by Defense in a classified, formal request for forces
submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. GAO did not assess the adequacy of these
requirements, but rather focused on whether the U.S. has been able to fill these
requirements and the effects, if any, of not being able to do so.
[32] The number of personnel assigned to assist the development of ANA units varies,
depending on the type of ANA unit. As of April 2008, the required number of personnel
for an embedded training team assisting an ANA maneuver battalion, combat support
battalion, or combat services support battalion was 16.
[33] Given the current U.S. embedded trainer shortage, Defense officials have advocated
that NATO members field greater numbers of mentor teams to meet the rising demand
for more trainers and mentors as the number of ANA forces completing basic training
rises. Defense officials have cautioned, however, that increased numbers of mentoring
teams may not necessarily correspond to decreased requirements for U.S. personnel,
especially when mentoring teams operate with restrictions that will not allow them to
accompany ANA units into combat operations.
[34] Between fiscal years 2005 and 2008, funds were provided to support the training and
equipping of the ANA through a variety of budget accounts, with the majority provided
through the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF). ASFF funding allocations are
reported to Congress in four categories: equipment and transportation, infrastructure
development, sustainment activities, and training. The $3.7 billion figure represents the
amount of ASFF funding directed toward equipment and transportation for the Afghan
army.
[35] The 82,000-person end-strength for the ANP includes over 6,000 authorized positions
in the Afghan Ministry of Interior, which oversees the police force.
[36] CSTC-A provided us with capability ratings for 433 police units, which include
uniformed police districts, civil order and border police battalions, and counter
narcotics police units.
[37] This does not include 57 uniformed police districts that Defense assessed as not formed
or not reporting.
[38] According to Defense, the number of police assigned includes personnel who were
already employed as police prior to coalition operations in Afghanistan and have not
necessarily been trained by coalition forces. By contrast, since Afghanistan’s army had
largely dissolved under the Taliban, nearly all army personnel listed as assigned have
been trained by coalition forces.
[39] Additionally, DynCorp officials stated that moving around Afghanistan to conduct
mentoring operations is difficult due to the size of the country and the lack of roads.
GAO is currently performing a separate review of U.S. and donor efforts to build roads
in Afghanistan.
[40] In January 2008, Defense announced the approved deployment of 3,200 additional
Marines to Afghanistan—1,000 to assist in training and development of the ANP and
2,200 to conduct security operations in Afghanistan under the command of the NATO-
led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission.
[41] Prior work by the State and Defense inspectors general highlighted the same challenge
over a year ago.
[42] The $5.9 billion figure includes approximately $736 million of fiscal year 2008 funding
requests. Between fiscal years 2005 and 2008, funds were provided to support the
training and equipping of the ANP through a variety of budget accounts, with the
majority provided through the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF). ASFF funding
allocations are reported to Congress in four categories: equipment and transportation,
infrastructure development, sustainment activities, and training. The $1.3 billion figure
48 GAO
represents the amount of ASFF funding allocated toward equipment and transportation
of the Afghan police.
[43] CSTC-A stated that they worked in conjunction with the Ministry of Interior to develop
equipment requirements for the ANP, which are listed in a document referred to as a
Tashkil.
[44] We limited our analysis to 2007 reporting because State was unable to provide a
complete set of weekly reports for prior years. Instances discussed in more than one
report were only categorized and counted the first time they appeared.
[45] GAO is currently performing a separate review on the accountability of equipment
provided to the ANSF.
[46] Training in supply and property accountability procedures is being provided to the
police by U.S. contractors.
[47] The security situation in Afghanistan, police performance, and retaining and recruiting
police were other top issues identified in our analysis. These topics are discussed
elsewhere in this report.
[48] GAO is currently performing a separate review of U.S. efforts to reform the Afghan
Ministry of Interior and National Police.
[49] Defense documents indicate that the Afghan border police will also eventually be
reconstituted through the Focused District Development initiative; however, according
to a Defense official, it is uncertain when such efforts will begin.
[50] Defense documents indicate that in addition to being trained, a district police force
undergoing Focused District Development will also have corrupt leaders replaced by
nationally vetted ones, receive new salaries on parity with Afghan army salary rates,
and have electronic funds transfer accounts established. Defense has also identified
development of the Afghan justice system as a goal of Focused District Development.
[51] According to State, the first cycle of training at the regional training centers was
completed in February.
Chapter 2
AFGHANISTAN: POST-WAR GOVERNANCE,

SECURITY, AND U.S. POLICY *
Kenneth Katzman
ABSTRACT
U.S. and outside assessments of the effort to stabilize Afghanistan are mixed and
subject to debate; the Administration notes progress on reconstruction, governance and
security in many areas of Afghanistan, particularly the U.S.-led eastern sector of
Afghanistan. However, recent outside studies contain relatively pessimistic assessments,
emphasizing a growing sense of insecurity in areas previously considered secure,
increased numbers of suicide attacks, increasing aggregate poppy cultivation, and
growing divisions within the NATO alliance about total troop contributions and the
relative share of combat primarily in the south. Both the official U.S. as well as outside
assessments are increasingly pointing to Pakistan, and particularly the new Pakistani
government, as failing to prevent Taliban infiltration from Pakistan. To try to gain
momentum against the insurgency, the Administration is adding U.S. troops to the still
combat-intense south, possibly eventually assuming U.S. command of the southern
sector. The Administration also has increased direct U.S. action against Taliban
concentrations inside Pakistan.
Politically, the Afghan central government is relatively stable. The post-Taliban
transition was completed with the convening of a parliament in December 2005; a new
constitution was adopted in January 2004, successful presidential elections were held on
October 9, 2004, and parliamentary elections took place on September 18, 2005. The
parliament has become an arena for factions that have fought each other for nearly three
decades to peacefully resolve differences, as well as a center of political pressure on
President Hamid Karzai, who is running for re-election in 2009. Major regional
strongmen have been marginalized. Afghan citizens are enjoying personal freedoms
forbidden by the Taliban, and women are participating in economic and political life.
Presidential elections are to be held in the fall of 2009, with parliamentary and provincial
elections to follow one year later.
To help stabilize Afghanistan, the United States and partner countries are deploying
a 53,000 troop NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that now
*
Excerpted from CRS Report RL30588, dated June 6, 2008.
50 Kenneth Katzman
commands peacekeeping throughout Afghanistan, including the restive south. Of those,

over 23,000 of the 34,000 U.S. forces in Afghanistan are part of ISAF. The U.S. and
partner forces also run regional enclaves to secure reconstruction (Provincial
Reconstruction Teams, PRTs), and are building an Afghan National Army and National
Police. The United States has given Afghanistan over $23 billion (appropriated, including
FY2008 to date) since the fall of the Taliban, including funds to equip and train Afghan
security forces. About $2 billion in reconstruction aid is requested for FY2009, including
in a FY2009 supplemental appropriations request. Breakdowns are shown in the tables at
the end of the chapter.
BACKGROUND TO RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Prior to the founding of a monarchy in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani, Afghanistan was
territory inhabited by tribes and tribal confederations linked to neighboring nations, not a
distinct entity. King Amanullah Khan (1919-1929) launched attacks on British forces in
Afghanistan shortlyafter taking power and won complete independence from Britain as
recognized in the Treaty of Rawalpindi (August 8, 1919). He was considered a secular
modernizer presiding over a government in which all ethnic minorities participated. He was
succeeded by King Mohammad Nadir Shah (1929-1933), and then by King Mohammad Zahir
Shah. Zahir Shah’s reign (1933-1973) is remembered fondly by many older Afghans for
promulgating a constitution in 1964 that established a national legislature and promoting
freedoms for women, including freeing them from coveringtheir face and hair. However,
possibly believing that he could limit Soviet support for communist factions in Afghanistan,
Zahir Shah also entered into a significant political and arms purchase relationship with the
Soviet Union.
Afghanistan’s slide into instability began in the 1970s when the diametrically opposed
Communist Party and Islamic movements grew in strength. While receiving medical
treatment in Italy, Zahir Shah was overthrown by his cousin, Mohammad Daoud, a military
leader who established a dictatorship with strong state involvement in the economy.
Communists overthrew Daoud in 1978, led by Nur Mohammad Taraki, who was displaced a
year later by Hafizullah Amin, leader of a rival faction. They tried to impose radical socialist
change on a traditional society, in part by redistributing land and bringingmore women into
government, sparking rebellion by Islamic parties opposed to such moves. The Soviet Union
sent troops into Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, to prevent a seizure of power by the
Islamic militias, known as the mujahedin (Islamic fighters). Upon their invasion, the Soviets
replaced Hafizullah Amin with an ally, Babrak Karmal.
Soviet occupation forces were never able to pacify the outlying areas of the country. The
mujahedin benefited from U.S. weapons and assistance, provided through the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) in cooperation with Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence
directorate (ISI). That weaponry included portable shoulder-fired anti-aircraft systems called
“Stingers,” which proved highly effective against Soviet aircraft. The mujahedin also hid and
stored weaponry in a large network of natural and manmade tunnels and caves throughout
Afghanistan. The Soviet Union’s losses mounted, and Soviet domestic opinion turned anti-
war. In 1986, after the reformist Mikhail Gorbachev became leader, the Soviets replaced
Karmal with the director of Afghan intelligence, Najibullah Ahmedzai (known by his first
name).
Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy 51
On April 14, 1988, Gorbachev agreed to a U.N.-brokered accord (the Geneva Accords)
requiring it to withdraw. The withdrawal was completed by February 15, 1989, leaving in
place the weak Najibullah government. The United States closed its embassy in Kabul in
January 1989, as the Soviet Union was completing its pullout. A warming of relations moved
the United States and Soviet Union to try for a political settlement to the Afghan conflict, a
trend accelerated by the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, which reduced Moscow’s
capacity for supporting communist regimes in the Third World. On September 13, 1991,
Moscow and Washington agreed to a joint cutoff of military aid to the Afghan combatants.
The State Department has said that a total of about $3 billion in economic and covert
military assistance was provided by the U.S. to the Afghan mujahedin from 1980 until the end
of the Soviet occupation in 1989. Press reports say the covert aid program grew from about
$20 million per year in FY1980 to about $300 million per year during FY1986-FY1990. The
Soviet pullout decreased the perceived strategic value of Afghanistan, causing a reduction in
subsequent covert funding.[1]
With Soviet backing withdrawn, on March 18, 1992, Najibullah publiclyagreed to step
down once an interim government was formed. That announcement set off a wave of
rebellions primarily by Uzbek and Tajik militia commanders in northern Afghanistan, who
joined prominent mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masud of the Islamic Society, a largely
Tajik party headed by Burhannudin Rabbani. Masud had earned a reputation as a brilliant
strategist by preventing the Soviets from occupying his power base in the Panjshir Valley of
northeastern Afghanistan. Najibullah fell, and the mujahedin regime began April 18, 1992.[2]
Table 1. Afghanistan Social and Economic Statistics
Population: 31 million
Pashtun 42%; Tajik 27%; Uzbek 9%; Hazara 9%; Aimak 4%; Turkmen 3%;
Ethnic Groups:
Baluch 2%; other 4%
Sunni Muslim (Hanafi school) 80%; Shiite Muslim (Hazaras, Qizilbash, and
Religions:
Isma’ilis) 19%; other 1%
Size of Religious Christians - estimated 500 - 8,000 persons; Sikh and Hindu - 3,000
persons; Bahai’s - 400 (declared blasphemous in May 2007); Jews - 1 person;
Minorities Buddhist - unknown, but small numbers, mostly foreigners. No Christian or
Jewish schools. One church, open only to expatriates.
Literacy Rate: 28% of population over 15 years of age
GDP: $21.5 billion (purchasing power parity). Double the 2002 figure.
GDP Per Capita: $300/yr; but $800 purchasing power parity
GDP Real Growth: 12% (2007)
Unemployment
40%
Rate:
Population: 31 million
Children in 5.7 million, of which 35% are girls. Up from 900,000 in school during
School/Schools Taliban era. 300,000 children in south cannot attend school due to violence. 8,000
Built schools built; 140,000 teachers hired since Taliban era.
82% with basic health services access - compared to 8% during Taliban era,
Afghans With
although access is more limited in restive areas. Infant mortality has dropped 18%
Access to Health
since Taliban to 135 per 1,000 live births. 680 clinics built with U.S. funds since
Coverage
Taliban.
52 Kenneth Katzman
Table 1. (Continued).
Roads Built About 5,000 miles post-Taliban, including ring road around the country.
Access to 20% of the population.
Electricity
Revenues: $715 million in 2007; $550 million 2006
Expenditures $1.2 billion in 2007 (est.); 900 million in 2006
External Debt: $8 billion bilateral, plus $500 million multilateral. U.S. forgave $108 million in
debt to U.S. in 2006
Foreign Exchange
$2.5 billion.
Reserves:
Foreign Investment $500 billion est. for 2007; about $1 billion for 2006
Major Exports: fruits, raisins, nuts, carpets, semi-precious gems, hides, opium
Oil Production: Negligible
Oil Proven 3.6 billion barrels of oil, 36.5 trillion cubic feet of gas, according to Afghan
Reserves: government on March 15, 2006
Major Imports: food, petroleum, capital goods, textiles
Import Partners: Pakistan 38.6%; U.S. 9.5%; Germany 5.5%; India 5.2%; Turkey 4.1%;
Turkmenistan 4.1%
Source: CIA World Factbook, January 2008, Embassy of Afghanistan in Washington, DC; President
Bush speech on February 15, 2007; International Religious Freedom Report, September 14, 2007;
press reports about draft Afghan National Development Strategy.
THE MUJAHEDIN GOVERNMENT AND RISE OF THE TALIBAN

The fall of Najibullah exposed the differences among the mujahedin parties. The leader
of one of the smaller parties (Afghan National Liberation Front), Islamic scholar Sibghatullah
Mojadeddi, was president during April - May 1992. Under an agreement among the major
parties, Rabbani became President in June 1992 with agreement that he would serve until
December 1994. He refused to step down at that time, saying that political authority would
disintegrate without a clear successor. Kabul was subsequently shelled by other mujahedin
factions, particularly that of nominal “Prime Minister” Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, a Pashtun, who
accused Rabbani of monopolizing power. Hikmatyar’s radical Islamist Hizb-e-Islami (Islamic
Party) had received a large proportion of the U.S. aid during the anti-Soviet war. Four years
of civil war (1992-1996) created popular support for the Taliban as a movement that could
deliver Afghanistan from the factional infighting.
In 1993-1994, Afghan Islamic clerics and students, mostly of rural, Pashtun origin, many
of them former mujahedin who had become disillusioned with continued conflict among
mujahedin parties and had moved into Pakistan to study in Islamic seminaries (“madrassas”),
formed the Taliban movement. They practiced an orthodox Sunni Islam called “Wahhabism,”
akin to that practiced in Saudi Arabia. They viewed the Rabbani government as corrupt, anti-
Pashtun, and responsible for civil war. With the help of defections, the Taliban seized control
of the southeastern city of Qandahar in November 1994; by February 1995, it had reached the
gates of Kabul, after which an 18-month stalemate around the capital ensued. In September
1995, the Taliban captured Herat province, bordering Iran, and imprisoned its governor,
Ismail Khan, ally of Rabbani and Masud, who later escaped and took refuge in Iran. In
September 1996, Taliban victories near Kabul led to the withdrawal of Rabbani and Masud to
the Panjshir Valley north of Kabul with most of their heavy weapons; the Taliban took
control of Kabul on September 27, 1996. Taliban gunmen subsequently entered a U.N.
facility in Kabul to seize Najibullah, his brother, and aides, and then hanged them.
Taliban Rule
The Taliban regime was led by Mullah Muhammad Umar, who lost an eye in the anti-
Soviet war while fighting under the banner of the Hizb-e-Islam (Islamic Party of Yunis
Khalis). Umar held the title of Head of State and “Commander of the Faithful,” but he mostly
remained in the Taliban power base in Qandahar, rarely appearing in public. Umar forged a
close bond with bin Laden and refused U.S. demands to extradite him. Born in Uruzgan
province, Umar is about 64 years old.
The Taliban progressively lost international and domestic support as it imposed strict
adherence to Islamic customs in areas it controlled and employed harsh punishments,
including executions. The Taliban authorized its “Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and
the Suppression of Vice” to use physical punishments to enforce strict Islamic practices,
including bans on television, Western music, and dancing. It prohibited women from
attending school or working outside the home, except in health care, and it publicly executed
some women for adultery. In what many consider its most extreme action, in March 2001 the
Taliban blew up two large Buddha statues carved into hills above Bamiyan city as
representations of idolatry. (Additional damage to the remaining structure was inflicted in
May 2008 from an accidental detonation of explosives near the site.)
The Clinton Administration held talks with the Taliban before and after it took power, but
relations quickly deteriorated. The United States withheld recognition of Taliban as the
legitimate government of Afghanistan, formally recognizing no faction as the government.
Because of the lack of broad international recognition, the United Nations seated
representatives of the ousted Rabbani government, not the Taliban. The State Department
ordered the Afghan embassy in Washington, DC, closed in August 1997. U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1193 (August 28, 1998) and 1214 (December 8, 1998) urged the Taliban
to end discrimination against women. Several U.S.-based women’s rights groups urged the
Clinton Administration not to recognize the Taliban government, and in May 1999, the
Senate passed a resolution (S.Res. 68) calling on the President not to recognize any Afghan
government that discriminates against women.
The Taliban’s hosting of Al Qaeda’s leadership gradually became the Clinton
Administration’s overriding agenda item with Afghanistan. In April 1998, then U.S.
Ambassador to the United Nations Bill Richardson visited Afghanistan and asked the Taliban
to hand over bin Laden, but was rebuffed. After the August 7, 1998, Al Qaeda bombings of
U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the Clinton Administration progressively pressured
the Taliban, imposing U.S. sanctions and achieving adoption of some U.N. sanctions as well.
On August 20, 1998, the United States fired cruise missiles at alleged Al Qaeda training
camps in eastern Afghanistan, but bin Laden was not hit. Some observers assert that the
Administration missed several other opportunities to strike him. Clinton Administration
officials say that they did not try to oust the Taliban from power with U.S. military force
because domestic U.S. support for those steps was then lacking and the Taliban’s opponents
were too weak and did not necessarily hold U.S. values.
54 Kenneth Katzman
The “Northern Alliance” Congeals

The Taliban’s policies caused different Afghan factions to ally with the ousted President
Rabbani and Masud and their ally in the Herat area, Ismail Khan — the Tajik core of the anti-
Taliban opposition — into a broader “Northern Alliance.” In the Alliance were Uzbek,
Hazara Shiite, and even some Pashtun Islamist factions discussed in the table at the end of
this chapter (Table 17).
• Uzbeks/General Dostam. One major Alliance faction was the Uzbek militia (the
Junbush-Melli, or National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan) of General Abdul
Rashid Dostam, who is frequently referred to by some Afghans as one of the
“warlords” who gained power during the anti-Soviet war, although Dostam had
earlier contributed to efforts to oust Rabbani.
• Hazara Shiites. Members of Hazara tribes, mostly Shiite Muslims, are prominent in
Bamiyan Province (central Afghanistan) and are always wary of repression by
Pashtuns and other larger ethnic factions. During the various Afghan wars, the main
Hazara Shiite grouping was Hizb-e-Wahdat (Unity Party, an alliance of eight smaller
groups).
• Pashtun Islamists/Sayyaf. Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf, who is now a parliament
committee chairman, headed a Pashtun-dominated mujahedin faction called the
Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan. Even though his ideology is similar
to that of the Taliban, Sayyaf joined the Northern Alliance.
Bush Administration Policy Pre-September 11, 2001
Prior to the September 11 attacks, Bush Administration policy toward the Taliban
resembled Clinton Administration policy — applying economic and political pressure while
retaining dialogue with the Taliban, and refraining from providing military assistance to the
Northern Alliance. The September 11 Commission report said that, in the months prior to the
September 11 attacks, Administration officials leaned toward such a step and that some
officials wanted to assist anti-Taliban Pashtun forces. Other covert options were under
consideration as well.[3] In a departure from Clinton Administration policy, the Bush
Administration stepped up engagement with Pakistan to try to end its support for the Taliban.
In accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1333, in February 2001 the State
Department ordered the Taliban representative office in New York closed, although the
Taliban representative continued to operate informally. In March 2001, Administration
officials received a Taliban envoy to discuss bilateral issues.
Fighting with some Iranian, Russian, and Indian financial and military support, the
Northern Alliance continued to lose ground to the Taliban after it lost Kabul in 1996. By the
time of the September 11 attacks, the Taliban controlled at least 75% of the country,
including almost all provincial capitals. The Alliance suffered a major setback on September
9, 2001, two days before the September 11 attacks, when Ahmad Shah Masud was
assassinated by alleged Al Qaeda suicide bombers posing as journalists. He was succeeded by
his intelligence chief, Muhammad Fahim, a veteran figure but who lacked Masud’s
undisputed authority.
September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom

After the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration decided to militarily overthrow
the Taliban when it refused to extradite bin Laden, judging that a friendly regime in Kabul
was needed to enable U.S forces to search for Al Qaeda activists there. United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1368 of September 12, 2001 said that the Security Council
“expresses its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond” (implying force) to the
September 11 attacks. In Congress, S.J.Res. 23 (passed 98-0 in the Senate and with no
objections in the House, P.L. 107-40) authorized:[4]
all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons
he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred
on September 11, 2001 or harbored such organizations or persons.
Major combat in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF) began on October 7,

2001. The combat consisted primarily of U.S. air-strikes on Taliban and Al Qaeda forces,
facilitated bythe cooperation between small numbers (about 1,000) of U.S. special operations
forces and the Northern Alliance and Pashtun anti-Taliban forces. Some U.S. ground units
(about 1,300 Marines) moved into Afghanistan to pressure the Taliban around Qandahar at
the height of the fighting (October-December 2001), but there were few pitched battles
between U.S. and Taliban soldiers; most of the ground combat was between Taliban and its
Afghan opponents. Some critics believe that U.S. dependence on local Afghan militia forces
in the war strengthened the militias in the post-war period.
The Taliban regime unraveled rapidly after it lost Mazar-e-Sharif on November 9, 2001.
Northern Alliance forces — the commanders of which had initially promised U.S. officials
they would not enter Kabul — entered the capital on November 12, 2001, to popular
jubilation. The Taliban subsequently lost the south and east to pro-U.S. Pashtun leaders, such
as Hamid Karzai. The end of the Taliban regime is generally dated as December 9, 2001,
when the Taliban surrendered Qandahar and Mullah Omar fled the city, leaving it under tribal
law administered by Pashtun leaders such as the Noorzai clan. Subsequently, U.S. and
Afghan forces conducted “Operation Anaconda” in the Shah-i-Kot Valley south of Gardez
(Paktia Province) during March 2-19, 2002, against 800 Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters. In
March 2003, about 1,000 U.S. troops raided suspected Taliban or Al Qaeda fighters in
villages around Qandahar. On May 1, 2003, then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld announced
an end to “major combat operations.”
POST-WAR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION[5]

The war paved the way for the success of a decade-long U.N. effort to form a broad-
based Afghan government; the United Nations was viewed as a credible mediator by all sides
largely because of its role in ending the Soviet occupation. During the 1990s, proposals from
a succession of U.N. mediators incorporated many of former King Zahir Shah’s proposals for
a government to be selected by a traditional assembly, or loya jirga. However, U.N.-mediated
cease-fires between warring factions always broke down. Non-U.N. initiatives made little
progress, particularly the “Six Plus Two” multilateral contact group, which began meeting in
1997 (the United States, Russia, and the six states bordering Afghanistan: Iran, China,
56 Kenneth Katzman
Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan). Other failed efforts included a “Geneva
group” (Italy, Germany, Iran, and the United States) formed in 2000; an Organization of
Islamic Conference (OIC) contact group; and Afghan exile efforts, including one from the
Karzai clan (including Hamid Karzai) and one centered on Zahir Shah.
Political Transition
Immediately after the September 11 attacks, former U.N. mediator Lakhdar Brahimi was
brought back (he had resigned in frustration in October 1999). U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1378 was adopted on November 14, 2001, calling for a “central” role for the
United Nations in establishing a transitional administration and inviting member states to
send peacekeeping forces to promote stability and aid delivery. After the fall of Kabul in
November 2001, the United Nations invited major Afghan factions, most prominently the
Northern Alliance and that of the former King — but not the Taliban — to a conference in
Bonn, Germany.
Bonn Agreement
On December 5, 2001, the factions signed the “Bonn Agreement.”[6] It was endorsed by
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1385 (December 6, 2001). The agreement, reportedly
forged with substantial Iranian diplomatic help because of Iran’s support for the Northern
Alliance faction:
• formed the interim administration headed by Hamid Karzai.

• authorized an international peace keeping force to maintain security in Kabul, and
Northern Alliance forces were directed to withdraw from the capital. Security
Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001) gave formal Security Council
authorization for the international peacekeeping force.
• referred to the need to cooperate with the international community on counter
narcotics, crime, and terrorism.
• applied the constitution of 1964 until a permanent constitution could be drafted.[7]
Permanent Constitution
A June 2002 “emergency” loya jirga put a representative imprimatur on the transition; it
was attended by 1,550 delegates (including about 200 women) from Afghanistan’s 376
districts. Subsequently, a 35-member constitutional commission drafted the permanent
constitution, and unveiled in November 2003. It was debated by 502 delegates, selected in
U.N.- run caucuses, at a “constitutional loya jirga (CLJ)” during December 13, 2003-January
4, 2004. The CLJ, chaired by Mojadeddi (mentioned above), ended with approval of the
constitution with only minor changes. Most significantly, members of the Northern Alliance
faction failed to set up a prime minister-ship, but they did achieve limits to presidential
powers by having major authorities assigned to an elected parliament, such as the power to
veto senior official nominees and to impeach a president. The constitution made former King
Zahir Shah honorary “Father of the Nation” - a title that is not heritable. Zahir Shah died on
July 23, 2007.[8] The constitution also set out timetables for presidential, provincial, and
district elections (by June 2004) and stipulated that, if possible, they should be held
simultaneously.
Hamid Karzai
Hamid Karzai, about 56, was selected to lead Afghanistan because he was a
credible Pashtun leader who seeks factional compromise rather than intimidation
through armed force. On the other hand, some observers believe him too willing to
compromise with rather than confront regional and other faction leaders, and to
tolerate corruption, resulting in a failure to professionalize government. Others say he
seeks to maintain Pashtun predominance in his government. From Karz village in
Qandahar Province, Hamid Karzai has led the powerful Popolzai tribe of Durrani
Pashtuns since 1999, when his father was assassinated, allegedly by Taliban agents, in
Quetta, Pakistan. Karzai attended university in India. He was deputy foreign minister
in Rabbani’s government during 1992-1995, but he left the government and supported
the Taliban as a Pashtun alternative to Rabbani. He broke with the Taliban as its
excesses unfolded and forged alliances with other anti-Taliban factions, including the
Northern Alliance. Karzai entered Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks to
organize Pashtun resistance to the Taliban, supported by U.S. special forces. He
became central to U.S. efforts after Pashtun commander Abdul Haq entered
Afghanistan in October 2001 without U.S. support and was captured and hung by the
Taliban. Some of his several brothers have lived in the United States, including
Qayyum Karzai, who won a parliament seat in the September 2005 election. With
heavy protection, he has survived several assassination attempts since taking office,
including rocket fire or gunfire at or near his appearances.
National Elections
Ultimately, it proved impractical to hold all elections simultaneously. The first election
was for president and it was held on October 9, 2004, missing the June deadline. The voting
was orderly and turnout heavy (about 80%). On November 3, 2004, Karzai was declared
winner (55.4% of the vote) over his seventeen challengers on the first round, avoiding a
runoff. Parliamentary and provincial council elections were intended for April-May 2005 but
were delayed until September 18, 2005. Because of the difficulty in confirming voter
registration rolls and determining district boundaries, elections for the 376 district councils,
each of which will have small and likely contentious boundaries, have not been held.
For the parliamentary election, voting was conducted for individuals running in each
province, not as party slates. (There are now 90 registered political parties in Afghanistan, but
parties remain unpopular because of their linkages to outside countries during the anti-Soviet
war.) When parliament first convened on December 18, 2005, the Northern Alliance bloc,
joined by others, selected a senior Northern Alliance figure, who was Karzai’s main
competitor in the presidential election, Yunus Qanooni, for speaker of the lower house. In
April 2007, Qanooni and Northern Alliance political leader Rabbani organized this opposition
bloc, along with ex-Communists and some royal family members, into a party called the
“National Front” that wants increased parliamentary powers and direct elections for the
provincial governors. The 102-seat upper house, selected by the provincial councils and
58 Kenneth Katzman
Karzai, consists mainly of older, well known figures, as well as 17 females (half of Karzai’s
34 appointments, as provided for in the constitution). The leader of that body is Sibghatullah
Mojadeddi, the pro-Karzai elder statesman.
Next Elections and Candidates

The next presidential elections are expected to be held in the fall of 2009. The Wolesi
Jirga voted on February 13, 2008 to hold parliamentary and provincial elections in 2010,
separate from the 2009 presidential elections, although discussions on combining all the
elections are continuing, given the high cost ($100 million per election). The indecision on
this question is holding up U.N. and other efforts to help Afghanistan plan the elections and
register voters. An election law was submitted for parliamentary approval in November 2007
and is being considered there. Karzai has said, in a Washington Post interview of January 27,
2008, and again in another interview on April 6, 2008, that he would run for re-election.
Qanooni might run again but some say that the senior Northern Alliance leader Burhannuddin
Rabbani, who is about 75 years old, might run instead. Some Afghans say independent
parliamentarian Ramazan Bashardost, a Hazara, might run, as might former Interior Minister
Ali Jalali, a Pashtun. There has been speculation in recent press articles that the Afghan-born
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Zalmay Khalilzad, who has served as Ambassador to
Afghanistan and has been extensively involved in Afghan issues in his U.S. career, might run
for President of Afghanistan. Khalilzad has dampened but not outright denied the speculation.
Governance Issues
With a permanent national government fully assembled, Karzai and the parliament —
relations between which are often contentious — are attempting to improve and expand
governance throughout the country. In testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on
February 28, 2008, Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell said that the Karzai
government controls only 30% of the country, while the Taliban controls 10%, and tribes and
local groups control the remainder;
U.S. officials in Kabul told CRS in March 2008 they disagree with that assessment as too
pessimistic. At the same time, there is a broader debate among Afghans over whether to
continue to strengthen central government — the approach favored by Karzai and the United
States and most of its partners — or to promote local solutions to security and governance, an
approach that some international partners, such as Britain, want to explore.
The parliament has asserted itself on several occasions, for example in the process of
confirming a post-election cabinet and in forcing Karzai to oust several major conservatives
from the Supreme Court in favor of those with more experience in modern jurisprudence. In
mid-2007, parliament enacted a law granting amnesty to commanders who fought in the
various Afghan wars since the Soviet invasion — some of whom are now members of
parliament — in an attempt to put past schisms to rest in building a new Afghanistan. The law
was rewritten to give victims the ability to bring accusations of past abuses forward; its status
is unclear because Karzai did not veto it but he did not sign it either.
In a sign of tension between Karzai and his opposition in parliament, in May 2007, the
National Front bloc engineered a vote of no confidence against Foreign Minister Rangeen
Spanta and Minister for Refugee Affairs Akbar Akbar for failing to prevent Iran from
expelling 50,000 Afghan refugees over a one-month period. Karzai accepted in principle the
dismissal of Akbar but deferred Spanta’s dismissal because refugee affairs are not his
ministry’s prime jurisdiction. The Afghan Supreme Court has sided with Karzai, causing
some National Front bloc members to threaten to resign from the parliament, an action they
believe would shake confident in Karzai’s leadership. Spanta remains in his position, to date,
but the dispute is unresolved. The Front conducted a walkout of parliament on November 26,
2007, to protest what it said was Karzai’s inattention to parliament’s views on whether or not
panic by security forces caused additional deaths following the November 6, 2007, suicide
bombing in Baghlan Province that killed 6 parliamentarians and about 70 other persons.
On the other hand, on some less contentious issues, the executive and the legislature
appear to be working well. Since the end of 2007, the Wolesi Jirga has passed and forwarded
to the Meshrano Jirga several laws, including a labor law, a mines law, a law on economic
cooperatives, and a convention on tobacco control. The Wolesi Jirga also has recently
confirmed Karzai nominees for a new Minster of Refugee Affairs, head of the Central Bank,
and the final justice to fill out the Supreme Court. (For further information, see CRS Report
RS21922, Afghanistan: Government Formation and Performance.)
U.N. Involvement
The international community is extensively involved in Afghan stabilization, not only in
the security field but in diplomacy and reconstruction assistance. Some of the debate over the
growing role of U.S. partners there was represented in a proposal to create a new position of
“super envoy” that would represent the United Nations, the European Union, and NATO in
Afghanistan. This would subsume the role of the head of the U.N. Assistance Mission in
Afghanistan (UNAMA). In January 2008, with U.S. support, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki
Moon tentatively appointed British diplomat Paddy Ashdown to this “super envoy” position,
but President Karzai rejected the appointment reportedly over concerns about the scope of
authority of such an envoy, in particular its potential to dilute the U.S. role in Afghanistan.
Karzai might have also sought to show a degree of independence from the international
community. Ashdown withdrew his name on January 28, 2008.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1806 of March 20, 2008, extends UNAMA’s mandate
for another year and expands it to include some of the “super-envoy” concept. UNAMA is co-
chair of the joint Afghan-international community coordination body called the Joint
Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), and Resolution 1806 directs UNAMA, in that
capacity, to coordinate the work of international donors and strengthen cooperation between
the international peacekeeping force (ISAF, see below) and the Afghan government.
UNAMA is helping implement the five-year development strategy outlined in a “London
Compact,” (now called the Afghanistan Compact) adopted at the January 31-February 1,
2006, London conference on Afghanistan. The priorities developed in that document also
comport with current drafts of Afghanistan’s own “National Strategy for Development,” to be
presented later in June 2008 in Paris, as discussed further below under “assistance.” The head
of UNAMA as of March 2008, and with the expanded powers, is Norwegian diplomat Kai
Eide. In speeches in Washington, D.C. in late April 2008, Eide said that additional capacity-
building resources are needed, and that some efforts by international donors duplicate each
other or are tied to purchasing decisions by Western countries.
60 Kenneth Katzman
Expanding Central Government Writ and Curbing “Warlords”

U.S. policy believes that stability and countering corruption and narcotics trafficking
depends on expanding the capacity, proficiency, and writ of the Afghan central government.
A Washington Post report of November 25, 2007, said that the failure to build capacity, as
well as government corruption and compromises with local factions, are major contributors to
a sense within the Administration of only limited U.S. success in stabilizing Afghanistan.
That same report echoed the concerns of U.S. commanders and officials that Taliban militants
are able to infiltrate “un-governed space,” contributing to the persistence and in some areas
the expansion of the Taliban insurgency. On the other hand, a February 2008 U.N. report on
the narcotics situation, discussed below, says that governance is improving and growing in
northern and parts of relatively restive eastern Afghanistan, contributing to a reduction of
opium cultivation there.
U.S. officials continue to try to bolster Karzai through repeated statements of support and
top level exchanges, including several visits there by Vice President Cheney and one by
President Bush (March 1, 2006). President Karzai has visited the United States repeatedly,
including two days of meetings with President Bush at Camp David (August 5 and 6, 2007).
They met again on September 26, 2007 in the context of U.N. General Assembly meetings in
New York, and again on the sidelines of the April 2008 NATO meeting in Bucharest,
Romania.
A key part of the U.S. strategy to strengthen the central government is to help Karzai curb
key regional strongmen and local militias – who some refer to as “warlords.” Karzai has cited
these actors as a major threat to Afghan stability because of their arbitrary administration of
justice and generation of popular resentment through their demands for bribes and other
favors. Some argue that Afghans have always sought substantial regional autonomy, but
others say that easily purchased arms and manpower, funded by narcotics trafficking, sustains
local militias as well as the Taliban insurgency.
Karzai has, to some extent, marginalized most of the largest regional leaders.
• Herat governor Ismail Khan was removed in September 2004 and was later
appointed Minister of Water and Energy. On the other hand, Khan was tapped by
Karzai to help calm Herat after Sunni-Shiite clashes there in February2006, clashes
that some believe were stoked by Khan to demonstrate his continued influence in
Herat.
• In April 2005, Dostam was appointed Karzai’s top military advisor, and in April
2005 he “resigned” as head of his Junbush Melli faction. However, in May 2007 his
followers in the north were again restive (conducting large demonstrations) in
attempting to force out the anti-Dostam governor of Jowzjan Province. In February
2008, Afghan police surrounded Dostam’s home in Kabul, but did not arrest him, in
connection with the alleged beating of a political opponent by Dostam supporters.
According to observers in Kabul, Karzai continues to weigh arresting him.
• Another key figure, former Defense Minister Fahim (Northern Alliance) was
appointed by Karzai to the upper house of parliament, although he remained in that
body only a few months. The appointment was intended to give him a stake in the
political process and reduce his potential to activate Northern Alliance militia
loyalists. Fahim continues to turn heavy weapons over to U.N. and Afghan forces
(including four Scud missiles), although the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
(UNAMA) says that large quantities of weapons remain in the Panjshir Valley.
• In July 2004, Karzai moved charismatic Northern Alliance figure Atta Mohammad
Noor from control of a militia in the Mazar-e-Sharif area to governor of Balkh
province, although he reportedly remains resistant to central government control.
Still, his province is now “cultivation free” of opium, according to the U.N.Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reports since August 2007.
• Two other large militia leaders, Hazrat Ali (Jalalabad area) and Khan Mohammad
(Qandahar area) were placed in civilian police chief posts in 2005; Hazrat Ali was
subsequently elected to parliament.
Provincial Governorships
Karzai has tried to use his power to appoint provincial governors to extend government
authority, although some question his choices and others say he has a limited talent pool of
corruption free officials to choose from. The key Afghan initiative to improve local
governance is the formation in October 2007 of the “Independent Directorate of Local
Governance” headed by Jelani Popal and reporting to the presidential office. This represents
and attempt to to institute a more effective and systematic process for selecting capable
governors by taking the screening function away from the Interior Ministry. The directorate is
also selecting police chiefs and other local office holders, and in many cases has already
begun removing allegedly corrupt local officials.
Forming the directorate represents an attempt by Karzai to build on his efforts since 2005
to appointed some relatively younger technocrats in key governorships: these include
Qandahar governor Asadullah Khalid, Paktika governor Muhammad Akram Khapalwak,
Khost governor Arsala Jamal, who U.S. commanders say has played a major role in
governance progress there, and Paktia governor Abdul Hakim Taniwal. (Taniwal was killed
in a suicide bombing on September 10, 2006.) Another key appointee has been Kabul
province governor Hajji Din Mohammad, son of the slain “Jalalabad Shura” leader Hajji Abd
al-Qadir. In March 2008, Karzai replaced the weak and ineffective Helmand governor
Asadullah Wafa with Gulab Mangal. Mangal is considered a competent administrator, but he
is from Laghman province, not Helmand, somewhat to the consternation of Helmand
residents.
Other pro-Karzai governors, such as Nangahar’s Ghul Agha Shirzai, are considered
corrupt and politically motivated rather than technically competent, although Shirzai is
credited with helping weaken the Taliban in Nangahar. In July 2007, Karzai removed the
governor of Kapisa province for saying that Karzai’s government was weak and thereby
failing to curb the Taliban insurgency.
DDR and DIAG Programs
A cornerstone of the effort to strengthen the central government was a program, run by
UNAMA, to dismantle identified and illegal militias. The program, which formally concluded
on June 30, 2006, was the “DDR” program: Disarmament, Demobilization, and
Reintegration. The program was run in partnership with Japan, Britain, and Canada, with
participation of the United States. The program had gotten off to a slow start because the
Afghan Defense Ministry did not reduce the percentage of Tajiks in senior positions by a July
1, 2003, target date, dampening Pashtun recruitment. In September 2003, Karzai replaced 22
62 Kenneth Katzman
senior Tajik Defense Ministry officials with Pashtuns, Uzbeks, and Hazaras, enabling DDR to
proceed.
The DDR program had initially been expected to demobilize 100,000 fighters, although
that figure was later reduced. Figures for accomplishment of the DDR and DIAG programs
are contained in the security indicators table later in this chapter. Of those demobilized,
55,800 former fighters have exercised reintegration options provided by the program: starting
small businesses, farming, and other options. U.N. officials say at least 25% of these have
thus far found long-term, sustainable jobs. Some studies criticized the DDR program for
failing to prevent a certain amount of rearmament of militiamen or stockpiling of weapons
and for the rehiring of some militiamen in programs run by the United States and its
partners.[9] Part of the DDR program was the collection and cantonment of militia weapons.
However, some accounts say that only poor quality weapons were collected. UNAMA
officials say that vast quantities of weapons are still kept by the Northern Alliance faction in
the Panjshir Valley, although the faction is giving up some weapons to UNAMA slowly, in
small weekly shipments. Figures for collected weapons are contained in the table. The total
cost of the program was $141 million, funded by Japan and other donors, including the
United States.
Since June 11, 2005, the disarmament effort has emphasized another program called
“DIAG,” Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups. It is run by the Afghan Disarmament and
Reintegration Commission, headed by Vice President Khalili. Under the DIAG, no payments
are available to fighters, and the program depends on persuasion rather than use of force
against the illegal groups. DIAG has not been as well funded as was DDR: it has received $11
million in operating funds. As an incentive for compliance, Japan and other donors made
available $35 million for development projects where illegal groups have disbanded. These
incentives were intended to accomplish the disarmament, by December 2007, of a pool of as
many as 150,000 members of 1,800 different “illegal armed groups”: militiamen that were not
part of recognized local forces (Afghan Military Forces, AMF) and were never on the rolls of
the Defense Ministry. These goals have not been met in part because armed groups in the
south fear the continued Taliban combat activity and refuse to disarm voluntarily, but
UNAMA reports that some progress has been achieved, as shown in the security indicators
table.
U.S. Embassy Operations/Budgetary Support to Afghan Government

A key component of U.S. efforts to strengthen the Afghan government has been
maintaining a large diplomatic presence. Zalmay Khalilzad, an American of Afghan origin,
wasambassador during December 2003-August 2005; he reportedly had significant influence
on Afghan government decisions.[10] The current ambassador is William Wood, who
previously was U.S. Ambassador to Colombia and who has focused on the counter-narcotics
issue. As part of a 2003 U.S. push to build government capacity, the Bush Administration
formed a 15-person Afghan Reconstruction Group (ARG), placed within the U.S. Embassy in
Kabul, to serve as advisors to the Afghan government. The group is now mostly focused on
helping Afghanistan attract private investment and develop private industries. The U.S.
embassy, housed in a newly constructed building, has progressively expanded its personnel
and facilities. The tables at the end of this chapter discuss U.S. funding for Embassy
operations, USAID operations, and Karzai protection.
Although the Afghan government has increased its revenue and is covering a growing
proportion of its budget, USAID provides funding to help the Afghan government meet gaps
in its budget – both directly and through a U.N.-run multi-donor Afghan Reconstruction Trust
Fund, ARTF account. Those aid figures, for FY2002-FY2007, are in Table 14 at the end of
the chapter.
Human Rights and Democracy

The Administration and Afghan government claim progress in building a democratic
Afghanistan that adheres to international standards of human rights practices and presumably
is able to earn the support of the Afghan people. The State Department report on human rights
practices for 2007 (released March 11, 2008)[11] said that Afghanistan’s human rights record
remained “poor,” but attributed this primarily to weak governance, corruption, drug
trafficking, and the legacy of decades of conflict. Virtually all observers agree that Afghans
are freer than they were under the Taliban.
The press is relatively free and Afghan political groupings and parties are able to meet
and organize freely, but there are also abuses based on ethnicity or political factionalism and
arbitrary implementation of justice by local leaders. In debate over a new press law, both
houses of parliament have approved a joint version, but Karzai has vetoed it on the grounds
that it gives the government too much control over private media. Even in the absence of the
law, media policy remains highly conservative; in April 2008 the Ministry of Information and
Culture banned five Indian-produced soap operas on the grounds that they are too risque. That
came amid a move by conservative parliamentarians to pass legislation to ban loud music,
men and women mingling in public, video games, and other behavior common in the West.
Since the Taliban era, more than 40 private radio stations, seven television networks, and 350
independent newspapers have opened.
The death penalty has been reinstituted, reversing a 2004 moratorium declared by Karzai.
Fifteen convicts were executed at once on October 7, 2007. In January 2008, Afghanistan’s
“Islamic council,” composed of senior clerics, backed public executions for convicted
murderers and urged Karzai to end the activities of foreign organizations that are converting
Afghans to Christianity.
The State Department International Religious Freedom report for 2007 (released
September 14, 2007 says that “there was an increase in the number of reports of problems
involving religious freedom compared to previous years.” There continues to be
discrimination against the Shiite (Hazara) minority and some other minorities such as Sikhs
and Hindus. In May 2007, a directorate under the Supreme Court declared the Baha’i faith to
be a form of blasphemy. Others have noted that the government has reimposed some Islamic
restrictions that characterized Taliban rule, including the code of criminal punishments
stipulated in Islamic law. Other accounts say that alcohol is increasingly difficult to obtain in
restaurants and stores. Some government policies reflect the conservative nature of Afghan
society; recent indications of that sentiment were the demonstrations in March 2008 in several
Afghan cities against Denmark and the Netherlands for Danish cartoons and a Dutch film
apparently criticizing aspects of Islam and its key symbols.
On January 25, 2008, in a case that has implications for both religious and journalistic
freedom, a young reporter, Sayed Pervez Kambaksh, was sentenced to death for distributing a
website report to student peers questioning some precepts of Islam. Karzai has said he will
allow the appeal process to play out — and the Supreme Court is likely to overturn that
64 Kenneth Katzman
sentence — before considering a pardon for Kambaksh. A previous religious freedom case
earned congressional attention in March 2006. An Afghan man, Abd al-Rahman, who had
converted to Christianity 16 years ago while working for a Christian aid group in Pakistan,
was imprisoned and faced a potential death penalty trial for apostasy — his refusal to convert
back to Islam. Facing international pressure, Karzai prevailed on Kabul court authorities to
release him on March 29, 2006; he subsequently went to Italy and sought asylum there. His
release came the same day the House passed H.Res. 736 calling on the Afghan government to
protect Afghan converts from prosecution. Another case was the October 2005 Afghan
Supreme Court conviction of a male journalist, Ali Nasab (editor of the monthly “Women’s
Rights” magazine), of blasphemy; he was sentenced to two years in prison for articles about
apostasy. A Kabul court reduced his sentence to time served and he was freed in December
2005.
Afghanistan was again placed in Tier 2 in the State Department report on human
trafficking issued in June 2008. The government is assessed as not complying with minimum
standards for eliminating trafficking, but making significant efforts to do so. The Trafficking
in Persons Report for 2008 says that women (reportedly from China and Central Asia) are
being trafficked into Afghanistan for sexual exploitation. Other reports say some are brought
to work in night clubs purportedly frequented by members of many international NGOs.
An Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) has been formed to
monitor government performance and has been credited in State Department reports with
successful interventions to curb abuses. Headed by former Women’s Affairs minister Sima
Samar, it also conducts surveys of how Afghans view governance and reconstruction efforts.
The House-passed Afghan Freedom Support Act (AFSA) re-authorization bill (H.R. 2446)
would authorize $10 million per year for this Commission until FY2010.
Funding Issues
USAID has spent significant funds on democracy and rule of law programs (support for
elections, civil society programs, political party strengthening, media freedom, and local
governance) for Afghanistan. Funding for FY2002-FY2007 is shown in Table 14. An
additional $100 million was requested in further FY2008 supplemental funding, to help
prepare for presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for 2009, and $248 million for
these functions is requested for FY2009.
Advancement of Women
According to State Department human rights report, the Afghan government is promoting
the advancement of women, but numerous abuses, such as denial of educational and
employment opportunities, continue primarily because of Afghanistan’s conservative
traditions. A major development in post-Taliban Afghanistan was the formation of a Ministry
of Women’s Affairs dedicated to improving women’s rights, although numerous accounts say
the ministry’s influence is limited and it is now headed by a male, although the deputy
minister is female. Among other activities, it promotes the involvement of women in business
ventures.
Three female ministers were in the 2004-2006 cabinet: former presidential candidate
Masooda Jalal (Ministry of Women’s Affairs), Sediqa Balkhi (Minister for Martyrs and the
Disabled), and Amina Afzali (Minister of Youth). However, Karzai nominated only one
(Minister of Women’s Affairs Soraya Sobhrang) in the cabinet that followed the
parliamentary elections, and she was voted down by opposition from Islamist conservatives in
parliament, leaving no women in the cabinet. (The deputy minister is a female.) In March
2005, Karzai appointed a former Minister of Women’s Affairs, Habiba Sohrabi, as governor
of Bamiyan province, inhabited mostly by Hazaras. As noted, the constitution reserves for
women at least 25% of the seats in the upper house of parliament, and several prominent
women have won seats in the new parliament, including some who would have won even if
there were no set-asides. However, some NGOs and other groups believe that the women
elected by the quota system are not viewed as equally legitimate parliamentarians.
More generally, women are performing some jobs, such as construction work, that were
rarely held by women even before the Taliban came to power in 1996, including in the new
police force. Press reports say Afghan women are increasingly learning how to drive. Under
the new government, the wearing of the full body covering called the burqa is no longer
obligatory, and fewer women are wearing it than was the case a few years ago. On the other
hand, women’s advancement has made women a target of Taliban attacks. Attacks on girls’
schools and athletic facilities have increased in the most restive areas.
U.S. officials have had some influence in persuading the government to codify women’s
rights. After the Karzai government took office, the United States and the new Afghan
government set up a U.S.-Afghan Women’s Council to coordinate the allocation of resources
to Afghan women. Empowerment of Afghan women was a major feature of First Lady Laura
Bush’s visit to Afghanistan in March 2005. According to the State Department, the United
States has implemented over 175 projects directly in support of Afghan women, including
women’s empowerment, maternal and child health and nutrition, funding the Ministry of
Women’s Affairs, micro-finance projects, and like programs.
Funding Issues
The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (AFSA, P.L.107-327) authorized $15
million per year (FY2003-FY2006) for the Ministry of Women’s Affairs. The House-passed
AFSA reauthorization (H.R. 2446) would authorize $5 million per year for this Ministry.
Appropriations for programs for women and girls, when specified, are contained in the tables
at the end of this chapter.
Combating Narcotics Trafficking[12]

Narcotics trafficking is regarded by some as one of the most significant problems facing
Afghanistan, generating about 40% of the Taliban’s funds. The U.N. Office of Drugs and
Crime (UNODC) reported in February 2008 that opium cultivation for 2008 will likely be
similar to the 2007 record harvest, which was an increased of 34% over the previous year.
The State Department’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, (INCSR) released
February 29, 2008, said area under cultivation had increased by 17% in 2007 over 2006
levels. Afghanistan is the source of about 93% of the world’s illicit opium supply, and
according to UNODC, “... leaving aside 19th Century China, no country in the world has ever
produced narcotics on such a deadly scale.” Narcotics now accounts for about $4 billion in
value, about 53% of the value of the legal economy.
On the other hand, there are some signs of progress. The February 2008 UNODC report
said that the number of “poppy free” provinces is 12, an increase from 6 in 2006, and that
cultivation is decreasing in another ten provinces, mostly in the north, where UNODC says
governance is increasing. The report said cultivation also decreased sharply in Nangarhar
66 Kenneth Katzman
Province (Jalalabad), a key province near the Pakistan border. The acting Minister of
Counter-Narcotics, Gen. Khodaidad, said in late April 2008 that overall cultivation will fall in
2008, and that as many as 20 provinces might soon be declared cultivation free, including
Nangarhar and Badakshan. Others attribute the apparent drop in cultivation to the large world
increase in prices for legal crops. Much of the cultivation growth in recent years has come
from Helmand Province (which now produces about 50% of Afghanistan’s total poppy crop)
and other southern provinces where the Taliban insurgency is still consistently active, and the
February 2008 UNDOC reports said cultivation is increasing in 7 provinces, mostly in the
west and south.
In response to congressional calls for an increased U.S. focus on the drug problem, in
March 2007 the Administration created a post of coordinator for counter-narcotics and justice
reform in Afghanistan, naming Thomas Schweich of the Bureau For a detailed discussion
and U.S. funding on the issue, see CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S.
Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard.
of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) to that post. On August 9, 2007,
he announced a major new counter-narcotics program and strategy that seeks to better
integrate counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency, as well as enhance and encourage
alternative livelihoods.[13] Part of the widely acknowledged lack of progress has been
attributed to disagreements on a counter-narcotics strategy. The Afghan government wants to
focus on funding alternative livelihoods that will dissuade Afghans from growing poppy crop,
and on building governance in areas where poppy is grown. The Afghan side, backed by
some U.S. experts such as Barnett Rubin, believe that narcotics flourish in areas where there
is no security, and not the other way around.
U.S. officials emphasize eradication. In concert with interdiction and building up
alternative livelihoods, the United States has prevailed on Afghanistan to undertake efforts to
eradicate poppy fields by cutting down the crop manually on the ground. However, there
appears to be a debate between some in the U.S. government, including Ambassador to
Afghanistan William Wood, and the Afghan government over whether to conduct spraying of
fields, particularly by air. The Ambassador and others in the Bush Administration feel that
aerial spraying is the only effective means to reduce poppy cultivation. President Karzai, most
recently in an interview with the Washington Post on January 27, 2008, strongly opposes
aerial spraying of poppy fields. He and others say that allowing such activity would cause a
backlash among Afghan farmers that could produce more support for the Taliban. Others
believe that Karzai feels that acquiescing to a U.S.-designed counter-narcotics program would
make him look like a puppet of the international community. NATO commanders, who have
taken over securityresponsibilities throughout Afghanistan, are now focusing on interdicting
traffickers and raiding drug labs, and outgoing NATO/ISAF commander Gen. Dan McNeill
said in February 2008 that his NATO mandate permits him to conduct counter-narcotics
combat when it is clearly linked to insurgent activity. Congress appears to be siding with
Karzai; the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriation (P.L. 110-161) prohibits U.S. counter-
narcotics funding from being used for aerial spraying on Afghanistan poppy fields.
The U.S. military, in support of the effort, is flying Afghan and U.S. counter-narcotics
agents (Drug Enforcement Agency, DEA) on missions and identifying targets; it also
evacuates casualties from counter-drug operations. The Department of Defense is also playing
the major role in training and equipping specialized Afghan counter-narcotics police, in
developing an Afghan intelligence fusion cell, and training Afghan border police, as well as
assisting an Afghan helicopter squadron to move Afghan counter-narcotics forces around the
country. The Bush Administration has taken some legal steps against suspected Afghan drug
traffickers;[14] in April 2005, a DEA operation successfully caught the alleged leading
Afghan narcotics trafficker, Haji Bashir Noorzai, arresting him after a flight to New York.
The United States is funding a new Counternarcotics Justice Center (estimated cost, $8
million) in Kabul to prosecute and incarcerate suspected traffickers.[15]
The Bush Administration has repeatedly named Afghanistan (and again in the February
2008 State Department INCSR report discussed above) as a major illicit drug producer and
drug transit country, buthas not included Afghanistan on a smaller list of countries that have
“failed demonstrably to make substantial efforts” to adhere to international counter-narcotics
agreements and take certain counter-narcotics measures set forth in U.S. law.[16] The
Administration has exercised waiver provisions (the last was published in the Federal
Register in May 2006) to a required certification of full Afghan cooperation that was needed
to provide more than $225 million in recent U.S. economic assistance appropriations for
Afghanistan. A similar certification requirement (to provide amounts over $300 million) is
contained in the House version of the FY2008 appropriation (P.L. 110-161). Other provisions
on counter-narcotics, such as recommending a pilot crop substitution program and cutting
U.S. aid to any Afghan province whose officials are determined complicit in drug trafficking,
are contained in the AFSA reauthorization bill (H.R. 2446). Narcotics trafficking control was
perhaps the one issue on which the Taliban, when it was in power, satisfied much of the
international community; the Taliban enforced a July 2000 ban on poppy cultivation, which
purportedly dramatically decreased cultivation.[17] The Northern Alliance did not issue a
similar ban in areas it controlled.
POST-WAR SECURITY OPERATIONS

AND FORCE CAPACITY BUILDING
The top security priority of theAdministration has been to prevent Al Qaeda and the
Taliban from challenging the Afghan government. The pillars of the U.S. security effort are
(1) continuing combat operations by U.S. forces and a NATO-led International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF); (2) U.S. and NATO operation of “provincial reconstruction teams”
(PRTs); and (3) the equipping and training of an Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan
National Police (ANP) force.
The Combat Environment, U.S. Operations,

and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)
U.S. and partner country troop levels (U.S. Central Command, CENTCOM) have
increased since 2006 to combat a Taliban resurgence. NATO/ISAF has led peacekeeping
operations nationwide since October 5, 2006, and about 65% of U.S. troops in Afghanistan
(numbers are in the security indicators table below) are under NATO command. The
NATO/ISAF force is headed by U.S. Gen. David McKiernan, who on June 1, 2008 took over
from U.S. Gen. Dan McNeill. McNeill in turn had taken over in February 2007 from U.K.
68 Kenneth Katzman
General David Richards. The remainder are under direct U.S. command as part of the
ongoing Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Most U.S. forces in Afghanistan, who are
primarily in eastern Afghanistan, report, as of May 2008, to Maj. Gen. Jeffrey Schloesser as
st
head of Combined Joint Task Force 101 (CJTF-101), named after the 101 Airborne
Division, and headquartered at Bagram Air Base north of Kabul. Gen. Schloesser commands
OEF but is dual-hatted as commander of ISAF Regional Command-East of the NATO/ISAF
mission. Incremental costs of U.S. operations in Afghanistan appear to be running about 2 - 3
billion dollars per month. The FY2008 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 110-181, Section
1229) requires a quarterly DOD report on the security situation in Afghanistan, along the
lines of the similar “Measuring Stability and Security” report required for Iraq. For further
information, see CRS Report RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War
on Terror Operations Since 9/11, by Amy Belasco.
Prior to the transfer to NATO command, 19 coalition countries — primarily Britain,
France, Canada, and Italy — were contributing approximately 4,000 combat troops to OEF,
but most of these have now been “re-badged” to the expanded NATO-led ISAF mission. A
few foreign contingents, such as a small unit from the UAE, remain part of OEF. Until
December 2007, 200 South Korean forces at Bagram Air Base (mainly combat engineers)
were part of OEF; they left in December 2007 in fulfillment of a July-August 2007,
agreement under which Taliban militants released 21 kidnapped South Korean church group
visitors in Ghazni province. Two were killed during their captivity. The Taliban kidnappers
did not get the demanded release of 23 Taliban prisoners held by the Afghan government. As
of April 2008, South Korea is in the process of re-engaging in Afghanistan by planning to
take over the Parwan Province PRT based at Bagram Air Base and possibly train Afghan
security forces at facilities in Kabul as well.
Japan provided naval refueling capabilities in the Arabian sea, but the mission ended in
October 2007 following a parliamentary change of majority there in July 2007. The mission
was revived in January 2008 when the new government forced through parliament a bill to
allow the mission to resume. On June 1, 2008, a senior Japanese official said Japan might
expand the mission of its Self Defense Forces to include some reconstruction activities in
Afghanistan. As part of OEF, the United States leads a multi-national naval anti-terrorist,
anti-smuggling, anti-proliferation interdiction mission in the Persian Gulf/Arabian Sea,
headquartered in Bahrain. That mission was expanded after the fall of Saddam Hussein to
include protecting Iraqi oil platforms in the Gulf.
In the four years after the fall of the Taliban, U.S. forces and Afghan troops fought
relatively low levels of Taliban insurgent violence. The United States and Afghanistan
conducted “Operation Mountain Viper” (August 2003); “Operation Avalanche” (December
2003); “Operation Mountain Storm” (March-July 2004) against Taliban remnants in and
around Uruzgan province, home province of Mullah Umar; “Operation Lightning Freedom”
(December 2004-February 2005); and “Operation Pil (Elephant)” in Kunar Province in the
east (October 2005). By 2005, U.S. commanders had believed that the combat, coupled with
overall political and economic reconstruction, had almost ended the insurgency.
The Taliban “Resurgence”

An increase in violence beginning in mid-2006 took some U.S. commanders by surprise
because the insurgency had been low level for several years, and polls showed that the
Taliban are politically unpopular, even in the conservative Pashtun areas. Taliban insurgents,
increasingly adapting suicide and roadside bombing characteristic of the Iraq insurgency –
and enjoying a degree of safehaven in Pakistan – nonetheless have been able to step up
attacks, particularly in Uruzgan, Helmand, Qandahar, and Zabol Provinces, areas that
NATO/ISAF assumed responsibility for on July 31, 2006. The violence triggered debate
about whether the resurgence was driven by popular frustration with the widely perceived
corruption within the Karzai government and the slow pace of economic reconstruction.
Some believe that Afghans in the restive areas were intimidated by the Taliban into providing
food and shelter, while others believe that some villages welcome any form of justice, even if
administered by the Taliban. Taliban attacks on schools, teachers, and other civilian
infrastructure have reportedly caused popular anger against the movement, but others say they
appreciate the Taliban’s reputation for avoiding corruption. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Admiral Michael Mullen testified on December 11, 2007, that the Taliban support had
tripled to about 20% over the past two years. Other developments in 2007 that the United
States found worrisome have been the Taliban’s first use of a surface-to-air missile (SAM-7,
shoulder held) against a U.S. C-130 transport aircraft, although it did not hit the aircraft.
NATO has countered the violence with repeated offensives, including such major
operations as Operation Mountain Lion, Operation Mountain Thrust, and Operation Medusa
(August-September 2006). The latter was considered a success in ousting Taliban fighters
from the Panjwai district near Qandahar. Operation Medusa also demonstrated that NATO
would conduct intensive combat in Afghanistan. In the aftermath of Medusa, British forces —
who believe in working more with tribal leaders as part of negotiated local solutions —
entered into an agreement with tribal elders in the Musa Qala district of Helmand Province,
under which they would secure the main town of the district without an active NATO
presence. That strategy failed when the Taliban captured Musa Qala town in February 2007.
A NATO offensive in December 2007, approved by President Karzai, retook Musa Qala,
although there continue to be recriminations between the Britain, on the one side, and the
United States and Karzai, on the other, over the wisdom of the original British deal on Musa
Qala. Some Taliban activity continues on the outskirts of the district.
During 2007, U.S. and NATO forces, bolstered by the infusion of 3,200 U.S. troops and
3,800 NATO/partner forces, pre-empted an anticipated Taliban “spring offensive.” In a
preemptive move, in March 2007, NATO and Afghan troops conducted “Operation Achilles”
to expel militants from the Sangin district of northern Helmand Province. One purpose of the
operation was to pacify the area around the key Kajaki dam. The Taliban “offensive” largely
did not materialize, and U.S. and NATO commanders say their efforts deprived the Taliban of
the ability to control substantial swaths of territory. Taliban militants are often killed 50 or 60
at a time by coalition airstrikes because theymove in remote areas where theyare easily
located and struck. The NATO operations, and a related offensive in late April 2007
(Operation Silicon), had a major success on May 12, 2007, when the purportedly ruthless
leader of the Taliban insurgency in the south, Mullah Dadullah, was killed by U.S. and
NATO forces in Helmand Province. His brother, Mansoor, replaced him as leader of that
faction but Mansoor was arrested crossing into Pakistan in February 2008 — arrests and
deaths such as these are contributing to U.S. command optimism that it will eventually defeat
the Taliban outright.[18] A U.S. airstrike in December 2006 killed another prominent
commander, Mullah Akhtar Usmani. A key commander in Kunar province, Mullah Ismail,
was arrested while crossing over into Pakistan in mid-April 2008.
70 Kenneth Katzman
Despite recent losses, several key Taliban leaders are at large and believed to be
workingwith Al Qaeda leaders; some Taliban are able to giveinterviews to Pakistani (Geo
television) and other media stations. In addition to Mullah Umar, Jalaludin Haqqani and his
son, Siraj, remain at large, leading an insurgent faction operating around Khost. Haqqani is
believed to have contact with Al Qaeda leaders in part because one of his wives is purportedly
Arab. The Taliban has several official spokespersons, including Qari Yusuf Ahmadi, and it
operates a clandestine radio station, “Voice of Shariat,” and publishes videos.
Policy Reviews and Further 2008-2009 U.S. Troop Buildup

Despite the offensives, a perception of growing Taliban strength has taken hold among
some observers, as evidenced by, among other indicators: (1) 2007 recording the most
casualties, including Taliban fighters, of the war so far: (2) numbers of suicide bombings at a
post-Taliban high, including such major bombings as one in Kabul on June 17, 2007, which
killed about 35 Afghan police recruits on a bus; a suicide bombing in early November 2007
that killed six parliamentarians, as noted above; the suicide bombing near Qandahar on
February 17, 2008 that killed 67 civilians and 13 Afghan police - the most lethal attack since
2002; and (3) expanding Taliban operations in provinces where it had not previously been
active, including Lowgar and Wardak (close to Kabul), as well as formerly stable Herat,
where there are few Pashtuns sympathetic to the Taliban; (4) attacks in Kabul against targets
that are either well defended or in highly populated centers, such as the January 14, 2008,
attack on the Serena Hotel in Kabul (see below); the January 26, 2008, kidnaping of an
American aid worker in Qandahar; and, (5) the April 27, 2008 assassination attempt on
Karzai during amilitary parade celebrating the ouster of the Soviet Union. A parliamentarian
was killed. This attack, aspects of which were uncovered beforehand, triggered a move by
parliament to vote no confidence in the intelligence director, the Defense Minister, and the
Interior Minister, but the three remain in their positions as of mid-May 2008.
On the other hand, U.S. commanders say that the United States and its allies have made
substantial progress reducing Taliban attacks in eastern Afghanistan where U.S. troops
mainly operate and are able to achieve significant coverage; one U.S. briefing in January
2008 said that attacks along the eastern Afghan-Pakistan border are 40% lower than they were
in December 2006. U.S. commanders say they have continued on the offensive during the
winter of 2008 to deny the Taliban the ability to regroup and that the Taliban “spring
offensive” has again been weak or non-existent in spring 2008, as it was in 2007. U.S.
commanders — and a U.N. Secretary General report of March 6, 2008 — say that 70% of the
violence in Afghanistan is now occurring in 10% of Afghanistan’s 376 districts, an area
including about 6% of the Afghan population. U.S. commanders say the increase in violence
is caused mainly by a higher tempo of U.S./ISAF anti-Taliban operations rather than any
increase in Taliban recruitment or capabilities, and attribute the Taliban resilience primarily
to the lax border policing of Pakistan. Some NATO commanders go so far as to say that the
Taliban is on the brink of defeat – nearly \ decapitated, having lost 7,000 fighters over the
past two years, and low on ammunition.
Still, to address the widespread perception of deterioration of the U.S. effort, a reported
National Security Council review (reported by the Washington Post on November 25, 2007)
found that the Taliban has been able to expand its presence, particularly in “un-governed”
remote areas. The review also reportedly concluded that the United States needed to focus
more attention and resources on the Afghan situation than it had previously. Joint Chiefs
Chairman Mullen largely confirmed the perception that the Afghan battlefield was “under-
resourced” in his December 11, 2007 testimony in which he stated that, in Iraq, “the United
States does what it must, while in Afghanistan, the United States does what it can.” Other
policy reviews have been conducted by the State Department; it evaluated its use of “soft
power” to complement the U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. Similar findings are
emphasized in recent outside assessments of Afghanistan policy, including a report in
November 2007 by the Senlis Council;[19] a January 2008 study by the Atlantic Council
(“Saving Afghanistan: An Appeal and Plan for Urgent Action”) and a January 30, 2008 study
by the Center for the Study of the Presidency (“Afghanistan Study Group Report”), as well as
in recent hearings, such as the January 31, 2008 hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee.
“Americanizing” the Southern Front?

As a consequence of the policy reviews and public perceptions, the Administration is
taking new steps to keep the pressure on the Taliban in the south, where it remains strongest,
as well as to ease strains with key NATO partners. Some policy decisions appear to indicate
that the United States might assume greater responsibility for the intense combat in the south.
On January 14, 2008, Secretary of Defense Gates approved the deployment of an additional
3,200 Marines to Afghanistan (for seven months), of which about 700 will be for training the
Afghan security forces, and the remainder will provide more combat capability in the south.
They have arrived and begun to engage in combat in Helmand Province; including an
operation that began in late April 2008 that expelled Taliban militants from the Garmsar
district of Helmand. Still, U.S. and NATO commanders in Afghanistan have decided that they
needed about three more brigades (about 10,000) to be able to stabilize the still restive
southern sector, particularly all of southern Helmand Province. With NATO countries
unlikely to fill that entire need, on April 4, 2008, at the NATO summit in Romania, President
Bush pledged to further increase U.S. forces in Afghanistan in 2009, regardless of the change
in U.S. Administration at that time. The 2009 addition could be as much as 7,000 U.S. forces,
in addition to finding replacements for the 3,200 additional Marines sent on a seven month
rotation. On May 22, 2008, the Defense Department confirmed that the United States is likely
to take over the command of Regional Command-South in November 2010, after rotations by
the Netherlands(2008-2009) and Britain (2009-2010). The issue of NATO/ISAF and the
positions of contributing countries is discussed further below.
U.S. and NATO commanders are also increasingly sensitive to losing “hearts and minds”
because of civilian casualties resulting from U.S. and NATO operations, particularly air
strikes. In a joint meeting on May 21, 2007, President Bush and NATO Secretary General
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said that U.S. and NATO operations were seeking to avoid civilian
casualties but that such results were sometimes inevitable in the course of fighting the
Taliban. President Bush and President Karzai said they discussed the issue during their Camp
David meetings in August 2007. With Karzai saying in October 2007 that he had asked for a
halt to the use of air strikes, NATO is reportedly examining using smaller air force munitions
to limit collateral damage from air strikes, or increased use of ground operations.
Feelers to the Taliban

President Karzai believes that an alternative means of combating Taliban militants is to
offer talks with Taliban fighters who want to consider ending their fight. Noted above is the
72 Kenneth Katzman
“Program for Strengthening Peace and Reconciliation” (referred to in Afghanistan by its

Pashto acronym “PTS”) headed by Meshrano Jirga speaker Sibghatullah Mojadeddi. The
program is credited with persuading numerous Taliban figures andcommanders to renounce
violence and joint the political process. Several Taliban figures, including its foreign minister
Wakil Mutawwakil, ran in the parliamentary elections. The Taliban official who was
governor of Bamiyan Province when the Buddha statues there were blown up, Mohammad
Islam Mohammedi — and who was later elected to the post-Taliban parliament from
Samangan Province — was assassinated in Kabul in January 2007. In September 2007,
Karzai offered to meet with Mullah Umar himself, appearing thereby to backtrack on earlier
statements that about 100-150 of the top Taliban leadership would not be eligible for
amnesty. The Taliban rejected the offer, saying they would not consider reconciling until (1)
all foreign troops leave Afghanistan; (2) a new “Islamic” constitution is adopted; and (3)
Islamic law is imposed.
In December 2007, other press reports appeared that European or other intermediaries
had been holding secret talks with Taliban figures. Even though it is Karzai’s position that
talks with the Taliban could be helpful, two European diplomats working for the United
Nations and European Union were expelled by the Afghan government in December 2007,
possibly because they allegedly provided the Taliban intermediaries with small gifts as
gestures of goodwill. As referenced above, there have been reports that, before his capture,
Mansoor Dadullah was in talks with British forces about ending his battles, and some recent
news stories say that Siraj Haqqani has been in talks with Pakistani intermediaries about
possibly ending Taliban activity inside Pakistan. In April 2008, representatives of the
minoritydominated National Front bloc (see above) said they have had some peace talks with
Taliban representatives.
Whereabouts of Al Qaeda Leaders and Fighters

Complicating the U.S. mission has been the difficulty in locating so-called “high value
targets” of Al Qaeda: leaders believed to be in Pakistan but who are believed able to direct Al
Qaeda fighters to assist the Taliban. The two most notable are Osama bin Laden himself and
his close ally, Ayman al-Zawahiri. They reportedly escaped the U.S.-Afghan offensive
against the Al Qaeda stronghold of Tora Bora in eastern Afghanistan in December 2001.[20]
A purported U.S.-led strike reportedly missed Zawahiri by a few hours in the village of
Damadola, Pakistan, in January 2006, suggesting that the United States and Pakistan have
some intelligence on his movements.[21] A strike in late January 2008, in an area near
Damadola, killed Abu Laith al-Libi, a reported senior Al Qaeda figure who purportedly
masterminded, among other operations, the bombing at Bagram Air Base in February 2007
when Vice President Cheney was visiting. During a visit to the United States in August 2007,
Karzai told journalists that U.S. and Afghan officials are no closer than previously to
determining bin Laden’s location. Other reports say there are a growing number of Al Qaeda
militants now being identified on the Afghan battlefield,[22] although senior U.S. officials say
that these militants may now be focused on sewing instability in Pakistan more so than in
Afghanistan.
Another “high value target” identified by U.S. commanders is the Hikmatyar faction
(Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, HIG) allied with Al Qaeda and Taliban insurgents. His fighters are
operating in Kunar and Nuristan provinces, northeast of Kabul. On February 19, 2003, the
U.S. government formally designated Hikmatyar as a “Specially Designated Global
Terrorist,” under the authority of Executive Order 13224, subjecting it to financial and other
U.S. sanctions. It is not formally designated as a “Foreign Terrorist Organization.” On July
19, 2007, Hikmatyar injected some optimism into the U.S. mission in Afghanistan by issuing
a statement declaring a willingness to discuss a cease-fire with the Karzai government,
although no firm reconciliation talks have been held between HIG and the Karzai
government.
U.S. Military Presence/SOFA/Use of Facilities

U.S. forces operate in Afghanistan under a “status of forces agreement” (SOFA) between
the United States and the interim government of Afghanistan in November 2002; the
agreement gives the United States legal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel serving in
Afghanistan. Even if the Taliban insurgency ends, Afghan leaders say they want the United
States to maintain a long-term presence in Afghanistan. On May 8, 2005, Karzai summoned
about 1,000 delegates to a consultative jirga in Kabul on whether to host permanent U.S.
bases. They supported an indefinite presence of international forces to maintain security but
urged Karzai to delay a decision. On May 23, 2005, Karzai and President Bush issued a “joint
declaration”[23] providing for U.S. forces to have access to Afghan military facilities, in
order to prosecute “the war against international terror and the struggle against violent
extremism.” The joint statement did not give Karzai enhanced control over facilities used by
U.S. forces, over U.S. operations, or over prisoners taken during operations. Some of the
bases, both in and near Afghanistan, that support combat in Afghanistan, include those in the
table. In order to avoid the impression that foreign forces are “occupying”Afghanistan,
NATO said on August 15, 2006, that it would negotiate an agreement with Afghanistan to
formalize the NATO presence in Afghanistan and stipulate 15 initiatives to secure
Afghanistan and rebuild its security forces.
Table 2. Afghan and Regional Facilities Used for Operations in Afghanistan
Facility Use
Bagram Air Base 50 miles north of Kabul, the operational hub of U.S. forces in Afghanistan,
and base for CJTF-82. At least 500 U.S. military personnel are based there,
assisted by about 175 South Korean troops. Handles many of the 150 U.S.
aircraft (including helicopters) in country. Hospital under construction, one
of the first permanent structures there. FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13)
provided about $52 million for various projects to upgrade facilities at
Bagram, including a control tower and an operations center, and the FY2006
supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-234) provides $20 million for military
construction there. NATO also using the base and sharing operational costs.
Afghans With Access to 82% with basic health services access - compared to 8% during Taliban era,
Health Coverage although access is more limited in restive areas. Infant mortality has dropped
18% since Taliban to 135 per 1,000 live births. 680 clinics built with U.S.
funds since Taliban.
Qandahar Air Field Just outside Qandahar. Turned over from U.S. to NATO/ISAF control in late
2006 in conjunction with NATO assumption of peacekeeping
responsibilities.
Shindand Air Base
In Farah province, about 20 miles from Iran border. Used by U.S. forces and
combat aircraft since October 2004, after the dismissal of Herat governor
Ismail Khan, whose militia forces controlled the facility.
74 Kenneth Katzman
Table 2. Afghan and Regional Facilities Used for Operations in Afghanistan
Facility Use
Peter Ganci Base: Manas, Used by 1,200 U.S. military personnel as well as refueling and cargo
Kyrgyzstan aircraft. Leadership of Kyrgyzstan changed in April 2005 in an uprising
against President Askar Akayev, but senior U.S. officials reportedly received
assurances about continued U.S. use of the base from his successor,
Kurmanbek Bakiyev. Bakiyev demanded a large increase in the $2 million
per year U.S. contribution for use of the base; dispute eased in July 2006
with U.S. agreement to give Kyrgyzstan $150 million in assistance and base
use payments.
About 2,100 U.S. military personnel there; U.S. aircraft supply U.S. forces
Incirlik Air Base, Turkey in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. use repeatedly extended for one year intervals
by Turkey.
Air base used by about 1,800 U.S. military personnel, to supply U.S. forces
Al Dhafra, UAE
and related transport into Iraq and Afghanistan.
Largest air facility used by U.S. in region. About 5,000 U.S. personnel in
Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar Qatar. Houses central air operations coordination center for U.S. missions in
Iraq and Afghanistan; also houses CENTCOM forward headquarters.
Naval Support Facility, U.S. naval command headquarters for OEF anti-smuggling, anti-terrorism,
Bahrain and anti-proliferation naval search missions, and Iraq-related naval
operations (oil platform protection) in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea.
About 5,100 U.S. military personnel there.
Karsi-Khanabad Air Base, Not used by U.S. since September 2005 following U.S.-Uzbek dispute over
Uzbekistan May 2005 Uzbek crackdown on unrest in Andijon. Once housed about 1,750
U.S. military personnel (900 Air Force, 400 Army, and 450 civilian) in
supply missions to Afghanistan. Uzbekistan allowed German use of the base
temporarily in March 2008, indicating possible healing of the rift. Could also
represent Uzbek counter to Russian offer to U.S. coalition to allow use of its
territory to transport equipment into Afghanistan.
The NATO-Led International

Security Assistance Force (ISAF)[24]
As discussed, the NATO-led “International Security Assistance Force” (ISAF, consisting

of all 26 NATO members states plus 14 partner countries), now commands peacekeeping
operations throughout Afghanistan. The several tables at the end of this chapter list
contributing countries and forces contributed, areas of operations, and Provincial
Reconstruction Teams they control. ISAF was created by the Bonn Agreement and U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001),[25] initially limited to Kabul. In
October 2003, NATO endorsed expanding its presence to several other cities, contingent on
formal U.N. approval. That NATO decision came several weeks after Germany agreed to
contribute an additional 450 military personnel to expand ISAF into the city of Konduz. The
U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1510 (October 14, 2003) formally authorizing
ISAF to deploy outside Kabul. NATO’s takeover of command of ISAF in August 2003 paved
the way for the expansion, and NATO/ISAF’s responsibilities broadened significantly in
2004 with NATO/ISAF’s assumption of security responsibility for northern and western
Afghanistan (Stage 1, Regional Command North, in 2004 and Stage 2, Regional Command
West, in 2005, respectively). The mission was most recently renewed by U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1776 (September 19, 2007), which also noted U.N. support for the
Operation Enduring Freedom mission.
The process continued on July 31, 2006, with the formal handover of the security mission
in southern Afghanistan to NATO/ISAF control. As part of this “Stage 3,” a
British/Canadian/Dutch-led “Regional Command South” (RC-S) was formed. Britain is the
lead force in Helmand; Canada is lead in Qandahar, and the Netherlands is lead in Uruzgan;
the three rotate the command of RC-S. “Stage 4,” the assumption of NATO/ISAF command
of peacekeeping in fourteen provinces of eastern Afghanistan (and thus all of Afghanistan),
was completed on October 5, 2006. As part of the completion of the NATO/ISAF takeover of
command, the United States put over half the U.S. troops operating in Afghanistan under
NATO/ISAF’s “Regional Command East” (RC-E), although still reporting to a U.S.
command in country.
The April 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, Romania resulted in some new pledges for
NATO and other partner forces to add troops to Afghanistan to meet the agreed requirement
of 10,000 total extra forces deemed needed to stabilize the restive south. As of now, the
partner forces that are bearing the brunt of combat in southern Afghanistan are Britain,
Canada, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Australia. The need to line up new pledges became
acute in February 2008, when Canada said it would extend its 2,500 troop deployment until
2009, but not beyond that, unless other partners contribute 1,000 forces to assist with combat
in the Canadian sector (Qandahar province).
New NATO Force Pledges in 2008 and Since

At and in conjunction with the NATO summit in Bucharest in early April 2008, twelve
countries did indicate new pledges, although some are of reconstruction aid rather than
troops, and others were restatements of previous pledges. The following were the major
pledges:
• France announced a deployment of up to 1,000 forces — a battalion of about 700

plus 200 special forces that formerly were part of OEF. The French forces will be
deployed mostly in the U.S.-led eastern sector, freeing up U.S. forces to go to the
south.
• Germany turned down a U.S. request to send forces to the combat-heavy south, but it
pledged in early 2008 to add 500 forces to its sector in the north, mostly to take over
a Norway-led rapid reaction force there. (Despite opposition in Germany to the
Afghanistan mission, Germany’s parliament voted by a 453-79 vote margin on
October 12, 2007, to maintain German troop levels in Afghanistan.)
• Britain plans to deploy about 600 more troops to its already significant 7,800 troop
commitment to Afghanistan. These forces will serve in Britain’s sector of the south
(very high combat Helmand Province).
• Poland recommitted to its February 2008 announcement that it would add 400 troops
to the 1,200 in Afghanistan, but that they would continue to fight alongside U.S.
forces as part of RC-E, operating mainly in Ghazni province.
• Norway plans to add 200 troops but in the largely passive north, where Norway is
deployed.
• Denmark will add about 600 forces to the mission in the south.
• Georgia pledged 500 additional forces for Afghanistan.
76 Kenneth Katzman
• Croatia pledged 200 - 300, which would double its existing force.
• The Czech Republic pledged 120 new forces.
• Greece and Romania promised to send an unspecified number of additional trainers
for the Afghan security forces.
• New Zealand pledged to increase its contingent at the PRT it runs in Bamiyan
province.
• Azerbaijan pledged an additional 45, more than its existing force there.
• In February 2008, Australia ruled out sending more forces to supplement its
contingent, which operates in combat intense Uruzgan province, but said it would
augment civilian assistance such as training Afghan police and judges and build new
roads, hospitals, and schools.
• In May 2008, Italy announced that it was now willing to deploy some of its forces to
the combat-intense south.
Among other unfulfilled pledges (in addition to the 3,200 combat forces the United States
has now decided to send) are 3,200 additional trainers that are needed for Afghan security
forces. About 700 of the 3,200 Marines that will deploy to Afghanistan by April 2008 will be
trainers to address that shortage.
Another key point of contention has been NATO’s chronic equipment shortages—
particularly helicopters, both for transport and attack — for the Afghanistan mission.
Secretary Gates has been pressing for NATO countries to contribute an additional 16
helicopters in southern Afghanistan to relieve a U.S. helicopter battalion that Gates said in
testimony would not have its deployment there extended again beyond mid-2008. One idea
considered at the NATO meeting in Scotland on December 13, 2007, was for U.S. or other
donors to pay for the upgrading of helicopters that partner countries might possess but have
inadequate resources to adapt to Afghanistan’s harsh flying conditions. Some NATO
countries reportedly are considering jointly modernizing about 20 Russian-made transport
helicopters that could be used by all participating nations in Afghanistan. In 2007, to try to
compensate for the shortage, NATO chartered about 20 commercial helicopters for extra
routine supply flights to the south, freeing up Chinooks and Black Hawks for other missions.
Some of the extra Polish troops to be deployed in 2008 will operate and maintain eight
helicopters.
The shortages persist even though several partner nations brought in additional
equipment in 2006 in conjunction with the NATO assumption of command of all
peacekeeping. At that time, Apache attack helicopters and F-16 aircraft were brought in by
some contributors. Italy sent “Predator” unmanned aerial vehicles, helicopters, and six AMX
fighter-bomber aircraft.[26] Germany notes that it provides six Tornado combat aircraft to
assist with strikes in combat situations in the south. NATO/ISAF also coordinates with
Afghan security forces and with OEF forces as well, and it assists the Afghan Ministry of
Civil Aviation and Tourism in the operation of Kabul International Airport (where Dutch
combat aircraft also are located). In October 2008, Hungary will add 60 troops and take over
security at that airport.
In an effort to repair divisions withinthe Afghanistan coalition, in his December 11, 2007,
testimony, Secretary Gates previewed his presentation, at a NATO meeting in Scotland on
December 13, 2007, of a “strategic concept paper” that would help coordinate and guide
NATO and other partner contributions and missions over the coming three to five years. This
is an effort to structure each country’s contribution as appropriate to the politics and resources
of that contributor. The concept paper, now titled the “Strategic Vision,” was endorsed by the
NATO summit in Bucharest, Romania in early April 2008.
National “Caveats” on Combat Operations

Some progress has been made in persuading other NATO countries to adopt flexible rules
of engagement that allow all contributing forces to perform combat missions, although
perhaps not as aggressively as do U.S. forces. At the NATO summit in April 2008, NATO
countries pledged to continue to work remove their so-called “national caveats” on their
troops’ operations that U.S. commanders say limit operational flexibility. Some nations refuse
to conduct night-time combat. Others have refused to carry Afghan National Army or other
Afghan personnel on their helicopters. Others do not fight after snowfall. These caveats were
troubling to those NATO countries with forces in heavy combat zones, such as Canada, which
feel they are bearing the brunt of the fighting and attendant casualties. There has been some
criticism of the Dutch approach in Uruzgan, which focuses heavily on building relationships
with tribal leaders and identifying reconstruction priorities, and not on actively combating
Taliban formations. Some believe this approach allows Taliban fighters to group and expand
their influence, although the Netherlands says this approach is key to a long-term pacification
of the south. At the NATO summit in Riga, Latvia, during November 28-29, 2006, some
NATO countries, particularly the Netherlands, Romania, and France, pledged to remove some
of these caveats, and some have done so. All agreed that their forces would come to each
others’ defense in times of emergency anywhere in Afghanistan. (See CRS Report RL33627,
NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance, by Paul Gallis.)
Provincial Reconstruction Teams
U.S. and partner officials have generally praised the effectiveness of “provincial
reconstruction teams” (PRTs) — enclaves of U.S. or partner forces and civilian officials that
provide safe havens for international aid workers to help with reconstruction and to extend the
writ of the Kabul government — in accelerating reconstruction and assisting stabilization
efforts. The PRTs, a December 2002 U.S. initiative, perform activities ranging from resolving
local disputes to coordinating local reconstruction projects, although the U.S.-run PRTs, and
most of the PRTs in southern Afghanistan, focus mostly on counter-insurgency. Some aid
agencies say they have felt more secure since the PRT program began, fostering
reconstruction activity in areas of PRT operations.[27] Other relief groups do not want to
associate with military force because doing so might taint their perceived neutrality. Secretary
Gates and U.S. commanders have attributed recent successes in stabilizing some areas, such
as Ghazni and Khost, to the PRTs’ ability to intensify reconstruction by coordinating many
different security and civilian activities. In Ghazni, almost all the schools are now open,
whereas one year ago many were closed because of Taliban intimidation. In Khost, according
to Secretary Gates on December 11, PRT activities focused on road building and construction
of district centers that tie the population to the government have led to a dramatic
improvement in security over the past year. Bombings there have fallen from one per week in
2006 to one per month now.
78 Kenneth Katzman
There are 25 PRTs in operation. In conjunction with broadening NATO security

responsibilities, the United States turned over several PRTs to partner countries, and virtually
all the PRTs are now under ISAF control, but with varying lead nations. The list of PRTs,
including lead country, is shown in table 16. Each PRT operated by the United States is
composed of U.S. forces (50-100 U.S. military personnel); Defense Department civil affairs
officers; representatives of USAID, State Department, and other agencies; and Afghan
government (Interior Ministry) personnel. Most PRTs, including those run by partner forces,
have personnel to train Afghan security forces. Many U.S. PRTs in restive regions are “co-
located” with “forward operating bases” of 300-400 U.S. combat troops. U.S. funds support
PRT reconstruction projects, as shown in the tables at the report’s end. According to U.S.
officials, 54 PRT development projects have been completed and 199 (valued at $20 million)
are ongoing. USAID funds used for PRT programs are in the table on USAID spending at the
end of this chapter.
In August 2005, in preparation for the establishment of Regional Command South,
Canada took over the key U.S.-led PRT in Qandahar. In May 2006, Britain took over the PRT
at Lashkar Gah, capital of Helmand Province. The Netherlands took over the PRT at Tarin
Kowt, capital of Uruzgan Province. Germany (with Turkey and France) took over the PRTs
and the leadership role in the north from Britain and the Netherlands when those countries
deployed to the south.
Representing evolution of the PRT concept, Turkey opened a PRT, in Wardak Province,
on November 25, 2006, to focus on providing health care, education, police training, and
agricultural alternatives in that region. As of March 2008, the Czech Republic has established
a new PRT in Lowgar Province. As noted above, South Korea is expected to soon take over
the U.S.-run PRT at Bagram Air Base. There also has been a move to turn over the lead in the
U.S.-run PRTs to civilians rather than military personnel, presumably State Department or
USAID officials. That process began in early 2006 with the establishment of a civilian-led
U.S.-run PRT in the Panjshir Valley.
Afghan Security Forces
U.S. forces (“Combined Security Transition Command- Afghanistan,” CSTC-A, headed

as of July 2007 by Gen. Robert Cone), along with partner countries, are training the new
Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP).
Afghan National Army

U.S. and allied officers say that the ANA, now about 55,000 trained, is becoming a major
force in stabilizing the country and a national symbol. Senior U.S. commanders say that some
ANA battalions in eastern Afghanistan have progressed to the point where they will be able to
conduct operations on their own by spring 2008. The commando forces of the ANA, trained
by U.S. Special Operations Forces, are considered well-trained and are taking the lead in
some counter-insurgency operations in the U.S.-led eastern sector, particularly against HIG
elements in Nuristan province. However, General McNeillll said in April 2008 that it would
not be until 2011 that ANA (and ANP) forces would be capable enough – and have sufficient
air transport and air support – to allow for a drawdown of international forces. Karzai has
pledged in April 2008 to take over security of the Kabul regional command from Italy as of
July 2008.
ANA battalions, or “Kandaks,” have improved and been stiffened by the presence of U.S.
and partner embeds, called “Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams” (OMLTs). Each OMLT
has about 12-19 personnel, and U.S. commanders say that the ANA will continue to need
embeds for the short term, because embeds give the units confidence they will be resupplied,
reinforced, and evacuated in the event of wounding. Coalition officers also are conducting
heavy weapons training for a heavy brigade as part of the “Kabul Corps,” based in Pol-e-
Charki, east of Kabul. Among the partner countries contributing OMLTs (all or in part) are
Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Britain, and the United States. As noted above, about 700 of the
extra 3,200 Marines being sent to Afghanistan in early 2008 will be devoted to training the
ANA and ANP. The Indian press reported on April 24, 2007, that a separate team from the
Indian Army would help train the ANA.[28]
The United States has built four AMA bases (Herat, Gardez, Qandahar, and Mazar-e-
Sharif). The ANA now has at least some presence in most of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces,
working with the PRTs and assisted by embedded U.S. trainers (about 10-20 per battalion).
The ANA deployed to Herat in March 2004 to help quell factional unrest there and to
Meymaneh in April 2004 in response to Dostam’s militia movement into that city. It deployed
outside Afghanistan to assist relief efforts for victims of the October 2005 Pakistan
earthquake. It is increasingly able to conduct its own battalion-strength operations, according
to U.S. officers. In June 2007, the ANA and ANP led “Operation Maiwand” in Ghazni
province, intended to open schools and deliver humanitarian aid to people throughout the
province.
On the other hand, U.S. officers report continuing personnel (desertion, absentee)
problems, ill discipline, and drugabuse, although some concerns have been addressed. Some
accounts say that a typical ANA unit is only at about 50% of its authorized strength at any
given time. At the time the United States first began establishingthe ANA, Northern Alliance
figures reportedly weighted recruitment for the national army toward its Tajik ethnic base.
Many Pashtuns, in reaction, refused recruitment or left the ANA program. U.S. officials in
Afghanistan say this problem has been at least partly alleviated with better pay and more
close involvement by U.S. forces, and that the force is ethnically integrated in each unit. The
naming of a Pashtun, Abdul Rahim Wardak, as Defense Minister in December 2004 also
reduced desertions among Pashtuns (he remains in that position). The chief of staff is Gen.
Bismillah Khan, a Tajik who was a Northern Alliance commander. U.S. officers in
Afghanistan add that some recruits take long trips to their home towns to remit funds to their
families, and often then return to the ANA after a long absence. Others, according to U.S.
observers, often refuse to serve far from their home towns. The FY2005 foreign aid
appropriation (P.L. 108-447) requires that ANA recruits be vetted for terrorism, human rights
violations, and drug trafficking.
Equipment, maintenance, and logistical difficulties continue to plague the ANA. Few
soldiers have helmets, many have no armored vehicles or armor. The tables below discusses
major equipment donations, as well as the new U.S. equipment being delivered in mid-2008.
The Afghan Air Force, a carryover from the Afghan Air Force that existed prior to the
Soviet invasion, is expanding gradually after its equipment was virtually eliminated in the
2001-2002 U.S. combat against the Taliban regime. It now has about 400 pilots, as well as 22
80 Kenneth Katzman
helicopters and cargo aircraft. Its goal is to have 61 aircraft by 2011. By May 2008, it is
expected to receive an additional 25 surplus helicopters from the Czech Republic and the
UAE, bought and refurbished with the help of U.S. funds. Afghan pilots are based at Bagram
air base. Afghanistan is seeking the return of 26 aircraft, including some MiG-2s that were
flown to safety in Pakistan and Uzbekistan during the past conflicts in Afghanistan. U.S.
plans do not include supply of fixed-wing combat aircraft such as F-16s, which Afghanistan
wants, according to U.S. military officials.
Table 3. Recent and Pending Foreign Equipment for ANA
Country Equipment
United States Major $2 billion value in arms delivered between May 2006-end of 2007.
Includes several hundred Humvees, 800 other various armored vehicles. Also
includes light weapons. Authorized total drawdown ceiling (un-reimbursed by
appropriations) is $550 million; H.R. 2446 - AFSA reauthorization — would
increase ceiling to $300 million/year. Afghanistan is eligible to receive grant
U.S. Excess Defense Articles (EDA) under Section 516 of the Foreign
Assistance Act.
Hungary 20,500 assault rifles
Egypt 17,000 small arms
Russia 4 helicopters and other equipment, part of over $100 million military aid to
Afghanistan thus far
Turkey 24 — 155 mm Howitzers
Bulgaria 50 mortars, 500 binoculars
Czech Republic 12 helicopters and 20,000 machine guns
Estonia 4,000 machine guns plus ammunition
Greece 300 machine guns
Latvia 337 rocket-propelled grenades, 8 mortars, 13,000 arms
Lithuania 3.7 million ammunition rounds
Montenegro 1,600 machine guns
Poland 110 armored personnel carriers, 4 million ammo rounds
Switzerland 3 fire trucks
Turkey 2,200 rounds of 155 mm ammo
Croatia 1,000 machine guns plus ammo
UAE 10 Mi-17 helicopters (to be delivered by May 2008)
Afghan National Police/Justice Sector

U.S. and Afghan officials believe that building up a credible and capable national police
force is at least as important to combating the Taliban insurgency as building the ANA. There
is a widespread consensus that this effort lags that of the ANA by about 18 months, although
U.S. commanders say that it is increasingly successful in repelling Taliban assaults on
villages and that the ANP (now numbering about 75,300 assigned) is experiencing fewer
casualties from attacks. To continue the progress, the U.S. military is conducting reforms to
take ANP out of the bureaucracy and onto the streets and it is trying to bring ANP pay on par
with the ANA. It has also launched a program called “focused district development” to
concentrate resources on developing individual police forces in districts, which is the basic
geographic area of ANP activity. (There are about ten “districts” in each of Afghanistan’s 34
provinces.) In this program, a district force is taken out and retrained, its duties temporarily
performed by more highly trained police, and then reinserted after the training is complete.
Gen. Cone said on April 18, 2008 that, thus far, ten districts have undergone this process,
which he says will take five years to complete for all of Afghanistan’s districts.
The U.S. police training effort was first led by State Department/INL, but the Defense
Department took over the lead in police training in April 2005. Much of the training is still
conducted through contracts with DynCorp. There are currently seven police training centers
around Afghanistan. In addition to the U.S. effort, which includes 600 civilian U.S. police
trainers (mostly still Dyncorp contractors) in addition to the U.S. military personnel (see table
on security indicators), Germany (technically the lead government in Afghan police training)
is providing 41 trainers. The European Union has sent an additional 120 police trainers as part
of a 190-member “EUPOL” training effort, and 60 other experts to help train the ANP. The
EU said in March 2008 the size of the EUPOL training team should be doubled to about 400.
To address equipment shortages, in 2007 CSTC-A is providing about 8,000 new vehicles
and thousands of new weapons of all types. A report by the Inspectors General of the State
and Defense Department, circulated to Congress in December 2006, found that most ANP
units have less than 50% of their authorized equipment,[29] among its significant criticisms.
Many experts believe that comprehensive police and justice sector reform is vital to
Afghan governance. Police training now includes instruction in human rights principles and
democratic policing concepts, and the State Department human rights report on Afghanistan,
referenced above, says the government and outside observers are increasingly monitoring the
police force to prevent abuses. However, some governments criticized Karzai for setting back
police reform in June 2006 when he approved a new list of senior police commanders that
included 11 (out of 86 total) who had failed merit exams. His approval of the 11 were
reportedly to satisfy faction leaders and went against the recommendations of a police reform
committee. The ANP work in the communities they come from, often embroiling them in
local factional or ethnic disputes.
The State Department (INL) has placed 30 U.S. advisors in the Interior Ministry to help it
develop the national police force and counter-narcotics capabilities. U.S. trainers are also
building Border Police and Highway Patrol forces.
U.S. justice sector programs generally focus on building capacity of the judicial system,
including police training and court construction; manyof these programs are conducted in
partnership with Italy, which is the “lead” coalition country on judicial reform. The United
States has trained over 750 judges, lawyers, and prosecutors, according to President Bush on
February 15, 2007, and built 40 judicial facilities. USAID also trains court administrators for
the Ministry of Justice, the office of the Attorney General, and the Supreme Court. On
February 15, 2007, President Bush also praised Karzai’s formation of a Criminal Justice Task
Force that is trying to crack down on official corruption, and the United States, Britain, and
Norway are providing mentors to the Afghan judicial officials involved in that effort.
Tribal Militias
Since June 2006, Karzai has authorized arming some local tribal militias (arbokai) in
eastern Afghanistan, building on established tribal structures, to help in local policing. Karzai
argues that these militias provide security and are loyal to the nation and central government
and that arming them is not inconsistent with the disarmament programs discussed below.
Britain favors expanding the arbokai program to the south, but U.S. military commanders say
that this program would likely not work in the south because of differing tribal structures
there.
82 Kenneth Katzman
U.S. Security Forces Funding/”CERP”

U.S. funds appropriated for Peacekeeping Operations (PKO funds) are used to cover
ANA salaries. Recent appropriations for the ANA and ANP are contained in the tables at the
end of this chapter. In addition to the train and equip funds provided by DoD, the U.S.
military in Afghanistan has additional funds to spend on reconstruction projects that build
goodwill and presumably reduce the threat to use forces. These are Commanders Emergency
Response Program funds, or CERP. The U.S. military spent about $206 million in CERP in
FY2007 and expect to spend, subject to FY2008 supplemental appropriations, about $410
million in CERP in FY2008. As noted in the table, the security forces funding has shifted to
DOD funds instead of assistance funds controlled by the State Department.
Table 4. Major Security-Related Indicators
Force Current Level

Total Foreign Forces in About 64,000, of which: 53,000 are NATO/ISAF. (12,000 ISAF in 2005; and
Afghanistan 6,000 in 2003.) U.S. forces: 34,500 total, of which 23,500 in NATO/ISAF and
11,000 in OEF. (U.S. total was: 25,000 in 2005; 16,000 in 2003; 5,000 in
2002). U.S. will rise further in 2009, according to President Bush on April 5,
2008, likely by about 7,000. U.S. forces deployed at 88 bases in Afghanistan,
and include 1 air wing (40 aircraft) and 1 combat aviation brigade (100
aircraft). About 1,000 coalition partner forces in OEF, but not ISAF.
U.S. Casualties in 443 killed, of which 308 by hostile action. Additional 65 U.S. deaths in other
Afghanistan OEF theaters, including the Phillipines and parts of Africa (OEF-Trans
Sahara). About 275 partner forces killed. 100+ U.S. killed in 2007, highest
yet. 150 U.S. killed from October 2001 - January 2003.
NATO Sectors RC-S - 23,000 (Canada, UK, Netherlands rotate lead); RC-E -16,400 (U.S.
(Regional Commands- lead); RC-N - 4,300; RC-W - 2,500 (Italy lead) RC-Kabul - 5,900 (Italy lead
South, east, north, west, but Afghanistan planning to take lead by July 2008).
and central/Kabul)
Afghan National Army 55,000 trained, with about 40,000 on duty. 63,000 including civilian support.
(ANA) Organized into 33 battalions. Will add 13,000 soldiers by end of 2008; 80,000
is goal by 2009, endorsed in Afghanistan Compact. Afghanistan proposes
raising ceiling to 120,000. About 2,000 trained per month. 4,000 are
commando forces, trained by U.S. Special Forces, active in north-east against
HIG. ANA private paid about $150 per month; generals receive about $750
per month. ANA now being outfitted with U.S. M16 rifles and 4,000 up-
armored Humvees.
Afghan National Police 75,300 assigned. Authorized strength: 82,000. Salaries raised to $100 per
(ANP) month in mid-2007 from $70 to counter corruption in the force. 2,600 are
counter-narcotics police. 10,000 are border police.
U.S. and Partner About 4,000 U.S. military trainers as Embedded Training Troops and Police
Trainers Mentoring Teams. Also, 600 civilian U.S. police trainers. Of these, about 900
U.S. military trainers are for ANP. The remaining 3,100 are for ANA training.
ANP training assisted by EUPOL (European Union contingent of 190 trainers,
organized as OMLTs; see text), and 41 German trainers of senior ANP.
Legally Armed Fighters
63,380; all of the pool identified for the program
disarmed by DDR
Armed Groups 161 illegal groups (five or more fighters) disbanded. Goal is to disband 1,800
disbanded by DIAG groups, of which several hundred groups are “significant.” 5,700 weapons
confiscated, 1.050 arrested.
Force Current Level

Weapons Collected by
DDR: 36,000 medium and light; 12,250 heavy.
DDR
Number of Suicide
Bombings 21 in 2005; 123 in 2006; 160 in 2007.
Afghan Casualties About 6,000 in 2007 (including Taliban; all types of violence)
Number of Improvised 500+ in 2007
Explosive Devices
(IED’s)
REGIONAL CONTEXT
Although most of Afghanistan’s neighbors believe that the fall of the Taliban has
stabilized the region, some experts believe that some neighboring governments are attempting
to manipulate Afghanistan’s factions to their advantage, even though six of Afghanistan’s
neighbors signed a non-interference pledge (Kabul Declaration) on December 23, 2002. In
November 2005, Afghanistan joined the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC), and Afghanistan has observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,
which is discussed below.
Pakistan/Pakistan-Afghanistan Border[30]
As Pakistan’s government has changed composition over the past year, experts
increasingly see Pakistan as unhelpful to U.S. efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. During 2001-
2006, the Bush Administration generally refrained from criticism of President Pervez
Musharraf, instead praising Pakistani accomplishments against Al Qaeda, including the arrest
of over 700 Al Qaeda figures, some of them senior, since the September 11 attacks. After the
attacks, Pakistan provided the United States with access to Pakistani airspace, some ports, and
some airfields for OEF. Among those captured by Pakistan are top bin Laden aide Abu
Zubaydah (captured April 2002); alleged September 11 plotter Ramzi bin Al Shibh
(September 11, 2002); top Al Qaeda planner Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (March 2003); and a
top planner, Abu Faraj al-Libbi (May 2005). Others say Musharraf has acted against Al
Qaeda only because of its threat to him; for example, he stepped up Pakistani military
activities in the tribal areas of Pakistan only after the December 2003 assassination attempts
against him by that organization.
On the Taliban, Pakistan has consistently faced Afghan criticism. Afghan leaders resent
Pakistan as the most public defender of the Taliban movement when it was in power and they
suspect it wants to have the option to restore a Taliban-like regime. (Pakistan was one of only
three countries to formally recognize it as the legitimate government: Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates are the others.) Pakistan viewed the Taliban as providingPakistan
strategic depth against rival India, and it remains wary that any Afghan government might fall
under the influence of India,which Pakistan says is using its diplomatic facilities in
Afghanistan to train and recruit anti-Pakistan insurgents, and is using its reconstruction funds
to build influence there. Pakistan ended its public support for the Taliban after the September
11, 2001, attacks. Efforts by Afghanistan and Pakistan to build post-Taliban relations never
84 Kenneth Katzman
fully recovered from March 2006, when Afghan leaders stepped up accusations that Pakistan
was allowing Taliban remnants, including Mullah Umar, to operating there. In a press
interview on February 2, 2007, Musharraf tacitly acknowledged that some senior Taliban
leaders might be able to operate from Pakistan but strongly denied that any Pakistani
intelligence agencies were deliberately assisting the Taliban. Karzai visited Pakistan on
December 27, 2007, to discuss the Taliban safehaven issue and other bilateral issues, and
reports said his meeting with Musharraf was highly productive, resulting in re-dedication to
joint action against militants. While in Pakistan, Karzai met with Pakistani opposition leader
Benazir Bhutto just hours before she was assassinated on December 27.
The latest phase of U.S. attempts to broker cooperation between Pakistan and
Afghanistan began on September 28, 2006, when President Bush hosted a joint dinner for
Karzai and Musharraf. It resulted in the two leaders’ agreeing to gather tribal elders on both
sides of their border in a series of “peace jirgas” to persuade them not to host Taliban
militants. (The first of them, in which 700 Pakistani and Afghan tribal elders participated, was
held in Kabul August 9-10, 2007.[31] Another is planned, but no date has been announced.)
In January 2007, Karzai strongly criticized a Pakistani plan to mine and fence their common
border in an effort to prevent infiltration of militants to Afghanistan. Karzai said the move
would separate tribes and families that straddle the border. Pakistan subsequently dropped the
idea of mining the border, but is building some fencing.
A U.S. shift toward the Afghan position on Pakistan increased following a New York
Times report of February 19, 2007, that Al Qaeda leaders, possibly including Osama bin
Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, had re-established some small Al Qaeda terrorist training
camps in Pakistan, near the Afghan border. The regrouping of militants is said to be an
outgrowth of a September 5, 2006, agreement between Pakistan and tribal elders in this
region to exchange an end to Pakistani military incursions into the tribal areas for a promise
by the tribal elders to expel militants from the border area. In July 2007, U.S. counter-
terrorism officials publicly deemed the agreement a failure. Despite the widespread
assessment that the deals had failed, in April 2008, the new government, dominated by
Musharraf’s opponents who prevailed in February 2008 parliamentary elections, began
negotiating a similar “understanding” with members of the Mehsud tribe, among which is
militant leader Baitullah Mehsud, believed responsible for harboring Afghan Taliban and for
growing militant acts inside Pakistan itself, possibly including the Bhutto killing. Outgoing
Gen. McNeill blamed the negotiations for an increase in militant infiltration across the border
that has undermined some of the progress in pacifying the Regional Command East sector. In
addition, Pakistan has stopped attending meetings of the “coordinating commission” under
which NATO, Afghan, and Pakistani forces meet regularly on both sides of the border. In
April 2008, in an extension of the commission’s work, the three set up six “border
coordination centers” to share intelligence on cross-border movement of militants, building
on an agreement in May 2007 to share intelligence on extremists’ movements.
Increased Direct U.S. Action

Since September 2007, press reports have said that U.S. military planners are proposing
increasing U.S. direct action against militants in Pakistan, partly in partnership with Pakistani
border and other forces.[32] Responding to the reports, Musharraf — as well as his newly
ascendant political opponents in Pakistan — publicly oppose unilateral U.S. action and any
presence of U.S. combat forces in Pakistan. In late January 2008, Secretary of Defense Gates
said that Pakistan had not yet asked for such U.S. help and that any U.S. troops potentially
deployed to Pakistan would most likely be assigned solely to train Pakistani border forces,
such as the Frontier Corps. However, press reports also say that visits to Pakistan by top U.S.
intelligence officials in January 2008 resulted in agreement for more U.S. Predator unmanned
aerial vehicle flights over the border regions; the Abu Laith al-Libi strike discussed earlier is
believed a product of that enhanced U.S. activity over Pakistan. In addition, U.S. forces in
Afghanistan have acknowledged on a few occasion since early 2007 that they have shelled
purported Taliban positions inside the Pakistani side of the border, and have done some “hot
pursuit” a few kilometers over the border into Pakistan. U.S. commanders said in June 2008
that NATO and U.S. forces had beefed up their numbers on the border to deal with the spike
in attacks caused by Pakistan’s relaxation of efforts to prevent militant infiltration.
Suggesting that it can act against the Taliban when it intends to, on August 15, 2006,
Pakistan announced the arrest of 29 Taliban fighters in a hospital in the Pakistani city of
Quetta. On March 1, 2007, Pakistani officials confirmed they had arrested in Quetta Mullah
Ubaydallah Akhund, a top aide to Mullah Umar and who had served as defense minister in
the Taliban regime. He was later reported released.
Pakistan wants the government of Afghanistan to pledge to abide by the “Durand Line,” a
border agreement reached between Britain (signed by Sir Henry Mortimer Durand) and then
Afghan leader Amir Abdul Rahman Khan in 1893, separating Afghanistan from what was
then British-controlled India (later Pakistan after the 1947 partition). It is recognized by the
United Nations, but Afghanistan continues to indicate that the border was drawn unfairly to
separate Pashtun tribes and should be re-negotiated. As of October 2002, about 1.75 million
Afghan refugees have returned from Pakistan since the Taliban fell, but as many as 3 million
might still remain in Pakistan, and Pakistan says it plans to expel them back into Afghanistan
in the near future.
Iran
Iranperceives its keynational interests in Afghanistan as exerting its traditional influence

over western Afghanistan, which Iran borders and was once part of the Persian empire, and to
protect Afghanistan’s Shiite minority. Iran’s assistance to Afghanistan has totaled about $205
million since the fall of the Taliban, mainly to build roads and schools and provide electricity
and shops to Afghan cities and villages near the Iranian border. After the fall of the Taliban in
late 2001, President Bush warned Iran against meddling in Afghanistan. Partly in response to
the U.S. criticism, in February 2002 Iran expelled Karzai-opponent Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, but
it did not arrest him. Iran did not oppose Karzai’s firing of Iran ally Ismail Khan as Herat
governor in September 2004, although Iran has opposed the subsequent U.S. use of the
Shindand air base.[33] Iran is said to be helping Afghan law enforcement with anti-narcotics
along their border. Karzai, who has visited Iran on several occasions says that Iran is an
important neighbor of Afghanistan. During his visit to Washington, DC, in August 2007,
some differences between Afghanistan and the United States became apparent; Karzai
publicly called Iran part of a “solution” for Afghanistan, while President Bush called Iran a
“de-stabilizing force” there. Still, Karzai received Ahmadinejad in Kabul in mid-August
2007.
86 Kenneth Katzman
The U.S.-Afghan differences over Iran’s role represent a departure fromthe past five
years, when Iran’s influence with political leaders in Afghanistan appeared to wane, and U.S.
criticism of Iran’s role in Afghanistan was muted. The State Department report on
international terrorism, released April 30, 2008, said Iran continued during 2007 to ship arms
to Taliban fighters in Afghanistan, including mortars, 107mm rockets, and possibly man-
portable air defense systems (MANPADS). On April 17, 2007, U.S. military personnel in
Afghanistan captured a shipment of Iranian weapons that purportedly was bound for Taliban
fighters. On June 6, 2007, NATO officers said they caught Iran “red-handed” shipping heavy
arms, C4 explosives, and advanced roadside bombs (“explosively-forcedprojectiles, EFPs,
such as those found in Iraq) to Taliban fighters in Afghanistan. Another such shipment was
intercepted in western Afghanistan on September 6, 2007. Gen. McNeill said the convoy was
sent with the knowledge of “at least the Iranian military.” Because such shipments would
appear to conflict with Iran’s support for Karzai and for non-Pashtun factions in Afghanistan,
U.S. military officers did not attribute the shipments to a deliberate Iranian government
decision to arm the Taliban. However, some U.S. officials say the shipments are large enough
that the Iranian government would have to have known about them. In attempting to explain
the shipments, some experts believe Iran’s policy might beshiftingsomewhatto gain leverage
against the United States in Afghanistan (and on other issues) by causing U.S. combat deaths.
There is little dispute that Iran’s relations with Afghanistan are much improved from the
time of the Taliban, which Iran saw as a threat to its interests in Afghanistan, especially after
Taliban forces captured Herat (the western province that borders Iran) in September 1995.
Iran subsequently drew even closer to the Northern Alliance than previously, providing its
groups with fuel, funds, and ammunition.[34] In September 1998, Iranian and Taliban forces
nearly came into direct conflict when Iran discovered that nine of its diplomats were killed in
the course of the Taliban’s offensive in northern Afghanistan. Iran massed forces at the
border and threatened military action, but the crisis cooled without a major clash, possibly out
of fear that Pakistan would intervene on behalf of the Taliban. Iran offered search and rescue
assistance in Afghanistan during the U.S.-led war to topple the Taliban, and it also allowed
U.S. humanitarian aid to the Afghan people to transit Iran. About 300,000 Afghan refugees
have returned from Iran since the Taliban fell, but about 1.2 million remain, mostly integrated
into Iranian society, and a crisis erupted in May 2007 when Iran expelled about 50,000 into
Afghanistan.
India
The interests and activities of India in Afghanistan are almost the exact reverse of those
of Pakistan. India’s goal is to deny Pakistan “strategic depth” in Afghanistan, and India
supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban in the mid-1990s. A possible reflection of
these ties is that Tajikistan allows India to use one of its air bases; Tajikistan supports the
mostly Tajik Northern Alliance. India saw the Taliban’s hosting of Al Qaeda as a major threat
to India itself because of Al Qaeda’s association with radical Islamic organizations in
Pakistan dedicated to ending Indian control of parts of Jammu and Kashmir. Some of these
groups have committed major acts of terrorism in India. For its part, Pakistan accuses India of
using its nine consulates in Afghanistan to spread Indian influence.
India is becoming a major investor in and donor to Afghanistan. It is co-financing, along

with the Asian Development Bank, several power projects in northern Afghanistan. In
January 2005, India promised to help Afghanistan’s struggling Ariana national airline and it
has begun India Air flights between Delhi and Kabul. It has also renovated the well known
Habibia High School in Kabul and committed to a $25 million renovation of Darulaman
Palace as the permanent house for Afghanistan’s parliament. Numerous other India-financed
reconstruction projects are under way throughout Afghanistan. India, along with the Asian
Development Bank, is financing the $300 million project, mentioned above, to bring
electricity from Central Asia to Afghanistan. Pakistan is likely to take particular exception to
the reported training by India of the ANA, discussed above.
Russia, Central Asian States, and China
Some neighboring and nearby states take an active interest not only in Afghan stability,
but in the U.S. military posture that supports OEF.
Russia
Russia provides some humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, although it keeps a low profile in
Afghanistan because it still feels humiliated by its withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 and
senses Afghan resentment of the Soviet occupation. In an effort to try to cooperate more with
NATO at least in Afghanistan, in conjunction with the April 2008 NATO summit, Russia
agreed to allow NATO to ship non-lethal supplies to coalition forces in Afghanistan by land
over Russian territory.
During the 1990s, Russia supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban with some
military equipment and technical assistance in order to blunt Islamic militancy emanating
from Afghanistan.[35] Although Russia supported the U.S. effort against the Taliban and Al
Qaeda in Afghanistan out of fear of Islamic (mainly Chechen) radicals, Russia continues to
seek to reduce the U.S. military presence in Central Asia. Russian fears of Islamic activism
emanating from Afghanistan may have ebbed since 2002 when Russia killed a Chechen of
Arab origin known as “Hattab” (full name is Ibn al-Khattab), who led a militant pro-Al Qaeda
Chechen faction. The Taliban government was the only one in the world to recognize
Chechnya’s independence, and some Chechen fighters fighting alongsideTaliban/Al Qaeda
forces have been captured or killed.
Central Asian States

During Taliban rule, Russian and Central Asian leaders grew increasingly alarmed that
radical Islamic movements were receiving safe haven in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan, in
particular, has long asserted that the group Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), allegedly
responsible for four simultaneous February 1999 bombings in Tashkent that nearly killed
President Islam Karimov, is linked to Al Qaeda.[36] One of its leaders, Juma Namangani,
reportedly was killed while commanding Taliban/Al Qaeda forces in Konduz in November
2001. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan do not directly border Afghanistan, but IMU guerrillas
transited Kyrgyzstan during incursions into Uzbekistan in the late 1990s.
During Taliban rule, Uzbekistan supported Uzbek leader Abdul Rashid Dostam, who was
part of that Alliance. It allowed use of Karshi-Khanabad air base by OEF forces from October
88 Kenneth Katzman
2001 until a rift emerged in May 2005 over Uzbekistan’s crackdown against riots in Andijon,
and U.S.-Uzbek relations remained largely frozen. Uzbekistan’s March 2008 agreement with
Germany for it to use Karshi-Khanabad air base temporarily, for the first time since the rift in
U.S.-Uzbekrelations developed in 2005, suggests that U.S.-Uzbek cooperation on
Afghanistan and other issues might be rebuilt. As a follow-up to this, Uzbekistan at the April
2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, proposed to revive the “6 + 2” process of neighbors of
Afghanistan to help its stability, but Karzai reportedly opposes this idea as unwanted Central
Asian interference in its affairs.
In 1996, several of the Central Asian states banded together with Russia and China into a
regional grouping called the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to discuss the Taliban threat.
It includes China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Reflecting
Russian and Chinese efforts to limit U.S. influence in the region, the group has issued
statements, most recently in August 2007, that security should be handled by the countries in
the Central Asia region. Despite the Shanghai Cooperation Organization statements,
Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan are all, for now, holding to their pledges of facility
support to OEF. (Tajikistan allows access primarily to French combat aircraft, and
Kazakhstan allows use of facilities in case of emergency.)
Of the Central Asian states that border Afghanistan, only Turkmenistan chose to seek
close relations with the Taliban leadership when it was in power, possibly viewing
engagement as a more effective means of preventing spillover of radical Islamic activity from
Afghanistan. It saw Taliban control as facilitating construction of a natural gas pipeline from
Turkmenistan through Afghanistan (see above). The September 11 events stoked
Turkmenistan’s fears of the Taliban and its Al Qaeda guests and the country publicly
supported the U.S.-led war. No U.S. forces have been based in Turkmenistan.
China
A major organizer of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China has a small border
with a sliver of Afghanistan known as the “Wakhan corridor” (see map). China had become
increasingly concerned about the potential for Al Qaeda to promote Islamic fundamentalism
among Muslims (Uighurs) in northwestern China. A number of Uighurs fought in Taliban
and Al Qaeda ranks in the U.S.-led war, according to U.S. military officials. In December
2000, sensing China’s increasing concern about Taliban policies, a Chinese official
delegation met with Mullah Umar. China did not enthusiastically support U.S. military action
against the Taliban, possibly because China was wary of a U.S. military buildup nearby. In
addition, China has been allied to Pakistan in part to pressure India, a rival of China. Still,
Chinese delegations are visiting Afghanistan to assess the potential for investments in such
sectors as mining and energy,[37] and a deal was signed in November 2007 as discussed
above (China Metallurgical Group).
Saudi Arabia
During the Soviet occupation, Saudi Arabia channeled hundreds of millions of dollars to
the Afghan resistance, primarily the Hikmatyar and Sayyaf factions. Saudi Arabia, a majority
of whose citizens practice the strict Wahhabi brand of Islam also practiced by the Taliban,
was one of three countries to formally recognize the Taliban government. The Taliban
initially served Saudi Arabia as a potential counter to Iran, but Iranian-Saudi relations
improved after 1997 and balancing Iranian power ebbed as a factor in Saudi policy toward
Afghanistan. Drawing on its reputed intelligence ties to Afghanistan during that era, Saudi
Arabia worked with Taliban leaders to persuade them to suppress anti-Saudi activities by Al
Qaeda. Some press reports indicate that, in late 1998, Saudi and Taliban leaders discussed,
but did not agree on, a plan for a panel of Saudi and Afghan Islamic scholars to decide bin
Laden’s fate.
According to U.S. officials, Saudi Arabia cooperated extensively, if not publicly, with
OEF. It broke diplomatic relations with the Taliban in late September 2001 and quietly
permitted the United States to use a Saudi base for command of U.S. air operations over
Afghanistan, but it did not permit U.S. airstrikes from it
U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL AID TO AFGHANISTAN AND

DEVELOPMENT ISSUES
Many experts believe that financial assistance and accelerating reconstruction would do
more to improve the security situation than intensified anti-Taliban combat. Afghanistan’s
economy and society are still fragile after decades of warfare that left about 2 million dead,
700,000 widows and orphans, and about 1 million Afghan children who were born and raised
in refugee camps outside Afghanistan. More than 3.5 million Afghan refugees have since
returned, although a comparable number remain outside Afghanistan. The U.N. High
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) supervises Afghan repatriation and Afghan refugee
camps in Pakistan.
Still heavily dependent on donors, Karzai has sought to reassure the international donor
community by establishing a transparent budget and planning process. Some in Congress
want to increase independent oversight of U.S. aid to Afghanistan; the conference report on
the FY2008 defense authorization bill (P.L. 110-181) established a “special inspector
general” for Afghanistan reconstruction, (SIGAR) modeled on a similar outside auditor for
Iraq (“Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction,” SIGIR). The law also authorized
$20 million for that purpose, although funds have not yet been provided in DOD
appropriations. On May 30, 2008, Maj. Gen. Arnold Fields (Marine, ret.) was named to the
position.
U.S. and Afghan officials see the growth in narcotics trafficking as a product of an
Afghan economy ravaged by war and lack of investment. Efforts to build the legitimate
economy are showing some results, by accounts of senior U.S. officials, including expansion
of roads and education and health facilities constructed. USAID spending to promote
economic growth is shown in Table 14, and U.S. and international assistance to Afghanistan
are discussed in the last sections of this chapter.
Some international investors areimplementingprojects, and there is substantial new
construction, such as the Serena luxury hotel that opened in November 2005 (long considered
a priority Taliban target and was attacked by militants on January 14, 2008, killing six) and a
$25 million new Coca Cola bottling factory that opened in Kabul on September 11, 2006.
Several Afghan companies are growing as well, including Roshan and Afghan Wireless (cell
phone service), and Tolo Television. A Gold’s Gym has opened in Kabul as well. The 52-
year-old national airline, Ariana, is said to be in significant financial trouble due to corruption
90 Kenneth Katzman
that has affected its safety ratings and left it unable to service a heavy debt load, but there are
new privately run airlines, such as Pamir Air, Safi Air, and Kam Air. Some Afghan leaders
complain that not enough has been done to revive such potentially lucrative industries as
minerals mining, such as of copper and lapis lazuli (a stone used in jewelry). However, in
November 2007, the Afghan government signed a deal with China Metallurgical Group for
the company to invest $2.8 billion to develop Afghanistan’s Aynak copper field in Lowgar
Province; the agreement will include construction of a coal-fired electric power plant and a
freight railway.
The United States is trying to build on Afghanistan’s post-war economic rebound. In
September 2004, the United States and Afghanistan signed a bilateral trade and investment
framework agreement (TIFA). These agreements are generally seen as a prelude to a broader
but more complex bilateral free trade agreement, but negotiations on an FTA have not begun
to date. On December 13, 2004, the 148 countries of the World Trade Organization voted to
start membership talks with Afghanistan. Another initiative supported by the United States is
the establishment of joint Afghan-Pakistani “Reconstruction Opportunity Zones” (ROZ’s)
which would be modeled after “Qualified Industrial Zones” run by Israel and Jordan in which
goods produced in the zones receive duty free treatment for import into the United States. For
FY2008, $5 million in supplemental funding is requested to support the zones. A Senate bill,
S. 2776, would authorize the President to proclaim duty-free treatment for imports from
ROZ’s to be designated by the President.
Afghanistan’s prospects also appeared to brighten by the announcement in March 2006 of
an estimated 3.6 billion barrels of oil and 36.5 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves. Experts
believe these amounts, if proved, could make Afghanistan relatively self-sufficient in energy
and possibly able to provided some exports to its neighbors.
Afghan officials are said to be optimistic for increased trade with Central Asia now that a
new bridge has opened (October 2007) over the Panj River, connecting Afghanistan and
Tajikistan. The bridge was built with U.S. assistance. The bridge will further assist what press
reports say is robust reconstruction and economic development in the relatively peaceful and
ethnically homogenous province of Panjshir, the political base of the Northern Alliance.
Another major energy project remains under consideration. During 1996-1998, the
Clinton Administration supported proposed natural gas and oil pipelines through western
Afghanistan as an incentive for the warring factions to cooperate. A consortium led by Los
Angeles-based Unocal Corporation proposed a $2.5 billion Central Asia Gas Pipeline
(CentGas), which is now estimated to cost $3.7 billion to construct, that would originate in
southern Turkmenistan and pass through Afghanistan to Pakistan, with possible extensions
into India.[38] The deterioration in U.S.-Taliban relations after 1998 largely ended hopes for
the pipeline projects while the Taliban was in power.
Prospects for the project have improved in the post-Taliban period. In a summit meeting
in late May 2002 between the leaders of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, the three
countries agreed to revive the gas pipeline project. Sponsors of the project held an inaugural
meeting on July 9, 2002 in Turkmenistan, signing a series of preliminary agreements.
Turkmenistan’s new leadership (President Gurbanguly Berdimukhamedov, succeeding the
late Saparmurad Niyazov) favors the project as well. Some U.S. officials view this project as
a superior alternative to a proposed gas pipeline from Iran to India, transiting Pakistan.
Some of the more stable provinces, such as Bamiyan, are complaining that international
aid is flowing mostly to the restive provinces in an effort to quiet them, and ignoring the
needs of poor Afghans in peaceful areas. Later in this chapter are tables showing U.S.
appropriations of assistance to Afghanistan, including some detail on funds earmarked for
categories of civilian reconstruction, and Table 14 lists USAID spending on all of these
sectors for FY2002-FY2007.
• Roads. Road building is considered a U.S. priority and has been USAID’s largest
project category there, taking up about 25% of USAID spending since the fall of the
Taliban. An FY2008 supplemental funding requests asks for $50 million more for
roads, particularly to rehabilitate a road that would connect northern Afghanistan
with Kabul, running through Bamiyan Province. Roads are considered key to
enabling Afghan farmers to bring legitimate produce to market in a timely fashion
and former commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan Gen. Eikenberry said “where
the roads end, the Taliban begin.” Among major projects completed: the Kabul-
Qandahar roadway project; the Qandahar-Herat roadway, funded by the United
States, Japan, and Saudi Arabia, completed by 2006; a road from Qandahar to Tarin
Kowt, built by U.S. military personnel, inaugurated in 2005; and a road linking the
Panjshir Valley to Kabul. U.S. funds are also building roads connecting remote areas
to regional district centers in several provinces in the eastern sector.
• Education. Despite the success in enrolling Afghan children in school since the
Taliban era (see statistics above), setbacks have occurred because of Taliban attacks
on schools, causing some to close.
• Health. The health care sector, as noted by Afghan observers, has made considerable
gains in reducing infant mortality and improving Afghans’ access to health
professionals. In addition to U.S. assistance to develop the health sector’s capacity,
Egypt operates a 65-person field hospital at Bagram Air Base that instructs Afghan
physicians. Jordan operates a similar facility in Mazar-e-Sharif.
• Agriculture. USAID has spent about 5% of its Afghanistan funds on agriculture, and
this has helped Afghanistan double its agricultural output over the past five years.
Afghan officials say agricultural assistance and development should be a top U.S.
priority as part of a strategy of encouraging legitimate alternatives to poppy
cultivation. (Another 10% of USAID funds is spent on “alternative livelihoods” to
poppy growing, mostly in aid to farmers.)
• Electricity. About 10% of USAID spending in Afghanistan is on power projects. The
Afghanistan Compact states that the goal is for electricity to reach 65% of
households in urban areas and 25% in rural areas by 2010. There have been severe
power shortages in Kabul, partly because the city population has swelled to nearly 4
million, up from half a million when the Taliban was in power, but power to the
capital is more plentiful as of March 2008. An FY2008 supplemental request asks for
$115 million more for this sector, particularly to ensure that a 100 Megawatt diesel
generator becomes operational for Kabul. The Afghan government, with help from
international donors, plans to import electricity from Central Asian and other
neighbors beginning in 2009. Another major pending project is the Kajaki Dam,
located in unstable Helmand Province. USAID has allocated about $500 million to
refurbish the remaining two electricity-generating turbines (one is operating) of the
dam (total project estimate, when completed) which, when functional, will provide
electricity for 1.7 million Afghans and about 4,000 jobs in the reconstruction.
92 Kenneth Katzman
However, progress depends on securing access to the dam; surrounding roads and
areas are controlled by or accessible to Taliban insurgents.
National Solidarity Program

The United States and the Afghan government are also trying to promote local
decisionmaking on reconstruction. The “National Solidarity Program,” largely funded by U.S.
and other international donors seeks to create and empower local governing councils to
prioritize local reconstruction projects. The assistance, channeled through donors, provides
block grants of about $60,000 per project to the councils to implement agreed projects, most
of which are water projects. Elections to these local councils have been held in several
provinces, and almost 40% of those elected have been women.[39] The U.S. aid to the
program is part of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) account. (Of the
supplemental FY2008 ESF funds requested, $40 million is to launch the next phase of the
National Solidarity Program, and $25 million is for the budgetary support portion of the
ARTF account.)
U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan
During the 1990s, the United States became the largest single provider of assistance to
the Afghan people. During Taliban rule, no U.S. aid went directly to that government; monies
were provided through relief organizations. Between 1985 and 1994, the United States had a
cross-border aid program for Afghanistan, implemented by USAID personnel based in
Pakistan. Citing the difficulty of administering this program, there was no USAID mission for
Afghanistan from the end of FY1994 until the reopening of the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan
in late 2001.
Post-Taliban U.S. Aid Totals

Since FY2002 and including funds already appropriated for FY2008, the United States
has provided over $23 billion in reconstruction assistance, including military “train and
equip” for the ANA and ANP and counter-narcotics-related assistance. These amounts do not
include costs for U.S. combat operations, which are discussed in CRS Report RL33110, The
Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, by Amy
Belasco. The tables below depict the aid.[40]
Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 and Amendments

A key post-Taliban aid authorization bill, S. 2712, the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act
(AFSA) of 2002 (P.L. 107-327, December 4, 2002), as amended, authorized about $3.7
billion in U.S. civilian aid for FY2003-FY2006. For the most part, the humanitarian, counter-
narcotics, and governance assistance targets authorized bythe act were met or exceeded by
appropriations. However, no Enterprise Funds have been appropriated, and ISAF expansion
was funded by the contributing partner forces. The act authorized the following:
• $60 million in total counter-narcotics assistance ($15 million per year for FY2003-
FY2006);
• $30 million in assistance for political development, including national, regional, and
local elections ($10 million per year for FY2003-FY2005);
• $80 million total to benefit women and for Afghan human rights oversight ($15
million per year for FY2003-FY2006 for the Afghan Ministry of Women’s Affairs,
and $5 million per year for FY2003-FY2006 to the Human Rights Commission of
Afghanistan);
• $1.7 billion in humanitarian and development aid ($425 million per year for FY2003-
FY2006);
• $300 million for an Enterprise Fund;
• $550 million in draw-downs of defense articles and services for Afghanistan and
regional militaries. (The original law provided for $300 million in drawdowns. That
was increased to $450 million by P.L. 108-106, an FY2004 supplemental
appropriations); and
• $1 billion ($500 million per year for FY2003-FY2004) to expand ISAF if such an
expansion takes place.
A subsequent law (P.L. 108-458, December 17, 2004), implementing the

recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, contained a subtitle called “The Afghanistan
Freedom Support Act Amendments of 2004.” The subtitle mandates the appointment of a
U.S. coordinator of policy on Afghanistan and requires additional Administration reports to
Congress, including (1) on long-term U.S. strategy and progress of reconstruction, an
amendment to the report required in the original law;
(2) on how U.S. assistance is being used; (3) on U.S. efforts to persuade other countries
to participate in Afghan peacekeeping; and (4) a joint State and Defense Department report on
U.S. counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan. The law also contains several “sense of
Congress” provisions recommending more rapid DDR activities; expansion of ISAF; and
counter-narcotics initiatives.
Afghan Freedom Support Act Re-Authorization
In the 110th Congress, H.R. 2446, passed by the House on June 6, 2007 (406-10), would
reauthorize AFSA through FY2010. Some observers say the Senate might take it up early in
2008. The following are the major provisions of the bill:
• A total of about $1.7 billion in U.S. economic aid and $320 in military aid (including
draw-downs of equipment) per fiscal year would be authorized.
• a pilot program of crop substitution to encourage legitimate alternatives to poppy
cultivation is authorized. Afghan officials support this provision as furthering their
goal of combatting narcotics by promoting alternative livelihoods.
• enhanced anti-corruption and legal reform programs would be provided.
• a mandated cutoff of U.S. aid to any Afghan province in which the Administration
reports that the leadership of the province is complicit in narcotics trafficking. This
provision has drawn some criticism from observers who saythatthe most needy in
Afghanistan might be deprived of aid based on allegations that are difficult to judge
precisely.
94 Kenneth Katzman
• $45 million per year for the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, the Afghan Independent
Human Rights Commission, and programs for women and girls is authorized.
• $75 million per year is authorized specifically for enhanced power generation, a key
need in Afghanistan.
• a coordinator for U.S. assistance to Afghanistan is mandated.
• military drawdowns for the ANA and ANP valued at $300 million per year (un-
reimbursed) are authorized (versus the aggregate $550 million allowed currently).
• authorizes appointment of a special U.S. envoy to promote greater Afghanistan-
Pakistan cooperation.
• reauthorizes “Radio Free Afghanistan.”
• establishes a U.S. policy to encourage Pakistan to permit shipments by India of
equipment and material to Afghanistan.
FY2007 and FY2008

The tables below show funds appropriated thus far for FY2008, both regular and
supplemental. When the supplemental request is factored in, the requests for both FY2007
and FY2008 appear to be somewhat higher than the amounts pledged in a December 2, 2005,
U.S.-Afghan agreement under which the United States said it would provide Afghanistan with
$5.5 billion in civilian economic aid over the next five years ($1.1 billion per year).[41]
International Reconstruction Pledges/Aid/Lending

Afghan leaders had said in 2002 that Afghanistan needs $27.5 billion for reconstruction
for 2002-2010. Including U.S. pledges, about $30 billion has been pledged at donors
conferences in 2002 (Tokyo), Berlin (April 2004), Kabul (April 2005), the London
conference (February 2006), and since then. Of that, about half are non-U.S. contributions.
However, not all non-U.S. amounts pledged have been received, although implementation
appears to have improved over the past few years (amounts received had been running below
half of what was pledged). The Afghanistan Compact also leaned toward the view of Afghan
leaders that a higher proportion of the aid be channeled through the Afghan government
rather than directly by the donor community. Only about $3.8 billion of funds disbursed have
been channeled through the Afghan government, according to the Finance Minister in April
2007. The Afghan government is promising greater financial transparency and international
(United Nations) oversight to ensure that international contributions are used wisely and
effectively.
Later in June 2008, when Afghanistan formally presents its Afghan National
Development Strategy in Paris, it reportedly will ask for $50.1 billion during 2009-2014 from
international donors. Of that, $14 billion will be requested to improve infrastructure,
including airports and to construct a railway. Another $14 billion would be to build the
ANSF, and about $4.5 billion would be for agriculture and rural development.
Among multilateral lendinginstitutions, in May 2002, the World Bank reopened its office
in Afghanistan after 20 years. On March 12, 2003, it announced a $108 million loan to
Afghanistan, the first since 1979. In August 2003, the World Bank agreed to lend Afghanistan
an additional $30 million to rehabilitate the telecommunications system, and $30 million for
road and drainage rehabilitation in Kabul. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has also been
playing a major role in Afghanistan, loaning (or granting) Afghanistan more than $450
million since December 2002. One of its projects in Afghanistan was funding the paving of a
road from Qandahar to the border with Pakistan, and as noted above, it is contributing to a
project to bring electricity from Central Asia to Afghanistan.
RESIDUAL ISSUES FROM PAST CONFLICTS

A few issues remain unresolved from Afghanistan’s many years of conflict, such as
Stinger retrieval and mine eradication.
Stinger Retrieval
Beginning in late 1985 following internal debate, the Reagan Administration provided
about 2,000 man-portable “Stinger” anti-aircraft missiles to the mujahedin for use against
Soviet aircraft. Prior to the U.S.-led war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, common estimates
suggested that 200-300 Stingers remained at large, although more recent estimates put the
number below 100.[42] The Stinger issue resurfaced in conjunction with 2001 U.S. war
effort, when U.S. pilots reported that the Taliban fired some Stingers at U.S. aircraft during
the war. No hits were reported. Any Stingers that survived the anti-Taliban war are likely
controlled by Afghans now allied to the United States and presumably pose less of a threat.
However, there are concerns that remaining Stingers could be sold to terrorists for use against
civilian aircraft. In February 2002, the Afghan government found and returned to the United
States “dozens” of Stingers.[43] In late January 2005, Afghan intelligence began a push to
buy remaining Stingers back, at a reported cost of $150,000 each.[44]
In 1992, after the fall of the Russian-backed government of Najibullah, the United States
reportedly spent about $10 million to buy the Stingers back, at a premium, from individual
mujahedin commanders. The New York Times reported on July 24, 1993, that the buy back
effort failed because the United States was competing with other buyers, including Iran and
North Korea, and that the CIA would spend about $55 million in FY1994 in a renewed
Stinger buy-back effort. On March 7, 1994, the Washington Post reported that the CIA had
recovered only a fraction (maybe 50 or 100) of the at-large Stingers.
The danger of these weapons has become apparent on several occasions. Iran bought 16
of the missiles in 1987 and fired one against U.S. helicopters; some reportedly were
transferred to Lebanese Hizballah. India claimed that it was a Stinger, supplied to Islamic
rebels in Kashmir probably by sympathizers in Afghanistan, that shot down an Indian
helicopter over Kashmir in May 1999.[45] It was a Soviet-made SA-7 “Strella” man-portable
launchers that were fired, allegedly by Al Qaeda, against a U.S. military aircraft in Saudi
Arabia in June 2002 and against an Israeli passenger aircraft in Kenya on November 30,
2002. Both missed their targets. SA-7s were discovered in Afghanistan by U.S. forces in
December 2002.
96 Kenneth Katzman
Table 5. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan,

FY1978-FY1998
($ in millions)
Fiscal Devel. Econ. P.L. 480 Military Other (Incl. Total

Year Assist. Supp. (Title I and II) Regional
(ESF) Refugee Aid)
1978 4.989 — 5.742 0.269 0.789 11.789
1979 3.074 — 7.195 — 0.347 10.616
1980 — (Soviet invasion - December 1979) — —
1981 — — — — — —
1982 — — — — — —
1983 — — — — — —
1984 — — — — — —
1985 3.369 — — — — 3.369
1986 — — 8.9 — — 8.9
1987 17.8 12.1 2.6 — — 32.5
1988 22.5 22.5 29.9 — — 74.9
1989 22.5 22.5 32.6 — — 77.6
1990 35.0 35.0 18.1 — — 88.1
1991 30.0 30.0 20.1 — — 80.1
1992 25.0 25.0 31.4 — — 81.4
1993 10.0 10.0 18.0 — 30.2 68.2
1994 3.4 2.0 9.0 — 27.9 42.3
1995 1.8 — 12.4 — 31.6 45.8
1996 — — 16.1 — 26.4 42.5
1997 — — 18.0 — 31.9a 49.9
1998 — — 3.6 — 49.14b 52.74
Source: Department of State.
a.
Includes $3 million for demining and $1.2 million for counternarcotics.
b
. Includes $3.3 million in projects targeted for Afghan women and girls, $7 million in earthquake relief
aid, 100,000 tons of 416Bwheat worth about $15 million, $2 million for demining, and $1.54 for
counternarcotics.
Mine Eradication
Land mines laid during the Soviet occupation constitute one of the principal dangers to
the Afghan people. The United Nations estimates that 5 -7 million mines remain scattered
throughout the country, although some estimates are lower. U.N. teams have destroyed one
million mines and are now focusing on de-mining priority-use, residential and commercial
property, including lands around Kabul. As shown in the U.S. aid table for FY1999-FY2002
(Table 6), the U.S. de-mining program was providing about $3 million per year for
Afghanistan, and the amount increased to about $7 million in the post-Taliban period. Most
of the funds have gone to HALO Trust, a British organization, and the U.N. Mine Action
Program for Afghanistan. The Afghanistan Compact adopted in London in February 2006
states that by 2010, the goal should be to reduce the land area of Afghanistan contaminated by
mines by 70%.
Table 6. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1999-FY2002

($ in millions)
FY1999 FY2000 FY2001 FY2002

(Final)
U.S. Department of 42.0 worth of 68.875 for 131.0 (300,000 198.12 (for
Agriculture (DOA) and wheat 165,000 metric metric tons food
USAID Food For Peace (100,000 tons. (60,000 under P.L.480, commodities)
(FFP), via World Food metric tons tons for May Title II, and
Program(WFP) under “416(b)” 2000 drought 416(b))
program.) relief)
State/Bureau of 16.95 for 14.03 for the 22.03 for 136.54 (to
Population, Refugees Afghan same purposes similar U.N. agencies)
and Migration (PRM) refugees in purposes
via UNHCR and ICRC Pakistan and
Iran, and to
assist their
repatriation
State Department/ 7.0 to various 6.68 for 18.934 for 113.36 (to
Office of Foreign NGOs to aid drought relief similar various U.N.
Disaster Assistance Afghans inside and health, programs agencies and
(OFDA) Afghanistan water, and NGOs)
sanitation
programs
State Department/HDP 2.615 3.0 2.8 7.0 to Halo
(Humanitarian Trust/other
Demining Program) demining
Aid to Afghan Refugees 5.44 (2.789 for 6.169, of 5.31 for similar
in Pakistan (through health, training which $3.82 purposes
various NGOs) -Afghan went to similar
females in purposes
Pakistan)
Counter-Narcotics 1.50 63.0
USAID/ Office of 0.45 (Afghan 24.35 for
Transition Initiatives women in broadcasting/
Pakistan) media
Dept. of Defense 50.9 ( 2.4
million
rations)
Foreign Military 57.0 (for
Financing Afghan
national army)
Anti-Terrorism 36.4
Economic Support 105.2
Funds (E.S.F)
Peacekeeping 24.0
Totals 76.6 113.2 182.6 815.9
98 Kenneth Katzman
Table 7. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2003

($ in millions, same acronyms as Table 6)
FY2003 Foreign Aid Appropriations (P.L. 108-7)

Development/Health 90
P.L. 480 Title II (Food Aid) 47
Peacekeeping 10
Disaster Relief 94
ESF 50
Non-Proliferation, De-mining, Anti-Terrorism (NADR) 5
Refugee Relief 55
Afghan National Army (ANA) train and equip (FMF) 21
Total from this law: 372
FY2003 Supplemental (P.L. 108-11)
Road Construction (ESF, Kabul-Qandahar road) 100
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (ESF) 10
Afghan government support (ESF) 57
ANA train and equip (FMF) 170
Anti-terrorism/de-mining (NADR, some for Karzai protection) 28
Total for FY2003 737

($ in millions, same acronyms as previous tables)

Disarmament and Demobilization (DDR program) (ESF) 30
Afghan government (ESF) $10 million for customs collection 70
Elections/democracy and governance (ESF) 69
Roads (ESF) 181
Schools/Education (ESF) 95
Health Services/Clinics (ESF) 49
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) 58
Private Sector/Power sector rehabilitation 95
Water Projects 23
Counter-narcotics/police training/judiciary training (INCLE) 170
Defense Dept. counter-narcotics support operations 73
Afghan National Army (FMF) 287
Anti-Terrorism/Afghan Leadership Protection (NADR) 35
U.S. Embassy expansion and security/AID operations 92
Total from this law: (of which $60 million is to benefit Afghan women and girls) 1,327
FY2004 Regular Appropriations (P.L. 108-199)
Development/Health 171
Disaster Relief 35
Refugee Relief 72
Afghan women (ESF) 5
Judicial reform commission (ESF) 2
Reforestation (ESF) 2
Aid to communities and victims of U.S. military operations (ESF) 2
Other reconstruction (ESF). (Total FY2004 funds spent by USAID for PRT-
64
related reconstruction = $56.4 million)
ANA train and equip (FMF) 50
Other: P.L. 480 Title II Food Aid .085
Total for FY2004 1,727

($ millions)
FY2005 Regular Appropriations (P.L. 108-447)

Assistance to Afghan governing institutions (ESF) 225
Train and Equip ANA (FMF) 400
Assistance to benefit women and girls 50
Agriculture, private sector investment, environment, primary education, reproductive
health, and democracy-building 300
Reforestation 2
Child and maternal health 6
Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission 2
Total from this law 985
Second FY2005 Supplemental (P.L. 109-13)
Other ESF: Health programs, PRT programs, agriculture, alternative livelihoods,
government capacity building, training for parliamentarians, rule of law programs (ESF). 1,073.5
(Total FY2005 funds spent by USAID for PRT-led reconstruction = $87.89 million.)
Aid to displaced persons (ESF) 5
Families of civilian victims of U.S. combat ops (ESF) 2.5
Women-led NGOs (ESF) 5
DOD funds to train and equip Afghan security forces. Of the funds, $34 million may go
to Afghan security elements for that purpose. Also, $290 million of the funds is to 1,285
reimburse the U.S. Army for funds already obligated for this purpose.
DOD counter-narcotics support operations 242
Counter-narcotics (INCLE) 220
Training of Afghan police (INCLE) 400
Karzi protection (NADR funds) 17.1
DEA operations in Afghanistan 7.7
Operations of U.S. Embassy Kabul 60
Total from this law 3,317
Other: P.L. 480 Title II Food Aid 56.95
Total 4,359
FY2006 Regular Foreign Aid Appropriations (P.L. 109-102)

ESF (ESF over $225 million subject to certification 430 (Mostly for reconstruction, governance, and
that Afghanistan is cooperating with U.S. counter- democracy-building; Includes $20 million for PRTs)
narcotics)
Peacekeeping (ANA salaries) 18
Counter-narcotics (INCLE) 235 (Includes $60 million to train ANP)
Karzai protection (NADR funds) 18
Child Survival and Health (CSH) 43
Reforestation 3
Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission 2
Aid to civilian victims of U.S. combat operations 2
Programs to benefit women and girls 50
Development Assistance 130.4
Total from this law: 931.4
FY2006 Supplemental Appropriation (P. L. 109-234)
Security Forces Fund 1,908

100 Kenneth Katzman
Table 10. (Continued).
FY2006 Regular Foreign Aid Appropriations (P.L. 109-102)

ESF 43 (Includes $11 million for debt relief costs, $5
million for agriculture development, and $27 million
for Northeast Transmission electricity project)
Embassy operations 50.1
DOD Counter-narcotics operations 103
Migration and Refugee aid 3.4
DEA counter-narcotics operations 9.2
Total from this law 2,116.7
Other: P.L. 480 Title II Food Aid 60
Total for FY2006 3,108.1
Regular Appropriation (In accordance with Continuing Appropriation P.L. 110-5)

ESF 479 (USAID plans $42 million for PRTs)
Counter-narc (INCLE) 209.7
Child Survival and Health (CSH) 100.77
Development Assistance (DA) 166.8
IMET 1.138
NADR 21.65
Total This Law 979
DOD Appropriati on (P.L. 109-289)
Security Forces train and equip 1,500
DOD Counter-narcotics support 100
Total Appropriated for FY2007 to
2,539.77
date
FY2007 Suppleme ntal (H.R. 2206/P.L. 110-28)
$653 million request/$737 in final law (of which in law: 174
for PRTs; 314 for roads; 40 for power; 155 for rural
ESF development; 19 for agriculture (latter two are alternative
livelihoods to poppy cultivation); 25 for governance; and 10
for the “civilian assistance program”
30 million also provides $16 million in Migration and Refugee
P.L. 480 Title II Food Aid aid for displaced persons near Kabul, and $16 million
International Disaster and Famine Assistance
U.S. Embassy security 47.2 million requested/79 in final version
5.900 billion requested/5.9064 in final version (includes 3.2
billion for equipment and transportation; 624 million for ANP
Security Forces train and equip
training; 415 for ANA training; 106 for commanders
emergency response, CERP; plus other funds )
no request/47 million in agreement; plus 60 million in DOD
INCLE aid to counter-narcotics forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
plus 12 million DEA
FY2007 supp. 6.870 billion in final version
FY2007 Total 10.388 billion (all programs)
Table 12. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2008 Request/Action
Regular FY2008 Appropriation (H.R. 2764, P.L. 110-161)

ESF $543 million total. Of this: $126 million for emergency request
(see below); $75 million to benefit women and girls; $20
million for agriculture. $300 million limit subject to counter-
narcotics cooperation certification. Regular ESF request was
for $693 million
INCLE 274.8 m., forbids use for aerial spraying
IMET 1.7 m.
Child Survival and Health (CSH) $65.9 m. (incl. $5.9 million for child and maternal clinics)
NADR (Karzai protection) 21.65
Radio Free Afghanistan 3.98
Afghan Security Forces Funding 1,350 (For emergency request below)
Total appropriated in P.L. 110161 2,261
Revised FY2008 Supplemental R equest (Global War on Terrorism)
ESF 834 m. request (additional 495 beyond 339 original
supplemental request) (Of the additional $495, $325 is for
provincial governance, National Solidarity program, election
support; $170 is for economic growth, including $115 for
power. Another $50 for roads, and another $5 is for
Reconstruction Opportunity Zones)
USAID operations 16
Security Forces equip and train 2,700 ($1.71 billion for ANA/$980 million for ANP)
U.S. Embassy security 162.4
U.S. Embassy construction, maintenance 160
NADR 5
Total FY2008 appropriated to date 2.26 b. (Of which $126 million in ESF and $1.35 billion in
Security Forces appropriated above)
Total FY2008 (if remaining requested 4.323 b.
FY2008 supp. funds are appropriated)
Regular Request
ESF 707 (includes 120 for alternative livelihoods, 248 for democracy
and governance, 226 for econ. growth, 74 for PRT programs)
Child Survival and Health 52 (Plus 57 more of ESF for health and education)
International Counter-Narcotics and Law 250
Enforcement (INCLE)
International Military Education and 1.4
Training (IMET)
Other non-military accounts 44 (incl. 12 m. in non-emergency food aid)
Afghan National Security Forces Funding 2,000
(DOD funds)
Total Regular Request $3.054 billion
Supplemental Request
ESF 749.9
INCLE 175
Total Supplemental Request 924.9
102 Kenneth Katzman
Table 14. USAID Obligations FY2002-FY2007
Sector FY FY FY FY FY FY2 FY2002-

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 007 (reg. + FY2007
supp)
Agriculture 27 56 50 77 27 61 298
Alternative 3 1 5 185 121 246 561
Livelihoods
Roads 51 142 354 276 250 418 1491
Power 3 77 286 66 136 568
Water 2 1 27 21 1 1 52
Econ. Growth 21 12 84 91 46 68 321
Education 19 21 104 86 51 62 343
Health 8 56 83 111 52 72 381
Afghan 38 40 67 87 45 41 317
Reconstruction
Trust Fund
Support to 3 36 31 15 5 90
Afghan Gov’t
Democracy 22 34 132 88 17 81 374
Rule of Law 4 8 21 15 6 13 67
PRT Programs 11 56 85 20 210 382
Program Suppt 5 6 17 16 4 14 63
Internally 108 23 10 141
Displaced -
Persons
Food Aid 159 51 49 57 60 - 376
Civilian
10 10
Assistance
Totals 471 462 1171 1510 779 1436 5830
(As of June 3, 2008, press reports [http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/isaf _placemat.pdf])
(RC=Regional Command).
Table 15. NATO/ISAF Contributing Nations
NATO Countries
Belgium 375
Bulgaria 420
Canada 2500
Czech Republic 370
Denmark 690
Estonia 120
France 1670
Germany 3370
Greece 150
Hungary 205
Iceland 10
Italy 2350
Latvia 75
Lithuania 200
Luxemburg 9
Netherlands 1770
Norway 580
Poland 1140
Portugal 165
Romania 570
Slovakia 70
NATO Countries
Slovenia 70
Spain 800
Turkey 760
United Kingdom 8530
United States 23250
Non-NATO Partner Nations
Albania 140
Austria 2
Australia 1100
Azerbaijan 45
Croatia 210
Finland 65
Ireland 7
Jordan 265
Macedonia 140
New Zealand 160
Singapore 2
Sweden 250
Ukraine 3
Total ISAF force (approx.)
53,000
Table 16. Provincial Reconstruction Teams
Location (City) Province/Command

U.S.-Lead (all under ISAF banner)
Gardez Paktia Province (RC-East, E)
Ghazni Ghazni (RC-E). with Poland.
Bagram A.B. Parwan (RC-C, Central)
Jalalabad Nangarhar (RC-E)
Khost Khost (RC-E)
Qalat Zabol (RC-South, S). with Romania.
Asadabad Kunar (RC-E)
Sharana Paktika (RC-E). with Poland.
Mehtarlam Laghman (RC-E)
Jabal o-Saraj Panjshir Province (RC-E), State Department lead
Qala Gush Nuristan (RC-E)
Farah Farah (RC-W)
Partner Lead (all under ISAF banner)
PRT Location Province Lead Force/Other forces
Qandahar Qandahar (RC-S) Canada
Lashkar Gah Helmand (RC-S) Britain. with Denmark and Estonia
Netherlands. with Australia and 40 Singaporean
Tarin Kowt Uruzgan (RC-S)
military medics and others
Herat Herat (RC-W) Italy
Qalah-ye Now Badghis (RC-W) Spain
Mazar-e-Sharif Balkh (RC-N) Sweden
Konduz Konduz (RC-N) Germany
Faizabad Badakhshan (RC-N) Germany. with Denmark, Czech Rep.
Meymaneh Faryab (RC-N) Norway. with Sweden.
Chaghcharan Ghowr (RC-W) Lithuania. with Denmark, U.S., Iceland
Pol-e-Khomri Baghlan (RC-N) Hungary
Bamiyan Bamiyan (RC-E) New Zealand (not NATO/ISAF). 10 Singaporean
engineers
Maidan Shahr Wardak (RC-C) Turkey
Pul-i-Alam Lowgar (RC-E) Czech Republic
104 Kenneth Katzman
Table 17. Major Factions/Leaders in Afghanistan
Party/ Ideology/
Leader Leader Ethnicity Regional Base
Taliban Mullah (Islamic cleric) Muhammad Umar ultra-orthodox Insurgent groups,
(still at large possibly in Islamic, mostly in the south and
Afghanistan)/Jalaludin and Siraj Haqqani. Pashtun east, and in Pakistan
Islamic Burhannudin Rabbani/ Yunus Qanooni moderate Much of northern and
Society (speaker of lower house)/Muhammad Islamic, western Afghanistan,
(leader of Fahim/Dr. Abdullah Abdullah (Foreign mostly Tajik including Kabul
“Northern Minister 2001-2006). Ismail Khan, a so-
Alliance”) called “warlord,” heads faction of the
grouping in Herat area. Khan, now Minister
of Energy and Water, visited United States in
March 2008 to sign USAID grant for energy
projects
National Abdul Rashid Dostam. Best known for March secular, Uzbek Mazar-e-Sharif,
Islamic 1992 break with Najibullah that precipitated Shebergan, and
Movement his overthrow. Subsequently fought Rabbani environs
of government (1992-1995), but later joined
Afghanistan Northern Alliance. Commanded about 25,000
troops, armor, combat aircraft, and some
Scud missiles, but was unable to hold off
Taliban forces that captured his region by
August 1998. During OEF, impressed U.S.
commanders with horse-mounted assaults on
Taliban positions at Shulgara Dam, south of
Mazar-e-Sharif, leading to the fall of that city
and the Taliban’s subsequent collapse. Karzai
rival in October 2004 presidential election,
now his top “security adviser.”
Hizb-e- Karim Khalili is Vice President, but Shiite, Hazara Bamiyan province
Wahdat Mohammad Mohaqiq is Karzai rival in tribes
presidential election and parliament.
Generally pro-Iranian. Was part of Rabbani
1992-1996 government, and fought
unsuccessfully with Taliban over Bamiyan
city.
Pashtun Various regional governors; central Moderate Dominant in southern,
Leaders government led by Hamid Karzai. Islamic, eastern Afghanistan
Pashtun
Hizb-e- Mujahedin party leader Gulbuddin orthodox Small groups around
Islam Hikmatyar. Lost power base around Jalalabad Islamic, Jalalabad, Nuristan and
Gulbuddin to the Taliban in 1994, and fled to Iran before Pashtun in southeast
(HIG) being expelled in 2002. Still allied with
Taliban and Al Qaeda in operations east of
Kabul, but may be open to ending militant
activity. Leader of a rival Hizb-e-Islam
faction, Yunus Khalis, the mentor of Mullah
Umar, died July 2006.
Islamic Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf. Islamic orthodox Paghman (west of
Union conservative, leads a pro-Karzai faction in Islamic, Kabul)
parliament. Lived many years in and Pashtun
politically close to Saudi Arabia, which
shares his “Wahhabi” ideology. During anti-
Soviet war, Sayyaf’s faction, with Hikmatyar,
was a principal recipient of U.S. weaponry.
Criticized the U.S.-led war against Saddam
Hussein after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.
APPENDIX A. U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS LIFTED

Virtually all U.S. and international sanctions on Afghanistan, some imposed during
the Soviet occupation era and others on the Taliban regime, have now been lifted.
• On January 10, 2003, President Bush signed a proclamation making Afghanistan a

beneficiary of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), eliminating U.S. tariffs
on 5,700 Afghan products. Afghanistan was denied GSP on May 2, 1980, under
Executive Order 12204 (45 F.R. 20740). This was done under the authority of
Section 504 of the Trade Act of 1974 [19 U.S.C. § 2464].
• On April 24, 1981, controls on U.S. exports to Afghanistan of agricultural products
and phosphates were terminated. Such controls were imposed on June 3, 1980, as
part of the sanctions against the Soviet Union for the invasion of Afghanistan, under
the authority of Sections 5 and 6 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 [P.L. 96-
72; 50 U.S.C. app. 2404, app. 2405].
• In mid-1992, the George H.W. Bush Administration determined that Afghanistan no
longer had a “Soviet-controlled government.” This opened Afghanistan to the use of
U.S. funds made available for the U.S. share of U.N. organizations that provide
assistance to Afghanistan.
• On March 31, 1993, after the fall of Najibullah in 1992, President Clinton, on
national interest grounds, waived restrictions provided for in Section 481 (h) of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 mandating sanctions on Afghanistan including
bilateral aid cuts and suspensions, including denial of Ex-Im Bank credits; the
casting of negative U.S. votes for multilateral development bank loans; and a non-
allocation of a U.S. sugar quota. Discretionary sanctions included denial of GSP;
additional duties on country exports to the United States; and curtailment of air
transportation with the United States. Waivers were also granted in 1994 and, after
the fall of the Taliban, by President Bush.
• On May 3, 2002, President Bush restored normal trade treatment to the products of
Afghanistan, reversing the February 18, 1986 proclamation by President Reagan
(Presidential Proclamation 5437) that suspended most-favored nation (MFN) tariff
status for Afghanistan (51 F.R. 4287). The Foreign Assistance Appropriations for
FY1986 [Section 552, P.L. 99-190] had authorized the President to deny any U.S.
credits or most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff status for Afghanistan.
• On July 2, 2002, the State Department amended U.S. regulations (22 C.F.R. Part
126) to allow arms sales to the new Afghan government, reversing the June 14, 1996
addition of Afghanistan to the list of countries prohibited from receiving exports or
licenses for exports of U.S. defense articles and services. Arms sales to Afghanistan
had also been prohibited during 1997-2002 because Afghanistan had been designated
under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132) as a
state that is not cooperating with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts.
• On July 2, 2002, President Bush formally revoked the July 4, 1999, declaration by
President Clinton of a national emergency with respect to Taliban because of its
hosting of bin Laden. The Clinton determination and related Executive Order 13129
had blocked Taliban assets and property in the United States, banned U.S. trade with
106 Kenneth Katzman
Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan, and applied these sanctions to

ArianaAfghanAirlines, triggering a blocking of Ariana assets (about $500,000) in the
United States and a ban on U.S. citizens’ flying on the airline. (The ban on trade with
Taliban-controlled territory had essentially ended on January 29, 2002 when the State
Department determination that the Taliban controls no territory within Afghanistan.)
• U.N. sanctions on the Taliban imposed by Resolution 1267 (October 15, 1999),
Resolution 1333 (December 19, 2000),and Resolution 1363 (July 30, 2001) have
now been narrowed to penalize only Al Qaeda (by Resolution 1390, January 17,
2002). Resolution 1267 banned flights outside Afghanistan by its national airline
(Ariana), and directed U.N. member states to freeze Taliban assets. Resolution 1333
prohibited the provision of arms or military advice to the Taliban (directed against
Pakistan); directing a reduction of Taliban diplomatic representationabroad; and
banning foreign travel by senior Taliban officials. Resolution 1363 provided for
monitors in Pakistan to ensure that no weapons or military advice was provided to
the Taliban.
• P.L. 108-458 (December 17, 2004, referencing the 9/11 Commission
recommendations) repeals bans on aid to Afghanistan outright, completing a pre-
Taliban effort by President George H.W. Bush to restore aid and credits to
Afghanistan. On October 7, 1992, he had issued Presidential Determination 93-3 that
Afghanistan is no longer a Marxist-Leninist country, but the determination was not
implemented before he left office. Had it been implemented, the prohibition on
Afghanistan’s receiving Export-Import Bank guarantees, insurance, or credits for
purchases under Section 8 of the 1986 Export-Import Bank Act, would have been
lifted. In addition, Afghanistan would have been able to receive U.S.assistance
because the requirement would have been waived that Afghanistan apologize for the
1979 killing in Kabul of U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Adolph “Spike” Dubs.
(Dubs was kidnapped in Kabul in 1979 and killed when Afghan police stormed the
hideout where he was held.)
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS. (K.Yancey 11/22/05).
Figure 1. Map of Afghanistan.

REFERENCES
[1] For FY1991, Congress reportedly cut covert aid appropriations to the mujahedin from
$300 million the previous year to $250 million, with half the aid withheld until the
second half of the fiscal year. See “Country Fact Sheet: Afghanistan,” in U.S.
Department of State Dispatch, vol. 5, no. 23 (June 6, 1994), p. 377.
[2] After failing to flee, Najibullah, his brother, and aides remained at a U.N. facility in
Kabul until the Taliban movement seized control in 1996 and hanged them.
[3] Drogin, Bob. “U.S. Had Plan for Covert Afghan Options Before 9/11.” Los Angeles
Times, May 18, 2002.
[4] Another law (P.L. 107-148) established a “Radio Free Afghanistan” under RFE/RL,
providing $17 million in funding for it for FY2002.
[5] More information on some of the issues in this section can be found in CRS Report
RS21922, Afghanistan: Government Formation and Performance, by Kenneth
Katzman. Some of the information in this section is derived from author participation
on a congressional delegation to Afghanistan in March 2008.
[6] Text of Bonn agreement at [http://www.ag-afghanistan.de/files/petersberg.htm].
[7] The last loya jirga that was widely recognized as legitimate was held in 1964 to ratify a
constitution. Najibullah convened a loya jirga in 1987 to approve pro-Moscow policies;
that gathering was widely viewed by Afghans as illegitimate.
[8] Text of constitution: [http://arabic.cnn.com/afghanistan/ConstitutionAfghanistan.pdf].
[9] For an analysis of the DDR program, see Christian Dennys. Disarmament,
Demobilization and Rearmament?, June 6, 2005, [http://www.jca.apc.org
/~jann/Documents/Disarmament %20demobilization%20 rearmament.pdf].
[10] Waldman, Amy. “In Afghanistan, U.S. Envoy Sits in Seat of Power.” New York Times,
April 17, 2004. Afghanistan’s ambassador in Washington is Seyed Jalal Tawwab,
formerly a Karzai aide.
[11] For text, see [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100611.htm].
[12] For a detailed discussion and U.S. funding on the issue, see CRS Report RL32686,
Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard.
[13] Text of the strategy, see [http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rpt/90561.htm#section1]
[14] Cameron-Moore, Simon. “U.S. to Seek Indictment of Afghan Drug Barons.” Reuters,
November 2, 2004.
[15] Risen, James. “Poppy Fields Are Now a Front Line in Afghanistan War.” New York
Times, May 16, 2007.
[16] This is equivalent to the listing by the United States, as Afghanistan has been listed
every year since 1987, as a state that is uncooperative with U.S. efforts to eliminate
drug trafficking or has failed to take sufficient steps on its own to curb trafficking.
[17] Crossette, Barbara. “Taliban Seem to Be Making Good on Opium Ban, U.N. Says.”
New York Times, February 7, 2001.
[18] Mansoor Dadullah was one of five Taliban leaders released in March 2007 in exchange
for the freedom of kidnapped Italian journalist Daniele Mastrogiacomo, but there were
reports in January 2008 that Mullah Umar Mullah Umar had dismissed Mansoor
because of reported talks with British military officers about his possible defection.
108 Kenneth Katzman
[19] Text of the report is at [http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/ publications/

Afghanistan_ on_the_brink/documents/Afghanistan_on_the_brink]
[20] For more information on the search for the Al Qaeda leadership, see CRS Report
RL33038, Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment, by Kenneth Katzman.
[21] Gall, Carlotta and Ismail Khan. U.S. Drone Attack Missed Zawahiri by Hours. New
York Times, November 10, 2006.
[22] Shanker, Thom. “U.S. Senses a Rise in Activity By Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.” New
York Times, December 4, 2007.
[23] See [http://www.mfa.gov.af/Documents/ImportantDoc/US-Afghanistan%20 Strategic%
20 Partnership%20Declaration.pdf].
[24] As noted above, six countries (in addition to the United States) are providing forces to
OEF, and twelve countries are providing forces to both OEF and ISAF.
[25] Its mandate was extended until October 13, 2006, by U.N. Security Council Resolution
1623 (September 13, 2005); and until October 13, 2007, byResolution 1707 (September
12, 2006).
[26] Kington, Tom. Italy Could Send UAVs, Helos to Afghanistan. Defense News, June 19,
2006.
[27] Kraul, Chris. “U.S. Aid Effort Wins Over Skeptics in Afghanistan.” Los Angeles Times,
April 11, 2003.
[28] Indian television news channel NDTV. April 24, 2007.
[29] Inspectors General, U.S. Department of State and of Defense. Interagency Assessment
of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness. November 2006. Department of State
report No. ISP-IQ0-07-07.
[30] For extensive analysis of U.S. policy toward Pakistan, and U.S. assistance to Pakistan
in conjunction with its activities against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, see CRS Report
RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt.
[31] Straziuso, Jason. Musharraf Pulls Out of Peace Council. Associated Press, August 8,
2007.
[32] Tyson, Ann Scott. “Pakistan Strife Threatens Anti-Insurgent Plan.” Washington Post,
November 9, 2007.
[33] Rashid, Ahmed. “Afghan Neighbors Show Signs of Aiding in Nation’s Stability.” Wall
Street Journal, October 18, 2004.
[34] Steele, Jonathon, “America Includes Iran in Talks on Ending War in Afghanistan.”
Washington Times, December 15, 1997.
[35] Risen, James. “Russians Are Back in Afghanistan, Aiding Rebels.” New York Times,
July 27, 1998.
[36] The IMU was named a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department in
September 2000.
[37] CRS Conversations with Chinese officials in Beijing. August 2007.
[38] Other participants in the Unocal consortium include Delta of Saudi Arabia, Hyundai of
South Korea, Crescent Steel of Pakistan, Itochu Corporation and INPEX of Japan, and
the government of Turkmenistan. Some accounts say Russia’s Gazprom would
probably receive a stake in the project. Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moscow), October 30,
1997, p. 3.
[39] Khalilzad, Zalmay (Then U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan). “Democracy Bubbles Up.”
Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2004.
[40] In some cases, aid figures are subject to variation depending on how that aid is
measured. The figures cited might not exactly match figures in appropriated legislation;
in some, funds were added to specified accounts from monies in the September 11-
related Emergency Response Fund.
[41] Among other forms of post-Taliban assistance, over $350 million in U.S. and allied
frozen funds were released to the Afghan government after the fall of the Taliban. The
U.S. Treasury Department (Office of Foreign Assets Control, OFAC) unblocked over
$145 million in assets of Afghan government-owned banking entities frozen under 1999
U.S. Taliban-related sanctions, and another $17 million in privately owned Afghan
assets. The funds were used for currency stabilization; mostly gold, held in
Afghanistan’s name in the United States, that backs up Afghanistan’s currency. Another
$20 million in overflight fees)withheld by U.N. Taliban-related sanctions were
provided in 2003. The Overseas PrivateInvestment Corporation (OPIC) has made
available investment credits as well.
[42] Saleem, Farrukh. “Where Are the Missing Stinger Missiles? Pakistan,” Friday Times.
August 17-23, 2001.
[43] Fullerton, John. “Afghan Authorities Hand in Stinger Missiles to U.S.” Reuters,
February 4, 2002.
[44] “Afghanistan Report,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. February 4, 2005.
[45] “U.S.-Made Stinger Missiles — Mobile and Lethal.” Reuters, May 28, 1999.
Chapter 3
REPORT ON PROGRESS TOWARD SECURITY

AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN
June 2008
Report to Congress in accordance with the
2008 National Defense Authorization Act
(Section 1230, Public Law 110-181)
ABSTRACT
This report to Congress is submitted consistent with Section 1230 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181). It includes a
description of the comprehensive strategy of the United States for security and stability in
Afghanistan. This report is the first in a series of reports required every 180 days through
fiscal year 2010 and has been prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State, the
Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General, the Administrator of the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development, and the Secretary of Agriculture. This assessment
complements other reports and information about Afghanistan provided to the Congress;
however, it is not intended as a single source of all information about the combined
efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its Coalition Partners, or Afghanistan.
The information contained in this report is current as of April 10, 2008.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States and our international partners
toppled the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, ending years of brutal misrule and denying al
Qaeda a safe haven from which to launch its attacks. The United States is committed to
helping Afghanistan recover from decades of strife, and preventing it from ever again
becoming a safe haven for terrorists. Our strategic goals remain that Afghanistan is: 1) a
reliable, stable ally in the War on Terror; 2) moderate and democratic, with a thriving private
sector economy; 3) capable of governing its territory and borders; and 4) respectful of the
rights of all its citizens. Achieving these goals requires the application of a whole-of-
112 Report to Congress
government approach, along multiple lines of operation, including security, governance, and
development. This report describes both the progress we are making in achieving our national
objectives, and the challenges we continue to face.
Security
Although security remains fragile in many parts of Afghanistan, our counterinsurgency

approach demonstrates how a combination of military and non-military resources can be
integrated to create a stable and secure environment, and to connect the Afghan people with
their government. Khowst Province is an example. Khowst was once considered
ungovernable and one of the most dangerous provinces in Afghanistan. Today, tangible
improvements in security, governance, reconstruction, and development are being made.
These improvements are achieved through the closely coordinated efforts of the local
government, the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF), international organizations,
as well as U.S. military, diplomatic, and development experts. Importantly, lessons learned
from the successes in Khowst are being shared with our partners and applied elsewhere in the
country.
The increase in U.S. forces in the spring of 2008 reinforced Afghan and international
forces’ momentum and is enabling accelerated growth of the ANSF. On February 5, 2008 the
Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) approved a proposal to expand the
authorized end strength of the Afghan National Army (ANA) from 70,000 to 80,000
personnel. The Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A) is
scheduled to complete the fielding of 80,000 ANA personnel by the end of 2010. Meanwhile,
a U.S. Marine Corps Marine Air Ground Task Force is deploying to bolster NATO
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) maneuver forces in Regional Command–
South.
The ANA has taken the lead in more than 30 significant operations to date and has
demonstrated increasing competence, effectiveness and professionalism. Operation
MAIWAND, executed in the summer of 2007 in the Andar District of Ghazni Province, is
just one example of the ANA’s progress. Planned, rehearsed, and executed under the direction
of the Afghan 203rd Corps Commander, a combined ANA and ISAF task force cleared the
entire district and removed a Taliban shadow governor. This well-integrated security
operation was quickly exploited with the synchronized application of governance and
development efforts consisting of medical treatment for 2,300 citizens, 10 new schools, the
delivery of 260 tons of humanitarian aid, and one million dollars committed toward additional
development. This operation resulted in the significant disruption to enemy forces in Ghazni
Province and is a manifestation of the growth and maturation of ANSF as well as the spread
of governance and development.
The Afghanistan National Police (ANP) are improving, although at a slower pace than
the ANA. Generally, police development has been hindered by a lack of reform, corruption,
insufficient U.S. military trainers and advisors, and a lack of unity of effort within the
international community. A new CSTC-A-led Focused District Development (FDD) plan,
implemented in late 2007, shows promise. This initiative withdraws the locally-based Afghan
Uniform Police (AUP) from selected districts, replacing them temporarily with highly trained
and effective Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP). The AUP then receive two
Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan 113
months of immersion training and equipping in a concentrated program of instruction by

carefully selected civilian police mentors, with the goal of increasing their professional
capability and their confidence to conduct law enforcement activities. Following their
collective training, the AUP return to their districts with enhanced capabilities and better able
to serve their communities.
Despite many positive developments, Afghanistan continues to face challenges. The
Taliban regrouped after its fall from power and have coalesced into a resilient insurgency. It
now poses a challenge to the Afghan Government’s authority in some rural areas. Insurgent
violence increased in 2007, most visibly in the form of asymmetric attacks as Afghan and
international forces’ relentless pressure forced the insurgents to shift the majority of its effort
to targeting police and civilians. More than 6,500 people died as a result of suicide attacks,
roadside bombs, and combat-related violence. The 2007 ISAF and ANSF military campaign
caused setbacks to the Afghan insurgency, including leadership losses and the loss of some
key safe-havens in Afghanistan. Despite these setbacks, the Taliban is likely to maintain or
even increase the scope and pace of its terrorist attacks and bombings in 2008. The Taliban
will challenge the control of the Afghan government in rural areas, especially in the south and
east. The Taliban will also probably attempt to increase its presence in the west and north. Up
to the first quarter of 2008, the most significant threat to stability in the north and west of the
country has come from warlords, criminals, and drug traffickers. The power of these entities
is increasingly challenged by the growing competence of local and national government.
Narcotics remain a significant challenge for Afghanistan and the international
community. While progress has been made in some areas, overall counternarcotics efforts in
Afghanistan have not been successful. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated in his
testimony to the House Armed Service Committee on December 11, 2007, “[T]he drug trade
continues to threaten the foundations of Afghan society and [the] young government [of
Afghanistan].” Opium production in Afghanistan increased substantially in 2007. The
narcotics trade dissuades work and investment in legitimate activities, provides the insurgents
with a lucrative source of funding, and contributes heavily to heroin addiction in Central Asia,
Europe and increasingly East Africa. Although counternarcotics (CN) efforts have resulted in
gains over the past six years, the battle against drug traffickers is ongoing, and will be for
some time. In conjunction with the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD), CSTC-A is assisting
with the development and fielding of a new CN infantry kandak (battalion) for the purpose of
providing force protection to poppy eradicators. This unit will shortly be put into action and
will provide protection for eradication teams to complete their mandates.
Governance and Human Rights
Afghanistan was the prime example of a failed state in 2001. Aside from the Taliban’s
enforcement of its version of sharia law, most functions of government were non-existent.
There were few social services and little investment in health, education, roads, power, or
water. Afghans were denied participation in their government, enjoyed no civil or political
liberties, and were afforded no avenue of dissent.
Since 2001, Afghanistan has made significant progress rebuilding its national political
institutions. Afghans wrote and passed a new Constitution in 2004; 8.1 million people voted
in the nation’s first presidential election; and 6.4 million voters helped reestablish their
National Assembly after 32 years without a legislature. Ministries are increasingly capable of
executing their responsibilities, particularly the ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, and
Finance. Since 2006, the Supreme Court has been headed by an internationally respected and
highly capable jurist with a formal legal education.
The international community continues to help develop Afghanistan’s justice sector and
provincial governments. Progress is slow, in part because of Afghanistan’s human capital
shortage. Only three in ten Afghans can read, leaving a very shallow pool of literate citizens
to staff the courts, government offices, police, armed forces, or private enterprises.
Despite important progress made since 2001, Afghanistan’s human rights record remains
poor. Though most human rights violations are perpetrated by the Taliban-led insurgency,
weak governmental and traditional institutions, corruption, narcotics trafficking, and the
country’s two-and-a-half decades of violent conflict exacerbate the problem. Abuses by
security forces continue. However, the government has worked to professionalize its army
and police force. Increased oversight of police by internal and external monitors has helped to
prevent some abuses, and human rights training has become a regular element for police and
army personnel.
Reconstruction and Development
Setting the conditions necessary for economic growth is essential to long-term security
and stability. Afghanistan has come a long way in seven years. Since 2001, Gross Domestic
Product, per capita income, and Foreign Direct Investment are all up. There has been
considerable growth in Afghanistan’s domestic revenues as well as international reserves,
which have nearly doubled since 2004. However, Afghanistan still faces formidable
economic challenges. The Afghan government remains overly dependent on foreign aid, with
official revenues covering only 20 percent of recurrent costs. Costs, particularly for food and
fuel, are rising, as is inflation. Access to credit is limited, and few Afghans are able to borrow.
Four strategic economic priorities support the counterinsurgency effort. These include: 1)
embracing free market economic policy at senior levels of government, 2) enhancing
government resources, 3) addressing inflation and 4) implementing structural reforms.
Commitment to free markets means resisting costly subsidies and price controls that serve to
reduce resources for other more constructive expenditures in areas like infrastructure,
education, and healthcare. U.S. and international community efforts are assisting the Afghan
government in moving towards a sustainable fiscal policy capable of generating revenue,
managing resources, and operating without foreign financial support. The international
community is also trying to boost economic growth by modernizing the country’s
infrastructure, particularly in the areas of electrical power, road construction, water
management and agricultural development. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are key
elements in these endeavors, ensuring that reconstruction and development efforts are
coordinated at all levels and responsive to local needs. Finally, trade is benefiting, albeit
slowly, from growing regional integration. Afghanistan is scheduled to join the South Asian
Free Trade Area, bringing greater access to and integration with six other countries in the
region including Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
LOOKING AHEAD
The U.S. commitment to Afghanistan is unwavering. Success in Afghanistan is both
crucial to global security and is a moral responsibility. Achieving that success will take time,
effort, resources, and the sustained interest and commitment of the international community.
Moreover, success will never be achieved through military means alone, but through a
comprehensive approach that involves all elements of power: military, diplomatic, and
economic. Above all, it will require a sustained effort to continue to develop the capacity of
the Afghans themselves. Where we have begun to apply such an approach, real progress is
being made. It is critical that we continue to build on the momentum that has been achieved.
SECTION 1: SECURITY
1.1. Counterinsurgency Strategy
The U.S. operational approach to the security component of counterinsurgency in

Afghanistan is to build Afghan security capacity while degrading the capacity of the Taliban.
U.S. forces work to root out insurgents while increasing the ability of the Afghans to do so on
their own. Throughout Afghanistan, this is achieved through kinetic and non-kinetic efforts to
separate the enemy from the local population by partnering with the ANSF and engaging
Afghan leaders. Shuras, key leader engagements, medical engagements, humanitarian aid
missions, and combined presence patrols provide a venue for ANSF forces to interact with the
general population and discuss needs for local improvements. These missions work to create
trust between the local populace, Afghan leadership, ANSF, and ISAF forces. As trust
increases, support for the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, (GIRoA), the
ANP, and the ANA evolves proportionately. Afghan civilians are beginning to report enemy
activity including improvised explosive device (IED) emplacements, suspicious activity, and
potential future attacks. In an effort to gain the support of the populace and demonstrate the
superior governance capabilities of the GIRoA as opposed to the Taliban, ANSF and
international forces have increased governance outreach and development activities.
1.2. Nature of the Threat
In 2008, there is the potential for two distinct insurgencies in Afghanistan; a Kandahari-
based insurgency dominated by the Taliban in the south and a more complex, adaptive
insurgency in the east. The eastern insurgency is a loose confederation of affiliates such as the
Haqqani Network and like-minded groups that are prepared to cooperate with the Taliban’s
Kandahari-based insurgency. These groups include al-Qaeda, Hizb-e Islami Gulbuddin, and
Pakistani militant groups Jaish-e Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Tehrik Nefaz-i-Shariat
Muhammad. Their shared goals include the expulsion of all foreign military forces from
Afghanistan, the elimination of external government influence in their respective areas, and
the imposition of a religiously conservative, Pashtun-led government.
A principal strength of the Taliban-led Kandahari insurgency is its ability to regenerate

combat power by leveraging tribal networks, exploiting lack of governance and the Afghan
peoples’ inherent resistance to change and outside influence. The Taliban’s strategy hinges on
their ability to prevent the Afghan government and ISAF from achieving victory, and the
international community eventually losing the will to tactically intervene in the
counterinsurgency effort. The insurgency’s critical capabilities are its ability to project
strength and a mystique of the inevitability of Taliban rule that is constantly sustained
through a focused information effort; in other words, not losing is winning.
A principal vulnerability of both the Taliban-led Kandarhari and Eastern Insurgencies is
that, beyond forcibly imposing Sharia-modeled law and order, they are unable to deliver to
the Afghan people sustainable governance or development of commercial infrastructure. Both
insurgencies are anticipatory in nature and maximize every opportunity to separate the
Afghan population from the GIRoA. The insurgencies are powerless to provide development
and they lack the capacity to meet the basic needs of the citizens of Afghanistan; however, it
is worth noting that this limitation did not prevent the original Taliban from controlling,
through force of arms, the majority of the country in the late 1990s. The preponderance of
both insurgencies’ influence stems from the use of fear and intimidation tactics. As a result of
these efforts, in the minds of the Afghan people, insurgent forces are cognitively becoming
separated from the respected mujahidin fighters that defeated the Soviets and sustained
Afghans for decades.
Figure 1. Distribution of Attacks in Afghanistan by Province.
Violence increased in Afghanistan in 2007. A significant factor in the increase in

violence was aggressive Afghan and international force tactics combined with insurgent
recognition that, while they cannot defeat Afghan and international forces on the battlefield,
they can harm political will by increasing casualties. Violence may also have increased
because Afghan and international forces are asserting control over a greater area in increased
numbers, thus increasing their exposure to insurgent attacks.
Attack levels alone are not always a good indicator of the security situation. Even in areas
where insurgent activity is high, Afghan and international forces often have the full support of
the local population. Khowst Province again provides a success story. In this eastern province
the level enemy activity and attacks remains relatively high, but most of the population lives
without fear, trusting the government to keep them safe.
The success of Afghan and international forces in military engagements has led
insurgents to increase asymmetric attacks. As such, IED attacks are on the rise. IED incidents
reached a high of 2,615 incidents in 2007, up from 1,931 in 2006. Counter-IED training is an
important part of U.S. and ISAF efforts to improve security in the country. It includes
curriculum that the NATO Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) and
Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) deliver when training members of the ANA. Although the
number of IED attacks increased in 2007 over 2006, so did the number of IEDs that were
discovered and pre-detonated, as well as those that were reported by local citizens.
The success of the GIRoA in meeting the needs of the population and winning their
allegiance has been uneven and sometimes temporary. In many provinces and districts, the
government’s failure to connect effectively with the people of the country and provide
security and prosperity has provided an opening for the Taliban to successfully install shadow
governments that provide basic security against lawlessness. The Taliban is likely to continue
efforts to emplace shadow governments in order to enhance local control by insurgent forces,
undermine the authority of district and provincial level officials appointed by Kabul, and
present a locally acceptable alternative to the Karzai government. Due to the nature of
insurgencies, estimates of their numbers are inherently unreliable and there is no agreed-upon
figure from the Intelligence Community. Therefore, no estimate is included in this report.1
1.3. North Atlantic Treaty Organization

International Security Assistance Force
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) has overall command of the battlespace in Afghanistan. Commanded by a 4-star U.S.
Army officer, all military guidance for ISAF forces is communicated from Supreme
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and the Joint Forces Command (JFC)
Brunssum. The international strategic direction has been approved by the North Atlantic
Council (NAC). U.S. forces assigned to ISAF operate in support of ISAF plans and
operations, and are under the operational control of Commander, International Security
Assistance Force (COMISAF). The bulk of U.S. forces assigned to ISAF operate in Regional
Command (RC) East. The United States contributes approximately 19,000 of the 47,000
personnel in ISAF. An assessment of United States Military requirements, including planned
force rotation for the three-month period following the date of the report can be found in the
monthly “Boots-on-the-Ground” Reports submitted to Congress in accordance with Public
Law 110-116. Force rotations beyond the three-month period following April 2008 will be
conditions-based and hence cannot be provided with reasonable accuracy.
1
An assessment of the elements of the insurgency are available in a classified format (see National Intelligence
Council report #ICB 2008 19).
1.3.1. Efforts to Encourage NATO ISAF Countries to Fulfill Commitments

A top U.S. government priority is to ensure that ISAF countries provide all required
forces as determined by NATO military authorities in the agreed Combined Joint Statement
of Requirements (CJSOR). The ISAF commander must have the forces and flexibility
necessary to accomplish the mission of assisting the GIRoA in the establishment and
maintenance of a safe and secure environment and the extension of its authority in order to
facilitate reconstruction and development. Although CJSOR shortfalls remain, especially for
maneuver battalions, helicopters, and OMLTs, all 26 Allies and 14 non-NATO partners are
contributing in important ways to the ISAF mission. ISAF has increased from approximately
31,000 personnel in November 2006, to approximately 47,000 personnel today. This number
is expected to increase in 2008.
In order to help Allies shore up domestic political support for increased resources in
Afghanistan, the U.S. focused efforts on the development of a Comprehensive Political
Military Strategic Plan for ISAF to explain how Allied security is directly linked to stability
in Afghanistan and to lay out a vision to guide ISAF’s role in Afghanistan over the next five
years. This Comprehensive Political Military Strategic Plan was agreed to by the Heads of
State and Government from Allied and other troop-contributing nations at Bucharest in March
2008. In the Comprehensive Political Military Strategic Plan, Allies agreed that Afghanistan
is the Alliance’s key priority. The Comprehensive Political Military Strategic Plan
incorporates four guiding principles:
• a firm and shared long-term commitment;

• support for enhanced Afghan leadership and responsibility;
• a comprehensive approach by the international community, bringing together civilian
and military efforts; and
• increased cooperation and engagement with Afghanistan’s neighbors, especially
Pakistan.
Among the pledges of support at the Bucharest Summit, France announced that it will
send approximately 700 additional troops to eastern Afghanistan. This will permit the U.S. to
assign more troops to the south where Canadian forces have been engaged in combat
operations against Taliban forces. Also at Bucharest, Russia agreed to permit ISAF nations to
transit through Russia to resupply ISAF forces in Afghanistan. Since the Bucharest Summit, a
number of other countries have pledged additional resources to ISAF. For example, Poland
has agreed to send 400 additional troops and eight helicopters. Several nations, such as
Romania, Italy, and Greece, have agreed to provide additional OMLTs.
A key component of ISAF operations is assisting in the training and equipping the ANA.
The ANA has approximately 52,000 troops engaged in or leading major operations alongside
ISAF forces. ISAF partners have fielded or pledged 36 OMLTs to help build a more effective
ANA. However, this still falls short of the total OMLTs required. Thirteen ISAF nations have
donated equipment to the ANA through NATO, and a trust fund has been established to cover
transportation and installation costs for the donated equipment. An indication of the
increasing professionalism and capabilities of the ANA, President Karzai announced at
Bucharest that the ANA plans to assume security responsibility for Kabul in August 2008.
1.3.2. National Caveats on NATO/ISAF Forces

The U.S. government has consistently emphasized the importance of giving commanders
in the field the maximum possible flexibility to ensure that they can accomplish their mission
in the fastest possible timeframe, while minimizing risk and loss of life. Just over half of the
Allies in ISAF have some form of caveats on the geographical and/or functional deployment
of their forces. Some Allies have no written caveats on their forces, but operate with de facto
restrictions that can be even more severe than caveats. Therefore, rather than focus
exclusively on caveats, the U.S. has pressed all Allies and partners to provide commanders on
the ground with the maximum possible flexibility in terms of when, where, and how they
utilize forces under their command. The most significant and commonly cited caveats are
restrictions that keep some troops currently in the north, west, and in Kabul from moving to
Regional Command-South without prior approval from their respective nations’ capitals. The
United States takes advantage of every opportunity to urge Allies to lift these restrictions.
1.4. Operations
Within the primary operational area for U.S. forces – Regional Command East –
operational tempo and the ability to extend the reach of ISAF forces increased two-fold with
the addition of a second Brigade Combat Team in early 2007. U.S. forces took part in full-
spectrum operations, often with ANSF in the lead. Keeping in line with the overall strategy of
clear, hold, and build, the increased security paved the way for improved local government
and economic growth. Additionally, CJTF-822 established Border Security Posts, Combat
Out-Posts, and Forward Operating Bases along known insurgent routes and support areas.
This expanded ISAF and ANSF presence probably contributed to the increase in enemy
attacks from 2006 to 2007.
1.4.1. Civilian Casualties

The increase in civilian casualties is largely due to a shift in insurgent focus to operations
in populated areas, and the use of indiscriminant asymmetric attacks. A series of well-
publicized events during the spring and summer of 2007 highlighted the negative
consequences of civilian casualties caused by combat operations in Afghanistan. The
willingness of the Afghan populace to support international forces and the GIRoA is directly
proportional to their trust and confidence in those forces. The support of the Afghan people is
essential to the security, reconstruction, and governance of the country.
In response to increasing civilian casualties in the country Admiral Fallon, former
Commander of U.S. Central Command; General McNeill, COMISAF; and General Ramms
(Commander, Joint Forces Command–Brunssum) published a series of complementary
guidance outlining the problems, challenges, and unintended consequences of civilian
casualties, and provided explicit direction to all commanders and the Marines, Soldiers,
Sailors, and Airmen under their command on how to limit those casualties. The published
guidance directed that, while not limiting the right of self defense, responses to enemy actions
2
On April 10, 2008 the 101st Airborne Division assumed command of Regional Command East from the 82nd
Airborne Division. CJTF-101 also serves as the U.S. national command element in Afghanistan.
must clearly demonstrate proportionality, requisite restraint, and the utmost discrimination in
the application of firepower.
1.5. Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF)
The long-term goal for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) is to build and
develop a force that is nationally respected; professional; ethnically balanced; democratically
accountable; organized, trained, and equipped to meet the security needs of the country; and
funded from the GIRoA budget. Security is a fundamental prerequisite for achieving
economic and social development in Afghanistan. The ANA and the ANP represent two
critical elements for establishing that security.
The mission of the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A) is
to plan, program and implement structural, organizational, institutional, and management
reforms of the ANSF in order to develop a stable Afghanistan, strengthen the rule of law, and
deter and defeat terrorism within its borders. CSTC-A receives funding through the Afghan
Security Forces Fund (ASFF) to equip, train, and sustain the ANSF. The Fiscal Year (FY)
2008 budget request delineates the program objectives aimed at enabling ANSF independent
operations. These objectives include improved enablers, logistics operations, infrastructure,
training, pay programs, medical facilities, and equipment.
The FY 2008 ASFF request totaled $2.7 billion, including $1,711 billion for the ANA,
$980 million for the ANP, and $9.6 million for detainee operations. For the ANA, these funds
will equip and sustain the 70,000-person 14 brigade force in 2008; upgrade garrisons and
support facilities; enhance ANA intelligence capabilities; and expand education and training,
including the National Military Academy, counter-improvised explosive device (CIED)
training, mobile training teams, branch qualification courses, and literacy and English
language programs. For the ANP, these funds will increase CIED, communications,
intelligence training; purchase additional equipment, weapons, and ammunition to respond to
insurgent threats; enhance ANP intelligence capabilities; set conditions for interoperability
with ANA to respond to events; enhance border surveillance; add basic health clinics in select
provinces to improve casualty treatment; and expand field medic and combat life support
training. Because the operational and security realities in Afghanistan are constantly
changing, it is not possible to make a reliable estimate of the long-term costs and budget
requirements for developing the ANSF.
1.5.1. ANSF Desired End-Strength

Despite achievements in Afghanistan, security threats and corruption remain a major
impediment to overall development. The security environment continues to be fluid,
demanding continual reexamination and assessment of requirements for the end-strength of
the ANSF. The 2001 Bonn Agreement established the goal of a 70,000-person ANA and
62,000-person ANP. The Afghanistan Compact in January 2006 confirmed those target end-
strengths. Security conditions necessitated a reexamination of ANSF end-strength.
Consequently, in May 2007, the international community’s Joint Coordination and
Monitoring Board (JCMB) endorsed an increase to 82,000 authorized ANP. Similarly, with
the endorsement of the JCMB on February 5, 2008, the authorized ANA force structure
increased to 80,000 personnel, with an additional 6,000 allotted for the trainee, transient,
hospitalized, and student account.
We are currently examining whether this new end-state is adequate for Afghanistan’s
needs. The long-term ANSF posture may also include a more robust Afghan National Army
Air Corps (ANAAC) capability and a larger army. However, additional analysis, study, and
consideration must be given to the sustainability and available financial support for such
efforts.
1.5.2. ANSF Recruiting and Retention

Actions to improve ANSF’s national recruiting system and the Afghan vetting process
continue. The current procedures for processing applications and conducting cursory
background checks for the ANSF are explained for the ANA and ANP in their respective
sections. However, additional measures and more sophisticated processes are currently being
pursued.
The ANSF is working to implement identification (ID) cards and biometrics. A national
ID program will incorporate equipment issue, pay, promotion and tracking and accountability
from accession to attrition using an accurate record management system for the ANP force
structure. Current efforts include integration of the ID card’s barcode system into the pay
system of the ANP. The ANA implemented an ID card system and an automated database in
April 2006. Similarly, the ANSF are embarking on a long-term, state-of-the-art biometric
collection and database program that will provide both the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and
Ministry of Interior (MoI) a capability to positively identify all Afghan soldiers and police.
The integrated database of fingerprints, iris scan, and facial photos will be jointly maintained
by ANA and ANP biometric analysts that are currently being identified and trained over the
next three years. Another group of ANA and ANP officers are being trained as collectors who
will be positioned at ANSF initial entry sites across Afghanistan. The biometric technology is
scalable and will allow the GIRoA to expand the program to other segments of the
government should Afghan leaders choose to do so.
CSTC-A’s leadership is involved in efforts towards developing overall awareness of
current retention rates and programs to offer re-contracting options. CSTC-A has enlisted the
help of key MoI staff members to promote re-contracting of separating personnel. Measures
taken with the MoD include staff assistance visits to the Corps and training by the MoD Re-
contracting Officer. In January 2008, the Assistant Minister of Defense for Personnel and
Education revised the re-contracting regulation to require Company to Corps-level
Commanders to project separation dates at least 12 months out and perform regular career
counseling with all soldiers and NCOs.
The ANSF has pursued monetary bonuses to incentivize enlistment and re-enlistment,
specifically directed at the Commandos in the ANA and Afghan Border Police (ABP) in the
ANP. Commandos currently receive an additional $30/month incentive pay. Additional
proposed initiatives are under financial review for the ABP including a sign-on bonus,
retention bonus, and hostile fire or imminent danger pay. More detailed efforts regarding
recruiting and retention in the ANA and ANP are described in the relevant sections that
follow.
1.5.3. Afghan National Army (ANA)

The ANA is subordinate to the Ministry of Defense (MoD), and is divided into five
regional corps and an emerging air corps. The 201st Corps operates in RC Central. The 203rd
Corps operates in RC-East. The 205th Corps operates in RC-South. The 207th Corps operates
in RC-West. The 209th Corps operates in RC-North. Currently, the army serves as an infantry
force operating alongside international forces under the command of the Chief of the General
Staff, General Bismullah Khan.
Each corps is divided into brigades comprising three infantry kandaks (battalions), one
combat support kandak, and one combat service support kandak. Additionally, commando
kandaks are in the process of being formed. These elite units are currently attached to regional
corps, pending establishment of a commando brigade headquarters.
Figure 2. Alignment of ANSF Regional Commands.
1.5.3.1. ANA Desired End-Strength

By the end of 2008, the GIRoA plans to field a total of 70,000 ANA personnel. An
additional 10,000 personnel are expected to be fielded by the end of 2009. Continued training,
mentoring, and development will be required beyond this timeframe. As stated above, the
long-term ANA posture potentially may include a more robust ANAAC capability and a
larger force; however, additional analysis, study, and consideration must be given to the
security environment, sustainability, and available financial support. The current program
calls for a light infantry force of 15 brigades, including artillery, armor, commando, combat
support, combat service support, an air corps, and the requisite intermediate commands and
sustaining institutions.
1.5.3.2. ANA Training and Mentoring Efforts

Training the ANA begins with individual training. The soldier training process begins
with careful, needs-based recruiting followed by initial entry training (IET) at the Basic
Warrior Training Course (BWT), supervised by international trainers. ANA basics are taught
to an objective standard uniformly applied throughout the force. The BWT provides the
foundation, but the individual soldier’s capabilities are strengthened through branch-specific
Advanced Combat Training. Although the priority of fielding a viable force has necessitated
training initially focused on infantry and other combat-specific branches, training for support
specialties has also developed.
Immediately following a new unit’s fielding and arrival at its Corps and brigade area, it
undergoes a 60-day period of individual and collective training before being put into the
rotation for combat operations. Combat and security operations continue to round out ANA
development. Each ANA combat unit is accompanied by either a U.S. Embedded Training
Team (ETT) or a NATO ISAF OMLT. These teams provide comprehensive mentoring across
the full spectrum of operations. Specifically, the teams provide the ANA unit leadership with
advisory support on all unit functions and direct access to U.S. and ISAF resources and
enablers to enhance the ability of the ANA to operate effectively and independently. They
also serve as role models and key liaisons between ANA and international forces. The
OMLTs and ETTs coach unit staffs and commanders and assist them in the development of
their training programs, logistics and administrative systems, planning, and employment in
operations. ETTs and OMLTs also facilitate the assessment of ANA units, helping the ANA
identify strengths, shortfalls, and opportunities for improvement.
As of March 2008, U.S. ETTs require a total of 2,391 personnel; however, only 1,062 are
currently assigned (44 percent fill). The low fill-rate is due to the additional requirement to
provide support to the ANP though Police Mentor Teams (PMTs). Full PMT manning
requires 2,358 total military personnel. Currently, 921 personnel are assigned (39 percent fill).
Sourcing solutions are being worked to address the shortfall of personnel across the ETT and
PMT requirements. Afghanistan deployment requirements are being weighed against other
global manning priorities. When additional forces become available to fill these critical
personnel requirements, they will be resourced against the ETT/PMT requirements. For now,
the Focused District Development (FDD) program, described below, aims to help mitigate the
shortages of the mentors for the ANP. In addition, more than 3,400 Marines are deploying to
Afghanistan. Of these, approximately 1,200 Marines will conduct ANP training missions in
nine Afghanistan districts. These Marines are deploying as a temporary risk mitigation
measure due to the global shortage of military trainers. Since the need for continued ANP
mentorship in those districts will remain following the Marine redeployment in the fall, the
enduring requirement for 1,400 additional ANP mentors remains.
In addition to the ETTs and PMTs, NATO OMLTs are also providing critical guidance
and mentorship to the ANA. As of March 2008, there are a total of 31 validated OMLTs out
of a NATO commitment to provide 71. In many instances, ANA combat units are assigned an
ISAF partner unit during combat operations. In general, those ANA units with international
partner units have shown a marked increase in their capability to provide security in their
areas. However, it should be noted that some Afghan commanders have shown great initiative
and improvement without the benefit of an international partner.
1.5.3.3 ANA Recruiting and Retention

The ANA continues to make significant progress in recruiting and retention and all
indicators point to decreasing rates of absence without leave (AWOL) and an increased
ability to curb absenteeism. The past year has surpassed the previous four years in ANA
recruitment. The ANA recruited 32,135 soldiers in the year leading up to March 2008.
Annual recruitment numbers for the previous four years, beginning with the most recent, are:
21,287; 11,845; 15,790; and 9,671.
The year-to-date re-enlistment average in the fielded ANA is 50 percent for soldiers and
56 percent for NCOs. Factors that challenge re-enlistment include the desire for larger
salaries, better leadership, and to be stationed closer to family.
In February 2008, the ANA had an 8.4 percent absentee rate. This is down from 12
percent at the height of summer. The three corps most consistently in contact with insurgents
and anti-government elements had the highest AWOL rates, but on average they experienced
less than 10 percent AWOL over the past year. This decrease in AWOL rates has contributed
directly to an increase of 20,000 in ANA end-strength since January 2007. This increase in
end strength coupled with a deliberate effort to staff combat units fully and overfill entry-
level soldier authorizations should further mitigate problems of absenteeism. During the past
year, overall AWOL rates in ANA combat forces have decreased three percent as compared
to the previous year. With increasing emphasis on pay and incentives, better facilities and
training, better leadership, and more robustly manned units, AWOL trends can be expected to
continue to decrease in the coming year.
The personnel accession and vetting process is the same for both ANA and ANP and
follows the 3-step process described below. All vetting of candidates to serve in the ANSF
meets the requirements of the law prohibiting military assistance to units or individuals
known to have committed human rights abuses. The ANA commissar at the National Army
Volunteer Center (NAVC) is the approval authority for both the ANA and ANP.
Step 1: The applicant provides 12 passport photos and secures a national

identification card from the district. This is verified by the Governor or another
designated individual. Recruits must be between 18 and 35 years-old. Age waivers are
considered based on the applicant’s qualification.
Step 2: The applicant sees a recruiter at Provincial HQ and completes a contract. An
escort guides them through the screening process which examines health and criminal
records, as well as other relevant background information. The applicant must get two
village elders to sign the form vouching for the recruit’s character. The form must also be
signed by an official at the district center. All documents are then taken by the escort to
the ANA Commissar HQ for verification and signature.
Step 3: Medical screening is conducted at the commissar’s office. All documents go
back to the sub-governor for signature. Ultimately, the Ministry of the Interior or the
Ministry of Defense reviews all the documentation and then notifies the Provincial
authorities of acceptance by issuing the directive to commence training.
The ANA has also implemented an additional level of review for potential ANA recruits.
An Afghan who requests to join the Army is given a form to complete at the recruiting center.
The recruit’s name is then added to a list that is circulated among various MoD offices,
including the ANA General Staff G2, for a rudimentary background check.
1.5.3.4. ANA Salary and Pay

Recruiting and retention initiatives have been boosted by steps taken to standardize and
institute a competitive pay scale. The following chart depicts the current monthly, 25-year
base salary plan for members of the ANA.
Table 1. 25-Year Base Pay Plan (ANA)
RANK GRADE <1 to >3 >6 >9 >12 >15 >18 >21 >24
3
GEN O-10 $880 $925 $940 $955 $970 $985 $1,000 $1,015 $1,030
LTG O-9 $780 $825 $840 $855 $870 $885 $900 $915 $930
MG O-8 $680 $735 $750 $765 $780 $795 $810 $825 $840
BG O-7 $580 $635 $650 $665 $680 $695 $710 $725 $740
COL O-6 $430 $465 $480 $495 $510 $525 $540 $555 $570
LTC O-5 $380 $415 $430 $445 $460 $475 $490 $505 $520
MAJ O-4 $330 $365 $380 $395 $410 $425 $440 $455 $470
CPT O-3 $250 $285 $300 $315 $330 $345 $360
1LT O-2 $210 $245 $260 $275 $290 $305
2LT O-1 $190 $225 $240 $255 $270
SGM E-9 $210 $245 $260 $275 $290 $305 $320 $335 $350
MSG E-8 $170 $205 $220 $235 $250 $265 $280 $295 $310
SFC E-7 $145 $180 $195 $210 $225 $240 $255 $270 $285
SSG E-6 $130 $165 $180 $195 $210 $225 $240
SGT E-5 $115 $150 $165 $180 $195 $210
SDR E-4 $100 $135 $150 $165 $180
1.5.3.5. ANA Equipment

The three infantry companies in each kandak are equipped with former Warsaw Pact
rifles, light and heavy machine guns, and rocket propelled grenade launchers. The weapons
company in each kandak provides anti-armor capability with SPG-9 recoilless rifles and
indirect fire with 82mm mortars. Plans are in place to effect a transition to NATO standard
weapons. CSTC-A is currently converting the ANA from the AK-47 to the M16 (or the
Canadian version, the C7). Later in 2008, the ANA will begin converting to U.S. model light
and medium machine guns and 81mm mortars.
Each brigade has an artillery battery consisting of eight former Warsaw Pact D-30
howitzers. Currently, 82 of the 132 required are functional. CSTC-A has contracted to have
the howitzers assessed for complete refurbishment and conversion to facilitate NATO
standard interoperability.
One ANA brigade is designed to include a mechanized kandak and an armor kandak.
These units are currently equipped with BMPs (amphibious infantry fighting vehicles) and T-
62 main battle tanks in various states of functionality. Procurement and donation options are
currently being studied to upgrade this capability.
The ANA’s primary vehicle is the light tactical vehicle (LTV), a Ford Ranger truck.
CSTC-A has procured more than 4,100 up-armored high mobility multipurpose wheeled
vehicles (HMMWVs) (M1151/M1152) to be fielded beginning this summer. These
HMMWVs will displace many of the LTVs, particularly in the combat battalions, to provide a
protected mobility capability.
The ANAAC currently consists of the following aircraft: seven medium cargo airplanes
(five AN-32s and two AN-26s) and thirteen helicopters (nine MI-17s and four MI-35s). The
ANAAC will eventually include reconnaissance and light attack air-to-ground fixed wing
aircraft. By December 2008, the inventory will include an additional fifteen MI-17s, six MI-
35s, and two AN-32s. Four out of a total of twenty C-27s are being procured for delivery.
1.5.3.6. ANA Assessment

ANA unit readiness is gradually improving. The numbers and readiness status provided
below are based on an 80,000 ANA structure comprised of 85 battalions/squadrons organized
into 14 combat brigades, 5 Corps headquarters (HQ) and 1 Air Corp HQ.
As of March 2008, the ANA reported one battalion and 1 Corps HQ as rated at Capability
Milestone (CM) 1: capable of operating independently. Twenty-six battalions/squadrons, five
brigade HQs, and two Corps HQs were reported at the CM2 level: capable of planning,
executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations at the battalion level with
international support. Twenty-six battalions/squadrons, five brigade HQs, two Corps HQs,
and one Air Corps HQ were reported at the CM3: partially capable of conducting
counterinsurgency operations at the company level with support from international forces.
Ten battalions/squadrons and one brigade HQ are reported at CM4: formed but not yet
capable of conducting primary operational missions. Finally, there are twenty-two
battalions/squadrons and three brigade HQ that are still not formed or reporting.
An overall assessment of the ANA officer corps effectiveness from the kandak- to Corps-
level is positive and ANA officers continue to work to improve their professionalism.
National illiteracy rates remain high, but the members of the officer corps are required to have
basic reading and writing abilities and plans are being made to improve the education level of
the officer corps. Overall, officers are proficient at the tactical level though not yet fully
mature in operational and strategic concepts. The majority of the officers, and most
importantly the very senior officers, believe in the concept of a national military. They are
starting to use the military decision-making process and to provide information and decision
briefs to their superiors. The chain of command works well when exercised, and there is strict
adherence to direction from higher ranks.
Although there is no credible reporting on estimated numbers or percentages of
insurgents infiltrating the ANA, there are multiple reports of insurgent intent to do so, as well
as occasional reports of ANA personnel collaborating with and/or assisting insurgents. These
reports usually mention ANA personnel providing insurgents with information and supplies
or collaborating with insurgent operations. However, we assess that these isolated reports of
collaboration are often the result of insurgent threats and intimidation against ANA members
in high-threat regions or criminal economic ventures on the part of ANA members as opposed
to actual insurgent penetration of the organization. There have been two incidents of ANA
soldiers shooting U.S. soldiers; both ANA soldiers involved in these incidents had reportedly
been influenced by insurgents while home on leave, but we assess that these cases were
probably more opportunistic in nature than contrived attempts at infiltration. We are also
aware of several ANA members who are reportedly under investigation by Afghan authorities
for being hostile agents. However, we have no indications that these authorities have
established proof of guilt. Although we are certain that there are cases of successful insurgent
infiltration of ANA units, we assess that the current level of ANA infiltration is not
operationally significant.
The current assigned strength of the ANA as of February 2008 stood at just over 49,000
personnel across 63 kandaks and three commando kandaks, with a planned expansion of one
kandak (roughly 600 personnel) every month. This population allows two of the five Corps to
field nearly all of their subordinate units and join their international partners in some of the
most contentious areas of RC East and South. After gaining experience in partnered U.S.
operations, the 201st and 203rd Corps have taken the lead and are now capable of
independent operations at the company level. Fifty percent of the kandaks in these Corps
maintain steady state operations independently and plan future operations. Last fall, the 203rd
Corps staff increased capacity sufficiently to plan and execute a brigade level operation with
U.S. and other international forces in a supporting role. The 201st and 203rd Corps engineers
conducted bridging operations with international engineer units repairing and replacing
bridges through the summer and fall allowing greater development in those areas. The ANA
have started basic explosive ordnance disposal and counter IED training, expanding their
capability to counteract one of the enemy’s most important weapons against the ANSF.
The Afghanistan National Military Command Center is able to host weekly video
teleconferences (VTCs) with its Corps across the country with newly installed
communications equipment. This is improving national headquarters command and control
and allowing for better adjacent unit coordination between the Corps. Additionally, both
ANA Corps in RC East are leading their own Regional Security Committee Meetings—
actively coordinating ANA, ANP and National Directorate for Security (NDS) operations
with the international forces. These meetings allow for a common intelligence and operational
picture among the ANP, ANA and NDS, which facilitates shared goals and objectives in
developing a stable security environment. The 201st Corps Commander has effectively
organized provincial governor meetings within his three brigade zones, complementing
security efforts with local governance and development efforts.
The ANA commando program continues to advance. The first kandaks demonstrate great
resolve under fire, a capacity for tactical patience, and the capability for precision operations
well above their conventional counterparts. The 201st Corps commando kandak continues to
make progress toward autonomous company-level operations. They have conducted six
different missions as part of larger ANA and ISAF operations, a no-notice operation with
other U.S. and ISAF Special Forces, and an independent company level operation. The 203rd
commando kandak conducted its first combat operation in December 2007. ANA Air Corps
(ANAAC) capacity and capabilities also grew in 2007. They are now executing re-supply
missions, troop movements and humanitarian assistance operations. The ANA Air Corps
increased flight time from 100 hours per month to 140 hours per month; a 40 percent capacity
increase. The Air Corps earned recognition and is credited with saving more than 1,200 lives
by performing flood relief missions. The relief missions built the ANAAC’s confidence in its
own abilities as well as the confidence of the populace in the Air Corps. In December 2007,
the ANAAC flew missions for the first time as an integrated part of a CJTF-82 Aviation Task
Force aerial formation. These missions were the result of a year-long mentorship between
Task Force (TF) Pegasus and the ANAAC. In January 2008, the ANAAC conducted a
medical evacuation test of concept that will further build capacity to conduct independent
operations. This operation allowed the ANAAC to move patients from Craig Military
Hospital at Bagram Airfield to the ANA National Military Hospital in Kabul and proved the
ANAAC to be an independent and strong partner for international forces during medical
evacuations.
1.5.4. Afghan National Police (ANP)

ANP capabilities still lag behind those of the ANA. The current ANP force has not been
sufficiently reformed or developed to a level at which it can adequately perform its security
and policing mission. Generally, police development has been hindered by lack of
institutional reform, corruption, insufficient trainers and advisors, and a lack of unity of effort
within the international community. Recently, CSTC-A, in coordination with the GIRoA, the
Department of State, and other international partners, implemented the Focused District
Development (FDD) initiative enabling a concentrated effort to reform the Afghan Uniform
Police. Full implementation of the FDD program under the current force structure is expected
to take several years. Section 1.5.4.3 of this report provides a more detailed description of the
FDD program.
1.5.4.1. ANP Desired End State

The target for the ANP is to build a reformed force of 82,000 personnel that is capable of
operating countrywide. The ANP consists of the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), the Afghan
Civil Order Police (ANCOP), the Afghan Border Police (ABP), Counternarcotics Police of
Afghanistan (CNPA), and additional specialized police including criminal investigation,
counter-terrorism, and customs. The roles of the various police services span a wide spectrum
of policing, law enforcement, and security functions:
• The AUP serve at the regional, provincial, and district levels. The AUP’s activities
are focused on patrols, crime prevention, traffic, and general policing. They are
intended to spread the rule of law throughout the country and provide a response
capability for local security incidents.
• The ANCOP is a highly skilled, specialized police force. It is split into rural and
urban units, and trained and equipped to counter civil unrest and lawlessness.
ANCOP units provide law enforcement and civil control, conduct operations in areas
where government control may be weak, and support counterinsurgency operations.
Eight of the 19 ANCOP battalions are currently fielded and are performing
exceptionally well, both in their support of FDD, and in their primary role as the
national quick reaction force in troubled areas. ANCOP are formed as units, receive
sixteen weeks of institutional training followed by another eight weeks of PMT-
supervised collective training. All reports on this new national police force have
indicated a solid performance in operations to dismantle illegal checkpoints, seize
illegal weapons, and retake lost districts. In the locations where ANCOP has
deployed, it has successfully conducted counterinsurgency operations and secured
the trust and confidence of the people.
• The ABP provides broad law enforcement capabilities at borders and entry points to
deter the illegal entry of people and material as well as other criminal activity. The
ABP has been challenged by the fact that they have received the least attention,
funding, and training. This has caused them to lag behind their AUP counterparts.
They are currently manned at levels below 50 percent in many areas, are poorly
equipped, and under-resourced. However, efforts to build the force and to fill
available training slots during FDD will continue to build the ABP, albeit at a slower
rate than the AUP. The majority of the ABP facilities along the border is run down
and lacks basic necessities. As of December 2007, CSTC-A approved new company
and kandak locations for the 2008-2009 build plan and will begin construction of
these locations in the summer of 2008 with an expected completion date later in
2009.
• The CNPA is the lead agency charged with reducing narcotics production and
distribution in Afghanistan.
The Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) supplements the AUP at the district level.
This bridging force receives two weeks of initial training and will attend follow-on three
week sustainment training or may attend the same eight weeks of training that uniform police
receive in their basic training. The ANAP will cease to exist by the end of 2008. Those
members that have served for at least one year, have undergone five weeks of training, and
have received a recommendation from their district chief will transition to the AUP.
Once comprehensive assessments can be made on the effects of recently begun reform
efforts, ANP strength will be reassessed to determine if additional police forces are required.
Currently, a lack of trainers and mentors precludes the acceleration or expansion of reform
and mentoring efforts. Through the FDD, current reform and mentoring efforts are principally
focused on the AUP. The AUP are closest to the population and are therefore the most
immediate face of the Afghan government.
1.5.4.2. ANP Training and Mentoring

The AUP at the district level require significantly more coaching and mentoring than the
ANA to ensure that all police units are operating according to national standards and
procedures as established by the Ministry of the Interior. Unlike the ANA, police forces are
not fielded as units. All policemen must be trained as individuals. The objective for ANP
training is a minimum of initial entry training (IET) for all new recruits. When training
capacity meets demand, it may be possible to tie police pay to training, thereby adding
incentive for immediate training attendance.
Current training capacity cannot meet demand and many untrained policemen remain in
the force. Efforts to expand the training capacity to meet demand should make it feasible to
require IET for all police recruits in approximately three years. Currently, individual training
is conducted at seven Regional Training Centers (RTCs), a Central Training Center, and the
Kabul Police Academy. The State Department’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (INL) uses a private contactor to provide civilian police training and
program design at the training centers and to provide field-based mentors. Courses provided
at the training centers include the basic 8-week course for all new and entry-level police; the
intermediate-level 5-week Transition Integration Program; the 16-week ANCOP program
(inclusive of basic and specialized training); and specialized courses in firearms, criminal
investigative division, instructor development, field training, tactical training, medic training,
and train-the-trainer instruction. From 2003 to 2008, more than 149,000 trainees have gone
through basic, intermediate, advanced and specialized training at the training centers.
Building Afghan police training capacity has been a priority. Civilian police mentors build
train-the-trainer capacity for Afghan instructors, who in turn provide instruction to Afghan
trainees.
To further increase training capacity, CSTC-A and INL have established an ANCOP
Training Center with a capacity of 800 students per class, and are also planning for a National
Police Training Center, which is expected to achieve initial operating capability later in 2008.
This center will have an eventual capacity of 2,000 policemen. When operational, the
National Police Training Center will make it possible for all new police to attend IET prior to
assumption of duties.
The CSTC-A training program, while recognizing that policemen do not operate in
“units,” as does the ANA, seeks to build cohesive, effective police organizations. CSTC-A, in
conjunction with TF Phoenix and the Department of State, mentors police at all levels,
although the program does not currently reach all police locations. The objective is to provide
a U.S. military Police Mentor Teams (PMTs) mentor team staffed with civilian police
advisors to each AUP police district, each provincial and regional headquarters, each ABP
company and battalion, and each ANCOP company and battalion. However, the shortage of
PMTs affects CSTC-A’s ability to increase and improve ANP training and mentoring. Each
PMT is composed primarily of military members that provide training support, maintenance,
logistics, and administrative coaching; encourage professionalism; and serve as liaisons with
international forces as required. Each team includes two civilian police mentors. Mentor
teams focus on a particular function and their efforts are tailored to develop skills, capacity
and professionalism in these areas.
The final element of every PMT is a security force. The majority of formal training
should be provided under the guidance of qualified civilian police advisors at one of the eight
training centers. However, due to the security situation, police training is most often provided
by military personnel with civilian or military police experience. There is no area of
Afghanistan that permits independent mentorship by civilian police or very small PMTs.
Mentoring of the ANP must occur locally in 364 districts spread throughout Afghanistan. The
broad geographic scope of the ANP necessitates additional mentoring forces and equipment
to adequately provide coaching, training and mentoring oversight. With 365 districts, 46 city
police precincts, 34 provinces, five regions, 19 ANCOP battalions, 33 ABP battalions, and
135 ABP companies, CSTC-A is currently able to provide PMTs to no more than one-fourth
of all ANP organizations and units.
More than 500 civilian police trainers and mentors are deployed – in some cases with
PMTs – to regional, provincial and district locations in nearly every province. Currently in
RC East, a dedicated mentor team is located at every provincial headquarters and at select
district level headquarters. Partnership for the police forces is facilitated through multiple
avenues. For instance, in RC East, CSTC-A maintains the mentorship role and CJTF-82
conducts partnership activities with the ANP.
1.5.4.3. Focused District Development (FDD) Program

The Focused District Development (FDD) program is a pilot initiative that addresses the
critical development requirements of the ANP in each district, while also allowing for a
strong reform program. The training and mentoring provided through FDD will build the
AUP as a reformed service loyal to the Afghan people and Afghan national interests. As the
primary government interface with the Afghan people, an effective AUP is critical to the
extension of the rule of law and to building trust in the institution of the police among the
general populace. Accordingly, FDD concentrates resources on the district-level AUP. A
reformed, more effective police force that can improve security in an area can facilitate the
realization of other desired outcomes.
The first part of the FDD process is an assessment of the district by a District Assessment
and Reform Team, composed of a PMT, several representatives of the MoI and other Afghan
government ministries, and, in some cases, other international partners (especially Canada
and the United Kingdom). This assessment leads to selection and vetting of new leaders as
required, recruiting to authorized levels, and building of equipment inventories, as well as
assessments of facilities, status of the rule of law, the district police’s relationship with the
local leaders, and overall professional effectiveness. Once the assessment is complete, an
ANCOP unit is deployed to the district to relieve the local AUP forces. The AUP forces then
report to the RTCs to begin eight weeks of reconstitution. This reconstitution period includes
three different levels of training (i.e., new entrants, advanced, and officer leader and
management training), biometric processing and identification card issue, pay records
establishment, full equipping, leader reinforcement training, and continual ethics
reinforcement. The AUP participating in the RTC training programs receive daily mentorship
from PMTs. The PMT remains with the reformed police after the eight week reconstitution
phase to continue collective training and mentoring in the district, ensuring the police put into
practice the key individual and collective competencies as well as the ethical standards
learned during training at the RTC. At the conclusion of this phase, which is proficiency-
driven, rather than time-driven, the district is validated as a reformed police force, using the
same objective assessment checklist that was used in the preliminary assessment phase.
Six cycles of FDD are planned for completion in 2008. The first cycle, which began in
seven districts in late 2007, is nearing completion with district ANP reinserted in their
districts and undergoing intensive mentoring. The second cycle of FDD is mid-course in five
districts, with district ANP undergoing reconstitution at the regional training centers. The
third cycle, being implemented in nine districts, is in the initial assessment phase.
Current challenges facing the FDD program are a shortage of PMTs, a shortage of trained
ANCOP units (currently a growing program), limited capacity at the RTCs, in some cases a
lack of provincial governor support (due to the perceived loss of power as the AUP become
loyal to the nation and the potential loss of a source of revenue for the governor), and
integration of other aspects of rule of law and governance reform. We anticipate that over the
course of 2008, these challenges will lessen with the training of additional ANCOP units, the
construction of the National Police Training Center, and the ability of FDD-reformed districts
to strengthen ties with district governance and populations.
The FDD initiative is linked and complementary to ongoing ISAF operations and will
center on the Eastern and Southern regions that have experienced increased instability due to
anti-government elements. It is aimed at focusing limited resources to maximize the overall
development of the AUP, ultimately creating communities able to sustain stability in the long
term. Popular perception of the FDD program – particularly in those districts where it is being
implemented – is favorable, and the national government views the FDD initiative as a
catalyst for similar programs which might benefit other governmental branches.
CSTC-A, in conjunction with TF Phoenix, has placed increased emphasis on the training
and mentoring of the ABP by increasing the number of U.S. ETTs within the unit
organization. ETTs are currently in place from the ABP brigade HQ down to the company
level. They are working to improve the standards of training in combat operations,
communications and logistics. All training efforts for the Afghan Border Police will be
coordinated with the Border Management Task Force, a group that provides oversight and
management of U.S. border initiatives and assists the GIRoA with border issues.
1.5.4.4. ANP Recruiting and Retention

The accession process for the ANP mirrors the process described above in the ANA
section minus the additional step of name circulation implemented by the ANA. ANP forces
have been difficult to man and sustain. Currently, USG is examining options for pay
incentives to boost ANP recruitment and retention.
From March 24, 2007, through March 2, 2008, the nationwide recruiting numbers for all
police programs was 17,474 (4,795 ABP; 1,414 ANCOP; and 11,265 AUP and specialty
police). Recruiting efforts are the critical lynchpin to the efforts to build and sustain a viable
and resourced national police force. The Ministry of Interior has been generally successful in
obtaining the required number of personnel to keep the growth in police on an upward trend.
However, some critical actions must be taken to preserve the forces on hand and to prepare
for replacing expected losses.
The first area for improvement is recruiting staff within the MoI. The GIRoA should
ensure that appropriate recruiting personnel are authorized and trained. Due to a shortage of
recruiters, the efforts to recruit personnel to date have been successful, though not as
expedient as desired. Additionally, dispersing recruiters to regional and provincial locations
enables the police to fill upcoming losses quicker by reducing recruiter travel time and
utilizing their familiarity with the area. Many international force commanders have requested
recruiting officers at the provincial level who can travel with them to areas where the village
elders have committed to provide men for the police forces. Due to the shortage of recruiters
these offers usually go unmet by the MoI Recruiting Department because the vetting and
recruiting team cannot focus on multiple areas simultaneously. One successful program
utilized in the central zone has been the utilization of assigned police personnel officers at the
unit level to assist in the recruitment process. These officers both know the area and the elders
and village leaders who bring forward their best personnel to serve their country in the ANP.
Similarly, the MoI must capitalize on the efforts that international forces have made
towards building relationships with the local elders and tribal leaders. A successful recruiting
effort in a nation led by patriarchs will work only if tribal leaders are included in the process.
If these leaders submit their own candidates for the police forces they are staking their
reputation alongside that of the future officer. In Afghanistan, tribal affiliations still play a
more important role than loyalty to the nation. The tribal elder’s certification of a prospective
police officer almost guarantees their viability as an asset.
While recruiting the right personnel for the national police force is crucial to its success,
retention is equally critical. One of the first steps towards retaining the police officers that
have been recruited is completion of a functional personnel management system that can
track personnel assignments and completion of service commitments. Additionally, police
officers are given no incentives to stay on the force when their commitment is complete.
Possible solutions could include re-enlistment bonuses and combat incentive pay for those
serving in high threat areas. The Ministry of Defense has employed incentives for the ANA
and has seen tremendous increases in the retention of their soldiers upon termination of
enlistment contracts. Some of the incentives include relocation of family, increased salary, or
promotion and professional schooling. It is hoped that programs such as these, when
implemented, will lead to an overall increase in the professionalism of those who serve in the
police forces.
Another issue that continues to plague the ANP and challenge recruiting and retention is
pay corruption. Cash payment of salaries leaves ample opportunity for corruption. The
implementation of Electronic Funds Transfer to the ANP will limit the amount of hand-to-
hand money transfers that must occur. In order to implement this program, some districts near
major population centers are bringing in Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) that are linked
into the Afghan Banking systems. Payment of salaries in full and on time significantly
reduces pay corruption and improves the morale of ANP officers. As the spread of ATMs and
banks continues across the country, the lack of adequate commercial or generator power
maintenance will hinder continued progress (highlighting the critical need for additional
police to prevent attacks on the power system).
Recruiting for the ANCOP is done through institutional-level recruiting by the MOI. In
the context of initial MoI reform, senior level MoI officials undergoing rank reform have
been vetted by UNAMA and the State Department. The MoI’s recent success in recruiting
and vetting well-qualified candidates for ANCOP presents a sound model for the recruitment
and vetting of all ANP individuals. Vetting for regular ANP recruits is still done on an ad-
hoc, group basis. In the case of ANCOP, recruits are solicited through self-initiative rather
than local nomination en masse. As such, the individuals applying for ANCOP training
classes are those with the personal drive and initiative to qualify for entry into the institution.
ANCOP recruits are vetted individually through the National Directorate of Security and the
MoI’s counter-terrorism division, and their citizenship and health records are verified.
Finally, two local community representatives are required to attest to their suitability for the
ANP.
Several similar checks will be applied to AUP officers in districts undergoing the new
FDD program, including candidate approval by a local elder, the district police chief, and a
senior representative from the MOI. Upon arrival at an RTC for FDD training, all AUP
officers are then vetted once again by a regional police recruiter. During the course of the
eight-week FDD training, U.S. civilian police mentors monitor all trainees and identify those
that need to be removed from the class. Police officers that fail to graduate from the FDD
course are removed from the police force. Although vetting of officer-level recruits is
systematic, vetting at the basic recruit level would benefit from a more thorough process. This
deficiency is the result of a number of factors, including the need to recruit new trainees in a
relatively short time-span.
Because Afghanistan National Police officers can leave at any time, unlike their
counterparts in the Afghan National Army, there are no numbers for absentee or AWOL rates
for the ANP. Furthermore, the lack of PMTs in the field preclude effective monitoring of
force levels in the field.
1.5.4.5. ANP Salary and Pay

Implementing pay equity between the ANA and ANP will contribute to the growth of the
latter organization. Before the pay equity initiative was approved in 2007, an individual in the
army would receive a higher monthly base pay than an individual of equivalent rank in the
police.
The following table illustrates the reform process for ANP pay rates. The current monthly
salaries for rank reformed personnel as of February 2008 can be found in the “Pay Reform”
column. Rank Reform is continuing in the grades O-4 to O-6 and when complete in summer
of 2008, all ranks will be paid the salaries indicated under the ANP/ANA Pay Parity column.
These significant changes should yield additional improvements in recruiting and retention
for the ANP.
Table 2. ANP Pay Reform
RANK GRADE Pre-Pay Reform Pay Reform ANP/ANA Pay Parity

LTG O-9 $107 $750 $780
MG O-8 $103 $650 $680
BG O-7 $95 $550 $580
COL O-6 $92 $400 $430
LTC O-5 $88 $350 $380
MAJ O-4 $83 $300 $330
CPT O-3 $78 $250 $280
1LT O-2 $69 $200 $230
2LT O-1 $66 $180 $210
1st SGT $62 $160 $190
2nd SGT $62 $140 $170
3rd SGT $62 $115 $145
1st PTRLMN $70 $80 $110
2nd PTRLMN $70 $70 $100
1.5.4.6. ANP Equipment

The ANP is equipped with light weapons, including AK-47s and 9mm pistols. Most
police elements also have light machine guns. The ABP will be provided heavy machine guns
later in 2008, in recognition of the higher level of operations they have on the borders.
ANCOP units will also be provided heavy machine guns. Former Warsaw Pact weapons are
provided through donations or through U.S.-funded purchases. Specialty organizations, such
as CNPA and counter-terrorism police receive unique equipment consistent with their
mission.
The ANP is provided Ford Rangers as light tactical vehicles (LTVs) and International
Harvesters as Medium Tactical Vehicles (MTVs). The ANCOP is currently fielded with
LTVs and MTVs, but these will be replaced with a high mobility multipurpose wheeled
vehicles or a similar vehicle in 2008.
Police are equipped with a variety of communications equipment. Interoperability issues
exist due to the wide variety of communications equipment provided by the previous lead
nation for the ANP. The remedy the issue, the U.S. has procured a common set of NATO
interoperable communication equipment to completely supply the entire ANP and will
complete fielding in 2008.
1.5.4.7. ANP Assessment

The MoI Readiness Reporting System (RRS) is being re-worked to produce timely and
accurate readiness system reports, provide actionable readiness data, and provide an executive
level brief. The revised RRS should enable the MoI and ANP to conduct analysis of readiness
data that will recognize shortfalls and allow MoI and ANP leadership to make corrective
actions. Without the full complement of PMTs, however, a comprehensive assessment of the
ANP will not be possible.
SECTION 2: GOVERNANCE, RULE OF LAW, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

2.1. Governance Strategy
The US seeks to build an Afghan Government that is stable, at peace, capable of

governing its territory, democratic, and that protects human rights. The Afghans and the
United States have committed to these goals in the Bonn Agreement of 2001, the US-Afghan
Strategic Partnership of 2005, the Afghanistan Compact of 2006, and the Afghanistan
National Development Strategy (ANDS) of 2008. Building an effective Afghan Government
is an integral part of counterinsurgency strategy because it will become the international
community’s most effective partner in protecting the population, retaining their loyalty by
enabling growth and development, and delivering services. The US’s governance assistance
strategy focuses on building capacity in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches;
supporting subnational governance; fighting corruption; and promoting human rights.
2.1.1. Progress Since the Taliban

Between 1996 and 2001, Afghanistan did not have a functioning, legitimate government.
After the Bonn Agreement established the Afghan Interim Administration in 2001, the nation
successfully held an Emergency Loya Jirga to ratify the Agreement; wrote and ratified a new
Constitution in 2003 and 2004; and held presidential and parliamentary elections in 2004 and
2005, respectively. The next presidential election is scheduled for fall 2009; legislative
elections will follow in summer 2010.
Much still needs to be done. Most Afghan officials are not trained or experienced in what
westerners would consider to be traditional managerial functions or leadership. This results in
inconsistent leadership quality across regions and levels of government. There is a cause and
effect relationship between good governance and security. In areas in which capable GIRoA
officials exercise the full scope of the duties and powers of their appointed office, the
population turns to the government for answers to their problems. The inverse is true for weak
or ineffective leaders, or in areas where lack of security does not allow for effective exercise
of GIRoA authority.
2.2. Legislative Branch
The rule of law begins with the creation of the law by a competent, honest, and
representative legislature. Afghanistan’s National Assembly recently celebrated its second
anniversary after a 32 year hiatus. In creating the laws of Afghanistan, the National Assembly
has become the primary national forum for the discussion of the major challenges facing the
nation, from long-standing inter-ethnic disputes to plotting Afghanistan’s course into a stable
future. Groups who at one time were in violent conflict with one another now debate the
issues confronting the country peacefully. Parliamentarians include former warlords, ex-
Taliban, former communists, Tajiks, Pashtun, and Hazaras.
Much progress has been made, though there are some hurdles that remain to be
overcome. As do other parts of the government, the National Assembly suffers from
corruption and a lack of trained human capital. As the contest between President Karzai and
the Tajik-dominated United Front has become more acute, the National Assembly’s lower
house has become more politicized and distracted from its primary task of legalizing pre-2005
presidential directives.
USG assistance to the National Assembly includes direct assistance to five parliamentary
commissions, establishing a Parliamentary Institute which will be the focal point for long-
term technical training of members of parliament and parliamentary staff, and strengthening
parliamentary budget oversight and analysis.
2.3. Executive Branch
The rule of law depends on its execution by capable and fair executives. The Afghan
population’s perception of the impartiality, probity and effectiveness of the presidency and
line ministries contributes significantly to its willingness to support the government and resist
insurgent inducements or coercion.
Great strides have been made in the executive branch of the GIRoA. The President
understands the importance of moving away from the traditional Afghan practice of
distributing senior ministerial positions, including governorships, on the basis of political
connections. The establishment of the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG),
described in section 2.7 of this report, in August 2007 has led to significant improvement in
gubernatorial appointments.
USAID is supporting capacity development at the Office of the President and several
ministries. Offices at the Presidency that benefit directly from USAID programming include
the Office of Administrative Affairs Department of Monitoring and Evaluation, the Office of
the Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs, the IDLG, the Chief of Staff’s Office, the
National Security Council, and the Office of the Presidential Spokesman.
2.3.1. Ministerial Capacity

Ministerial capacity is improving, but challenges remain. The Ministries of Health and
Education continue to demonstrate to remote rural populations the central government’s
ability and willingness to improve their lives. Additionally, the establishment of the IDLG is
catalyzing improvements in the ministries’ delivery of services in the provinces.
The biggest threats to the rule of law in the Ministries include corruption and a lack of
human capital. Afghan ministries and institutions are currently challenged with minimal
organization and a lack of fundamental management and leadership skills. The majority of
national and provincial leaders have some education, but the government faces a shortage of
adequately qualified civil servants. District-level leadership largely lacks sufficient education
and training. Approximately 60 percent of Afghan civil servants are over the age of 50. The
government of Afghanistan continues to suffer from a shortage in experienced staff at all
levels due to a low national literacy rate, low wages in government service, and existing
salary imbalances. With the high demand for manual labor as a result of reconstruction efforts
along with demand from international organizations and non-governmental organizations

(NGOs), laborers can earn more than teachers and civil servants. USAID funds two major
public management initiatives, the Capacity Development Program and the Local Governance
and Community Development Program to provide advisory support and technical assistance
to 14 national ministries at the national and provincial levels to improve basic governance and
public service delivery. In addition, the Afghan Civil Service Commission, also supported by
USAID, is improving the process of training and testing civil servants for their ability to meet
certain qualifications. Concurrently, training programs at the national and provincial level are
being strengthened with support from USAID to develop basic skills among government
workers and managers to grow the necessary human capital to form the basis for a future civil
service system.
2.4. Judicial Branch
An effective Judicial Branch is essential to establishing the rule of law and good
governance in Afghanistan. This sector is a major focus of Afghan, U.S., and international
efforts in the country. Currently, the central justice institutions have competent leaders willing
to work with the international community. Several key laws have been passed or are being
revised that will lay the foundation for an effective justice sector, and the institutions are
generally supportive of organizational restructuring and civil service reform. In addition, the
GIRoA is advancing narcotics prosecutions under the Central Narcotics Tribunal (CNT) and
Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF) in Kabul. Since March 2005, when the CJTF was set up,
it has investigated and prosecuted more than 1,200 cases involving 1,600 defendants from 33
provinces for narcotics-related crimes. Of these, 1,450 defendants were convicted.
2.4.1. Civil Legal System

Land disputes represent the largest single source of cases before Afghan courts, involving
both private individuals and the government. These cases include land seizures by powerful
interest groups and persons, the return of refugees and internally displaced persons to homes
occupied by others, and landlord and tenant disputes. Resolving these land disputes is one of
the most pressing civil law issues in Afghanistan, as the efficient and equitable restoration
and re-distribution of land is essential to the resettlement of returning refugees and internally
displaced persons to their homes and provinces of origin, and the future stability of the
country.
The current civil legal system faces many challenges: a lack of clarity as to who is
responsible for land rights; an overall lack of financial support, administrative personnel,
educated government (and private) attorneys, and judges in the area of land dispute
resolution; and facilities for the Afghan court system. The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) lacks the
skills, training, and support staff to evaluate and review land disputes.
The ANP are currently increasing their capacity and capability to bring peaceful
resolution to disputes and respect the due process of suspects’ and plaintiff’s rights. The ANP
possess the same responsibility and authority in both civil and criminal legal systems. Given a
civil matter such as a land dispute, the ANP may effectively resolve the dispute between the
concerned parties. If the parties cannot agree to the resolution then the case must be presented
for adjudication in the given system of law in that area. The Afghan Justice system struggles
to balance three types of law −constitutional, sharia, and tribal− while protecting the rights of
all Afghans. Hence, although it is a national police force, the ANP must work within the
system of justice that takes precedence in their jurisdiction.
Afghanistan’s legal system has inadequate commercial dispute resolution mechanisms. A
lack of education and procedures inhibit the enforcement of consistent commercial law on
such issues as banking, intellectual property, technology, energy, corporate law, corporate
finance, leasing, and bankruptcy. Currently, commercial courts operate in two regions, Kabul
and Mazar-e-Sharif. The lack of efficient procedures and resolution for commercial disputes
is discouraging to international investors, who fear the risk of doing business in Afghanistan
without a court system to enforce commercial rights.
The ANDS proposes several solutions to the challenges facing the justice sector. With
regard to land disputes, the Supreme Court will develop judicial capacity in property dispute
issues, increasing the number of judges trained in this area in all provinces. The courts and the
MoJ will also encourage jirgas and shuras to certify and record the decisions they reach in
disputes. Finally, the MoJ will improve the government’s ability to defend its interests in land
dispute cases and will encourage the adoption of improved laws, regulations and procedures
for land ownership and land dispute resolution.
More broadly, the ANDS will not only set the roadmap and strategy for establishing the
rule of law in Afghanistan, but also provide a sense of security for international donors and
international investors. The “Law of Organization of Courts” created by the MoJ, establishes
eight commercial courts throughout the country. The timeline for the initiation of these courts
will be set in the final ANDS. Once the courts are established, the MoJ plans to increase the
capacity of these courts to hear cases and increase the number of qualified commercial court
judges with specialized skills in the areas of both national and international market
economies. Furthermore, the Independent Bar Association and Afghan Investment Support
Agency both plan to develop private commercial law and train attorneys in these areas. A
viable commercial bar of attorneys, with regional commercial courts and qualified judges,
will enhance the appeal and reduce the risks of doing business in Afghanistan.
The international community has not yet done a great deal to assist Afghanistan in the
areas of land dispute resolution and commercial law. Although UNAMA, USAID, and private
initiatives by NGOs around the world have offered support, available donor funds are waiting
for completion of the plan for the way ahead.
2.4.2. Criminal Justice System

While the Criminal Justice system is in the early developmental stage and requires
substantial assistance from the international community, some progress has been made.
Currently, the most visible progress has taken place in areas with large populations. With
USAID assistance, judges are being trained, forty judicial facilities in 16 provinces were built,
the laws of the country have been published and distributed in a Judicial Reference Set, the
Kabul University Law School is updating its curriculum, and a new court administration
system is being implemented. Significant progress has been made in strengthening
counternarcotics judicial and enforcement capacity at the national level.
However, work remains to be done. In many provinces, most Afghans are not aware of
their rights under the constitution nor do they have a basic understanding of the justice
system. Nationwide, fully functioning courts, police, and prisons are rare. Municipal and
provincial authorities as well as judges have minimal training and little or no access to
published law, often basing their judgments on their personal understanding of sharia law,
tribal codes of honor, or local custom. Judges and prosecutors with jurisdiction over the
districts often reside in the provincial capital. The lack of trained and qualified judicial
personnel hinders the courts and results in very few cases being processed. Renovation of
existing judicial infrastructure is needed and utilities, communication equipment, and basic
office supplies are lacking. Prison conditions remain poor. Most Afghan prisons are decrepit,
severely overcrowded, unsanitary, and fall well short of international standards. Many prisons
hold more than twice their planned capacity.
At the local and municipal levels, there are still no functional standardized criminal
justice procedures in place in Afghanistan because the focus of establishing the rule of law
has been primarily on the provincial and national levels. Once a suspected criminal has been
arrested the subsequent process is inconsistent and ill-defined. The arrest of a suspect for any
offense requires a viable form of detention but jails and prisons are overcrowded and under-
equipped. A viable and complete investigation is dependent on having trained, capable, and
honest investigators as well as forensic specialists. Although the police manning document
authorizes specialists in each province, the training and availability of these personnel vary.
Pending the outcome of the investigation the individual is either released or the case is
referred to the system of justice that takes precedence in that area, usually sharia or tribal law.
In the absence of a viable criminal justice system these non-constitutional legal mechanisms
fill a gap and are somewhat effective in deterring criminality and dispensing justice, though
they often violate the rights of women and minorities. As the rule of law in Afghanistan
matures, standardized procedures for the prosecution of all serious crimes must be established
throughout the country at the provincial, regional and national levels.
At present there is no reliable data to estimate the cost of the long-term reconstruction
and development of a comprehensive justice system in Afghanistan. Efforts are currently
underway to assess the shortfalls of judicial infrastructure, training, and equipment
throughout the country. In February 2008, ISAF directed the Regional Commands and
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to conduct a survey of judicial infrastructure,
equipment, and other capacity to identify deficiencies and areas in need of improvement. The
survey questionnaire was closely coordinated with the interagency, the international rule of
law community, and, most importantly, the World Bank. The World Bank will utilize the
information gathered from the survey to determine how best to commit resources from the
Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund. The surveys will be completed by May 2008 and should
provide an adequate assessment of progress made thus far in establishing the rule of law in
Afghanistan.
2.4.3. Efforts to Build Judicial Capacity

The GIRoA has made strides in drafting and consolidating a National Justice Sector
Strategy (NJSS). However, disproportionately low salaries, widespread corruption, poor
infrastructure, inefficient organizational structures, untrained professionals, and a lack of
equipment and supplies plague the system. The NJSS is an element of the ANDS and sets
development goals to be met by 2013. To implement these goals, the GIRoA and international
community are finalizing the National Justice Program (NJP) which will use a combination of
Afghan and donor programs (both bilateral and multilateral) to develop and reform the justice
system. The World Bank is establishing a justice program that will support the NJP, using
pooled donor funding to reduce the number of small-scale implementers.
With the NJP providing a new strategic framework for the justice sector, the U.S.
Government (USG) is developing its own strategy to support the NJP that is coordinated
through the U.S. Embassy and incorporates U.S. military efforts. Priority areas of the U.S.
strategy include: accelerating institutional reform; building provincial infrastructure and
capacities; bolstering counternarcotics and anti-corruption prosecutions; investing in the
corrections system; improving linkages between police and prosecutors; and focusing on
public awareness and legal aid to improve public confidence in and access to the justice
system. These efforts support the overall USG push to project governance to the provincial
and district levels, which in turn will build nationwide confidence in the central
Government’s ability to provide security and services.
To effectively move the justice sector forward, the GIRoA and the international
community must coordinate the development of the central, provincial, and district justice
systems to ensure standardized training and application of laws. At the central level, our
programs and Embassy are working closely with the Afghan Government and international
community, and are making progress. At the provincial level, our programs are leading the
way, but the needs far exceed available donor resources and programs at present. The GIRoA
and its partners must build 34 provincial justice systems. At the district level there is little
established judicial capacity, but a plan to train district-level personnel at the provincial level
will be launched starting in the summer of 2008. In summary, notable progress has been made
and U.S. Government assistance programs have been carefully prioritized, although the
overall needs of the justice sector and demands placed on it outpace available international
resources.
U.S. Government assistance to the justice sector has gradually grown over the years, with
an FY07 budget of $67.35 million ($55 million in International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement (INCLE) funding and $12.35 million in USAID funding). For FY08, the
projected INCLE funding level for justice is $68 million, while USAID is projected to
provide $4 million. This level of funding makes the USG the largest donor to the Afghan
justice sector, not including the substantial contributions made by DoD in establishing the
rule of law.
There are four U.S. agencies primarily involved in building Afghanistan’s justice system:
INL, USAID, the Department of Justice (DoJ), and DoD. These agencies and their programs
are coordinated through the U.S. Embassy Special Committee on the Rule of Law, chaired by
the U.S. Rule of Law Coordinator.
The INL Afghanistan Administration of Justice program is primary concerned with
building and reforming the criminal justice and corrections systems. Two major assistance
platforms support this program: the Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP) and the
Corrections System Support Program (CSSP), described in greater detail below. Both
programs are implemented by Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE) Government Services
and have been in place since mid-2005 and early 2006, respectively.
In addition to these two primary programs, INL also supports several smaller initiatives,
including: (1) a grant to the University of Washington – Seattle which brings Afghan law
professors to the United States to earn certificates and Master’s of Law (LLM) degrees; (2) a
grant with the International Association of Women Judges (IAWJ) to support women in the
legal profession; (3) an agreement with the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) to focus
on specific policy and reform issues; (4) contributions to two multilateral trust funds to
address disproportionately low salaries for judges, prosecutors, and corrections personnel; and
(5) funding to support three field offices of the Provincial Justice Coordination Mechanism
mentioned above. INL also funds the DoJ Senior Federal Prosecutors Program in
Afghanistan.
The JSSP supports 30 U.S. justice advisors (prosecutors, judges, defense attorneys, and
criminal justice systems experts) and 30 Afghan legal advisors, and has permanent teams
based in Kabul, Herat, Balkh, Konduz, and Nangarhar provinces to build Afghanistan’s
criminal justice system. JSSP provincial teams as well as DoJ prosecutors are conducting
police-prosecutor training and mentoring, and will soon establish a new training program to
improve justice capacities at the district level, working closely with the police program’s
Focused District Development initiative. To date, DoJ and the JSSP have trained more than
1,000 Afghan lawyers. The Kabul JSSP team is split into three sections. The first section
consists of 16 U.S. and Afghan advisors who are reorganizing the Attorney General’s Office,
providing training and mentoring, and advising the Afghan Attorney General on key issues.
The second section supports the Ministry of Justice and its key directorates with three U.S.
and 11 Afghan advisors, including the recently established and entirely Afghan staffed Policy
and Strategy Unit. The Policy and Strategy Unit provides policy and organizational reform
advice to the Minister. The third JSSP section focuses on improving access to justice, which
includes mentoring and capacity building for private legal defense organizations, legal
education and training, and organizing provincial justice conferences. The JSSP also has a
gender justice advisor who is developing linkages between police Family Response Units and
the prosecution services, as well as a military liaison to coordinate joint police-justice efforts.
The CSSP supports more than 30 U.S. corrections advisors in Kabul, Herat, Balkh,
Nangarhar and Paktia provinces. This support is focused on four areas: training, capacity-
building, infrastructure support, and operations and maintenance for a new facility in Kabul.
The provincial teams have trained more than 1,300 corrections officers to date in a basic 8-
week course and a “train the trainers” course. The training program is based on international
and United Nations human rights standards and was developed specifically for (and with) the
Afghan Government. The program launching numerous advanced and specialized courses in
2008. The CSSP also supports a capacity-building program which is advising the Ministry of
Justice’s Central Prison Directorate (CPD) on prison policies, prison management,
establishing a prisoner tracking system, and organizational reforms. The third CSSP
component is the infrastructure team, which has refurbished the national corrections training
center, completed numerous small-scale renovations of prisons, provided a new annex for the
CPD headquarters for staff, and established an Afghan Engineering Office within the CPD.
Together with Afghan architects and engineers, the CSSP has developed a “hybrid” prison
design that incorporates international human rights standards with Afghan realities and cost-
effectiveness to create a sustainable, humane, and secure prison design. In addition to
constructing two prisons over the coming year, the CSSP is also advising other donors to
ensure that their designs and construction of prisons implement this Afghan-approved
sustainable model. Lastly, the CSSP will support the operations and maintenance of the
Counternarcotics Justice Center (CNJC) in Kabul, a secure facility built by the Army Corps
of Engineers that will house the Counternarcotics Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF) and
Central Narcotics Tribunal (CNT) as well as a detention center.
Finally, INL entered into an agreement with the United States Institute of Peace in mid-
2007 to work with Afghan and international actors to develop policies and possible linkages
with the non-state system of dispute resolution. Although the focus of U.S. assistance must be
on building the central government’s reach through the formal justice institutions, there may
be linkages with the informal system for certain civil (but not criminal) disputes that could
maximize efficiency and utilize the legitimacy that many customary systems enjoy, so long as
human rights and gender rights are respected and enforced.
The USAID-funded Afghanistan Rule of Law Project assists in the development of a
democratic Afghan government, which has broad citizen participation and a vigorous
economic sector, by improving the country’s legal infrastructure. Working with the Ministry
of Justice and the Supreme Court, as well as with faculties of law and Sharia in five
provincial universities, the project works to improve the formal court system, strengthen
institutional capacity for lawmaking, and increase citizens’ awareness of their legal rights and
how the judicial system operates.
The project is divided into seven components:
• Court administration, which simplifies and standardizes court administration

procedures to improve access to court information;
• Judicial Training and Professional Development, which creates opportunities for
improving judicial professionalism, knowledge and skills;
• Commercial Dispute Resolution, which lays a foundation for the effective resolution
of commercial disputes;
• Legal Education, which strengthens the formal legal education system;
• Legislative Process Reform, which improves the legislative process and access to
legal information;
• Women’s Rights Under Islam, which increases knowledge of women’s rights under
Islam; and
• Access to Justice and Building Links to the Informal Justice Sector, which ensures
that the appropriate sector for resolving disputes is recognized.
Starting in 2007, the Supreme Court began sending its justices on inspection tours of
provincial courts to ensure that they are in compliance with judicial regulations. The
inspections are followed by 3-day conferences, where the visiting Supreme Court justice will
discuss the inspection results and recent or upcoming changes in court policy and operations.
Judges participating in these conferences, which are supported by the Afghanistan Rule of
Law Project, also receive training in the Regulation of Judicial Conduct and the recently
adopted Afghan Court Administration System for streamlining the courts’ case-management
processes.
Since 2005, DoJ has assigned up to four senior Assistant United States Attorneys as
Senior Legal Advisors and three senior experienced criminal investigators to Kabul to assist
in law reform and training and mentoring of the Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF) and the
Central Narcotics Tribunal (CNT), a special task force of Afghan judges, prosecutors, and
police investigators responsible for cases against mid- and high-level drug traffickers. DoJ’s
Senior Federal Prosecutor Program also provides criminal law advice to the Embassy and
Afghan leadership and U.S. law enforcement, upon request. The prosecutors have succeeded
in 1) drafting and enacting a comprehensive counternarcotics law that also provides for the
use of modern investigative techniques (e.g., electronic surveillance, and the use of
informants and undercover officers); 2) establishing a specialized narcotics court with
nationwide exclusive jurisdiction for cases against mid- and high-level traffickers; 3)
achieving the first-ever extraditions of major drug traffickers from Afghanistan to the United
States and 4) working with U.S. and international partners to establish, train, and mentor the
CJTF and CNT.
Department of Justice prosecutors have:
• Drafted (in consultation with Afghan legal advisors, DoJ's Criminal Division, and the
international community) and had signed into law a Comprehensive Counternarcotics
Law that builds upon former Afghan law to criminalize all narcotics and narcotics-
related offenses, sets controls on processing chemicals, authorizes the use of modern
investigative techniques, and confirms the use of the 1988 U.N. Convention against
Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances in extradition;
• Drafted and had signed into law the Presidential Decree establishing the Central
Narcotics Tribunal with exclusive nationwide authority for the trial of all mid- and
high-level narcotics trafficking cases;
• Refined and had signed into law the Military Courts Legislation and Military Courts
Penal and Procedural Law that established a separate court and its law and attendant
procedures for the Afghan National Army that meet international standards;
• Drafted counter-terrorism and extradition laws now under review by the Afghan
legislative unit at the Ministry of Justice;
• Prepared a legal analysis of Afghanistan’s former, interim, and proposed criminal
procedure codes, highlighting areas for reform;
• Deployed a DoJ expert team to Kabul to assess current capacities and make
recommendations for assisting the Afghan Attorney General and the CJTF with an
anti-corruption initiative. As a result, DoJ has now assigned one of the federal
prosecutors full-time to the Attorney General’s Office and will be establishing a sub-
unit within the CJTF dedicated to investigating and prosecuting narcotics-related
corruption cases upon country clearance approval from the Department of State for
additional DoJ attorneys;
• Provided and continues to provide prosecutorial advice to the Embassy leadership,
Afghan officials, and U.S. law enforcement (DEA and FBI) and prosecutors in the
development of criminal investigations for prosecution in Afghanistan, the United
States, or elsewhere;
• Prepared an in-depth training regime and conducted training for the CJTF and CNT
focused on the new Afghan Counternarcotics Law and proactive investigations. In
addition, the DoJ attorneys provide in-depth special topics seminars for the CJTF,
CNT, and provincial prosecutors on regular basis to improve understanding of
fundamental concepts and the implementation of investigative modern techniques;
• Advised on the design of Afghanistan's Counternarcotics Justice Center in Kabul that
is under construction and will soon house the CJTF and CNT; and
• Assisted in the development of an adjunct project by the U.S. Marshals Service that
has been deployed to train a protective corps drawn from the Afghan National Police
to provide court security at the CNT and protection to CNT judges and CJTF
prosecutors.
The Department of Defense has increased its activities in providing rule of law assistance
over the past year in two main areas: improving linkages between the justice and police
sectors, and expanding rule of law programming by the Judge Advocate General Corps in
eastern Afghanistan.
On police-justice integration, CSTC-A has played an important role in furthering joint
initiatives to support the justice sector, building the ANP and the Ministry of Interior (MoI).
In this capacity, CSTC-A has advised the MoI Legal Advisor’s Office on key legislation and
procedures that govern law enforcement, and is working closely with other U.S. agency
efforts and the international community on advancing overall justice sector development and
reform.
In addition, Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-101 is implementing rule of law
initiatives in its area of operations in Eastern Afghanistan. CJTF-101 has worked with the
U.S. Embassy and programs listed above on legal training, distribution of legal texts, and
infrastructure support to improve provincial and district level justice systems.
2.5. Corruption
Corruption is a significant problem in Afghanistan and erodes the legitimacy of the

GIRoA. Insufficient analytical work has been completed to give the exact scope and extent of
corruption in Afghanistan. Some analysis conducted by the members of the donor community
and the Afghan government, as well as anecdotal evidence, suggest that Afghanistan’s
sources of corruption are composed of both typical sources of corruption as well as corruption
that is unique to Afghanistan. The sources and forms of corruption includei:
• Low public sector salaries and unqualified public officials;

• Discretionary power of public administration;
• Weak legal, legislative and regulatory frameworks;
• Weak or non-existing mechanisms and systems for public scrutiny;
• Dysfunctional justice sector and insufficient law enforcement;
• The narco-economy;
• Fraudulent NGOs that are actually for-profit businesses;
• Limited oversight of the central government over the sub-national administration;
• An unprecedented amount of international assistance;
• Corruption in the management of natural resources;
• Political, social, and economic uncertainty; and
• Tribal and regional leaders outside the central government’s control.
Advancement to higher positions in some government agencies is often tied to bribes and
influence. This limits the advancement of those who can not afford to pay for it, and creates a
perception of unfairness and inequality by those who see corrupt officials advance while their
position remains unchanged for years at a time.
Anti-corruption efforts in Afghanistan have been the focus of much discussion at recent
meetings of the U.S. Embassy’s Special Committee for the Rule of Law (SCROL). Examples
abound of corrupt public officials who are immune from prosecution, judges and prosecutors
whose discretion is subject to influence, and police who not only refuse to take action to stem
corruption, but also engage in corrupt activities themselves. It should be noted that what is
perceived as corruption in need of correction by Western standards may simply be indicative
of the way Afghan society operates. The real issue is not whether corruption exists, but
whether the amount of corruption that does exist has reached the point where it undermines
the legitimacy of the Afghan government.
2.5.1. Anti-Corruption Efforts

The primary focus of anti-corruption efforts has been the removal of corrupt government
officials from public service. This process, however, has been significantly hampered by
Afghan law. The Afghan Civil Service System does not contain a mechanism for the
administrative removal of civil servants. There are only two ways that a civil servant can be
removed from office. The first method involves direct removal by the President of
Afghanistan. The second method is via a criminal conviction. The employee must be found
guilty of misconduct by an Afghan court, the authorized punishment for the offense must
include dismissal, and the court must determine that dismissal is, in fact, warranted. CSTC-A
is currently working with the MoI on redrafting the personnel regulation that governs MoI
employees, specifically, the ANP. These efforts are aimed at empowering lower-level
officials to make removal decisions while providing sufficient administrative due process to
the employee subject to termination. The creation of an administrative separation mechanism
will dramatically speed the process of removing corrupt government officials. Unfortunately,
implementing this new process is likely to take at least two years. Once adopted, these laws
will serve as a model for reforming the remainder of Afghanistan’s personnel laws. Anti-
corruption efforts for agencies that do not fall under the MoI are the responsibility of the Civil
Service Commission, the Ministry of Justice, and the Independent Directorate for Local
Governance (IDLG) at the provincial level.
Judicial corruption remains endemic in Afghanistan. Since his appointment to the
Supreme Court in August 2006, Chief Justice Abdul Salam Azimi has made cleaning up the
courts his top priority. Working with USAID, he has instituted an aggressive, two-pronged
approach to reduce the level of corruption in the courts and to raise the level of public trust
and confidence in the judiciary. The strategy includes instituting a new code of conduct for
judges and raising judges’ salaries so the judges are less inclined to accept bribery.
The two-pronged approach to fighting judicial corruption:
• New Regulation of Judicial Conduct: The first part of the Supreme Court strategy
focused on developing a modern code of judicial conduct that establishes ethical
standards for how all of Afghanistan’s judges are to conduct their affairs. On June
19, 2007, that code, entitled the Regulation of Judicial Conduct for the Judges of the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, was adopted. Each of Afghanistan’s 1,280 judges
will receive training on the Regulation’s meaning and importance by the end of
September 2008.
• Improving Judicial Salaries and Working Conditions: The second part of the strategy
focuses on securing funds from the international community to increase judges’
wages and improve their working conditions so that they are less inclined to accept
bribes. Donor money for judges’ salaries was incorporated as one of the court’s
highest funding priorities in July 2007 when the Supreme Court presented its
Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) to international donors at the

Rome Conference on the Rule of Law in Afghanistan, July 2-3, 2007.
Building GIRoA capacity to manage its own justice system is an integral part of a secure
and sustainable Afghan state. However, without high-level political will on the part of the
GIRoA to tackle corruption from the top down building justice sector capacities and strong
public demand for a functional justice system will have very little effect. To that end, the U.S.
strategy emphasizes using diplomatic, political, and law enforcement tools to strengthen
Afghan political will to institute true reforms and tackle corruption within their government.
We have seen several positive signs, including the recent passage of the Advocates Law
(establishing a national bar and legal defense service). The GIRoA recently became a
signatory to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), an important step
in the right direction.
2.6. Human Rights
Since the fall of the Taliban some important progress has been made in protecting human
rights in Afghanistan. Under the Taliban regime women were removed from all forms of
public life. Today while women’s active participation in Afghan society has gained a degree
of acceptance, women who are active in public life continue to face disproportionate levels of
threats and violence. Currently women work as teachers, health care providers, hold 91 seats
in the Afghan Parliament, and a woman serves as chairperson of the Afghan Independent
Human Rights Commission (AIHRC). As described in section three of this report, access to
education for girls and women has increased dramatically. Police and other security forces
receive training in how to respect the rights of individual citizens. In the country as a whole
there is increased space and scope for a functioning civil society. Media freedom, despite
recent setbacks, is still much more vibrant than it was under the Taliban.
Although progress has been made, Afghanistan's human rights record remains poor and
serious abuses continue. The GIRoA and its partners are fighting an insurgency that respects
no boundaries in perpetrating violence upon civilian populations. Human rights abuses
include extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrest and detention, poor prison conditions, official
impunity, prolonged pretrial detention, torture, and abuse of authority. Restrictions on
freedoms of movement and association continue as does violence and societal discrimination
against women, minorities, and religious converts; trafficking in persons; abuse of worker
rights; and child labor. Women and girls face severe discrimination. Violence against women
including domestic violence, sexual violence, forced marriages, kidnappings, trafficking, and
honor killings remains rampant. Although women's political participation has gained a degree
of acceptance, women who are active in public life continue to face disproportionate threats
and violence. The media faced increased restrictions in 2007, including heightened detention
of journalists and government interference in media coverage. Government repression and
armed groups prevent the media from operating freely. A draft media law sent back to
Parliament by Karzai in December 2007 could place greater restrictions on media content and
create a climate of government intimidation and media self-censorship.
The Ambassador and other senior U.S. officials consistently emphasize the importance of
human rights to their Afghan counterparts. During Secretary Rice's visit in January 2008 she
delivered both public and private messages underscoring governance and human rights
themes. The U.S. continues to support the AIHRC, as well as the Ministry of Women's
Affairs and the Ministry of Refugees. The U.S. integrates women’s issues into virtually all of
its programs, aiming to increase female political participation, education, economic
opportunities, and their role in civil society. U.S.-funded NGOs hold workshops to educate
women on their legal rights and the justice system, the new Constitution, and the National
Assembly and Provincial Council Elections. U.S. programs promote independent press and
electronic media by facilitating the development of a network of independent community-
based radio stations and investing in training and business plan development to ensure the
sustainability of independent media organizations.
2.7. Subnational Government
One of the central programs intended to improve governance at the provincial, district,
and municipal levels is the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG). President
Karzai issued a decree on August 30, 2007, establishing the IDLG as a focal point for
governance policy under his presidency and a new home for the MoI’s dysfunctional Civil
Administration Division. The IDLG oversees provincial governors, district governors,
provincial councils, and municipalities (except Kabul). The IDLG has established specific
assessment criteria for selecting and evaluating district and provincial governors. Those
criteria include loyalty to the president and the constitution, freedom from corruption, good
management and leadership skills, success in working with the international community and
good public outreach. This codification of core values required for the selection and
evaluation of provincial governors and sub-governors represents a step towards establishing
standards to which current and future governors will have to adhere. Using the established
criteria, the IDLG has removed and replaced many provincial governors in the past six
months. With few exceptions, these changes have resulted in more effective governors and,
by extension, improvements in overall governance. The long-term effect of these changes
cannot yet be precisely determined but the outlook is very positive. The impetus behind this
approach is in keeping with the IDLG’s mandate of providing good governance by
establishing and strengthening government institutions at the subnational levels to achieve
open, transparent, participative, accountable and effective governance structures that are
based on consensus and rule of law.
Recently, the IDLG targeted six governors for replacement or reassignment. The IDLG
recently played a pivotal role in the replacement of the governor of Ghazni province due to
consistently poor performance. Conversely, the IDLG capitalizes on the strengths of top-
performing governors by reassigning them to provinces that are in need of sound leadership
and management. A case in point was the recent relocation of the Laghman governor to
Helmand province.
The IDLG staff frequently travel to each of the 34 provinces to monitor the performance
of provincial governors and district governors. The IDLG uses this visibility and awareness to
appoint capable and respected members of the community to village and district shuras that
serve to link the village community to the government. To this end, the IDLG has effectively
spearheaded several district-level shuras, aimed at promoting the capacity of local
governance. The IDLG also participates in frequent working group meetings that bring
together various stakeholders—ministries, agencies, international organizations, and embassy

officials to discuss governance challenges and solutions. In collaboration with IDLG, USAID,
through the Local Governance and Community Development (LGCD) program is
strengthening the capacity of provincial and district level officials to govern effectively, more
transparently, and to provide better services to constituent communities.
Last year, no province in Afghanistan had a viable plan for development. The central
government, supported by the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA)
and United States Agency for International Development (USAID), organized an effort to
facilitate, mentor, and oversee the completion of Provincial Development Plans (PDPs). After
less than three months’ effort, through aggressive interaction with the Provincial
Development Committees and elected Provincial Councils, every province now possesses an
initial PDP. Much work remains to expand the PDPs into comprehensive, actionable
documents, but progress has been remarkable.
On the anti-corruption front, the IDLG recently signaled its intent to foster public sector
accountability when it filed suit with the Attorney General’s office against six non-
performing firms that were contracted under the Afghan Stabilization Program to construct
government facilities. Eight additional companies are expected to face prosecution in the
short term. With technical assistance and support from a growing consortium of donors,
including USAID, key IDLG leaders are implementing measures aimed at advancing the
mandate of the GIRoA as it relates to the promotion of good governance, rule of law and anti-
corruption initiatives.
As part of its mandate, the IDLG has established other short and long-term goals aimed at
achieving the following:
• Ensuring that Afghan women enjoy greater equity in education, political

participation and justice;
• Elimination of discrimination against women and promotion of their involvement in
leadership activities;
• Ensuring participation of the people at all levels of government;
• Promotion and advancement of security;
• Improving the performance of service delivery institutions at the provincial, district
and village levels; and
• Fighting public and private sector corruption to improve the effectiveness,
transparency and accountability of government, thus creating the conditions for
investment.
2.8. Key Measures of Political Stability
Progress in government effectiveness is one of the most difficult areas to measure. Most
indicators are subjective in nature primarily because they require a measurement of human
capacity, leadership and effectiveness. Although public perception surveys provide
quantifiable insight into government effectiveness as it relates to the population, other
quantifiable indicators can cause an inaccurate assessment of overall government
effectiveness as they fail to consider the inherent qualitative nature of leadership.
Any subjective measurement of governance should include the population acceptance of

government authority, government capability to provide for and/or protect the population,
effectiveness and use of the judicial system to resolve disputes, and the level and effect of
corruption. Though down from a high of 83 percent in 2005, 63 percent of Afghans polled
approved of President Karzai’s leadership in 2007. A point of concern is Afghans’ perception
of corruption as a major problem for the country. 25 percent of Afghans believed that
corruption was the biggest problem facing their country, down slightly from 27 percent in
2006, but a large increase over previous years.
Objective measures of the government’s institutional effectiveness vary across ministries
and organizations according to the outcome they are charged with accomplishing. For
example, the Ministry of Finance’s effectiveness could be measured by the population’s tax
compliance rate; the government’s tax revenue as a percentage of GDP; or the government’s
budget execution and disbursement rates. The Ministry of Refugees’ effectiveness could be
measured by the number of refugees successfully resettled. The Ministry of Education’s
effectiveness could be measured by the number of schools built, teachers hired, students
enrolled, or students graduated.
Unfortunately, Afghanistan is a data-poor environment and it is difficult to create a
comprehensive or systematic picture of the quality of institutional performance in the Afghan
Government. Most ministries do not track their own performance, make data widely
available, or keep accurate statistics. The lack of a solid baseline of data continues to hamper
reconstruction efforts. Better information, statistical analysis, and intelligence will help create
a clearer picture of Afghan governance in the future. We aim to make improvements in data
collection a key part of continuing capacity development programs.
Difficulties persist in implementing reform at both central and provincial levels.
Improving sub-national capabilities remains an essential component of continued progress.
Success in the fight against corruption is central to maintaining popular support for both the
existing political system and the GIRoA. Success in developing the government’s capacity is
essential to sustaining the progress that has been made to date.
SECTION 3: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

3.1. Overview
The long-term comprehensive plan for economic and social development in Afghanistan
is the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. This strategic document is the central
framework for Afghanistan’s development, aiming to promote growth, support the
development of democratic processes and institutions, and reduce poverty and vulnerability.
The ANDS lays out the strategic priorities and mechanisms for achieving the government’s
overall development vision and serves as the key document used by the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund in assessing the country’s poverty reduction strategy.
In addition, broad-based and sustainable economic growth is driven by private-sector,
market-oriented initiatives. Key economic “enablers” such as roads, power, education, health
care, rule of law, sound macroeconomic policy, and security are critical to creating conditions
that allow such initiatives to occur.
3.1.1. Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS)

The ANDS seeks to strengthen Afghanistan’s emerging private sector through improved
economic governance, but it also heavily emphasizes key economic enablers such as security,
governance, rule of law, and human rights. Within its sectoral strategies and cross-cutting
issues, the ANDS addresses several key economic sectors, including infrastructure, natural
resources, agricultural and rural development, and counter-narcotics. The Afghan government
submitted the ANDS to the World Bank on 15 April 2008, as required for setting the
conditions for debt relief under the IMF Poverty and Growth Facility.
Given the staggering challenges of developing Afghanistan from an extremely low level
of economic and social development, effectively implementing the ANDS will require
significant long-term donor financing and political support to ensure its benchmarks,
indicators, and overall objectives are realized.
3.1.2. Interagency and International Cooperation

Development of the ANDS is being coordinated by the ANDS Secretariat and supervised
by the ANDS Oversight Committee, comprised of seven cabinet ministers. The Joint
Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) is the high-level international body responsible
for overseeing the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact and the ANDS.
The final ANDS comprises strategies for 18 sectors, divided into 8 pillars: 1) security, 2)
governance, 3) infrastructure and natural resources, 4) education and culture, 5) health and
nutrition, 6) agriculture and rural development, 7) social protection, and 8) economic
governance and private sector development. It will also include strategies for 6 crosscutting
themes: 1) capacity development, 2) gender equity, 3) counter-narcotics, 4) regional
cooperation, 5) anti-corruption, and 6) environment.
The ANDS articulates both a policy framework and a road map for implementation,
translating strategic priorities into effective programs that deliver both immediate and lasting
results for the Afghan people. Through identifying a clear set of cost estimates and sequenced
priorities, the full ANDS, together with the Afghanistan Compact, is expected to provide a
coherent path to achieving Afghanistan’s Millennium Development Goals.
3.2. Reconstruction and Development
3.2.1. Communications
Afghanistan has experienced nearly 30 years of conflict and under-investment that has
impeded the development of a national telecommunications network. Only 15,000 people had
access to telecommunications services in 2001. Today, Afghanistan has approximately 4.5
million people that have access to telephones, and cell phone coverage is available in 150
towns and cities. Afghan Telecom has installed 86,000 fixed digital lines and 233,000
wireless lines using the most modern technology in all 34 provinces. It has also connected
provincial capitals and district centers via a satellite network that provides voice, internet, and
video conferencing services - the District Communication Network (DCN).
The Ministry of Communication and Information Technology (MOCIT) has issued 15
internet service provider licenses. These licensees are providing internet services in major
cities in Afghanistan. The MOCIT is also in the process of constructing a 3,200-kilometer
optical-fiber network connecting major provincial capitals with one another and also with
neighboring countries. So far, 600 kilometers have been installed and the project is expected
to be completed in mid-2009. The MOCIT has also extended basic communications services
to government units at the ministry and provincial capital levels, and has improved
international connectivity through a microwave link to Pakistan and an optical fiber link to
Iran. Almost 220 of the 398 districts across the country are connected via voice, data and fax
facilities.
3.2.2. Power
Commercial access to electricity is vital for economic development. In 2001, Afghanistan
produced 430 Megawatts of electricity; today the country produces 754 megawatts.
International statistics maintained by the World Bank indicate the ratio of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) growth to electrical production is approximately $1,000 to 300 kwh. The
GIRoA’s current Power Plan sets a goal to deliver sufficient electricity to meet the needs of
an economic growth rate of 9 percent per annum. Additionally, the GIRoA anticipates
approximately 90 percent of urban businesses will have access to electrical power by the end
of 2010. Finally, the plan’s objective is to provide access to electricity to 65 percent of urban
and 25 percent of rural households by the end of 2010.
To achieve these goals, initiatives are underway to improve both electrical power
production and transmission. These efforts include:
• Improvements underway on the North East Power System (NEPS), a GIRoA

initiative with multi-donor funding designed to bring power to the northern and
eastern regions of the country. NEPS will enable transmission of domestically
produced power as well as imported power from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and
Turkmenistan.
• Work to restore natural gas production at Sheberghan so that domestic resources can
be used to produce electricity in northern Afghanistan and Kabul, reducing reliance
on imported energy.
• Roll out of a rural renewable-energy project extending access to rural populations not
covered by the regional grid.
• Purchase and installment of diesel-powered generators, intended to provide Kabul
with 100MW of reliable power by March 2009.
• Improvements in the Southern Electrical Power System to increase generation
capacity, enhance transmission efficiency, and utilize Kajaki dam hydropower.
• Installation of transmission lines from Kajaki to Lashkar Gah and Kandahar.
• Improvements to the Western Transmission System by strengthening transmission
lines from Herat to Turkmenistan and Herat to Iran.
The Da Afghanistan Breshna Moassesa (DABM) Corporation is responsible for both the
operation and maintenance of national assets for the generation, transmission and distribution
of electricity, as well as the sale of electricity, metering, loss control, and revenue collection.
Presently, annual government subsidies estimated at $56 million are required to maintain
power production and transmission. The IMF is pressing the GIRoA to restructure the DABM
and reduce its level of subsidies. Reforms are proposed that include tariffs, installation of
tamper-proof meters, and reduction of technical losses (presently as high as 44 percent) to
boost cost recovery to 75 percent by 2010. However, it is anticipated that the proposed
730,000 new connections by 2010 will not be realized as a result of shortages in funding
outlined in the National Energy Sector Plan of the ANDS.
Electricity distribution, rehabilitation, and infrastructure projects in all major urban
centers are underway. Access of rural households to electricity has been increased by seven
percent and a Renewable Energy Master Plan has been approved. However, the lack of
electrical power significantly affects the pace of development in Afghanistan. There is some
potential for private funding of power-generation initiatives and business ventures. An
example is the Aynak Copper Mine, where the Chinese developers are expected to build a
power plant to provide energy for mining and processing needs.
Afghanistan is envisioned as the corridor for the Central Asian-South Asian (CASA)
Regional Energy Market, intended to bring electric power from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan
through Afghanistan into Pakistan. Under CASA-1000, the first phase of the project,
1000MW will reach Peshawar in Pakistan and 300MW will reach Kabul. The North East
Power System (NEPS) is used to import power to Kabul from three Central Asian neighbors.
Other energy projects include: efforts to rehabilitate hydropower plants at Kajaki, Naghlu,
and Darunta; the transmission line from Pul-e Khumri to Kabul to be built by India; the
transmission lines from Naghlu to Jalalabad/Methar Lam; and the transmission lines from
Kabul to Gardez (including a substation for Gardez) to be funded by the Asian Development
Bank. The required 33 percent increase per year in electrical connections to meet 2010 goals
will likely not be realized due to a $1.2 billion gap in funding the National Energy Sector
Plan.
The electrical power system in Afghanistan remains rudimentary at best. It severely
constrains the economic development of the country, primarily hindering the pace of
industrial and manufacturing growth. Power shortages are forecasted to be heavy in 2008
which will likely have a destabilizing effect. Massive, resource-intensive reconstruction
programs of the nation’s generation and transmission infrastructure are required. However,
such large power projects take time, especially where there is limited physical infrastructure.
An absence of a sufficient legal framework and protections for private investment in the
sector and a lack of bilateral power purchase or sharing agreements hinder connection of
power supplies to existing grids across borders. In the long term, Afghanistan’s dependence
on imported power may be reduced if the Afghan government actively pursues increases in
generation capacity, mainly through hydropower.
3.2.3. Agriculture
Afghanistan’s agricultural sector accounts for about 45 percent of the nation’s GDP and
employs more than 70 percent of the work force. Accordingly, growth in this sector is
particularly important. Unfortunately, most farmers producing licit crops have failed to
advance beyond subsistence farming. Afghanistan urgently needs to improve the productivity
of its agricultural sector, currently impeded by inadequate infrastructure, a lack of knowledge
of modern practices, water scarcity, and soil degradation.
Under semi-arid conditions, community-based watershed management and infrastructure
are critical starting points for improving agricultural productivity. Irrigated crop land is in
short supply due to an irrigation infrastructure that has been destroyed or degraded.
Afghanistan has few dams for harnessing rainwater and spring snowmelt for agricultural use
or preventing the damaging seasonal floods which destroy cropland. Additionally, due to the
lack of electrical power, transportation, and low-cost/low-technology storage facilities (both
cold and silo) at the village and district level, there is little capacity to store, process, or
market agricultural products. Lack of modern agricultural practices also contributes to
severely limited crop yields.
A current drive for new, integrated initiatives is underway to increase productivity in this
sector. USAID is supporting commercial agriculture though agricultural extension services
and U.S. land-grant university programs, partnerships with the private sector, and access to
capital for agribusiness using a loan-guarantee program. Promoting commercial agricultural
growth at each step in the value chain is key to increasing employment opportunities, raising
incomes of rural households and farmers, and contributing to the overall security of
Afghanistan.
Progress in agriculture requires reforms of land tenure and improved access to finance.
Currently, both land tenure and finance are dominated by poppy cultivation. Alternative
development programs have expanded, but are not yet effective enough. A current drive for
new integrated initiatives is underway to increase productivity in this sector. The first
Agribusiness Development Team (ADT) from the Missouri Army National Guard deployed
in Nangarhar in February 2008. The ADT provides a complete array of expertise in
agriculture, horticulture, pest management, hydrology, soil science, agricultural processing,
marketing, and veterinary science. The ADT also has an organic security force and is capable
of sustained independent operations. In June 2008, the Texas Army National Guard will
provide an ADT to Ghazni Province and the Nebraska Army National Guard will deploy an
ADT to Parwan Province in November 2008.
USAID’s Alternative Development and Agriculture (ADAG) programs are creating licit
alternatives to poppy production by promoting and accelerating rural economic development.
ADAG programs are partnering with a variety of entities including GIRoA institutions, civil
society organizations, the private sector, other donors, Provincial Reconstruction Teams
(PRTs), and the U.S. Military to coordinate actions. The goals are to increase commercial
agriculture opportunities, improve agricultural productivity, create rural employment,
improve family incomes and well being, and help to ensure the sustainability and
management of the natural resource base. Improved job opportunities and incomes provide
significant alternatives to opium poppy production. Counternarcotics activities are active
where poppy production is most prevalent. Moreover, a robust agriculture economy will play
a major role in helping to eliminate poppy production and move the country to both economic
and political stability.
To accelerate sustainable economic development in regions most affected by poppy
production, USAID provides access to materials, technology, and expertise necessary to
produce and market high-value licit crops such as fruits, vegetables, and tree crops. Various
programs dedicate significant resources to providing sources of credit, identifying and
supporting value chains, developing new markets, improving productive infrastructure, and
removing the administrative constraints that hinder business growth. The goal is to create a
vibrant and diversified commercial agriculture sector that provides employment opportunities
for rural Afghans. One example is the Mazar Foods Initiative, which will develop a
commercial agriculture farm and processing center to create employment, increase sales of
agricultural products, and demonstrate agricultural production and retail best practice
techniques on a large scale (approximately 6,250 hectares, close to13,000 acres). Other
programs facilitate trade opportunities by providing linkages between buyers and farmers.
Activities also seek to improve natural resource management by involving local

communities and agricultural universities in problem identification and resolution, and by
crafting and employing resource management policies in a manner that contributes to the
sustainability of licit livelihoods. USAID also provides Air Services facilitating the ability of
USG program managers and key implementing partner staff to move between field locations
for program monitoring and management purposes.
To increase commercial agriculture opportunities, improve agricultural productivity,
create rural employment, and improve family incomes and well being, USAID will build
upon the successes of 2007. These successes included: 1) over 1,500 metric tons (MT) of fruit
and vegetable exports shipped, valued at over $6 million in sales; 2) over 30,000 farmers
under contract with local food processing firms and/or wholesalers to produce and sell licit
agricultural products; 3) seven national and regional AgFairs hosted; 4) over 150 rural farm
stores or AgDepots established; 5) national and regional market information systems
launched; 6) over 3,200,000 forestry cuttings, saplings, and fruit trees planted; 7) 630 Animal
Health Care providers attended the first-ever Afghan Veterinary Association Convention held
in Kabul; 8) over 9,000,000 vaccines for livestock administered; 9) over 8,500 Afghans
trained in business skills and over 75,000 farmers trained in agricultural practices; 10) 58
Kabul University staff members involved in masters degree programs via land-grant
universities; and 11) cross-cutting activities that saw women and persons with disabilities
incorporated into these programs.
There has been significant progress. Cereals production has nearly doubled since 2001,
but this progress is dependent on favorable conditions during the growing season. Although
Afghans have the ability to produce nearly enough agricultural products to sustain
themselves, they lack the ability to store those products for extended periods. Instead, they
sell excess produce to Pakistan at the end of the harvest season. Merchants in Pakistan, who
have the ability to store these grains and other foods, will sell these products back to Afghans
during off-harvest season at an increased cost.
To address these problems USAID’s Local Governance and Community Development
(LGCD) program is providing small-scale community support for agriculture infrastructure
improvement and village-level training and commodity support in coordination with the
ACDI/VOCA program.
3.2.4. United States Department of Agriculture Efforts

The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) continues to provide substantial
contribution to the revitalization of Afghanistan’s agricultural sector. USDA activities are
described in the following sections.
3.2.4.1. USDA Agricultural Advisors on Provincial Reconstruction Teams

USDA deploys, supports, and provides guidance to agricultural advisors on PRTs. Since
2003, USDA has deployed 38 advisors from nine different USDA agencies to work in
Afghanistan. These advisors work with both U.S. military and civilian personnel, as well as
with their Afghan counterparts. Agricultural advisors develop and implement projects to
rehabilitate provincial-level agricultural systems and provide capacity-building assistance.
For fiscal year 2008, USDA expects to deploy a total of 13 PRT advisors.
3.2.4.2. USDA Technical Assistance

USDA’s technical assistance programs in Afghanistan include livestock health,
agricultural extension and the Afghan Conservation Corps. USDA administers several
exchange programs including the Cochran Fellowship Program (Cochran), Norman E.
Borlaug International Science and Technology Fellows Program (Borlaug) and the Faculty
Exchange Program (FEP), all of which provide participants training to develop their technical
skills on various agricultural topics and further the achievement of technical assistance goals.
To help build Afghanistan’s national capacity to detect and control animal diseases,
USDA, with USAID funding, provides technical guidance and training to the Afghanistan
Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL) and other partners, including
veterinary and animal health faculty at Kabul University. USDA also provides technical
experts, including a resident animal health advisor, to provide expertise and training to MAIL
in animal disease surveillance, data analysis, field response, lab diagnostics, and national
planning for disease control. Under an agreement with Fort Valley State University in
Georgia, USDA will produce a technical guide of animal diseases in Afghanistan that will
assist animal health officials and livestock producers in the detection and control of animal
diseases.
To enable Afghanistan to achieve its goals in the livestock sector, USDA provides
training for Afghan participants under the Cochran and Borlaug Programs. In 2008, USDA
will host two participants from Afghanistan under the Cochran Program for training in
livestock dairy production. In 2007, two Afghans participated in training on animal disease
detection and control methods. Meanwhile, in 2007, four Afghans participated in the Borlaug
Program and were trained in animal science and epidemiology.
USDA provides technical guidance to the Afghanistan Ministry of Higher Education on
the use of USDA monetized food aid proceeds to build university teaching capacity in
agricultural and veterinary sciences, including extension services. Similar assistance was
given to MAIL in programming monetized food aid proceeds to develop and deliver
extension services throughout Afghanistan. Efforts in agricultural extension led to the
development of a prototype district-level agricultural extension facility and staffing model.
Monetized food aid proceeds have also supported the construction of 17 provincial
agricultural centers for extension and cultural activities. With the University of California-
Davis, USDA is working to build MAIL’s capacity to produce agricultural extension
materials for use by agricultural producers. Forthcoming activities will focus on agricultural
extension services for horticultural products.
Training courses are provided to develop the technical skills for the participants to
achieve the objectives of the agricultural extension program. In 2008, the Cochran Program
will host eight participants from Afghanistan for agricultural extension-related training. Since
initiating Cochran Program training activities for Afghanistan in 2004, 12 women have
participated in a program on the role of women in small agricultural enterprise development.
In 2007, three Afghans participated in the Borlaug Program in agricultural extension,
economics, and rangeland management.
USDA, with USAID funding, has provided technical guidance to assist MAIL in
developing a pistachio forest management plan for rehabilitating degraded pistachio
woodlands. In 2006, target villages realized a 65 percent increase in income from pistachio
nuts, with 2007 also showing an increase above 2006. This project is being expanded to
include other villages. USDA technical specialists have provided training and consultation on
improving the management of tree nurseries and on improving seed collection and storage. In
2008, to support Afghanistan’s goals in forest management, USDA expects to host at least
three FEP participants. The FEP brings Afghan participants from institutions of higher
learning to the United States for training in a U.S. university. Since 2006, USDA has hosted
four FEP participants, all from Kabul University. In 2007, five Afghans participated in the
Borlaug Program in horticulture, agronomy and plant pathology.
3.2.4.3. Food Assistance

USDA has provided food assistance through Food for Progress (FFP) and the McGovern-
Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition (FFE) Programs. In March 2008,
USDA approved a government-to-government agreement with the Government of
Afghanistan that will provide $10 million in vegetable oil and also will support agricultural
development in Afghanistan.
In 2007, USDA signed an FFP agreement with the Government of Afghanistan to provide
more than 8,000 metric tons of soybean oil valued at $9.5 million. The sale of the soybean oil
in Afghanistan generated support for agricultural education, agricultural research and
extension, plant and animal disease diagnostics and control, food safety, and natural resource
management.
Since 2005, USDA implemented a total of six food assistance programs in Afghanistan,
including two FFP agreements with the government and four FFP programs with U.S. private
voluntary organizations.
3.2.5. Natural Resources

Afghanistan possesses hydrocarbon, mineral, and other natural resources estimated at
amounts that represent significant commercial value. These resources include an unknown
quantity of oil; an estimated 16 trillion cubic feet of natural gas; as much as two billion tons
of copper; significant quantities of precious gemstones; substantial deposits of gold; large
reserves of coal; and millions of tons of several other valuable minerals such as chromite, iron
and uranium. Although many of these resources are currently unexploited, several
(particularly gemstones and timber) are being illegally depleted at an alarming rate, robbing
the country and its people of hopes for economic growth.
Since 1978, Afghan provinces have experienced 30 to 70 percent deforestation from
uncontrolled logging following the disruption of traditional, sustainable, and locally managed
logging practices. If current trends continue, Afghanistan could be virtually deforested in 25
years, destroying potential tourism and forestry industries. In addition to the long-term
consequences, deforestation causes accelerating soil erosion, flooding, and mudslides which
hinder Afghanistan’s immediate development.
Illicit gemstone and timber production primarily take raw materials from Afghanistan,
effectively outsourcing to Pakistan most of the badly needed employment and income derived
from processing and final sales. Funds derived from illicit gemstone and timber sales have
become a source of revenue for insurgent operations, including the financing of IED cells and
funding for attacks against Afghan and international forces. Therefore, it is crucial to
integrate actions to counter the illegal trade in gemstones and timber along with other efforts
to counter illicit activities and prosecute the counterinsurgency.
Figure 3. Known Natural Resources in Afghanistan.
Developing Afghanistan’s natural resources will require significant working capital and
infrastructure investment. Unfortunately, the security situation and lack of established civil
law make the country an unattractive place to do business. Ill-defined and poorly enforced
licensing and concession procedures in some sectors, combined with a weak regulatory
environment, continue to dissuade potential investors. USAID is providing funding to the
Afghan National Environmental Protection Agency to strengthen the country’s ability to
enforce the regulatory framework. USAID also provides significant funding for reforestation
and biodiversity protection. Yet, there remains great need in this area. Donor institutions and
U.S. Government programs provide inadequate assistance in the natural resources sector.
Moreover, such programs are long-term in nature, with progress often measured in years.
Although significant potential exists for development of Afghanistan’s natural resources,
critical building blocks related to the investment climate—commercial laws and the legal and
regulatory environment—are only gradually beginning to take hold, thus the full economic
potential in these natural resource deposits will remain untapped in the near to medium-term.
Military solutions are not sufficient to address these large-scale problems, which will require
civilian expertise and a long-term perspective.
3.2.6. Transportation
The primary activity of the international community in regards to transportation has been
road improvement. Several in-depth studies have been completed, resulting in an overall
‘master’ plan for the road network of the country. Additional modes of transportation, such as
rail or air, have received limited attention and should be the subject of further in-depth studies
and research.
The primary goal of road construction is to increase transport of goods, national and
regional trade, and economic growth. The major ancillary benefit of the roads is freedom of
movement for Afghan and international forces due to their anti-IED effect. The Afghan
saying is, “Where the road ends, the Taliban begins.” The Road Development Master Plan
provides the primary strategy to build a network of roads in the country. The basic design
calls for roads to connect district centers to provincial centers, and then provincial centers to a
central Ring Road connecting the major cities around the country. Thus, the population will
be physically linked from the local to the national level, and from their district centers all the
way to the capital in Kabul. The Road Development Master Plan will be a permanent legacy
of a strong Afghan government providing jobs, linking the nation, and expanding commerce
that no alternate organization can provide. Currently, Afghanistan’s road network includes
35,566 kilometers of roads (8,231 kilometers of which have been completed by the United
States. and its allies since the inception of Operation Enduring Freedom). An additional 2,200
kilometers of roads are planned for completion over the course of 2008. Road construction
projects have injected $71 million into the local economy since January 2007. One kilometer
of road construction generates and average of 3,500 labor days.
The Ring Road will be approximately 2,200 kilometers long upon completion in
December 2009. An estimated 73 percent (1,755 kilometers) of the planned length has been
constructed to date. Over 60 percent of Afghans live within 50 kilometers of the Ring Road,
making it critical to trade and transport. Afghans composed 75 percent of the workforce for
the largest section of road, the Kabul-Kandahar-Herat Highway USAID, through the Louis
Berger Group, will begin the reconstruction of the Khowst to Gardez Road. This road will
connect two major provinces and increase economic stability in the region.
Afghanistan’s Ministry of Public Works intends to initiate a fiscally sustainable road
maintenance system to effectively maintain 7,000 kilometers of roads. Roads, like any other
structure or facility, require continuous maintenance. If these gravel or paved roads are
maintained by Afghans, this activity will demonstrate the Afghan government’s ability to
provide the sustained basic necessities for continued economic growth. It will also sustain the
large monetary investment that the United States has made on behalf of the Afghan
government. At the current rate of funding, U.S. agencies will increase the current number of
improved roads by approximately 20 percent. Between 2002 and the end of 2008, a total of
more than 21,000 kilometers of roads will have been completed by the United States and its
allies.
3.3. Economic and Social Indicators of Progress
A key indicator of progress made in security, governance, and development in the context
of a counterinsurgency campaign are the actions and perceptions of the general population.
Popular perceptions are measured both quantitatively and qualitatively. Several organizations
have sponsored public opinion surveys in Afghanistan since 2005. Combined Forces
Command-Afghanistan commissioned a quarterly nationwide survey, the Afghanistan
National Development Poll (ANDP), until August 2006. A follow-up ANDP was initiated by
the CSTC-A in July 2007. ISAF is currently working to resume nationwide polling on a
recurring basis. On a regional level, CJTF-82 has conducted monthly surveys of RC East
since April 2007. Additionally, a number of U.S. and international organizations have
commissioned nationwide perception surveys, including the Asia Foundation, the British
Broadcasting Corporation, the U.S. State Department, and Charney Research.
According to polls conducted in 2007, perceptions among Afghans of their country’s
economy are improving. In 2004, when asked what they thought was the biggest problem
facing Afghanistan, 51 percent of individuals polled chose the economy. When asked the
same question in 2007 only 32 percent answered that they believed the economy to be the
biggest problem facing the country. Perceptions of the Taliban and security have also shown
slight improvements. However, the same polls indicated that public perception of corruption
as a major problem is increasing.
Organizations such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the United Nations
Children’s Fund, and the Afghanistan Central Statistics Office research and publish annual
indicators of economic growth and development. These fairly standardized indicators of
social and economic development include GDP, GDP per capita, life expectancy, infant
mortality, unemployment, the poverty rate, and rates of access to power, water, health, and
education. The difficulty in gathering data in Afghanistan is evident in the diverging results;
however, almost all development indicators show that progress is occurring.
Many development indicators are dependent on data from a relatively accurate census of
the population, including size, geographic disparity, ethnicity, age and sex. Afghanistan has
not conducted a full census since 1979; this was a sampling census that results in statistical
estimates of the population size and demographics. Extrapolations of those census results
have been conducted by many organizations since 1979, with each publishing their own
estimates of the population size. The divergence of these estimates has been significant: the
Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) World Fact Book states that Afghanistan has a
population of 31,889,923; in 2007, the UN estimated the population at 27,145,000; while the
Afghanistan Central Statistics Office—the lead GIRoA agency for population data—
published a population estimate of 22,575,900, highlighting the difficulty that assistance and
aid providers face in estimating and reporting development indicators in Afghanistan.
3.3.1. Unemployment
Although most analysts estimate that unemployment is high in Afghanistan, accurate
statistical data is virtually non-existent. The CIA World Fact Book indicates that as of 2005,
the official unemployment rate in Afghanistan was 40 percent. The Afghan Central Statistical
Office also maintains an official unemployment rate of 40 percent for 2007. However, other
estimates of the unemployment rate are as high as 60 percent, and unemployment could be
even higher in some rural provinces and districts.
Defining unemployment is difficult in Afghanistan as many Afghans are employed on a
temporary basis in the informal economy or on seasonal basis during the agricultural harvest.
Regardless of the actual unemployment rate, the increase in international support activity
since 2001, combined with the exponential growth of Afghan-owned businesses, has created
more jobs. This growth has been consistent, even though the number of unemployed is still
high. Though an accurate prediction of unemployment numbers may not be possible until the
completion of the next Afghan census unemployment indicators remain a cause for concern.
3.3.2. Poverty Levels

Poverty remains a significant problem for Afghanistan. According to broad estimates of
Afghanistan’s national income and population, per capita income is about $300. This makes
Afghanistan one of the poorest nations in the world, despite recent economic growth.
Given the overall low level of national income, it is difficult to establish poverty
measures in Afghanistan. However, the latest surveys of the National Risk and Vulnerability
Assessment (NRVA) conducted in spring 2007 showed that approximately 50 percent of the
Afghan population lives below the poverty line. An additional 20 percent of the population is
concentrated close to the poverty line and is at risk of falling into poverty. The impact of
rising diesel fuel prices and the doubling of wheat prices may be driving some of these
families below the poverty line. Poverty may be even higher among rural and nomadic
populations.
The latest poverty analyses identify the existence of a large number of working poor in
Afghanistan. Low salaries place many who are employed at risk of falling below the poverty
line, including government employees. The analysis also showed that poverty was unevenly
spread throughout Afghanistan: the poverty rates of provinces vary from around 10 percent in
some provinces to more than 70 percent in others. Poverty is more severe in the northeast,
central highland, and parts of the southeast. Despite a significant increase in public spending
in key sectors to support poverty reduction, scarce domestic resources and limited
international assistance resulted in only limited assistance to the poorest of the poor.
The Afghan government and its international partners are committed to address the
problem of widespread poverty. Poverty research was a vital part of the overall development
of the ANDS. To improve poverty data, the Central Statistics Office and the Ministry of Rural
Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) launched two National Risk and Vulnerability
Assessments in 2003 and 2005. Approximately 45,000 households from across the country
were interviewed. This research led to the preparation of a comprehensive poverty analysis in
2007 which has been used as a basis for drafting the ANDS Poverty Profile and formulating
the ANDS poverty reduction policies. The ANDS will also serve as Afghanistan’s Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP); the PRSP will guide the efforts of the government,
international donors, and the major international financial institutions (the IMF and World
Bank) in their efforts to reduce poverty in Afghanistan.
3.3.4. Health
Since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the health sector has seen significant progress in
development, with reductions in morbidity (disease), and mortality (death). In 2001, 8 percent
of the Afghan population had access to basic health care; today, 79 percent have access to
basic health services. In 2001, Afghanistan was ranked the world's worst in infant mortality;
in 2007 Afghanistan’s infant mortality rates are falling due to the efforts of the Ministry of
Public Health (MoPH) and its international partners. Since 2006, Afghanistan has reduced
child mortality (five years and under) by 25 percent, saving 89,000 children in 2007. In 2006,
23,000 Afghans died from tuberculosis. In 2007, due to improved access to basic health care,
only 12,000 Afghans died from this disease. Immunization coverage has reached 83 percent
of children under one year of age and additional progress has been made in updating routine
immunizations for older children, adolescents, and adults. Finally, recent data showed that 70
percent of health facilities have at least one female provider on staff, compared to 45 percent
during the Taliban era.
The MoPH developed the Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS), a program which
includes maternal and newborn health, child health and immunization, public nutrition,
communicable diseases, mental health, disability, and supply of essential drugs. The program
has recently increased its coverage of the population from 77 to 82 percent.
There has been a marked increase in health infrastructure; the number of health facilities
providing the BPHS has increased to 897 (from 746), the number of health facilities
providing comprehensive emergency obstetric care has also increased to 89 (from 79), and the
number of health facilities within the government’s program of Integrated Management of
Childhood Illnesses reached the stands at 309 facilities located in eight provinces and 39
districts. Thirteen therapeutic feeding units have been established, and two additional
midwifery schools were opened. Twelve mobile health facilities were established to provide
basic health services to the nomadic Kuchi population. The number of health facilities
providing direct observed treatment short courses (in the treatment of tuberculosis) increased
to 55 percent (from 45 percent). Approximately 40,000 insecticide bed nets were distributed
to control the spread of malaria. Provincial teams in eight provinces were established to track
the prevalence of avian flu. In total, 670 health facilities have been renovated or constructed.
The GIRoA has clearly articulated its health sector objectives in the ANDS. The ANDS
states the following strategic goal for health: "...to reduce the morbidity and mortality of the
Afghan population by implementing a package of health and hospital services, special
programs and human resource development” (see figure below).
Figure 4. ANDS Health Sector Strategic Area and Programs.
The GIRoA ministry responsible for Afghan health programs is the Ministry of Public
Health (MoPH) which published a series of progressive health sector strategies beginning in
2005. It also created two documents that lay out operating procedures for health facilities:
first, the BPHS is the key document that describes the services provided for primary out-
patient health care and outlines staffing, equipment, and medications required to operate a
facility; second, the Essential Package of Hospital Services (EPHS) is the key document that
describes in-patient facilities and identifies a standardized package of hospital services,
provides a guide for private and public sector hospitalization, and promotes a referral system
that integrates the BPHS with hospitals.
Key improvements are focusing less on the number of new health facilities and more on
improving the standardization of care, coordination among all levels of care, refining referral
services, increasing the available range of services, increasing hours of clinic operations, and
fielding appropriate numbers and types of staff. In general, the focus is on increasing
intellectual and human capacity as opposed to building facilities and developing
infrastructure.
Additional improvements include an increased deployment of the Basic Package of
Health Services through a nationwide network of linked primary care facilities. This has
resulted in increased access to care, raising the numbers of people within a two-hour walk of
a medical facility to 66 percent in 2007. Continued improvements are focused towards the
long-term goal of achieving standardized, sustainable, and independent health services.
3.3.5. Education
Only 28.1 percent of adult Afghans are literate, according to the CIA World Factbook.
Many of the literate people are only able to read and write at the second or third grade level.
Most of the literate population is only able to read and write at the second or third-grade level.
The majority of teachers in Afghanistan have education equivalent to the ninth- to twelfth-
grade levels in the United States. They are able to teach basic reading and writing, plus
reading (reciting) of Arabic text in the Quran. The Ministry of Education’s (MoE) National
Education Strategy Plan in concert with the ANDS is making strides in the educational
system. These strides will guarantee access to education to all Afghans.
Currently, there are more than five million children that are enrolled in schools today,
nearly 38 percent female, compared to five years ago when a little more than one million
students were enrolled with almost no females. The number of teachers has grown more than
seven-fold, but only 22 percent meet the minimum MoE qualification of Grade 14. Only 28
percent of teachers are female, located primarily in urban areas. The emphasis on improving
the curriculum over the last five years has been concentrated on the first six years of
schooling. However, a secondary school curriculum is currently being developed. Although
more than 3,500 schools have been established, only 40 percent of students have actual
buildings in which to meet. Thousands of communities have no easy access to schools,
causing parents to send their children to madrassas in Pakistan where Islamic fundamentalism
is a focus. There are security concerns for Afghan schools: nearly six percent of schools have
been burnt or closed down due to terrorism in the last 18 months. Finally, approximately
30,000 to 40,000 students graduate from high school every year, but only one third are
admitted to universities due to a lack of university capacity.
In accordance with the ANDS, the Afghan government intends to guarantee access to
primary education for all children by the year 2020 and provide for most to attend secondary
school. Access to higher education will be readily available and the government will ensure
that university graduates have a realistic hope of obtaining jobs. To achieve these goals, the
United States and the international community must continue to support the ongoing
development of the comprehensive national educational system. This effort requires
constructing or rehabilitating schools, upgrading primary-school teacher skills through
national teacher training programs, increasing the MoE’s capacity to provide in-service and
pre-service support for teachers, and coordinating the printing of five to ten million books per
year in 2008 through 2010. In the area of higher education, all 16 university faculty training
and education programs must be prioritized. The Ministry of Education must coordinate and
resource the printing of five to 10 million books per year in 2008 through 2010.
The literacy and productive skills of Afghans, especially woment, must be enhanced to
meet the needs for skilled workers in a growing economy. The educational system must
expand to provide more choices and more competition, such as private schools and American-
style education opportunities for university students. This comprehensive plan for a national
education system in turn will directly contribute to the long-term sustainable growth of the
Afghan economy and hence an improved way of life for the Afghan people.
3.4. Economic Development Outlook
The GIRoA continues to make slow but measurable progress in the area of economic
development. Afghanistan has met most of the targets on monetary and fiscal policy under its
International Monetary Fund (IMF) economic program, but it has fallen short on benchmarks
related to structural reforms. The national budget process has improved significantly, as noted
by the IMF in its latest assessment, and the government adheres to a strict fiscal policy of no
borrowing and no overdrafts with the banking system. Incremental improvements have been
made in raising government revenue from customs duties and other sources, and budget
deficit targets were met in the current fiscal year (March 21, 2007 though March 20, 2008).
The GIRoA’s challenges include increasing revenue, controlling the afghani exchange
value, and increasing ministry capacity to plan and implement development programs.
Afghanistan continues to have one of the world's lowest domestic revenue to GDP ratios, at
about 8 percent. The afghani appreciated in real terms against the U.S. dollar in 2004-06,
owing in part to large aid inflows and drug-related financial flows. In the first seven months
of this fiscal year, however, the afghani remained steady despite rising inflation. The concern
is that an overly strong afghani could inhibit the growth of a domestic industrial base (and the
employment it would bring) by encouraging imports and discouraging exports.
Figure 5. Afghanistan Gross Domestic Product (Licit), 2002-2006 (Source: World Bank).
Afghanistan's overall economic performance under the IMF Poverty Reduction and
Growth Facility program has been strong. Since the beginning of the program, fiscal revenue
has increased steadily and the monetary policy framework has been enhanced. The drought-
induced decline in agricultural production held the real economic growth to an estimated
seven percent in 2006 and 2007. Real GDP growth is expected to exceed 13 percent in the
2007-2008 fiscal year, which ended on March 20, 2008. GDP per capita has increased by
around 53 percent in the last five years and grew from around US$200 to around US$306.
Inflation declined to five percent in 2007 but rose to double digits in 2008, owing mainly
to sharp increases in the prices of imported fuel and foodstuffs. Some of this inflation is tied
to instability in Pakistan as well as Pakistan’s increased dependency on imports in 2007 and
early 2008. Pakistan is usually a large exporter of basics (food and fuel) to Afghanistan, but
Pakistan’s difficulties in meeting internal demands due to drought significantly affected the
Afghan economy. The underlying trends, however, signal that domestic inflationary pressures
are being contained. Confidence in the domestic currency, which has remained broadly stable
against the U.S. dollar, has been instrumental due largely to a sound monetary policy.
According to the IMF, the Afghan economy has grown by an average of 11.4 percent per
year in real terms since 2002, albeit from a small base. This strong growth can be attributed
largely to reconstruction efforts fuelled by development assistance, as well as to a recovering
agriculture sector. In 2006-2007, real economic growth was at an estimated 7.5 percent,
weaker than recent averages. The slowdown was the result of a return to drought conditions,
which caused agricultural production to drop considerably that year. There has been better
weather to date through 2007-2008, and agriculture is expected to rebound. Due to increased
agricultural output, the IMF projects that economic growth in Afghanistan will rise to 13
percent in 2007-2008, but it expects GDP to begin to normalize and fall to around 9 percent in
2008-2009
A major challenge for the GIRoA is progress toward fiscal sustainability. While the
GIRoA has increased it revenue collection, it cannot keep pace with increased expenditures,
largely driven by the security sector. Increasing the number of ANSF and sufficient pay is
clearly important for security, but it has fiscal implications for the GIRoA which will
eventually have to pick up those substantial costs. It is estimated that the GIRoA will roughly
cover less than 20 percent of its total recurrent expenditures, including the core and external
budgets, in 2008-2009. Furthermore, the GIRoA has now begun to experience difficulty
meeting its annual revenue target due in part to political interference and lack of capacity.
3.5. Provincial Reconstruction Teams
3.5.1. Strategy and Objectives

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) consist of a combination of military and civilian
personnel whose mission is to aid in the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan.
PRTs are under military command. Military personnel provide a security envelope in which
civilian experts can work on governance and development projects. U.S. PRTs operate under
general guidance provided by ISAF. The stated mission of the PRTs is as follows:
“Provincial Reconstruction Teams will assist the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to

extend its authority, in order to facilitate the development of a stable and secure
environment in the identified area of operations, and enable security sector reform and
reconstruction efforts.”
While the specific activities of each PRT are determined by the needs in its respective
area of operation, PRTs achieve their objectives by following four key lines of operation:
• increase effectiveness of legitimate authorities;

• decrease effectiveness of illegitimate authorities;

• increase legitimacy of legitimate authorities; and
• decrease legitimacy of illegitimate authorities.
The U.S.-led PRTs in RC-East play an integral role in the ground commanders’ counter-
insurgency approach. They coach, train, and mentor sub-national government officials in
order to implement good governance practices that are transparent, guarantee human rights,
are free of abuse and corruption, and provide due regard to the rule of law.
Additionally, through the DoD-funded Commander’s Emergency Response Program
(CERP) and USAID funding, U.S.-led PRTs fund construction projects that assist the local
government in meeting the basic needs of the populace and provide the basic infrastructure to
support economic growth and development. Although CERP funds are dispersed at the
discretion of the U.S. military commanding officer, the program achieves the best results
when planned and carried out in coordination other agencies (i.e., USAID) working in the
same sectors and in many cases the same districts or villages. This is particularly true for
USAID’s Local Governance and Community Development program, which provides
technical assistance and training to provincial and district officials combined with
community-level small infrastructure activities, as well as USAID’s Alternative Development
programs that support the agriculture sector in many of the RC East provinces.
Conducting these disparate activities independently of one another would achieve only
minor effects; however, by integrating the right combination of governance and development
activities with complementing security capabilities, PRTs have the potential to make
significant contributions to the reconstruction and development progress in non-permissive
environments. The PRTs are in essence synthesizing agents that apply the right combination
of governance capacity building and development assistance in concert with the commanders’
security component in order to achieve the greater overall desired outcomes. PRT command
teams meet with provincial governors, district officials, and ministry officials in their areas of
responsibility several times during each week. The PRTs work closely with Provincial
Councils, Provincial Development Committees and the local representatives of other
organizations and aid agencies. In their role as coaches, mentors and trainers, the PRTs work
closely with all these provincial-level officials and agencies to assist them in providing for the
populace.
3.5.2. Composition and Laydown

The table below indicates U.S.-led PRT staffing levels. Current shortages in U.S. civilian
agency personnel (primarily USAID advisors and USDA representatives) are currently being
addressed by Embassy Kabul and the relevant agencies in Washington.
PRT Military Civilian

DoS USAID USDA
Auth O/H Auth O/H Auth O/H Auth O/H
Asadabad 89 89 1 1 1 1 1 0
Bagram 63 63 0 0 2 1 0 0
Farah 99 99 1 1 1 1 1 0
Gardez 88 88 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ghazni 88 88 1 1 1 1 1 1
Jalalabad 88 88 1 1 1 1 1 0
PRT Military Civilian

DoS USAID USDA
Auth O/H Auth O/H Auth O/H Auth O/H
Khowst 88 88 1 1 1 1 1 0
Mehtar 88 88 1 1 1 1 1 1
Lam
Nuristan 88 88 1 1 1 1 1 0
Panjshir 55 55 1 1 1 1 1 1
Qalat 99 99 1 1 1 1 1 0
Sharana 88 88 1 1 1 1 1 0
Total 1021 1021 11 11 13 12 11 4
The U.S.-led PRTs are positioned in the following locations:
City Province ISAF Regional Command

Bagram Parwan and Kapisa East
Panjshir Panjshir East
Kalagush Nuristan East
Asadabad Konar East
Mehtar Lam Laghman East
Jalalabad Nangarhar East
Khowst Khowst East
Gardez Paktia East
Sharana Paktika East
Ghazni Ghazni East
Qalat Zabul South
Farah Farah West
3.5.3. Coordination and Chain of Command

Each U.S.-led PRT in RC East is under military command, subordinate to a U.S. brigade
task force. The PRTs receive instructions and guidance from their brigade headquarters. They
coordinate their actions through the brigade headquarters and laterally with the battalions and
civil affairs teams occupying the same area. PRT actions are synchronized by their commands
with U.S. and ISAF campaign objectives.
The U.S.-led PRTs have an integrated command group structure combining the military
and civilian elements (e.g., USAID, DoS, and USDA) to ensure effective execution of
security, development and governance programs and policies. Coordination among the PRTs
is conducted laterally as well, through USAID and USDA representatives in their respective
organizations. CJTF-82 provides liaison officers to ISAF, USAID, UNAMA and CSTC-A to
coordinate efforts. USAID and DoS provide advisors at the CJTF-82 HQ, each brigade task
force headquarters and each U.S.-led PRT. USAID and DoS also provide advisors to many of
the PRTs led by other international partners active in Afghanistan. CJTF-82 hosts quarterly
development conferences with USAID and UNAMA which include representatives from the
brigades and PRTs. CJTF-82 also sponsors quarterly interagency conferences that include
wide representation from CSTC-A, the U.S. Embassy and USAID. These conferences address
the salient issues that pertain to all U.S. Government agencies executing governance and
development support in Afghanistan and are supported by day-to-day coordination between
CJTF-82 development related staff and USAID technical officers on development and
governance issues. CJTF-82 also sponsors quarterly stakeholder conferences that include
UNAMA, most UN agencies, and multiple non-governmental organizations operating in
Afghanistan. These conferences are conducted for the same reasons as the interagency
conferences mentioned above.
Recurring meetings and conferences at ISAF serve as the unifying agent across Afghan
and international forces as with the CJTF-82 interagency and stakeholder’s conferences.
These meetings and conferences help to establish and maintain good working relationships
among the respective functional staff sections of the various agencies. It is through these
meetings and conferences, as well as the day-to-day coordination and cooperation between
the agencies, that U.S. and international organizations drive toward unity of effort
3.5.4. Provincial Reconstruction Team Funding

The U.S.-led PRT efforts are funded through CERP under the Department of Defense,
complemented by USAID-funded development programs. CERP funds are not used to cover
PRT operating costs. The CERP funds available in FY2007 were $206 million. The amount
earmarked for FY2008 is $208 million. The following table indicates the amount distributed
to each of the PRTs for FY2007.
PRT FY07 OBLIGATED

Bagram $6,736,139.14
Farah $4,300,167.81
Gardez $4,746,008.00
Ghazni $10,568,059.00
Khowst $17,968,464.43
Kunar $10,559,073.23
Laghman $3,435,263.00
Nangarhar $12,839,907.00
Nuristan $20,546,045.73
Panjshir $5,450,159.22
Qalat $927,174.02
Sharana $23,816,477.07
PRT TOTAL $121,892,937.65
Although the CERP funding is shared with the maneuver units, the PRTs execute a
majority of the CERP-funded projects. Each month, the PRTs receive a monthly CERP
allocation which provides them funding for quick-impact projects, calculated on a per capita
basis. Additionally, this monthly amount is not a spending limit. PRTs nominate projects
identified as being needed within their areas of responsibility that are above and beyond their
monthly allocation. A CERP Review Board meets weekly to evaluate the project nominations
and funds projects that are deemed technically and legally sufficient and meet the
commander’s intent as stated in the current development guidance and operations order. The
following table indicates the amount distributed monthly to each of the PRTs.
Across the command, CJTF-82, USAID, and DoS work to partner with GIRoA officials
at all levels. The primary objective is to help connect the Afghan populace to the government,
help build trust and confidence in government institutions and to solidify popular support for
the government. The CJTF-82 Commanding General and Deputy Commanding Generals
meet regularly with ministers and deputy ministers to ensure that CJTF-82 objectives are in
line with GIRoA ministerial strategies. CJTF-82 staff officers meet with and correspond
regularly with ministerial officials to work common solutions to issues.
PRT Monthly Allocation

Bagram $158,900.00
Panjshir $22,200.00
Nuristan $5,400.00
Asadabad $21,600.00
Mehtar Lam $32,100.00
Jalalabad $107,300.00
Khowst $41,400.00
Gardez $26,500.00
Sharana $20,900.00
Ghazni $88,900.00
Qalat $43,900.00
Farah $72,900.00
3.6. Reconstruction and Development Oversight
Through capacity building programs with Afghan ministries and provincial governments,
the United States is working to eliminate inefficiencies and corruption in the delivery of
assistance to the Afghan people. U.S. foreign assistance programs work with ministries –
focusing on the most important service providers, like the ministries of health, education,
finance, and agriculture – to put more responsibility for service delivery at the local levels and
ensure funds reach the provinces. This will also allow ministry representatives working at the
provincial levels to do planning, decision-making, delivery, and monitoring activities,
ensuring assistance reaches the Afghan people. Advisors will mentor and support capacity
building for Afghan government employees in areas such as financial management,
budgeting, procurement, human resources management, strategic planning, project planning,
and project implementation, and information and communications systems.
In addition, the U.S. Government has made progress over the past seven years
streamlining our disbursement of funds to program implementers. The U.S. Government has
disbursed 69 percent of the $26.3 billion in U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan from Fiscal Year
2001 to Fiscal Year 2008 (this is not including the Fiscal Year 2008 Supplemental), which is
higher than the Ministry of Finance’s reported international average of 62 percent, and almost
20 percent higher than where the U.S. Government was two years ago. Efforts to put more
control of funding decisions into the hands of Provincial Reconstruction Teams have
improved the PRTs’ ability to quickly follow security gains with development efforts that
address locally-identified priorities.
The Office of the Inspector General in Afghanistan has spent $2.7 million on oversight
activities. As of December 2007, they had completed 18 performance and 23 financial audits.
Not a single one of these audits revealed significant findings of waste, fraud, or abuse.
SECTION 4: COUNTERNARCOTICS (CN)

The cultivation, production and trafficking of narcotics in Afghanistan is a major
concern. Narcotics-related activities are fueling the insurgency in Afghanistan and, if left
unchecked, threaten the long-term stability of the country and the surrounding region. Over
90 percent of the world’s opium originates in Afghanistan, and the emerging nexus between
narcotics traffickers and the insurgency is clear. Due to the threat to economic development,
security, and governance posed by the trafficking of drugs in Afghanistan, the Office of the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics (OSD CN), the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), the U.S. Marshals Service, the Department of Justice
(DoJ), and the Department of State (DoS) are committed to strengthening the
counternarcotics (CN) capabilities of the GIRoA and bordering nations.
4.1. Strategy, Resources, and Priorities
The U.S. Government has developed both short and long-term objectives to meet CN
goals in Afghanistan and the region. These objectives are framed within the Five Pillar
strategic plan for Afghanistan. The five pillars include: 1) Public Information, 2) Interdiction
and Law Enforcement, 3) Eradication, 4) Rule of Law and Justice Reform 5) Alternative
Development. In the short-term (one to three years), the primary focus will be on the
interdiction pillar. To this end, DoD will continue to focus on capacity building programs;
sustaining CN police forces; training the ABP to identify, track and interdict outgoing
narcotics and incoming precursor chemicals; increasing the capacity of the CNPA to detect,
gather evidence, develop cases and incarcerate drug traffickers; integrate CN capacity
building in the provinces within the CSTC-A FDD Plan; and better utilize the National Guard
State Partnership Program for regional CN support activities.
The long-term (three to five years) strategy is to continue providing support to
interdiction-capacity building. This support will primarily be targeted towards Afghan law
enforcement, but legitimate law enforcement organizations of neighboring countries will also
be beneficiaries. U.S. efforts aim to contain narcotics trafficking within Afghanistan, break
the tie between insurgents and the drug trade, continue to engage Central Asian countries in
order to gain access, ensure regional efforts remain Afghan centric, and eventually transfer
CN program support to partner nations. To achieve these goals, the United States will
continue to fund programs that enhance the logistical and technical abilities of partner
countries to conduct CN interdiction operations. Descriptions of other agencies
responsibilities can be found in section 4.2 below.
In August 2007, the U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan was revised by the
interagency community to improve implementation of CN activities in Afghanistan. Strategy
elements were based on input from an interagency group of experts representing the DoS,
DoD, Department of Justice, USDA, Department of the Treasury, Drug Enforcement
Administration, the Office of National Drug Control Policy, and USAID. The improved
strategy evaluated the previous CN strategy for Afghanistan, examined pertinent issues,
obstacles and lessons learned, and presented a way forward on the five pillars of the strategy.
The way forward involves three main elements: (1) dramatically increasing development
assistance to provide incentives for licit development while simultaneously amplifying the
scope and intensity of both interdiction and eradication operations; (2) coordinating CN and
counterinsurgency planning and operations in a manner not previously accomplished, with a
particular emphasis on integrating CN into the counterinsurgency mission; and (3)
encouraging consistent, sustained political will for the CN effort among the Afghan
government, our allies, and international civilian and military organizations. To ensure the
goals of this strategy are met, several weekly and bi-weekly interagency counternarcotics
coordination meetings are held. All principal policy makers take part in the Afghan
Interagency Operations Group (AIOG), the Afghan Working Group (AWG), the Afghan
Steering Group (ASG), and the Deputies and Principals Committee meetings.
4.2. Roles and Missions
At the national level, the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) are the policing
agency responsible for countering illicit narcotics traffickers in Afghanistan. The CNPA
mission is to enforce the narcotics laws and regulations, the policy of the President of the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and orders from the Ministry of the Interior. In order to
foster stability and security, the CNPA targets narcotics trafficking suspects and those who
protect them. Provincial governors are responsible for discouraging poppy cultivation and
conducting Governor-led eradication (GLE), if necessary. Should governors need assistance
in conducting eradication, they can ask for national assistance. In provinces where governors
are either unwilling or unable to conduct GLE, the central government’s Poppy Eradication
Force (PEF) may be deployed, even if the governor does not request support. Those provinces
that demonstrate notable progress in counternarcotics by greatly reducing poppy cultivation
or eliminating it altogether, may qualify for high-impact development assistance through the
Good Performers Initiative.
The international forces present in the country provide operational support to the GIRoA.
ISAF does not have a direct mission in CN; however, ISAF assistance to CN activities is a
key supporting task. The DoS works within the five pillar plan to coordinate public
information campaigns and poppy eradication. DoS and DoJ work in conjunction to enhance
the Afghan judicial system, train prosecutors, and build the infrastructure necessary to indict,
arrest, try, convict, and incarcerate drug traffickers. The DEA, DoJ, DoS and DoD have been
successful in building the interdiction capacity of the CNPA. With the assistance of DoD, the
DEA recently opened a new training facility for the CNPA. The DEA is also in the process of
developing a three-to-five-year expansion plan for DEA operations in Afghanistan. USAID
provides devolvement opportunities for the Afghan people, and is building roads, installing
irrigation, constructing cold storage facilities, and introducing improved farming techniques
to the Afghan people with the goal of providing viable alternatives to opium cultivation.
4.3. Efforts to Improve Coordination
4.3.1. Interagency
As mentioned previously, the U.S. Coordinator for Counternarcotics and Justice Reform
in Afghanistan worked with an interagency group of experts to revise the U.S.
Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan with the goal of improving the implementation of
CN activities in Afghanistan. Experts from DoD, DoS, Department of Justice, USDA,
Department of the Treasury, Drug Enforcement Administration, the Office of National Drug
Control Policy, and USAID worked together to create the revised strategy, which was
publicly released in August 2007.
4.3.2. International
The opium problem in Afghanistan can not be viewed as Afghanistan’s problem alone.
For this reason, the USG will continue to build the interdiction capacity of neighboring
countries in the South and Central Asia region. Regionally, DoD will continue to provide
non-intrusive detection equipment, training and infrastructure support for better border
security to the Government of Pakistan; improve border facilities and provide new
communications equipment in Tajikistan; provide scanning equipment and construct border
crossings in Turkmenistan; and improve command and control and provide mobile
interdiction training in Kyrgyzstan. In addition, DoD will continue to provide the Pakistan
Frontier Corps (FC) with funds to improve its ability to identify and interdict narcotics
traffickers; in FY08 alone DoD will provide more than $50 million to continue to build the
capacity of the FC. Building regional counternarcotics capacity ensures that the Afghan
opium problem will not simply migrate to another country in the region and continue to
threaten U.S. goals of peace and security in this important corner of the world.
4.3.3. Use of Intelligence

The U.S. Government coordinates the development of CN programs and the sharing of
CN intelligence and information with partner nations and lead federal law enforcement
agencies. Sharing intelligence, while building the capacity of the GIRoA and neighboring
countries to collect CN intelligence, will allow the United States to shift the burden of
counternarcotics activities in Afghanistan to the Government of Afghanistan more quickly.
The Joint Narcotics Analysis Center (UK-led, based in London) enables analysts from
different U.S. and U.K. intelligence and law enforcement agencies to conduct strategic
analysis to provide CN policy makers with an accurate assessment of the Afghan opium
problem. The Interagency Operations Coordination Center (IOCC) (U.S.-U.K. joint
leadership, based in Kabul) provides law enforcement targeting support and operational
coordination for U.S., U.K., GIRoA and other CN law enforcement operations. These
operations target the illicit Afghan narcotics industry, and the IOCC works to support,
strengthen and expand the rule of law and good governance in Afghanistan. The DoD-funded
CNPA Intelligence Fusion Center (CNPA – IFC), located in the CNPA headquarters, liaises
closely with the CNPA Intelligence and Analysis Department. On a daily basis, the CNPA-
IFC handles information requests from the CNPA and IOCC and provides targeting
coordination based on information gathered from intelligence sources and seized documents.
By coordinating efforts between the CNPA and the international partners, and by facilitating
the flow of information, the CNPA-IFC acts as a critical enabler for the intelligence and
analysis department while playing a vital role in creating synergy between the GIRoA and
partner law enforcement agencies.
The Criminal Investigations Management System is a database system for recording data
and performing link analysis on criminal activity in support of the CNPA. In addition to a
database function, the system provides capabilities for collecting biometric data on criminals.
The project involves developing the database system and deploying equipment to Afghanistan
in conjunction with system management training. This development enables the CNPA to
archive information and share it with international law enforcement agencies. The mission of
the Centers for Drug Information is to help disrupt illegal drug trafficking through operational
and tactical law enforcement information sharing. Sharing of drug-related information
between and among the participating nations and agencies enhances the effectiveness and
efficiency of CN law enforcement. These systems will ultimately provide the CNPA with the
capability to develop a comprehensive information sharing process; and will facilitate sharing
of timely and secure investigations information. DoD is also working to improve its human
intelligence capability. In FY 2008, DoD will provide more than $57 million towards CN
intelligence programs in Afghanistan, and has requested funding to continue these programs.
4.4. Efforts to Improve Afghan Capacity
CN operations are severely constrained by the capacity of the Afghan law enforcement
and judicial systems. In Afghanistan the judicial system is negatively affected by varying
degrees of corruption and a lack of transparency. As a result, DoD, DoS, DoJ, DEA and the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) are working to build the infrastructure necessary
for the GIRoA to conduct legitimate law enforcement operations against narcotics traffickers.
Over the next several years, the U.S. and its international allies will assist the CNPA in
building the capacity to arrest high value drug traffickers, intercept narcotics during transit,
and destroy clandestine laboratories. Current joint DoD programs with DEA have resulted in
the construction of the National Interdiction Unit (NIU) training compound, the installation of
equipment for the Sensitive Investigative Unit and the Technical Investigations Unit, and
provided advanced training for the CNPA, with DoS funding all the operations and
maintenance costs for these facilities. Additional funding for these programs was supplied by
DoD and DEA to conduct background checks on applicants and train those who were found
to be suitable for duty in these elite units. With DoS, DoD provided funding for the Afghan
Joint Aviation Facility and the CN Justice Center, while providing helicopter flight training to
MoI personnel for the creation of an organic airlift capability for Afghan CN organizations.
DoD is developing an Unmanned Aerial System program to provide dedicated intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance support to interagency CN forces. This program will provide
situational awareness and force protection for CN forces when they are conducting
operations, specifically DEA Foreign Advisory Support Teams (FASTs) and the NIU. The
FASTs provide guidance, mentoring, and bilateral assistance to the GIRoA and CNPA in
identifying and disrupting clandestine drug operations. The DEA FAST teams have
consistently requested and received helicopter support from DoS, including mission support,
insertion, extraction, medevac, search and rescue, and reconnaissance. Although U.S. military
personnel do not directly participate in law enforcement operations, USCENTCOM forces do
provide medical evacuation, in-extremis support, pilot training, helicopter lift support for
administrative purposes, and intelligence for law enforcement CN missions.
In FY 2008, DoD is providing more than $95 million to foster CNPA development. Some
major DoD funded initiatives are Afghan helicopter crew member training ($4 million), Mi-
17 helicopter operations and maintenance ($13.2 million), aviation facilities ($4.3 million),
NIU sustainment training ($5.6 million), DEA mentoring and training program ($9 million),
expansion of the CNPA headquarters compound ($20 million) and construction of two
regional law enforcement centers ($9.7 million). DoD has long-term plans to further support
the capacity building of GIRoA CN forces. Some of the potential programs could include
acquisition of additional MI-17 helicopters, Afghan helicopter crew member training,
additional regional operations and training centers, NIU sustainment training, and mentoring
for all levels of the counternarcotics police.
DoD also plays an integral role in building the operational capacity of the Afghan Border
Police (ABP) and Afghan Customs Department (ACD). The ABP and ACD require extensive
support if they are to be effective in controlling Afghanistan’s 5,000 plus kilometer border.
Border crossings with Pakistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and China
present a challenge to these Afghan departments. To meet this challenge, DoD funded a DoS
program, the Border Management Initiative (BMI). The purpose of BMI is to improve
security and promote stability in the border regions, and to increase interdiction capacity. In
FY08, DoD will provide more than $14 million to build the capacity of the ABP and ACD. At
the request of DoS, DoD funded the development of the U.S. Embassy Border Management
Task Force (BMTF). The BMTF provides oversight and management of U.S. border
initiatives and assists the GIRoA with border issues. The United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime looks to the BMTF as the focal point for border management issues on behalf of the
international community. Under the BMTF, U.S. mentors are provided to the ABP and ACD
for border crossing points at Islam Qalah and Towrkham. DoD funded construction of several
border crossing points in Afghanistan and the region including Sher Khan Bander,
Towragundhi, and Islam Qalah. A communications system was also purchased for the ABP to
support key command and control functions. Non-intrusive detection capability (x-ray and
gamma scanners) has been provided to support inspections at major border crossing points
and airports.
The Counternarcotics Infantry Kandak (CNIK), security element for the CN forces, is the
Ministry of Defense’s contribution to GIRoA CN efforts. The unit is intended to provide
cordon security in direct support of Poppy Eradication Force deployments. The CNIK will
enable the CN forces to focus on their core competencies and reduce the security burden on
international forces. OSD (CN) is coordinating with CSTC-A and the Afghan MoD to
develop the requirements to field a fully air-mobile unit with appropriate combat enablers to
deter security threats posed to CN forces by the insurgents and the drug traffickers. The
creation of the unit is part of the USG CN strategy for Afghanistan.
4.5. Assessment
4.5.1. Progress to Date

Although there has been some limited progress in the fight against narcotics, Afghanistan
remains the leading producer of opium in the world. While many provinces have seen success
in reducing poppy cultivation (12 of 34 provinces had more than a 50 percent decrease from
2006 to 2007 and the number of provinces that did not cultivate poppy rose from 6 in 2006 to
13 in 2007), four provinces experienced a significant increase in cultivation. Helmand in the
south, Farah and Nimroz in the west, and Nangarhar in the east each saw an increase of more
than 4,000 hectares from 2006 to 2007. Helmand alone now accounts for 53 percent of the
total poppy growth in Afghanistan. One of the foremost problems is the lack of a
comprehensive CN strategy among Afghanistan and its regional and international neighbors,
especially Pakistan. With growing evidence of a link between the insurgency and the
narcotics trade, it is becoming increasingly apparent that security in Afghanistan is directly
tied to counternarcotics efforts.
Another major issue that requires resolution is the lack of coordination between the MoD
and MoI. The current framework leads to a compartmentalization of responsibility between
these ministries. The CNIK is an example of improvement. The MoD initially opposed the
augmentation of the CNPA with ANA forces, mainly due to the potential risks posed by
association with counternarcotics operations. In early 2008, the MoD changed its position,
and the CNIK went into development. However, the issues that still need to be worked out are
officer training for the CNIK, a memorandum of understanding with MoI on equipment loans
and shared logistics during operations, and joint coordination and mission planning between
the ministries.
4.5.2. Impact of Counternarcotics on the Counterinsurgency Mission

U.S. forces provide support to CN law enforcement operations within the scope of
current rules of engagement, applicable law and regulation, and within the limits of their
means and capabilities. Use of limited forces in Afghanistan is a zero-sum endeavor. A shift
in force application from one mission set to another comes with a cost of a reduction of
available forces for the former mission set. A shift of limited assets may result in a
degradation of the counter-terrorism mission. Intelligence sharing, limited logistical support,
and in-extremis rescue and medical evacuation are currently being provided by U.S. and
international forces towards the CN mission. Additional resources, targeted to the CN mission
would be needed to expand direct DoD support to counternarcotics operations. Similarly
changes in rules of engagement and national law would also be required.
The CN mission affects the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism missions in another
way. It is likely that counternarcotics operations have in some areas enabled insurgents to
make common cause with farmers against the Afghan Government and ISAF. Insurgents can
set up a protection racket, exchanging protection against eradication forces for support,
supplies, and equipment from locals.
4.5.3. Potential Improvements

The impact of building GIRoA CN operational capacity complements the DoD’s primary
mission of CT and counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. There is a clear nexus between
narcotics and the insurgency in Afghanistan that threatens U.S. gains in Afghanistan and the
region. The narcotics trade has strong links with the anti-government insurgency, most
commonly associated with the Taliban. Narcotics traffickers provide revenue and arms to the
Taliban, while the Taliban provides protection to growers and traffickers and keeps the
government from interfering with their activities. By enabling the GIRoA to confront drug
trafficking organizations we positively impact the effort to defeat the insurgency. The U.S.
military is committed to continued work with other U.S. agencies, within the legal constraints
imposed by Congress on military assistance to law enforcement operations, to support U.S.
efforts in Afghanistan and Central and South Asia to defeat the Afghan opium problem.
SECTION 5: REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT

Regional cooperation is essential for the Afghan government. Following the first
Regional Economic Cooperation Conference in December 2005, limited regional cooperation
sections have been established within the administrative structures of some Afghan ministries.
Additionally, in 2006, a Directorate for Regional Cooperation was established at the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs. Unfortunately, despite an ongoing successful Asian Development Bank
Technical Assistance program towards mainstreaming regional cooperation, human capacity

of this Directorate continues to need serious attention. The establishment of a cross-cutting
consultative group and a working group for regional cooperation, within the framework of the
ANDS, has helped create platforms of dialogue and interaction between different stakeholders
on regional cooperation. However, there is very little discussion or lively debate on regional
cooperation in the Afghan media and hence little public awareness of the subject. For the
most part, progress has been limited in achieving visible and practical results on the ground in
regional economic cooperation.
5.1. Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Areas

and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
The greatest challenge to long-term security within Afghanistan is the insurgent

sanctuary within the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. The ANSF
must be able to coordinate actions with a Pakistani force that is trained and resourced to
eliminate threats emanating from within Pakistan. The Pakistan Military (PAKMIL)’s clashes
with Taliban members and terrorist organizations in Pakistan’s northwestern tribal areas have,
in the past, contributed to a decrease in cross-border insurgent activity in Afghanistan’s
eastern provinces. The U.S. is concerned about ceasefire negotiations and other agreements
between the Government of Pakistan (GoP) and possible militant groups in South Waziristan
and other locations in the FATA and North West Frontier Province. After similar agreements
were signed in 2005 and 2006, cross-border operations by extremist groups against U.S. and
NATO forces increased substantially. The United States recognizes that there is no purely
military solution to militancy, but we have made it clear to the GoP that any agreement
should be enforceable and backed up by the credible threat of force.3
The potential repatriation of Afghan refugees is a major regional issue. Although there
have been no refugees in the FATA itself since 2005, there are many in the greater border
region. Of current concern are three camps, Jalozai, Girdi Jungle, and Jungle Pir Alizai,
which the GoP has placed on the closure list every year since 2006 but not closed. The
estimated combined population of these camps ranges from 130,000 to 145,000. Last year,
Pakistan identified four refugee camps −including the three above− for closure. However,
only the fourth camp, Kacha Gari, was closed. A worst-case scenario based on the GoP
unexpectedly and precipitously closing and clearing multiple camps and expelling Afghans
could result in up to 400,000 refugees trying to return to Afghanistan. Pakistan has committed
to voluntary, not forced, repatriation and has stated that it will allow refugees from closed
camps to relocate to other camps. This option could be attractive for many families who have
lived in Pakistan for decades. Some refugees in Pakistan have returned voluntarily to
Afghanistan because of sectarian violence, pressure from GoP authorities, and, for some
former Kacha Gari residents, the cost of living in Pakistan outside of a camp environment.
Mass repatriations, something that neither the United Nation High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) in Pakistan or the Government of Pakistan believes will materialize,
3
For further detail on the Afghan-Pakistani border see Enhancing Security and Stability in the Region Along the
Border of Afghanistan and Pakistan, submitted April 24, 2008 in response to section 1232(a) of the 2008
NDAA.
would severely tax the existing Afghan infrastructure, particularly in urban areas. Therefore,
the Afghan government will attempt to negotiate with Pakistan to delay additional camp
closures. Afghans who registered as refugees with the Pakistan authorities received a Proof of
Registration card that allows them to stay in Pakistan until the end of 2009. A large number
of the refugees have no intention of returning for a variety of social and economic reasons.
UNHCR Pakistan is working with the GoP to identify mutually acceptable alternatives for
extended temporary solutions for some Afghans.
The Tripartite Commission (TPC) is comprised of senior military and diplomatic
representatives from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and NATO-ISAF and was established as a forum
in which to discuss issues related to the border. The Commission has not met as regularly as
originally intended and the last three meetings have been cancelled. However, recent efforts
have aimed to reinvigorate the activities of the TPC. In addition to the Tripartite Commission,
there is an ongoing series of meetings of representatives of the ANA, PAKMIL, and ISAF
that convene on a quarterly basis. One of these initiatives is the Border Security
Subcommittee Meeting (BSSM), a subordinate entity to the TPC, which serves as a forum for
border issues to be discussed between U.S., ANSF, and PAKMIL leadership. The location for
the BSSMs alternates between the Afghanistan and Pakistan sides of the border in order to
foster trust and cooperation between the two countries. At the tactical commander level,
Border Flag Meetings between ISAF, ANSF and PAKMIL brigade and battalion commanders
ensure that the agreements made at the BSSMs are reinforced with the ground commanders.
Pakistan, the United States, and NATO have embarked on a multi-year Security
Development Plan for Pakistan’s western border region. One element of the SDP concerns the
effort to develop Border Coordination Centers (BCC) along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.
Designed to be manned by liaison officers from ISAF, ANSF, and PAKMIL, these BCCs will
be optimized with intelligence feeds – including a network of Forward-Looking Infra-Red
Radar (FLIR) nodes with the objective of presenting the liaison officers with a common view
of the border area. The BCCs will also be supported with sophisticated communications that
will link the liaison officers with their respective force providers – ANSF, the PAKMIL and
paramilitary Frontier Corps (PAKMIL/FC) and RC-East – with the objective of speeding the
delivery of target intelligence so force providers can execute interdiction missions against
Taliban, Al-Qaeda, other extremists, and narco-smugglers. The first BCC was opened on
March 29, 2008 at Torkham Gate on the Afghan side of the border. Five additional BCCs are
planned for 2008-2010, with the next center expected to be completed before the end of 2008.
In terms of communications capabilities, the United States continues to provide high-
frequency radios to PAKMIL and FC to increase communication interoperability between
U.S. forces and PAKMIL. Additionally, the United States began to field the Combined
Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS) to PAKMIL, providing a
secure, rapid, computer-based interface between American and Pakistan forces. Designed as
an information system for interactions with all partners active in Afghanistan, CENTRIXS
will further increase the international and Afghan forces’ communications capability with
Pakistan.
The ongoing relations between the U.S., NATO ISAF, Pakistan, and Afghanistan have
been fostered principally along military channels. If the border areas between the two
countries are ever to be fully secured, the strong U.S.-Pakistan partnership should be utilized
to ensure that the Afghan-Pakistan military partnership extends to the political arena –
specifically including the development programs that are active on both sides of the border.
Afghanistan and Pakistan took initial steps to establish this political extension when they
agreed, with U.S. backing, to establish a tribal jirga comprised of tribal elders and
government officials from both sides of the border in September 2006. The first meeting of
the jirga was held in August 2007. A subset of the jirga has met since then, and we expect the
next meeting to be set soon.
5.2. Iran
Iran is a significant donor for reconstruction, infrastructure, and development assistance

to Afghanistan. Iran is responsible for much of the development in Herat Province,
particularly the electric power and transportation infrastructure. Iranian influence is expected
to continue to increase at a steady rate over the rest of 2008 and the beginning of 2009. Iran
will continue to try to achieve multiple objectives by providing overt monetary and
reconstruction aid to the GIRoA, while at the same time providing training, weapons and
other support to the insurgency to undermine ISAF influence.
Iran is also a major trading partner with Afghanistan due to the countries’ extensive
mutual border. This prominence gives Iran large amounts of political and economic influence.
Numerous Iranian companies continue to expand their presence in Afghanistan, employing
large numbers of Afghans.
There is evidence that the insurgency in Afghanistan has been provided with lethal aid
originating in Iran since at least 2006. It is unclear what role, and at what level, the Iranian
government plays in providing this assistance. At present, the lethal support that has been
provided to the insurgency in Afghanistan has not proven militarily significant. Analysis of
interdicted weaponry, ordnance, and explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) in Afghanistan
indicate that the Taliban has access to Iranian weaponry produced as recently as 2006 and
2007. We monitor and take seriously any such assistance to the insurgency.
Iran will continue to protect its stated national interests and there remains potential for
disagreement between Afghanistan and Iran. An example of a potential source of conflict is
water-sharing rights, which could be affected by current Afghan dam projects. Forced
expulsions of Afghan refugees and undocumented economic migrants within its borders
challenge the Afghan government’s ability to ensure the well-being of its citizens. Further
deportations of Afghan refugees living in camps in Iran would severely strain the existing
Afghan infrastructure and could create a humanitarian crisis similar to that of 2007, when Iran
deported hundreds of thousands of Afghans over the course of a few months. The Afghan
government will attempt to negotiate with the Iranian government to cease deportations and
find a way to facilitate legal employment for the many Afghan workers who contribute to
Iran’s economy, particularly in the construction and agricultural sectors.
Chapter 4
UNITED STATES PLAN FOR SUSTAINING THE

AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES
June 2008
Report to Congress in accordance with the
2008 National Defense Authorization Act
(Section 1231, Public Law 110-181)
ABSTRACT
This report to Congress is submitted consistent with Section 1231 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181). It includes the
United States plan for sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF). In
accordance with subsection (a), it includes a description of the long-term plan for
sustaining the ANSF, with the objective of ensuring that the ANSF will be able to
conduct operations independently and effectively and maintain long-term security and
stability in Afghanistan. The report includes a comprehensive strategy and budget, with
defined objectives; mechanisms for tracking funding, equipment, training, and services
provided to the ANSF; and any actions necessary to assist the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan to achieve a number of specified goals and the results of such actions. This
report is the first of the annual reports required through 2010 on the long-term plan for
Afghanistan. Consistent with this Act, this report has been prepared in coordination with
the Secretary of State. This assessment complements other reports and information about
Afghanistan provided to the Congress; however, it is not intended as a single source of all
information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its
international partners, or Afghanistan.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Developing the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which includes both the
Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), is one of the United
States’ top priorities in Afghanistan. The purpose of the ANSF development program is to
grow the capacity and capability of the ANSF in line with internationally agreed benchmarks
solidified in the 2006 Afghanistan Compact. The desired end state is a professional, capable,
respected, multi-ethnic ANSF, with competent ministries and staffs and sustaining
institutions, capable of directing, planning, commanding, controlling, training and supporting
the ANSF.
Afghan National Army (ANA)

The capabilities of the Afghan National Army (ANA) are improving steadily. The ANA
has taken the lead in more than 30 significant operations and has demonstrated increasing
competence, effectiveness and professionalism. On February 5, 2008 the Joint Coordination
and Monitoring Board (JCMB) approved a proposal to expand the authorized end-strength of
the ANA from 70,000 to 80,000 personnel. The current program calls for a light infantry
force of 15 brigades, including artillery, armor, commando, combat support, combat service
support, an air corps, and the requisite intermediate commands and sustaining institutions.
The long-term ANA posture may also include a more robust ANA Air Corps capability and a
larger force.
Afghan National Police (ANP)
The Afghan National Police (ANP) force is making steady progress, but its capabilities
still lag behind those of the ANA. The current ANP force has not been sufficiently reformed
or developed to a level at which it can adequately perform its security and policing mission.
However, the Afghan and U.S. governments, and our international partners, recognize the
shortcomings and are working to improve ANP capabilities. The target for the ANP is to
build a reformed force of 82,000 personnel that is capable of operating countrywide. The
Afghan Ministry of the Interior is instituting rank and salary reforms to ensure that qualified
officers remain on the force and achieve the rank and salary that they deserve. The new
Focused District Development (FDD) plan, which began being implemented in late 2007,
shows promise. The FDD withdraws the locally-based Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) from
selected districts, replacing them temporarily with highly trained and effective Afghan
National Civil Order Police (ANCOP). The AUP then receive two months of immersion
training and equipping in a concentrated program of instruction. The goal of the FDD
program is for the AUP to return to their home districts with increased professional capability
and confidence to enforce the laws of their country.
The Way-Ahead
An independent, capable Afghan National Army (ANA) and Police (ANP) are critical to
our counter-insurgency (COIN) efforts, and to establishing the security environment that will
allow Afghanistan to become an economically prosperous, moderate democracy. It is crucial
that the United States and our international partners dedicate the necessary resources and
personnel to ensure that the mission to develop the ANSF is a success.
United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces 181
SECTION 1: UNITED STATES PLANS TO ASSIST THE ISLAMIC

REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN IN BUILDING THE AFGHANISTAN
NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES
1.1. Long-Term Strategy for Afghanistan
National Security Forces Development
Building Afghanistan’s capacity to provide for its own security is a major priority of the
U.S. effort in the country. Besides ongoing and concurrent efforts to defeat the Taliban-led
insurgency and provide reconstruction and development to Afghanistan’s people, the United
States and its international partners, and the Government of the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan (GIRoA) are focused on fielding and sustaining the Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF). The ANSF are comprised of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan
National Police (ANP). These forces represent critical pillars for establishing security and
stability in Afghanistan. The long-term goal is to build and develop ANSF that are nationally
respected; professional; ethnically balanced; democratically accountable; organized, trained,
and equipped to meet the security needs of the country; and increasingly funded from GIRoA
revenue.
The plan for ANSF development is consistent with the Afghanistan National
Development Strategy (ANDS). The ANDS lays out the strategic priorities and mechanisms
for achieving the government’s overall development vision. The plan for developing the
ANSF is also consistent with the Afghanistan Compact, an agreement which defined a
political partnership between the GIRoA and the international community. According to the
compact, the international community commits to providing the budgetary, materiel, and
training support necessary to develop national military forces, police services, and associated
ministerial structures and the GIRoA commits to providing the human resources and political
will. Although the United States (U.S.) is the primary provider of ANSF training and
development, other international members are contributing to the effort. Sections 1 through 4
address U.S. efforts to build and sustain the ANSF, and Sections 5 and 6 describe
international efforts to do so.
Despite achievements in Afghanistan, security threats and corruption remain major
impediments to overall development. The security environment continues to be fluid,
demanding continual reexamination and assessment of requirements. The 2001 Bonn
Agreement established the goal of a 50,000-person ANA and a 62,000-person ANP. The
Bonn II Agreement in December of 2002 expanded the ANA target end-strength to 70,000
personnel. Since the Bonn Agreements and the international declaration of the Afghanistan
Compact in 2006, security conditions have evolved, with a resurgence of activity by
insurgents and anti-government elements. Consequently, in May 2007, the international
community’s Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) approved an increase to
82,000 authorized ANP. Similarly, with the endorsement of the JCMB on February 5, 2008,
the authorized ANA force structure increased to 80,000 personnel, with an additional 6,000
allotted for the trainee, transient, hospital, and student account.
The long-term ANSF posture potentially may include a more robust Afghan National
Army Air Corps (ANAAC) capability and a larger army. Additional analysis, study, and
consideration must be given to the security environment, sustainability of the force, and
available financial support for such efforts.
1.2. United States Plan for ANSF Development
Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) is the lead U.S. agency

responsible for ANSF development. With policy guidance from Washington and the U.S.
Ambassador, CSTC-A directs all U.S. efforts to organize, train, and equip Afghan security
forces, and seeks to integrate the efforts of lead nations and other members of the
international community into a comprehensive police plan. With GIRoA and international
partners, CSTC-A plans, programs, and implements the development of enduring national
military forces and police services with associated ministerial and sustaining institutions. This
development covers the full spectrum of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership,
education, personnel, and facilities.
The CSTC-A Campaign Plan, which has been developed in close coordination with the
GIRoA, follows three lines of operation: (1) build and develop ministerial institutional
capability; (2) generate the fielded forces; and (3) develop the fielded forces. Specific
objectives include:
• Ministries capable of effective inter-ministerial cooperation and formulating,

promulgating, and implementing policies, plans and guidance throughout all levels of
the ANA and ANP;
• Reduced corruption in the ministries and throughout the ANA and ANP;
• Increased credibility of the ministries, ANA, and ANP as effective and professional
organizations;
• ANA and ANP manned, trained, and equipped to conduct the full spectrum of
internal security and law enforcement missions as dictated by the local security
situation, independent of significant external assistance;
• Common ideology and procedures across all elements of the ANA and ANP;
• Well-developed personnel management systems for the ANA and ANP;
• An enduring training base that can provide basic training, professional training and
education, and literacy education at all levels;
• Efficient and mature acquisition, maintenance, and logistics systems capable of
identifying, acquiring, and distributing required resources to the ANA and ANP and
thus providing an effective, long-term sustainment capability without external
assistance;
• Fully operational units capable of independent operations with minimal external
assistance; and
• A joint command and control structure coordinated at the national level to integrating
the ANA, ANP, and the National Directorate for Security (NDS) at the regional and
provincial levels.
Progress along the three lines of operation is tracked using four Capability Milestones
(CMs):
• CM4 describes a unit, agency, staff function, or installation that is formed but not yet
capable of conducting primary operational missions. It may be capable of
undertaking portions of its operational mission but only with significant assistance
from, and reliance on, international community support.
• CM3 describes a unit, agency, staff function, or installation that is capable of
partially conducting primary operational missions, but still requires assistance from,
and is reliant on, international community support.
conducting primary operational missions with routine assistance from, or reliance on,
international community support.
conducting primary operational missions. Depending on the situation, units may
require specified assistance from the international partners.
The Campaign Plan’s three phases are conditions-based. They are not sequential and they
may overlap. The focus of Phase I (Field/Generate the Afghan National Security Capability)
is to generate and field effective national military forces and police services, their ministries,
sustaining institutions, and intermediate commands. Substantial assistance will be required
from the international community in all areas during this phase. The end state of Phase I will
be achieved when the programmed forces have been fielded, received some collective
training, and are participating in operations. The Ministry of Defense (MoD), Ministry of
Interior (MoI), sustaining institutions, and intermediate commands will have been established.
During Phase II (Development of the Afghan National Security Capability) the ANA,
ANP, and international forces will jointly plan, coordinate, and conduct operations. The
ANSF, ministries, and institutions will continue to develop the capabilities necessary to
achieve CM1. All elements of the fielded ANSF will undergo collective training and
evaluation. For the ANA, each unit will go through a validation process conducted by
international training teams with final certification being done by the ANA itself. For the
ANP, validation and certification processes will be conducted in coordination with the MoI,
U.S. Embassy, and various international organizations. The end state of Phase II will be
achieved when most ANSF elements achieve CM1, i.e., ANSF organizations are between 85
and 100 percent manned, equipped, and trained and have the capacity to plan, program,
conduct, and sustain operations with specified international support.
Phase III (Transition to Strategic Partnership and Afghan Security and Police Re-
orientation) occurs when the GIRoA assumes full responsibility for its own security needs,
with continued engagement with the international community. At this point, CSTC-A will
transition to a more traditional security assistance organization. The end state is characterized
by an ANSF configured to provide for the security needs of the country: the defense of
national independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity against prospective enemies and
internal threats.
1.3. Budget
CSTC-A receives funding through the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) to equip,
train, and sustain the ANSF. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 ASFF request totaled approximately
$2.7 billion, including $1,711 billion for the ANA, $980 million for the ANP, and $9.6
million for detainee operations. For the ANA, these funds will equip and sustain the 70,000-
person, 14- brigade force in 2008; upgrade garrisons and support facilities; enhance ANA
intelligence capabilities; and expand education and training, including the National Military
Academy, counter-improvised explosive device (CIED) training, mobile training teams,
branch qualification courses, and literacy and English language programs. For the ANP, these
funds will increase CIED, communications, and intelligence training; purchase additional
equipment, weapons, and ammunition to respond to insurgent threats; enhance ANP
intelligence capabilities; set conditions for interoperability with the ANA to respond to
events; enhance border surveillance; add basic health clinics in select provinces to improve
casualty treatment; and expand field medic and combat life support training. Because the
operational and security realities in Afghanistan are constantly changing, it is not possible to
make a reliable estimate of the long-term costs and budget requirements for developing the
ANSF.
1.4. Tracking U.S. Funding
ASFF funds are appropriated by the U.S. Congress to the U.S. Army. The Secretary of
the Army distributes these funds to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).
DSCA provides funding to Military Departments Life Cycle Management Commands
(LCMCs) for purchases in the continental U.S. (CONUS) (e.g., major end items, weapons,
ammunition, and communication needs), as well as to CSTC-A for items that can be procured
through the local contracting office, or to fund services performed by the Department of State
(DoS) or the United Nations
CSTC-A’s annual program objectives for the force generation and development of the
ANSF bridge the gap between the strategic aims of the CSTC-A Campaign Plan, subordinate
development strategies, and budget execution. Baseline requirements are derived from the
approved ANSF force structure. Any modifications to these requirements come from the
GIRoA, in consultation with CSTC-A. Changes to requirements result either from a change to
the security situation as reflected in updated strategic planning documents of the MoD or
MoI, or from lessons learned through operational experience.
The ASFF is subdivided by Budget Activity Groups for the Afghan National Army,
Afghan National Police and Related Activities that include Detainee Operations. Budget
activities are then further subdivided into sub-activity groups. Tracking of funds begins at the
Budget Activity Group (BAG – e.g., ANA and ANP) and Sub-Budget Activity Group (SAG)
– e.g., Equipment and Training) levels. BAG and SAG funding authorizations for each fiscal
year are loaded into the Army’s Program Budget Accounting System (PBAS), as well as a
database managed locally in Afghanistan. As Memoranda of Request (MORs) are submitted
for CSTC-A requirements, funds availability is confirmed by reviewing current funds status.
For tracking of funds execution below the BAG- and SAG-levels, in addition to the
MILDEP accounting systems, CONUS Life Cycle Management Command obligation reports
are provided to the CSTC-A CJ8 and uploaded into a local database. For local procurement
funds sent to CSTC-A via Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request (MIPR), CSTC-A
tracks all purchase requests against available MIPR funding and reconciles amounts daily. As
contracts and payments are made against purchase requests, the CSTC-A CJ8 posts the
transactions in the local database. CSTC-A provides funds status on local procurement cases
to USASAC who records the activity in the accounting system (SOMARDS) and the local
Disbursing Office provides DFAS documentation of the disbursements made. The various
MILDEP accounting systems report funds status monthly to the DSCA reporting systems
(DIFS). The DIFS position is official program fund status. A funds control analyst reviews
and audits funds status through the local database on a daily basis. Any discrepancies are
worked with the appropriate offices and corrected.
The status of funds and financial decisions are managed using a Program Budget Activity
Council (PBAC) process. The CSTC-A PBAC process reviews budget execution rates, un-
financed requirement prioritization, and recommendations for command decision on program
changes on a monthly basis.
1.5. Tracking Equipment
1.5.1. U.S. Procurement

The CSTC-A CJ4 tracks equipment from the identification of the requirement, to the
refinement of the requirement; from procurement source through shipment delivery; and from
issue to end user.
A new requirement for a weapon or vehicle system is initiated by a request to the CSTC-
A directorate or subordinate task force that owns the BAG or SAG. The initiator of the
requirement works with the BAG or SAG owner, CSTC-A CJ7, CSTC-A CJ4 Requirements
Division, and Security Assistance Office representatives to develop and refine the
requirement details to a level that can be correctly sourced. The generation of new
requirements is a formal approval process that is documented in an order that details CSTC-
A’s ANSF development programs.
Once approved as a new requirement by the CSTC-A CJ7 (or the Deputy Commanding
General for Programs, depending on the dollar value), the CSTC-A CJ4 coordinates with the
CSTC-A CJ8 to determine budget availability. The CSTC-A CJ4 allocates the requirement to
a specific budget program, the CSTC-A CJ8 commits the funds for the requirement, and the
CSTC-A CJ4 conducts a final verification.
The CSTC-A CJ4 then determines how to source the requirement—via local purchase or
CONUS Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case. DSCA guidance requires weapons and vehicles
to be purchased via CONUS FMS cases. Determinations for other items are accomplished in
accordance with DSCA local procurement guidance and through liaison with DSCA.
For an FMS case, a MOR is fully staffed through CSTC-A prior to submission to DSCA.
DSCA validates funding exists in the appropriate SAG and determines which service agent
would best fulfill the requirement, and the services submit the requirement to their respective
LCMCs. LCMCs work with the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) to develop
and award contracts for equipment. Items procured through FMS cases that are designated by
DSCA as requiring end use certification due to their sensitivity are certified by the end user
through a program managed by the CSTC-A CJ4.
1.5.2. International Donations

CSTC-A works closely with the GIRoA at all levels to manage the manning, equipping,
training, and provision of facilities for the ANSF. As requested in a December 2007 letter
from Afghan Defense Minister Wardak to CSTC-A Commander General Cone, all equipment
donations to the ANA are vetted through the office of the CSTC-A Deputy Commanding
General for International Security Cooperation (DCG-ISC) to ensure that each donation fits
an actual requirement for the ANA and will be logistically sustainable. A similar CSTC-A
vetting process is in place for equipment donated for the ANP. Once vetted by CSTC-A, the
donation offer is sent to the MoD or MoI for final approval. For Donations from NATO
countries, the donor nation is notified of the initial acceptance of the offer through the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
Directorate of Army Training and Education Support (DATES), Joint Forces Command-
Brunssum, and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).
Non-NATO countries can make donations in one of two ways, both considered bilateral
donations. The first is similar to the process for NATO countries. A donor nation can
approach the DCG-ISC with a potential donation. The vetting process would proceed at
CSTC-A as described above, though without the involvement of ISAF DATES. Final
approval and acceptance of the offer falls to the MoI or the MoD. The second way that a non-
NATO country can make a donation to the ANSF is by a direct offer to the sovereign GIRoA.
At this point, if necessary, an inspection in the donor country is conducted to verify the
condition of the equipment. These inspections are required for all ammunition, weapons, and
highly technical equipment. After the in-country inspection is completed, an arrangement for
delivery of all accepted equipment is conducted. Regardless of the shipping method, the
CSTC-A CJ4 transportation office is contacted with the arrival times of the donation in order
to coordinate its delivery to a logistics depot in Kabul. A receipt (signed by a representative
from either the MoD or MoI) is then sent to SHAPE to confirm the delivery and
accountability of the donation.
Arrival information (e.g., specific quantities and types of equipment) is annotated in a
donation database. Since 2002, 46 donor nations (both NATO and non-NATO) have
contributed equipment worth $822 million. There are currently 18 pending donation offers
from 14 nations with a total value of more than $194 million. Major items include Leopard-1
tanks, MI-17 and MI-35 helicopters, M2 machine guns, 81mm mortars, and millions of
dollars in construction funding for such projects as the Kabul Military High School.
Future solicitations for donations will focus on equipment from both the ANA and ANP
requirements lists. However, CSTC-A, on behalf of the GIRoA, is putting more effort into
seeking donor funding for equipment already being purchased for the ANSF and for
engineering projects. In the search for these resources, CSTC-A is working with the local
contingent of 20 defense attachés and with all of the national military representatives at
SHAPE. The Polish contingent within the DCG-ISC office focuses on coordinating with
Eastern European nations to meet ANSF needs for Eastern-bloc equipment and in-theater
training to support this equipment.
1.5.3. Shipment of Equipment

CONUS-sourced weapons and ammunition for both the ANA and ANP are shipped by
Special Assignment Airlift Mission to Kabul International Airport (KAIA). Equipment is
transferred from aircraft to ANA trucks by the U.S. element of the Combined Air Terminal
Operations (CATO) activity at KAIA. The CSTC-A CJ4 representative attached to CATO
and the ANA transportation element commander both sign a transportation management
document that is subsequently signed by an ANA Depot 1 representative (the national depot
for ANA weapons) or a “22 Bunkers” Ammunition Depot representative (national depots for
ammunition and ANP weapons) upon delivery.
Large equipment, including vehicles, is shipped via sealift to the port of Karachi,
Pakistan, where they are transferred onto commercial trucks by contracted carrier for
movement to Afghanistan. Commercial vehicles depart Karachi, cross the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border at Torkham Gate, and proceed to delivery points in Kabul. The CSTC-A
CJ4 receives shipping reports through the Army Surface Deployment and Distribution
Command. ANA vehicles are delivered to ANA Depot 2 where they are signed for by ANA
personnel and prepared for issue. ANP vehicles are delivered to a contracted maintenance
organization for preparation and hand-receipt to the MoI Technical Department.
1.5.4. Issue Process and Documentation
1.5.4.1. Afghan National Army

Units at initial fielding are "pushed" weapons and vehicles from the national depots in
Kabul to the Forward Support Depot (FSD) in the unit area. The directive to issue the initial
fielding sets is generated in a "push letter" signed by the CSTC-A CJ4 and transmitted to the
U.S. mentors at the national depots. Staff at the depots generate an Afghan MoD Form 9 Issue
or Turn-in Order, which is signed by the ANA unit transporting the equipment to the FSD.
One copy is kept on file at the depot. The FSD supply officer signs the MoD 9
acknowledging receipt of the equipment and returns a copy to the issuing depot. The FSD
issues the equipment to unit supply officers using the MoD Form 9 as well.
After the initial issue, units request equipment and supplies on MoD Form 14 Request for
Issue or Turn-in. Units submit these requests through their chain of command, through the
FSD and Forward Support Group, to the Logistics Support Operations Center at the MoD
Logistics Command. Each supporting level in the supply chain will either fulfill the request,
forward to higher headquarters if unable to fulfill, or deny the request if it is not within
authorization.
1.5.4.2. Afghan National Police

The initial fielding process for the ANP is similar to the ANA process described above,
except that equipment is “pushed” only in support of the scheduled fielding of Afghan
National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) battalions and through the Focused District
Development (FDD) program. Equipment is “pushed” to the Regional Training Centers
(RTCs), which currently serve as the regional supply depots until the planned Regional
Logistics Centers (RLCs) are constructed. RLCs will be the ANP equivalent of FSDs in the
ANA. Documentation occurs through the use of the MoI Form 9.
After the initial issue, ANP units use the MoI Form 14 to request equipment. Other than
support for the scheduled fielding of new units and the FDD program, all equipment is issued
to the ANP by request only.
1.6. Efforts to Build and Maintain ANSF-Sustaining Institutions
CSTC-A provides military officers to assist in the education and mentoring of Afghan
military and civilian leadership on a daily basis. These officers assess and evaluate ANA and
ANP progress and provide valuable advice that is designed to assist the ANSF to meet its
development goals. They build confidence and experience in the leadership at the ground
level, serving as an example for success. On a daily basis these officers help move the ANSF
towards becoming a reliable, capable, and professional organization.
CSTC-A mentors currently advise leaders throughout the MoI and the MoD. CSTC-A
provides advisors to key leaders including: the Ministers of the Interior and Defense, Deputy
Minister of Defense, 1st Deputy Minister of Interior, Deputy Minister for Counter-Narcotics,
Deputy Minister of Security, Deputy Minister for Administration and Logistics, Chief of the
ANA General Staff (GS), Chief of the Criminal Investigative Division, Chief of Uniform
Police, Chief of ANCOP, Chief of Counter-Terrorism, Chiefs of Training and Education,
Intelligence, Finance, Internal Affairs, and many others.
CSTC-A-contracted trainers also provide staff training via Mobile Training Teams
(MTTs) in the areas of logistics planning and property accountability, military decision-
making processes, and other staff processes. A recent initiative has begun to expand this
training to include students from district-level operations centers of the ANP.
CSTC-A is committed to working in concert with the MoD and MoI to build training
management and assessment procedures which train personnel to meet the demands of the
entire system, build honest and accurate assessments from the bottom up, and assist the
leadership in identifying issues requiring action. In order to develop common objectives and
standardization, the oversight of training, including the formation of new training and
schools, remains with CSTC-A. To summarize, a few of the processes that assist the ANSF in
becoming strong and fully capable are:
• Development of common core and synchronized programs of instruction ensures the

same standards are met regardless of the source of the training cadre.
• Mentor and assessment teams confirm the accomplishment of training standards and
the students’ ability to apply the processes, tactics, techniques, and procedures.
• Contracts for new training facilities and programs ensure that transition is planned
and phased to ensure a successful transition to the ANSF.
• Training on management and leadership practices, and assisting in their
implementation within normal ANSF operations, provides common procedures
throughout the command structure to identify and resolve issues.
1.6.1. The Ministry of Defense

CSTC-A executes a ministerial development program that synchronizes the development
of MoD organizations and institutions with the development of management and operational
systems. Vertical and horizontal integration of systems is achieved through mentor meetings,
functional boards, and the Ministerial Development Board, a group of senior mentors and
staff that reviews methods to improve the ANA. CSTC-A functional staffs focus on building
organizational capacity and capability; and contractors with prerequisite skills (working with
military functional experts and staff) develop the core management and operational systems
essential to enable the ministry to plan, program, and manage the army. The specific core
systems being developed within the MoD include:
Personnel Logistics
• Personnel Management • Logistics
• Reserve Affairs • Acquisition
• Public Affairs
Special Staff
Intelligence • Resource Management and Budgeting
• Military Intelligence • Inspector General
• Installation Management
Operations • Military Justice and Legal
• Strategic Defense Planning • Ministerial Administration
• Operational Planning • Medical and Health Care
• Force Management
• Training Management Ministerial level Capability
• Doctrine Development • Disaster Response and Relief
• Readiness Reporting • Parliamentary Affairs
• Command, Control, Communications, and Computers
Additionally, senior military and civilian personnel serve as advisors to selected senior
Afghan officials and officers within the MoD and General Staff (GS) to assist with senior-
level issues and serve as liaison officers between the Afghan officials and the CSTC-A
Commander and principal staff on matters affecting the development of the security sector.
1.6.2. Ministry of the Interior

As the lead U.S. agency for ANSF development, CSTC-A works with the Department of
State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), the European Union
Police (EUPOL) Mission in Afghanistan, and others in the international community to
develop and reform the MoI. Ministerial development is managed through a program that
works to synchronize MoI headquarters agencies and the core management systems essential
to reforming the ministry and enabling its organizations and personnel to plan, program, and
manage ANP institutions and forces. Vertical and horizontal integration of systems is
achieved through mentor meetings, working groups, and the Ministerial Development Board.
The International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) serves as the international coordinating
body between the operational-level entities and ANP reform efforts at the political level. The
MoI serves as a co-chair for this body. Once issues have been resolved via an international
caucus, the IPCB provides direction for action.
Senior military and civilian personnel from the U.S. and international community advise
selected senior Afghan MoI officials and officers on actions and issues associated with reform
initiatives. These senior advisors also serve as a conduit between MoI officials, the CSTC-A
Commander and principle staff, and the EUPOL Head of Mission. INL provides contractors
who also assist with advising senior Afghan officials to facilitate reform efforts. CSTC-A
functional staff focus on building organizational capacity and capability. Contractors with the
prerequisite skills, working with military functional experts and staff, assist the Afghan senior
leaders and staff to develop and implement policies, systems, and modern management
practices essential to effective reform of the MoI. The core systems being developed within
the MoI include:
• Strategic Planning • Personnel Management

• Operational Planning • Legal Affairs
• Operations and Force Readiness • Finance and Budget
• Internal Affairs • Force Management
• Intelligence • Training Management
• Logistic Management • Programming
• Faculties and Installation Management • Parliamentary/Public Affairs
• Ministerial Administration
1.6.3. Logistics, Intelligence, Medical Services, and Recruiting

The ability of Afghan security forces to operate independently will rely, in part, on
adequate logistical support at all levels that allows the ANA and ANP to sustain their fielded
forces. CSTC-A’s current policy is that equipment is not issued unless there is verification of
appropriate supply and accountability procedures.
A mature and continually improving national logistics infrastructure exists and is already
supporting the ANA. A series of national and forward support depots currently provide the
bulk of the ANA’s needs. Neither the United States nor the international community is
involved in the distribution of supplies or equipment to ANA forces. Brigade-level logistics
structures and systems are adequate and continue to develop. However, there is a gap in the
linkage from the brigade level to the national level. This gap will require development of a
corps-level logistics structure that will be addressed with the increase of 10,000 personnel
beginning in 2009. Plans for 2009 lay the groundwork for making currently-contracted
logistics an ANA core responsibility.
For the ANP, logistics development is currently focused on verification and
accountability. CSTC-A is addressing regional, provincial, and district level gaps in ANP
logistics that stem in part from still-developing MoI logistics policies and procedures and
logistics officer training. The MoI is working to close these gaps through regional, provincial,
and district level logistics officer training.
The Afghan intelligence community has three main components: the NDS, MoD, and
MoI. Historically, information has rarely been shared; collaborative analysis and coordinated
collection have been the exception rather than the norm. The establishment of clear roles and
functions among the three major agencies has been hampered by distinct developmental
paths, legacy Soviet paradigms, and disjointed U.S. Government and international support
efforts. Although each agency is playing an increasingly effective role in the government’s
counterinsurgency strategy, much work remains to build national intelligence structures that
encourage intelligence sharing and can provide coherent, timely intelligence to Afghan
national decision- and policymakers.
Medical services are developing, but are not yet adequate. Existing emergency medical
services do not meet the needs of the ANA and ANP. Routine medical care is also
rudimentary. However, the integration of ANA and ANP medical personnel into a
collaborative health care system with the Ministry of Public Health will improve care,
especially for combat casualties. Three new regional hospitals have opened, medical logistics
proficiency and patient record keeping processes have improved, and immunizations have
increased. Nevertheless, significant challenges remain before the ANA and ANP health care
system can provide quality health care to those serving in the ANSF and their dependents.
Effective ANA and ANP recruitment programs are in place. Both the ANA and ANP
have consistently met recruiting goals year after year. Although separate and distinct, the
ANA and ANP recruitment programs share resources where possible in order to remain as
effective and efficient as possible.
1.6.4. Command and Control

During the 12 months prior to March 2008, mentors have engaged in a variety of
activities to develop ANSF communications capabilities among the national command and
coordination centers, the regional coordination centers, and the provincial coordination
centers. CSTC-A has focused on strengthening and refining the established command and
control centers by improving the efficiency of operations at the National Military Command
Center (NMCC) and National Police Command Center (NPCC) by standardizing reporting
formats and procedures.
Efforts at the NMCC have been concentrated on enhancing operational command and
control by developing standard operating procedures for Corps headquarters’ reporting of
operational information to the NMCC. In addition, training and mentoring of liaison officers
(LNOs) have been an ongoing activity designed to foster an attitude of urgency and accuracy
in obtaining information from field units. A weekly video teleconference with Corps
commanders was implemented to establish strong personal links at the command level.
Current efforts are being made in the NMCC to establish a common operating picture
(COP). A COP is established using GPS-established unit locations and graphic control
measures that will then allow the NMCC to share its COP with other command centers
through e-mail. The NPCC is included in this effort in order to establish a national level COP
for all ANSF. This effort also includes an ability to share intelligence at appropriate levels.
At the NPCC, efforts have been concentrated on developing standard operating
procedures for internal NPCC operations as well as Joint Regional Coordination Center
(JRCC) and Joint Provincial Coordination Center (JPCC) reporting requirements. The NPCC
assumed control of radio communication operations and has been involved in an aggressive
program of establishing and maintaining regularly scheduled communication checks with
each JRCC. Command emphasis has been placed on the need to consolidate Regional
Commands (RCs) and JRCCs in order to institute a single chain of command and control
from district to province (i.e., JPCC) to region (i.e., JRCC) to the NPCC. Training and
mentoring of LNOs has been an ongoing activity focused on coordinating all operational
activities.
At the national level, a weekly video teleconference between the NMCC and NPCC has
focused on the exchange of intelligence and operations information in an effort to enhance
situational awareness of both organizations. In addition, each command center provides
LNOs to the other command center to ensure timely and accurate exchange of operational
information.
SECTION 2: AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

2.1. Programmed ANA End State
By the end of 2008, the GIRoA plans to field a total of 70,000 ANA personnel. An
additional 10,000 personnel are expected to be fielded by the end of 2009. Continued training,
mentoring, and development will be required beyond this timeframe. As stated above, the
long-term ANA posture may include a more robust ANAAC capability and a larger army.
The current program calls for a light infantry force of 15 brigades, including artillery, armor,
commando, combat support, combat service support, an air corps, and the requisite
intermediate commands and sustaining institutions.
2.2. Training Efforts
The soldier training process begins with quality, needs-based recruiting. New recruits
receive initial entry training (IET) at the Basic Warrior Training Course (BWT), conducted by
Afghan trainers with international supervision. ANA basics are taught to an objective
standard uniformly applied throughout the force. The BWT provides the basics, but the
individual soldier’s foundation is strengthened through branch-specific Advanced Combat
Training. Although the necessity of fielding the force resulted in an initial focus on infantry
and other combat-specific branches, training for the support specialties has also developed.
Immediately following a new unit’s fielding and arrival at its Corps and brigade area, it
undergoes a 60-day period of individual and collective training before being put into the
rotation for combat operations. Combat and security operations continue to round out ANA
development. Each ANA combat unit is accompanied by either a U.S. Embedded Training
Team (ETT) or a NATO-ISAF Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT). OMLTs
and ETTS perform the same function: providing ANA units with comprehensive mentoring
across the full spectrum of operations. Specifically, the teams provide the ANA unit
leadership with advisory support on all unit functions as well as direct access to U.S. and
NATO-ISAF resources and enablers that enhance the operational effectiveness of the Afghan
units. They coach unit staffs and commanders and assist them in development of their training
programs, logistics and administrative systems, and planning and employment in operations.
ETTs and OMLTs facilitate the assessment of ANA units, helping the ANA identify
strengths, shortfalls, and opportunities for improvement. They also serve as role models and
liaisons between ANA and international forces.
As more ANA units improve their capabilities and achieve operational independence it
becomes increasingly important to track and record their progress. CSTC-A and the GIRoA
have recently deployed Validation Training Teams (VTTs) consisting of U.S. and Afghan
personnel to each of the ANA Corps to begin the validation process with the Corps’ most
capable units. VTTs assist ETTs and OMLTs in establishing collective training strategies and
evaluation standards to assess unit operational capability. These teams have begun to validate
the most capable units. March 2008 saw the 203rd Corps Headquarters and the 3rd Kandak,
2nd Brigade, 203rd Corps become the first ANA units validated as CM1.
In many instances, ANA combat units are assigned an ISAF partner unit during combat
operations. In general, those ANA units with U.S. or NATO-ISAF partner units have shown a
marked increase in their capability to provide security in their areas. However, it should be
noted that some Afghan commanders have shown great initiative and improvement without
the benefit of an international partner.
CSTC-A and the MoD have enacted a cyclical readiness system to manage individual
soldier and unit readiness. This cycle is designed around a four-month rotation that allows
units to manage missions, training, schools, and leave. The system recognizes past
experience, poor banking infrastructure, and issues with overall unit manning levels and
readiness. This program has helped to reduce the absent without leave (AWOL) rate to a
manageable 10 percent.
2.3. Equipment
The three infantry companies in each kandak, or battalion, are equipped with former
Warsaw Pact rifles, light and heavy machine guns, and rocket propelled grenade launchers.
The weapons company in each kandak provides anti-armor capability with SPG-9 recoilless
rifles and indirect fire with 82mm mortars. Plans are in place to effect a transition to NATO
standard weapons. CSTC-A is currently converting the ANA from the AK-47 to the M16 (or
the Canadian version, the C7). Later in 2008, the ANA will begin converting to U.S. model
light and medium machine guns and 81mm mortars.
Each brigade has an artillery battery consisting of eight former Warsaw Pact D-30
howitzers. Currently, 82 of the 132 required are functional. CSTC-A has contracted to have
the howitzers assessed for complete refurbishment and conversion to facilitate NATO
standard interoperability.
One ANA brigade is designed to include a mechanized kandak and an armor kandak, but
they are currently equipped with BMPs (amphibious infantry fighting vehicles) and T-62
main battle tanks in various states of functionality. Procurement and donation options are
currently being studied to upgrade this capability.
The ANA’s primary vehicle is the light tactical vehicle (LTV), a Ford Ranger truck.
CSTC-A has procured more than 4,100 up-armored high mobility multipurpose wheeled
vehicles (HMMWVs) (M1151/M1152) which will be fielded beginning in the summer of
2008. These HMMWVs will displace many of the LTVs, particularly in the combat
battalions, to provide a protected mobility capability.
The ANAAC currently consists of the following aircraft: seven medium cargo airplanes
(five AN-32s and two AN-26s) and 17 helicopters (13 MI-17s and 4 MI-35s). The ANAAC
will eventually include reconnaissance and light attack air-to-ground fixed wing aircraft. By
December 2008, the inventory will include an additional 11 MI-17s, 6 MI-35s, and two AN-
32s. Four, of a total of 20, C-27s are will be delivered in 2009.
Strategic command and control is accomplished through an ANA-controlled
telecommunications network that connects the NMCC and Corps headquarters. The ANA
communication network provides voice, video, and data communications capabilities. An
offline commercial encryption capability provides secure data messaging. Secure voice
capability will be provided by commercial TalkSECURE Digital Wireline terminals and
wireless phones. U.S.-made Datron high frequency (HF) base station, vehicle-mounted, and
man pack radios, with commercial encryption capacity, provide tactical and backup strategic
command and control and extends HF communications to mobile forces. Thuraya satellite
phones have been fielded to key ANA leadership to provide a tertiary means of strategic
command and control. Tactical phones and field switches provide battlefield communication
capability. Additionally, commercial cell phones provide backup tactical command and
control in urban areas with cell phone coverage.
2.4. Readiness and Assessment Tools
The MoD readiness reporting system is maturing and provides a metrics-based analytical
and decision-support tool to improve readiness. The ANA system, similar to the U.S. Army’s
Unit Status Report, is well-established and providing accurate, timely, and useful information
that enables the ANA to manage the force more effectively. The system assesses ANA units
using CM ratings on a monthly basis. Contractors developed the ANA readiness reporting
system regulations and are currently in the process of updating them. Future improvements to
the system will enable analysis of ANA mission essential personnel and equipment unique to
different types of units (e.g. pacing items).
In order to brief unit status on manpower, equipment, munitions, and other operational
readiness subjects, the ANA Combat Power Assessment briefing was redesigned to allow
ANA leadership a more powerful reporting tool. This briefing is an increasingly Afghan-
owned and run briefing chaired by the ANA G3 and other key staff. To enable its effective
use, training and mentorship was provided to the GS G3 and Corps commanders.
2.5. Building and Sustaining the Officer Corps
The ANA officer corps is working to improve its professionalism. Illiteracy rates remain
high in Afghanistan, but members of the officer corps are required to have basic reading and
writing abilities. Plans are being made to improve the educational level of the officer corps.
Overall, officers are proficient at the tactical level though not yet fully mature in operational
and strategic concepts. Nevertheless, the majority of the officers, and most importantly the
very senior officers, believe in the concept of a national military and are starting to use the
military decision-making process and provide information and decision briefs to their
superiors. The chain of command works well when exercised, and there is strict adherence to
direction from higher ranks.
Entry-level officer training occurs in three forms. Officers with previous experience in
the former Afghan Army attend an eight-week Officer Training Course which provides
professional ethics training. New officers attend the six-month Officer Candidate School or
the four-year National Military Academy of Afghanistan.
Training provided by or coordinated with CSTC-A is conducted with the intent of
building a self-sufficient, strong, and fully capable ANA. The keystone of the ANA end-to-
end career and training program is the formation and incorporation of branch service schools
and combined career progression courses. Advanced training conducted on both branch
specific and general military and leadership subjects ensures that the professional non-
commissioned officers (NCOs) and officers continue their professional development. A
planned career path that includes professional, advanced schooling also allows for
reinforcement of the values and goals of the GIRoA and develops an appreciation for and
support of the national agenda. Although initially based on the U.S. Army branch and higher
military education system, the ANA career schools must reflect Afghan organization and
operation to ensure internalization and independence. In the interim, this training is provided
through MTTs and on-the-job training provided by either ETTs or OMLTs.
2.6. Merit-Based Rank, Promotions, and Salary Reform
There is currently an increasingly effective soldier and NCO promotion process in place.
The regulation and process refinement for senior NCO and officer promotion has been held in
abeyance pending passage of the Military Service Law. However, in February 2008 a policy
referred to as “Pay by Rank” was decreed and implemented. The policy ensured that officers
are paid according to their post-reform rank. The implementation of this policy will work
toward ensuring salaries are based on merit and appropriate rank is worn.
2.7. Mechanisms for Incorporating Lessons Learned and Best Practices
The process for capturing ANA lessons learned has been resident at the ANA Training
and Education Command. Both international and Afghan members of VTTs have the
responsibility to capture lessons learned and appropriately process the information so that it
eventually arrives in the ANA Training and Education Command Doctrine Cell. Once it has
reached the Doctrine Cell it is incorporated into the relevant ANA guidance.
The build-up of additional mentors at the NMCC and NPCC and other staff agencies will
result in more opportunities to mentor Afghans on proper operational and administrative
functions. To date, minimal mentor manning has resulted in missed learning opportunities, as
there was insufficient coverage to identify all areas in need of correction and/or mentoring.
2.8. Oversight Mechanisms
2.8.1. Personnel
2.8.1.1. Recruiting and Retention

2007 surpassed the previous four years in ANA recruitment of soldiers. The ANA has
recruited 32,135 soldiers in the year leading up to March 20, 2008. Annual recruitment
numbers for the past four years, beginning with the most recent, are: 21,287; 11,845; 15,790;
and 9,671.
The year-to-date re-enlistment average in the fielded ANA is 50 percent for soldiers and
56 percent for NCOs. Factors that preclude higher re-enlistment rates include the desire for
larger salaries, better leadership, and to be stationed closer to family.
In the February 2008, the ANA had an 8.4 percent absentee rate. This rate is down from
the 12 percent rate experience at the height of summer 2007. The three Corps most
consistently in contact with insurgents and anti-government elements had the highest AWOL
rates, but on average they experienced an average rate of less than 10 percent in 2007 and the
beginning of 2008. This decrease in AWOL rates has contributed directly to an increase of
20,000 in ANA end strength since January 2007. This increase in end strength coupled with a
deliberate effort to fully man combat units fully and overfill entry level soldier authorizations
should further mitigate this issue. During the past year, AWOL rates in ANA combat forces
have decreased three percent. With increasing emphasis on pay and incentives, better
facilities and training, better leadership in the ANA, and more robustly manned units, we
anticipate AWOL rates will continue to decrease through 2008.
2.8.1.2. Accountability
To improve personnel management, the ANA is currently implementing the Personnel
Accounting and Strength Reporting (PASR) system at all levels of command. The objective is
for all units to provide accurate information in a standardized format. The supporting policy
and regulation have been distributed throughout the ANA, and training on the various
processes is taking place by MTTs in the Corps’ respective areas. Once training is complete, a
decree will be issued directing all units to use the new PASR system.
The military justice system serves as a model for the civilian law enforcement and
judicial system. CSTC-A’s ANA mentors have focused upon manning, equipping, and
training the military attorneys and judges throughout the ANA. Each Corps has a staff judge
advocate office comprised of prosecutors, one or more defense attorneys, and military judges.
There is also a Court of Military Appeals staffed with five military judges. There is currently
one U.S. or NATO-ISAF force judge advocate at each Corps mentoring the Corps staff judge
advocates. The ANA military justice system is operating effectively and hundreds of ANA
soldiers have been court-martialed for misconduct.
CSTC-A also oversees the creation of justice centers at each of the five ANA Corps. The
justice centers will serve as courthouses, office space for ANA attorneys, and short-term
detention facilities. Additionally, CSTC-A mentors have been involved in the drafting,
reviewing, and staffing of three cornerstone military justice laws: (1) the Military Courts
Law, Military Crimes Code and Military Criminal Procedure Code (currently in force by
Presidential decree); (2) the Prosecutor and Criminal Investigative Department Law (final
draft recently forwarded to Minister of Defense); and (3) the Military Disciplinary
Punishment Regulation (final draft recently forwarded to Minister of Defense). The passing
and promulgating of these laws will enhance the ANA’s ability to enforce good order and
discipline and ensure fairness in the military justice process.
The MoD Inspector General (IG) system is very well established. It is currently rated as
capable with international support (CM2) with the expectation that it will be capable of
independent operations (CM1) by the end of 2008 or early 2009. IG offices are at the MoD,
GS, Corps, and brigade levels and more than 98 percent of assigned IG personnel are school-
trained.
In addition, the MoD IG, the ANA GS IG, and the MoI Internal Affairs (IA) all have
functional hotlines. Any soldier, policeman, or civilian can call these hotlines to report
misconduct or request assistance.
2.8.2. Tracking of Equipment

There are two systems used to maintain oversight of ANA equipment, the Core
Information Management System (Core-IMS), and the National Asset Visibility (NAV)
System. Core-IMS is a commercial warehouse management system that has been used at the
primary ANA national logistics depots since 2006. Core-IMS complies with ANA supply
decree processes and is used to track and document equipment receipt, inventory, and issues
resulting from ANA national-level depot operations. The NAV system has been used since
2001 and is a mechanism to track by-unit issue transactions for munitions, vehicles, and
communications items. NAV entries are made using Core-IMS issue data from ANA national
level depot operations and updated when battle damage documentation is received. Continued
training and development of the systems are required to address current challenges with asset
visibility and reporting.
SECTION 3: AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

3.1. Programmed ANP End State
The Department of Defense assumed responsibility for the development of the ANP in
April 2005. Efforts prior to this time were not comprehensive and lacked both resources and
unity of effort within the international community. CSTC-A’s current efforts focus on key
reforms within the MoI, greater unity of effort within the international community, and
continued individual training and mentoring with the support of the INL.
The target for the ANP is to build and reform 82,000 personnel that are capable of
operating countrywide. The ANP consists of Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), the Afghan
National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), the Afghan Border Police (ABP), the Counter-
Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), and additional specialized police including criminal
investigation, counter-terrorism, and customs. The roles of the various police services span a
wide spectrum of policing, law enforcement, and security functions:
• The AUP serve at the regional, provincial, and district levels, they focus on patrols,
crime prevention, traffic, and general policing. They are meant to spread the rule of
law throughout the country and provide a response capability for local security
incidents.
• The ANCOP is a highly skilled, specialized police force, split into rural and urban
units, trained and equipped to counter civil unrest and lawlessness. ANCOP units
provide law enforcement and civil control, conduct operations in areas where
government control may be weak, and support counterinsurgency operations. Eight
of the planned 20 ANCOP battalions are currently operating. They are performing
exceptionally well, both in their support of FDD, and in their primary role as the
national quick reaction force in troubled areas. ANCOP battalions are formed as
units and receive 16 weeks of institutional training followed by another eight weeks
of Police Mentor Team (PMT)-supervised collective training. All reports on this new
national police force indicate solid performance through its operations to dismantle
illegal checkpoints, seize illegal weapons, and retake lost districts. ANCOP has
successfully conducted counterinsurgency operations and secured the trust and
confidence of the people.
• The ABP provides broad law enforcement capabilities at borders and entry points in
order to deter illegal entry and other criminal activity.
• The CNPA is the lead agency charged with reducing narcotics production and
distribution in Afghanistan.
Once assessments can be made on the effects of recently begun reform efforts, the ANP
strength should be reassessed to determine if additional police forces are required. However,
at this point in time, a lack of U.S. military trainers and mentors available for Police Mentor
Teams precludes the acceleration or expansion of reform and mentoring efforts beyond the 25
percent of the ANP that is presently covered. Current PMT coverage is focused on the AUP
who are closest to the population and are, therefore, the most immediate face of the Afghan
government.
The auxiliary police are a temporary force of 9,000 officers, hired in 21 provinces,
intended to augment the AUP. The auxiliary police will cease to exist by the end of 2008;
those members that have served for at least one year, undergone five weeks of training, and
receive a recommendation from their district chief will transition to the AUP. Those that do
not meet these requirements will be released from service by September 30, 2008.
3.2. Training Efforts
3.2.1. Initial and Field Training

Currently, the ANP has fielded 92 percent of its forces, but it lags behind the ANA in
capability. Police development has been hindered by a lack of reform, corruption, insufficient
trainers and advisors, and a lack of unity of effort within the international community, among
other things.
Unlike the ANA, police are not fielded as units. All policemen must be trained as
individuals. The objective for ANP individual training is to require initial entry training (IET)
for all accessions. However, current training capacity cannot meet demand, and many
untrained policemen remain in the force. Efforts to expand the training capacity to meet
demand should make it feasible to require IET for all police recruits in approximately three
years. Currently, individual training is conducted at seven RTCs, a Central Training Center,
and the Kabul Police Academy. Concurrently, CSTC-A and INL are developing a National
Police Training Center (NPTC), which will achieve initial operating capability in 2008. This
center will have an eventual training capacity of 2,000 policemen per year. Once the NPTC is
complete (estimated for late 2010), it will be feasible to require all new policemen to attend
IET prior to assumption of any duties. INL contracts to assist in individual police program
training design, instructional implementation, and mentoring. More than 500 qualified
civilian police advisors serve as training developers and instructors at the RTCs and Central
Training Center, and as mentors at regional, provincial, and district locations. These civilian
police mentors provide the civilian police expertise to augment the approximately 1,000
military mentors focused on police development.
The chart below is an overview of the police courses offered by the U.S. program. All
ANP go through the basic course, with the exception of the auxiliary police. In addition to the
core courses outlined below, advanced and specialized courses are provided for instructor
development, field training, tactical training, medic training, and trainer training courses for
investigative techniques, weapons proficiency, communications, and ethics.
Courses Level Length Description

Basic (AUP, ABP) Entry 8 weeks Basic policing skills
Firearms Basic 5 days Training and qualification
Transitional Integration Intermediate 5 weeks Democratic policing and human
Program rights
Criminal Investigative Intermediate 6 weeks Investigative skills; forensics
Division
ANCOP Advanced 16 weeks Followed by 60 days of unit field
training
The ANP training program, while recognizing that policemen do not operate in “units” as
the ANA does, seeks to build cohesive, effective police organizations. The goal is to provide
a mentor team to each police district, each provincial and regional headquarters, each ABP
company and battalion, and each ANCOP company and battalion. However, the shortage of
Police Mentor Teams affects CSTC-A’s ability to increase and improve ANP training and
mentoring. Each PMT is composed of mostly military members that provide training support,
maintenance, logistics, and administrative coaching; encourage professionalism; and serve as
liaisons with international forces as required. Each team ideally includes two civilian police
mentors (provided by INL contract) that provide civilian police training expertise and advice.
Due to the security situation, field-based police training is most often provided by military
personnel with civilian or military police experience; RTC-based training is provided by
civilian police trainers. Every PMT has a security force. There is no area of Afghanistan that
permits independent mentorship by civilian police or very small PMTs. With 365 districts, 46
city police precincts, 34 provinces, five regions, 20 ANCOP battalions, 33 ABP battalions,
and 135 ABP companies, CSTC-A is currently able to cover no more than one fourth of all
ANP organizations and units with PMTs. Security is not only an issue for mentoring and
training personnel. ANP officers perform hazardous duty. In many instances, the ANP
experience significantly higher casualty rates when conducting counterinsurgency operations
than do the ANA. The dedication and perseverance of individual police officers to fighting
the insurgency and enforcing the laws of their country is commendable.
3.2.2. Focused District Development (FDD) Program

CSTC-A, in a coordinated effort with the GIRoA, the U.S. Embassy, NATO-ISAF and
the international community, has recently implemented the Focused District Development
(FDD) program to train, reconstitute, mentor and develop the AUP on a district by district
basis. As the primary government interface with the Afghan people, an effective AUP is
critical to the extension of the rule of law and to building trust in the institution of the police
among the general populace. Accordingly, FDD concentrates resources on the district-level
AUP. A reformed, more effective police force that can improve security in an area can
facilitate the realization of other desired outcomes. It will take several years to reform the
45,000-person AUP and 18,000 ABP.
The first phase of FDD is an assessment of the district by a District Assessment and
Reform Team, composed of a PMT, several representatives of the MoI and other Afghan
government ministries, and, in some cases, other international partners (currently Canada and
the United Kingdom). This assessment leads to selection and vetting of new leaders as
required, recruiting to full authorization, and equipment inventories, as well as assessments of
facilities, rule of law status, relationships with local leaders, and overall professional
effectiveness. In the second phase, an ANCOP unit is deployed to the district to relieve the
local AUP forces which then report to the RTCs to begin eight weeks of reconstitution (the
third phase). The reconstitution period includes three different levels of training (i.e., new
entrants, advanced, and officer leader and management training), biometric processing and
identification card issue, pay records establishment, full equipping, leader reinforcement
training, and continual ethics reinforcement. The AUP participating in the RTC training
programs receive daily mentorship from PMTs. Upon completion of the TRC training phase,
the PMT returns with the reformed police to continue collective training and mentoring in the
district, ensuring the police put into practice the key individual and collective competencies as
well as the ethical standards learned during training at the RTC. At the conclusion of this
phase, which is proficiency-driven rather than time-driven, the district is validated as a
reformed police force, using the same objective assessment checklist that was used in the
preliminary assessment phase. The PMT then goes into an overwatch mode to ensure the
district police retain the ethic and skills they have learned.
The first cycle, which began in seven districts in late 2007, is nearing completion with
district ANP reinserted in their districts and undergoing intensive mentoring. As of April
2008, the second cycle of FDD was mid-course in five districts, with district ANP undergoing
reconstitution at the RTCs. The third cycle, being implemented in nine districts, was in the
initial assessment phase. Three additional cycles of FDD are planned for 2008.
Current challenges facing the FDD program include shortages of PMTs, shortages of
trained ANCOP units (currently a growing program), limited space availability at the RTCs
(which will be alleviated by construction of the NPTC), lack of provincial governor support
(due to the perceived loss of power as the AUP become loyal to the nation, as well their loss
as a source of revenue for the governor from illegal checkpoints and graft). We anticipate that
over the course of 2008, these challenges will lessen with the training of additional ANCOP
units, the construction of the NPTC, and the ability of FDD-reformed districts to strengthen
ties with district governance and populations.
The FDD initiative is focused nation-wide and is linked and complementary to ongoing
ISAF operations. It is aimed at focusing limited resources to maximize the overall
development of the AUP, ultimately creating communities able to sustain stability in the long
term. The initial popular perception of the FDD program is favorable, and the national
government views the FDD as a catalyst for similar programs that might benefit other
governmental branches.
3.3. Equipment
The ANP is equipped with light weapons, including AK-47s and 9mm pistols. Most
police elements also have light machine guns. The Afghan Border Police (ABP) will be
provided heavy machine guns later in 2008, in recognition of the higher level of operations
they encounter on the borders. ANCOP units also will be provided heavy machine guns.
There is no intent to provide the ANP with NATO weapons. Former Warsaw Pact weapons
are provided through donations or through U.S. funded purchase. Specialty organizations,
such as the CNPA and counter-terrorism police, receive unique equipment consistent with
their mission.
The ANP is provided Ford Rangers as LTVs and International Harvesters as Medium
Tactical Vehicles (MTVs). The ANCOP is currently fielded with LTVs and MTVs, but these
will be replaced with armored HMMWVs or a similar vehicle in 2008.
Police are equipped with a variety of communications equipment. They currently face an
interoperability challenge because of the wide variety of communications equipment provided
by the previous lead nation for the ANP. The U.S. Government has procured a common set of
NATO-interoperable communication equipment to field the ANP completely, and will
complete fielding during the coming year.
3.4. Readiness and Assessment Tools
The MoI Readiness Reporting System (RRS) is being re-worked to produce timely and
accurate readiness system reports, provide actionable readiness data, and provide an executive
level brief. The revised RRS should enable the MoI and ANP to conduct analysis of readiness
data that will recognize shortfalls and allow MoI and ANP leadership to make corrective
actions. Without the full complement of PMTs, however, a comprehensive assessment of the
ANP will not be possible.
3.5. Building and Sustaining the Officer Corps
Overall, most MoI senior leaders are currently assessed as capable of performing their
functions and duties with limited assistance (CM2), although others are less capable and
require more assistance (CM3). The capacity of lower-level leaders and their loyalty to
national police organizations are questionable. The lack of full implementation of approved
organizational authorization documents and incomplete rank reform hinder progress toward
leader professionalism. Assessment and reform are being addressed at the district level
through the FDD program.
Professional training and development at the national level is a new concept within the
various ANP organizations. However, this situation is changing because of MoI involvement
in the management of the FDD program, the continuation of the Kabul Police Academy, and
a common eight-week leader and management course that all new officers must attend. Each
training program provides objective and standardized training to ensure a greater degree of
professionalism within the police forces. Additionally, an in-service training program is being
implemented in each district and will eventually expand to all of the police forces to sustain
training proficiency. Selected officers in each district and unit attend an instructor
development course in subjects such as ethics and professional behavior, medical,
communications, investigative techniques, and weapons. These officers then become the
sustainment trainers in their districts and units. We expect that this program will be fully
implemented in 2008.
We are also seeing improvements in the establishment of a professional NCO corps in the
ANP. This development is critical to the success of the police, as only officers and NCOs
have arrest authority, largely due low rates of literacy among patrolmen. Approximately
1,300 police NCOs will graduate from the Kabul Police Academy in 2008. Recently, more
than 200 academy graduates were assigned to the districts outside Kabul that are going
through FDD. We expect this to continue in 2008. Additionally, an advanced course targeted
to NCOs was added to the curriculum for police training. Simultaneously, we are
implementing literacy programs in the MoI to increase the literacy level of all policemen.
3.6. Merit-Based Rank, Promotions, and Salary Reform
The MoI has taken substantial steps toward establishing fair and equitable compensation
and recognition across the ANP. It began with rank reform, which sought to evaluate and
stratify ANP personnel to ensure that each member was provided the opportunity to be
objectively compared to their counterparts. Rank reform looked at the top 18,000 officers
within a top-heavy structure and, through an international vetting process, reduced the officer
corps by more than 9,000 officers. In addition to rank reform, pay reform provided for a more
adequate pay scale, and pay parity provided the police with pay equal to that of the ANA.
Other initiatives, including the development of comprehensive promotion and recognition
programs, are underway, and written guidance regarding these initiatives is under review by
the MoI for implementation.
3.7. Mechanisms for Incorporating Lessons Learned and Best Practices
The build-up of additional mentors at the NPCC and other staff agencies will result in
more opportunities to mentor Afghans on proper operational and administrative functions. To
date, shortfalls in mentor manning has resulted in missed opportunities to identify all actions
needing correction or mentoring.
Lessons learned from the FDD process are captured via After Action Reviews (AARs).
Training and mentor teams complete AARs and route them back through FDD program
implementers, to be used to continually update the training programs as required. This
process ensures lessons learned are efficiently applied to future FDD cycles and instruction
blocks. This feedback is shared through the mentor chain and with the MoI and ANP
leadership to improve the Afghan police beyond those areas that can be touched by FDD.
3.8. Oversight Mechanisms
3.8.1. Personnel
3.8.1.1. Recruiting and Retention

From March 24, 2007 through March 2, 2008, the nationwide recruiting number for all
police programs was 17,474 (4,795 ABP, 1,414 ANCOP, and 11,265 AUP and specialty
police).
3.8.1.2. Accountability
In general, accountability for the ANP has been a significant challenge. The Identification
Card Program is a major step towards addressing the problem. This program maintains
photographic and biometric records of all registered police. The end state of the program is an
identification card that will incorporate equipment issue, pay, promotion, and tracking from
accession to attrition using an accurate record management system. Current efforts include
use of the identification card barcode system to pay ANP personnel. Identification cards will
allow tracking of all ANP officers as well as their pay, providing accurate strength numbers
and ensuring that officers receive their full pay.
CSTC-A has proposed a draft ANP strength accountability regulation that incorporates
all 11 of the current ANP strength tracking documents as well as adding a Unit Manning
Roster (UMR) to track policemen by their position of work, including the data collected
during the initial the initial recruitment and vetting process. The database will then be linked
to the ANP Identification Card database and a finance database. The UMR should eliminate
the possibility of “ghost” employees since every position will either be vacant or have a name
attached to it. These reforms will facilitate personnel complaints because it will show exactly
where the complainant is located, and it will be easier to find his or her chain of command
and records and resolve the issue. In addition, all ANP personnel have the ability to call the
hotline mentioned above to request assistance, and the MoI IA is working to add a block of
instruction on this subject to the FDD program.
CSTC-A mentors are working with the MoI Legal Advisor to provide disciplinary
instruction for the ANP. This instruction will be executed and implemented under the
Minister of the Interior’s signature and will provide for the administrative discipline of police
personnel through the reduction in rank, pay forfeitures, and transfers. However, developing
the capacity to implement the program will be challenging.
Despite having 11 police prosecutors assigned to MoI headquarters, police corruption and
misconduct remain a challenge. Effective administrative internal controls within the ANP are
hampered in part due to the law itself and a lack of capacity and will to execute that law.
Firing a patrolman requires a criminal conviction or a Presidential decree. CSTC-A is
currently working with the MoI on redrafting the personnel regulation that governs MoI
employees, specifically, the ANP. These efforts are aimed at empowering lower-level
officials to make removal decisions while providing sufficient administrative due process to
the employee subject to termination. Regional IA units have been included in the 2008
Tashkil (authorization document) in five of the six police regions (Kabul is not included due
to the presence of the national headquarters).
The Minister of Interior has commissioned a legislative drafting committee to revise the
“Inherent” (or police personnel) Law, by consolidating three outdated laws that apply to the
AUP. The drafting committee includes representatives from CSTC-A and the international
community. Although the new law may not be passed for some time, the goal is to ensure that
it provides for the administrative separation of corrupt or inept police officers. This change
likely will require either an advisory opinion from the Supreme Court or a Presidential
delegation of authority (the Afghan Constitution grants only the President the authority to fire
police).
Additionally, CSTC-A ANP legal mentors have focused on using the police court and the
police prosecutor to bring criminal cases against police officers for misconduct that amounts
to a crime. Again, these efforts have not yet shown results. A policy on drug use is under
development. Though the drug use policy is not yet implemented police officers known to use
drugs are removed from the force. In 2007 during the FDD cycle, 29 policemen (out of 650)
were identified as drug users, immediately removed from the program, and released from the
police force.
3.8.2. Equipment
A Stock Record Account (SRA) is used to maintain oversight of ANP equipment. The
ANP SRA has been used at the MoI Interim Logistics Facility (ILF) since 2006 to track and
document equipment receipt, inventory, and issues. The SRA from the ILF provides the
details of all munitions, vehicles, clothing and individual equipment items. The MoI
Technical Department maintains a manual property book to track equipment damaged in
combat.
SECTION 4: U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS

4.1. ANSF Development Efforts
The DoS and U.S. Embassy play a major role in mentoring, shaping, and developing the
ability of Afghan leadership to direct and prioritize the use of security forces countrywide.
Representatives of the U.S. Embassy assist in advising the security sector ministers and
provide assistance in coordinating with the international community and participating in
security sector development planning forums. The U.S. Government provides International
Military Education and Training (IMET) funding to send Afghan military officers to U.S.
military schools for professional development and leadership training. IMET is also provided
for English language training. Further efforts include:
• The U.S. Ambassador provides policy guidance for all U.S. actors in Afghanistan,
with particular emphasis on the development of the ANP. INL provides trainers and
mentors to assist CSTC-A in executing the police program. INL’s specific mandate is
to assist in the development of the police through training in accordance with
direction from CSTC-A.
• The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), in conjunction with INL and the U.S.
Embassy’s Counter-Narcotics Task Force, is the lead U.S. agency for
counternarcotics planning and operations.
• The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Afghan Engineering District supports CSTC-A’s
efforts in planning and programming infrastructure development for the ANSF, as
well as supporting (as needed) USAID’s infrastructure development efforts in
Afghanistan.
• The United States works with the IPCB in order to coordinate its efforts and train
Afghan police more efficiently and professionally.
The U.S Government, the GIRoA, and international entities coordinate their security
sector development activities through the Policy Action Group, the Security Operations
Group, and the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board. DoS and CSTC-A also coordinate
their efforts through these forums.
The Policy Action Group (PAG) is a committee composed of GIRoA ministers,
international agencies (e.g., United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA),
EU, NATO, and ambassadors from key donor nations such as the United Kingdom (UK),
Canada, and the Netherlands), and others. The PAG was created to address issues pertaining
to four southern provinces (Nimroz, Helmand, Kandahar, and Zabol). Over time the PAG has
become a forum for discussing overarching national issues (e.g., regulation of private security
companies and reconciliation). The PAG is scheduled to meet twice monthly and is chaired
by the Afghan National Security Advisor. The U.S. Ambassador, CSTC-A Commander, and
the ISAF Commander all attend these sessions. The PAG is chartered to develop joint long-
term strategic security initiatives with the international forces and the ANSF to ensure that a
long-term, consistent approach is adopted towards security, economic development, and
social challenges. All of these efforts are designed to accelerate the development, equipping,
manning, and modernization of the ANSF. Issues to be addressed by the PAG are discussed
in Afghan interagency working groups corresponding to six pillars: security operations,
counternarcotics, reconstruction and development, intelligence fusion, sub-governance, and
strategic communications.
The Security Operations Group (SOG) is composed of representatives at the one- to
three-star general officer rank from MoD, MoI, and NDS; international partners; ISAF; and
U.S. Embassy representatives. The SOG meets weekly, but a SOG Working Group meets
each day to produce an overall security assessment that is passed to Afghan ministries and
ISAF. The SOG provides coordinated guidance and direction for security operations,
facilitating coordination between security operations and other efforts supporting the pillar
groups mentioned above. It is perceived to be the lynchpin of the pillar construct. The SOG
ensures the implementation of security-related decisions made by the PAG. The ANSF are
fully represented at the SOG and brief their requirements to the forum.
The JCMB was established by the GIRoA and the international community for overall
strategic coordination of the ANDS. The 28 JCMB members include ministerial-level
representatives from the GIRoA and the international community who oversee the delivery of
the ANDS. CSTC-A and other U.S. Government participants are critical parts of all JCMB
meetings and working groups. They assist in preparing policy discussions and papers that are
related to the ANSF. The JCMB meets quarterly.
The primary U.S. Government policy-making mechanisms to provide guidance to sustain
and build national military forces and police services capacity are the Afghanistan
Interagency Operations Group, the Afghanistan Steering Group, and the Deputies Committee.
CSTC-A participates in the preparation and coordination of topics that are directly or
indirectly related to the ANSF via these interagency working groups. The groups meet weekly
to discuss all aspects of Afghanistan security policy issues (e.g., ANSF development,
counternarcotics planning, reconciliation, border issues, and election security).
Additionally, CSTC-A coordinates daily with members of the interagency through the
Deputy Commander for Political-Military Affairs (DCG-PMA) and his primary staff who
work and live at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. The DCG-PMA staff coordinates with the
country team at the U.S. Embassy and ensures that ANSF policies and planning are consistent
with policies of other U.S. Government agencies. DCG-PMA is also the main conduit to pass
and coordinate information through the chain of command to the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Joint Staff, and other relevant members of the U.S. Government entities.
CSTC-A assists in hosting and briefing U.S. Government representatives visiting
Afghanistan. CSTC-A officials also make periodic visits to Washington in order to discuss
key issues with U.S. Government officials.
4.2. Efforts to Ensure Progress in Other Pillars of the Afghan Security Sector
4.2.1. Rule of Law

The U.S. Government is developing its own strategy to support the GIRoA in
establishing the rule of law in Afghanistan that is coordinated through the U.S. Embassy and
incorporates U.S. military efforts. Priority areas of the U.S. strategy include: accelerating
institutional reform; building provincial infrastructure and capacities; bolstering
counternarcotics and anti-corruption prosecutions; investing in the corrections system;
improving linkages between police and prosecutors; and focusing on public awareness and
legal aid to improve public confidence in and access to the justice system. These efforts
support the overall U.S. Government push to project governance to the provincial and district
levels, which in turn will build nationwide confidence in the central Government’s ability to
provide security and services. U.S. Government agencies currently pursuing justice sector and
rule of law efforts include: DoD, Department of Justice (DoJ), DoS, and USAID.
The Special Committee on the Rule of Law (SCROL), established in 2006 and chaired by
the U.S. Embassy Rule of Law (ROL) Coordinator, meets on a weekly basis. The SCROL
provides a mechanism to organize, coordinate, and deconflict ROL programs and policy
issues among elements of the Embassy; to highlight unresolved issues for decision by the
ambassador; and to present a consistent face to the justice sector ministries.
4.2.2. Counternarcotics
CN operations are severely constrained by the capacity of the Afghan law enforcement
and judicial systems. As a result, DoD, DoS, DoJ, DEA, USAID and the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) are working to build the infrastructure necessary for the GIRoA to
conduct legitimate law enforcement operations against narcotics traffickers.
The U.S. counternarcotics strategy focuses on helping the GIRoA disrupt Afghanistan’s
opium-based economy and strengthen the central government’s control over the country.
DoD, INL, USAID, Department of Justice (DoJ), and DEA collectively promote the “Five
Pillar” Afghan National Drug Control Strategy. The five pillars include:
• Public Information: Designed as a year-round, nationwide program focused on

helping the GIRoA achieve sustainable reductions in poppy cultivation and
production through public information, engagement, and education, the most recent
campaign has increased its emphasis on person to person community outreach
initiatives through local Shuras that engage trusted local opinion leaders.
• Alternative Development: Designed to help the GIRoA establish economic
alternatives to the cultivation of poppy for the Afghan people, this includes short-
term cash-for-work projects and comprehensive agricultural and business
development projects.
• Elimination/Eradication: Designed to help the GIRoA deter and reduce the

cultivation of opium poppy through incentives while also building a credible forced
eradication capability, this program includes support for Governor-Led Eradication
and the centrally-led Poppy Eradication Force.
• Interdiction: Interdiction efforts focus on decreasing narcotics trafficking and
processing in Afghanistan by helping the GIRoA to build its capacity to disrupt and
dismantle the most significant drug trafficking organizations. Groups such as the
CNPA, the Afghanistan Special Narcotics Force, and the National Interdiction Unit
of the CNPA are being equipped to arrest and prosecute the command and control
elements of narcotics trafficking organizations.
• Law Enforcement/Justice Reform: Both police and justice sector efforts help the
GIRoA increase overall rule of law, specifically in the area of narcotics-related law
enforcement. U.S. advisors mentor the Afghan Criminal Justice Task Force’s pursuit
of narcotics and public corruption cases through the Central Narcotics Tribunal in
Kabul. Building the overall justice system has a direct effect on expanding the rule of
law and thus on enhancing counternarcotics law enforcement efforts.
CSTC-A serves in a coordinating role with the U.S. agencies listed above. CSTC-A also
coordinates with counternarcotics specialists at ISAF, CJTF-101, the UN Office on Drugs and
Crime, and the U.K Embassy. Finally, CSTC-A provides a representative to the Counter-
Narcotics Sub-PAG meetings hosted by the Afghan Ministry of Counter-Narcotics.
Through the various staff agencies, CSTC-A trains, equips, and supports members of the
ANP and ANA that are involved either directly or indirectly in the counternarcotics effort.
CSTC-A funds training at the Counter-Narcotics Police Academy and is assisting the MoD in
its efforts create a new unit, the Counternarcotics Infantry Kandak, intended to provide
security for MoI eradication operations. Additionally, CSTC-A provides a mentor to the
Deputy Minister of Counternarcotics within the MoI.
Current joint DoD-DEA programs have resulted in the construction of the National
Interdiction Unit (NIU) training compound, the installation of equipment for the Sensitive
Investigative Unit and the Technical Investigations Unit and provided advanced training for
the CNPA. Funding for these programs was supplied by DoD. DEA conducted background
checks on applicants and trained those suitable for duty in these elite units. With DoS, DoD
provided funding for the Afghan Joint Aviation Facility and the CN Justice Center, while
providing helicopter flight training to MoI personnel for the creation of an organic lift
capability for Afghan CN organizations. DoD is developing an Unmanned Aerial System
program to provide dedicated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance support to CN
forces. This program will provide situational awareness and force protection for DEA Foreign
Advisory Support Teams (FASTs) and the NIU when conducting operations. DEA deployed
FASTs are supported by DoD and provide guidance, mentoring and bilateral assistance to the
GIRoA and CNPA to identify and disrupt clandestine drug operations. While U.S. military
personnel do not directly participate in law enforcement operations, U.S. forces do provide
medical evacuation and in-extremis support, pilot training, helicopter lift support for
administrative purposes, and intelligence for law enforcement CN missions.
DoD and DEA are working with the MoI to strengthen the capacity of the CNPA. In
FY08, DoD is providing more than $95 million to foster CNPA development. Some major
DoD-funded initiatives are: Afghan helicopter crew member training, Mi-17 helicopter
operations and maintenance, aviation facilities, NIU sustainment training, DEA mentoring
and training program, expansion of the CNPA headquarters compound, and construction of
two regional law enforcement centers. DoD has long-term plans to further support the
capacity building of GIRoA law enforcement CN forces.
DoD also plays an integral role in building the operational capacity of the Afghan Border
Police (ABP) and Afghan Customs Department (ACD). The ABP and ACD require extensive
support if they are to effectively control Afghanistan’s 5,000 plus kilometer border. To help
the GIRoA meet this challenge, DoD funded a DoS program, the Border Management
Initiative (BMI). The purpose of BMI is to improve security and promote stability in the
border regions, and to increase interdiction capacity. In FY08, DoD will provide over $14
million to build the capacity of the ABP and ACD. At the request of DoS, DoD funded the
development of the U.S. Embassy Border Management Task Force (BMTF). The BMTF
provides oversight and management of U.S. border initiatives and assists the GIRoA with
border issues. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) looks to the BMTF
as the focal point for border management issues on behalf of the international community.
Under the BMTF, U.S. mentors are provided to the ABP and ACD for border crossing points
at Islam Qalah and Towrkham. DoD-funded construction of several border crossing points in
Afghanistan and the region to include Sher Khan Bander, Towragundhi, and Islam Qalah. A
communications system was also purchased for the ABP to support key command and control
functions. Non-intrusive detection capability (x-ray and gamma scanners) has been provided
to support inspections at major border crossing points and airports.
The DoS works within the five pillar plan to coordinate public information campaigns
and poppy eradication. DoS and DoJ work together to increase the capacity and competence
of the Afghan judicial system, train prosecutors, and build the infrastructure necessary to
indict, arrest, try, convict, and incarcerate drug traffickers. DEA is in the process of
developing a three-to-five-year expansion plan for DEA operations in Afghanistan. USAID
provides devolvement opportunities for the Afghan people, and is building roads, installing
irrigation, constructing cold storage facilities, and introducing improved farming techniques
to the Afghan people with the goal of providing viable alternatives to opium cultivation.
4.2.3. Demobilizing, Disarming, and Reintegrating Militia Fighters

In May 2005, Takim-e-Solh (PTS) was established as an independent commission by
presidential decree. PTS is reconciliation program for the former insurgent fighters. The
Office of the Afghan National Security Council (ONSC) provides oversight for the
commission. At the outset, ONSC assigned a full-time PTS program manager and the former
Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan assigned a full-time contractor to the program, in
addition to providing CJ2 and CJ5 directorate support. Since its inception, PTS has reconciled
5,000 Afghans. Since December 2006, CSTC-A has maintained oversight of PTS. CSTC-A’s
role in PTS is under transition, and management options are being explored.
The program receives donor funding from USAID, the U.K., and the Netherlands. The
United States contributes $1.3 million to the program, and the U.K. and the Netherlands
contribute $390,000 collectively. The United States pays for PTS employee salaries and
overhead operating expenses, including rent and administrative expenses for the main office
in Kabul and 10 of 11 field offices. U.S. funding has been constant since the outset of the PTS
reconciliation program. On 1 April 2007, USAID assumed the primary funding role.
SECTION 5: NATO-ISAF EFFORTS

5.1.1. Donation and Funding Coordination

The CSTC-A DCG-ISC coordinates closely with the ISAF DATES in order to effectively
coordinate both NATO and non-NATO donations to the ANA. CSTC-A also works closely
with the MoI and the IPCB Secretariat to coordinate international donations for the ANP. The
ISC advertises the training and equipment needs of the ANA and ANP and then manages the
details of integrating donated requirements into the force. Donations are coordinated through
CSTC-A to validate the necessity, suitability, and sustainability of each donation.
5.1.2. Mentoring and Training

NATO ISAF supports ANA training and mentoring in three main areas: generating and
deploying OMLT teams; filling CSTC-A training billets; and providing functional area
mentoring, mobile niche training, schools, and courses. DCG-ISC coordinates the validation
and fielding of OMLTs through cooperation with ISAF DATES. Currently, there are a total of
32 validated OMLTs. This number is insufficient to meet current needs. Furthermore, some
OMLTs come into the country with national caveats that prevent them from deploying with
ANA units out of their home area of operations, thus hindering operational flexibility. The
shortage of OMLTs delays ANA development and has a further adverse effect on police
mentoring. At present, the police mentor mission is significantly under-resourced. ISAF does
not directly support ANP development with resources. However, the more NATO OMLTs in
the field, the more U.S. military assets can be applied to the police mentor mission.
Functional area and niche training efforts include officer and commando training provided by
France and NCO and officer training provided by the U.K.
5.1.3. Operations
ISAF’s operational approach to counterinsurgency is to build Afghan capacity while
degrading destabilizing influences. Accordingly, the ISAF Partnership Program continues to
enhance the capabilities of the ANSF to plan, gather intelligence, conduct independent
operations sustainable at the battalion level, and to integrate enablers in order to enhance
security. At the tactical level, ISAF has begun to integrate ANA forces into planning and
conducting operations in various degrees depending on the capabilities of the ANA and the
respective Regional Commander’s intent and objectives. Additionally, key leader
engagements, medical operations, humanitarian aid missions, and combined presence patrols
provide a venue for ANSF forces to interact and discuss needs and local improvements with,
and create trust among the local populace, Afghan leadership, ANSF, and ISAF. As trust
increases, support for the GIRoA, ANA, and ANP evolves proportionately. An example of
improved trust and confidence among Afghan civilians is their reporting of enemy activity,
including improvised explosive device emplacements, suspicious activity, and potential future
attacks.
RC-East is the most advanced regional command in regards to coordination of ISAF
Operations with the ANA. ISAF forces in RC-East have benefited from having the most
capable ANA units currently fielded, the 201st and 203rd Corps, deployed in their area of
operation. The integration of the ANA into RC East efforts has contributed to increasing the
ANA ability to successfully plan, coordinate, and execute combined operations. RC-East also
complements the PMT effort at the district level. International forces are employed in
coordination with CSTC-A to maximize mentorship opportunities for police forces
throughout the country, providing some level of mentorship coverage where the PMTs are
unable to do so. RC East forces have also created programs that enhance police training at the
RTCs.
5.1.4. Sustaining Institutions

ISAF efforts to reform and establish ANSF-sustaining institutions are somewhat limited
at this time but are beginning to increase, with work focused on the MoD and ANA GS. ISAF
does not have a mandate to support police operations or ANP development.
ISAF recently began to integrate the GS into its planning and coordination processes. The
effort was initiated and continues to be facilitated by CSTC-A and serves two purposes: (1)
develop the operational planning and coordination ability of the ANA and (2) integrate the
GS into ISAF planning for future operations. RC East works to integrate the ANA GS into
planning for the RC East area of operation through regular interfaces. ISAF headquarters staff
advises MoD and ANA GS officers on the conduct and planning of security operations in
regular meetings. These meetings include:
• A monthly War Council meeting with the ISAF Commander, CSTC-A Commander,
ANA Chief, GS, and other key leaders;
• A weekly Operations Review with the ISAF Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
and the ANA GS G3;
• A weekly Short-Term Planning Coordination Meeting among ISAF CJ35, CSTC-A
CJ5, and ANA GS G3 key staff members; and
• A weekly Long-Term Planning Coordination Meeting among ISAF CJ5 and ANA
GS G3 key staff members.
5.2. Efforts to Ensure Progress in Other Pillars of the Afghan Security Sector
5.2.1. Counternarcotics (CN)

ISAF does not have a direct CN mission; however, ISAF assistance to CN activities is a
key supporting task. ISAF is providing CN support consistent with its operations plan. The
U.K. and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) have assisted the GIRoA
in producing its National Drug Control Strategy. CSTC-A coordinates with counternarcotics
specialists at the U.S. Embassy, ISAF, CJTF-101, the UNODC, and the U.K. Embassy.
5.2.2. Demobilizing, Disarming, and Reintegrating Militia Fighters

ISAF supports the disbandment of illegal armed groups (IAGs), contributing to the
GIRoA’s goal of establishing a secure environment through disarmament. In its areas of
operations, ISAF units participate in the disbandment of IAGs within their means,
capabilities, and mandates; authorized rules of engagement; and applicable national caveats.
This support amounts to active participation in policy development at both national and
provincial government levels; planning support and coordination; information gathering;
information operations; situation monitoring; influencing IAG commanders; and, in extremis,

logistic and medical support.
SECTION 6: OTHER INTERNATIONAL PARTNER EFFORTS

6.1. Funding and Donation Coordination
CSTC-A works closely with DSCA to ensure that funds from donor nations are spent in
the most efficient and productive manner possible. DCG-ISC and the IPCB encourage the
Coalition partners to donate funding for equipment, training, engineering projects, or to trust
funds set up by SHAPE to cover equipment transportation costs from donor countries to
Afghanistan. As part of the CSTC-A headquarters, the DCG-ISC concentrates on
international donations (both lethal and non-lethal), international training, international
military relations, and mentorship of the MoD’s International Military Affairs Department. A
detailed description of the funds coordination process can be found in section 1.5.2 of this
report.
CSTC-A encourages and facilitates international training efforts by educating the

international community on requirements and encouraging the provision of key leader and
staff mentors, International Police Mentor Teams (IPMTs), and MTTs to assist in the
development of both the MoD and MoI and their subordinate organizations. DCG-ISC
coordinates the validation and fielding of IPMTs through cooperation with ISAF DATES.
Currently, the U.K., Canada, and the Netherlands are providing IPMTs in Afghanistan.
There are several bilateral MTTs in Afghanistan, including one from Mongolia and two from
Romania. Additionally, several countries are supporting the establishment of institutions such
as the Command and General Staff College (France), the Drivers-Mechanics School
(Germany), and the Kabul Military High School (Turkey).
Many of our international partners participate in the same coordinating forums discussed
above (e.g., PAG, SOG, and JCMB). Still, many groups and programs exist to promote
reform and ANSF sustainment independent of the U.S. Government process and NATO-
ISAF.
The Interagency Coordination Team (IACT) is the coordinating mechanism between the
PAG pillar working groups and the PAG itself. The IACT is chaired by a member of the
ONSC. IACT members attend the Pillar working group meetings and serve as the liaison for
the PAG. Members of CSTC-A, UNAMA, and GIRoA attend the IACT sessions. Aided by a
standing secretariat, the IPCB is the principal means for both Afghan and international
community coordination with regard to the ANP. The primary international institutions
represented at the IPCB include the European Commission, EUPOL, and UNAMA. CSTC-A
and the U.S. Embassy are IPCB members and assist in ANP reform by developing a common
approach to policing that reflects the challenges of the security environment, the need to
protect communities, and the requirement to strengthen policing skills. CSTC-A has a full
time staff member on the IPCB Secretariat.
The Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) was established in May 2002
and is managed by the United Nations Development Program. LOTFA finances are disbursed
to the MoI through the Ministry of Finance in support of ANP salaries and rations.
CSTC-A supports Training Program Development at the Office of the National Security
Council (ONSC) through educational programs. The programs are provided by several
institutions, including:
• The George C. Marshall European Center for Strategic Studies (GCMC) in

Garmisch, Germany;
• The Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA) in Washington, D.C;
• The Naval Post Graduate School in Monterrey, California; and
• The National Defense University (NDU), Washington, D.C.
GCMC courses include the Senior Executive Seminar; Program on Advanced Security
Studies; Program on Terrorism/Security Studies; and the Stability, Security, Transition, and
Reconstruction Course. NESA offers the Senior Executive Seminar and the Seminar on
Counter-Terrorism and the Afghanistan-Pakistan Workshop in Washington, D.C. NDU
courses include Civilian-Military Response to Terrorism and the Masters Program in
Counter-Terrorism. Other educational opportunities include the UK-taught MoD/ANA
Leadership Management Training Project in Kabul.
LIST OF ACRONYMS
AAR After Action Review
ABP Afghan Border Police
ANSF Afghanistan National Security Forces
ANA Afghan National Army
ANAAC Afghan National Army Air Corps
ANCOP Afghan National Civil Order Police
ANP Afghan National Police
ASFF Afghan Security Forces Fund
AUP Afghan Uniform Police
AWOL absent without leave
BAG Budget Activity Group
CATO Combined Air Terminal Operations
CJTF-101 Combined Joint Task Force-101
CM apability Milestone
CONUS Continental United States
COP common operating picture
Core-IMS Core Information Management System
CNPA Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan
CSTC-A Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
DATES Directorate of Army Training and Education Support (ISAF)
DCG-ISC Deputy Commanding General for International Security Cooperation
DCG-PMA Deputy Commanding General for Political-Military Affairs

DCMA Defense Contract Management Agency
DEA Drug Enforcement Administration
DOJ Department of Justice
DOS Department of State
DSCA Defense Security Cooperation Agency
ETT Embedded Training Team
EUPOL European Union Police
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FDD Focused District Development
FMS Foreign Military Sales
FSD Forward Support Depot
GCMC George C. Marshall European Center for Strategic Studies
GIRoA Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GS General Staff
HF high frequency
HMMWV high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle
IA Internal Affairs
IACT Interagency Coordination Team
IAG illegal armed group
I-ANDS Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy
IET initial entry training
IG Inspector General
INL Bureau of Narcotics and Law Enforcement
IPCB International Police Coordination Board
IPMT International Police Mentor Team
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
JCMB Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board
JPCC Joint Provincial Coordination Center
JRCC Joint Regional Coordination Center
KAIA Kabul International Airport
LCMC Life Cycle Management Command
LNO liaison officer
LOFTA Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan
LTV Light Tactical Vehicle
MIPR Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request
MoD Ministry of Defense
MoI Ministry of Interior
MOR Memorandum of Request
MTT Mobile Training Team
MTV Medium Tactical Vehicle
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAV National Asset Visibility
NCO non-commissioned officer
NESA Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies
NDS National Directorate for Security
NDU National Defense University

NMCC National Military Command Center
NPCC National Police Command Center
OMLT Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team
ONSC Office of the National Security Counsel
PAG Policy Action Group
PASR Personnel Accounting and Strength Reporting
PBAC Program Budget Activity Council
PMT Police Mentor Team
RC Regional Command
RLC Regional Logistics Center
ROL Rule of Law
RRS Readiness Reporting System
RTC Regional Training Center
SAG Sub-Budget Activity Group
SCROL Special Committee on the Rule of Law
SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SOG Security Operations Group
SPBS-R Standard Property Book System-Reinstated
SSR Security Sector Reform
UK United Kingdom
UMR Unit Manning Roster
UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDOC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNDP United Nations Development Program
U.S. United States
USAID United States Agency for International Development
VTT Validation Training Team
Chapter 5
U.S. EFFORTS TO DEVELOP CAPABLE

AFGHAN POLICE FORCES FACE CHALLENGES
AND NEED A COORDINATED, DETAILED PLAN
TO HELP ENSURE ACCOUNTABILITY *
Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss U.S. efforts to assist in the development of
Afghan National Police (ANP) forces and the establishment of rule of law in Afghanistan. My
testimony is based on our concurrently issued report[1] regarding U.S. efforts to develop the
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which consist of the Afghan National Army
(ANA) and the ANP. According to Defense, an improved police force is vital to stabilizing
and maintaining security throughout Afghanistan. U.S. support for the ANP began in 2002
and increased significantly in 2005 in response to deteriorating security in Afghanistan and
concerns that ANP development was proceeding too slowly. U.S. activities currently include
manning, training, and equipping of police forces as well as efforts to reform the Afghan
Ministry of Interior, which oversees the ANP.[2]
My testimony today focuses on (1) U.S. efforts to develop capable ANP forces; (2)
challenges that affect the development of capable ANP forces; and (3) our analysis of U.S.
efforts to develop a coordinated, detailed plan for completing and sustaining the ANSF,
including the ANP. Over the course of our work, we reviewed and analyzed Defense
reporting and planning documents. In addition, we interviewed cognizant Defense, State, and
contractor officials in Washington, D.C., as well as in Kabul, Afghanistan, where we also met
with Afghan government officials. We also visited an equipment warehouse and police
training facilities.
We conducted our work for the concurrently issued report from March 2007 through June
2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to
*
Excerpted from GAO Report GAO-08-883T, dated June 18, 2008.
216 Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.
provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We
believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
ABSTRACT
Since 2002, the United States has provided about $6.2 billion[3] to train and equip
the ANP. However, as of April 2008, no police unit was assessed as fully capable of
performing its mission. Over three-fourths of the police units were assessed as not
capable—the lowest capability rating Defense assigns to units that have been formed. As
of the same date, the ANP had reportedly grown in number to nearly 80,000—about 97
percent of the force’s end-strength of 82,000. However, the extent to which the ANP has
truly grown is questionable given concerns that have been raised by Defense about the
reliability of police manning figures.
Building a capable ANP requires manning, training, and equipping forces; however,
several challenges have impeded U.S. efforts to build a capable ANP.
• The shortage of police mentors has impeded U.S. efforts to conduct training, evaluation,
and verification that police are on duty.[4] As of April 2008, only about 32 percent (746
of 2,358) of required military mentors were present in Afghanistan.[5] According to
Defense, the shortfall in military mentors is due to the higher priority assigned to
deployments of U.S. military personnel elsewhere, particularly Iraq.
• The ANP continues to encounter difficulties with equipment shortages and quality. As of
February 2008, shortages remained in several types of police equipment that Defense
considers critical, such as trucks, radios, and body armor. In addition, Defense officials
expressed concerns about the quality and usability of thousands of weapons donated to
the police. For example, officials estimated that only about 1 in 5 of the nearly 50,000
AK-47 automatic rifles received through donation was of good quality. In addition,
distribution of hundreds of equipment items on hand has been delayed due to limited
police ability to account for equipment provided to them.
• The ANP faces a difficult working environment. For example, although a working
judiciary is a prerequisite for effective policing, State noted that much of Afghanistan
continues to lack a functioning justice sector. In addition, police in the field face
consistent problems with pay, corruption, and attacks.
In November 2007, Defense began a new initiative called Focused District

Development to address some of these concerns. Under this initiative, the entire police
force of a district is withdrawn to train as a unit—similar to the way Defense trains the
Afghan army—and receive all authorized equipment. We have not fully assessed this
new initiative; however, the continuing shortfall in police mentors may put this effort at
risk.
Despite our 2005 recommendation and a 2008 congressional mandate, Defense and
State have yet to develop a coordinated, detailed plan with milestones for completing and
sustaining the Afghan police and army forces. In 2007, Defense produced a 5-page
document intended to meet our 2005 recommendation. However, the document does not
identify the role or involve the participation of State—Defense’s partner in training the
ANP. Further, State has not developed a plan of its own. In the absence of a coordinated,
detailed plan that clearly states the various agencies’ roles and responsibilities, a dual
U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan Police Forces Face Challenges 217
chain of command exists between Defense and State that has complicated the efforts of
civilian mentors training the police.
Defense’s 5-page document also contains few milestones, including no interim
milestones that would enable assessment of progress made in developing the ANP. While
Defense maintains that its monthly status reports allow progress to be monitored, these
status reports also lack the interim milestones and end dates needed to determine if U.S.
efforts are on track. Similarly, although Defense’s newly adopted Focused District
Development initiative involves considerable resources and is projected to last until 2012
at a minimum, Defense has not identified interim milestones or a consistent end date by
which to gauge the progress of this new effort. Without interim milestones against which
to assess the ANP, it is difficult to know if current ANP status represents what the United
States intended to achieve by 2008.
In addition, Defense’s 5-page document lacks a sustainment strategy. U.S. officials
have stated that until Afghan revenues increase substantially, the international
community will likely need to assist in paying sustainability costs. Defense officials in
Washington have not indicated how long and in what ways the U.S. government expects
to continue assisting the ANSF. Without a detailed strategy for sustaining the ANSF, it is
difficult to determine how long the United States may need to continue providing funding
and other resources for this important mission.
To help ensure accountability of U.S. efforts to build a capable ANSF and facilitate
assessment of progress, we included a matter for congressional consideration in our
report issued concurrently with this testimony encouraging Congress to consider
conditioning a portion of future appropriations on completion of a coordinated, detailed
plan to develop the ANSF. Defense disagreed with our matter for congressional
consideration, stating that current guidance provided to the field is sufficient to
implement a successful program to train and equip the ANSF. State also expressed
concerns about conditioning future appropriations on the completion of a detailed plan.
We continue to believe that a coordinated, detailed plan is essential to helping ensure
accountability for U.S. investments and facilitating assessment of progress.
Afghanistan’s security institutions, including its police and judiciary, were severely
damaged prior to the U.S. and coalition overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001.
Reconstitution of the ANP formally began in February 2002 when donor nations agreed
to establish a multiethnic, sustainable, 62,000-member professional police service
committed to the rule of law. Germany volunteered to lead the police reform effort;
however, due, in part, to Afghanistan’s pressing security needs and concerns that the
German training program was moving too slowly, the United States expanded its role in
the police training effort in 2005—including involvement, for the first time, of the U.S.
Department of Defense, as well as increased funding.[6] In May 2007, the Afghan
government and its international partners approved an interim increase in the number of
police forces from 62,000 to 82,000, to be reviewed every 6 months. The force structure
for the police includes Ministry of Interior headquarters and administrative staff,
uniformed police personnel, and several specialized police units. (See app. I for further
details on the force structure and functions of the ANP.)
In addition to enforcing the rule of law, the role of the ANP is to protect the rights of
citizens, maintain civil order and public safety, control national borders, and reduce the
level of domestic and international organized crime, among other activities. Also, the
deterioration in Afghanistan’s security situation since 2005 has led to increased ANP
involvement in counterinsurgency operations, resulting in additional training in weapons
and survival skills and counterinsurgency tactics.
U.S. efforts to organize, train, and equip the ANP are directed by Defense through its
Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan (CSTC-A), with support from
State, which provides policy guidance to the effort and oversight of civilian contractors
implementing police training courses. The primary U.S. contractor involved in training
the ANP is DynCorp International.
From 2002 to 2008, the United States provided about $16.5 billion to train and equip
the ANSF, including about $6.2 billion for the ANP (see table 1). Over 40 percent (about
$2.7 billion) of funds for training and equipping the ANP were provided in fiscal year
2007, in an effort to accelerate ANP development and enhance its capability in response
to increased levels of violence and insurgent activity.
BACKGROUND
Table 1. Defense and State Funding for Training and
Equipping Afghan National Police, Fiscal Years 2002-2008
Dollars in millions
Assistance FY FY FY FY FY FY FY
a
program 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008request Total
Afghan $25.5 $5.0 $223.9 $837.9 $1,299.8 $2,701.2 $1,105.6 $6,198.8
Police
Sources: GAO analysis of Defense and State data.
Note: Totals above include funding from a variety of Defense and State sources. In fiscal years 2007
and 2008, these sources included Afghan Security Forces Funding, Defense Counternarcotics
funding, and International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement counternarcotics funding.
a
Fiscal year 2008 includes approximately $342 million that has been appropriated and approximately
$764 million that has been requested.
Defense has developed criteria—called capability milestones (CM)—to assess police and
army capability. The table below provides descriptions of the capability milestones.
Table 2. Capability Milestones for Afghan National Security Forces
Capability milestone Description

CM1 The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is capable of conducting primary operational
mission(s). Depending on the situation, units may require specified assistance from the
Coalition or international community.
CM2 The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is capable of conducting primary operational
mission(s) with routine assistance from, or reliance on, international community support.
CM3 The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is capable of partially conducting primary
operational mission(s), but still requires assistance from, and is reliant on, international
community support.
CM4 The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is formed but not yet capable of conducting
primary operational mission(s). It may be capable, available, or directed to undertake
portions of its operational mission but only with significant assistance from, and reliance
on, international community support.
Source: CSTC-A.
MOST AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE UNITS ARE RATED AS

NOT CAPABLE OF PERFORMING THEIR MISSION
After an investment of more than $6 billion, Defense reporting indicates that, as of April
2008, no police unit (0 of 433) was assessed as fully capable of performing its mission and
more than three-fourths of units rated (334 of 433) were assessed as not capable (see table
3).[7] Furthermore, among rated units, about 96 percent (296 of 308) of uniformed police
districts and all border police battalions (33 of 33), which together comprise about 75 percent
of the ANP’s authorized end-strength, were rated as not capable.[8]
Table 3. Defense Assessment of ANP Capabilities, as of April 2008
CM2Capable CM3
CM1Fully withCoalition Partially CM4Not Unit Not Formed
a
Police units Capable Support Capable Capable or Not Reporting
Uniformed 0 6 6 296 57
Police
Districts (365)
Border Police 0 0 0 33 0
Battalions
(33)
Civil Order 0 6 2 2 10
Police
Battalions
(20)
Counter 0 0 10 3 2
Narcotics
Police Units
(15)
Number of 0 12 (3%) 18 (4%) 334 (77%) 69 (16%)
ANP units
(433)
a
A uniformed police district that is categorized as “not formed or not reporting” has not been rated by
Defense. A civil order police battalion or a counter narcotics police unit that is categorized as “not
formed or not reporting” is a planned unit or in training.
Six of the remaining 12 uniformed police districts were rated as capable of leading
operations with coalition support, and the other 6 as partially capable. Overall, Defense
assessed approximately 4 percent (18 of 433 units rated) of police units as partially capable
and about 3 percent (12 of 433 units rated) as capable of leading operations with coalition
support. According to Defense reporting as of April 2008, the expected date for completion of
a fully capable Afghan police force is December 2012. However, the benchmark set by the
Afghan government and the international community for establishing police forces that can
effectively meet Afghanistan’s security needs is the end of 2010.
Growth of Police Force Is Difficult to Quantify
Defense reporting indicates that, as of April 2008, nearly 80,000 police had been assigned
out of an end-strength of 82,000. This is an increase of more than double the approximately
35,000 we reported as trained as of January 2005. Despite this reported increase in police
manning, it is difficult to determine the extent to which the police force has grown. As we
noted in May 2007, the Afghan Ministry of Interior produces the number of police assigned
and the reliability of these numbers has been questioned. A Defense census undertaken since
our May 2007 report to check the reliability of ministry payroll records raises additional
concerns about numbers of police reportedly assigned. In September 2007, Defense reported
that it was unable to verify the physical existence of about 20 percent of the uniformed police
and more than 10 percent of the border police listed on the ministry payroll records for the
provinces surveyed. Because Defense’s census did not cover all 34 Afghan provinces, these
percentages cannot be applied to the entire police force. Nonetheless, the results of Defense’s
census raise questions about the reliability of the nearly 80,000 number of police reportedly
assigned.
SEVERAL CHALLENGES IMPEDE DEVELOPMENT

OF CAPABLE POLICE FORCES
Several challenges impede U.S. efforts to build a capable police force. These include (1)
shortages in the police mentors needed to provide training and evaluation and verify that
police are on duty; (2) shortfalls in several types of equipment that Defense considers critical;
(3) a weak judicial system; and (4) consistent problems with police pay, corruption, and
attacks by insurgents. Recognizing these challenges to ANP development, Defense began a
new initiative in November 2007 to reconstitute the uniformed police—the largest component
of the Afghan police. Although this effort is too new to fully assess, the continuing shortfall
in police mentors may put the initiative at risk.
Shortage of Police Mentors Hinders Training,

Evaluation, and Verification of Police on Duty
According to Defense officials, the shortage of available police mentors has been a key
impediment to U.S. efforts to conduct training and evaluation and to verify that police are on
duty. Police mentor teams in Afghanistan consist of both civilian mentors, who teach law
enforcement and police management, and military mentors, who provide training in basic
combat operations and offer force protection for the civilian mentors. As of April 2008, only
about 32 percent (746 of 2,358) of required military mentors were present in country. Due to
this shortage of military mentors to provide force protection, movement of available civilian
mentors is constrained.[9] According to Defense officials, the shortfall in military mentors for
the ANP is due to the higher priority assigned to deploying U.S. military personnel elsewhere,
particularly Iraq.
Defense officials identified the continuing shortfall in police mentors as an impediment to

U.S. efforts to develop the Afghan police in three areas.
First, senior Defense officials, including the commanding general of CSTCA, stated that
the ongoing shortfall in police mentors has been the primary obstacle to providing the field-
based training necessary to develop a fully capable police force. Second, while Defense
recently introduced a monthly assessment tool to be used by mentors to evaluate police
capability and identify areas in need of further attention, CSTC-A identified extremely
limited mentor coverage as a significant challenge to using this tool. Third, the shortage of
available police mentors has impeded U.S. efforts to verify the number of Afghan police on
duty. For example, as of April 2008, Defense could not verify whether any police were
reporting for duty in 5 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces due to the lack of mentors. Without
sufficient police mentors present to conduct field-based training and evaluation and verify
police manning, the development of fully capable, fully staffed Afghan police forces may
continue to be delayed.
Police Continue to Face Difficulties with

Equipment Shortages and Quality
As of February 2008, shortages remained in several types of police equipment that

Defense considers critical, such as trucks, radios, and body armor. In addition, Defense
officials expressed concerns with the quality and usability of thousands of weapons donated
to the police. For example, officials estimated that only about 1 in 5 of the nearly 50,000 AK-
47 automatic rifles received through donation was of good quality (see figure 1).
Source: GAO.
Figure 1. Donated Rifles of Variable Quality.

Our analysis of weekly progress reports produced in 2007 by DynCorp civilian police
mentors provides additional evidence of equipment-related challenges and other logistical
difficulties.[10] Specifically, 88 percent (46 of 52) of weekly reports contained instances of
police operating with equipment of insufficient quality or quantity or facing problems with
facilities or supplies. In addition, 81 percent (42 of 52) of weekly reports contained examples
of limited police ability to account for the equipment provided to them.[11] In July 2007,
CSTC-A initiated efforts to train the police in basic supply and property accountability
procedures. According to CSTC-A, equipment is no longer being issued to police districts
unless the districts’ property officers are first trained. For example, according to Defense,
more than 1,500 trucks have been on hand and ready for issue since late 2007 (see figure 2),
but the Afghan Minister of Interior has delayed distribution of these vehicles until adequate
accountability procedures are established in the target districts.
Source; GAO.
Figure 2. Trucks Awaiting Distribution to ANP.
Police Face Problems with Weak Judicial Sector,

Pay, Corruption, and Attacks
Establishing a working judiciary in Afghanistan based on the rule of law is a prerequisite

for effective policing. However, in 2005, we reported that few linkages existed in Afghanistan
between the Afghan judiciary and police, and the police had little ability to enforce judicial
rulings. Our 2005 report also noted that overall justice sector reform was underfunded and
understaffed. Subsequently, we reported in 2006 and 2007 that rebuilding the Afghan judicial
sector lagged behind the other four security pillars—army, police, combating drugs, and
disarmament.[12] According to State, much of Afghanistan continues to lack a functioning
justice system. In addition, according to CSTC-A, the slow rate at which the rule of law is
being implemented across Afghanistan inhibits effective community policing.
Furthermore, our analysis of DynCorp’s weekly progress reports from 2007 indicates that
police in the field also face persistent problems with pay, corruption, and attacks (see table
4).[13]
Table 4. Examples and Frequency of Problems Faced

by ANP Relating to Pay, Corruption, and Attacks
Frequency of related
Issue Selected examples of problems cited problems
Pay Police not being paid for several months 94 percent (49 of 52
Police receiving incomplete pay weekly reports)
Police quitting due to pay-related problems
Remote location of payment sites leading police to spend
part of pay on transportation
Corruption Police personnel providing weapons or defecting to the 87 percent (45 of 52
Taliban weekly reports)
High-ranking officials engaging in bribery or misconduct
Police collecting unauthorized “tolls” from drivers
Attacks Police targeted by suicide bombers or with improvised 85 percent (44 of 52
explosive devices weekly reports)
Police stations overrun by insurgent forces
Dangerous working conditions causing difficulties in
retaining or recruiting police
Source: GAO analysis of documents provided to State by DynCorp.
Note: Examples provided are illustrative only and do not constitute the entirety of problems that we
found.
New Initiative to Reconstitute Police Has Begun,

but Limited Mentor Coverage Is a Risk Factor
Defense has recognized challenges to ANP development and began a new initiative
called Focused District Development in November 2007 to address them. According to
Defense documentation, the objective of this initiative is to focus resources on reforming the
uniformed police—the largest component of the ANP—as the key to the overall reform of the
ANP. [14] Under this initiative, the entire police force of a district is withdrawn from the
district and sent to a regional training center for 8 weeks to train as a unit—similar to how
Defense trains the Afghan army—and receive all authorized equipment while their district is
covered by the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), a specialized police force
trained and equipped to counter civil unrest and lawlessness.[15] The police force then returns
to its district, where a dedicated police mentor team provides follow-on training and closely
monitors the police for at least 60 days. Defense expects to be able to reconstitute about 5 to
10 districts at a time, with each training cycle lasting about 6 to 8 months. Overall, according
to State, it will take a minimum of 4 to 5 years to complete the initiative.
Defense documentation indicates that no districts had completed an entire Focused
District Development cycle as of April 2008. Until an entire cycle is completed, it will be
difficult to fully assess the initiative. However, limited police mentor coverage may
complicate efforts to execute this new program. Defense documentation identifies sufficient
police mentor teams as the most important requirement for successful reform. However,
according to the commanding general of CSTC-A, the ongoing shortfall in police mentors
available to work with newly trained district police will slow implementation of the initiative.
In addition, a senior Defense official stated that unless the mentor shortage is alleviated, the
number of police mentor teams available to provide dedicated training and monitoring will
eventually be exhausted.
DEFENSE AND STATE HAVE NOT DEVELOPED A COORDINATED,

DETAILED PLAN FOR COMPLETING AND SUSTAINING THE ANSF
In our June 2005 report, we recommended that the Secretaries of Defense and State
develop detailed plans for completing and sustaining the ANSF that contain several elements,
including milestones for achieving stated objectives and a sustainability strategy. Despite the
concurrence of both agencies with our recommendation, Defense and State have not
completed a coordinated, detailed plan for completing and sustaining the ANSF. In the
absence of such a plan, coordination difficulties have occurred and progress is difficult to
assess. In 2008, Congress mandated that the President, acting through the Secretary of
Defense, submit reports to Congress on progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan,
including a comprehensive and long-term strategy and budget for strengthening the
ANSF.[16] Congress also mandated that Defense submit reports on a long-term detailed plan
for sustaining the ANSF.[17] The first submission of each of these reports was due at the end
of April 2008, but neither has yet been provided to Congress.
Recurrent Coordination Difficulties Have Arisen

in the Absence of a Coordinated Plan
In February 2007, Defense provided us a 5-page document that, according to Defense

officials, is intended to meet GAO’s 2005 recommendation for detailed plans to complete and
sustain the ANSF. Although Defense and State are partners in training the ANP, the Defense
document does not identify or discuss the roles and responsibilities of State. State also did not
contribute to the development of this document and has not developed a plan of its own. In
the absence of such a plan, coordination has been a problem. For example, DynCorp stated
that a dual chain of command between Defense and State has affected the efforts of civilian
mentors in multiple ways, such as by producing conflicting guidance and complicating
reporting, placement of personnel, the use of facilities, and training and mentoring activities.
Prior work by the State and Defense inspectors general highlighted the same challenge over a
year ago. While Defense and State have both cited improvements in coordination since our
August 2007 visit to Afghanistan, a coordinated plan that clearly states the various agencies’
roles and responsibilities would nonetheless be beneficial given the continuous turnover of
U.S. government staff. For example, Defense officials told us that CSTC-A staff typically
serve tours of 1 year or less and often have no period of overlap with outgoing officials
during which to gain knowledge about their new positions. Given such turnover and loss of
institutional knowledge, a coordinated, detailed plan that clearly identifies the agencies
involved in developing the ANP and their respective roles and responsibilities could help
incoming personnel become familiarized with their new duties.
Limited Milestones Hinder Assessment of Progress
Defense’s 5-page document developed in response to our 2005 recommendation contains

few milestones, including no interim milestones that would help assess progress made in
developing the ANP. Furthermore, while Defense maintains that the monthly status reports it
produces allow progress to be monitored, these status reports also lack the interim milestones
needed to determine if the program is on track. For instance, Defense status reports as of
April 2008 note that no ANP units (0 of 433) are rated as fully capable and 3 percent (12 of
433) are capable of leading operations with coalition support. Without interim milestones
against which to assess the ANP, it is difficult to know if this status represents what the
United States intended to achieve after 3 years of increased efforts and an investment of more
than $6 billion in the program.
Defense’s monthly status reports also lack consistent end dates. In particular, completion
dates cited in Defense status reports have shifted numerous times during the course of our
review. For instance, the completion dates for development of the ANP stated in monthly
status reports dated June 2007, November 2007, and May 2008 fluctuated from December
2008 to March 2009 to December 2012, with a 3-month period when the completion date was
reported as “to be determined.”
Similarly, although Defense’s newly adopted Focused District Development initiative to
reconstitute the uniformed police involves considerable resources and is expected to last 4 to
5 years at a minimum, no interim milestones or consistent end date for the effort are identified
in Defense’s 5-page document, monthly status reports, or briefings that outline the effort. In
the absence of interim milestones and a consistent end date for Focused District
Development, it will be difficult to determine if this ambitious new effort is progressing as
intended. Furthermore, without an end date and milestones for the U.S. effort to complete and
sustain the entire ANP, it is difficult to determine how long the United States may need to
continue providing funding and other resources for this important mission—one that U.S.
military officials stated may extend beyond a decade.
Defense Document Lacks Sustainment Strategy
Defense’s 5-page document developed in response to our 2005 recommendation does not
provide a detailed strategy for sustaining the ANSF. Defense currently estimates that
approximately $1 billion a year will be needed to sustain the ANP, and expects the
sustainment transition to begin in fiscal year 2009. However, despite the estimate of U.S.
military officials in Afghanistan that U.S. involvement in training and equipping the ANSF
may extend beyond a decade, neither Defense nor State has identified funding requirements
or forecasts beyond 2013.
U.S. officials stated that until Afghan revenues increase substantially, the international
community would likely need to assist in paying sustainability costs. At present, Afghanistan
is unable to support the recurring costs of its security forces, such as salaries, equipment
replacement, and facilities maintenance, without substantial foreign assistance. According to

Defense and State, sustainment costs will be transitioned to the government of Afghanistan
commensurate with the nation’s economic capacity, and the United States and the
international community will need to assist Afghanistan in developing revenues. Defense
officials in Washington have not indicated how long and in what ways the U.S. government
expects to continue assisting the ANSF. Without a detailed strategy for sustaining the ANSF,
it is difficult to determine how long the United States may need to continue providing funding
and other resources for this important mission.
CONCLUSION
Establishing capable Afghan police is critical to improving security in Afghanistan. The
United States has invested more than $6 billion since 2002 to develop the ANP, but no police
forces are assessed as fully capable of conducting their primary mission. As such, interagency
coordination, assessment of progress, and estimation of long-term costs are particularly
important given that Defense has begun a new initiative that is expected to last at least 4 to 5
years and military officials estimate that U.S. involvement in developing the ANP could
exceed a decade. We believe a coordinated, detailed plan that outlines agency roles and
responsibilities, lists clear milestones for achieving stated objectives, and includes a
sustainment strategy may improve coordination and would enable assessment of progress and
estimation of costs. However, despite our prior recommendation and a mandate from
Congress that a plan be developed, Defense and State have not done so. Until a coordinated,
detailed plan is completed, Congress will continue to lack visibility into the progress made to
date and the cost of completing this mission—information that is essential to holding the
performing agencies accountable.
APPENDIX I: STRUCTURE OF THE MINISTRY OF

INTERIOR AND AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE
The Afghan National Police (ANP) currently consists of six authorized components
under the Ministry of Interior. The uniformed police, the largest of these six components,
report to the police commanders of each Afghan province. Provincial commanders report to
one of five regional commanders, who report back to the Ministry of Interior. The other five
authorized components of the ANP all report directly to the ministry (see figure 2).
Figure 2. ANP Chain of Command.
Table 5 provides further detail on the Ministry of Interior and the various components of
the ANP that it oversees.
Table 5. Structure of the Ministry of Interior and Afghan National Police
Ministry of Interior Department of the Government of Afghanistan responsible for the
protection of the country’s international borders and the enforcement of
the rule of law
Afghan Uniformed Police Police assigned to police districts and provincial and regional
commands; duties include patrols, crime prevention, traffic duties, and
general policing
Afghan Border Police Provide broad law enforcement capability at international borders and
entry points
Afghan National Civil Order Specialized police force trained and equipped to counter civil unrest and
Police lawlessness
Criminal Investigative Lead investigative agency for investigations of national interest, those
Division with international links, and those concerned with organized and white-
collar crime
Counter Narcotics Police of Lead law enforcement agency charged with reducing narcotics
Afghanistan production and distribution in Afghanistan
Counter Terrorism Police Lead police and law enforcement efforts to defeat terrorism and
insurgency
Standby Police/Highway No longer authorized
Police/Auxiliary
Police/Customs Police
REFERENCES
[1] GAO, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure
Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National
Security Forces, GAO-08-661 (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2008).
[2] GAO is currently performing a detailed review of U.S. efforts to reform the Afghan
Ministry of Interior and National Police. This report is currently planned for release in
early 2009.
[3] This figure includes $342 million appropriated and $764 million requested in fiscal year
2008.
[4] In this testimony, personnel who train Afghan police in the field are collectively
referred to as mentors. U.S. military personnel who train Afghan police in the field are
referred to as military mentors, while contractors who train Afghan police in the field
are referred to as civilian mentors.
[5] As of the same date, about 98 percent (540 of 551) of the authorized number of civilian
mentors were present in country.
[6] Defense also leads U.S. efforts to develop capable ANA forces.
[7] CSTC-A provided us with capability ratings for 433 police units, which include
uniformed police districts, civil order and border police battalions, and counter
narcotics police units.
[8] This does not include 57 uniformed police districts that Defense assessed as not formed
or not reporting.
[9] Additionally, DynCorp officials stated that moving around Afghanistan to conduct
mentoring operations is difficult due to the size of the country and the lack of roads.
GAO is currently completing a review of U.S. and donor efforts to build roads in
Afghanistan. This report is due to be released in July 2008.
[10] We limited our analysis to 2007 reporting because State was unable to provide a
complete set of weekly reports for prior years. Instances discussed in more than one
report were only categorized and counted the first time they appeared.
[11] GAO is currently performing a detailed review of the accountability of lethal equipment
provided to the ANSF. This report is currently planned for release in early 2009.
[12] GAO, Afghanistan Drug Control: Despite Improved Efforts, Deteriorating Security
Threatens Success of U.S. Goals, GAO-07-78 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2006);
GAO-07-801SP
[13] The security situation in Afghanistan, police performance, and retaining and recruiting
police were other top issues identified in our analysis. These topics are discussed in our
concurrently issued report.
[14] Defense documents indicate that the Afghan border police will also eventually be
reconstituted through the Focused District Development initiative; however, according
to a Defense official, it is uncertain when such efforts will begin.
[15] Defense documents indicate that, in addition to being trained, a district police force
undergoing Focused District Development will also have corrupt leaders replaced by
nationally vetted ones, receive new salaries on parity with Afghan army salary rates,
and have electronic funds transfer accounts established. Defense also has identified the
development of the Afghan justice system as a goal of the Focused District
Development initiative but anticipates limited integration of rule of law reform into the
initiative until summer 2008.
[16] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. 110-181, sec. 1230.
[17] Pub. L. 110-181, sec. 1231.
INDEX
aggression, 5
agricultural, 78, 91, 105, 114, 150, 152, 153, 154,
9 155, 156, 160, 164, 165, 178, 206
agricultural sector, 152, 154, 178
9/11, 68, 92, 93, 106, 107
agriculture, 91, 94, 99, 100, 101, 150, 153, 154, 165,
9/11 Commission, 93, 106
166, 169
aid, 50, 51, 52, 56, 63, 64, 67, 70, 73, 75, 77, 79, 80,
A 81, 86, 87, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 100, 101,
105, 106, 107, 109, 112, 114, 115, 140, 155, 160,
AAR, 212 164, 165, 166, 178, 206, 209
access, 4, 18, 52, 73, 83, 88, 91, 92, 114, 123, 138, air, 6, 12, 14, 18, 35, 46, 55, 66, 69, 71, 74, 79, 80,
140, 141, 142, 146, 150, 151, 153, 159, 161, 162, 82, 86, 87, 88, 89, 105, 122, 126, 158, 174, 180,
163, 170, 178, 192, 206 192, 193
accidental, 53 airports, 94, 174, 208
accountability, 2, 26, 30, 48, 121, 148, 186, 188, al Qaeda, 53, 55, 67, 70, 72, 73, 83, 84, 87, 88, 89,
190, 203, 217, 222, 228 95, 104, 106, 108, 111
accounting, 184 Albania, 103
accuracy, 33, 34, 117, 191 alcohol, 63
achievement, 15, 155 allies, 4, 29, 70, 158, 159, 170, 173
acquisitions, 35 alternative, 57, 66, 72, 91, 93, 99, 100, 101, 117
activism, 87 alternatives, 78, 91, 93, 153, 171, 177, 206, 208
acute, 75, 136 ambassadors, 205
addiction, 113 AMF, 62
adjudication, 137 analysts, 121, 160, 172
administration, 36, 56, 60, 138, 142, 144 anger, 69, 126, 193
administrative, 6, 123, 130, 137, 145, 153, 173, 175, animal diseases, 155
192, 195, 199, 202, 203, 207, 208, 217 animal health, 155
administrators, 81 anti-terrorism, 74, 105
adolescents, 161 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 105
ADT, 153 ants, 66, 85
adult, 163 appendix, 2, 30, 31, 40
adultery, 53 application, 111, 112, 120, 140, 175
adults, 161 appropriations, 4, 30, 33, 50, 67, 80, 82, 89, 91, 93,
affiliates, 115 107, 217
Africa, 82, 113 Arabia, 52, 84, 89, 91, 95, 104, 108
age, 51, 136, 159, 161 armed forces, 114
agent, 168, 185 Army, vii, 1, 5, 8, 12, 13, 15, 19, 32, 34, 35, 45, 50,
agents, 57, 67, 127, 166 67, 74, 77, 78, 79, 82, 98, 99, 112, 117, 121, 122,
232 Index
124, 133, 141, 143, 153, 179, 180, 181, 184, 186, Belgium, 102
187, 192, 194, 195, 204, 212, 215 benchmark, 22, 219
Army Corps of Engineers, 141, 204 benchmarks, 150, 164, 179
arrest, 61, 83, 85, 139, 146, 171, 173, 201, 207, 208 Best Practice, 195, 202
articulation, 44 Bhutan, 114
ash, 206 bilateral aid, 105
Asia, 64, 87, 88, 90, 95, 113, 159, 172, 175, 212, 213 bilateral trade, 90
Asian, 83, 87, 88, 92, 95, 114, 152, 159, 170, 175 billets, 209
assassination, 57, 70, 83 bin Laden, Osama, 72, 84
assault, 20, 80 biodiversity, 157
assaults, 80, 104 biometric, 121, 131, 172, 200, 203
assessment, 6, 16, 17, 25, 32, 43, 58, 84, 111, 117, biometrics, 121
120, 123, 126, 131, 135, 139, 147, 148, 164, 172, births, 52
179, 181, 188, 192, 199, 200, 201, 205, 217, 221, blasphemy, 63, 64
226 block grants, 92
assessment procedures, 188 blocks, 202
assets, 105, 106, 109, 151, 175, 209 BMI, 174, 208
assignment, 45 bonus, 121
asylum, 64 border crossing, 172, 174, 208
Atlantic, 71, 117 border security, 172
attachment, 43 borrowing, 164
attacks, 2, 4, 22, 27, 49, 50, 54, 55, 56, 57, 65, 69, Bosnia, 24
70, 80, 83, 84, 85, 91, 111, 113, 115, 116, 117, bribery, 27, 145, 223
119, 133, 156, 209, 216, 220, 223 bribes, 60, 144, 145
Attorney General, 81, 111, 141, 143, 148 Britain, 50, 58, 62, 68, 69, 71, 75, 78, 79, 81, 82, 85,
auditing, 2, 34, 215 103
Australia, 75, 76, 103 brothers, 57
Austria, 103 Buddha, 53, 72
authority, 2, 52, 55, 59, 61, 73, 105, 113, 117, 118, Buddhist, 51
124, 135, 137, 143, 146, 149, 165, 201, 203 budget deficit, 164
autonomy, 60 building blocks, 157
availability, 10, 29, 139, 184, 185, 200 buildings, 163
avian flu, 161 Bulgaria, 80, 102
aviation, 82, 173, 208 bureaucracy, 80
awareness, 121, 140, 142, 147, 173, 176, 191, 206, buses, 124, 146
207 Bush Administration, 54, 55, 62, 66, 67, 83, 105
Azerbaijan, 76, 103
C
B
Camp David, 60, 72
background information, 124 campaigns, 171, 208
backlash, 66 Canada, 62, 68, 75, 77, 78, 79, 82, 102, 103, 131,
Bahrain, 68, 74 199, 205, 211
Bangladesh, 114 candidates, 3, 13, 16, 124, 132, 133
bank account, 16, 27 capacity, 4, 11, 51, 59, 60, 62, 67, 81, 91, 99, 115,
banking, 109, 138, 164, 193 116, 127, 129, 130, 131, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139,
bankruptcy, 138 140, 141, 142, 144, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151,
banks, 133 152, 153, 154, 155, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 169,
basic needs, 116, 166 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 179, 181, 183,
battery, 125, 193 194, 198, 201, 203, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 226
beating, 61 capacity building, 99, 141, 166, 169, 170, 173, 208
behavior, 63, 201 capital goods, 52
Beijing, 108 career counseling, 121
Index 233
cargo, 19, 74, 80, 126, 193 Co, 19, 32, 54, 65, 83, 88, 150, 175, 184, 186, 212,
carpets, 52 213
carrier, 187 coaches, 166
casting, 105 coal, 90, 156
catalyst, 131, 200 codes, 20, 139, 143
caucuses, 57 coercion, 136
cease-fire, 56, 73 collaboration, 126, 148
cell, 67, 90, 150, 194 collateral, 72
cell phones, 194 collateral damage, 72
censorship, 146 Colombia, 62
CENTCOM, 68, 74 commerce, 158
Central Asia, 64, 87, 88, 90, 92, 95, 113, 152, 170, commodity, 154
172 communication, 19, 30, 134, 139, 177, 184, 191,
Central Bank, 59 193, 201
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 50, 52, 95, 160, Communist Party, 50
163 communities, 81, 99, 113, 131, 148, 154, 163, 200,
certification, 67, 99, 101, 132, 183, 185 211
chain of command, 25, 44, 126, 187, 191, 194, 203, community, 2, 5, 6, 11, 12, 14, 18, 20, 22, 27, 31, 43,
206, 217, 224 56, 59, 66, 67, 89, 94, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116,
channels, 177 118, 120, 128, 133, 135, 137, 138, 139, 140, 143,
Chechnya, 87 144, 145, 147, 152, 154, 158, 163, 166, 170, 174,
chemicals, 143, 170 181, 182, 183, 189, 190, 197, 198, 199, 203, 204,
Chief Justice, 145 205, 206, 208, 211, 217, 218, 219, 222, 225
Chief of Staff, 136, 210 community support, 12, 154, 183, 218
child labor, 146 compensation, 46, 202
child mortality, 161 competence, 112, 113, 180, 208
Child Survival and Health (CSH), 100, 101 competition, 163
children, 52, 89, 91, 161, 163 competitor, 58
China, 56, 64, 65, 87, 88, 90, 174 complement, 71, 135, 201
Christianity, 63, 64 compliance, 62, 142, 149
Christians, 51 components, 35, 142, 190, 226, 227
circulation, 132 composition, 83
citizens, vii, 6, 28, 49, 89, 106, 111, 112, 114, 116, concentrates, 131, 199, 211
117, 142, 146, 178, 217 conditioning, 4, 30, 217
citizenship, 133 confidence, 59, 70, 79, 113, 119, 127, 128, 140, 145,
civil law, 137, 157 168, 180, 188, 197, 206, 209
civil servant, 136, 145 conflict, 4, 51, 52, 63, 86, 95, 114, 135, 150, 178
civil servants, 136, 145 Congress, 2, 4, 9, 20, 25, 29, 30, 31, 33, 47, 55, 66,
civil service, 137 81, 89, 93, 107, 111, 117, 175, 179, 184, 217,
civil service reform, 137 224, 226
civil society, 64, 146, 147, 153 congressional budget, 33
civil war, 52, 53 connectivity, 151
civilian, 7, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, 33, 44, 45, 61, 69, 71, consensus, 80, 147
74, 76, 77, 78, 81, 82, 83, 91, 92, 94, 95, 99, 100, Constitution, 5, 56, 113, 135, 147, 203
113, 118, 119, 129, 130, 133, 146, 154, 157, 165, constraints, 4, 13, 153, 175
166, 167, 170, 187, 189, 196, 198, 199, 217, 220, construction, 65, 73, 78, 81, 88, 90, 101, 114, 129,
222, 224, 228 131, 141, 143, 155, 158, 166, 173, 174, 178, 186,
classes, 133 200, 207, 208
classroom, 24 consulting, 5
cleaning, 145 content analysis, 32
clinics, 52 contractors, 2, 7, 26, 45, 48, 81, 188, 189, 217, 228
Clinton Administration, 53, 54, 90 contracts, 81, 132, 184, 185, 198
closure, 176
234 Index
control, 6, 53, 58, 59, 61, 63, 67, 69, 73, 74, 75, 78, Czech Republic, 76, 78, 79, 80, 102, 103
87, 88, 107, 113, 116, 117, 127, 128, 144, 151,
155, 156, 161, 169, 172, 174, 182, 185, 191, 193,
197, 206, 207, 208, 217 D
conversion, 125, 193
dairy, 155
conviction, 64, 145, 203
danger, 95, 121
coordination, 3, 4, 29, 30, 59, 74, 85, 111, 127, 128,
data analysis, 155
154, 162, 166, 167, 168, 171, 172, 174, 179, 182,
data collection, 149
183, 191, 205, 209, 210, 211, 224, 226
data communication, 193
COP, 191, 212
database, 13, 121, 172, 184, 186, 203
copper, 90, 156
death, 46, 63, 64, 161
corporate finance, 138
death penalty, 63, 64
corruption, 4, 22, 27, 28, 57, 60, 61, 63, 69, 81, 82,
deaths, 59, 70, 82, 86
90, 94, 112, 114, 120, 128, 133, 135, 136, 139,
debt, 52, 90, 100, 150
140, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 159,
decision makers, 9, 46
166, 169, 173, 181, 182, 198, 203, 206, 207, 216,
decision making, 45
220, 223
decision-making process, 126, 188, 194
cost of living, 176
decisions, 31, 60, 62, 71, 138, 145, 169, 185, 203,
cost-effective, 141
205
costs, 3, 7, 11, 29, 43, 46, 68, 73, 92, 100, 114, 118,
defendants, 137
120, 165, 168, 173, 184, 211, 217, 225, 226
defense, 9, 35, 46, 77, 85, 86, 89, 93, 105, 119, 141,
counternarcotics, 8, 97, 113, 138, 140, 142, 170, 171,
146, 183, 186, 196
172, 173, 174, 175, 204, 205, 206, 207, 210, 218
Defense Authorization Act, 4, 68
counter-terror, 84, 128, 133, 134, 143, 175, 197, 201
deficiency, 133
counterterrorism, 175
definition, 31, 43
courts, 114, 137, 138, 142, 145
deforestation, 156
coverage, 24, 25, 28, 70, 146, 150, 161, 194, 195,
degradation, 152, 175
198, 210, 221, 223
degrading, 115, 209
covering, 63, 65, 114
delivery, 21, 56, 112, 126, 136, 137, 148, 169, 177,
CPD, 141
185, 186, 187, 205
crack, 81
demand, 47, 129, 136, 146, 198
credibility, 182
democracy, 64, 98, 99, 101, 180
credit, 114, 153
demographics, 159
crime, 6, 35, 56, 128, 197, 203, 217, 227
denial, 64, 105
crimes, 137, 139
Denmark, 64, 75, 76, 102, 103
criminal activity, 128, 172, 198
Department of Agriculture, 97, 154
criminal justice, 139, 140, 141
Department of Defense, 2, 14, 23, 40, 67, 144, 168,
criminal justice system, 139, 141
197, 217
criminality, 139
Department of Homeland Security, 173, 206
criminals, 113, 172
Department of Justice, 140, 143, 170, 171, 206, 213
criticism, 77, 83, 85, 86, 94
Department of State, 2, 31, 37, 97, 107, 108, 128,
Croatia, 76, 79, 80, 103
130, 143, 170, 184, 189, 213
crops, 66, 152, 153
deported, 178
cross-border, 85, 92, 176
deposits, 156, 157
crossing over, 70
desertion, 79
CRS, 49, 50, 58, 59, 66, 68, 77, 92, 106, 107, 108
desire, 124, 195
cruise missiles, 54
detection, 155, 172, 174, 208
cultivation, 49, 60, 61, 65, 66, 67, 91, 93, 100, 153,
detention, 139, 141, 146, 196
169, 171, 174, 206, 207, 208
detonation, 53
culture, 150
development assistance, 165, 166, 170, 171, 178
currency, 109, 165
Development Assistance (DA), 100
curriculum, 117, 138, 163, 202
dictatorship, 50
cycles, 131, 200, 202
diesel, 91, 151, 160
Index 235
diesel fuel, 160 economic policy, 114

direct action, 85 economic stability, 159
directives, 136 Economic Support Fund, 98
Director of National Intelligence, 58, 111 economics, 155
disability, 161 education, 8, 91, 98, 101, 102, 121, 136, 142, 155,
disbursement, 149, 169 156, 163, 186, 188, 195, 204, 212
discipline, 79, 196, 203 educational programs, 212
discrimination, 53, 63, 120, 146, 148 educational system, 163
diseases, 155 Egypt, 80, 91
displaced persons, 99, 100, 137 elders, 69, 84, 124, 132, 178
disputes, 77, 81, 135, 137, 138, 142, 149 election, 49, 57, 58, 59, 101, 104, 113, 135, 205
distribution, 21, 26, 27, 35, 129, 137, 144, 151, 152, election law, 58
190, 198, 216, 222, 227 electric power, 90, 152, 178
divergence, 160 electrical power, 114, 151, 152
division, 129, 133 electricity, 85, 87, 91, 95, 100, 151, 152
domestic resources, 151, 160 electronic surveillance, 142
domestic violence, 146 emergency medical services, 190
donations, 8, 20, 21, 80, 134, 186, 200, 209, 211 emergency response, 100
donor, 4, 6, 21, 33, 45, 47, 63, 87, 89, 94, 138, 139, employees, 145, 160, 169, 203
140, 144, 150, 151, 178, 186, 205, 208, 211, 217, employment, 64, 123, 153, 154, 156, 164, 178, 192
228 empowerment, 65
donors, 4, 8, 20, 59, 62, 76, 89, 92, 94, 138, 141, encryption, 193
146, 148, 153, 161 end-to-end, 194
draft, 4, 30, 31, 43, 52, 146, 196, 203 energy, 88, 90, 104, 138, 151, 152
drainage, 95 engagement, 2, 12, 33, 34, 54, 77, 88, 118, 175, 183,
drought, 97, 164, 165 206, 210
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 111, 170, English language program, 120, 184
171, 204, 213 enterprise, 155
Drug Enforcement Agency, 67 environment, 43, 99, 112, 118, 120, 122, 127, 149,
drug trafficking, 63, 67, 79, 107, 172, 175, 207 150, 157, 165, 176, 180, 181, 182, 210, 211, 216
drug use, 203 Environmental Protection Agency, 157
drug-related, 164, 172 epidemiology, 155
drugs, 161, 170, 204, 222 equipment, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18, 19, 20,
due process, 137, 145, 203 21, 22, 25, 26, 28, 29, 32, 33, 34, 43, 46, 47, 48,
duties, 11, 35, 81, 105, 130, 135, 164, 198, 201, 225, 74, 76, 80, 81, 87, 93, 94, 100, 118, 120, 121,
227 127, 130, 131, 134, 139, 162, 172, 173, 175, 179,
duty free, 90 184, 185, 186, 187, 190, 194, 196, 200, 201, 203,
duty-free treatment, 90 204, 207, 209, 211, 215, 216, 220, 221, 222, 223,
225, 228
equity, 133, 148, 150
E estimating, 29, 160
Estonia, 80, 102, 103
earthquake, 79, 97
ethical standards, 131, 145, 200
East Timor, 24
ethics, 131, 194, 199, 200, 201
Eastern Europe, 186
ethnicity, 63, 159
economic assistance, 67
EU, 1, 8, 24, 81, 205
economic cooperation, 176
Europe, 109, 113, 117, 186, 214
economic development, 4, 90, 151, 152, 153, 159,
European Commission, 211
164, 170, 205
European Union, 1, 33, 59, 72, 81, 83, 189, 213
economic growth, 89, 101, 114, 119, 151, 156, 158,
evacuation, 12, 18, 35, 46, 128, 173, 175, 207
159, 160, 164, 165, 166
evolution, 78
economic growth rate, 151
execution, 11, 19, 26, 136, 149, 167, 184, 185
economic migrants, 178
Executive Branch, 136
economic performance, 164
236 Index
Executive Order, 73, 105 firms, 148, 154

exercise, 135 fiscal policy, 114, 164
expenditures, 114, 165 fitness, 7
expert, iv, 143 flexibility, 77, 118, 119, 209
expertise, 153, 155, 157, 198, 199 flight, 67, 127, 173, 207
exploitation, 64 flood, 127
explosives, 53, 86 flooding, 156
exporter, 165 flow, 172
Export-Import Bank, 106 fluid, 120, 181
exports, 90, 105, 154, 164 FMF, 98, 99
exposure, 116 focusing, 14, 66, 96, 131, 140, 162, 169, 200, 206
expulsion, 115 food, 52, 69, 97, 101, 114, 154, 155, 156, 165
extraction, 173 food aid, 101, 155
extradition, 143 food commodities, 97
extremism, 73 food safety, 156
foodstuffs, 165
foreign aid, 79, 114
F foreign assistance, 11, 169, 226
Foreign Direct Investment, 114
F-16, 76, 80
Foreign Military Financing, 97
failure, 57, 60, 84, 117
Foreign Military Sales, 185, 213
fairness, 196
Foreign Relations Committee, 71
faith, 63
foreign travel, 106
family, 16, 58, 124, 132, 153, 154, 195
foreigners, 51
family income, 153, 154
forensic, 139
family members, 16, 58
forest management, 155
farmers, 66, 91, 152, 153, 154, 175
forestry, 154, 156
farming, 62, 152, 171, 208
France, 68, 75, 77, 78, 79, 102, 118, 209, 211
farming techniques, 171, 208
fraud, 169
fax, 151
free trade, 90
fear, 62, 86, 87, 116, 117, 138
free trade agreement, 90
fears, 87, 88
freedom, 63, 64, 107, 146, 147, 158
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 143, 213
Freedom Support Act (FSA), 64, 65, 92, 93
federal law, 172
freedoms, vii, 49, 50, 146
Federal Register, 67
freight, 90
feedback, 202
fruits, 52, 153
feeding, 161
frustration, 56, 69
fees, 109
FTA, 90
feet, 52, 90, 156
fuel, 86, 114, 165
females, 58, 97, 163
fulfillment, 68
fencing, 84
funding, 2, 5, 7, 8, 10, 19, 20, 21, 26, 29, 30, 31, 33,
FFP, 97, 156
43, 47, 51, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 82, 90, 91, 95, 107,
fiber, 150
113, 120, 129, 139, 140, 141, 145, 151, 152, 155,
fighters, 50, 55, 62, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 77, 83, 85, 86,
156, 157, 159, 166, 168, 169, 173, 179, 183, 184,
87, 116, 208
185, 186, 204, 207, 208, 211, 217, 218, 225, 226
film, 64
funds, vii, 8, 20, 21, 27, 33, 47, 48, 50, 52, 62, 64,
finance, 65, 153, 169, 203
65, 78, 79, 80, 82, 84, 86, 89, 91, 92, 94, 96, 99,
financial institution, 161
100, 101, 105, 109, 120, 137, 138, 140, 145, 166,
financial support, 114, 121, 122, 137, 182
168, 169, 172, 184, 185, 207, 211, 218, 228
financing, 87, 150, 156
fusion, 67, 205
Finland, 103
fire, 12, 57, 80, 90, 121, 125, 127, 193, 203
firearms, 129
fires, 56
Index 237
guiding principles, 118

G guilt, 127
guilty, 145
games, 63
guns, 13, 19, 26, 80, 125, 134, 186, 193, 200
GAO, 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20,
23, 26, 28, 30, 31, 35, 36, 40, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47,
48, 215, 218, 219, 221, 222, 223, 224, 227, 228 H
gas, 52, 88, 90, 91, 151, 156
Gates, Robert, 113 hands, 169
gauge, 45, 217 harm, 116
Gazprom, 108 harvest, 65, 154, 160
GDP, 51, 149, 151, 152, 159, 164, 165 healing, 74
GDP per capita, 159, 164 health, 11, 52, 53, 65, 78, 89, 91, 97, 99, 101, 113,
gender, 141, 142, 150 120, 124, 133, 146, 149, 150, 155, 159, 161, 162,
gender equity, 150 169, 184, 190
Generalized System of Preferences, 105 health care, 53, 78, 91, 146, 149, 161, 162, 190
generation, 11, 13, 60, 94, 151, 152, 184, 185 health care sector, 91
generators, 20, 151 health care system, 190
Geneva, 4, 51, 56 health clinics, 120, 184
Georgia, 19, 76, 155 health services, 52, 161, 162
Germany, 4, 7, 45, 52, 56, 74, 75, 76, 78, 79, 81, 88, healthcare, 114
102, 103, 211, 212, 217 hearing, 71
gestures, 72 height, 55, 124, 195
gifts, 72 helicopters, 73, 76, 77, 80, 95, 118, 126, 173, 186,
girls, 52, 65, 94, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 146 193
Global War on Terror, 33, 68, 92, 101 helmets, 80
goals, 3, 11, 16, 30, 44, 45, 62, 111, 115, 127, 135, heroin, 113
139, 148, 151, 152, 153, 155, 156, 163, 170, 171, high school, 163
172, 179, 188, 191, 195 higher education, 163
gold, 109, 156 high-level, 142, 143, 146, 150
governance, 49, 58, 60, 61, 63, 64, 66, 81, 93, 98, 99, Homeland Security, 173, 206
100, 101, 112, 115, 116, 119, 127, 131, 135, 137, homogenous, 90
140, 147, 148, 149, 150, 159, 165, 166, 167, 170, horizontal integration, 188, 189
172, 200, 205, 206 horse, 104
government revenues, 31, 43 hospital, 85, 91, 161, 162, 181
government-to-government, 156 hospitalization, 162
governors, 58, 61, 147, 166, 171 hospitalized, 121
GPS, 191 hospitals, 76, 162, 190
grades, 134 host, 73, 84, 127, 155, 156
grains, 154 household, 4
grants, 92, 203 households, 91, 151, 152, 153, 161
Greece, 76, 80, 102, 118 housing, 36
grids, 152 hub, 73
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 114, 151, 164 human, 63, 64, 79, 81, 93, 114, 124, 135, 136, 141,
grouping, 54, 88, 104 142, 146, 148, 150, 161, 162, 166, 169, 173, 176,
groups, 2, 17, 53, 54, 58, 62, 65, 77, 83, 86, 87, 104, 181, 199
115, 137, 146, 176, 184, 189, 205, 210, 211 human capital, 114, 136
growth, 16, 66, 89, 101, 112, 114, 119, 132, 133, human resource development, 161
135, 149, 151, 152, 153, 156, 158, 159, 160, 163, human resources, 169, 181
164, 165, 166, 174 human rights, 63, 64, 79, 81, 93, 114, 124, 135, 141,
GSP, 105 142, 146, 150, 166, 199
guidance, 4, 7, 11, 25, 30, 35, 44, 117, 119, 123, 130, humane, 141
154, 155, 165, 167, 168, 173, 182, 185, 195, 202, humanitarian, 79, 86, 87, 92, 93, 112, 115, 127, 178,
204, 205, 207, 217, 224 209
238 Index
humanitarian aid, 79, 86, 87, 112, 115, 209 insertion, 173
Hungary, 77, 80, 102, 103 insight, 148
Hussein, Saddam, 68, 104 inspection, 142, 186
hybrid, 141 inspections, 142, 174, 186, 208
hydrocarbon, 156 Inspector General, 169, 189, 196, 213
hydrology, 153 inspectors, 47, 224
hydropower, 151, 152 instability, 50, 73, 131, 165
Institute of Peace, 140, 141
institutions, 6, 13, 14, 35, 99, 113, 114, 122, 136,
I 137, 142, 147, 148, 149, 153, 156, 157, 168, 180,
182, 183, 188, 189, 192, 210, 211, 212, 217
id, 92, 116, 135
instruction, 24, 81, 113, 129, 180, 188, 202, 203
identification, 121, 124, 131, 154, 185, 200, 203
instructors, 130, 198
ideology, 54, 104, 182
insurance, 106
illiteracy, 126
integration, 5, 114, 121, 131, 144, 188, 189, 190,
imbalances, 136
209, 229
immersion, 113, 180
integrity, 183
immunization, 161
intellectual property, 138
implementation, 17, 28, 46, 63, 94, 128, 133, 143,
intelligence, 18, 35, 45, 51, 55, 67, 70, 72, 84, 85,
150, 169, 170, 171, 188, 195, 198, 201, 202, 205,
89, 95, 120, 127, 149, 172, 173, 177, 184, 190,
224
191, 205, 207, 209
imports, 90, 164, 165
Intelligence Community, 117
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), 83, 117
intensity, 170
IMS, 196, 212
interaction, 148, 176
inattention, 59
interactions, 177
incentive, 62, 90, 121, 129, 132
interest groups, 137
incentives, 62, 124, 132, 170, 196, 207
interface, 130, 177, 199
income, 114, 155, 156, 160
interference, 83, 88, 146, 165
incomes, 153, 154
intermediaries, 72
increased access, 162
internal controls, 203
independence, 46, 50, 59, 87, 183, 195
internalization, 195
India, 52, 57, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 90, 91, 94, 95, 114,
internally displaced person, 137
152
International Disaster and Famine Assistance, 100
Indian, 54, 63, 79, 87, 95, 108
international financial institutions, 161
indication, 118
international law, 172
indicators, 62, 68, 70, 81, 124, 148, 150, 159, 160
International Military Education and Training
industrial, 152, 164
(IMET), 8, 100, 101, 204
industry, 172
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 149, 150, 151,
inequality, 144
161, 164, 165
infant mortality, 91, 159, 161
International Narcotics Control and Law
infant mortality rate, 161
Enforcement (INCLE), 8, 98, 99, 100, 101, 140,
inflation, 114, 164, 165
218
inflationary pressures, 165
international standards, 63, 139, 143
information sharing, 172
international terrorism, 86
information systems, 154
internet, 150
Information Technology, 150
interoperability, 120, 125, 177, 184, 193, 201
infrastructure, 4, 20, 47, 69, 94, 114, 116, 120, 139,
interview, 58, 66, 84
140, 141, 142, 144, 150, 152, 153, 154, 157, 161,
interviews, 32, 33
162, 166, 171, 172, 173, 177, 178, 190, 193, 204,
intimidation, 57, 78, 116, 126, 146
206, 208
inventories, 131, 200
inherited, 4
Investigations, 172, 173, 207
initiation, 138
investigative, 35, 129, 142, 143, 199, 201, 227
insecticide, 161
insecurity, 49
Index 239
investment, 3, 22, 44, 45, 63, 89, 90, 99, 109, 113, Kuwait, 104
148, 150, 152, 157, 159, 219, 225 Kyrgyzstan, 74, 88, 152, 172
investors, 90, 138, 157
Iran, 53, 56, 59, 74, 85, 86, 89, 91, 95, 97, 104, 108,
151, 174, 178 L
Iraq, 18, 19, 24, 26, 68, 69, 71, 74, 86, 89, 92, 104,
labor, 59, 136, 158
216, 220
land, 50, 87, 96, 137, 138, 152, 153, 154
Ireland, 103
land tenure, 153
iris, 121
language, 120, 184, 204
iron, 156
large-scale, 157
irrigation, 152, 171, 208
Latvia, 77, 80, 102
ISC, 186, 209, 211, 212
law, 4, 6, 24, 27, 31, 35, 55, 59, 63, 64, 67, 72, 86,
Islam, 52, 53, 64, 72, 88, 89, 104, 142, 174, 208
89, 93, 98, 99, 100, 107, 113, 116, 120, 124, 128,
Islamic, 45, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 63, 72, 87, 88, 89,
131, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 142, 143, 144,
95, 104, 115, 145, 163, 165, 171, 179, 181, 213
145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 157, 166, 170, 172,
Islamic law, 63, 72
173, 175, 182, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 203, 206,
Islamic movements, 50, 87
207, 208, 215, 217, 220, 222, 227, 229
Israel, 90
law enforcement, 24, 35, 86, 113, 128, 142, 143,
Italy, 50, 56, 64, 68, 76, 79, 81, 82, 102, 103, 108,
144, 146, 170, 172, 173, 175, 182, 196, 197, 198,
118
206, 207, 208, 220, 227
laws, 59, 135, 137, 138, 140, 143, 145, 157, 171,
J 180, 196, 199, 203
lawyers, 81, 141
jails, 139 lead, 3, 4, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 29, 57, 75, 78, 79, 81,
Japan, 62, 68, 91, 108 82, 103, 112, 119, 127, 129, 133, 134, 160, 172,
Japanese, 68 180, 182, 189, 198, 201, 204, 217
jewelry, 90 leadership, 3, 13, 15, 16, 53, 59, 72, 78, 88, 91, 94,
Jews, 51 108, 113, 115, 118, 121, 123, 124, 134, 135, 136,
Jirga, 58, 59, 72, 135 142, 143, 147, 148, 149, 172, 177, 182, 187, 188,
jobs, 27, 62, 65, 92, 158, 160, 163 192, 194, 195, 196, 201, 202, 204, 209
Joint Chiefs, 31, 32, 33, 34, 46, 69, 71 learning, 65, 156, 195
Jordan, 90, 91, 103 Lebanon, 19
journalists, 55, 73, 146 legal systems, 137
judge, 94, 196 legislation, 33, 63, 109, 144
judges, 76, 81, 137, 138, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, legislative, 135, 142, 143, 144, 203
145, 196 legislative elections, 135
judicial branch, 135 licenses, 105, 150
judiciary, 27, 98, 145, 216, 217, 222 licensing, 157
jurisdiction, 59, 73, 138, 139, 142 life expectancy, 159
justice, 27, 48, 59, 60, 63, 66, 69, 81, 114, 137, 138, limitation, 24, 116
139, 140, 141, 142, 144, 146, 147, 148, 196, 206, limitations, 4, 19
207, 216, 222, 228 linkage, 190
links, 35, 175, 191, 227
literacy, 16, 120, 136, 163, 182, 184, 201
K Lithuania, 80, 102, 103
livestock, 154, 155
Kashmir, 87, 95
Livestock, 155
Kazakhstan, 88
loans, 105, 175
Kenya, 53, 95
local community, 133
killing, 84, 90, 106
local government, 112, 119, 166
Korea, 68
location, 29, 73, 177, 223
Korean, 68, 73
logging, 156
Kosovo, 24
240 Index
logistics, 3, 13, 14, 16, 18, 22, 35, 45, 46, 120, 123, mentoring, 6, 18, 24, 25, 29, 32, 47, 122, 123, 129,
130, 132, 175, 182, 186, 188, 190, 192, 197, 199 130, 131, 141, 142, 173, 187, 191, 192, 195, 196,
London, 45, 60, 94, 96, 172 197, 198, 199, 200, 202, 204, 207, 208, 209, 224,
long-term, 3, 9, 10, 11, 22, 29, 30, 31, 62, 73, 77, 93, 228
114, 118, 120, 121, 122, 136, 139, 147, 148, 149, mentorship, 123, 127, 130, 131, 194, 199, 200, 210,
150, 156, 157, 162, 163, 169, 170, 173, 176, 179, 211
180, 181, 182, 184, 192, 205, 208, 224, 226 messages, 147
Los Angeles, 90, 107, 108 metric, 97, 154, 156
losses, 51, 70, 113, 132, 151 microwave, 151
low-tech, 152 migrants, 178
loyalty, 132, 135, 147, 201 militant, 84, 85, 87, 104, 115, 176
LTC, 125, 134 military, 9, 10, 11, 17, 24, 29, 30, 33, 35, 45, 46, 50,
Luxemburg, 102 51, 54, 60, 67, 71, 73, 74, 77, 78, 80, 81, 82, 83,
84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 99, 101,
103, 106, 107, 112, 113, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124,
M 126, 130, 140, 141, 154, 165, 166, 167, 170, 173,
175, 176, 177, 181, 182, 183, 186, 187, 188, 189,
Macedonia, 103
194, 196, 198, 199, 204, 205, 206, 207, 209, 211,
macroeconomic, 149
216, 220, 225, 226, 228
macroeconomic policy, 149
military aid, 51, 80, 93
maintenance, 22, 46, 80, 101, 118, 130, 133, 141,
militias, 50, 55, 60, 62, 81
151, 159, 173, 182, 187, 199, 208, 226
Millennium, 150
major cities, 150, 158
Millennium Development Goals, 150
malaria, 161
minerals, 90, 156
management, 11, 13, 24, 25, 35, 114, 120, 121, 131,
mines, 59, 96
132, 136, 141, 142, 144, 147, 152, 153, 154, 155,
mining, 84, 88, 90, 96, 98, 152
156, 169, 172, 174, 182, 186, 188, 189, 196, 197,
Ministry of Education, 149, 163
200, 201, 203, 208, 220
minorities, 50, 63, 139, 146
management practices, 189
minority, 63, 85
mandates, 93, 113, 210
missiles, 54, 61, 95, 104
manpower, 60, 194
missions, 35, 67, 74, 76, 77, 115, 123, 126, 127, 173,
manufacturing, 152
175, 177, 182, 183, 193, 207, 209
Marines, 24, 47, 55, 71, 76, 79, 119, 123
Missouri, 153
market, 91, 114, 138, 149, 153, 154
mobility, 126, 134, 193, 213
marketing, 153
MOD, 113
markets, 114, 153
models, 123, 192
marriages, 146
modernization, 205
Marxist, 106
modules, 108
maternal, 65, 99, 101, 161
momentum, 49, 112, 115
maturation, 112
monetary policy, 164, 165
measurement, 148, 149
money, 10, 21, 33, 43, 133, 145
measures, 2, 8, 9, 10, 29, 30, 43, 45, 67, 121, 148,
Mongolia, 211
149, 160, 191
Montenegro, 80
media, 63, 64, 70, 97, 146, 147, 176
morale, 133
mediators, 56
moratorium, 63
medical care, 190
morbidity, 161
medications, 162
mortality, 52, 91, 159, 161
membership, 90
Moscow, 51, 107, 108
memorandum of understanding, 175
movement, 24, 52, 69, 79, 83, 85, 107, 146, 158,
men, 63, 132
187, 220
mental health, 161
multi-ethnic, 180
mentor, 14, 18, 24, 25, 28, 33, 47, 104, 130, 143,
multilateral, 52, 56, 95, 105, 139, 140
148, 166, 169, 188, 189, 195, 199, 202, 207, 209,
Musharraf, Pervez, 83
220, 221, 223
Index 241
music, 53, 63 non-emergency, 101

Muslim, 51 normal, 105, 188
Muslims, 54, 88 North Atlantic, 1, 32, 117, 186, 213
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1, 32, 117, 186,
213
N North Korea, 95
Northeast, 100
NADR, 98, 99, 100, 101
Norway, 75, 76, 79, 81, 102, 103
naming, 66, 79
NSC, 208, 212
narcotics, 4, 23, 33, 35, 47, 56, 60, 62, 66, 67, 81, 82,
nutrition, 65, 150, 161
86, 89, 92, 93, 94, 98, 99, 100, 101, 113, 114,
nuts, 52, 155
129, 137, 142, 143, 150, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173,
174, 175, 198, 206, 207, 219, 227, 228
nation, 11, 81, 105, 113, 131, 132, 134, 135, 152, O
158, 186, 200, 201, 226
national, 3, 4, 6, 29, 35, 50, 58, 68, 77, 78, 79, 80, obligation, 184
81, 87, 90, 93, 97, 105, 106, 112, 113, 119, 121, observations, 32
124, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 135, 136, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), 109
138, 139, 141, 144, 146, 149, 150, 151, 154, 155, Office of National Drug Control Policy, 170, 171
158, 160, 163, 164, 166, 171, 175, 178, 181, 182, oil, 52, 68, 74, 90, 156
183, 186, 187, 190, 191, 194, 195, 197, 200, 201, on-the-job training, 195
203, 205, 209, 210, 217, 227 Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), 55, 68, 74, 75,
National Defense Authorization Act, 45, 111, 179, 76, 82, 83, 87, 88, 89, 104, 108, 158
229 operational independence, 192
national emergency, 105 opium, 52, 60, 61, 65, 153, 170, 171, 172, 174, 175,
National Guard, 14, 153, 170 206, 207, 208
national income, 160 opposition, 2, 54, 58, 59, 65, 75, 84
national interests, 130, 178 optical, 150
national security, 4, 29 optical fiber, 151
National Security Council, 71, 136, 208, 212 optimism, 70, 73
National Strategy, 60 organic, 153, 173, 207
NATO, vii, 1, 2, 19, 20, 21, 47, 49, 59, 60, 66, 67, organization, 12, 83, 96, 108, 126, 131, 133, 136,
68, 69, 71, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 82, 84, 85, 86, 158, 182, 183, 187, 188, 195
87, 88, 102, 103, 112, 117, 118, 119, 123, 125, organizational capacity, 188, 189
134, 176, 177, 186, 192, 193, 196, 199, 200, 201, organizations, 8, 34, 55, 63, 87, 92, 105, 112, 130,
205, 209, 211, 213 134, 137, 141, 147, 148, 149, 153, 156, 159, 160,
natural, 50, 88, 90, 144, 150, 151, 153, 154, 156, 157 166, 167, 168, 170, 173, 175, 176, 182, 183, 188,
natural gas, 88, 90, 151, 156 189, 191, 199, 200, 201, 207, 211
natural resource management, 154, 156 organized crime, 6, 217
natural resources, 144, 150, 156, 157 orientation, 183
Near East, 212, 213 orthodox, 52, 104
Nebraska, 153 outsourcing, 156
negative consequences, 119 oversight, 3, 4, 7, 9, 30, 43, 89, 93, 94, 114, 130,
negotiating, 84 132, 136, 144, 169, 174, 188, 196, 204, 208, 217
Nepal, 114 ownership, 138
Netherlands, 64, 71, 75, 77, 78, 79, 82, 102, 103,
205, 208, 211
network, 50, 147, 150, 158, 162, 177, 193 P
New York, 54, 60, 67, 84, 95, 107, 108
Pacific, 140
New York Times, 84, 95, 107, 108
pacification, 77
New Zealand, 76, 103
pacing, 194
newspapers, 63
Pakistan, 49, 50, 52, 54, 56, 57, 64, 66, 69, 70, 72,
NGOs, 64, 65, 97, 99, 137, 138, 144, 147
79, 80, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 92, 94, 95,
nodes, 177
242 Index
97, 101, 104, 106, 108, 109, 114, 118, 151, 152, planning, 2, 3, 9, 11, 12, 13, 31, 45, 46, 68, 82, 89,
154, 156, 163, 165, 172, 174, 176, 177, 187, 212 123, 126, 130, 155, 169, 170, 175, 180, 184, 188,
Pakistani, 49, 70, 72, 83, 84, 85, 90, 115, 176 192, 204, 205, 209, 210, 215
paramilitary, 177 plants, 152
parents, 163 platforms, 68, 140, 176
Paris, 60, 94 play, 64, 132, 153, 166, 204
Parliament, 146 PMA, 205, 213
partition, 85 Poland, 76, 79, 80, 102, 103, 118
partnership, 6, 12, 62, 81, 85, 130, 177, 181 police, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 22, 23, 24, 25,
partnerships, 153 26, 27, 28, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48,
Pashtun, 51, 52, 54, 55, 57, 58, 62, 69, 79, 85, 86, 61, 65, 67, 70, 76, 78, 80, 81, 82, 83, 98, 99, 106,
104, 115, 136 112, 113, 114, 121, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133,
passenger, 95 134, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 144, 170, 173, 181,
passive, 76 182, 183, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204,
pathology, 156 205, 206, 207, 209, 210, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219,
patients, 128 220, 221, 222, 223, 225, 226, 227, 228
payroll, 23, 46, 220 policy makers, 171, 172
PDPs, 148 policymakers, 30, 190
peacekeeping, vii, 24, 50, 56, 59, 68, 74, 75, 76, 93 political leaders, 86
peacekeeping forces, 56 political participation, 146, 147, 148
Peacekeeping Operations, 82 political parties, 58
peers, 64 political stability, 153
PEF, 171 politics, 77
penalties, 16 polling, 159
penalty, 63, 64 poor, 62, 63, 91, 114, 139, 146, 147, 149, 160, 193
per capita, 114, 159, 160, 164, 168 poor performance, 147
per capita income, 114, 160 poppy cultivation, 49, 66, 67, 91, 93, 100, 153, 171,
perception, 27, 70, 71, 131, 136, 144, 148, 149, 159, 174, 206
200 population, 51, 52, 70, 78, 91, 115, 116, 117, 127,
perceptions, 71, 159 129, 133, 135, 136, 148, 149, 158, 159, 160, 161,
performance, 2, 8, 9, 10, 24, 29, 30, 34, 45, 48, 64, 163, 176, 198
128, 147, 148, 149, 164, 169, 197, 228 population size, 159
periodic, 206 ports, 83
permit, 89, 94, 118 Portugal, 102
perseverance, 199 posture, 87, 121, 122, 180, 181, 192
Persian Gulf, 68, 74 poverty, 149, 159, 160
personal, vii, 49, 133, 139, 191 poverty line, 160
personnel costs, 7 poverty rate, 159, 160
persons with disabilities, 154 poverty reduction, 149, 160, 161
persuasion, 62 power, 4, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 57, 61, 65, 67, 71, 83,
pest management, 153 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 94, 100, 101, 104, 113, 114,
petroleum, 52 115, 116, 131, 133, 144, 149, 151, 152, 159, 178,
Phoenix, 6, 32, 130, 131 200
phone, 90, 150, 194 power generation, 94
phosphates, 105 power plant, 152
physical fitness, 7 powers, 57, 58, 60, 135
physicians, 91 prediction, 160
pilot training, 173, 207 premium, 95
pilots, 80, 95 presidency, 136, 147
pipelines, 90 president, 52, 57, 147
PKO, 82 President Bush, 52, 60, 71, 73, 81, 82, 84, 85, 105
plague, 80, 133, 139 President Clinton, 105
presidential elections, vii, 49, 58
Index 243
pressure, vii, 49, 54, 55, 64, 71, 88, 113, 176 public, 6, 53, 63, 71, 83, 137, 140, 144, 145, 146,
pretrial, 146 147, 148, 159, 160, 161, 162, 171, 176, 206, 207,
prevention, 35, 128, 197, 227 208, 217
PRI, 32 public administration, 144
prices, 66, 160, 165 public awareness, 140, 176, 206
primary care, 162 public opinion, 159
printing, 163 public opinion surveys, 159
priorities, 3, 5, 9, 13, 18, 19, 26, 46, 60, 77, 114, 123, public safety, 6, 217
145, 149, 150, 169, 179, 181 public sector, 144, 148, 162
prisoners, 68, 73 public service, 137, 145
prisons, 138, 139, 141 public support, 84
private, 2, 17, 63, 82, 99, 111, 114, 129, 137, 138, punishment, 145
141, 147, 148, 149, 150, 152, 153, 156, 162, 163, purchasing power, 51
205 purchasing power parity, 51
private enterprises, 114
private investment, 63, 152
private sector, 99, 111, 148, 150, 153 Q
private sector investment, 99
Qatar, 74
private-sector, 149
qualifications, 137
proactive, 143
questioning, 64
producers, 155
questionnaire, 139
production, 19, 20, 35, 113, 129, 151, 153, 154, 155,
156, 164, 165, 169, 198, 206, 227
productivity, 152, 153, 154 R
professional development, 194, 204
professionalism, 112, 118, 126, 130, 133, 142, 180, radical, 50, 52, 87, 88
194, 199, 201 radio, 63, 70, 147, 191
profit, 144 radio station, 63, 70, 147
program, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 27, 28, 30, 31, 43, 44, 46, rail, 158
51, 62, 66, 67, 72, 77, 79, 80, 82, 83, 92, 93, 96, rainwater, 152
97, 98, 100, 101, 107, 113, 120, 121, 122, 123, random, 25
127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 139, 140, 141, range, 11, 162
148, 153, 154, 155, 161, 164, 166, 169, 170, 173, rangeland, 155
174, 176, 179, 180, 183, 184, 185, 187, 188, 189, ratings, 47, 90, 194, 228
191, 192, 193, 194, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, raw material, 156
204, 206, 207, 208, 217, 218, 223, 225 raw materials, 156
programming, 136, 144, 155, 204 reading, 126, 163, 194
progress reports, 26, 27, 30, 32, 33, 222, 223 Reagan Administration, 95
pro-Iranian, 104 real terms, 164, 165
proliferation, 68, 74 recognition, 53, 116, 127, 134, 200, 202
promote, 56, 58, 88, 89, 92, 94, 121, 147, 149, 174, reconciliation, 73, 205, 208
206, 208, 211 reconstruction, vii, 5, 49, 50, 59, 64, 67, 68, 69, 75,
property, iv, 26, 48, 96, 105, 138, 188, 204, 222 77, 78, 82, 84, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 99, 112,
proportionality, 120 114, 118, 119, 136, 139, 149, 152, 159, 165, 166,
prosecutor, 203 178, 181, 205
prosperity, 117 record keeping, 190
protection, 24, 35, 57, 63, 74, 98, 99, 101, 113, 143, recovery, 151
150, 157, 173, 175, 207, 220, 227 recruiting, 13, 14, 15, 16, 27, 35, 48, 121, 123, 124,
prototype, 155 131, 132, 133, 134, 191, 192, 200, 202, 223, 228
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), vii, 50, 68, reduction, 51, 60, 106, 149, 151, 160, 161, 175, 203
74, 76, 77, 78, 98, 99, 101, 102, 103, 114, 139, reelection, vii
153, 154, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169 refining, 162, 191
reflection, 87
244 Index
reforms, 80, 120, 141, 146, 153, 180, 197, 203 risks, 138, 175
refuge, 53 road map, 150
refugee camps, 89, 176 roadmap, 138
refugees, 59, 85, 86, 89, 97, 137, 149, 176, 178 roads, 52, 91, 98, 102, 159
regenerate, 116 roadside bombs, 86, 113
regional, vii, 5, 8, 28, 35, 48, 49, 50, 57, 60, 79, 88, Romania, 60, 71, 75, 76, 77, 102, 103, 118, 211
91, 93, 104, 114, 122, 128, 130, 131, 132, 133, Rome, 146
138, 139, 144, 150, 151, 154, 158, 159, 170, 172, rotations, 13, 71, 117
173, 174, 175, 176, 182, 187, 190, 191, 197, 198, rule of law, 4, 6, 27, 35, 64, 99, 120, 128, 131, 135,
199, 208, 209, 223, 226, 227 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 144, 147, 148, 149, 150,
regional cooperation, 150, 175 166, 172, 197, 199, 200, 206, 207, 215, 217, 222,
regional integration, 114 227, 229
regular, 94, 114, 121, 133, 143, 210 runoff, 57
regulation, 121, 145, 175, 195, 196, 203, 205 rural, 52, 91, 94, 100, 113, 128, 136, 150, 151, 152,
regulations, 105, 138, 142, 171, 194 153, 154, 160, 197
regulatory framework, 144, 157 rural areas, 91, 113
rehabilitate, 91, 95, 152, 154 rural development, 94, 100, 150
rehabilitation, 95, 98, 152 rural population, 136, 151
reimbursement, 8 Russia, 56, 80, 87, 88, 108, 118
reinforcement, 131, 195, 200 Russian, 54, 74, 76, 87, 88, 95
relationship, 30, 36, 44, 50, 131, 135
relationships, 77, 132, 168, 200
relaxation, 85 S
reliability, 23, 33, 34, 216, 220
safety, 80, 90
rent, 208
salaries, 8, 11, 16, 17, 27, 46, 48, 82, 99, 124, 133,
repair, 77
134, 139, 140, 144, 145, 160, 195, 208, 212, 225,
repatriation, 89, 97, 176
228
repression, 54, 146
salary, 11, 27, 46, 48, 125, 132, 136, 180, 228
reputation, 51, 69, 132
sales, 105, 153, 154, 156
research, 156, 158, 159, 160
sample, 25
resentment, 60, 87
sampling, 159
reserves, 65, 90, 114, 156
sanctions, 53, 73, 105, 106, 109
resettlement, 137
sanitation, 97
residential, 96
satellite, 150, 194
resilience, 71
Saudi Arabia, 52, 84, 89, 91, 95, 104, 108
resistance, 57, 89, 116
scalable, 121
resolution, 53, 137, 138, 141, 142, 154, 174
scarcity, 152
resource management, 154
school, 51, 52, 53, 65, 69, 76, 78, 79, 85, 91, 112,
resources, 9, 10, 20, 30, 31, 46, 60, 65, 71, 76, 77,
149, 161, 163, 188, 193, 194, 196, 204, 209
81, 112, 114, 115, 118, 123, 131, 139, 140, 144,
schooling, 133, 163, 195
150, 151, 153, 156, 157, 160, 169, 175, 180, 181,
search, 55, 74, 86, 108, 173, 186
182, 186, 191, 192, 197, 199, 200, 209, 217, 223,
Seattle, 140
225, 226
secret, 72
responsibilities, 2, 29, 30, 31, 44, 74, 75, 78, 114,
secretariat, 211
170, 216, 224, 226
Secretary General, 59, 70, 71
restaurants, 63
Secretary of Agriculture, 111
restructuring, 46, 137
Secretary of Defense, 3, 9, 31, 32, 55, 71, 85, 113,
retail, 153
170, 206, 224
retention, 15, 45, 121, 124, 125, 132, 133, 134
Secretary of State, 3, 111, 179
returns, 28, 187, 200, 223
secular, 50
revenue, 63, 114, 131, 149, 151, 156, 164, 165, 175,
Security Council, 53, 54, 55, 56, 59, 71, 74, 108,
181, 200
136, 208, 212
risk, 4, 22, 119, 123, 138, 160, 216, 220
seed, 156
Index 245
seizure, 50 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation,

seizures, 137 83
selecting, 61, 147 South Korea, 68, 73, 78, 108
Self Defense Forces, 68 sovereignty, 183
semi-arid, 152 Soviet Union, 20, 50, 51, 70, 105
Senate, 53, 55, 58, 71, 90, 93 soybean, 156
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 71 Spain, 79, 103
sensing, 88 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction,
sensitivity, 185 89
separation, 121, 145, 203 spectrum, 119, 123, 128, 182, 192, 197
September 11, 4, 54, 55, 56, 57, 83, 84, 88, 90, 109, speculation, 58
111 speech, 52
series, 84, 91, 111, 119, 162, 177, 190 speed, 145
service provider, 150, 169 Sri Lanka, 114
services, 6, 11, 15, 17, 34, 47, 52, 93, 105, 113, 128, stability, 9, 56, 60, 87, 88, 111, 113, 114, 118, 131,
135, 136, 140, 141, 148, 150, 153, 155, 161, 162, 137, 153, 159, 169, 171, 174, 179, 181, 200, 208,
179, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 190, 197, 205, 206 224
sex, 159 stabilization, 59, 77, 109
sexual violence, 146 stabilize, vii, 49, 71, 75, 83
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 83, 88 staffing, 155, 162, 166, 196
shaping, 204 stakeholder, 167, 168
shares, 104 stakeholders, 3, 10, 44, 148, 176
Sharia, 116, 142 standard operating procedures, 191
sharing, 73, 152, 172, 173, 175, 178, 190 standardization, 13, 20, 162, 188
shelter, 69 standards, 2, 34, 63, 64, 129, 131, 132, 139, 141,
Shiite, 51, 54, 60, 63, 85, 104 143, 145, 147, 188, 192, 200, 215
Shiites, 54 State Department, 51, 53, 54, 63, 64, 65, 67, 71, 78,
shipping, 86, 186, 187 81, 82, 86, 97, 103, 105, 106, 108, 129, 133, 159
short supply, 152 statistical analysis, 149
shortage, 3, 16, 24, 25, 26, 29, 47, 76, 114, 123, 130, statistics, 91, 149, 151
131, 132, 136, 199, 209, 216, 220, 221, 224 steady state, 127
short-term, 170, 196, 206 stockpiling, 62
shoulder, 50, 69 storage, 152, 156, 171, 208
SIGIR, 89 strain, 178
sign, 59, 104, 121, 124, 186 strains, 71
signs, 66, 146, 187 strategic, 5, 12, 31, 35, 44, 45, 51, 77, 84, 86, 111,
Singapore, 103 114, 117, 126, 140, 149, 150, 161, 169, 170, 172,
sites, 121, 223 181, 184, 194, 205
skills, 3, 7, 13, 17, 18, 22, 130, 136, 137, 138, 142, strategic planning, 31, 169, 184
147, 154, 155, 163, 188, 189, 199, 200, 211, 217 strategies, 2, 31, 150, 162, 168, 184, 192
skimming, 27 strength, 10, 22, 23, 28, 44, 47, 50, 70, 79, 82, 112,
Slovakia, 102 116, 120, 124, 127, 129, 180, 181, 196, 198, 203,
Slovenia, 79, 103 216, 219, 220
smugglers, 177 strikes, 55, 71, 76
smuggling, 68, 74 structural reforms, 114, 164
social development, 120, 149, 150 students, 52, 130, 149, 163, 188
social services, 11, 113 subjective, 148, 149
socialist, 50 subsidies, 114, 151
soil, 152, 153, 156 subsistence, 152
soil erosion, 156 subsistence farming, 152
solutions, 58, 69, 123, 132, 138, 148, 157, 168, 177 substitutes, 19
South Asia, 83, 114, 152, 175, 212, 213 substitution, 67, 93
sugar, 105
246 Index
suicide, 27, 49, 55, 59, 61, 69, 70, 113, 223 teaching, 155
suicide bombers, 27, 55, 223 technical assistance, 87, 137, 148, 155, 166
summer, 17, 112, 119, 124, 126, 127, 129, 134, 135, technology, 20, 121, 138, 150, 152, 153
140, 193, 195, 229 telecommunications, 95, 150, 193
Sunni, 51, 52, 60 telecommunications services, 150
supervision, 192 telephone, 32, 34
supplemental, 50, 64, 73, 82, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 101 television, 53, 63, 70, 108
supplements, 129 tension, 59
supply, 26, 48, 65, 74, 76, 80, 127, 134, 161, 187, tenure, 153
190, 197, 222 term plans, 173, 208
supply chain, 187 terminals, 193
support services, 17 territorial, 183
support staff, 137 territory, 50, 69, 74, 87, 106, 111, 135
Supreme Court, 59, 63, 64, 81, 114, 138, 142, 145, terrorism, 5, 29, 35, 56, 74, 79, 84, 86, 87, 98, 105,
203 120, 128, 133, 134, 143, 163, 175, 197, 201, 227
surplus, 80 terrorist, 55, 68, 84, 108, 113, 176
surprise, 69 terrorist attack, 55, 113
surveillance, 120, 142, 155, 173, 184, 207 terrorist organization, 108, 176
survival, 7, 217 terrorists, 2, 4, 95, 111
suspects, 137, 171 testimony, 58, 71, 76, 77, 113, 215, 217, 228
suspensions, 105 Texas, 153
sustainability, 2, 3, 11, 29, 31, 121, 122, 147, 153, textiles, 52
154, 165, 182, 209, 217, 224, 225 Third World, 51
sustainable economic growth, 149 threat, 60, 82, 83, 86, 87, 88, 95, 113, 126, 132, 170,
sustainable growth, 163 176
Sweden, 79, 103 threat of force, 176
Switzerland, 4, 80 threatened, 86
symbols, 64 threats, 4, 120, 126, 136, 146, 174, 176, 181, 183,
sympathetic, 70 184
systems, 50, 86, 123, 133, 137, 140, 142, 144, 154, timber, 156
169, 173, 182, 184, 188, 189, 190, 192, 196, 206 time frame, 4, 11, 31, 43, 44, 45
title, 53, 57
tobacco, 59
T Tokyo, 94
tolls, 223
tactics, 116, 188, 217
torture, 146
Tajikistan, 56, 87, 88, 90, 151, 152, 172, 174
total costs, 46
takeover, 75
tourism, 156
talent, 61
tracking, 121, 141, 179, 184, 203
Taliban, vii, 4, 27, 47, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57,
trade, 4, 90, 105, 113, 114, 153, 156, 158, 170, 174,
58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71,
175
72, 73, 77, 78, 80, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90,
Trade Act, 105
91, 92, 95, 96, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 111,
trading, 178
112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 135, 136, 146,
traffic, 35, 128, 197, 227
158, 159, 161, 175, 176, 177, 178, 181, 217, 223
trafficking in persons, 146
tangible, 112
Trafficking in Persons, 64
tanks, 125, 186, 193
trainees, 129, 133
Tanzania, 53
training programs, 123, 131, 137, 192, 200, 202
targets, 67, 70, 72, 93, 96, 164, 171
transactions, 46, 185, 197
tariff, 105
transfer, 2, 16, 27, 48, 68, 170, 228
tariffs, 105, 151
transition, vii, 10, 12, 30, 49, 56, 125, 129, 183, 188,
task force, 6, 11, 112, 142, 167, 185
193, 198, 208, 225
teacher training, 163
Transition Initiatives, 97
teachers, 52, 69, 137, 146, 149, 163
Index 247
transmission, 151, 152 United Nations Development Programme, 8, 32

transparency, 31, 45, 94, 148, 173 United States, v, vii, 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 11, 13, 18, 22, 24,
transparent, 89, 147, 166 32, 43, 49, 51, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 60, 62, 65, 66,
transport, 21, 69, 74, 76, 79, 158 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 81,
transportation, 20, 21, 46, 47, 100, 105, 118, 152, 83, 86, 89, 90, 91, 92, 94, 95, 103, 104, 105, 107,
158, 178, 186, 211, 223 108, 109, 111, 117, 119, 135, 140, 141, 142, 143,
travel, 132, 147 148, 154, 156, 158, 159, 163, 169, 170, 172, 176,
travel time, 132 177, 179, 180, 181, 182, 190, 204, 208, 212, 214,
Treasury, 109, 170, 171 216, 217, 218, 225, 226
Treasury Department, 109 United States Agency for International Development
trees, 154 (USAID), 111, 148, 214
trend, 51, 132 United States Attorneys, 142
trial, 64, 143 universities, 142, 154, 163
tribal, 50, 55, 69, 77, 81, 83, 84, 116, 132, 138, 139, university students, 163
176, 178 unmanned aerial vehicles, 76
tribes, 50, 54, 58, 84, 85, 104 updating, 138, 161, 194
trucks, 19, 22, 26, 80, 186, 187, 216, 221, 222 uranium, 156
trust, 21, 115, 118, 119, 128, 131, 140, 145, 168, urban areas, 91, 163, 177, 194
177, 197, 199, 209, 211 urban centers, 152
trust fund, 21, 118, 140, 211 USAID, 63, 64, 78, 81, 89, 91, 92, 97, 99, 100, 101,
tuberculosis, 161 102, 104, 136, 137, 138, 140, 142, 145, 148, 153,
Turkey, 52, 74, 78, 80, 103, 211 154, 155, 157, 159, 166, 167, 168, 170, 171, 204,
Turkmenistan, 52, 56, 88, 90, 108, 151, 172, 174 206, 208, 214
turnout, 57 Uzbekistan, 56, 74, 80, 87, 88, 151, 174
turnover, 30, 224
V
U
validation, 18, 183, 192, 209, 211
U.N. Security Council, 53, 54, 56, 59, 74, 108 validity, 33
U.S. Department of Agriculture (UDSA), 97, 154, values, 54, 147, 195
155, 156, 166, 167, 170, 171 variation, 109
U.S. military, 10, 11, 24, 45, 46, 54, 67, 71, 73, 74, vegetable oil, 156
78, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85, 86, 87, 88, 91, 95, 99, 112, vegetables, 153
130, 140, 154, 166, 173, 175, 198, 204, 206, 207, vehicles, 3, 4, 13, 18, 19, 21, 26, 76, 80, 81, 125,
209, 216, 220, 225, 228 126, 134, 185, 187, 193, 197, 204, 222
U.S. Treasury, 109 venue, 115, 209
UAVs, 108 Vice President, 60, 62, 72, 104
Ukraine, 103 victims, 59, 79, 99, 100
uncertainty, 144 video games, 63
unclassified, 33 village, 57, 72, 124, 132, 147, 148, 153, 154
unemployment, 159, 160 violence, 52, 68, 69, 70, 72, 83, 113, 116, 146, 176,
unemployment rate, 160 218
unfolded, 57 violent, 73, 114, 135
UNHCR, 89, 97, 176 visible, 138, 176
uniform, 129 vision, 5, 118, 149, 181
United Arab Emirates (UAE), 68, 74, 80, 84 voice, 150, 151, 193
United Kingdom (UK), 82, 103, 131, 172, 200, 205, voters, 58, 113
214 voting, 57, 58
United Nations (UN), 2, 8, 25, 27, 32, 53, 55, 56, 58, vulnerability, 116, 149
59, 72, 85, 94, 96, 141, 146, 148, 159, 160, 167,
174, 184, 205, 207, 208, 210, 212, 214
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 8,
32, 212, 214
248 Index
wholesalers, 154
W winning, 116, 117
winter, 70
wages, 136, 145
wireless, 150, 193
Wahhabism, 52
wisdom, 69
Wall Street Journal, 108
withdrawal, 51, 53, 87
war, 18, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 70, 73, 86, 88, 89,
wives, 70
90, 95, 104
women, vii, 49, 50, 53, 56, 63, 64, 65, 92, 93, 94, 97,
War on Terror, 33, 68, 92, 101, 111
98, 99, 100, 101, 139, 140, 142, 146, 147, 148,
warfare, 89
154, 155
warlord, 104
work projects, 206
warlords, 54, 60, 113, 136
worker rights, 146
Warsaw, 125, 134, 193, 200
workers, 77, 137, 163, 178
Warsaw Pact, 125, 134, 193, 200
workforce, 158
Washington Post, 58, 60, 66, 71, 95, 108
working conditions, 27, 145, 223
water, 4, 92, 97, 113, 114, 152, 159, 178
working groups, 189, 205, 211
watershed, 152
World Bank, 95, 139, 149, 150, 151, 159, 161, 164
Waziristan, 176
World Food Program (WFP), 97
weapons, 3, 7, 18, 19, 20, 21, 26, 27, 50, 53, 61, 62,
World Trade Organization, 90
79, 80, 81, 83, 86, 95, 106, 120, 125, 127, 128,
writing, 126, 163, 194
134, 178, 184, 185, 186, 187, 193, 197, 199, 200,
201, 216, 217, 221, 223
well-being, 178 Y
Western countries, 60
wheat, 97, 160 yield, 134

Lawrence B. Peabody-Afghanistan Security-Nova Science Publishers (2009) PDF

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AFGHANISTAN SECURITY

Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

NOTICE TO THE READER

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA

Published by Nova Science Publishers, Inc.  New York

June 18, 2008

Figure 1. Mountainous Terrain in Afghanistan.

The Role and Development of the Afghan National Army

Figure 2. ANA Commando Training Facility Outside of Kabul.

Reconstitution of the Afghan National Police Force

Figure 3. Trainees Attending a Class at the Kabul Police Academy.

U.S. Support to Train and Equip Afghan National Security Forces

Table 1. Defense and State Support to Train and Equip Afghan

Other Donor Support

Prior GAO Recommendations and Congressional Mandate

THE DEPARTMENTS OF DEFENSE AND STATE HAVE NOT

Defense Document Is Limited in Scope and Detail

sustaining the results achieved, including transitioning program responsibility to Afghanistan.

High-Level Plan Lacks Focus on Sustainment Funding

CSTC-A Plan Provides Guidance for Field-Level Operations,

Table 2. Capability Milestones for Afghan National Security Forces

Campaign phase Description Milestone date

FEW AFGHAN ARMY UNITS ARE CAPABLE OF LEADING

More Troops Trained, but Very Few ANA Units

Table 4. Afghan Ministry of Defense and ANA

Forces Authorized Trained and assigned Percent assigned

Table 5. Defense Assessment of ANA Capabilities, as of April 2008

Army units CM1Fully CM2Capable CM3 CM4Not Unit Not Formed

Development of a Capable Army Faces Challenges in

Afghan Army Faces Difficulties Reducing Absenteeism, Recruiting

Source: GAO analysis of Defense data.

Table 6. Re-Enlistment Rates for ANA Combat Personnel,

Shortage of U.S. Embedded Trainers and Coalition

Critical Equipment Shortfalls Remain Due to Changing

Number Number on Percent of required

Figure 5. Rifles of Variable Quality Donated to the ANSF.

SEVERAL CHALLENGES IMPEDE EFFORTS TO IMPROVE

No Police Units Are Rated as Fully

Table 8. Defense Assessment of ANP Capabilities, as of April 2008

Police units CM1Fully CM2Capable CM3 CM4Not Unit Not

Growth of Police Force Is Difficult to Quantify

Table 9. Afghan Ministry of Interior Forces, as of April 2008

Number authorized Number assigned Percent assigned

Shortage of Police Mentors Hinders Training,

• Field-based training: Senior Defense officials, including the commanding general of

Efforts of Civilian Mentors Complicated by Dual Chain of Command

Police Continue to Face Difficulties with Equipment Shortages and Quality

Figure 6. Trucks Awaiting Distribution to ANP.

New Initiative to Reconstitute Police Has Begun,

Figure 7. Afghan National Civil Order Police Trainees in Kabul.

MATTER FOR CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION

APPENDIX I: OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

Additionally, we asked State to provide weekly progress reports produced by DynCorp

reports. Specifically, we independently proposed categories, agreed on the relevant

• To determine the completeness and consistency of U.S. and international funding

• To determine the reliability of data on the number of military mentors, we

• To assess the reliability of equipment data, we compared different lists of equipment

APPENDIX II. STRUCTURE OF THE AFGHAN

Figure 8. Structure of the ANA Combat Forces.

Source: GAO analysis of Defense and State data.

Figure 9. ANP Chain of Command.

APPENDIX III: COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

APPENDIX IV: COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Published by Nova Science Publishers, Inc.  New York