CASES IN STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
salaries.
GARCIA VS. SSS (G.R. NO. 170735, 17
DECEMBER 2007)
ISSUE: Whether or not the only surviving
director of a corporation is liable for the
whole collected and unremitted SSS
contribution to the SSS, with penalties.
RULING: Yes.
“SEC. 22 Remittance of Contributions. (a)
The contribution imposed in the preceding
section shall be remitted to the SSS within in
the first ten days of each calendar month
following the month for which they are
applicable or within such time as the
Commission may prescribe. Every employer
required to deduct and to remit such
contributions shall be liable for their
payment and if any contribution is not paid
to the SSS as herein prescribed, he shall pay
besides the contribution a penalty thereon
of three percent (3%) per month from the
date the contribution falls due until paid. If
deemed expedient, and advisable by the
Commission, the collection and remittance
of contributions shall be made quarterly or
semi-annually in advance, the contributions
payable by the employees to be advanced by
their respective employers: Provided, that
upon separation of an employee, any
contribution so paid in advance but not due
shall be credited or refunded to his
employer.
- Liable for unpaid employer
contribution only.
- Not the deducted contribution from
employees.
- Contribution supposedly paid to the
SSS which shows the employee’s
contribution since it was already
deducted from the employee’s
- Specified that the penalties will be
directed to directors.
- Managing head are liable; since
Immaculada Garcia is the sole
survivor of the company, they are
liable since they already deducted
them from the employees.
NOTES:
- Free to talk about whether or not the
SC was right in the interpretation;
assess the decision of the court.
- Assess if it was a good decision.
- A4 – TNR – 12 – Normal – 1.5 spacing.
- No min. page required.
- 5 pages minimum, 20 pages
maximum.
-
LAPID VS. COURT OF APPEALS
ISSUE: Whether a decision of the
Ombudsman in an administrative charge
finding the respondent guilty and imposing
the penalty of suspension of one year
without pay is immediately executory and is
not stayed by a timely appeal to the CA.
RULING: The SC ruled that since the penalty
is suspension of one year without pay, the
timely filling of an appeal will stay the
immediate execution of the decision of the
Ombudsman.
PEOPLE VS. JABINAL
ISSUE: Whether a person appointed as
secret agent by a provincial governor and
found in possession of an unlicensed firearm
at a time when the Macarandang Doctrine
was still in force can be prosecuted and
convicted of illegal possession of firearms.
RULING: The Mapa Doctrine cannot be given
retroactive effect as the new doctrine should
be applied prospectively.
 REPUBLIC VS. LACAP (G.R. NO. 158253, 2
MARCH 2007)
ISSUE: Whether a contractor with an expired
license is entitled to be paid for completed
projects
RULING: Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566
explicitly provides:
SEC. 35. Penalties. Any contractor who, for a
price, commission, fee or wage, submits or
attempts to submit or attempts to submit a
bid to construct, or contracts to or
undertakes to construct, or assumes charge
in a supervisory capacity of a construction
work within the purview of this Act, without
first securing a license to engage in the
business of contracting in this country; or
who shall present or file the license
certificate of another, give false evidence of
any kind to the Board, or any member
thereof in obtaining a certificate or license,
impersonate another, or use an expired or
revoked certificate or license, shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall,
upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine
of not less than five hundred pesos but not
more than five thousand pesos.
The wordings of RA 4566 are clear. It does
not declare, expressly or implied, as void
contracts entered into by a contractor
whose license had already expired.
However, such contractor is liable for
payment of the fine prescribed. Thus,
respondent should be paid for the projects
he completed.
CITY OF BAGUIO vs. MARCOS
Title of RA 931: AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE
FILING IN THE PROPER COURT, UNDER
CERTAIN CONDITIONS, OF CERTAIN CLAIMS
OF TITLE TO PARCELS OF LAND THAT HAVE
BEEN DECLARED PUBLIC LAND, BY VIRTUE
OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED WITHIN
THE FORTY YEARS NEXT PRECEDING THE
APPROVAL OF THIS ACT.
Facts: In April 12, 1912, the director of lands
in the CFI of Baguio INSTITUTED the
reopening of cadastral proceedings. In
November 13, 1922, a decision was
RENDERED. The land involved was the
Baguio Townsite which was declared public
land. In July 25, 1961, Belong Lutes
petitioned to reopen the civil case on the
following grounds: 1) he and his
predecessors have been in continuous
possession and cultivation of the land since
Spanish times; 2) his predecessors were
illiterate Igorots, thus, were not able to file
their claim. On the contrary, F. Joaquin Sr., F.
Joaquin Jr., and Teresita Buchholz opposed
Lutes’ reopening on the following grounds:
1) the reopening was filed outside the 40-
year period provided in RA 931; 2) the
petition to reopen the case was not
published; and 3) as lessees of the land, they
have standing on the issue.
Issue: Whether or not the reopening of the
peririon was filed outside the 40-year period
provided in RA 931, which was ENACTED on
June 20, 1953
Held: The Supreme Court granted the
reopening of cadastral proceedings
Ratio: The title of RA 931 was “An Act to
Authorize the Filing in Proper Court under
Certain Conditions, of Certain Claims of Title
to Parcels of Land that have been Declared
Public Land, by Virtue of Judicial Decisions
RENDERED within the 40 Years Next
Preceding the Approval of this Act.” Section
1 of the Act reads as “..in case such parcels
of land, on account of their failure to file
such claims, have been, or about to be
declared land of the public domain by virtue
of judicial proceedings INSTITUTED within
the 40 years next preceding the approval of
this act.” If the title is to be followed,
November 13, 1922 is the date which should
be followed, hence, would allow the
reopening of the case. If Section 1 is to be
followed, the date of the institution of
reopening of the case which was April 12,
1912, the petition would be invalid.
StatCon maxim: The title is an indispensable
part of a statute, and what may inadequately
be omitted in the text may be supplied or
remedied by its title.
EBARLE vs. SUCADALDITO
Facts: Ebarle, the petitioner, was then
provincial governor of Zamboanga and a
candidate for re-election in 1971 local
elections. The Anti-Graft League of the
Philippines filed complaints with the city
fiscal against the petitioner for violations of
RA 3019 (Anti-Graft Law) and Articles 171,
182,183, 213, and 318 of the Revised Penal
Code. The petitioner filed petitions for
prohibition and certiorari in CFI but they
were dismissed. He petitioned to the
Supreme Court and alleged that the City
Fiscal and Anti-Graft League failed to comply
with the provisions of EO 264, which
outlined the procedure how complainants
charging the government officials and
employees with the commission of
irregularities should be guided.
Issue: Whether or not EO 264 is exclusively
applicable to administrative charges and not
to criminal complaints
Held: Petition dismissed.
Ratio: The title of the EO 264 is of
“Commission of Irregularities”. It speaks of
commission of irregularities and not criminal
offenses. Had the order intended to make it
applicable thereto, it could have been
referred to the more specific terms like
“accused,” “convicted,” and the like.
PEOPLE vs. PURISIMA
Facts: These twenty-six (26) Petitions for
Review were filed by the People of the
Philippines charging the respective accused
with “illegal possession of deadly weapon” in
violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a
motion to quash filed by the accused, the
three Judges issued an Order quashing or
dismissing the Informations, on a common
ground, viz, that the Information did not
allege facts which constitute the offense
penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9
because it failed to state one essential
element of the crime.
Issue: Whether or not the Informations filed
by the petitioners are sufficient in form and
substance to constitute the offense of
“illegal possession of deadly weapon”
penalized under PD No. 9.
Ruling: No. The Informations filed by
petitioner are fatally defective. The two
elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3)
must be alleged in the Information in order
that the latter may constitute a sufficiently
valid charged. The sufficiency of an
Information is determined solely by the facts
alleged therein. Where the facts are
incomplete and do not convey the elements
of the crime, the quashing of the accusation
is in order.
 SALAYSAY vs. CASTRO
➢ The case involves the interpretation
of the phrase “actual holding” in a
provision that states “any elective
provincial, municipal, or city official
running for an office, other than the
one which he is actually holding, shall
be considered resigned from his
office from the moment of filing his
certificate of candidacy”
➢ The examined the legislative history
of the said provision. The provision
was originally Section 2 of the
Commonwealth Act No. 666 – “for
which he has been lastly elected.”
➢ Bearing the purpose of the
legislature, that is, “to give the
benefit or privilege of retaining office
not only to those who have been
elected thereto but also to those
who have been appointed”
➢ The provision does not apply to the
Acting Mayor who filed a COC for the
position of Mayor because he is
merely acting as Mayor in a
temporary capacity. Thus, the Acting
Mayor is not deemed automatically
resigned upon his filing of COC for
the position of Mayor.
BUENASEDA vs. FLAVIER
Facts: The petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus, with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order,
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court,
seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman
directing the preventive suspension of
petitioners Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda et.al.
The questioned order was issued in
connection with the administrative
complaint filed with the Ombudsman (OBM-
ADM-0-91-0151) by the private respondents
against the petitioners for violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
Supreme Court required respondent
Secretary to comply with the foretasted
status quo order. The Solicitor General, in his
comment, stated that (a) “The authority of
the Ombudsman is only to recommend
suspension and he has no direct power to
suspend; “and (b) “Assuming the
Ombudsman has the power to directly
suspend a government official or employee,
there are conditions required by law for the
exercise of such powers; [and] said
conditions have not been met in the instant
case”
Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman has
the power to suspend government officials
and employees working in offices other than
the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the
investigation of the administrative
complaints filed against said officials and
employees.
Ruling: YES. Petition was dismissed, status
quo lifted and set aside.
Ratio: When the constitution vested on the
Ombudsman the power “to recommend the
suspension” of a public official or employees
(Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to “suspension,” as a
punitive measure. All the words associated
with the word “suspension” in said provision
referred to penalties in administrative cases,
e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under
the rule of noscitur asociis, the word
“suspension” should be given the same
sense as the other words with which it is
associated. Where a particular word is
equally susceptible of various meanings, its
correct construction may be made specific
by considering the company of terms in
which it is found or with which it is
associated.
 SOLID HOMES vs. TAN
➢ The issue is whether or not Art.
1385 of the Civil Code should be
literally applied.
➢ Art. 1385. Rescission creates the
obligation to return the things
which were the object of the
contract, together with their
fruits, and the price with its
interests; consequently, it can be
carried out only when he who
demands rescission can return
whatever he may be obliged to
restore.
➢ When the contract is rescinded,
will the lot buyer be entitled to
the return of what he had paid or
will he be entitled to receive from
the lot seller the prevailing
market value of the property?
➢ The SC ruled that were we to
follow the letter of Article 1385,
we will be in effect paving the
way to an absurd situation
whereby subdivision developers
who have reneged on their
contractual and legal obligation
to provide utility systems and
facilities for the use of
subdivision lot owners may
themselves profit from their very
own wrongs and shortcomings.
➢ Indeed, there would be unjust
enrichment if respondents Solid
Homes, Inc. & Purita Soliven are
made to pay only the purchase
price plus interest. It is definite
that the value of the subject
property already escalated after
almost two decades from the
time the petitioner paid for it.
NORKIS FREE AND INDEPENDENT
WORKERS UNION vs. NORKIS TRADING CO.
Issue: Whether the employer violated the
CBA in its refusal to grant its employees an
across-the-board increase as a result of the
passage of Wage Order No. ROVII-06.
➢ Section 2, Art. XII of the CBA
provides: In the event that law is
enacted increasing the minimum
wage, an across-the-board increase
shall be granted by the Company
according to the provisions of the
law.
➢ The Wage Order was intended to fix
a new minimum wage only, not to
grant across-the-board wage
increases to all employees in Region
VII. The intent of the Order is
indicated in its title, “Establishing
New Minimum Wage Rates,” as well
as in its preamble: The purpose,
reason, or justification for its
enactment was “to adjust the
minimum wage of workers to
cushion the impact brought about by
the latest economic crisis not only in
the Philippines but also in the Asian
region.”
➢ There are two methods of adjusting
the minimum wage. In Employers
Confederation of the Phils. v.
National Wages and Productivity
Commission, these were identified as
the “floor wage” and the “salary
ceiling” methods.
➢ The “floor wage” method involves
the fixing of a determinate amount
to be added to the prevailing
statutory minimum wage rates.
➢ The “salary-ceiling” method of wage
adjustment applies to employees
receiving a certain denominated
salary ceiling. In other words,
 workers already being paid more
than the existing minimum wage (up
to a certain amount stated in the
Wage Order) are also to be given a
wage increase.
➢ The intention of the Regional Board
of Region VII was to prescribe a
minimum or “floor wage” and not to
determine a “salary ceiling.”
➢ Section 2. AMOUNT AND MANNER
OF INCREASE. – Upon the effectivity
of this Order, the daily minimum
wage rates for all the workers and
employees in the private sector shall
be increased by Ten Pesos (PhP
10.00)
CHU vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (1992)
Issue: Whether a co-terminous employee, or
one whose appointment is co-existent with
the duration of a government project, who
has been employed as such for more than
two years, is entitled to early retirement
benefits under Section 2 of RA 6683, which
provides in part that the “benefits
authorized under this Act shall apply to all
regular, temporary, casual and emergency
employees, regardless of age, who have
rendered at least a total of two (2)
consecutive years of government service as
of the date of separation.”
Ruling: Co-terminous employee is no
different from a casual or temporary
employee, and by necessary implication, the
inclusion of “co-terminous employee” in the
class of government employees entitled to
the benefits of the law necessarily implies
that the co-terminous employees should
also be entitled to such benefits.
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR vs.
NLRC
➢ The issued in this case is whether or
not an employer that was compelled
to cease its operation because of the
compulsory acquisition by the
government of its land for purposes
of agrarian reform, is liable to pay
separation pay to its affected
employees.
➢ The employee claiming for
separation pay cited Art. 283 of the
Labor Code “The employer may also
terminate the employment of any
employee” for reasons therein by
serving notice thereof and paying
separation pay to affected
employees.”
➢ The SC ruled that the employees
were not entitle to such separation
pay because the situation
contemplated in Art 283 is a
unilateral and voluntary act on the
part of the employer to close the
business establishment as may be
gleaned from the wording of the said
legal provision.
➢ The use of the word “may” in a
statute denotes that it is directory in
nature and generally permissive only.
The plain meaning rule of verba legis
in statutory construction is thus
applicable in this case.
➢ In other words, Art 283 of the Labor
Code does not contemplate a
situation where the closure of the
business is forced upon the employer
and ultimately for the benefit of the
employees.
 BATUNGBAKAL vs. NATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT CO.
➢ A civil service employee was
suspended and later dismissed
without cause as shown by the fact
that after investigation he was
exonerated and found guiltless of the
charge of gross negligence.
➢ The SC ruled that the employee must
be reinstated. However, there is a
problem for his reinstatement.
When he was dismissed (illegally),
somebody was appointed in his
position.
➢ The Court ruled that inasmuch as the
employee was illegally dismissed,
legally speaking, his position never
became vacant. Hence, there was no
vacancy to which the present
incumbent could be permanently
appointed, and his occupancy of said
position is temporary and does not
come within the constitutional
prohibition against dismissal without
cause.
➢ In any event, the court added that
the incumbent’s being made to leave
the post to give way to the
employee’s superior right may be
considered as removal for cause.

Prepared by: Pia Isabelle Macasaquit

Revised by: Czyra Camaya