PANADOL/61 19 February 2023

United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs GENERAL Distr.

INFORMATION CIRCULAR ENGLISH

THE PARA-DIMENSIONAL AGREEMENT CONCERNING

NEGOTIATIONS, SPACE AUTOMOBILE MANAGEMENT, AND
DEFINITIONS WITHIN OUTER SPACE LAW, WITH ANNEXED
MULTILATERAL GUIDELINES (THE PANADOL 300 MG TREATY)

Notification of the entry into force

1. The Para-dimensional Agreement concerning Negotiations, space Automobile
management, and Definitions within multilateral Outer space Law, with annexed
Multilateral Guidelines (the PANADOL 300 MG treaty) shall remain open to official
signature until 1130, 19th February 2023.
2. Indirect Ratification systems to be excluded upon the immediate enforcement of
the treaty but would be considerable over long terms, specifically following 31st
December 2024.
_______________________________________________________________

THE PARA-DIMENSIONAL AGREEMENT CONCERNING

NEGOTIATIONS, SPACE AUTOMOBILE MANAGEMENT, AND
DEFINITIONS WITHIN MULTILATERAL OUTER SPACE LAW, WITH
ANNEXED MULTILATERAL GUIDELINES (THE PANADOL 300 MG
TREATY)

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the ‘Parties to the Treaty’,

Recalling the previous resolutions of the General Assembly, mainly 57/57 (2002),
59/65 (2004), 60/54 (2005), 61/58 (2006), 62/20 (2007), 68/50 (2013), 70/230 (2015),
70/53 (2015), 73/6 (2018), 75/92 (2020), 76/76 (2021), and the recent 77/121 (2022),
Noting the importance of preventing an arms race in Outer Space for the benefit of all
humankind, given that the Outer Space, in accordance with the Outer Space Treaty,
should be sustained as a region for international cooperation and peaceful purposes,

Alarmed by the recurrent testing and demonstrations of Anti-Satellite weapons and

Anti-Ballistic missiles, that have posed an increased risk to the initiation of an arms
race,

Noting the four fundamental treaties and conventions of the Committee on Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), being the Outer Space Treaty (1967), the Astronaut
Rescue Agreement (1968), International Liability Convention (1972), and the Space
Registry Convention (1974),

Regretting the incomplete and inadequate implementation of the jurisdictional rulings

of International Outer Space Law, due to insufficiency in multilateral negotiations,
confidence-building measures, and communication systems,

Noting with concern the sustained lack and misinterpretation of Outer Space
nomenclature and definitive terms which have constituted for prevention of effective
and assured implementation of Outer Space law,

Having devoted attention to the rise of commercialization and privatization of Outer

Space, that has led to national appropriation of Outer Space resource systems,
establishing an economic hegemony on space assets and promoting their un-equal
provisions,

Have agreed as follows:

CHAPTER I – DEFINITIONS AND SCOPE

ARTICLE I

The Outer Space to be defined as a demarcated and trans-terrestrial region extending

at an altitude of 100-105 kilometers of above the sea-level, that shall be legally
confined by the rulings of this Treaty and the jurisdictions of the Outer Space Treaty.
Such a region should be demarcated and classified based upon spatial interpretations
throughout, but should be compartmentalized according to its functional
interpretations above the exosphere (400 km altitude).

ARTICLE II
 The spatial interpretations for Outer Space as defined in Article I, such that orbits
around the terrestrial surface of the Earth can be divided as follows, and are based
upon interpretations related to physical limitations:
a) Low-space orbit – ranging from 100-1000 kilometers above the sea level, with
maximum inclination of the objects put in it, such as telescopic satellites,
military observation satellites and low reconnaissance satellites;
b) Geo-synchronous orbit – ranging from 1000-36000 kilometers above the sea
level, with zero inclination of the objects put in it, that include geostationary
satellites, communication satellites, and electronic intelligence transmission
satellites;
c) Semi-synchronous orbit – ranging from 20000-36000 kilometers above the sea
level, with variable inclination of the objects put in it, that include modern
navigation satellites, and advanced and information satellites;
d) Molinya orbit – ranging from 100-40000 kilometers, with partial inclination of
the objects put in it, that include remote-sensing, information transmission
satellites and imagery intelligence satellites.

ARTICLE III

The functional interpretations to be regarded as a secondary definitive measure for

Outer Space, defined in Article I, which are interpretations related to practical and
tactical limitations:
a) Acquisition of information that applies to all types of imagery, signal
interceptions, and orbitals;
b) Transmission of information that applies to all types of communication and
reconnaissance systems;
c) Dual usage that would imply if a space object is active in both peaceful and
non-peaceful activities as described in Article IV and V.

ARTICLE IV

The militarization of Outer Space to be defined as the use, deployment, propagation

or sustenance of military for peaceful or non-peaceful purposes in Outer Space, as
defined in Article I. The peaceful military purposes can be outlined as follows, which
are uses of military that do not threaten stability of other space automobiles and
objects in the Outer Space, are non-aggressive and do not damage (‘damage’ in Outer
Space has been referred to as loss of life, personal injury or other impairment of
health; or loss of or damage to property of States or of persons, natural or judicial, or
property of international intergovernmental organizations; as stated in the
International Liability Convention of 1972):
 a) Activities pertaining to a scientific, exploratory or research-based nature,
authorized by the respective States, or affiliated Organizations,
b) Activities pertaining to usage of and information exchange through Global
Positioning Systems (GPS) and Global Navigation Systems, that are not
classified to be dual-use and are assured to not to be coordinated with
ground-military communication systems,
c) Activities contributing to strategic stability which can conform with
monitoring and confidence-building of disarmament and de-weaponization
agreements,
d) Actions relating to National Technical Means (NTMs), which are means of
verification that use satellite photography for monitoring, confidence-
building measures and verifying adherence to international law; using but
not limited to imagery and signals intelligence (SIGINT and IMINT),
orbital surveillance networks, weapon test and radiation detectors, and
reconnaissance satellites.

ARTICLE V

The non-peaceful purposes, which are uses of military that constitute aggression
and offense, and have the potential to ‘damage’ (as described in Article IV),
excluding measures of potential self-defense, can be described as follows:
a) Actions leading or eventually causing weaponization of Outer
Space, as mentioned in Article VI;
b) Activities that are established within close links of aggressive
military activities that are either occurring on terrestrial region or
airspace region and that which assist or lead to humanitarian
political, legal or territorial crises and conflicts on Earth;
c) Activities that allow military to dictate, maneuver, target or
conduct tactical or ballistic missile strikes on Earth or airspace, that
are assisted by reconnaissance, SIGINT or IMINT satellites:
i) The dual usage nature of SIGINT and IMINT satellites
prevents a clear distinction between their peaceful and non-
peaceful nature, that has to assured by transparency
measures as outlined in Article X.

ARTICLE VI

The weaponization of Outer Space to be defined as the deployment, usage or ‘active’

stockpiling of a weapon in Outer Space or on Earth that will be projected into Outer
Space, as described in Article I, which have a potential to ‘damage’ (as outlined in
Article IV) and can constitute an armed conflict in the Outer Space. It only relates to
 non-peaceful uses of Outer Space, and excludes self-defense mechanisms and
peaceful uses. Weapons in the Outer Space can be classified as follows:
1. Anti-Satellite Weapons (ASATs) – weapons that are designed to destroy,
debilitate or counter satellites, specifically reconnaissance or military
information satellites. Such weapons can be further differentiated into two
types for various purposes:
a) Kinetic – weapons and vessels that use brute force to destroy the satellite
and physically bombard into the satellite. They generate a massive amount
of space debris and can be used at any range within a specified altitude;
b) Non-kinetic – virtual weapons that use intelligence technologies to conduct
cyber-attacks, bombard two coordinated vehicles or either use
concentrated electromagnetic radiation to ‘blind’ satellites;
c) ASATs can also be vastly used in the destruction of decommissioned and
obsolete satellites, which contributes to the addition of space debris in the
debris belt, but can be justified, given certain non-destructive mechanisms;
2. Anti-Ballistic Missile Weapons (ABMs) – intercepting weapons that destroy,
dismantle or demobilize Ballistic Missiles (BMs) or any other delivery system
carrying a conventional weapon or a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD)
that follows the ballistic trajectory. Such weapons are classified to be either
from surface-to-air (projected from a terrestrial surface) or either lying in a
low-orbit.

ARTICLE VII

The above given elaborate definitions for Outer Space, militarization of Outer Space,
weaponization of Outer Space, and Weapons in Outer Space, to be mandated by the
Legal Sub-committee of the United Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space (COPUOS) and enforced with regards to its own rulings and interpretations.

CHAPTER II – MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS

ARTICLE VIII

The Hextuple Consultative and Connective Cabinet (HC3) to be formed as a PAROS

(Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space) ad-hoc committee under the COPUOS,
constituting of dialogue by the United States of America, the Russian Federation, the
People’s Republic of China, the State of India, the French Republic, and the United
Kingdom; the six main nations involved in contemporary space militarization. The
mandate of the body to be followed, as outlined in Article IX.

ARTICLE IX
 The HC3’s mandate is to function as a fundamental negotiatory body that would
include multilateral, extensive and critical dialogue over issues of ASAT testing,
threats posed by ABM weapons and their testing, failure of preventive measures,
possibilities of preventive measures, the extent for the involvement of individual
and unilateral character in defining international space law, and scope of
militarization within Outer Space. The committee is also responsible for the
imposition of moratoria on the testing of Space weapons (as outlined in Article X),
authorize and mandate legalized transparency measures (as outlined in the Chapter
III), and consistently maintain a multilateral environment for dialogue.

ARTICLE X

The HC3 to establish the International Moratoria Imposition Mechanism for

Contingent purposes (IMORCON) for providing rulings and decisions on the
possibilities, viabilities, management, catering, arrangement, and sustenance of
imposed moratoria on ASAT and ABM tests and demonstrations:
1. The moratoria imposed on testing capabilities to be multilateral and
legalized in their entirety, and the HC3 to be updated with the records of
any space weapons, objects, or vessels launched in space, by the Space
Registry of the UNOOSA;
2. The IMORCON to classify Space weapons as defined in Article VI, and the
individual moratoria on weapon testing to be imposed with regards to the:
a) The functional type of Space weapon (kinetic or non-kinetic);
b) The spatial type of Space weapon (ASAT or ABM);
c) The resources required to impose the moratoria and a detailed report on
their development processes (pharmaceutical, technical, or automobile)
d) The estimated tenure to complete halt development and processing of
weapon-based material;
e) The solicitation of immediate and transparent reports to the HC3
identifying any possible dual-usage of the space vessel.

ARTICLE XI

The HC3, as elaborated in Article IV, would also be accommodating auxiliary

representatives, such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Federal Republic of
Germany and Japan, having roles of advisory opinions, providing
recommendations on possible improvements to moratoria and de-weaponization
programs.

ARTICLE XII
 Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any
proposed amendment shall be submitted to the HC3 which shall circulate it to all
Parties to the Treaty, with mutual inclusion of the auxiliary representatives.
Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty,
the HC3 shall convene a conference, for the consideration of the amendment.

ARTICLE XIII

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not
sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with the preliminary
notification of this Treaty may accede to it at any time;
2. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments of the countries
pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE XIV

Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from
the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this
Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of
such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) three months in advance.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE in duplicate, at Beaconhouse Margalla Campus, Islamabad Capital Territory,

the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the 19th day of February, two thousand and twenty-
three.