This document summarizes the political involvement of Muslims in Bihar, India in response to colonialism and nationalism. It finds that large sections of Muslims in Bihar opposed communal separatism and supported composite nationalism, as articulated by organizations like the Imarat-e-Shariah and the Muslim Independent Party, which were ideologically aligned with the Indian National Congress. However, the Congress failed to support Muslim leaders and groups opposed to separatism. Rising Hindu communalism also contributed to the Muslim League's victory in Bihar in 1946, which was far from inevitable given prior Muslim support for composite nationalism in the region.
This document summarizes the political involvement of Muslims in Bihar, India in response to colonialism and nationalism. It finds that large sections of Muslims in Bihar opposed communal separatism and supported composite nationalism, as articulated by organizations like the Imarat-e-Shariah and the Muslim Independent Party, which were ideologically aligned with the Indian National Congress. However, the Congress failed to support Muslim leaders and groups opposed to separatism. Rising Hindu communalism also contributed to the Muslim League's victory in Bihar in 1946, which was far from inevitable given prior Muslim support for composite nationalism in the region.
This document summarizes the political involvement of Muslims in Bihar, India in response to colonialism and nationalism. It finds that large sections of Muslims in Bihar opposed communal separatism and supported composite nationalism, as articulated by organizations like the Imarat-e-Shariah and the Muslim Independent Party, which were ideologically aligned with the Indian National Congress. However, the Congress failed to support Muslim leaders and groups opposed to separatism. Rising Hindu communalism also contributed to the Muslim League's victory in Bihar in 1946, which was far from inevitable given prior Muslim support for composite nationalism in the region.
Muslim resistance to communal separatism & colonialism in Bihar: nationalist
politics of the Bihar Muslims (sajjad.history@gmail.com)
Mohammad Sajjad: Centre of Advanced Study in History, AMU, Aligarh, UP This article explores the issue of community & nation-making in a relatively less explored region of colonial India, Bihar.Although engaging with the existing literature on the theme, it looks into new sources including those in Urdu. The exploration finds that considerably large sections of Muslims were firmly & consistently opposed to the communal separatist politics of the Muslim League in the last days of the empire. Their adherence was to the principle of composite nationalism (muttahidah qaumiyat) & was articulated through the Imarat-e-Shariah & the Muslim Independent Party (MIP), whose essential ideological affiliation was with the Congress. This affiliation was manifested most clearly during & after the Congress ministry (1937–1939). The Muslim League’s victory in 1946 elections of Bihar was far from inevitable. The ‘Rajendra Prasad Papers’, Urdu sources, besides other archival accounts, how- ever, clearly suggest that the Congress refused to extend necessary cooperation to those Muslim leaders/political formations (religious/secular & biradri based, most of them belonging to the Congress itself) which were opposed to the idea of communal sep- aratism. Rising assertion of the majoritarian communalism of organizations like the Hindu Mahasabha/RSS & the considerable communalization of the lower strata of the Congress was no less significant factor, which is amply testified by the archival documents (like intelligence reports & official correspondences) of 1940s. Introduction The historiography of India’s partition is confined mainly to three provinces of British India, namely Punjab, Bengal & UP.This has had much to do with the (mis) perception that Partition was a Muslim affair rather than a Muslim League affair. However,historically speaking, the policies & programs of the Muslim League alone have not guided the political behavior of Indian Muslims.At the same time, the failings of the Congress in shaping the responses of the Muslims have often been ignored. The role of organizations like the Hindu Mahasabha has also been explored inadequately.An all-inclusive study of Partition will, therefore, have to equally undertake explorations at two levels. First, the role of majoritarian communalism articulated not only through organizations like the HMS but also manifested by the Congress (notwithstanding its anti-communal ideological commitments).Second, regarding the political behavior of the Muslims, a clear distinction has to be made between the politics of territorial separatism & the demanding of adequate/proportionate representation in the power structure. With this aim, this article explores the political responses of the Muslims to colonialism & nationalism in Bihar. It will argue that the Muslim demand for adequate representation in power structures may have produced instances of communal tension, but was not necessarily linked to a demand for territorial separatism. Political evolution of Muslims & their response to colonial modernity in Bihar There are a number of studies on the politics of Muslim separatism. Of these, Francis Robinson’s essay ‘Islam & Muslim Separatism’ contends that the Muslims have certain primordial instincts which direct them towards separatism, that they are an innately separate political entity & that there are always some symbols in their cultural storehouse which are used for political mobilization & separatism. This, according to him, was the reason why even western educated politicians like Maulana Mohammad Ali Jauhar & MAJinnah slipped into religious nationalism, demanding a homeland for the ummah. According to Robinson, even prior to the formation of a Muslim middle class & even before this class began competing with the Hindus for government employment & other privileges, elements of separatism existed among the Indian Muslims.Farzana Shaikh, on the other hand, has argued that the Muslim demand for communal separatist representation emanated from the Islamic ideology of not accepting to be represented by a non-Muslim, as well as from a sense of historical superiority, ‘grounded in Mughal values’.Among other scholars, Paul R. Brass relies on the theory of elite manipulation & argues that Muslim separatism originated as an ideology of the upper class & elite (landlords & lawyer politicians), who attempted to preserve their social privileges from the Hindus.None of these scholars therefore take note of the community’s espousal of muttahidah qaumiyat/mushtarka wataniyat (composite nationalism) & the anti-colonial & collaborative positions (with the Congress) taken by Deoband, Jamiatul Ulema-e-Hind (JUH), Imarat- e-Shariah (Patna), Momin Conference, Shia Political Conference, Rayeen Conference, Mansoori Conference & so on. Contrary to such formulations as available in the existing scholarship on Muslim politics, Bihar offers the historian a different perspective. As early as 1836, Shah Kabiruddin of Sasaram khanqah had appealed to the Governor General of India for providing mod- ern education in English in the madrasa associated with the khanqah where Hindus & Muslims both received their primary education. The first literary society called Anjuman- e-Islamia was established at Arrah (headquarters of the district of Shahabad) in August 1866. The chief patrons included non-Muslims like Babu Surajmal besides Muslims like Waris Ali Khan & Khuda Bakhsh Khan. The society was open for both the communities.Syed Imdad Ali’s Bihar Scientific Society, Muzaffarpur, founded in May 1868, had 500 members including an overwhelming number of Hindus. Its fortnightly journal in Urdu, Akhbarul-Akhyar, was edited by a Hindu, Babu Ajodhya Prasad ‘Bahar’. The society had many branches & a chain of schools even in the villages of the district of Muzaffarpur & elsewhere. The network was funded by a number of Hindu zamindars. It later developed into collegiate school & subsequently, in 1899, it was handed over to Langat Singh of the Bhumihar Brahman Sabha who developed it to the premier college of modern education in north Bihar. Similarly, in Patna,Zubdatul Madaris,Bihar Literary Society (1873),Bihar Association (1871),Bihar Upkar Sabha (1876) were all open to both communities.In March 1884, Shamsul Ulema Mohammad Hasan founded Mohammadan Anglo Arabic School.It brought out gazetteers in Urdu & English & had many Hindu students on its rolls. Syed Sharfuddin (1856–1921) established a darul ulum at Bankipur (Patna) on the Deoband pattern. The point can therefore be brought home that the movement for education in Bihar was one arena where the Muslims did not show a particularist or exclusivist orientation, & contrary to Brass’ formulation, the more ‘traditional’ social segments operated in collaboration with others in their goal towards a more modern education. When Hindi in the Nagri script was introduced as the court language in Bihar in January 1881, both Hindus (particularly Kayasthas) & Muslims unitedly opposed it.In the Patna College as well as in other schools, not less than 23% of the total students were Muslims whereas their total population was only 13%.It was no wonder then that when Sir Syed Ahmad Khan advised the Muslims to stay away from the Congress to avoid another conflict with the colonial masters after 1857 & to concentrate on modern education, the educated Muslim elites of Bihar explicitly declared that they would go along with the Congress. The foremost voice representing this idea came from Syed Sharfuddin. At the Allahabad session of the INC in 1888,he led the Bihar delegates. Wazir Ali Khan of Gaya also accompanied him.At the Allahabad session, Sharfuddin declared,‘I am proud to say we have here amongst us more than 200 Muslims. I hope that at least in my province of Bihar the Muslims have the fullest sympathy with the objects of the INC.’Similarly, a large section of the Ulema was associated with the Congress from the very beginning. In 1899,Afaq Khan set up ‘Boys’ Association’ at Darbhanga to popularize the Congress’ programs in the region. The BPCC held its first meeting at the Sonepur fair,which was chaired by Sarfaraz Hussain Khan, & of the six delegates,two were Muslims,namely Hasan Imam & Najmul Hoda. Ali Imam was elected the president of the BPCC at Patna in 1908.At the Madras session of the Congress,he spoke on the matter of civil liberties & demanded repeal of the Deportation Regulation.Maulana Shibli Nomani vehemently criticized the ML whereas Mazharul Haq,Sarfaraz Hussain Khan, Ali Imam, asan Imam & so on brought the ML’s provincial branch nearer the Congress. Due to the overwhelming presence of nationalist Muslims in the BPML,it was kept out of the agitation for the separate electorate.In fact, the Bihar Congress, during its early phase, was dominated by the Muslims rather than the Hindus.Most prominent of them were Nawab Sohrab Jung,Syed Wilayat Ali Khan,Syed Fazal Imam & Wazir during its initial phase.Syed Imdad Imam,Syed Amir Husain(1864– 1910),Syed Sulaiman Nadvi(1884–1953),Khuda BakhshKhan(1842– 1908),SyedSharfuddin(1856–1921), Salahuddin KhudaBakhsh (1875– 1931),MazharulHaq(1866–1931),SMFakhruddin(1868–1931),KhwajaMdNoor (1878– 1936), SAli Imam(1869–1932), SHasan Imam (1871–1933), Sir Sultan Ahmad (1880– 1963),SMZubair(1884–1930),SMUmair (1894–1978),Shafi Daudi (1875–1949),Abdul Qaiyum Ansari (1905–1974),Manzoor Aijazi (1913–1969) &Maghfoor Aijazi (1900– 1967)were other leading figures. Here it should be reiterated that ‘Instrumentalist’ thesis of Paul R. Brass & Anil Seal’s explanation regarding the ‘Muslim Breakaway’ fail to explain the case of Bihar, where, like UP, the Muslims were far ahead of the Hindus in education & jobs. However, unlike the Muslims of UP, the Muslims of Bihar, by & large,did not chart an exclusivist or antagonistic course from that of the Hindus, either in establishing their educational institutions or in taking up a position against colonial rule.At the same time, in the case of Bihar, we cannot make a rigid distinction between traditionalists & modernists because the Muslim leaders there maintained a more syncretic approach.Significantly, in the late nineteenth & early 20thcentury Bihar, even the champions of modern education like Noorul Hoda & Khuda Bakhsh Khan(1842–1908) remained concerned about religio-cultural traditions. Hence, they revived the old madrasas & opened up new ones. In fact regarding education, there was not a great deal of conflict between the traditionalists & modernists.Each remained committed to both systems of education, & this blend of tradition & modernity might possibly have helped check the growth of separatism.These institutions produced many leaders. Shri Krishna Sahay (First Indian member of the Governor’s ExCouncil of Bihar),Dr. Sachidanand Sinha, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, Alakh Kumar Sinha, Narayan Babu (First IGP,Bihar) & many other luminaries got their primary education at such Anglo- Urdu/Persian madrasas.It is also instructive to note here that next only to the Bengalis, the Muslims in Bihar dominated in public employment & the medical & legal professions. Consequently, in the movement for the separation of Bihar from the Bengal, the Muslims were at the forefront. In 1905, when the Swadeshi movement was launched against Curzon’s partition of Bengal, the leadership of the movement adopted certain mobilizational symbols & meth- ods, which alienated the Muslims giving way to the rise & growth of communalism.Bihar, on the other hand, presented a different picture of Hindu–Muslim relations.Here, although there was competition between the educationally advanced Bengalis, who were Hindus (who dominated the government jobs in Bihar also), & the Muslims, this contest was not expressed in religio- communitarian,particularist/separatist overtones. The contrast with Bengal is striking, where the bhadralok,afraid of losing their hegemony, ensured as much delay as possible in the establishment of the University of Dhaka. As AK Biswas puts it:even after annulment of partition (of Bengal) in 1911,the high caste Hindus ensured as much delay as possible in the establishment of the University at Dhaka which was one of the essential conditions for undoing the partition of Bengal…the high priests of nationalism, or swadeshi were frenzied over the prospect of the loss of their hegemony over the Muslims & the lower castes in Eastern Bengal. By mixing religion with politics, the upper castes made swadeshi an exclusively Hindu, that too a religious affair & precluded the participation of the Muslims & the low castes in the agitation which in any case lacked mass support & base. In Bihar, on the other hand, the positivity in Hindu–Muslim relations had reached such a high watermark that at the 3 rd session of the Bihar PC(Muzaffarpur,1910),when Deep Narayan Singh,in his presidential address, proposed the extending of the principle of separate electorate to the Hindus in areas where they were the minority, the Muslim delegates, who were as much as half of the total delegates, supported this proposal enthusiastically.The Biharee of 20May 1910 observed that it was difficult to find any other province where such an exemplary collaboration between the political life of Hindus & Muslims existed & that it was an example worthy of being emulated by the rest of the country. Simultaneously, it was none other than Mazharul Haq (1866–1931) & Hasan Imam (1871–1933) who opposed the extension of the system of separate electorate to the Muslims in the local bodies. Mazharul Haq said, ‘I shall sacrifice ten thousand principles & ten thousand separate electorates simply with one object, namely, to bring the two communities together in order that they may work hand in hand.’ Freedom fighter, activist & writer,Taqi Raheem is emphatic about the role played by Mazharul Haq in the Lucknow Pact of 1916.According to him, Haq was most instrumen- tal in bringing the League out of loyalist politics & close to the Congress. Haq had already presided over the League session of 1915 in Bombay. Here his presidential address was much more daringly patriotic & anti-colonial than that of any other address of a Congress session thus far. In this session of the League, the Congress had sent a delegation on a goodwill mission, consisting of Lord Sinha,SN Banerji,MMMalviya,Annie Besant & above all Gandhiji. Here, to develop a better understanding between the League & the Congress & also to work out the constitutional reforms, the League appointed a committee in which as many as nine people were from Bihar. They were Ali Imam (1869–1932),Mazharul Haq, Maulvi Fakhruddin, an advocate (1868–1931),Nawab Sarfaraz Hussain Khan,Maulvi Ahmad Hussain, advocate from Muzaffarpur, Maulvi Akhtar Hussain, also advocate from Muzaffarpur, Syed Mahmud & Barrister Syed Md. Naim of Bhagalpur. It is intriguing therefore that although the Bihar leadership so successfully arrived at a better political understanding between the communities in 1916, in the subsequent period, the region suffered from one of the most consequential communal riots in the history of the time. This was the Shahabad riots of 1917. Political unity & social divide: Hindu–Muslim relations, 1917–1937 According to Papiya Ghosh,the Shahabad riots very decisively ‘polarized the texture of Bihar politics’. his riot was mainly on the issue of cow slaughter. Ever since the 1880s,organizations like Gaurakshini Sabha,Sanatan Dharma Sabha,Hindu sabhas & AryaSamajs had started proliferating in Bihar. After 1908, the Gwala movement also emerged.Since 1893,communal riots also became frequent occurrences.The Shahabad riots, however,surpassed the intensity of all previous riots.In Oct1917, enquiry into the riots started. Mazharul Haq put together the report of the Bihar Congress & M L ,which dismissed the details of the mosques defiled, women raped & in particular of women throwing themselves into wells to escape rape. Apparently,this was to avert the accentuation of the crisis & communal tensions. In the 10th session of the AIML(1917),Hindu leaders were condemned & at its special session,it condemned the Bihar-ML for grossly neglecting the aftermath of the riots. In fact, to avoid any communal polarization,Hasan Imam (Chairman of the joint meeting of BPCC, Bihar PA & the provincial branch of the ML) had preferred not to mention the riots & had confined himself on the follow-up details of the Lucknow Pact & its application to Bihar.In Papiya Ghosh’s words, ‘This not surprisingly alienated the Muslims. Gandhi, then deep into the Champaran Satyagraha, explained his inability to move to Shahabad…His message to the Hindus was that they were to try to stop the daily wholesale slaughter of cows…’ Consequently, the ML leaders came under increasing pressure to break with the Congress. In a series of hugely attended meetings organized by the Muslims from all classes, the leadership was thoroughly rejected by the ‘community’, which strongly denounced the politics of Hasan Imam,Mazharul Haq,SafarazHKhan & Jinnah.Simultaneously, the Gaurakshini movements went on gaining momentum. Communal tension further increased due to the Shudhi movement in the 1920s & 1930s, particularly after 1923,when the focus was on converting the Malkana Muslim Rajputs back to Hinduism. Conversions were mostly in the Shahabad area. At the same time, the issue of the conversion of Hindus in Malabar & the Multan riots became recurrent issues even in the speeches of Rajendra Prasad & SKSinha,& Sinha was associated with the HMS for several years. Retrospectively,therefore,Syed Mahmud was to say that after 1923 the Muslims turned increasingly towards intransigent leaders in the face of the Shudhi movement & the Congress could not be accepted as a secular body as it had a tendency to combine ‘communalism in culture with nationalism in politics’.The Khilafat Committee’s inaction over the Shudhi issue added to the resentment among the Muslims. After the Lucknow Pact (1916), the most important political development was the Champaran Satyagrah. As early as in 1914, Khan Bahadur Fakhruddin, from the platform of the Bihar PC,had moved a resolution pressing the government to institute an enquiry into the conflictual relation between the European planters & the ryots of Tirhut, whose grievances, he said, were genuine.It is a lesser known fact of history that Peer Md. Moonis was one of the most prominent leaders who had organized & mobilized the peasantry of Champaran. A teacher in the Bettiah Guru Training School, his service was terminated due to his anti-colonial activities. Moonis was a regular columnist in the Hindi daily Pratap, Kanpur, & was counted amongst the leading Hindi journalists of the day. The then SDO of Bettiah, WH Louis, called him ‘a connecting link between the educated class & the ryots’.It was none other than Moonis who led the delegation that met Gandhiji in Lucknow in 1916.Other important Muslim leaders who organized the peasants were Shaikh Gulab & Adalat Hussain.Hasan Imam gave financial assistance to Gandhiji when he came to Champaran. For the following years, the enthusiastic participation of the Muslims in the Non- cooperation & Khilafat movements is too well known to be repeated here. However, there are some significant developments, which are worth mentioning in the context of Bihar. The Bihar Provincial Congress Committee ratified the Nagpur resolution of 1920 & appointed several district committees. Shafi Daudi for Muzaffarpur, Maulvi Zakaria Hashmi for Saran & Shah Md.Zubair for Monghyr were appointed to popularize the Non-cooperation programme in the respective districts. In Arrah, it was Mahfuz Alam.Government educational institutions were boycotted & the Bihar Vidyapeeth was set up with Mazharul Haq as the Chancellor. Abdul Bari (1882–1947),a Socialist leaning Congressman & a famous leader of workers, joined it as a teacher. Shafi Daudi made the arrangement for the examination of the students. In the National Council of Education for Bihar, Masher Haq, Shafi Daudi, Nazir Ahmad, Qazi Abdul Wadood, Qazi Ahmad Hussain,S.M. Zubair & Maulvi Wirasat Rasul were included. Shafi Daudi & the Aijazi brothers of Muzaffarpur were extremely successful in forming panchayats to adjudicate the cases of villagers as the courts were boycotted. Daudi himself had given up a very lucrative practice in the Muzaffarpur court. Due to the remarkable organizing capacity of Daudi & the Aijazi brothers, the Tirhut Division had become a ‘danger zone’ in official circles. Here, the Congress machinery was at its highest efficiency. The volunteer corps organized by Daudi & the Aijazis became a serious concern for the government. On 30Oct1921, Daudi’s house at Muzaffarpur was raided by the police, because it was the headquarters of the Central Board of Control for the National Volunteer Corps/Sewa Samitis. Yet,the period of 1925–1928 witnessed a widening divide between the Hindus & the Muslims. The municipal & the District Board elections of 1924–1925, says Kamta Chaubey, left a legacy of bad blood between the two communities in Bihar. In these elections, several important Congress Muslims lost, namely Hadi Hussain, Shafi Daudi & others. The former was a candidate for vice president of the Gaya District Board & the latter was a candidate for chairman of the Muzaffarpur District Board.Both of them were extremely prominent Congressmen yet they were not voted for by the Hindu Congressmen. It was all the more distressing because Daudi was defeated by a European planter Danby, who evidently secured a good number of votes from the Hindu Congressmen.This breach of trust made Daudi suspicious of Hindus & the Congress. This was the decade when the Arya Samaj’s Shudhi movement was also very active in Bihar.Even more telling was the defeat of no less a person than Mazharul Haq in the elections of the Bihar LC.Haq, in utter disgust, retired from politics.He retired at a time when he was needed the most to contain the monster of communalism. Maulana Azad wrote a letter (20Aug1926),persuading him to accept the presidency of the Congress (Guwahati, 1926) but he did not relent.Nevertheless, he, along with Daudi, toured the whole of Bihar to work for communal harmony in the midst of recurrent riots.The Bihar Provincial Conference of 1925 was presided over by SMZubair & the district conference of Banka was presided by Daudi to popularize khadi.In many villages like Kapasi, Muslim women were seen engaged in weaving & spinning,& despite worsening communal relations, no important Congress Muslim leader took recourse to the doctrine of separatism. Rather, in a special meeting in the Anjuman Islamia Hall,Patna, on 8May1927, they decided for joint electorates rather than separate electorates.The hall was packed to its capacity, with Ali Imam, Fakhruddin, Sarfaraz H Khan, Daudi, Khan Bahadur M. Ismail, Syed Abdul Aziz being the notable participants. Muslim politics in Bihar, up until at least 1928, says Kamta Chaubey, was liberal, non- communal & nationalist to the core & opposed to the principle of separate electorates. It was due to the influence of a group of committed nationalist leaders from Bihar that even the Bihar Muslim League remained ideologically close to the Congress. According to Shashi Shekhar Jha, ‘[A] Notable feature of the Bihar Muslim League was the absence of communal character . . . perhaps the leadership of Mazharul Haq & other eminent Muslims as also the natures of political activities were responsible for it.’On 20Mar1927, Muslims had a meeting in Delhi where Daudi, SMZubair & other leaders were present.They had experienced the limitations of separate electorates.Hence, they were pressing against the separate electorates but simultaneously demanding the reservation of seats for minorities in the legislature. SMZubair had already emphasized this point in the provincial conference of the Congress at Purulia in 1926.The Muslims gave up the demand of separate electorates for which Jinnah & Iyengar also played an instrumental role.It was a gesture of the Muslims, which according to Taqi Raheem had impressed even the HMS leaders like Moonje, Kelkar,Jayakar & Aney, & it was ratified by the AICC at Bombay in May 1927.It is evident therefore that the fissures created in the Hindu–Muslim relationship during the elections of 1924–1926 had been redeemed to an extent, thanks to Daudi & Zubair.This went a long way in presenting a formidable united opposition against the all-white Simon commission. On 30 January 1928, under Daudi’s presidentship, a conference was held at the Anjuman Islamia Hall, Patna, where it was resolved to put a stiff resistance against the Simon commission.In Muzaffarpur’s Jama Masjid, Daudi delivered a stirring speech to mobilize people against the commission. He himself led a demonstration of students in Patna. Nevertheless, the MLNehru Report was seen as unsatisfactory by a section of the Muslim leadership. They had insisted on demands like a one-third reservation of seats for Muslims, federation with complete provincial autonomy & creation of Sind province out of Bombay, which were denied. Shafi Daudi & Maulana Sajjad were most critical of the report.They called a meeting in Patna in Dec1928, but it was to no avail.Shah Muhammad Umair,retrospectively, subjected Congress to severe criticism by saying that in exchange of the joint electorate, conceding one-third of the seats of the central assembly would not have been a bad bargain.While writing his autobiography in the Hazaribagh Jail during 1942–1944, he further commented that it particularly unjustified on the part of the Congress to not accommodate the Muslim League’s demand, when it had conceded reserved seats to the Harijans after the Poona Pact (1932). The Congress’ denial of reserved seats to the Muslims propelled Daudi’s retirement from politics, which was indeed a big loss for the Congress as he was one of the greatest leaders of Bihar. Mazharul Haq had already retired from politics (& subsequently died in 1931). This was a time when the Hindu Mahasabha leaders were increasing their influence in the Congress, & the share of Muslims in the politics of the Bihar Congress had started to decline visibly. It was being taken over by the upper- caste Hindus, mostly Bhumihars & Rajputs. In fact, the rise of the Bhumihars in education, politics & bureaucracy is a subject that remains to be fully explored & elaborated. Swami Sahajanand Saraswati was the first leader to start organizing the Bhumihars & was associated with the Bhumihar Brahman Sabha (founded in 1889 at Patna by the Raja of Benaras, among many others).However, he subsequently gave up addressing caste issues of the Bhumihars & engaged himself in the politics of peasant radicalism. Later, Sir Ganesh Dutt Singh (1868–1943) emerged as their leader, who remained loyal to the Raj, entered the reformed Legislative Council & occupied influential portfolios of education & local self-government. This position helped him distribute patronage to his caste-brethren. Later, this patronage was extended to the Bhumihars by SKSinha,who occupied the premiership/CMship of Bihar during 1937– 1939 & then during 1946–1967. Despite their grudges against the Congress, Muslim leaders like Syed Mahmud (1889– 1971), SMZubair & Abdul Bari had remained with the party.Abdul Bari gained much popularity among the workers in Jamshedpur during the 1920s & 1930s. S. Mahmud came in to fill the gap created by Daudi & Haq.In 1930, at Lahore, Mahmud was elected GS of AICC.The Maulanas Sajjad, Nuruddin Bihari, Usman Ghani, Abdul Wahab Darbhangwi,Abdul Wadud were active within the Congress & during the Civil Disobedience Movement. Seeing their popularity & mobilizing capacity, they were put behind the bars. Their anti-League position remained consistent &, in Mar1929, they set up the All India Muslim Nationalist Party. By July 1930,its provincial branch was opened in Bihar with Maulana Sajjad as its president. Overwhelming participation of the Muslims (in the Civil Disobedience Movement) in Saran,Champaran & Muzaffarpur was due mainly to Syed Mahmud’s organizational ability, & in Jamshedpur, Shahabad & Patna it was due to Abdul Bari. In these years, all these districts had a number of influential Muslim leaders associated with the Congress. Taqi Raheem says that as the Bihar Muslims, in the hope of fighting colonialism, had given up the demand for separate electorates, their demand for reservation of one-third of the total seats in the central assembly for the Muslims (under joint electorate) should have been conceded as it was done in the case of Harijans with the Poona Pact of 1932.It may be noted that the McDonald ‘Award’ under the scheme of separate electorate had offered only 72 reserved seats to the Harijans in the central assembly, but after the Gandhi– Ambedkar [Poona Pact of 1932,as many as 147 seats were reserved for them in exchange of Harijans giving up separate electorate.] However, the Congress, under the pressure of Hindu Mahasabha, failed to accommodate this demand, which added to the Muslims’ woes against the Congress.Unfortunately, this was the time when two great leaders in Bihar,Hasan Imam & Ali Imam, passed away.The situation made it increasingly more difficult for the nationalist leaders like Syed Mahmud, Abdul Bari & SMUmair to keep the Muslims with the Congress.This was the backdrop against which the elections of 1937 came to be held. Denying share of power to the Muslims, 1937 Many Muslims, though having grievances against the Congress, did not switch over to the League & instead formed a nationalist party, the MIP, which was ideologically akin to the Congress. It was led by Maulana Sajjad of Imarat-e-Shariah, a legal & spiritual institution that was set up in Phulwari Sharif, Patna, in 1921 for the implementation of the shariat & had a formidable mass base even in the remotest villages.In the 1937 elections, the Congress & the MIP contested elections with seat adjustments. The MIP won 15/40 reserved seats & the Congress won 5 seats. The League was unable to secure any seats. Such ideological affinity & electoral adjustment gave rise to an impression in the public mind that the Congress & MIP would jointly form the government in Bihar.The Congress, however, reneged on the tacit understanding, giving a rude shock to the Muslims.The Congress, on the issue of ‘Governor’s discretion’, initially refused to form the ministry.Accordingly, the MIP, being the second largest party, formed its ministry (for about 120 days during April–July 1937), though making it clear that it would give way to a new ministry as soon as the Congress reconsidered its decision. However, there took place a sort of ‘Hindu backlash’ against the MIP, whereby, according to Taqi Raheem, even the Socialists were embittered by the fact of the MIP’s formation of the interim ministry.Raheem’s account indicated the growth of misgivings among the Muslims so far as their perception of the Hindu political class was concerned. At about the same time, the AG of Bihar,Sir Sultan (1880–1963),was replaced with Baldev Sahay.Sir Sultan had been the only Muslim AG in India, & his removal proved to be another step in the growing apprehension among the Muslims. Yet another cause of disaffection was the preference given to Shri Krishna Sinha (by the Congress) over Syed Mahmud for the Premiership of Bihar.As the share of the Muslims in the organizing & building of the Bihar Congress had been significant, they had expected proportionate share in the power structure. The reluctance of the Congress to give proportionate power to the Muslims was the major reason for the growth of the Bihar branch of the Muslim League, which until 1937 was almost non-functional. In his study, Jawaid Ahmad has named the increased Shudhi campaign of the Arya Samaj for creating communal tensions in Bihar. According to him:[T]here was a good prospect of Hindu–Muslim rapprochement in Bihar. The Bihar Congress was in a position to curb separatist euphoria & communal instinct by projecting the Congress Muslims to the forefront of the movement but the Bihar Congress intoxicated with electoral politics & unwilling to share power with the Muslims, failed to bring the prospect of Hindu–Muslim amity to a reality. The Congress’ denial of power-sharing proved fatal. The League could exaggerate & magnify the grievances of the Muslims. However, contrary to the claims of the apolo- gists of the Congress, the grievances were not completely unfounded & hence cannot be ruled out summarily. There may be reasons to look at the Pirpur & Shareef Reports (these were the enquiry reports of the Muslim League about excesses committed or dis- crimination perpetrated against Muslims by the Congress ministries during 1937–1939) with some doubt as they were made use of by the League as an instrument to alienate the Muslims away from the Congress, but the one written by the consistently anti- League Imarat-e-Shariah’s Maulana Sajjad cannot be dismissed as baseless. The JUH, Imarat-e-Shariah & MIP had started with supporting the Congress, had opposed the League & had expected to have a share in governance. But in 1939, Sajjad had to reach the ‘inevitable conclusion’ that the Congress was ‘communalist to the core’. He wrote a 22-p-long letter to the Congress High Command cataloguing the grievances of the Muslims against the Congress ministry. This letter was written after the Congress resigned from the ministry in 1939 & was supposedly meant for the Congress to do a ‘self examination of its failings & errors’. Mushirul Hasan, in his paper on the Muslim Mass Contact Programme of the Congress ministry (1937–1939), clearly says, ‘within two years of its launching, the Mass Contacts Campaign ran into serious trouble not so much due to the Muslim League’s opposition or the lack of Muslim support, but because of Congress’ own reluctance to pursue it with any vigor or sense of purpose’. In the early 1939 it was scrapped, as it was only a ‘brainchild of Nehru’. Most of the influential Congress leaders remained either opposed to or unenthusiastic about it.Shah Md Umair’s remarks corroborate it: ‘In fact, right since very beginning, the Congress was considering the existence of the nationalist Muslims as a dead body (laasha-e-be jaan)…& by the time wisdom dawned upon it that only through this [Muslim Mass Contact] Programme could it strengthen the nationalist Muslims, all the organs of the Mass Contact had withered away.’ The Congress right wing came out with the bitter criticism against its Muslim Mass Contact Program, with the outcome that Abul Kalam Azad’s pamphlet, ‘Congress & Musalmans’, could not be distributed on the lame excuse of lack of funds. B.S. Moonje proposed to Bhai Parmanand & Raja Narendra that all the Hindu Mahasabhites should join the Congress to counter the effect of Muslim influx into the party’s organizational structure. His indictment of the Congress was also an indication of the Mahasabhite hold on the district units of the Congress, & Mushirul Hasan concludes: ‘Congress’ own position regarding Communal activities of its members remained dangerously vague.’ Despite such differences, however, a fairly large section of the Muslim leadership remained committed to the idea of a composite nationalism & consistently opposed to the League. Syed Mahmud, Abdul Bari, Jameel Mazhari (the famous Urdu poet) & a host of popular mass leaders were still with the Congress.Jameel Mazhari was the publicity officer of the Congress ministry of Bihar. When it resigned in 1939, Mazhari also resigned. In Nov1940, Maulana Sajjad, the great nationalist leader who had exercised political & religious influence on the Muslims, passed away. This weakened the Muslim politics of composite nationalism at a time when the League’s separatism was becoming rapidly strident. At this time, Abdul Qaiyum Ansari had emerged on the political firma- ment as a promising leader of tremendous popularity. He was the leader of the Momin Conference.Apart from him, Syed Mahmud, Abdul Bari, Comrade Ali Ashraf, Manzar Rizvi, Maghfoor Ahmad Aijazi & his elder brother Manzoor Aijazi were active leaders. A large number of Muslims were engaged in the anti-colonial struggles during the Second World War under the influence of these leaders.Ali Ashraf, Peerzada Syed Shah Sulaiman & Chaudhry Abul Hasnat of Arrah went to jail for their fierce anti- colonial activities. Majlis-e-Ahrar,Momin Conference,Rayeen Conference,Shia Political Conference,Mansoori Conference were quite popular among the relevant groups & were vehemently opposed to the League.It is to be noted that although Abdul Qaiyum Ansari(1905–74) of the Momin Conference subjected the Muslim League to criticism for being a party of the upper-caste feudal elites, he never said anything against the Congress which had the similar class base.On 14Apr1940,Maulana Sajjad refuted the ‘Pakistan’ resolution of the Muslim League.On 19Apr1940,some of the Congressmen observed ‘Hindustan Day’ against the League’s observances of ‘Pakistan Day’ at several places.In Jul1940, at a village of Bhagalpur, a famous journalist of Purnea, Syed Abdullah (of the All India Azad MC), convened a meeting of Muslims opposed to the League.In that meeting, the League & Jinnah were subjected to most severe criticism.The issues of an English daily of Patna,The Searchlight (3Jan– 30Apr1940),edited by Murli Manohar Prasad, a Congressman, give reports about frequent meetings of the Momin Conference,Rayeen Conference,Shia Conference in several districts of Bihar where they had vehemently opposed the ‘two-nation theory’. The Azad Conference meetings,repudiating Jinnah & his two-nation theory, continued in several district towns & even villages,in the following years, particularly in 1942.It alarmed the ML,but to counter the anti-League propaganda, there was no leader of required stature in Bihar.It, therefore, sent KNazimuddin from Bengal,who convened a ‘Pakistan Meeting’ on 29Apr1944 at Jamui,Monghyr.According to an official report, ‘The attempted reorganization of the ML...however [was] not making much progress in the province.The local Shias [were] (however) very critical of the Pakistan Scheme which they describe(d) as fraud.’ At the same time, the activities of the RSS were also on the rise in Bihar.On 15Aug1943, Savarkar had told in a conference at Nagpur, the RSS Headquarter, ‘We Hindus are a nation by ourselves & it is a historical fact that Hindus & Muslims are two nations’, & BSMoonje, in the same conference had noted, ‘let our proportion in the army be increased & every problem will be automatically solved’.Earlier on 26Mar1939, Savarkar, in his address to the eighth session of the HMS, at Monghyr, had said, ‘Congress was manned & managed by Hindus who…(have),now fallen in wrong track by complete adherence to the Muslim vagaries’ & that ‘Hindustan belonged to Hindus & none other than the Hindus would rule it.’ He also referred to Nazi Germany by saying, ‘Mahasabha is as much national as the National Government in Germany’,& lambasted the Congress for giving ‘meaningless concessions to minorities’. He further declared that all branches of the Bengal Hindu Sabha be instructed to establish gymnasiums in every village to introduce lathi, dagger play & to hold physical tournaments periodically & promote physical training among women.In the subsequent session of the Bihar Hindu Sabha, SP Mukherji, in his presidential address, said, ‘one of the tasks of the HMS will be to build up a national militia’.Intelligence reports warned that the organizational proliferation of the RSS had gained an alarming pace, intruding into the educational institutions & recruiting students & teachers, indulging in lathi drills with ‘use of certain uniform & performance of exercises of a military nature’, particularly since Oct1943. Its branches were spread across ‘11 districts lying in the northern half of the province along the Ganges’, besides ‘30 other mofussil branches’. These activities had continued in defiance of the administrative prohibition. Prof. Diwakar, the general secretary of the provincial wing of the RSS, also visited Monghyr & Sasaram in April 1944 mobilizing gatherings of the students, ‘with a view to revitalizing local activities’.These developments were felt to be a danger to the law & order which warranted the Government of India to issue a general instruction to all the provinces, ‘If any Provincial government considers it necessary in the interest of law & order to proceed openly against RSS, it should not hesitate to do so. . . .’It is also to be noted that although the administrative measures taken against the RSS were much stringent in the Punjab, Central Provinces, Ajmer, Marwar, in Bihar no such measures were taken,even though the high officers of the security & intelligence agencies of the government of Bihar were asking to do so, in view of the fact that ‘many military deserters, dismissed/discharged police personnel were joining the private armies of the communal political organizations’, most notably the RSS. The lower units of the Congress & HMS/RSS were almost synonymous; they identified the League & other Muslim constituencies as synonymous/ interchangeable entities. This overlap of H M S & the Congress was corrob- orated by the HMS itself, when it was declared,‘the HMSites should not look upon the Congress as untouchables’ & that the Hindus were the mainstay of the Congress, & if they were weak the Congress would also be weak.This stance of the lower Congressmen alienated the Muslims, with communal tension & riots looming large. Growing communal polarization after 1937, rapid rise of the HMS/RSS & the ML caused communal riots more frequently in several towns of Bihar, either on the issue of Mahabiri Jhanda processions or on cow slaughter. In 1940, after the Lahore Resolution of the ML(which was construed as demanding India’s partition along Hindu–Muslim lines) the religious tension was even more palpable. As a consequence of this communal polarization, hereafter, the Jamiatul Ulema, Imarat-e-Shariah, Congress Muslims all suffered a definite erosion of their mass base. However, leaders like Comrade Ali Ashraf had an abiding influence & the Communists in general were gaining much popularity among the Muslims. It was this section of the Muslim leadership which helped in containing the Muslim alienation to a considerable extent after 1942. Therefore, during the Quit India Movement, fairly large sections of the Muslims remained with the national movement. Many of the participants are alive & still live in the same areas.KKDatta gives a long list of such Muslim freedom fighters who had been in the forefront of the movement. The noteworthy point here is that even when the Muslims were disillusioned with the Congress & even when very few of them were actually at the forefront of the party, Muslim participation in the activities of the party remained significant.Taqi Raheem thus expressed his dismay to see that ‘almost all Hindu historians & intellectuals, in order to cover up the faults of their leaders, keep saying that it was the Muslims of Bihar & UP who divided the country & created Pakistan’. The most serious impact on the Congress’ Muslim support base, however, came during & after the elections of 1946.(The elections for the central Assembly were held in OctNov1945, & those for the provincial assembly were held in FebMar1946.) In these elections the Congress resorted to every kind of means to defeat the League, including extending support to pro-British candidates, & creating sectarian divides among Muslims. At this time, even Maulana Maududi, founder of the JeI(1941), opposed the League’s demand of Pakistan, even though it was for his own narrow interests. In other words, when the League went to the elections, it stood by itself.Yet, it was able to win 34/40 Muslim seats in Bihar. The nationalist Muslim organizations lost most of the seats in the elections of 1946, largely because of a resources crunch & less because of the League’s popularity. According to a contemporary source,The nationalist Muslim bodies had scarce resources;the Momins & the Jamiatul Ulama were poor communities.’The Muslim leaders of the District Congress Committees had started demanding that at least Rs. 10,000 had to be allocated for every Muslim seat to win.The nationalist Muslim organizations demanded an assurance from the Congress regarding the appointment of Muslim teachers in primary schools but Rajendra Prasad refused to assure anything except religious freedom. This gesture of the Congress leadership created differences amongst the nationalist Muslims affecting the prospects of the Congress in the elections of 1946. The Congress also refused to come out with a joint manifesto, although it did form the ‘Nationalist Muslim Board’. As a result, the campaign for the election remained ‘confused & uncoordinated’ as later confessed by Rajendra Prasad himself. Nevertheless, mere electoral victory of the League did not make the idea of Partition welcome to all Muslims. The Muslims of Bihar continued contesting the League & its two-nation theory regardless of their disenchantment with the Congress. In Muzaffarpur,the Aijazi brothers along with others campaigned from house to house on bicycles in 1946-1947.Maghfoor Aijazi had set up the All India Jamhoor Muslim League, in 1940,to oppose Jinnah’s scheme of Pakistan. He had been active, since 1940, to oppose Jinnah’s Pakistan (notwithstanding his disillusionment with the Congress, which he had joined in 1920 & built it up so assiduously).Maulvi Ahmad Ghafoor & Sayeedul Haq of Darbhanga, Fazlur Rahman of Patna, Qazi Md. Husain of Gaya, Hafiz Md. Sani of Bettiah, Qazi Md. Ilyas of Begusarai, Md. Noor of Purnea & Isa Rizwi of Sheikhpura were still active in the Congress. In Siwan, Abdul Ghafoor of the FB & Zawar Husain of AISF were active & popular mass leaders working for the Congress candidates. Maulana Shah Mohiuddin, sajjada nashin of Khanqah-e-Mujibiya, Phulwari Shareef, had great spiritual influence on the Muslims of Bihar. He had people with him such as Abdus Samad Rahmani, Usman Ghani & Ahmad Husain who campaigned for the Congress. However, the greatest help came from Qaiyum Ansari’s Momin Conference. Of the six Muslim seats won by the Congress in 1946, five were of the Momin Conference & the sixth (Syed Mahmud) was won largely with the Momin Conference’s support. Among the Socialists, Abul Hayat Chand Kazmi, Ahad Fatmi & Razi Azimabadi put up an effective resistance to the League. Manzar Rizwi, Ali Ashraf & S. Habeeb Ali Amjad dominated the Communist Party in Bihar & effectively influenced public opinion against the League. The riots of Oct1946 (after the elections, when the Congress had formed its ministry on 16Apr1946), however, became the ‘turning point’ in Bihar’s nationalist politics.The riots across Bihar broke out after a strike (hartal) in Patna against the Noakhali riots.On 25Oct, Anti-Noakhali Day was observed, at a meeting organized by Jagat Narayan Lal, the district’s leading Congressman. (It should be noted here that Jagat Narayan Lal was one of the leaders who took the initiative for the Shudhi campaign in the 1920s & was a member of both Hindu Mahasabha & the Congress.) On 26Oct, various Muslim villages were attacked, & the rioting spread to other districts.The Raj, the Congress & the League give different estimates of total casualties differing from 6 to 50,000.There were instances of women jumping into wells to save themselves from being raped. The sheer size of the violent mobs created panic. Congress workers while visiting the affected areas in Chapra came across mobs consisting of close to 50,000 people.To add fuel to the fire, accounts of the East Bengal happenings from the Calcutta press were republished in the local press with additional inflammatory comments.On 25Oct, ‘Anti-Noakhali Day’, a Hindu procession consisting of important Congress leaders paraded through the streets of Gaya holding the portraits of Gandhi & Nehru & shouting slogans such as Noakhali ka badla le kar rahenge & Hindustan Hinduon ka nahin kisi ke baap ka (We shall take revenge of the Noakhali killings & Hindustan belongs only to the Hindus & not to somebody else’s father).Taqi Raheem, an eyewitness, also recalls that in the consequent meeting the Congress leaders including KB Sahay & Murli Manohar Prasad (the editor of the pro-Congress/‘nationalist’ English daily, The Searchlight) delivered extremely inflammatory speeches & provoked the crowd. Of the riots which started from Chapra on 26 Oct1946, one of the most fatal was that of Biharshareef.For a long time, Biharshareef had been the educational, cultural, religious & spiritual centre of the Muslims & had given the national movement leaders like Maulana Sajjad, Syed Sulaiman Nadvi (1884–1953) & Dr.ARahman.This riot, therefore, greatly affected the Muslims of Bihar. According to official records, ‘This riot had convinced them that if power is transferred to the Congress then the Muslims wouldn’t have even the right to assemble & protest for their legitimate democratic rights.’ The then viceroy Wavell also testified the complicity of the Congress in the riots. He noted that like UP, the lower strata of the Congress did the planning of the outbreaks of the riots & ‘they [the riots] were undoubtedly organized & organized very thoroughly by supporters of the Congress’.This was corroborated when some Congressmen confessed before Gandhi to having taken part in the riots.On his part, Jawaharlal Nehru also admitted that some Congressmen with inclinations towards the Hindu Mahasabha were involved in these riots.Such developments gave much space to the discourses of the League which alleged that relief works were being obstructed at the instance of the Congress-led administration. The League attempted ‘to simulate the exo- dus of the refugees to Bengal & to collect & concoct blackmailing material against the Bihar Govt’.The migration continued even after the leader of the Bihar ML, Abdul Aziz, advised against it. Papiya Ghosh therefore noted:It is the implications of the disillusionment among Muslim supporters of the Congress that provide an insight into the visible resolve to migrate from Bihar…Eg,when the Secretary of the Telmar CC refused to take shelter in the house of the nearby Khusraupur zamindar household of the Hussains, he was confident that ‘no one would touch a Congress Muslim’. Not long after, he was killed along with 16 members of his family. The Momins were among the ‘worst sufferers’, in Biharsharif despite the fact that they had been supporters of the Congress. They alleged that many people high up in the Congress had taken part in the riot. Ghosh therefore argues that ‘During the 1946 riot in particular the abducting Hindu, rein- forced by the “Hindu Raj” of the Congress, became a major factor in transforming Pakistan into an imminent inevitability.’ After the 1946 riot, the disaffection & alienation of Muslims rendered even the most influential & popular nationalist organizations like the Imarat-e-Shariah ineffective during the last 5m of colonial rule.They had all along championed the cause of muttahidah qaumiyat (composite nationalism) in conformity with the Congress, whereas the Congress had, by that time, come to embrace the ‘two-nation’ theory. This complete turnaround by the Congress left the Imarat-e-Shariah in confusion about its course of action. The assassination of Abdul Bari on 28Mar1947 by a local constable created further distrust between the Hindus & Muslims. Prof. Abdul Bari was then the president of the provincial Congress. The clarification that the assassination was accidental & not communally motivated came much later, that is, after independence. We therefore see that in Bihar, where the Muslim communities strongly favoured the idea of composite nationalism & opposed separatism, the ‘two-nation theory’ had the support of the communalized lower strata of the Congress, the Hindu Mahasabha & the Arya Samaj.The Bihar Provincial Muslim League (BPML), on the other hand, though weak had charted out a course entirely different from that of the AIML,to the effect that though they were not opposed to the ‘2N’ theory per se they did oppose Pakistan. In the face of the riots of 1946, they, in April 1947, demanded an inde- pendent homeland within Bihar itself.They asked ‘what will happen to the five million Muslims of Bihar, who…are surrounded by a hostile majority all over the province’& stated that their salvation lay only in having a homeland of their own within the province of Bihar where they could develop socially, politically & economically. The reason for such a demand, given by the BPML-GS, Jafar Imam, was that both the Congress-led administration in Bihar & the common cadres of the Congress were complicit in the massacre of the Muslims of Bihar in 1946. It therefore becomes quite clear that the tilt towards separatist politics took place largely because of the communalization in the wake of the 1946 riots rather than due to the ideo- logical appeal of the ML & the idea of Pakistan. In fact Syed Abdul Aziz, the leader of Bihar ML, kept persuading the Muslims not to migrate from Bihar. As for the Congress, its refusal to incorporate the Muslims in the power structure in a judicious proportion & its lower units being dominated by the HMSites led to its alienation of most of the nationalist Muslim leaders. Yet, some like Syed Mahmud expressed their sense of betrayal many years thereafter. Despite all their grievances none of them went over to the League. They remained firmly committed to the composite or united nationalism & kept contesting the ‘two-nation’ theory till the very end.Shah Md Umair, the Congress leader, lambasted the Ailaan-e-Pakistan of the Muslim League (Lahore session,1940) as khaufnaak aur gustakhana qadam (dreaded & outra- geous step). Simultaneously, he also bemoaned the Muslim dilemma by recalling an Urdu couplet:Khudawanda yeh terey saadaah lauh bandey kidhar jaayen Ke sultani bhi aiyaari hai darweshi bhi aiyaari.(Oh God where should these simpletons go When being both master & slave are perfidy.) Conclusion Bihar offers new challenges to the historians of modern India (dealing particularly with nationalism, communalism & separatism in Bihar, which still remains a broadly unex- plored area). Deeper explorations into the dynamics of Bihar politics will surely explode many a myth dominant in the existing historiography. It is important to understand that although the meta-narratives of Congress nationalism need to be challenged anyways, there is also a need to realize that these meta-narratives, which rely on high-flown ideas, such as the Congress’ socialism & secularism, often had absolutely no meaning at the provin- cial & local levels. Thus, there existed a vast disparity between the political principles & rhetoric voiced by the national Congress leadership & the operation of the Congress units at the district & mofussil level. A study of nationalist politics in Bihar may also help us understand the assertions of the marginalized social groups/castes/biradris of Muslims, who had become involved in the processes of democracy during the colonial period. It may explain why the composition of Muslim leadership of post-Independence Bihar has been relatively less feudal, almost non- conservative & relatively more connected to the masses.The Bihar Muslims’ history of democratic participation ensured the success of the movement for making Urdu the second official language in independent India. It created employment avenues in government offices, which considerably contributed (particularly since 1980s) to the emergence of a sizeable middle class among Muslims, this despite the fact that Bihar does fall among the most backward provinces of India in socio- economic terms.In addition, such explorations may also help us understand the quest of Muslims for intra- community democratization in Bihar, where the assertion of marginalized social groups/castes/biradris of the Muslims had started during the colonial period.Often referring to their roles in fighting British imperialism as well as in resisting the Muslim League’s separatism, various communities of the lower-caste Muslims (Pasmanda Biradris) of Bihar (more notably the Momins/Ansaris, Mansooris, Quraishis & Idrisis) & the popular religious organizations like the Imarat-e-Shariah re-organized & took recourse to constitutional democratic methods of mobilization & agitation in the post- colonial India. It helped them gain their own space in the structures of power in Bihar, as compared to the Muslim communities of the adjacent provinces of Uttar Pradesh & West Bengal.On account of such mobilizations,37/41 castes of the Muslims of Bihar have been enlisted as backward communities & have secured reservations (positive discrimination/affirmative action) in public employment, & in rural & urban local bodies, & preferential treatment in the welfare schemes of the government.