Syriza: left-wing populism as a

response to the 2008 crisis

EUR2102 – Álvaro Hernández García
INDEX
1. SYRIZA RISE. HISTORICAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT .................................... 3

2. WHY IS SYRIZA A POPULIST PARTY? A DISCURSIVE APPROACH ........... 4

3. POSITION RESPECT TO THE EU AND EUROPE ............................................... 5

3.1. Economic Euroscepticism.................................................................................. 5

3.2. Inclusive Europe ................................................................................................ 8
4. CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................................... 8

BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................................. 9
 1. SYRIZA RISE. HISTORICAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT
Since the end of the Greek dictatorship in 1974 Greece has experienced a pendulum
dynamic with populism: left-wing populism represented by PASOK during 1980s,
orthodox far-right party LAOS at the beginning of the century and, with the outbreak of
2008 economic crisis that devasted Greek economy, Syriza emerged as a left-wing
populism alternative to deal with economic and political crisis. Syriza was born in 2004
with the aim of bringing together a several number of leftist political parties, but it wasn´t
until 2010 when it began to grow.

The economic crisis based on unaffordable debt and deficit drove different Greek
governments to adopt austerity measures supervised by the famous troika. It was a
necessary condition to receive bailout funds. The two main political parties that
dominated the political system, PASOK (center-left) and New Democracy (center-right),
applied between 2010 and 2015 the same economic policies dictated by ECB, EU and
IMF and based on austerity, so the economic crisis led to a crisis of political
representation as well.

There was a social perception that there was no real alternative to the reduction of public
spending and tax increases. Proof of it were the massive protests and demonstrations from
2010 to 2012 in which Syriza actively participated. These protests weren´t an isolated
Greek phenomenon, also in Spain the “Indignados” movement had the same roots:
austerity measures implemented by the two main parties of the political system. Data of
that time showed this crisis of political representation. For example, a Eurobarometer
developed during 2011 revealed that an increasingly majority of Greek population (82%
of those surveyed) tend not to trust their National Parliament, that is the representatives
that they had elected.

With a high political disaffection and the absence of an alternative to neoliberal policies
Syriza presented itself as a force who will face troika impositions and apply expansive
economic policies. This way it started to grow in the polls and in the elections celebrated
in 2012 and 2015.
Source: Standard Eurobarometer 75 / Spring 2011 – TNS Opinion & Social
QA13.2 I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions.
For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it.
The (NATIONALITY PARLIAMENT)

Tend to trust Tend not to trust DK

EB 75.3 Diff. EB EB 75.3 Diff. EB EB 75.3 Diff. EB

% 74.2 74.2 74.2

17 -7 82 +9 1 -2

Percentage of Syriza votes in national elections

40
36,34
35

30 26,89
25

20 16,79
15

10
4,6
5

0
7 October 2009 06-may-12 17 June 2012 25 January 2015

Source: Greece Ministry of Interior

2. WHY IS SYRIZA A POPULIST PARTY? A DISCURSIVE

APPROACH
Analyzing how the populist discourse of Syriza is articulated will help us to define which
is its position towards the EU and what idea of Europe does it have.

First, is necessary to determine which are the elements that allow us to define Syriza as a
populist party. Following the discursive approach developed by Laclau and Mouffe it is
possible to highlight two main characteristics. The notion of “the people” as the nodal
point of all the political strategy, and the representation of an antagonistic political space,
where we can find the “non-privileged” and the “establishment”.

Syriza took advantage of the political situation and adopted a discourse that tried to
construct a collective identity with the notion of “the people” from a plurality of
unsatisfied demands and needs. The link to this identity is achieved through the
opposition to a common enemy. The enemy was perfectly identified by Syriza: the
“Memorando” forces, which included the PASOK and ND in a national level and the EU,
ECB and the IMF in a supranational level. Or in the words of Syriza,s leader, Alexis
Tsipras: “internal troika and external troika”.

Populism movements characterize “the people” they invoke in different ways. Syriza
represents an example of inclusive populism. It doesn´t exclude the plurality, it doesn´t
appeal to a unitarian identity with common cultural or ethnic elements. Instead , it
welcomes social plurality. Syriza has defended immigrant reception policies, same sex
marriage or gender equality, which differs from extreme right parties.

It was during the 2012 electoral campaign when we can start to observe how Tsipras and
other Syriza´s politics highlight populist rhetoric with meetings in which the word
“people” is repeated dozens of times and Syriza is identified as the peoples voice. A voice
that talks about the narrow circumstances of the Greek social majority provoked by “the
others”. This antagonism that has already been mentioned clearly appears in 2012
campaign with slogans like this one: “They decided without us, we are moving on without
them”.

3. POSITION RESPECT TO THE EU AND EUROPE

3.1.Economic Euroscepticism
When a political party is described as Eurosceptic, we should analyze which are the
ideological elements that derive in that negative vision of the EU. Syriza´s
Euroscepticism is articulated around economic issues, specifically to the austerity
measures of 2008 crisis. Therefore, the thick ideology of the party determines the intensity
and the modality of its Euroescepticism. Observing the Chapel Hill data about Syriza´s
position towards the EU during the hardest years of the crisis (2010 and 2014 surveys)
we can extract different conclusions: the party is highly against European integration; the
EU policies occupy an important part of its discourses, and it tends to consider that Greece
is not benefited of being an EU member.

EU POSITION: overall orientation of the party leadership towards

European integration
2006 2010 2014 2019
3,1 2,18 3,44 5
1 = Strongly opposed
4 = Neutral
7 = Strongly in favor

EU SALIENCE: relative salience of European integration in the

party’s public stance
2006 2010 2014 2019
5,93 8,18 6,33 6,66
0 = European Integration is of no importance, never mentioned.
10 = European Integration is the most important issue.

EU BENEFIT: position of the party leadership in year on whether

country has benefited from being a member of the EU
2010 2014
2,18 2,22
1 = Benefited
2 = Neither benefited nor lost
3 = Not benefited

As the crisis was becoming more serious, the presence of the EU started to gain
importance in Syriza´s strategy. Its criticism is focused on the economic policy that the
EU demanded from the European peripheral economies and especially from Greece.
Fiscal discipline, fulfilling deficit targets and debt reduction imposed by the troika gave
rise to what Syriza called a "humanitarian drama". In contrast to the neoliberal postulates
dictated from Brussels, Syriza presented in 2014 the “Thessaloniki programme” where it
showed an opposed vision of the EU economic policy. While EU proposed austerity,
Syriza wanted an “European New Deal”; while EU prescribed a debt reduction based on
cuts in public spending, Syriza wanted an “European Debt Conference” to make southern
European countries debt sustainable. Addressing “the humanitarian crisis” and changing
the course of austerity were the main objectives of Syriza. Therefore, Syriza´s
Euroescepticism consists of the will to produce a change of the economic response to the
crisis, not a break with the essential pillars of the EU.

Germany was the most influential State during the economic crisis. Merkel government
supported austerity measures and rejected a European response to the crisis. This attitude
generated a narrative in Greece (and Southern countries) where Brussel elites were
pledged to German desires abandoning basic European principles: equitable distribution
of resources and solidarity. This narrative based on German dominance and a the will of
a new model for the EU was fully developed by Syriza as can be seen in different
declarations and articles of Syriza´s politics:

“A small minority, centered on the conservative leadership of the German government

and a part of the populist press, insists on rehashing old wives’ tales and Grexit
stories”

“Today we can discern two diametrically opposed strategies on Europe’s future. On the
one hand we have a view headed by Mr. Schauble (German Finance Minister), that
regardless of whether the laws and principles that we have agreed on work, we should
continue to implement them. On the other, is the strategy of “whatever it takes,” to save
the euro. In reality, the forthcoming Greek elections are a collusion of these two
different strategies”

Alexis Tsipras – January 5, 2015

“Europe’s dominant economy and its economic strategy for the continent and the world
economy is stuck in a rut”

Yanis Varoufakis (Former Greek Minister of Finance) - July 29, 2013

The idea of “men in black” deciding economic policies from Brussels led to the question
of democratic deficit within the EU. Syriza defend a more democratic functioning of the
EU as can be observed in Chapel Hill data about European Parliament empowerment.
This position proves that Syriza is not an anti-EU party. Instead, it bet on a EU
characterized by an expensive economic policy (as can be seen in “Thessaloniki
programme”) and a more democratic takin decisions system.
 EU EP: position of the party leadership in year on the powers of the
European Parliament.
2006 2010 2014
5,5 4,9 5,25
1 = Strongly opposed
4 = Neutral
7 = Strongly in favor

3.2.Inclusive Europe
Greece is considered the cradle of the actual European civilization which is characterized
by three main pillars: democracy, civil rights and welfare state. Syriza is lined up with
these principles and defends the idea of an inclusive Europe where inmigrants or LGTB
people are not considered a threat. This conception is totally different to the one defended
by some extreme-right parties that links Europe with Christianity, closed borders or
traditional family.

Syriza´s approach to an European identity has an important economic component as they

collect the notion of internationalism represented in the past by Communist parties. This
notion seeks to promote the welfare of the working class. European identity defended by
Syriza is not linked with cultural, religious or ethnic elements, but with the welfare of
Europeans.

4. CONCLUSIONS
Syriza cannot be understood without the historic moment in which it started to grow and
adopted a populist discourse. EU became one of the enemies that Syriza wanted to defeat
due to its economic policies, that is why Syriza represents a soft Euroscepticism based on
economic issues, but it is not against the existence of the EU. Its notion of Europe is not
lined up with the extreme-right parties one, it is an inclusive notion that prosecutes the
improvement of the living conditions of citizens.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Jolly, Seth , Bakker, R., Hooghe, L., Marks, G., Polk, J., . . . Vachudova, M. (2022).
Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trend File, 1999-2019. Electoral Studies 75.

Plaza Coldoro, C., Gómez Reino, M., & Marcos Marne, H. (2018). Does host ideology
shape populist parties´ attitudes towards the EU? The links of populism and
Euroscepticism in Southern Europe. Revista Internacional de Sociología .

Siomons, T., & Stavrakakis, Y. (2019). Syriza´s Populism: Testing and Extending an
Essex School Perspective. Anales de la Cátedra Francisco Suárez, 131-156.

Stavrakakis, Y., & Katsambekis, G. (2014). Left-wing populism in the European

periphery: the case of Syriza. Journal of Political Ideologies , 119-142.

Syriza. (2014). The Thessaloniki programme.

Varoufakis, Y. (29 de July de 2013). The Germany Europe and the World Need.
Handelsblatt.