Week 1 week

In Re: JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO, 241 SCRA 405

Facts:

The respondent in this case, Joaquin T. Borromeo, is not a lawyer but has apparently read some
law books, and ostensibly come to possess some superficial awareness of a few substantive
legal principles and procedural rules. Incredibly, with nothing more than this smattering of
learning, the respondent has, for some sixteen (16) years now, from 1978 to the present, been
instituting and prosecuting legal proceedings in various courts, dogmatically pontificating on
errors supposedly committed by the courts, including the Supreme Court.

Case 1: Cases involving Traders Royal Bank (TRB).

The first bank that Joaquin T. Borromeo appears to have dealt with was the Traders Royal Bank
(TRB). On June 2, 1978, he got a loan from it in the sum of P45,000.00. This he secured by a
real estate mortgage created over two parcels of land covered by TCT No. 59596 and TCT No.
59755 owned, respectively, by Socorro Borromeo-Thakuria (his sister) and Teresita Winniefred
Lavarino. On June 16, 1978, Borromeo obtained a second loan from TRB in the amount of
P10,000.00, this time giving as security a mortgage over a parcel of land owned by the Heirs of
Vicente V. Borromeo, covered by TCT No. RT-7634. Authority to mortgage these three lots was
vested in him by a Special Power of Attorney executed by their respective owners.

Case 2: Cases involving United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB).

Borromeo (together with a certain Mercader) also borrowed money from the United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB) and executed a real estate mortgage to secure repayment thereof. The
mortgage was constituted over a 122-square-meter commercial lot covered by TCT No. 75680
in Borromeo's name. This same lot was afterwards sold on August 7, 1980 by Borromeo to one
Samson K. Lao for P170,000.00, with a stipulation for its repurchase (pacto de retro) by him
(Borromeo, as the vendor). The sale was made without the knowledge and consent of UCPB.

Case 3: Cases involving Security Bank and Trust Co. (SBTC).

The third banking institution which Joaquin T. Borromeo engaged in running court battles, was
the Security Bank & Trust Company (SBTC). From it Borromeo had obtained five (5) loans in
the aggregate sum of P189,126.19, consolidated in a single Promissory Note on May 31, 1979.
To secure payment thereof, Summa Insurance Corp. (Summa) issued a performance bond
which set a limit of P200,000.00 on its liability thereunder. Again, as in the case of his
obligations to Traders Royal Bank and UCPB, Borromeo failed to discharge his contractual
obligations. Hence, SBTC brought an action in the Cebu City RTC against Borromeo and
Summa for collection.
Issue:

Whether the respondent-accused is liable for constructive contempt?

Held:

Joaquin T. Borromeo is found and declared GUILTY of constructive contempt repeatedly

committed over time, despite warnings and instructions given to him, and to the end that he may
ponder his serious errors and grave misconduct and learn due respect for the Courts and their
authority, he is hereby sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment of TEN (10) DAYS in the City
Jail of Cebu City and to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00). He is warned that
a repetition of any of the offenses of which he is herein found guilty, or any similar or other
offense against courts, judges or court employees, will merit further and more serious sanctions.

On the 12th of February 1995, the Supreme Court has decided to issue a decision in relation to
the mishaps of Joaquin T. Borromeo, a Cebuano who’s “come to possess superficial awareness
of a few substantive legal principles and procedural rules”, but is not registered to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and, most importantly, not a lawyer.

For almost 16 years, he has been instituting and prosecuting legal proceedings in different
courts, and has the balls to represent himself in numerous original and review proceedings,
which, expectedly, have been disastrous. He also circulated scandalous and defamatory
statements against courts, judges, their employees, and his opponents in the legal arena.

The series of court shenanigans started in 1978, he filed different civil and criminal charges
against Traders Royal Bank (TRB) and Security Bank and Trust Co. (SBTC). He also pressed
charges against clerk of courts, judicial staff, lawyers, and even the Supreme Court justices.

He also filed a petition for certiorari and grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals (CA). The aforementioned petitions should only be filed in
the Supreme Court, which has the power to review cases.

In total, he filed 50 cases, all of which were lawyered by himself.

Furthermore, the pseudo-lawyer spreaded defamatory and libelous flyers against the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines-Cebu Chapter and the Regional Trial Court judges of the province, and to
the CA and SC justices.

Borromeo’s ignorant battling with the courts ended in a contempt charge against him for “abuse
of and interference with judicial rules and processes, gross disrespect to courts and judges and
improper conduct directly impending, obstructing, and degrading the administration of justice”.
SC found him guilty of constructive contempt repeatedly committed over time, despite warnings
and instructions given to him, and the end that he may ponder his serious errors and grave
misconduct and learn due respect for the Courts and their authority.

He was sentenced to serve a term for 10 days and a fine of Php 1,000. He was also warned that
serious sanctions will be charged against him if he repeats the similar offenses in which he is
found guilty or any similar offense against courts, judges or court employees.

Moral damages of no less than P20,000.00 and exemplary damages of P10,000.00, and
litigation expenses of P5,000.00.

[CASE DIGEST] DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) v. SAN

DIEGO (G.R. No. 89572)
December 21, 1989

Facts:

The question is whether a person who has thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test
(NMAT) is entitled to take it again.

The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule that -... h). A student shall be allowed only
three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3) successive failures, a student shall not be
allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.

The private respondent insists he can, on constitutional grounds.

In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to academic
freedom and quality education.

After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the
challenged order invalid and granting the petition. We cannot sustain the respondent judge. Her
decision must be reversed.

This Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission
to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for
a medical education

Issues:

Whether there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a
condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and
safety of the general community, on the other hand.

Ruling:
We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a
means of achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our]
medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the... country."... The
NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in
this area.

That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of
incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for
disease or trauma.

The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is
the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to ensure that the medical profession is not
infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily... entrust their lives and health.

The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law
nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools
and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of... those not qualified to be doctors.

While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to
be a doctor.

The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The
Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of
study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic... requirements."

The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those better prepared.

The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is not well-taken. A
law does not have to operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.

There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted
and others who have also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what the equal
protection requires is equality among equals.

The private respondent has failed... the NMAT five times.[7] While his persistence is noteworthy,
to say the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love.

It is for the appropriate calling that he is entitled to quality education for the full harnessing of
his... potentials and the sharpening of his latent talents toward what may even be a brilliant
future.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

Principles:

The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a
reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of... the public. That the power to
regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the
ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and
administrative... regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass
medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental
power.

There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that the
power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those
of a particular class, require the... interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are
reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.[5]

In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful
subject and a lawful method what the equal protection requires is equality among equals.

White Light Corporation, et.al. v. City of Manila G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009
Tinga, J.

FACTS
The City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7774 which prohibits short time admission, or
checking in for less than twelve hours, in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and
similar establishments in the city, and provided that violators shall be punished by imprisonment
and fine. The Petitioners questioned the ordinance before the Regional Trial Court arguing that
it is unconstitutional for violating right to privacy, and infringing their property right thus affecting
their business interests as operators of drive-in hotels and motels in the city.

The RTC ruled in their favor and strike down the ordinance as unconstitutional for infringing
personal liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution such as the right to operate economic
enterprises. Further, the illicit relationships the ordinance sought to dissuade could be
performed still by paying the 12-hour stay. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision
of the RTC stating that (1) it did not violate right to privacy and freedom of movement as it only
penalizes owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for a short time, and (2) it
is a valid exercise of police power.

ISSUE
Whether or not Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power under the general
welfare clause.
RULING
The Court ruled in favor of the Petitioners. The Court ruled that in order for an ordinance to be
valid, it must also conform to the substantive requirements: (1) it must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent
with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable. In using this test, the Court is constrained
to struck down the Ordinance for arbitrarily intruding into private rights. It must appear that the
interests of the public generally require an interference with private rights and the means must
be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of
private rights.

In the present case, the Ordinance could have been valid if it employed less intrusive measures
of curtailing immorality in the city such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug
dealers through active police work, or the strict enforcement of existing laws penalizing
prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of
the petitioners who may offer short time rates for families who pass by only for a few hours while
there is a black out, or a traveler who washes up for a few hours before continuing his travel.
Further, the ordinance can be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any
hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Petition is GRANTED. Decision of the CA is REVERSED. Decision of the RTC is REINSTATED.
Ordinance No. 7774 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Zabal vs. Duterte

Facts:
- Petitioners Zabal and Jacosalem are both residents of Boracay who were earning a living from
the tourist activities therein.
- Respondents PDU30, Executive Secretary Salvador Medialdea and DILG Secretary Eduardo
Ano were being sued in their capacity as officials of the government.
- President Duterte through Presidential Spokesperson Harry Roque announced the total
closure of Boracay for a maximum period of 6 months starting April 26, 2018.
- Petitioners filed a petition praying that:
Upon filing of the petition a TRO and/or a Writ of Preliminary Prohibition Injunction be
immediately issued restraining and/or Enjoining the respondents, and all persons acting under
their command, order, and responsibility from enforcing the closure of Boracay Island. + Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction directing respondents to allow petitioners, tourist and
non-residents to enter and leave Boracay Island
And in the alternative, that a Status Quo Ante Order be issued restoring and maintaining the
condition prior to closure.
And a judgment be rendered Permanently Restraining Respondents from enforcing a closure of
Boracay Island and declaring the ban/closure to be unconstitutional
Petitioner’s Arguments
- Proclamation No. 475 is an invalid exercise of legislative powers.
- Petitioners argued that its issuance is in truth a law-making exercise since the proclamation
imposed a restriction on the constitutional right to travel and due process (right to work and earn
a living) which is not vested in the President.
- Petitioner likewise argue that the closure of Boracay could not be anchored on police power
because it is not exercised by the executive but by the legislative bodies through creation of
statutes and ordinances.
- Petitioner also stated that the Proclamation impinges upon the local autonomy of the affected
LGUs

Respondent’s Arguments
- Respondents assert that PDU30 must be dropped as party-respondent in the case because he
is immune from suit.
- Prohibition is not the proper remedy because the proclamation has already been
simplement fait accompli.
- Mandamus is not the proper remedy because they were not neglectful of their duty to protect
the environment.
- That the petition is in the nature of a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP)
under Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases which is a legal action filed to simply harass,
vex, exert undue pressure or stifle enforcement of environmental laws.
- Respondents contend that the issuance of the Proclamation is a valid exercise of delegated
legislative power, it being anchored on Section 16 of the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and
Management Act or the authority of the president to declare a state of calamity.
- They also contend that the Proclamation was issued pursuant to the President’s executive
power to enforce and administer laws which include the power to control bureaus and offices.
- In sum, respondents emphasize that the issuance of the Proclamation is within the ambit of the
powers of the President and not contrary to the doctrine of separation of powers.
- On the right to travel and due process, respondents emphasize that the right to travel is not an
absolute right, it may be impaired or restricted in the interest of national security, public safety
etc.
- On the right to due process, respondent claimed that petitioners were merely freelances and
their private interests should yield to the reasonable prerogatives of the States for the public
good and welfare.
- Lastly, respondents argued that the Proclamation does not unduly transgress upon the local
autonomy of the LGU concerned; the national government can interfere with LGU’s affairs
especially when the localized problem cannot be resolved by the LGU concerned.

Issue:
- Whether or not PDU30 acted within the scope of the powers granted him by the Constitution in
ordering the closure of Boracay
- YES

Ruling:
According to the Supreme Court:
- President Duterte is dropped as respondent in this case.
- According to the case of Professor David v. President Arroyo on the non-suability of an
incumbent president. “Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or
actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case.”
- Prohibition is not the proper remedy – it is not intended to provide a remedy for acts already
accomplished
- Mandamus is not the proper remedy – no neglect of duty on the part of respondents as they
were
precisely performing their duty to protect the environment.
- SC held that the petitioners do not have locus standi because the closure of Boracay would
not directly affect their livelihood due to the fact that the employment of petitioners were not
certain as SC quoted that there are some days/seasons that they do not earn anything.
- However, notwithstanding petitioner’s lack of locus standi, SC allowed this petition to proceed
to its ultimate conclusion due to its transcendental importance.
- Defense of SLAPP is not applicable because the ultimate issue for resolution is the
constitutionality of the Proclamation.
- Proclamation No. 475 does not pose an actual impairment on the right to travel.
- The questioned proclamation is clearly focused on its purpose of rehabilitating Boracay and
any intention to directly restrict the right cannot be deduced from its import – as opposed to
several laws which directly impose restrictions on the right to travel.
- Proclamation No. 475 must be upheld for being in the nature of a valid police power measure.
- Police power has been defined as the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare.
- It consists of (1) imposition or restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster common
good.
- The assailed governmental measure draws authority and the constitutional provisions

Article II, Sections 15 and 16 and Article XII, Section 2 which serve as its framework, are
primarily concerned with the environment and health, safety, and well-being of the people, the
promotion and securing of which are clearly legitimate objectives of governmental efforts and
regulations.

- Petitioners have no vested rights on their sources of income as to be entitled to due process.
- Property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though
sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.
- Petitioners cannot be said to have already acquired vested rights to their sources of income in
Boracay as they are part of the informal sector of the economy where earnings are not
guaranteed.
- No intrusion into the autonomy of the concerned LGUs
- RA 10121 recognizes and even puts a premium on the role of the LG Us in disaster risk
reduction and management as shown by the fact that a number of the legislative policies set
out in the subject statute recognize and aim to strengthen the powers decentralized to LGUs.
JESUS P. MORFE, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AMELITO R. MUTUC, as Executive Secretary, ET
AL., defendants-appellants.

Facts:

One of the specific provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 is that every
public officer, either within thirty (30) days after its approval or after his assumption of office “and
within the month of January of every other year thereafter”, as well as upon the termination of
his position, shall prepare and file with the head of the office to which he belongs, “a true
detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and
sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of
income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar: . . .”

In relation to Morfe’s alleged accumulation of assets grossly disproportionate to his reported

incomes after his assumption to office, plaintiff Morfe alleged that the periodical submission of
such sworn statement of assets is violative of due process as an oppressive exercise of police
power and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy, implicit in the ban
against unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the prohibition against
self-incrimination..

On the other hand, the defendants Secretary of Justice and Executive Secretary contended that
it was a legitimate exercise of police power, and that Morfe, having accepted a public position,
voluntarily assumed the obligation to give information about his personal affair, not only at the
time of his assumption of office but during the time he continues to discharge public trust.

Lower court: Law is unconstitutional.

Issue:

Whether or not the required periodical submission of sworn statements of assets and liabilities
is unconstitutional on the grounds of it being an unlawful invasion of right to privacy, and an
insult to the personal integrity and official dignity of public officials.

Held:

No. SC said that such provision of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is constitutional. It is
within the State’s police power, and is not violative of due process and liberty. It is also not a
violation of guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure, and is not against the
non-incrimination clause. Furthermore, it is not an insult to the personal integrity and official
dignity of public officials.
The Anti-Graft Act of 1960 was precisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for
official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. It is intended to
further promote morality in public administration. A public office must indeed be a public trust.

The State’s inherent police power enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety,
and welfare of society. However, if the police power extends to regulatory action affecting
persons in public or private life, then anyone with an alleged grievance can invoke the protection
of due process which permits deprivation of property or liberty as long as such requirement is
observed.

If due process mandate is not disregarded, even a public official, to protect the security of tenure
which is analogous to property, can protect himself from an infringement of his liberty. However,
liberty, in the interest of public health, public order, or safety, of general welfare, in other words
through the proper exercise of the police power, may be regulated.

In here, the reasonableness of the law makes the prohibition valid and within the ambit of police
power.

It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore the harsh and compelling realities
of public service with its ever-present temptation to heed the call of greed and avarice to
condemn as arbitrary and oppressive a requirement as that imposed upon public officials and
employees to file such sworn statement of assets and liabilities every two years after having
done so upon assuming office. There was therefore no unconstitutional exercise of police
power.

A periodical submission of sworn statements of assets and liabilities after assumption of office is
within the power of the government to impose, even if it will affect the public officer’s liberty, for
as long as due process is observed. In subjecting the public officer to such a further compulsory
revelation of his assets and liabilities, including the statement of the amounts and sources of
income, the amounts of personal and family expenses, and the amount of income taxes paid for
the next preceding calendar year, there is no unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise
would be a private sphere.

Other Notes:

Presumption of validity

Plaintiff asserted that the submission of SAL was a reasonable requirement for employment so
a public officer can make of record his assets and liabilities upon assumption of office. Plaintiff
did not present evidence to rebut the presumption of validity.
“If the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of
governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects
the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.”
(Ermita-Malate Hotel v. Mayor of Manila)

Exercise of Police power and the defense provided by the Due Process Clause

“Inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety and welfare of society” (Justice Malcolm)

The power of sovereignty, the power to govern men and things within the limits of its domain
(Justice Taney, going beyond curtailment of rights)

Anyone with an alleged grievance regarding the extension of police power to regulatory action
affecting persons in public or private life can invoke the protection of due process.
It has been held that due process may be relied upon by public official to protect the security of
tenure which in a limited sense is analogous to property. Therefore he could also use due
process to strike down what he considers as an infringement of his liberty.

Under the Constitution, the challenged provision is allowable as long as due process is
observed.

The standard for due process is REASONABLENESS. Test: Official action must not outrun the
bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression.

“It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore the harsh and compelling realities
of public service with its ever-present temptation to heed the call of greed and avarice to
condemn as arbitrary and oppressive a requirement as that imposed upon public officials and
employees to file such sworn statement of assets and liabilities every two years after having
done so upon assuming office. There was therefore no unconstitutional exercise of police
power.”

Right to privacy or Right to be left alone

“It cannot be said that the challenged statutory provision calls for disclosure of information which
infringes on the right of a person to privacy. It cannot be denied that the rational relationship
such a requirement possesses with the objective of a valid statute goes very far in precluding
assent to an objection of such character. This is not to say that a public officer, by virtue of
position he holds, is bereft of constitutional protection; it is only to emphasize that in subjecting
him to such a further compulsory revelation of his assets and liabilities, including the statement
of the amounts of personal and family expenses, and the amount of income taxes paid for the
next preceding calendar year, there is no unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise would be
a private sphere.”
Unreasonable Search and Seizure

The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure does not give freedom
from testimonial compulsion.

Right against self-incrimination

We are not aware of any constitutional provision designed to protect a man’s conduct from
judicial inquiry, or aid him in fleeing from justice.

Insult to personal integrity and official dignity

Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis
for declaring a statute invalid.

MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY v. BERNARDO L. LOZADA

Facts:

Subject of this case is Lot No. 88-SWO-25042 (Lot No. 88), with an area of 1,017 square
meters, more or less, located in Lahug, Cebu City.

Its original owner was Anastacio Deiparine when the same was subject to expropriation
proceedings, initiated by the Republic of the

Philippines (Republic), represented by the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), for the
expansion and improvement of the Lahug Airport. The case was filed with the then Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Third Branch, and docketed as Civil Case No. R-1881.

During the pendency of the expropriation proceedings, respondent Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr.
acquired Lot No. 88 from Deiparine.

On December 29, 1961, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the Republic and ordered
the latter to pay Lozada the fair market value of Lot No. 88, adjudged at P3.00 per square
meter, with consequential damages by way of legal interest computed from November 16,
1947--the... time when the lot was first occupied by the airport.

Lozada, with the other landowners, contacted then CAA Director Vicente Rivera, Jr., requesting
to repurchase the lots, as per previous agreement.

On November 29, 1989, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued a Memorandum to the
Department of Transportation, directing the transfer of general aviation operations of the Lahug
Airport to the Mactan International Airport before the end of 1990 and, upon such transfer, the...
closure of the Lahug Airport.
From the date of the institution of the expropriation proceedings up to the present, the public
purpose of the said expropriation (expansion of the airport) was never actually initiated, realized,
or implemented.

Thus, on June 4, 1996, petitioners initiated a complaint for the recovery of possession and
reconveyance of ownership of Lot No. 88.

On October 22, 1999, the RTC rendered its Decision, disposing as follows... he Court hereby
renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr.,... Aggrieved, petitioners
interposed an appeal to the CA.

After the filing of the necessary appellate briefs, the CA rendered its assailed Decision dated
February 28, 2006, denying petitioners' appeal and affirming in toto the Decision of the RTC,
Branch 57, Cebu City.

Issues:

(1) the respondents utterly failed to prove that there was a repurchase agreement or
compromise settlement between them and the Government; (2) the judgment in Civil Case No.
R-1881 was absolute and unconditional, giving title in fee simple to... the Republic;

Ruling:

The petition should be denied.

Indeed, the Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 should be read in its entirety, wherein it is
apparent that the acquisition by the Republic of the expropriated lots was subject to the
condition that the Lahug Airport would continue its operation. The condition not having...
materialized because the airport had been abandoned, the former owner should then be
allowed to reacquire the expropriated property.

More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to
use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing
which, it should file another petition for the new purpose.

In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the taking of private property, consequent
to the Government's exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to the condition
that the property be devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was taken.

Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is
peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of
the property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation received. In such... a
case, the exercise of the power of eminent domain has become improper for lack of the required
factual justification.

It bears stressing that both the RTC, Branch 57, Cebu and the CA have passed upon this
factual issue and have declared, in no uncertain terms, that a compromise agreement was, in
fact, entered into between the Government and respondents, with the former undertaking to
resell Lot

No. 88 to the latter if the improvement and expansion of the Lahug Airport would not be
pursued.

the testimony of Lozada was based on... personal knowledge as the assurance from the
government was personally made to him.

As regards the position of petitioners that respondents' testimonial evidence violates the Statute
of Frauds, suffice it to state that the Statute of Frauds operates only with respect to executory
contracts, and does not apply to contracts which have been completely or partially...
performed,... The right of respondents to repurchase Lot No. 88 may be enforced based on a
constructive trust constituted on the property held by the government in favor of the former.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Principles:

If x x x land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that purpose is
ended or abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then, of course, when the
purpose is terminated or abandoned the former owner reacquires the... property so
expropriated. If x x x land is expropriated for a public street and the expropriation is granted
upon condition that the city can only use it for a public street, then, of course, when the city
abandons its use as a public street, it returns to the former... owner, unless there is some
statutory provision to the contrary. x x x. If, upon the contrary, however, the decree of
expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title, then, of course, the land becomes the
absolute property of the expropriator, whether it be the State, a... province, or municipality, and
in that case the non-user does not have the effect of defeating the title acquired by the
expropriation proceedings. x x x.

When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the exercise
of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no right in the land, and the public
use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without... any impairment
of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner. x x x.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Algue Inc. GR No. L-28896 | Feb. 17, 1988

Facts:
· Algue Inc. is a domestic corp engaged in engineering, construction and other allied
activities
· On Jan. 14, 1965, the corp received a letter from the CIR regarding its delinquency
income taxes from 1958-1959, amtg to P83,183.85
· A letter of protest or reconsideration was filed by Algue Inc on Jan 18
· On March 12, a warrant of distraint and levy was presented to Algue Inc. thru its counsel,
Atty. Guevara, who refused to receive it on the ground of the pending protest
· Since the protest was not found on the records, a file copy from the corp was produced
and given to BIR Agent Reyes, who deferred service of the warrant
· On April 7, Atty. Guevara was informed that the BIR was not taking any action on the
protest and it was only then that he accepted the warrant of distraint and levy earlier sought to
be served
· On April 23, Algue filed a petition for review of the decision of the CIR with the Court of
Tax Appeals

CIR contentions:
- the claimed deduction of P75,000.00 was properly disallowed because it was not an
ordinary reasonable or necessary business expense
- payments are fictitious because most of the payees are members of the same family in
control of Algue and that there is not enough substantiation of such payments
· CTA: 75K had been legitimately paid by Algue Inc. for actual services rendered in the
form of promotional fees. These were collected by the Payees for their work in the creation of
the Vegetable Oil Investment Corporation of the Philippines and its subsequent purchase of the
properties of the Philippine Sugar Estate Development Company.

Issue: W/N the Collector of Internal Revenue correctly disallowed the P75,000.00 deduction
claimed by Algue as legitimate business expenses in its income tax returns

Ruling:
· Taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should be collected without
unnecessary hindrance, made in accordance with law.
· RA 1125: the appeal may be made within thirty days after receipt of the decision or ruling
challenged
· During the intervening period, the warrant was premature and could therefore not be
served.
· Originally, CIR claimed that the 75K promotional fees to be personal holding company
income, but later on conformed to the decision of CTA
· There is no dispute that the payees duly reported their respective shares of the fees in
their income tax returns and paid the corresponding taxes thereon. CTA also found, after
examining the evidence, that no distribution of dividends was involved
· CIR suggests a tax dodge, an attempt to evade a legitimate assessment by involving an
imaginary deduction
· Algue Inc. was a family corporation where strict business procedures were not applied
and immediate issuance of receipts was not required. at the end of the year, when the books
were to be closed, each payee made an accounting of all of the fees received by him or her, to
make up the total of P75,000.00. This arrangement was understandable in view of the close
relationship among the persons in the family corporation
· The amount of the promotional fees was not excessive. The total commission paid by the
Philippine Sugar Estate Development Co. to Algue Inc. was P125K. After deducting the said
fees, Algue still had a balance of P50,000.00 as clear profit from the transaction. The amount of
P75,000.00 was 60% of the total commission. This was a reasonable proportion, considering
that it was the payees who did practically everything, from the formation of the Vegetable Oil
Investment Corporation to the actual purchase by it of the Sugar Estate properties.
· Sec. 30 of the Tax Code: allowed deductions in the net income – Expenses - All the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any
trade or business, including a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for
personal services actually rendered xxx
· the burden is on the taxpayer to prove the validity of the claimed deduction
· In this case, Algue Inc. has proved that the payment of the fees was necessary and
reasonable in the light of the efforts exerted by the payees in inducing investors and prominent
businessmen to venture in an experimental enterprise and involve themselves in a new
business requiring millions of pesos.
· Taxes are what we pay for civilization. Without taxes, the government would be paralyzed
for lack of the motive power to activate and operate it. Hence, despite the natural reluctance to
surrender part of one's hard earned income to the taxing authorities, every person who is able to
must contribute his share in the running of the government. The government for its part, is
expected to respond in the form of tangible and intangible benefits intended to improve the lives
of the people and enhance their moral and material values
· Taxation must be exercised reasonably and in accordance with the prescribed procedure.
If it is not, then the taxpayer has a right to complain and the courts will then come to his succor

Algue Inc.’s appeal from the decision of the CIR was filed on time with the CTA in accordance
with Rep. Act No. 1125. And we also find that the claimed deduction by Algue Inc. was permitted
under the Internal Revenue Code and should therefore not have been disallowed by the CIR

Week 2
Discuss Marquez v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 244274,
03 September 2019

CASE SUMMARY /FACTS:

In October 2018, petitioner Norman Cordero Marquez filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
Senator in the May 13, 2019 national and local elections. He is a resident of Mountain Province,
a real estate broker, and an independent candidate. However, the COMELEC Law Department
filed a petition to declare Marquez a nuisance candidate and argued that: (1) Marquez was
"virtually unknown to the entire country except maybe in the locality where he resides;" and (2)
though a real estate broker, there is no clear proof of financial capability, " to sustain the
financial rigors of a nationwide campaign."Marquez countered that, among others, he is the
co-founder and sole administrator of an animal advocacy group based in Baguio, and is known
in various social media and websites; and that has been interviewed in television and radio
shows; He argued that the COMELEC should not discount "the potential of those animal lovers,
raisersand handlers, and the existing local and foreign benefactors and donors who are willing
and capable to subsidize the expenses of a social-media-enhanced national campaign. "The
COMELEC First Division cancelled Marquez' CoC, citing this Court's ruling in Martinez vs HRET,
that "in elections for national positions, the sheer logistical challenge posed by nuisance
candidates gives compelling reason for the Commission to exercise its authority to eliminate
nuisance candidates who obviously have no financial capacity or serious intention to mount a
nationwide campaign."The amounts set forth in Section 13 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7166 15
"would at least require[Marquez] to prove that he can mount a viable nationwide campaign" and
"x x x running as an independent further decreases a candidate's chances with even more
limited resources at his disposal."Marquez, then filed a MR which the COMELEC En Banc
denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC may use lack of proof of financial capacity to sustain the financial
rigors of waging a nationwide campaign, by itself, as a ground to declare an aspirant for senator
a nuisance candidate.

RULING:

1. No. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it declared Marquez a nuisance
candidate on the ground of lack of proof of his financial capacity to wage a nationwide
campaign. By so doing, the COMELEC has effectively imposed a "property qualifications are
inconsistent with the nature and essence of the Republican system ordained in our Constitution
and the principle of social justice underlying the same x x x" as clearly prescribed in the case of
Maquera
In Maquera, the Court declared RA 4421 as unconstitutional insofar as it required "all
candidates for national, provincial, city and municipal offices" to "post a surety bond equivalent
to the one-year salary or emoluments of the position to which heis a candidate x x x." The Court
ruled that the law had the following effects: (1) preventing or disqualifying candidates from
running although they possess the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution or law because
they cannot pay the premium; and (2) imposing property qualifications in order that a person
could run for public office and that the people could validly vote for him.

2. While Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[t]he State shall guarantee
equal access to opportunities for public service," it is equally undisputed that there is no
constitutional right to run for public office. It is, rather, a privilege subject to limitations imposed
by law. Thus, in Pamatong, the Court explained the rationale behind the prohibition against
nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide
intention to run for public office:

The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective,
and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in
conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the
opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and
resources in preparation for the election. These practical difficulties should, of course, never
exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated electoral exercise. At the same time, remedial
actions should be available to alleviate these logistical hardships, whenever necessary and
proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot
that erodes faith in our democratic institutions.

3. Neither can the COMELEC seek succor behind the provisions of Section 13 of RA 7166,
which it interpreted as imposing a financial capacity requirement (or proof thereof) on those
seeking to run for national office. Section 13 of RA 7166 merely sets the current allowable limit
on expenses of candidates and political parties for election campaigns. It does not (whether by
intention or operation) require a financial requirement for those seeking to run for public office,
such that failure to prove capacity to meet the allowable expense limits would constitute a
ground to declare one a nuisance candidate.

4. The COMELEC cannot conflate the bona fide intention to run with a financial capacity
requirement. A candidate's financial capacity to sustain the rigors of waging a nationwide
campaign does not necessarily equate to a bona fide intention to run for public office.The
COMELEC's burden is thus to show a reasonable correlation between proof of abona fide
intention to run, on the one hand, and proof of financial capacity to wage a nationwide campaign
on the other. Moreover, the Court acknowledges the COMELEC's legitimate objective in
weeding out candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office from the
electoral process. However, any measure designed to accomplish the said objective
should,however, not be arbitrary and oppressive and should not contravene the Republican
System ordained in our Constitution. Unfortunately, the COMELEC's preferred standard falls
short of what is constitutionally permissible.
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS v. COMELEC, GR No. 119976, 1995-09-18

Facts:

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8,
1995

On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the
First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification"[5] with the Commission on Elections... alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs.
Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates to the House of
Representatives on the evidence of... declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record
94-No. 3349772[6] and in her Certificate of Candidacy.

On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing

the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate.[8] On the
same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed... petitioner that:

[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on the ground
that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the filing of the same having already lapsed on March
20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy should have been... filed on or
before the March 20, 1995 deadline.

Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the

COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private
respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed with the head office on the same...
day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original
Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest misinterpretation"

After respondent had registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her six month
actual residence therein, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of
Tolosa from the First District to the

Second District and pursued such a move up to the Supreme Court, his purpose being to
remove respondent as petitioner's opponent in the congressional election in the First District.
He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking the creation of another...
legislative district to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve his purpose.
However, such bill did not pass the Senate.
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote
of 2 to 1,[13] came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for
Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's

Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original
Certificate of Candidacy.

"Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word "Seven"
(months) was a result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her part and,
therefore, an amendment should subsequently be allowed. She averred that she thought that...
what was asked was her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin or
domicile in the First Legislative District, to which she could have responded "since childhood."

Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa, respondent
announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate for the
District. However, this intention was rebuffed when petitioner wrote the

Election Officer of Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and not
Tacloban. She never disputed this claim and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in
Tolosa.

After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission RESOLVED to DENY it,
no new substantial matters having been raised therein to warrant re-examination of the
resolution granting the petition for disqualification.[18]

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should
the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the
congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the
COMELEC... reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of
petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes.

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May, 1995, petitioner averred that she was the
overwhelming winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held
May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May
14,... 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70,471
votes compared to the 36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said
Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition.

Issues:

He prayed that "an order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the
certificate of candidacy.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues
may be classified into two general areas:

I. The Issue of Petitioner's qualifications

Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a
period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.

II. The Jurisdictional Issue... a) Prior to the elections

Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner
outside the period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for disqualification cases under
Article 78 of the said Code.

b) After the Elections

Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction
over the question of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections.

Ruling:

In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied
the residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what
significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her...
residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months?

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be

decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution's residency
qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or...
appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and
knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his... or her
disqualification.

From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its
proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various places of

(actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on
residence in election law and the deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code

The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from
rendering a decision after the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked
jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to...
render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or
prescribed period.

In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of
B.P. 881[52], it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and
decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.

As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction

over the issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that
HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections,... returns and
qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of
the House of Representatives.[53] Petitioner not being a member of the House of
Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no... jurisdiction over the question.

It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to
either to ignore or deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality of a
petitioner in a case. Obviously a distinction was made on such a ground... here. Surely, many
established principles of law, even of election laws were flouted for the sake perpetuating power
during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred ideals, including the meaning and
spirit of EDSA by ourselves bending established principles of... law to deny an individual what
he or she justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat the
mistakes of the past.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence

qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the
COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are
hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of
Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of
Leyte.

Principles:

This incident belies respondent's claim of 'honest misinterpretation or honest mistake.' Besides,
the Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her Answer, she
was quite aware of 'residence of origin' which she interprets to be Tacloban City,... it is curious
why she did not cite Tacloban City in her Certificate of Candidacy. Her explanation that she
thought what was asked was her actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe
because there is none in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact,... item no. 8 in the
Certificate of Candidacy speaks clearly of 'Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to
be elected immediately preceding the election.' thus, the explanation of respondent fails to be
persuasive.
From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation, therefore,
is devoid of merit.

To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made, she cited the
case of Alialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance of respondent on the case of Alialy is
misplaced. The case only applies to the `inconsequential deviations which cannot... affect the
result of the election, or deviations from provisions intended primarily to secure timely and
orderly conduct of elections.' The Supreme Court in that case considered the amendment only
as a matter of form. But in the instant case, the amendment cannot be considered... as a matter
of form or an inconsequential deviation. The change in the number of years of residence in the
place where respondent seeks to be elected is a substantial matter which determines her
qualification as a candidacy, specially those intended to suppress, accurate... material
representation in the original certificate which adversely affects the filer. To admit the amended
certificate is to condone the evils brought by the shifting minds of manipulating candidate, to the
detriment of the integrity of the election.

Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her residency in order to
prolong it by claiming it was 'since childhood' is to allow an untruthfulness to be committed
before this Commission. The arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months residency the... respondent
indicated in her certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in her Voter's Registration
Record accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects that she is a resident of Brgy Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at the time of the said registration (Annex A,... Petition). Said
accuracy is further buttressed by her letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila,
dated August 24, 1994, requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List
of Voters thereat so that she can be re-registered or... transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
The dates of these three (3) different documents show the respondent's consistent conviction
that she has transferred her residence to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila only for such
limited period of time, starting in the last week... of August 1994 which on March 8, 1995 will
only sum up to 7 months. The Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded to believe in the
respondent's contention that it was an error.

Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that respondent has
not complied with the one year residency requirement of the Constitution.

In election cases, the term `residence' has always been considered as synonymous with
'domicile' which imports not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a...
fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons,
one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon v. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez v.
RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In respondent's case, when she returned to the Philippines...
in 1991, the residence she chose was not Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her
animus revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban.
This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First District since
childhood is nothing more than to give her a color of qualification where she is otherwise
constitutionally disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the face of the facts admitted... by the
respondent in her affidavit. Except for the time that she studied and worked for some years after
graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila. In 1959, after her husband was
elected Senator, she lived and resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she... was a registered
voter. In 1965, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she was again a registered voter. In
1978, she served as member of the Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the City of
Manila and later on served as the Governor of Metro Manila. She... could not have served
these positions if she had not been a resident of the City of Manila. Furthermore, when she filed
her certificate of candidacy for the office of the President in 1992, she claimed to be a resident
of San Juan, Metro Manila. As a matter of fact... on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a letter
with the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for the cancellation of her
registration in the permanent list of voters that she may be re-registered or transferred to
Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts... manifest that she could not have been a resident
of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because
she became a resident of many places, including Metro Manila. This debunks her claim that
prior to her residence in Tolosa,... Leyte, she was a resident of the First Legislative District of
Leyte since childhood.

In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her domicile,
she registered as a voter in different places and on several occasions declared that she was a
resident of Manila. Although she spent her school days in Tacloban, she is... considered to
have abandoned such place when she chose to stay and reside in other different places. In the
case of Romualdez v. RTC (226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one acquires a new
domicile by choice. There must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new... locality;
(2) intention to remain there; and (3) intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words there
must basically be animus manendi with animus non revertendi. When respondent chose to stay
in llocos and later on in Manila, coupled... with her intention to stay there by registering as a
voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have
abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood and school days, as her place of
domicile.

Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be conduct indicative
of such intention. Respondent's statements to the effect that she has always intended to return
to Tacloban, without the accompanying conduct to prove that intention, is not... conclusive of her
choice of residence. Respondent has not presented any evidence to show that her conduct,
one year prior the election, showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was evident
was that prior to her residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident... of Manila.

It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First District of Leyte
"since childhood."
To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the First District of
Leyte for more than one year, petitioner correctly pointed out that on January 28, 1995;
respondent registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doing... so, she
placed in her Voter Registration Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a
period of six months. This may be inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it refers
only to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove that... she was a resident of the
First District of Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing proof that
she had been a resident of the district for six months only."

First, a minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a
new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila,
Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This... domicile was not
established only when she reached the age of eight years old, when her father brought his
family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments.

Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one
must demonstrate:[37]

An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one;
and

Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence. Both terms
imply relations between a person and a place; but in residence, the relation is one of fact while
in domicile it is legal or juridical, independent of the necessity of physical... presence.[40]

Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 110. - The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the
wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994
Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as
well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the
existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue
Code. There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.

One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as
required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the
consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S.
No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution

Held: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives
as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not
the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated
the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same
as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to concur with amendments but
also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative
for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills
and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that,
elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more
sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the
Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as
action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.

The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate
days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the
same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The
presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of
reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President the
requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed
with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.

Tañada vs Tuvera Case Digest

ESCOLIN, J.:

Facts
The petitioners filed for a writ of mandamus. This is to compel respondents to publish various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders,
letters of implementations, and administrative orders.
The case dismissed on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring
the instant petition through the Solicitor General.

The respondent shows that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the
alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances.

On the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public
right, and its object is to compel the performance of public duty, they need not show any specific
interest for their petition to be given due course.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity
dates.

It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions
as to the date they are to take effect; publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for
their effectivity.

ISSUE
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes
valid and enforceable.

RULING
The Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances. Unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette,
even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.

The clear object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various
laws. which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without publication, there
would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official
Gazette….

The word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must
be enforced. It is the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public
concern.

DE CASTRO VS. JBC

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL – ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010

FACTS:

The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days
after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.

These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the
presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall
be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that Section 15,
Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President
from making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process
of filling up the position of Chief Justice.

Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of
Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate
Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita
Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio
Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters dated
January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because
the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in
the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90
days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the
framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have
easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article
VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the
framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s power
to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from “political
vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the
positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall
appoint a Supreme Court Justice.

A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the
process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could
only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of
course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the
provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one
from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an
Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.

ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon
his retirement.

HELD:

Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the
Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or
Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme
Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc
or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely
written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect
the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to
appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies
only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of
the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be
considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between
Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential
appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers,
if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most
likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.

Case Digest: Lagman vs Medialdea

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a sufficient factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus

FACTS: On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring
Martial Law in the whole island of Mindanao and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus therein. On May 25, the president submitted a written report to Congress on the
factual basis of the Martial Law declaration (as required by the Constitution). The main basis of
the declaration was the attack of the Maute terrorist group in Marawi City. According to the
report, the Maute group is an affiliate of ISIS which is aiming to establish an Islamic caliphate in
Marawi City (and might spread its control in all the other parts of Mindanao). It also cited the
ongoing rebellion and lawless violence that has plagued Mindanao for decades.

DECISION: Yes
​
RATIO DECIDENDI: In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or
suspension, the Court considers only the information and data available to the President prior to
or at the time of the declaration. The determination by the Court of the sufficiency of factual
basis must be limited only to the facts and information mentioned in the Report and
Proclamation. The Court held that the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had
sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President only has to
ascertain if there is probable cause for a declaration of Martial Law and the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus. The petitioners’ counter-evidence were derived solely from unverified
news articles on the internet, with neither the authors nor the sources shown to have affirmed
the contents thereof. As the Court has consistently ruled, news articles are hearsay evidence,
twice removed, and are thus without any probative value, unless offered for a purpose other
than proving the truth of the matter asserted. The alleged false and/or inaccurate statements
are just pieces and parcels of the Report; along with these alleged false data is an arsenal of
other independent facts showing that more likely than not, actual rebellion exists.

Week 3

[CASE DIGEST - Maria Carolina Araullo vs Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III]

Petitioner: Maria Carolina Araullo

Respondent: Benigno Aquino III

G.R. No. 209287 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Separation of Powers – Fund Realignment –
Constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration Program

Power of the Purse – Executive Impoundment

When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the
economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio
“Butch” Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).

The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the
Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next
year’s appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being
undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefore will be withdrawn by the
Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by the Executive and said funds will
then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as
economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by
the Supreme Court).

Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.

Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that he, and other
Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of
then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP
but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.

This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within the
Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for
the CPLA (Cordillera People’s Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation
Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation
Projects, etc.

This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several
other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the
DAP. Among their contentions was:

DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that “no money shall
be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law“.

Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and
augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to
augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and
authority to use savings, respectively).

Issues:

I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).

II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive.

III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.

IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.

V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.

HELD:

I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by
the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing
government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art.
VI of the Constitution. In DAP, no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an
appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the
GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.

II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the President’s
power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason.
Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national
government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, there’s no impoundment in the case at
bar because what’s involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.

III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and
even the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make
realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made “within their
respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the
DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being
transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.

Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing
project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects
are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the
GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA
because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional
and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are “savings”

These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under the
definition of “savings” in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in
the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The
GAA does not refer to “savings” as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the
statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the
transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year (12 months). But
under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year
and then being declared as “savings” by the Executive particularly by the DBM.

IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because
under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to
the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such
certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.

V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being
declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped
stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions
under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The
beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they received especially so that they relied on the
validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors,
implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or
administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.

[CASE DIGEST: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. MARIA LOURDES SERENO]

Summary:
Deciding on the quo warranto petition en banc, the Supreme Court justices voted to remove Sereno from
the court on May 11, 2018, by a vote of 8-6, making Sereno the first officer in the Philippines unlawfully
holding office to be removed from office without an impeachment trial. Sereno filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the decision which she filed on May 31, 2018.

Doctrine:
Quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed of when the subject act or
omission was committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an official’s
qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid. Acts or omissions, even if it
relates to the qualification of integrity being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during
the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official cannot be the subject of a quo
warranto proceeding, but of impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or
omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or to disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if
otherwise.
Facts:
Respondent served as a member of the faculty of the UP College of Law (UP) from 1986 to 2006. She
also served as legal counsel for the Republic of the Philippines for several agencies from 1994 until 2009.

In July 2010, Respondent submitted her application for the position of Associate Justice of the SC.
Despite the span of 20 years of employment with UP from 1986 to 2006 and despite having been
employed as legal counsel of various government agencies from 2003 to 2009, records from the UP
Human Resources Development Office, Central Records Division of the Office of the Ombudsman, and
the Office of Recruitment Selection and Nomination (ORSN) of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) show
that the only Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) available on record and filed by
Respondent were those for the years 1985, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, and
2002, or only 11 out of 25 SALNs that ought to have been filed. No SALNs were filed from 2003 to 2006
when she was employed as legal counsel for the Republic. Neither was a SALN filed when she resigned
from U.P. College of Law as of 1 June 2006 and when she supposedly re-entered government service as
of 16 August 2010.

Respondent was appointed by President Benigno Aquino III on 25 August 2012. Five years later, an
impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon with the House Committee of Justice. Included in
the complaint was the allegation that Respondent failed to make a truthful statements of her SALNs. Such
complaint filed in the House spawned a letter dated 21 February 2018 of Atty. Eligio Mallari to the OSG
requesting the latter to initiate a quo warranto proceeding against Respondent.

Issues Ratio:
ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for quo
warranto

(2) Whether or not Sereno may be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding notwithstanding the fact
that an impeachment complaint has already been filed with the House of Representatives.

(3) Whether or not Sereno, who is an impeachable officer, can be the respondent in a quo warranto
proceeding

(4) Whether or not the Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is
violative of the doctrine of separation of powers.

(5) Whether or not the determination by the JBC of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination partakes of
the character of a political question outside the Court’s supervisory and review powers;

(6) Whether or not Sereno failed to file her SALNs as mandated by the Constitution and required by the
law and its implementing rules and regulations

RULING:
(1) Yes, Supreme Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for quo
warranto.

Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution states that the SC has original jurisdiction over petitions for quo
warranto. This jurisdiction is concurrent with the Court of Appeals (CA) and the Regional Trial Court
(RTC). Section 7, Rule 66 of Rules of Court provides that the venue for an action for quo warranto is in
the RTC of Manila, Court of Appeals, or Supreme Court when commenced by the Solicitor General.

In the instant case, direct resort to the Suprme Court is justified, even if it did not gone through to either
the RTC or the CA considering that the action for quo warranto questions the qualification of no less than
Member of the Court. The issue of whether a person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
exercises public office is a matter of public concern over which the government takes special interest as it
obviously cannot allow an intruder or impostor to occupy public position. The instant petition is one of
first impression and of paramount importance to the public in the sense that the qualification, eligibility
and appointment of an incumbent Chief Justice, the highest official of the Judiciary, are being scrutinized
through an action for quo warranto.

Hence, the Supreme Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for quo
warranto.

(2) Yes, Sereno may be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding notwithstanding the fact that an
impeachment complaint has already been filed with the House of Representatives.

Jurisprudence teaches that forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several
judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues,
either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court, to increase his chances of obtaining a
favorable decision if not in one court, then in another. The test for determining forum shopping is whether
in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs
sought.

Here, quo warranto and impeachment may proceed independently of each other as these remedies are
distinct as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal,
and (4) limitations. The issue in the quo warranto proceedings is the determination of whether or not
Sereno legally holds the Chief Justice position to be considered as an impeachable officer in the first
place, while, impeachment is for respondent’s prosecution for certain impeachable offenses. Simply put,
while Sereno’s title to hold a public office is the issue in quo warranto proceedings, impeachment
necessarily presupposes that Sereno legally holds the public office and thus, is an impeachable officer, the
only issue being whether or not she committed impeachable offenses to warrant her removal from office.
Moreover, the reliefs sought are different, respondent in a quo warranto proceeding shall be adjudged to
cease from holding a public office in which he/she is ineligible to hold, while, in impeachment, a
conviction for the charges of impeachable offenses shall result to the removal of the respondent from the
public office that he/she is legally holding. It is not legally possible to impeach or remove a person from
an office that he/she, in the first place, does not and cannot legally hold or occupy. Lastly, the
impeachment proceedings before the House is not the impeachment case proper, since it is only a
determination of probable cause. The impeachment case is yet to be initiated by the filing of the Articles
of Impeachment before the Senate, thus, at the moment, there is no pending impeachment case against
Sereno.

Hence, Sereno may be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding notwithstanding the fact that an
impeachment complaint has already been filed with the House of Representatives.

(3) Yes, Sereno, who is an impeachable officer, can be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding.

Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or invalidly elected

impeachable official may be removed from office. The language of Section 2, Article XI of the
Constitution does not foreclose a quo warranto action against impeachable officers: “Section 2. The
President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of,
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal
of public trust.” The provision uses the permissive term “may” which denote discretion and cannot be
construed as having a mandatory effect, indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity, or an option.
Further, Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution allows the institution of a quo warranto action against an
impeachable officer. After all, a quo warranto petition is predicated on grounds distinct from those of
impeachment. The former questions the validity of a public officer’s appointment while the latter indicts
him for the so-called impeachable offenses without questioning his title to the office he holds.

In this case, while Respondent Sereno is an impeachable officer, the quo warranto is a proper remedy to
remove her from her office because the petition is predicated on the validity of her appointment as Chief
Justice, that is, she failed to satisfy the requisite proof of integrity when she applied for the position of
Chief Justice by failing to submit the required SALNs from 1985 to 2006.

Hence, Sereno, who is an impeachable officer, can be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding.

(4) No, the Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is not violative of
the doctrine of separation of powers.

Section 3(1) and 3(6), Article XI, of the Constitution respectively provides that the House of
Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment while the Senate shall
have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Again, the difference between quo
warranto and impeachment must be emphasized. An action for quo warranto does not try a person’s
culpability of an impeachment offense, neither does a writ of quo warranto conclusively pronounce such
culpability. An act or omission committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an
official's qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid is properly the
subject of quo warranto petition, provided that the requisites for the commencement thereof are present.
Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity, being continuing
requirement but nonetheless committed during the incumbency of validly appointed and/or validly elected
official, cannot be the subject of quo warranto proceeding, but of something else, which may either be
impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an
impeachable offense, or disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.

In this case, the Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings does not preclude
Congress from enforcing its own prerogative of determining probable cause for impeachment, to craft and
transmit the Articles of Impeachment, nor will it preclude Senate from exercising its constitutionally
committed power of impeachment. Furthermore, non-filing of SALN by respondent before she was
appointed in the bench goes against to her integrity which is one of the qualifications required for the
appointment as members of the Supreme Court. Failure to present proof of integrity belies her
qualification to hold office of the Chief Justice, which is a proper subject of quo warranto petition.

Hence, the Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is not violative of the
doctrine of separation of powers.

(5) No, the determination by the JBC of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination partakes of the
character of a political question outside the Court’s supervisory and review powers.

Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides that “A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created
under the supervision of the Supreme Court.” The power of supervision means “overseeing or the
authority of an officer to see to it that the subordinate officers perform their duties.” JBC’s absolute
autonomy from the Court as to place its non-action or improper actions beyond the latter’s reach is
therefore not what the Constitution contemplates. What is more, the JBC’s duty to recommend or
nominate, although calling for the exercise of discretion, is neither absolute nor unlimited, and is not
automatically equivalent to an exercise of policy decision as to place, in wholesale, the JBC process
beyond the scope of the Court’s supervisory and corrective powers.

Here, while a certain leeway must be given to the JBC in screening aspiring magistrates, the same does
not give it an unbridled discretion to ignore Constitutional and legal requirements nor is JBC allowed to
waive or bargain the constitutional requirement that a member of the Judiciary must be of proven
competence, integrity, probity, and independence. In nominating Sereno in the position of the Chief
Justice by the JBC, the Court can inquire to such nomination process especially in view of the Republic’s
contention that Sereno was ineligible to hold office.

Hence, the determination by the JBC of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination partakes of the character
of a political question outside the Court’s supervisory and review powers.

(6) Yes, Sereno failed to file her SALNs as mandated by the Constitution and required by the law and
its implementing rules and regulations.

Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution states that “A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption
of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets,
liabilities, and net worth.” This has likewise been required by RA 3019 and RA 6713, these laws are
malum prohibitum such that the omission or commission of that act as defined by the law, and not the
character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. “Failure to
comply” with the law is a violation of law, a “prima facie evidence of unexplained wealth, which may
result in the dismissal from service of the public officer.” Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713 even provides that
non-compliance with this requirement is not only punishable by imprisonment and/or a fine, it may also
result in disqualification to hold public office.

In this case, Sereno chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus violated the Constitution, the law, and
the Code of Judicial Conduct. In Sereno’s 20 years of government service in UP Law, only 11 SALNs
have been filed. Sereno could have easily dispelled doubts as to the filing or non-filing of the unaccounted
SALNs by presenting them before the Court, yet, Sereno opted to withhold such information or such
evidence, if at all, for no clear reason. The existence of these SALNs and the fact of filing thereof were
neither established by direct proof constituting substantial evidence nor by mere inference. Moreover, the
statement of the Ombudsman is categorical: “based on records on file, there is no SALN filed by Sereno
for calendar years 1999 to 2009 except SALN ending December 1998.”

Hence, Sereno failed to file her SALNs as mandated by the Constitution and required by the law and its
implementing rules and regulations.

Dispositive:
Petition for Quo Warranto granted.

[CASE BRIEF ON PIMENTEL V. LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD AND ABAYATA V.

MEDIALDEA AND LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD (2019) CONCERNING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PHILIPPINE LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION TEST (PHILSAT)]

On September 10, 2019, the Supreme Court en banc in Pimentel v. LEB struck down Sec. 9 of LEBMO
No. 7, Series of 2016, as void and unconstitutional.

Specifically, the majority opinion penned by Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr., the Honorable Supreme Court
ruled that when the PhiLSAT is used to exclude, qualify and restrict admissions to law schools, the
PhiLSAT goes beyond mere supervision and regulation and violates institutional academic freedom for
being unconstitutional. Hence, in the dispositive portion of the ponencia, Sec. 9 of LEBMO No. 7, Series
of 2016:[2]

“The PhiLSAT presently operates not only as a measure of an applicant’s aptitude for law school. The
PhiLSAT, as a pass or fail exam, dictates upon law schools who among the examinees are to be admitted
to any law program. When the PhiLSAT is used to exclude, qualify, and restrict admissions to law
schools, as its present design mandates, the PhiLSAT goes beyond mere supervision and regulation,
violates institutional academic freedom, becomes unreasonable and therefore, unconstitutional. In strking
down these objectionable clauses in the PhiLSAT, the State’s inherent power to protect public interest by
improving legal education is neither emasculated nor compromised. Rather, the institutional academic
freedom of law schools to determine for itself who to admit pursuant to their respective admissions
policies is merely protected. In turn, the recognition of academic discretion comes with the inherent
limitation that its exercise should not be whimsical, arbitrary, or gravely abused.
In similar vein, certain LEB issuances which exceed the powers granted under its charter should be
nullified for being ultra vires.” (Underscoring and emphasis supplied)

The body of the decision indicates that the PhiLSAT excludes, qualifies, and restricts admission to law
schools, which is violative of academic of freedom. The ponencia, however, is silent as to whether the
taking of the PhiLSAT should be mandatory and therefore, integral to admission. If the taking of the
Philsat is integral to admission then this would clearly be violative of institutional academic freedom.

A careful reading of the separate opinions of Senior Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe, Associate
Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, who is joined by Chief Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, Associate Justices
Benjamin S. Caguioa, Alexander G. Gesmundo, and Andres B. Reyes, Jr., taken together with the
majority opinion, reflect the view that the PhiLSAT is an optional law admission test. Thus, any
government regulatory agency which prescribes minimum standards for admission to law school cannot
be arbitrary and unreasonable in its issuances relating to admission since they are required to show a
compelling State interest to do so, which must be reasonable, and for a public purpose. Any form of
government regulation must therefore pass the constitutional test of reasonableness, as measured against
the four principles of academic freedom, specifically, the freedom of law schools to determine who to
admit for the study of law.

To ensure that institutional academic freedom is preserved and protected, the Honorable Supreme Court
recognizes the right of an institution of higher learning to have the exclusive prerogative to admit students
and provide that “atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an
atmosphere in which there prevails the ‘four essential freedoms’ of a university — to determine for itself
on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be
admitted to study.”[3]

Law schools play a major role in the sphere of legal education within the structure of institutions of higher
learning. In their exercise of academic freedom, law schools must have the liberty to decide for
themselves their “aims and objectives and how best to attain them”. They must be “free from outside
coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint, and a
wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students.” Academic freedom, as held by
this Honorable Court, “is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion, for that
would be to frustrate its purpose, or nullify its intent.”[4]

The relevant portions of the following separate opinions in Pimentel v. Legal Education Board are
reproduced to show that the PhiLSAT is optional, because to consider it mandatory would make law
school admissions exclusionary, qualifying and restrictive, and thus, contrary to the academic freedom of
law schools to determine who to admit for the study of law in our respective institutions.

Senior Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe, in her separate concurring opinion, succinctly discusses
why the provisions of Legal Education Board (LEB) Memorandum Order No. 7, Series of 2016 (LEBMO
No. 7-2016) that mandatorily require the passing of the Philippine Law School Admission Test
(PhiLSAT) as a pre-requisite for admission to any law school violate institutional academic freedom and
hence, unconstitutional:[5]

“In this case, while the policy of the State to ‘uplift the standards of legal education’ may be characterized
as a compelling State interest, the means of achieving this goal, through the PhiLSAT, together with its
mandatory and exclusionary features as above-discussed, do not appear to be narrowly tailored or the
least restrictive means for achieving this interest. There is no concrete showing why the implementation
of a standardized but optional State aptitude exam, which schools may freely adopt in their discretion as a
tool for their own determination of who to admit (such as the National Medical Aptitude Test for medical
schools or the Law School Admission Test in the United States of America), would be less of a “sifting”
measure than a mandatory and exclusively State-determined one (such as the PhiLSAT). This is especially
so since, as conceded by LEB Chairperson Emerson B. Aquende during the oral arguments in this case,
there is no statistical basis to show the propensity of the PhiLSAT to improve the quality of legal
education. Furthermore, no other study or evaluation regarding the viability of the PhiLSAT was shown to
this effect. It is true that in a general sense, the PhiLSAT operates as a basic aptitude exam which seeks to
test skills that have rational connection to the field of law, i.e., communications and language proficiency,
critical thinking, and verbal and quantitative reasoning. However, because the test was solely crafted by
the LEB, it completely excludes the law schools’ input and participation, and worse, even puts their very
existence in jeopardy should there be non-subservience. Verily, an absolutist approach in any facet of
academic freedom would not only result in an overly restrictive State regulation, it would also be
practically counterproductive because law schools, being at the forefront, are the quintessential
stakeholders to the mission of improving legal education. Again, by constitutional fiat, the State’s role is
limited to reasonable supervision, not control. For these reasons, the provisions of LEBMO No. 7-2016
on the PhiLSAT clearly transgress institutional academic freedom.” (Underscoring and emphasis
supplied)

In his dissenting and concurring opinion, Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen is clear and categorical that all
aspects of the Philippine Law School Admission Test, and for that matter, any national admission test –
even if not made mandatory, is unconstitutional for being an infringement of academic freedom. Justice
Leonen’s opinion, joined by no less than Chief Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, further makes a distinction
between the Philippine Law School Admission Test and the National Medical Admission Test:[6]

“The Philippine Law School Admission Test is an unwarranted intrusion into this essential freedom. The
government’s imposition of a passing score as a bar to admission violates the educational institutions’
academic freedom to determine who to admit to study. The existence of the Legal Education Board, on
the other hand, interferes with the right of academic institutions with respect to how to teach and who to
teach.” (Underscoring and emphasis supplied)

...

“As found by the majority, the Philippine Law School Admission Test, unlike the National Medical
Admission Test, violates institutional academic freedom insofar as it prescribes a passing score that must
be followed by law schools. Failure to reach the passing score will disqualify the examinee from
admission to any Philippine law school. This is because a Certificate of Eligibility is necessary for
enrollment as a first year law student. Respondent Legal Education, which administers the test, only
allows law schools to impose additional requirements for admission, but passing the test is still
mandatory. The failure of law schools to abide by these requirements exposes them to administrative
sanctions.

In contrast, failure to achieve a certain score in the National Medical Admission Test no longer
disqualifies an examinee from applying to all medical schools. For one, test scores are reported with a
corresponding percentile rank that ranges from 1 to 99+. It “indicates the percentage of [National Medical
Admission Test] examinees who have [test] scores the same as or lower than the examinee. This
percentile rank is evaluated by the medical schools against the cutoff grade that they themselves
determine. Hence, the percentile rank cutoff is only a “minimum score that qualfies an examinee as a
bonafide applicant for admission into his/her preferred medical school. The test score only determines the
available medical schools where a person may apply; the higher the score, the more options the applicant
has.

Thus, I agree with the majority’s characterization that the Philippine Law School Admission Test employs
a “totalitarian scheme” that leaves the actions of law schools entirely dependent on the test results. It
usurps the right of law schools to determine the admision requiremens for its would-be students –
ulitmately infringing on the institutional academic freedom they possess, as guaranteed by the
Constitution.”

Upon closer inspection, Justice Leonen observes that “the Philippine Law School Admission Test does
not merely recommend, but dictates on law schools who are qualified to be admitted. By prescribing a
passing score and predetermining who may enroll in law schools, the State forces its judgment on the
institutions, when it has no business doing so. Any fovernmental attempt to dictate upon schools the
composion of their studentry undermines their institutional academic freedom.”[7]

In his separate concurring opinion, Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa states that the PhiLSAT is
violative of academic freedom, and that the State’s power over law schools is limited to supervision and
regulation, not control:[8]

“With respect to the academic freedom aspect of who may be admitted to the schools, I reiterate my
position that the ponencia is correct in holding that the PhiLSAT is violative of academic freedom.
Mandating legal education institutions to reject examinees who failed to obtain the prescribed passing
score amounts to a complete transfer of control over student admissions from the law schools to the LEB.
To emphasize, the permissible power of the State over institutions of higher learning is limited to
supervision and regulation, not control.” (Underscoring and emphasis supplied)

In finding that the PhiLSAT should be set aside, Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo further explains his view
in his separate concurring and dissenting opinion:[9]

“I concur with the ponencia that the LEB Memorandum Orders and Circular, requiring the PhiLSAT as
mandatory and exclusionary, are unconstitutional.
Institutions of higher learning have academic freedom, under the Constitution, and this includes the
freedom to determine who may be admitted to study. Such freedom may only be limited by the State
based on the test of reasonability. In this case, however, the assailed Memorandum Orders fail to provide
a reasonable justification for restraining the admission of students to law schools based on the following
reasons:

First, by making the PhiLSAT mandatory and exclusionary, the LEB significantly restricts the freedom of
law schools to determine who shall be admitted as law students. Only those who pass the said
examination shall be considred for admission to these institutions of higher learning. Consequently, the
LEB, through the PhiLSAT, first chooses the potential law students, and only afterwards, shall the law
schools be allowed to choose their students from the limited pool of student-passers. The said institutes of
higher learning are barred from considering those students who failed the examinations, regardless of
their previous academic grades and achievements.

Second, the LEB does not give any justification for the required passing score of 55% and the format of
the examinations. The studies cited by the LEB were conducted by different organizations, for different
professions, and for foreign jurisdictions. Indeed, no concrete study conducted in the Philippines for the
legal profession was provided to substantiate the passing score and the test format. It is not even clear
whether the consensus of the law schools in the country was secured before the LEB imposed the
PhiLSAT. Without any concrete basis for the conduct of the examination, it would be unreasonable to
impose the same mandatorily and without exemption to the institutes of higher learning.

Third, law schools are given no option other than to follow the LEB Memorandum Orders and Circular.
Failure to comply with these shall result in administrative sanctions, ranging from closure of the law
school, phase-out of the law program, provision cancellation of its recognition and/or liailityto pay a fine
of P10,000.00 for each infraction. Even without a valid reason for the impostion of the PhiLSAT
requirement, the LEB completely restricts the law schools from accepting students who did not pass the
said examination. The schools’ exercise of academic freedom to choose their students is restricted by the
threat of administrative and pecuniary sanctions.

Assuming arguendo that the LEB Memorandum Orders and Circular were issued under the exercise of
police power of the State to regulate the rights of certain institutions, it does not justify the unreasonable
restriction on the academic freedom of institutes of higher learning. Notwithstanding its extensive sweep,
police power is not without its own limitations. For all its awesome consequences, it may not be exercised
arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised,
that is to advance the public good. Thus, when the power is used to further private interests at the expense
of the citizenry, there is a clear misuse of the power.

Here, the LEB failed to establish the reasonable means to limit the academic freedom of the institutes of
higher learning. Again, there is no valid explanation provided on the mandatory and exclusionary
requirement of the PhiLSAT, its passing grade, and format of examinations. Manifestly, to impose a
penalty on law schools based on an unreasonable policy that restricts academic freedom would be an
invalid exercise of police power.” (Undescoring and emphasis supplied)
In his separate concurring opinion, Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. [10] agreed with the ponencia in striking
as unconstitutional LEBMO No. 7, and all its adjunct orders, for being violative of the institutions’ and
students’ academic freedom, emphasizing that

“. . . it becomes all too apparent that LEBMO No. 7, insofar as it imposes the PhiLSAT, is a constricting
regulation that binds the hands of the schools from choosing who to admit in their law program. The LEB
thrusts upon the law schools a pre-selected roster of applicants, and effectively deprives them of the right
to select their own students on the basis of factors and criteria of their own choosing. Consequently, the
law schools are left with no choice but to elect from this limited pool. Worse, they are forbidden from
admitting those who failed to comply with the LEB’s requirements, under pain of administrative
sanctions.

Undoubtedly, the imposition of the PhiLSAT is an oppressive and arbitrary measure. The LEB is bereft of
power to substitute its own judgment for that of the universities’. Rather, the universities should be free to
consider other criteria (aside from the PhiLSAT) in determining their prospective students’ aptitude and
ability to survive in law school. In fact, during the Oral Arguments held on March 5, 2019, amicus curiae
Dean Sedfrey Candelaria revealed that passing the law entrance exam is not a guarantee that the student
will survive through law school . . .

Indeed, the level of supervision and regulation granted unto the State must be reasonable. This
“reasonableness” in no way grants a warrant for the State to exercise oppressive control over the schools.”
(Underscoring and emphasis supplied)

At present, the case is still pending final resolution of the motions for reconsideration that have been filed
by the petitioners who are law professors, and the respondent Legal Education Board.

KILUSANG MAYO UNO v. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, GR No. 210500, 2019-04-02

Facts:

This Court is called to determine the validity of the Social Security System premium hike, which took
effect in January 2014. The case also involves the application of doctrines on judicial review, valid
delegation of powers, and the exercise of police power.

issued to annul the Social Security System premium hike embodied in the following issuances: (1)
Resolution No. 262-s. 2013 dated April 19, 2013;[2] (2) Resolution No. 711-s. 2013 dated September 20,
2013;[3] and (3) Circular

Kilusang Mayo Uno, together with representatives from recognized labor centers, labor federations,
party-list groups, and Social Security System members (collectively, Kilusang Mayo Uno, et al.), filed the
case against government officials and agencies involved in issuing the assailed issuances.

Lastly, petitioners pray that a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction be issued
to stop the implementation of the increase in contributions.
provisions of the Constitution on the protection of workers, promotion of social justice, and respect for
human rights.[

Issues:

Petitioners claim that the assailed issuances were issued per an unlawful delegation of power to
respondent Social Security Commission based on Republic Act No. 8282, or the Social Security Act. In
particular, Section 18[14] allegedly offers vague and unclear standards, and are incomplete in its terms
and conditions. This provision, they claim, has allowed respondent Social Security Commission to fix
contribution rates from time to time, subject to the President's approval. Petitioners claim that the
delegation of the power had no adequate legal guidelines to map out the boundaries of the delegate's
authority.[15]

Section 4(b)(2) of the Social Security Act,[16] which states that the "increases in benefits shall not require
any increase in the rate of contribution[.]" They argue that this proviso prohibits the increase in
contributions if there was no corresponding increase in... contributions is an invalid exercise of police
power for not being reasonably necessary for the attainment of the purpose sought, as well as for being
unduly oppressive on the labor sector.[18] According to them, the Social Security System can extend

First, whether or not this Court can exercise its power of judicial review; Second, whether or not there is
an actual case or controversy; Third, whether or not the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
applies; Fourth, whether or not petitioners have legal standing to file the Petition; and Finally, whether or
not the assailed issuances were issued in violation of laws and with grave abuse of discretion. In
connection with the fifth issue, this Court further resolves:

Petitioners allege that they "have no appeal nor any plain, speedy[,] and adequate remedy under the
ordinary course of law except through the instant Petition."[61]

Petitioners' attack on the increase in contribution rate and maximum monthly salary credit is two
(2)-tiered: (1) they assail the validity of the exercise of respondents Social Security System and Social
Security Commission's power under the law; and (2) they assail the validity of the delegation of power to
respondent Social Security Commission.

Petitioners argue that the assailed issuances are void for being issued under vague and unclear standards
under the Social Security Act. They admit that Section 18 allows the Social Security Commission to fix
the contribution rate subject to several conditions. However, petitioners claim that the term "actuarial
calculations" is too vague and general, and the relationship between the rate of benefits and actuarial
calculations is not clearly defined. Thus, they conclude that the delegation of power to fix the contribution
rate is incomplete in all its terms and conditions.

Ruling:
The president is the head of the executive branch,[23] a co-equal of the judiciary under the Constitution.
His or her prerogative is entitled to respect from other branches of government.[24] Inter-branch
courtesy[25] is but a consequence of the doctrine of separation of powers.[26]

As such, the president cannot be charged with any suit, civil or criminal in nature, during his or her
incumbency in office. This is in line with the doctrine of the president's immunity from suit.

Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be
sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will
degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court
litigations while s

Francisco v. The House of Representatives, we recognized that this expanded jurisdiction was meant "to
ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by 'any branch or
instrumentalities of government.'

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the
government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question
whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction
or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this
nature.

Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of jurisdiction, certiorari is to be
distinguished from prohibition by the fact that it is a corrective remedy used for the re-examination of
some action of an inferior tribunal, and is directed to the cause or proceeding in the lower court and not to
the court itself, while prohibition is a preventative remedy issuing to restrain future action, and is direct...
petitioners filed a Petition for both certiorari and prohibition to determine whether respondents Social
Security System and Social Security Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in releasing the
assailed issuances. According to them, these issuances violated

Petitioners must, thus, comply with the requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review: (1)
there must be an actual case or justiciable controversy before this Court; (2) the question before this Court
must be ripe for adjudication; (3) the person challenging the act must be a proper party; and (4) the issue
of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and must be the very litis mota of the
case.[39]

The existence of an actual case or controversy depends on the allegations pleaded.[53]

Here, petitioners allege that the premium hike, through the assailed issuances, violates their rights as
workers whose welfare is mandated to be protected under the Constitution.[54] They further allege that
the issuances are grossly unjust to the working class and were issued beyond the scope of constitutional
powers.[55]... how the assailed issuances violated workers' constitutional rights such that it would warrant
a judicial review
Petitioners cannot merely cite and rely on the Constitution without specifying how these rights translate to
being legally entitled to a fixed amount and proportion of Social Security System contributions.

case is ripe for adjudication when the challenged governmental act is a completed action such that there is
a direct, concrete, and adverse effect on the petitioner.[58]... something had been performed by the
government branch or instrumentality before the court may step in, and the petitioner must allege the
existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged acti

Courts may only take cognizance of a case or controversy if the petitioner has exhausted all remedies
available to it under the law.

Furthermore, jurisdiction is determined by laws enacted by Congress. The doctrine of exhaustion of

administrative remedies ensures that this legislative power is respected by courts. Co

Courts cannot ignore Congress' determination that the Social Security Commission is the entity with
jurisdiction over any dispute arising from the Social Security Act with respect to coverage, benefits,
contributions, and penalties.

For a valid exercise of delegation, this Court enumerated the following requisites:

All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation
must be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; and that the regulation be not in contradiction to,
but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law. Under the first test or the so-called
completeness test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature
such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The second test or
the sufficient standard test, mandates that there should be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.[90]

To determine completeness, all of the terms and provisions of the law must leave nothing to the delegate
except to implement it. "What only can be delegated is not the discretion to determine what the law shall
be but the discretion to determine how the law shall be enforced."[92]

Not only is the Social Security Act complete in its terms; it also contains a sufficient standard for the
Social Security Commission to fix the monthly contribution rate and the minimum and maximum
monthly salary credits

Principles:

freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the
performance of his official duties and functions.
Week 4
\
Cabansag v. Fernandez (Dangerous tendency rule re: court-related grievances)

Facts:

Apolonio Cabansag filed a complaint on Jan. 13, 1947 seeking to evict Germiniana Fernandez
from a parcel of land. The hearing on the said case was postponed on multiple instances from
1947 to 1952, with the most notable postponement being caused by the lack of transcripts of
previous hearings.

On Dec. 30, 1953, Pres. Ramon Magsaysay assumed office and created the Presidential
Complaints and Action Commission (PCAC), a body tasked to receive complaints
regarding government services. Cabansag, with the clearance from his lawyers Roberto and
Rufino Merrera, wrote a letter to PCAC due to the delays in his case. He wrote asking
Magsaysay help in fast tracking his case because it was delayed due to “careful maneuvers
of a tactical lawyer” and the lack of transcripts due to the stenographers being assigned
to other courts.

The court declared Cabansag and his lawyers guilty of contempt and asked them to pay
court fines. The petitioners are seeking to reverse the said ruling.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the lower court legitimately and justifiably exercised the power to punish
for contempt in the instant case

Ruling:

No. The appellants believe that the sending of letters is covered by their right to petition the
government for redress of grievances. With this, there are two issues: independence of the
judiciary and the right for redress of grievance.

There are two tests used: the clear and present danger rule and the dangerous tendency
rule. In the said case, there are no clear and present danger and dangerous tendency because
the letter does not seek to belittle or degrade the court. Cabansag’s letter seeks the help of
PCAC in fast tracking his case and does not make comments against the court, thus there is no
obvious or immediate danger of interference in the court’s job and there is no dangerous
tendency to belittle the court.

The court reversed its decisions without pronouncement as to costs.

ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION v. COMELEC, GR No. 133486, 2000-01-28

Facts:

The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon "information from [a] reliable
source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct
radio-TV coverage of the elections x x x and to make [an] exit survey of the x x x vote during
the... elections for national officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of which
shall be [broadcast] immediately." (Exit polls/survey - asking people exiting the precints on who
they voted for)

The electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as
well as the unofficial... quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also
noted that it had not authorized or deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.

Issues:

"Whether or not the Respondent Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction when it approved the issuance of a
restraining order enjoining the petitioner or any [other group], its agents or...
representatives from conducting exit polls during the x x x May 11 elections."

Ruling:

The solicitor general contends that the petition is moot and academic, because the May 11,
1998 election has already been held and done with. Allegedly, there is no longer any actual
controversy before us.

The issue is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution referred specifically to the May 11,
1998 election, its implications on the people's fundamental freedom of expression transcend the
past election. The holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our democratic...
government. By its very nature, exit polling is tied up with elections. To set aside the resolution
of the issue now will only postpone a task that could well crop up again in future elections

In any event, in Salonga v. Cruz Pano, the Court had occasion to reiterate that it "also has the
duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It
has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of... protection given by
constitutional guarantees."

Since the fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press are being invoked here, we have
resolved to settle, for the guidance of posterity, whether they likewise protect the holding of exit
polls and the... dissemination of data derived therefrom.

The solicitor general argued that exit polls pose a clear and present danger because it was
not supervised by any government agency and can in general be manipulated easily. He
insists that these polls would sow confusion among the voters and would undermine the
official tabulation of votes conducted by the Commission, as well as the quick count
undertaken by the Namfrel.

Such arguments are purely speculative and clearly untenable. (Thus, walang clear and
present danger) First , by the very nature of a survey, the interviewee or participants are
selected at random, so that the results will as much as possible be representative or
reflective of the general sentiment or view of the community or group polled. Second , the
survey result is not meant to replace or be at par with the official COMELEC count. It
consists merely of the opinion of the polling group as to who the electorate in general has
probably voted for, based on the limited data gathered from polled individuals.Finally, not at
stake here are the credibility and the integrity of the elections, which are exercises that are
separate and independent from the exit polls. The holding and the reporting of the results of
exit polls cannot undermine those of the elections, since the former is only part of the latter. If at
all, the outcome of one can only be indicative of the other.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, and the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the
Court on May 9, 1998 is made PERMANENT. Assailed Minute Resolution No. 98-1419 issued
by the COMELEC en banc on April 21, 1998 is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

Principles:

In any event, in Salonga v. Cruz Pano, the Court had occasion to reiterate that it "also has the
duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It
has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of... protection given by
constitutional guarantees.

ELISEO F. SORIANO v. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA, GR No. 164785, 2009-04-29

Facts:

In these two petitions for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Eliseo F. Soriano
seeks to nullify and set aside an order and a decision of the Movie and Television Review
and Classification Board (MTRCB) in connection with certain utterances... he made in his
television show, Ang Dating Daan.

After a preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared, the MTRCB, by Order of August 16,
2004, preventively suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan program for 20 days, in
accordance with Section 3(d) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1986, creating the MTRCB, in...
relation to Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of PD
1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII of the MTRCB Rules of Procedure.[5] The same order also set the
case for preliminary investigation.

The following day, petitioner sought reconsideration of the preventive suspension order, praying
that Chairperson Consoliza P. Laguardia and two other members of the adjudication board
recuse themselves from hearing the case.[6] Two days after,... however, petitioner sought to
withdraw[7] his motion for reconsideration, followed by the filing with this Court of a petition for
certiorari and prohibition,[8] docketed as G.R. No. 164785, to nullify the preventive suspension
order... thus issued.

Issues:

THE ORDER OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION PROMULGATED BY RESPONDENT [MTRCB]

DATED 16 AUGUST 2004 AGAINST THE TELEVISION PROGRAM ANG DATING DAAN x x x
IS NULL AND VOID FOR BEING ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION

We shall first dispose of the issues in G.R. No. 164785, regarding

It is petitioner's threshold posture that the preventive suspension imposed against him and the
relevant IRR provision authorizing it are invalid inasmuch as PD 1986 does not expressly
authorize the MTRCB to issue preventive suspension.

Ruling:

Petitioner's contention is untenable.

Administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be administrative, investigatory,
regulatory, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of the five, as may be conferred by the
Constitution or by statute.[12] They have in fine only... such powers or authority as are granted
or delegated, expressly or impliedly, by law.[13] And in determining whether an agency has
certain powers, the inquiry should be from the law itself. But once ascertained as existing, the
authority given should... be liberally construed.[14]

A perusal of the MTRCB's basic mandate under PD 1986 reveals the possession by the agency
of the authority, albeit impliedly, to issue the challenged order of preventive suspension. And this
authority stems naturally from, and is necessary for the exercise of, its power of... regulation and
supervision.

The issuance of a preventive suspension comes well within the scope of the MTRCB's authority
and functions expressly set forth in PD 1986, more particularly under its Sec. 3(d), as quoted
above, which empowers the MTRCB to "supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel,
permits... for the x x x exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures,
television programs and publicity materials, to the end that no such pictures, programs
and materials as are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with
paragraph (c) hereof shall be... x x x exhibited and/or broadcast by television."

The case at bar, petitioner used indecent and obscene language and a three (3)-month
suspension was slapped on him for breach of MTRCB rules. In this setting, the assertion by
petitioner of his enjoyment of his freedom of speech is ranged against the duty of the
government to protect and promote the development and welfare of the youth. After a
careful examination of the factual milieu and the arguments raised by petitioner in support of his
claim to free speech, the Court rules that the government's interest to protect and promote
the interests and welfare of the children adequately buttresses the reasonable
curtailment and valid restraint on petitioner's prayer to continue as program host of Ang
Dating Daan during the suspension period.

Recall that the MTRCB is expressly empowered by statute to regulate and supervise
television... programs to obviate the exhibition or broadcast of, among others, indecent or
immoral materials and to impose sanctions for violations and, corollarily, to prevent
further violations as it investigates. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, the aforequoted Sec. 3
of the IRR... neither amended PD 1986 nor extended the effect of the law. Neither did the
MTRCB, by imposing the assailed preventive suspension, outrun its authority under the law. Far
from it. The preventive suspension was actually done in furtherance of the law, imposed
pursuant, to repeat,... to the MTRCB's duty of regulating or supervising television programs,
pending a determination of whether or not there has actually been a violation. In the final
analysis, Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 IRR merely formalized a power which PD 1986
bestowed, albeit... impliedly, on MTRCB.

Even if we concede that petitioner's remarks are not obscene but merely indecent speech,
still the Court rules that petitioner cannot avail himself of the constitutional protection of
free speech. Said statements were made in a medium easily accessible to children. With
respect... to the young minds, said utterances are to be treated as unprotected speech.

In ending, what petitioner obviously advocates is an unrestricted speech paradigm in which

absolute permissiveness is the norm. Petitioner's flawed belief that he may simply utter gutter
profanity on television without adverse consequences, under the guise of free speech, does...
not lend itself to acceptance in this jurisdiction. We repeat: freedoms of speech and expression
are not absolute freedoms. To say "any act that restrains speech should be greeted with
furrowed brows" is not to say that any act that restrains or regulates speech or... expression is
per se invalid. This only recognizes the importance of freedoms of speech and expression, and
indicates the necessity to carefully scrutinize acts that may restrain or regulate speech.

Human Rights Law Case Digest: Philippine Blooming Mills Employment Organization v.
Philippine Blooming Mills Co. (1973)
G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973

Lessons Applicable: Nature and Definition of Human Rights, Human Right is superior to
property rights, Social justice, jurisdiction over violation of constitutional right
Laws Applicable: Bill of Rights on rights of free expression, rights of free assembly and rights of
petition
FACTS:
• March 2, 1969: Philippine Blooming Mills discovered that Philippine Blooming Mills
Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration as a valid exercise
of their constitutional right of freedom expression in general and of their right of assembly
and petition for redress of grievances in particular before appropriate governmental agency,
the Chief Executive, alleged abuses of the police officers of the municipality of Pasig at
Malacañang on March 4, 1969 to be participated in by the workers in the first, second and third
shifts (6am-2pm, 7am-4pm. and 8am-5pm respectively)
• March 3, 1969: Philippine Blooming Mills held 2 meetings in the morning and afternoon
where PBMEO confirmed the demonstration which has nothing to do with the Company
because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management. That Management, thru
Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is
an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that
any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation thus
whoever fails to report for work the following morning shall be dismissed for violation of
the existing CBA Article XXIV: NO LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE amounting to an illegal strike
• March 3, 1969 9:50 am: Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to the
Company: REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING
DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969
• The Company filed for violation of the CBA. PBMEO answered that there is no violation
since they gave prior notice. Moreover, it was not a mass demonstration for strike against
the company.
• Judge Joaquin M. Salvador: PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and PBMEO
officers directly responsible for ULP losing their status as employees
• September 29, 1969: PBMEO motion for reconsideration – dismissed since 2 days late
ISSUE:
1. W/N to regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as
evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining
agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees,
stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is an inhibition of the
rights of free expression, free assembly and petition
HELD: YES. Set aside as null and void the orders of CFI and reinstate the petitioners.
• In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human
personality is the central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The
inviolable character of man as an individual must be "protected to the largest possible extent in
his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person
• The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security
"against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of
small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with
general principles.
• The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included
among the immunities reserved by the sovereign people
• The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also
political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and
complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic
establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the administration of public
affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights
so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and
protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and
employees.
• While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over
property rights is recognized.
o Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible.
o a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion,
namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the
right to prevent
o Rationale: Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of
the human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in
monetary terms. The wounds fester and the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even
as he cries in anguish for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised tissues.
o injunction would be trenching upon the freedom expression of the workers, even if it legally
appears to be illegal picketing or strike
• The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the
absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for
the preservation merely of their property rights.
• There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting
the request of the Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass
demonstration. And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against
the Pasig police, not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer,
which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.
o The most that could happen to them was to lose a day's wage by reason of their absence
from work on the day of the demonstration. One day's pay means much to a laborer, more
especially if he has a family to support. Yet, they were willing to forego their one-day salary
hoping that their demonstration would bring about the desired relief from police abuses. But
management was adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of their right of free
speech, free assembly and the right to petition for redress.
o the dismissal for proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being absent from
work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to these
lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State "the
promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all of the people,"
which guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the
Constitution that "the State shall afford protection to labor ...". Under the Industrial Peace Act,
the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate the
causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by employees of their
right to self-organization for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion of their
moral, social and economic well-being."
• The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in
relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in concert
activities for ... mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice
for an employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights
guaranteed in Section Three."
• violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction. Relief from a criminal
conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through habeas
corpus proceedings even long after the finality of the judgment. There is no time limit to the
exercise of the freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one
speech, the printing of one article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a continuing
immunity to be invoked and exercised when exigent and expedient whenever there are errors to
be rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise these
guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the period for
appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race for time. And in such a contest between an
employer and its laborer, the latter eventually loses because he cannot employ the best an
dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with the required diligence and zeal, bereft as he
is of the financial resources with which to pay for competent legal services
• enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by the organic law, is a most
compelling reason to deny application of a Court of Industrial Relations rule which impinges on
such human rights. It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent power to
"suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes
of justice require."

ADIONG V. COMELEC [G.R. No. 103956]

Facts:

COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347. Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:

Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. — The following are lawful election propaganda: (a)
Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers, handwritten or printed letters, or other written or
printed materials not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14)
inches in length. Provided, that decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized
posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.

Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate assails the COMELEC's Resolution
insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other
moving vehicles. Petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and print political
advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and
irreparable injury with this prohibition. The posting of decals and stickers on cars and other
moving vehicles would be his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial
candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections.

Issue:

Whether or not the COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile"
places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC is
constitutional.

Held:

No.

Ratio:

First — the prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech
enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). There is no public interest substantial enough
to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case. There are various concepts surrounding
the freedom of speech clause which we have adopted as part and parcel of our own Bill of
Rights provision on this basic freedom.

The preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect
when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the
equally vital right of suffrage. (Mutuc v. Commission on Elections).

The so-called balancing of interests — individual freedom on one hand and substantial
public interests on the other — is made even more difficult in election campaign cases because
the Constitution also gives specific authority to the Commission on Elections to supervise the
conduct of free, honest, and orderly elections.

The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles
does not endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest
threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free
speech and expression. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be
patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive
as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled.

Second — the questioned prohibition premised on the statute and as couched in the
resolution is void for overbreadth.

A statute is considered void for overbreadth when "it offends the constitutional principle that a
governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations
may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area
of protected freedoms."

The resolution prohibits the posting of decals and stickers not more than eight and one-half
(8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14) inches in length in any place, including mobile places
whether public or private except in areas designated by the COMELEC. Verily, the restriction as
to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the
citizen's private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle.

Third — the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal
opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section
26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not
impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. Compared to the
paramount interest of the State in guaranteeing freedom of expression, any financial
considerations behind the regulation are of marginal significance.

DAVID, ET AL. VS. ARROYO, ET AL.

G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424 May 3, 2006

TOPICS: Constitutional Law, PP 1017, Sec. 17, Article XII

FACTS:

Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and call upon AFP and the to
prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country. Permits to hold
rallies issued earlier by the local governments were revoked. Rallyists were dispersed. The
police arrested petitioner David and Llamas without a warrant.
President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to
exist. Petitioners filed petitions with the SC, impleading Arroyo, questioning the legality of the
proclamation.

At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5,
raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila. The raiding team confiscated news stories by
reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue. Policemen from
Camp Crame in Quezon City were stationed inside the editorial and business offices of the
newspaper; while policemen from the Manila Police District were stationed outside the
building.

A few minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the police surrounded
the premises of another pro-opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid
Abante.
The raid, according to Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor, is "meant to show a
'strong presence,' to tell media outlets not to connive or do anything that would help the
rebels in bringing down this government." The PNP warned that it would take over any
media organization that would not follow "standards set by the government during the
state of national emergency ." Director General Lomibao stated that "if they do not follow
the standards — and the standards are — if they would contribute to instability in the
government, or if they do not subscribe to what is in General Order No. 5 and Proc. No.
1017 — we will recommend a 'takeover.'" National Telecommunications' Commissioner
Ronald Solis urged television and radio networks to "cooperate " with the government for the
duration of the state of national emergency. He asked for "balanced reporting " from
broadcasters when covering the events surrounding the coup attempt foiled by the government.
He warned that his agency will not hesitate to recommend the closure of any broadcast outfit
that violates rules set out for media coverage when the national security is threatened.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional?

RULING:

No. PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to
prevent or suppress lawless violence whenever becomes necessary as prescribe under Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution. However, the SC ruled that under Section 17, Article XII of the
Constitution, the President, in the absence of legislative legislation, cannot take over
privately-owned public utility and private business affected with public interest. Therefore, the
PP No. 1017 is only partly unconstitutional.

G.R. No. 171409, (Cacho-Olivares, et al.) presents another facet of freedom of speech i.e., the
freedom of the press. Petitioners' narration of facts, which the Solicitor General failed to refute,
established the following: first, the Daily Tribune's offices were searched without warrant;
second , the police operatives seized several materials for publication; third , the search was
conducted at about 1:00 o'clock in the morning of February 25, 2006; fourth , the search was
conducted in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the
building; and fifth, policemen stationed themselves at the vicinity of the Daily Tribune offices.

The search is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the
steps in the conduct of search and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other premise be made
in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of
the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the
same locality. And Section 9states that the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime,
unless the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a
direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these rules were
violated by the CIDG operatives.

Not only that, the search violated petitioners' freedom of the press. The best gauge of a free and
democratic society rests in the degree of freedom enjoyed by its media.

While admittedly, the Daily Tribune was not padlocked and sealed like the "Metropolitan Mail "
and "We Forum " newspapers in the above case, yet it cannot be denied that the CIDG
operatives exceeded their enforcement duties. The search and seizure of materials for
publication, the stationing of policemen in the vicinity of the The Daily Tribune offices,
and the arrogant warning of government officials to media, are plain censorship. It is that
officious functionary of the repressive government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if
allowed to do so, and no more and no less than what he is permitted to say on pain of
punishment should he be so rash as to disobey. Undoubtedly, the The Daily Tribune was
subjected to these arbitrary intrusions because of its anti-government sentiments. This
Court cannot tolerate the blatant disregard of a constitutional right even if it involves the
most defiant of our citizens. Freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the
vitality of a representative democracy. It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the
constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.

JOSE BURGOS V. CHIEF OF STAFF G.R. No L-64261 December 26, 1984

Facts:

Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of “Metropolitan
Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been used in
subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined from
using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner.

Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two warrants
issued indicated only one and the same address. In addition, the items seized subject to the
warrant were real properties.

Issue: Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.

Held:

The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by the court as a
typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct determination of the place sought to be
searched set forth in the application. The purpose and intent to search two distinct premises
was evident in the issuance of the two warrant.
As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court applied the principle in the
case of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling “that machinery which is movable by nature
becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so
when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right,
unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.” In the case at bar, petitioners did not claim
to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This being
the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable
property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.

However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void.

Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that
the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.

The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not satisfy the
requirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses having been mere
generalizations.

Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants.

(Stanford vs. State of Texas). The description and enumeration in the warrant of the items to be
searched and seized did not indicate with specification the subversive nature of the said items.

The premises searched were the business and printing offices of the "Metropolitan Mail" and the
"We Forum" newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises were
padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of said
newspapers were discontinued. Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or
censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law,
(Sec. 9, Art. IV of the Constitution) and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to
express themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic
framework where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment
and growth of the citizenry.

CHAVEZ V. GONZALES

[G.R. No. 168338]

Facts:

Congress, acting as national board of canvassers, proclaimed President Arroyo winner

in the 2004 presidential elections. Radio station dzMM aired the Garci Tapes where the parties
to the conversation discussed "rigging" the results of the 2004 elections to favor President
Arroyo. Respondent Gonzalez ordered the NBI to investigate media organizations which aired
the Garci Tapes for possible violation of RA 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

NTC issued a press release warning radio and television stations that airing the Garci
Tapes is a "cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or
authorizations" issued to them.

Chavez, as citizen, filed this petition to nullify the "acts, issuances, and orders" of the
NTC and respondent Gonzalez; that respondents’ conduct violated freedom of expression and
the right of the people to information on matters of public concern under Section 7, Article III of
the Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not the NTC warning embodied in the press release of 11 June 2005
constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on freedom of expression.

Held:

Ratio:

Freedom of expression is the foundation of a free, open and democratic society.

Freedom of expression is an indispensable condition to the exercise of almost all other civil and
political rights. No society can remain free, open and democratic without freedom of expression.
Freedom of expression guarantees full, spirited, and even contentious discussion of all social,
economic and political issues. To survive, a free and democratic society must zealously
safeguard freedom of expression.

The function of freedom of expression is to stir disputes: it may indeed best serve its
high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as
they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may
strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for
acceptance of an idea.

When expression may be subject to prior restraint, apply in this jurisdiction to only four
categories of expression, namely:

§ pornography,

§ false or misleading advertisement,

§ advocacy of imminent lawless action, and

§ danger to national security. All other expression is not subject to prior restraint.
Any content-based prior restraint on protected expression is unconstitutional without exception.
A protected expression means what it says – it is absolutely protected from censorship.

Prior restraint on expression is content-based if the restraint is aimed at the message or idea of
the expression. Courts will subject to strict scrutiny content-based restraint. If the content-based
prior restraint is directed at protected expression, courts will strike down the restraint as
unconstitutional because there can be no content-based prior restraint on protected expression.
The analysis thus turns on whether the prior restraint is content-based, and if so, whether such
restraint is directed at protected expression, that is, those not falling under any of the
recognized categories of unprotected expression.

If the prior restraint is not aimed at the message or idea of the expression, it is
content-neutral even if it burdens expression. A content-neutral restraint is a restraint which
regulates the time, place or manner of the expression in public places without any restraint on
the content of the expression. Courts will subject content-neutral restraints to intermediate
scrutiny.

An example of a content-neutral restraint is a permit specifying the date, time and route of a
rally passing through busy public streets. A content-neutral prior restraint on protected
expression which does not touch on the content of the expression enjoys the presumption of
validity and is thus enforceable subject to appeal to the courts.

Only unprotected expression may be subject to prior restraint. However, any such prior restraint
on unprotected expression must hurdle a high barrier. First, such prior restraint is presumed
unconstitutional. Second, the government bears a heavy burden of proving the constitutionality
of the prior restraint.

Prior restraint is a more severe restriction on freedom of expression than subsequent

punishment. Although subsequent punishment also deters expression, still the ideas are
disseminated to the public. Prior restraint prevents even the dissemination of ideas to the public.

The prevailing test in this jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of government action
imposing prior restraint on three categories of unprotected expression – pornography, advocacy
of imminent lawless action, and danger to national security - is the clear and present danger
test. The expression restrained must present a clear and present danger of bringing about a
substantive evil that the State has a right and duty to prevent, and such danger must be grave
and imminent.

The NTC does not claim that the public airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes unprotected
expression that may be subject to prior restraint. The NTC does not specify what substantive
evil the State seeks to prevent in imposing prior restraint on the airing of the Garci Tapes. The
NTC does not claim that the public airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil, of grave and imminent character, that the State has a right and
duty to prevent.

We rule that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom
of speech and of the press.

There is enough evidence of chilling effect of the complained acts on record. The
warnings given to media came from no less the NTC, a regulatory agency that can cancel the
Certificate of Authority of the radio and broadcast media. They also came from the Secretary of
Justice, the alter ego of the Executive, who wields the awesome power to prosecute those
perceived to be violating the laws of the land. After the warnings, the KBP inexplicably joined
the NTC in issuing an ambivalent Joint Press Statement. After the warnings, petitioner Chavez
was left alone to fight this battle for freedom of speech and of the press. This silence on the
sidelines on the part of some media practitioners is too deafening to be the subject of
misinterpretation.

Clearly, the NTC has no factual or legal basis in claiming that the airing of the Garci
Tapes constitutes a violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law. The radio and television stations were
not even given an opportunity to be heard by the NTC.

CASE DIGEST: CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY. G.R. NO.
83896. FEBRUARY 22, 1991
FACTS:

This petition is about the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued
by President Aquino on July 25, 1987.

The said EO 284 allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries, and assistant
secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions,
albeit subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of 1987
Constitution, which provides as follows:

"Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice
any other professions, participate in any business or be financially interested in any contract
with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office."
The DOJ however in its issued Opinion No. 73 construed Section 13 of Art. VII together with
Sec. 7, paragraph 2 of Art. IX-B which provides that:

"Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency,
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries."

ISSUE:

Whether the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet
members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for
appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B.

RULING:

No, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object
sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied.

Although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of
multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public
officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13,
Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies, and assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless
otherwise provided in the Constitution itself.

The intent of the framers of the constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President
and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or
elsewhere is concerned. As compared to other prohibition found in the Constitution which
provides restriction only to office or employment in the government and GOCC's or their
subsidiaries, Article VII Section 13 provides absolute disqualification embracing and covers both
public and private office or employment unless otherwise provided by the Constitution itself.

This prohibition is proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and his
official family as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions. The reason
is that because they exercise more powers and, therefore more cheeks and restraints on them
are called for because there is more possibility of abuse in their case.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or
employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the
primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may
do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article
I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public
officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applies only to
the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies, and assistants.

The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation
to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the
Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article
VII; or acting as President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article
VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officiomember of the Judicial and Bar Council by
virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.

SUMMARY NOTES FOR THIS CASE:

The case of CLU vs. Executive Secretary explains Sec. 13, Article VII of the constitution as an
exception to the general rule provided under Sec. 7 Article IX-B.

The general rule is that all appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office
or employment in the government during their tenure. Provided, that such holding of another
employment is allowed by law or by their primary functions. The questioned appointive positions
in EO 284 are Cabinets, their undersecretaries, and assistant secretaries. The latter positions
are appointive in nature, thus it seems that it is also covered by Sec. 7 Article I-XB of the
Constitution, but it is not. The exception now is provided under Sec. 13, Article VII of the
Constitution. The provision specifically includes the appointive positions of “Cabinets, their
undersecretaries, and assistant secretaries. It strictly prohibits the mentioned positions from
holding any other office or employment during their tenure to avoid conflict of interest. This is a
special provision because their positions are separated from the rule governing all other
appointive officials under Sec. 7 of Article IX-B. They cannot hold any other office or
employment by means of any law allowing them, like this one, EO 284, and by means of their
primary functions because only the constitution may allow them to hold any other position.
Those positions that are allowed by the Constitution are exclusive, what is excluded cannot be
included. Thus cabinets, their undersecretaries, and assistant secretaries are allowed only to
hold only positions that the Constitution provided.

On the contention that the position will be held in an Ex-Officio capacity and in accordance with
the primary functions:
The term ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an "authority derived from
official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather
annexed to the official position." Ex-officio denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a
consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the
office."

Sec. 13 of Article VII does not cover the positions held by the executives in his ex-officio
capacity and without additional compensation because such positions do not comprise any
other position as what the constitution prohibits. His holding of such position in an ex officio
capacity imposed only additional duties and functions on the said official.

Likewise, the function of the official in his additional position must be closely related to or
required by the official’s primary functions. It should not be a mere incidental, remotely related,
inconsistent, incompatible, or otherwise alien to his primary function. Otherwise, it will fall under
the prohibition lay down in Sec. 13 of Article VII because it will be considered as “any other
office”

Francisco Chavez vs. PCGG ( DIGEST )

299 SCRA 744 ( G.R. No. 130716), December 9, 1998

FACTS:

Petitioner Chavez, as taxpayer, citizen and former gov’t official, impelled to bring this action
regarding several news reports on: (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos
assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks and (2) the reported execution of a
compromise, between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or
share these assets.

Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information, demands that respondents make
public any negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG’s task of recovering the Marcoses’
ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth
involves an issue of paramount public interest, since it has a “debilitating effect on the country’s
economy” that would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino People. Hence,
they have the right to know the transactions effected by the Government.

Respondents, on the other hand, contended that petitioner’s action is premature, because there
is no showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements.
And even if he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the
proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not become effective and binding.

Further, Pres. Ramos, in his Memorandum, commanded the PCGG Chairman NOT to approve
the Compromise Agreements. Embodied in the covenant that (a) the Marcoses shall provide
the gov’t assistance by way of testimony or disposition on any information that may shed light
on the cases; (b) the assets determined to belong to the Marcoses shall be net of and exempt
from, any form of taxes due the Republic of the Philippines; (c) that all disclosures of assets
shall not used as evidence by the Gov’t in any criminal, civil, tax or administrative case against
the former.

ISSUES:

(A) Procedural:

1) W/N the petitioner has the personality or legal standing to file the instant petition; and

2) W/N this Court is the proper court before which this action may be filed.

(B) Substantive:

1) W/N this Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public the details of any agreement,
perfected or not, with the Marcoses; and

2) W/N there exist any legal restraints against a compromise agreement between the Marcoses
and the PCGG relative to the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth.

HELD:

First Procedural Issue

YES. The Petitioner has the legal standing to file the instant petition.

In Legaspi vs. CSC, the Court declared that “when a mandamus proceeding involves the
assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that
petitioner is a citizen and, therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right.”

The instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and access to official
records and documents which guaranteed under Sec. 7, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution. Due to
the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioner’s
legal standing, i.e. 1) the enforcement of a public right; 2) espoused by a Filipino citizen, the
Court ruled that the petition at bar should be allowed.

Second Procedural Issue

YES. Section 5, Art. VIII of the Constitution expressly confers upon the SC original jurisdiction
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus.
The Court ruled that this petition is not confined to the Agreements that have already been
drawn, but likewise to any other ongoing or future undertaking towards any settlement on the
alleged Marcos loot. Ineluctably, the core issue boils down to the precise interpretation, in terms
of scope, of the twin constitutional provisions on “public transaction.” This broad and
prospective relief sought by the instant petition brings it out of the realm of Civil Case.

First Substantive Issue

YES. The Court can require the PCGG to disclose to the public the details of any agreement,
whether perfected or not.

Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution provides that the right of the people to information on matters
of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions or decisions, as well as to gov’t research data used as
basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.

Such recognized restrictions are as follows: a) national security matters and intelligence
information; b) trade secrets and banking transactions; c) criminal matters and; d) other
confidential information.

The Court emphasized that ill-gotten wealth assumes a public character which refers to assets
and properties acquired, directly or indirectly, by former Pres. Marcos, his family and relatives
through or as a result of improper of illegal use of government funds or properties; or their
having taken undue advantage of their public office; or their use of powers or influences
resulting in their unjust enrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino
People and the Republic of the Philippines.

Thus, the Court can require the PCGG to disclose sufficient public information on any
agreement that may arrived at and any proposed settlement concerning the Marcoses’
purported ill-gotten wealth.

Second Substantive Issue

YES. There are Legal Restraints existed against the compromise agreement between the
PCGG and the Marcos heirs.

Generally, law encourages compromises in civil cases, except with regard to the following
matters: 1) the civil status of persons, 2) the validity of a marriage of a legal separation, 3) any
ground for legal separation, 4) future support, 5) the jurisdiction of courts, and 6) future
legitimate. A Compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy or
public order.
In Republic & Campos Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, the power to grant criminal immunity was
conferred on PCGG by Section 5 of EO No. 14, as amended by EO No. 14-A, which provides:

Section 5. The PCGG is authorized to grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person
who provides information or testifies in an investigation conducted by the Commission to
establish the unlawful manner in which any respondent, defendant or accused has acquired the
properties in question in any case where such information or testimony is necessary to ascertain
or prove the latter’s guilt or his civil liability. The immunity thereby granted shall be continued to
protect the witness who repeats such testimony before the Sandiganbayan when required to do
so by the latter or by the Commission.

In the case at bar, the compromise agreements revealed serious flaws. First, the agreements
did not conform to the requirements of EO 14 and 14-A. Criminal immunity under section 5
cannot be granted to the Marcoses, who are the principal defendants in the ill-gotten wealth
cases. The provision is applicable mainly to witnesses who provide information against a
respondent, defendant or accused in an ill-gotten wealth case.

Second, under the General Agreement, the PCGG commits to exempt from all forms of taxes
the properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs. This is a clear violation of the Constitution.
Sec. 28(4), Art. VI of the Constitution specifically provides: “No law granting any tax exemption
shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Member of the Congress.” The
PCGG has absolutely no power to grant such exemptions.

Third, under the Agreement, the government binds itself to cause the dismissal of all cases
against the Marcos heirs, pending before the Sandiganbayan and other court. This is a direct
encroachment on judicial powers of the court which has the jurisdiction on dismissal. Hence,
PCGG cannot guarantee the dismissal of all such criminal cases against the Marcoses.

Fourth, the government also waives all claims and counterclaims, whether past, present, or
future against the Marcoses. This stipulation is contrary to the Civil Code which states that “an
action for future fraud may not be waived.” Further, the Agreements do not provide for a definite
or determinable period within which the parties shall fulfill their respective prestations.

Based on the foregoing discussion, it is crystal clear that the Agreements which PCGG entered
into with the Marcos heirs violated the Constitution.

Petition GRANTED.