Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 2021, 670–682

doi: 10.1093/scan/nsab032
Advance Access Publication Date: 26 March 2021
Original Manuscript

Social value orientation modulates fairness processing

during social decision-making: evidence from

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/scan/article/16/7/670/6189093 by guest on 20 March 2023

behavior and brain potentials
Xinmu Hu and Xiaoqin Mai
Department of Psychology, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China
Correspondence should be addressed to Xiaoqin Mai, Department of Psychology, Renmin University of China, 59 Zhongguancun Street, Beijing 100872,
China. E-mail: maixq@ruc.edu.cn.

Abstract
Social value orientation (SVO) characterizes stable individual differences by an inherent sense of fairness in outcome alloca-
tions. Using the event-related potential (ERP), this study investigated differences in fairness decision-making behavior and
neural bases between individuals with prosocial and proself orientations using the Ultimatum Game (UG). Behavioral results
indicated that prosocials were more prone to rejecting unfair offers with stronger negative emotional reactions compared
with proselfs. ERP results revealed that prosocials showed a larger P2 when receiving fair offers than unfair ones in a very
early processing stage, whereas such effect was absent in proselfs. In later processing stages, although both groups were
sensitive to fairness as reflected by an enhanced medial frontal negativity (MFN) for unfair offers and a larger P3 for fair
offers, prosocials exhibited a stronger fairness effect on these ERP components relative to proselfs. Furthermore, the fairness
effect on the MFN mediated the SVO effect on rejecting unfair offers. Findings regarding emotional experiences, behavioral
patterns and ERPs provide compelling evidence that SVO modulates fairness processing in social decision-making, whereas
differences in neural responses to unfair vs fair offers as evidenced by the MFN appear to play important roles in the SVO
effect on behavioral responses to unfairness.

Key words: social value orientation (SVO); fairness decision-making; P2; medial frontal negativity (MFN); P3

Introduction responders are prone to rejecting unfair offers, especially those

In highly complex social environments, people must consider
the outcomes of their own behaviors along with others’ during
social interactions; such considerations influence the decision-
making process (Rilling and Sanfey, 2011). As per the adage
‘inequality rather than want is the cause of trouble’, fair-
ness norm plays crucial roles in social decision-making. The
Ultimatum Game (UG) has been widely employed to examine
individuals’ responses to fairness in resource allocation (Güth
et al., 1982). Studies using the UG paradigm have revealed that
below 20% of the total (Camerer, 2003; Sanfey et al., 2003; Güth
and Kocher, 2014). Rejection of unfair offers contradicts clas-
sical game theory, in which the responder should presumably
accept any offer because ‘something is better than nothing’
(Morgenstern and Von Neumann, 1953; Rubinstein, 1982). These
studies have suggested that people are concerned with their own
interests and prefer fairness. When treated unfairly, many peo-
ple are willing to sacrifice their own interests to punish unfair
behaviors in others (Fehr et al., 2002; Decety and Yoder, 2017).

Received: 16 June 2020; Revised: 5 March 2021; Accepted: 26 March 2021

© The Author(s) 2021. Published by Oxford University Press.

This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/),
which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

670

Theoretical explanations of fairness preferences
Why do humans attach great importance to fairness vis-à-vis
resource allocation? Several theoretical models have been pro-
posed to explain individuals’ fairness preferences. Inequity
aversion theory holds that people prefer equitable outcomes
and are willing to forgo some material payoff in favor of more
equitable outcomes (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Fehr et al., 2002).
Studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
have demonstrated that brain regions associated with rewards,
such as the ventral striatum and ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC), are more active under fair UG offers than unfair offers
(Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Tabibnia et al., 2008; Tricomi et al.,
2010; Yu et al., 2014).
From an evolutionary perspective, the strong reciprocity
model claims that negative reciprocity (i.e. rejecting unfair
offers) reflects prosociality because individuals who reject an
offer sacrifice their own resources to punish unfair behavior,
which may enforce a fair social norm and promote cooperation.
This pattern has important evolutionary significance (Bowles
and Gintis, 2004; Kaltwasser et al., 2016). Non-invasive brain
stimulation studies have reported that disruption of the right
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (rDLPFC) using repetitive transcra-
nial magnetic stimulation or cathodal transcranial direct current
stimulation is associated with decreased rejection rates of unfair
offers in the UG, indicating that the rDLPFC is involved in exert-
ing cognitive effort to override individuals’ prepotent selfish
impulses and thus drives people to consider fairness norms
more carefully (Miller and Cohen, 2001; van’t Wout, Kahn et al.,
2005; Knoch et al., 2006, 2008; Feng et al., 2015). Moreover,
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) has demonstrated stronger
activation under unfair offers, implying that individuals expe-
rience greater perceived violations of fairness norms (Fehr and
Camerer, 2007; Harlé et al., 2012).
The emotion model posits that negative emotions provoked
by unfair offers lead to rejections in the UG (Pillutla and
Murnighan, 1996). fMRI studies have shown that the anterior
insula and amygdala are more active for unfair offers than fair
offers, suggesting that individuals might experience negative
emotions such as aversion and anger when receiving unfair
offers (Sanfey et al., 2003; Gospic et al., 2011; Harlé et al., 2012).
The inequality aversion theory and strong reciprocity model
explain individuals’ obedience to fairness norms from a moti-
vational point of view, whereas the emotion model explores
responses to fairness through an emotional lens. These three
approaches have been used to explore the rationale behind
individuals’ fairness preferences from different perspectives,
reflecting the complexity of human social behavior.
Social value orientation
Individual differences in fairness preferences represent an
other-focused preference in social decision-making. Social value
orientation (SVO) can explain a portion of this variance (Rilling
and Sanfey, 2011). SVO is defined as the dispositional weights
that individuals assign to outcomes for themselves and others
in interdependent situations (McClintock, 1972; Murphy and
Ackermann, 2014; Pletzer et al., 2018). Two main types of SVO,
prosocial and proself, are frequently distinguished in this pop-
ulation. Individuals with a prosocial orientation are willing to
sacrifice their own interests to establish equal allocations and/or
maximize joint outcomes, whereas individuals with a proself
orientation focus on their personal interests in an effort to
maximize their own outcomes while largely ignoring those of
X. Hu and X. Mai | 671
others (Liebrand, 1984; Van Lange and Kuhlman, 1994; Bogaert
et al., 2008). SVO has been regarded as a dispositional per-
sonality construct due to its temporal stability and situational
consistency (Van Lange et al., 1997; Balliet et al., 2009; Murphy
et al., 2011), and it is expressed automatically (Kuss et al., 2015).
SVO is also closely related to the honesty–humility trait, which
describes one’s tendency to be fair and honest and can effec-
tively predict prosocial behavior in social dilemmas (Ashton and
Lee, 2007; Hilbig et al., 2014).
The integrative model of SVO suggests that prosocials pursue
equality in outcomes and aim to maximize joint outcomes in
interdependent situations, whereas proselfs seek to maximize
personal outcomes and are less concerned with equality (Van
Lange, 1999; De Cremer and Van Lange, 2001). Recent evidence
has substantiated the claim that equality in outcomes is proso-
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cials’ primary concern (Eek and Gärling, 2006; Van Lange et al.,
2013). Further, behavioral and neuroimaging studies have pro-
vided evidence for the integrative model. In the dictator game
(a simplified version of the UG wherein the responder becomes
a passive receiver of the proposer’s offer and therefore can-
not reject it), prosocials allocate more resources to the receiver
compared with proselfs, and this prosociality is expressed auto-
matically (Cornelissen et al., 2011). Moreover, prosocials are less
likely to accept unfair offers than proselfs in the UG (Haruno
et al., 2014; Bieleke et al., 2017). When asked to evaluate the desir-
ability of reward pairs for the self and another in a reward-pair
evaluation task, prosocials disliked large absolute differences
in outcome allocations, whereas proselfs were unaffected by
such differences and preferred larger personal rewards. Notably,
the magnitude of differences in allocations was positively cor-
related with amygdala activation in prosocials but not in pros-
elfs (Haruno and Frith, 2010). In a follow-up study, researchers
found stronger amygdala activation for prosocials than pros-
elfs in response to unfair offers in the UG (Haruno et al., 2014).
These findings suggest that prosocials possess stronger inequal-
ity aversion than proselfs in social decision-making and are
more willing to punish unfair behavior at the expense of their
own interests.
Event-related potential components
Although studies involving fMRI have contributed greatly to
identifying brain regions related to individuals’ responses to
fairness (Haruno and Frith, 2010; Haruno et al., 2014), little is
known about the temporal characteristics of fairness process-
ing among individuals with different SVOs in social interac-
tions. The event-related potential (ERP) could reveal important
insights about the precise timing of processes underlying cog-
nitive functions given the measure’s excellent time resolution.
Therefore, using the ERP in the present study, we aimed to
examine the time characteristics of SVO in modulating fairness
processing.
In ERP studies, several ERP components have often been
used as biomarkers for outcome evaluation processing: the P2,
the medial frontal negativity (MFN), and the P3. The P2 is a
medial frontal positivity that peaks around ∼200–300 ms post-
stimulus. It is associated with attentional capture (Potts et al.,
2004) and integration of motivational information, specifically
reward information from the mesencephalic dopamine system,
from an ongoing event (Potts et al., 2006; Boudreau et al., 2009);
hence, the P2 is commonly considered indicative of automatic
processing of a current event (Horat et al., 2016). Prior study using
DG has found that the P2 is greater for fair offers than for unfair
offers (Wu et al., 2011).
 672 | Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 2021, Vol. 16, No. 7
The MFN [also known as the feedback-related negativity
(FRN)] is a fronto-central negativity that peaks at ∼200–350 ms
post-outcome onset, presumably generated in the ACC, and
represents a rapid processing of the current outcome in a ‘like–
dislike’ dimension (Miltner et al., 1997; Gehring and Willoughby,
2002; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004; Sambrook and Goslin, 2014;
Pfabigan et al., 2018). The MFN is typically more pronounced fol-
lowing negative outcomes than positive outcomes (Hajcak et al.,
2006; Paul and Pourtois, 2017; Sidarus et al., 2017) and is sensitive
to the degree to which an outcome deviates from expectations
(Oliveira et al., 2007; Bellebaum et al., 2010; Alexander and Brown,
2011; Ferdinand et al., 2012; Marciano et al., 2018). During the UG,
the MFN amplitude is more pronounced in response to unfair
offers than to fair offers (Boksem and De Cremer, 2010; Hewig
et al., 2011; Massi and Luhmann, 2015; Peterburs et al., 2017).
Following the MFN, the P3 is a centro-parietal positivity
appearing in the 300–600 ms time window (Holroyd and Coles,
2002; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004; San Martín, 2012). The P3 encodes
the valence and magnitude of an outcome, with a greater ampli-
tude to an affectively positive than negative outcome and to a
larger than smaller reward (Yeung and Sanfey, 2004; Sato et al.,
2005; Yeung et al., 2005; Bellebaum and Daum, 2008; Glazer et al.,
2018). The P3 reflects allocation of attentional resources and
the subjective importance of a desired outcome (Nieuwenhuis
et al., 2005; Polich, 2007; Mussel et al., 2018). ERP studies in social
decision-making have found that the P3 is also sensitive to the
fairness of outcome allocation, exhibiting a larger amplitude for
fair offers than for unfair offers (Wu et al., 2011; Wang et al.,
2017a).
Recent ERP studies have investigated the SVO effect on out-
come processing in various social contexts. Hu et al. (2017) found
that individuals with distinct SVOs processed outcomes involv-
ing others differently; that is, prosocials were more concerned
about others’ outcomes in interdependent situations than pros-
elfs as revealed by the FRN, P3 and late positive component. The
SVO effect was also observed in the Chicken Game. Compared
with proselfs, prosocials considered non-reciprocated coopera-
tion as the least desirable outcome as evidenced by an enhanced
FRN (Wang et al., 2017a). When compared with other social
agents, prosocials were sensitive to others’ outcomes in self-
gain and self-loss contexts, whereas proselfs were only inter-
ested in others’ outcomes in the self-gain context as indicated
by distinct FRN patterns (Qi et al., 2018). These findings sug-
gest that SVO influences the processing of outcomes involv-
ing others, further supporting our supposition that SVO could
modulate fairness processing in social decision-making through
outcome-related ERP indicators.
In the present study, a multi-round, one-shot UG task was
conducted with electroencephalography (EEG) recording. A typ-
ical UG involves two players: a proposer and a responder. First,
the proposer suggests a division of a sum of money. The respon-
der can then either accept the proposal, in which case the sum is
allocated as suggested, or reject it, in which case neither player
receives any money. The P2, MFN and P3 (representing different
stages of outcome processing) were selected for analysis. Due to
the characteristics of these ERP components, we hypothesized
that the three components would be modulated by SVO for fair
and unfair offers. In particular, we predicted that the fairness
factor would be processed automatically in the prosocial group
rather than the proself group as reflected by distinct P2 pat-
terns. Further, we anticipated that the effect of fairness would
be more prominent in the prosocial group than the proself group
as indicated by the MFN and P3. These findings would provide
direct evidence of individual variation in social values contribut-
ing to differences in time-dynamic characteristics underlying
fairness processing.
Methods
Participants
Sixty young, healthy participants (32 women and 28 men)
between 18 and 24 years of age (M = 19.55, s.d. = 1.92) were
recruited from the university population. All participants were
right-handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
They had no history of neurological or psychiatric disorders,
and none were taking psychoactive medication at the time
of the experiment. Data from one female participant were
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excluded due to an insufficient number of trials after arti-
facts were removed (<20 trials, the minimal number of tri-
als required for a stable ERP component; Marco-Pallares et al.,
2011). The final sample for analysis consisted of 59 participants
(31 women and 28 men) with an average age of 19.51 years
(s.d. = 1.91 years). An a priori sample size estimation was con-
ducted using G*Power v.3.1 (Faul et al., 2009). According to the
analysis (d = 0.25, α = 0.05, β = 0.9, analysis of variance (ANOVA):
repeated measures, within-between interaction), a total sam-
ple size of 46 participants was required to detect a reliable
effect. Written informed consent was obtained from all partic-
ipants. The experiment was performed in accordance with the
Declaration of Helsinki and was approved by the Ethics Com-
mittee of the Department of Psychology, Renmin University of
China.
Procedure
Session 1: measurement of SVO. In the first session, partici-
pants’ SVOs were measured using the Slider Measure (Murphy
et al., 2011), an efficient and simple measure of SVO with
documented high reliability and excellent convergent validity
(Anderl et al., 2015) and significant predictive validity on social
decision-making tasks (Bogaert et al., 2008; Bieleke et al., 2017).
On this six-item measure, participants were asked to choose
between several self-other payoff combinations. Based on their
decisions, an SVO angle in a two-dimensional space consisting
of one’s own payoff and others’ payoff was computed (Murphy
et al., 2011; Pletzer et al., 2018). This measurement allowed for
calculation of a continuous SVO score; then participants could,
in principle, be grouped into corresponding categories based on
their scores on prosocial or proself social preferences (Fiedler
et al., 2013; Pletzer et al., 2018). The boundary between the
two categories was 22.45◦ ; angles below 22.45◦ indicated pro-
selfs and greater angles indicated a more prosocial orientation
(Murphy et al., 2011; Murphy and Ackermann, 2014).
Session 2: the UG. After measuring SVOs, participants received
general instructions about the UG. Each participant played the
UG repeatedly in a series of one-shot trials as a proposer and
a responder. In the proposer role, each participant could divide
10 Chinese yuan into two shares (one for her-/himself and the
other for the unknown responder) for 30 rounds. They were told
that these offers would be stored in the database and used for
future participants.
Afterward, participants played the UG in the responder role,
while EEGs were recorded. In this crucial session, participants
were informed they would receive 300 monetary offers proposed
 X. Hu and X. Mai | 673

by volunteers and previous participants from the database, but EEG recording and preprocessing
they would receive only one offer from a particular proposer. In
EEG data were recorded using 64 cap-mounted tin electrodes
addition, participants were informed that the proposers would
arranged according to the 10–20 international placement sys-
never know whether the offer was rejected or accepted. This
tem (Neuroscan Inc., Herndon, VA, USA), with an online ref-
explanation was fabricated to avoid learning and reputation
erence to the left mastoid and an offline re-reference to the
effects, and the proposer session was conducted to render the
averaged mastoid electrodes. A horizontal electro-oculogram
task context more plausible. During the formal experiment, par-
(EOG) was recorded from electrodes placed 1.5 cm laterally to
ticipants sat comfortably in a room shielded from sound and
the outer canthi of both eyes. A vertical EOG was recorded
electrical fields, seated ∼80 cm from a 22-inch computer mon-
from electrodes placed above and below the left eye. All inter-
itor. The entire task consisted of 300 trials in which all stimuli
electrode impedance was kept below 5 kΩ during recording.
were displayed in the center of the computer screen. Figure 1
Signals were amplified using a 0.01–100 Hz band-pass filter and
illustrates the time course of stimulus presentation in this UG
continuously sampled at 500 Hz/channel. Offline analysis of EEG
task. Each trial began with a fixation cross appearing for 500 ms
data was performed using Neuroscan software (Scan 4.5, Neu-
followed by a picture of a 10-yuan bill (2.6◦ × 1.3◦ ) for 500 ms
roScan, Inc., Herndon, VA, USA). Ocular artifacts were removed
against a black background. A fixation cross was then presented

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from EEGs using a regression procedure implemented in Scan
again for 800 to 1200 ms. Later, the offer screen was presented
4.5 software (Semlitsch et al., 1986). All EEG data were digi-
for 1000 ms, depicting a distributive outcome of 10 yuan between
tally low-pass filtered at 30 Hz (24 dB/oct) and segmented into
the respective proposer and the participant (responder). Par-
epochs time-locked to the onset of offer presentation, beginning
ticipants decided to accept or reject the offer at this point by
200 ms before offer onset and continuing for 1000 ms. Data were
pressing either the F or J key with their left or right index fin-
then baseline-corrected according to the 200 ms pre-offer period.
ger. After an interval of 800–1200 ms, feedback on the offer was
Epochs containing artifacts exceeding ± 70 µV were excluded
presented for 1000 ms. Trials were separated by an inter-trial
from subsequent analyses. Then, epochs were averaged sepa-
interval of 500 ms. In addition, participants were asked to eval-
rately for each condition of each participant.
uate their affective reaction to the currently received offer on
a 9-point scale (1 = extremely negative and 9 = extremely posi-
tive) (Bradley et al., 2001; Hewig et al., 2011; Yang et al., 2015). Statistical analyses
Emotion evaluation occurred three times randomly for each type
Behavioral data. Participants’ SVO scores were analyzed using
of offer.
an independent-samples t-test. Acceptance rates (ARs) and
The entire task was divided into four blocks of 75 trials each
emotion ratings were subjected to mixed two-way repeated-
with a brief break between blocks. Each block consisted of 30
measures ANOVA with SVO type (proself vs prosocial) as a
fair trials (15 offers of 5–5 and 15 offers of 4–6), 30 unfair trials
between-subjects factor and fairness (fair vs unfair) as a within-
(15 offers of 1–9 and 15 offers of 2–8) and 15 moderately unfair
subject factor. Trials with a moderate unfair offer (3–7) in this
offers (3–7). Unbeknownst to the participants, all offers were
task functioned as fillers and thus excluded from analyses; pre-
generated by the computer program rather than actual people.
vious studies reported that responders held diverse opinions
Therefore, when a participant acted as the responder, each type
about whether this offer could be considered fair (Halko et al.,
of offer was presented in a random sequence. Before the for-
2009; Hewig et al., 2011; Luo et al., 2014), resulting in difficulty
mal task, participants completed 10 practice trials to familiarize
classifying this type of offer.
themselves with the UG task. The entire task lasted for ∼30 min.
Before the EEG task, all participants were informed they would
be paid 30 Chinese yuan for their participation plus the cumu- ERP data. Analyzed ERP components included the P2, MFN
lative outcome based on their decisions during the task. Upon and P3. For statistical analyses, based on previous studies and
finishing the experiment, each participant was paid roughly 70 inspection of the grand-averaged waveforms, amplitudes of
Chinese yuan regardless of their decisions in the UG task. Partic- the P2, MFN and P3 were quantified as mean values within
ipants were also asked about the plausibility of the cover story, the time windows of 200–270 ms (Potts et al., 2006; Luo et al.,
and no participants expressed suspicion about it. Stimulus pre- 2015), 290–370 ms (Polezzi et al., 2008; Wu et al., 2011; Massi
sentation and behavioral data acquisition were conducted using and Luhmann, 2015) and 400–600 ms (Luo et al., 2014; Peterburs
E-Prime 2.0 software (PST, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA, USA). et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2017a) following the onset of the offer

Fig. 1. Illustration of a single trial of the multi-round one-shot UG task. Each trial began with presentation of a fixation cross for 500 ms followed by a picture of the
10-yuan bill for 500 ms. Then, a fixation cross was presented again for 800–1200 ms. Later, the offer screen appeared for 1000 ms, depicting a distributive outcome of 10
yuan between the respective proposer and the participant (responder). Participants decided to accept or reject the offer by pressing either the F or J key with their left
or right index finger. After an interval of 800–1200 ms, outcome feedback was presented for 1000 ms. Participants were then asked to evaluate their emotional reaction
to the offer on a 9-point scale. Emotion evaluation occurred randomly three times for each type of offer.
 674 | Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 2021, Vol. 16, No. 7
Fig. 2. Topographical voltage distributions of the P2 (200–270 ms) and P3 (400–
600 ms) for fair and unfair conditions and topographies of voltage differences
between unfair and fair offers in the MFN time interval (290–370 ms) for SVO
groups, respectively.
stimulus, respectively. Compared to peak measures, mean mea-
sures are less sensitive to high-frequency noise and not biased
by the noise level, and thus, could make the statistical results
more reliable (Luck, 2014). Based on prior studies (Gehring and
Willoughby, 2002; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004; Luo et al., 2015) and
scalp topographies of each ERP component (Figure 2), the P2 and
MFN were calculated at the FCz site, and the P3 was calculated
at the Pz electrode site where they reached maximum ampli-
tudes. The ERP amplitudes were subjected to mixed two-way
repeated-measures ANOVA with SVO type (proself vs prosocial)
as a between-subjects factor and fairness (fair vs unfair) as a
within-subject factor.
Neural-behavioral correlation. To evaluate the relationships
between behavioral responses and neural activities, Pearson cor-
relation coefficients were calculated between fairness enforce-
ment performance and brain activities.
Mediation analysis. Mediation analysis was conducted using
the SPSS version of the INDIRECT macro (Preacher and Hayes,
2008), taking the SVO score as the independent variable,
d-MFN (MFN for unfair offers minus MFN for fair offers)
as the mediator and ARs for unfair offers as the outcome
variable.
The significance level was set at 0.05 for all analyses. The
Greenhouse–Geisser correction was conducted to account for
sphericity violations whenever appropriate. Post-hoc testing of
significant main effects was applied with Bonferroni adjust-
ments. Partial eta-squared (η p 2 ) values were calculated to indi-
cate the effect size in ANOVA models, with 0.05 representing a
Fig. 3. Histogram of interaction effect between SVO type and fairness on ARs (A) and emotion ratings (range from 1–9) (B). Error bars indicate standard error of the
mean (SEM). *P < 0.05, ***P < 0.001.
small effect, 0.1 representing a medium effect and 0.2 repre-
senting a large effect (Cohen, 1973). Behavioral and ERP data
were analyzed statistically using SPSS software (version 25.0;
IBM Corp., Armonk, NY, USA).
Results
Behavioral results
SVO scores and test-retest reliability. The SVO scores of 59
participants in this study ranged from −7.80◦ to 37.85◦ , of
which 30 were proselfs (score < 22.45◦ ) and 29 were proso-
cials (score > 22.45◦ ). Mean (±s.d.) SVO scores of prosocials
were significantly higher than those of proselfs (31.09 ± 7.14◦
vs 13.29 ± 4.51◦ ; t(1, 57) = 11.41, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 3.02). To
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test the reliability of SVO, 1 year after the first measurement,
all participates were contacted by e-mail and asked to complete
the SVO Slider Measure again. Fifty-one participants (25 pros-
elfs and 26 prosocials) completed the SVO Slider Measure again.
Forty-six of them were divided into the same SVO category into
two times of the Slider Measure, yielding a consistency of 90%.
Further the correlation between the resulting angles from the
test–retest SVO Slider Measure was r = 0.885. The results of test–
retest reliability in this study are consistent with the finding of
the previous study (Murphy et al., 2011).
ARs. Figure 3A illustrates the ARs of offers. A significant main
effect of fairness was confirmed, F(1,57) = 213.32, P < 0.001,
η p 2 = 0.79, with lower ARs for unfair offers than fair offers
(0.34 ± 0.37 vs 0.96 ± 0.11). The main effect of SVO type was
also significant, F(1, 57) = 12.98, P < 0.001, η p 2 = 0.19, with lower
ARs in the prosocial group than the proself group (0.56 ± 0.44 vs
0.74 ± 0.36). Notably, the interaction effect of SVO type × fairness
was significant, F(1, 57) = 15.91, P < 0.001, η p 2 = 0.22. Simple-
effects analysis of the interaction effect demonstrated that
prosocials were more likely than proselfs to reject unfair offers
(0.17 ± 0.26 vs 0.51 ± 0.38), F(1, 57) = 15.98, P < 0.001, η p 2 = 0.22.
Conversely, no significant difference was found for fair offers
(0.95 ± 0.11 vs 0.96 ± 0.12), F(1, 57) = 0.07, P = 0.79.
Emotion ratings. Figure 3B illustrates participants’ emotion
ratings of offers. For emotional ratings, the main effect of
fairness was significant, F(1, 57) = 253.90, P < 0.001, η p 2 = 0.82,
with more negative emotional reactions to unfair offers than

to fair offers (3.91 ± 1.04 vs 5.88 ± 0.86). The interaction effect
of SVO type × fairness was also significant, F(1, 57) = 38.32,
P < 0.001, η p 2 = 0.40. Simple-effects analysis of the interaction
effect revealed that prosocials were more prone than proselfs
to experiencing more positive reactions to fair offers (6.11 ± 0.91
vs 5.66 ± 0.77; F(1, 57) = 4.30, P = 0.043, η p 2 = 0.07) and to expe-
riencing more negative reactions than proselfs to unfair offers
(3.37 ± 0.69 vs 4.45 ± 1.06), F(1, 57) = 21.48, P < 0.001, η p 2 = 0.27.
ERP results
P2. Figure 4A depicts grand-average ERP waveforms at the
FCz electrode site. The P2 and MFN were measured at the
FCz site. For the P2 amplitude, the main effect of fairness
was significant, F(1, 57) = 17.41, P < 0.001, η p 2 = 0.23, indicat-
ing that fair offers elicited a larger P2 compared with unfair
offers (3.85 µV vs 3.30 µV). Importantly, a significant interaction
effect emerged between SVO type and fairness, F(1, 57) = 9.13,
P = 0.004, η p 2 = 0.14. A simple-effects analysis was conducted
to investigate the two-way interaction; results showed that the
fairness effect was only significant for prosocials, indicating a
larger P2 in response to fair offers than unfair offers (4.08 µV
vs 3.14 µV), F(1, 57) = 25.45, P < 0.001, η p 2 = 0.31. In contrast,
the fairness effect on the P2 was not significant for proselfs
(3.62 µV vs 3.47 µV), F(1, 57) = 0.67, P = 0.415. The SVO difference
of this fairness effect is displayed in a topographic map of the P2
(Figure 2A).
MFN. As to the MFN amplitude, the main effect of fairness
was significant, F(1, 57) = 58.91, P < 0.001, η p 2 = 0.51, indicating
that unfair offers elicited a more negative-going MFN compared
Fig. 4. Grand-average ERP waveforms from FCz and Pz electrode sites for the SVO groups, respectively. (A) Light gray and darker gray areas denote time windows of
200–270 ms and 290–370 ms in which peak amplitudes of the P2 and MFN were measured, respectively. (B) Light blue areas denote the time window (400–600 ms) in
which the mean amplitude of the P3 was measured.
X. Hu and X. Mai | 675
with fair offers (1.19 µV vs 2.23 µV). Moreover, a significant
interaction effect was observed between SVO type and fair-
ness, F(1, 57) = 8.47, P = 0.005, η p 2 = 0.13. Consequently, a
simple-effects analysis was conducted to investigate the sig-
nificant interaction. Findings indicated that although the MFN
was more negative-going in response to unfair offers than fair
offers in both SVO groups, the fairness effect on the MFN was
more prominent in the prosocial group (1.70 µV vs 3.14 µV),
F(1, 57) = 55.10, P < 0.001, η p 2 = 0.49 than the proself group
(0.68 µV vs 1.33 µV), F(1, 57) = 11.07, P = 0.002, η p 2 = 0.16. The SVO
difference in this fairness effect is shown in a topographic map
of the MFN (Figure 2B).
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P3. Figure 4B presents grand-average ERP waveforms at the Pz
electrode site. The main effect of fairness on the P3 amplitude
was significant, F(1, 57) = 42.55, P < 0.001, η p 2 = 0.43, indicating
that fair offers elicited a larger P3 than unfair offers (4.63 µV
vs 3.64 µV). A significant interaction effect emerged between
SVO type and fairness, F(1, 57) = 6.38, P = 0.014, η p 2 = 0.10. Thus,
a simple-effects analysis was conducted to explore the sig-
nificant interaction effect. Results revealed that the P3 was
larger in response to fair offers than unfair offers in both SVO
groups, whereas the fairness effect on the P3 (fair minus unfair)
appeared more prominent in the prosocial group (5.04 µV vs
3.67 µV), F(1, 57) = 40.27, P < 0.001, η p 2 = 0.41 than the proself
group (4.21 µV vs 3.61 µV), F(1, 57) = 8.12, P = 0.006, η p 2 = 0.13.
This analysis further revealed that the P3 amplitudes elicited by
fair offers were significantly larger in the prosocial group than
the proself group (5.04 µV vs 4.21 µV), F(1, 57) = 4.28, P = 0.43,
η p 2 = 0.07, whereas the P3 amplitudes elicited by unfair offers
were comparable between SVO groups (3.67 µV vs. 3.61 µV),
 676 | Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 2021, Vol. 16, No. 7
Fig. 5. Mediation effect: the effect of SVO scores on ARs for unfair offers was significantly reduced when the d-MFN was included in the regression model. Estimates
are standardized values. ***P < 0.001.
F(1, 57) = 0.02, P = 0.894. The SVO difference of the fairness effect
is displayed in a topographic map of the P3 (Figure 2C).
Results of neural-behavioral correlation
Next, we examined whether increase in individuals’ SVO scores
was associated with a corresponding decrease in ARs for unfair
offers. A Pearson correlation analysis was conducted between
SVO scores and ARs for unfair offers. The results revealed
that SVO scores were negatively correlated with ARs for unfair
offers, r = −0.50, P < 0.01. To address the potential contribu-
tion of neural activities to decreased ARs for unfair offers,
we examined whether the P2, MFN or P3 effects correlated
with ARs for unfair offers. Results showed only the MFN
effect (d-MFN) was positively correlated with ARs for unfair
offers, r = 0.59, p < 0.01; however, no other correlations survived,
ps > 0.102.
Results of mediation analysis
In this study, given an SVO effect on both the d-MFN and ARs
for unfair offers, we conducted a mediation analysis to explore
whether the SVO effect on participants’ responses to unfair-
ness was mediated by the d-MFN. The findings confirmed that
the effect of SVO on ARs for unfair offers was mediated by
the d-MFN, Sobel test: t = −2.92, P = 0.003. A stepwise regres-
sion excluding the factor of SVO was no longer significant when
d-MFN was introduced, β = −0.23, p = 0.099, as compared with
initial coefficient, β = −0.50, P < 0.001, suggesting that the effect
of SVO on d-MFN acted as a full mediator of the effect of SVO
on ARs for unfair offers (Figure 5). Bootstrapping results indi-
cated that this mediation effect was different from zero with 95%
confidence (number of bootstrap resamples = 5000; β = −0.83,
confidence intervals = −1.55 to −0.21). Confidence intervals for
indirect effect were bias-corrected (Preacher and Hayes, 2008).
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Discussion
The present study investigated the modulating effect of SVO
on individuals’ fairness processing in the UG task and explored
the temporal characteristics of neural activities underlying this
issue through the ERP technique. As expected, the results
demonstrated that individuals with distinct SVOs responded
differently to fairness in the UG and revealed the neural under-
pinnings of SVO modulation of fairness processing. Prosocials
appeared more satisfied with fair offers and more upset about
being treated unfairly than proselfs, in which case prosocials
were less likely than proselfs to accept unfair offers. Elec-
trophysiologically, three ERP indicators (the P2, MFN and P3),
revealed group differences in fairness processing. Compared
with proselfs, prosocials exhibited automatic processing to the
fairness factor as evidenced by a significant difference in the
P2 for fair and unfair offers. Furthermore, prosocials exhibited
deeper processing to fairness in later time windows, reflected
in the MFN and P3. Moreover, the fairness effect on the MFN
(d-MFN) mediated the relationship between individuals’ SVOs
and behavioral responses to unfairness in the UG. We discuss
the implications of these findings in the subsequent sections.
SVO modulates individuals’ behavioral responses to
fairness in social decision-making
In the present study, unfair offers induced negative affective
responses from responders, concomitant with findings from
prior research (Damasio et al., 2000; van’t, Kahn, Sanfey, and
Aleman, 2006; Xiao and Houser, 2005; Hewig et al., 2011; Gilam
et al., 2015). Also, the behavioral results replicated a well-
established behavioral pattern wherein people are likely to reject
unfair offers in the UG (Güth et al., 1982; Nowak et al., 2000;
Holper et al., 2018).
The abovementioned affective and behavioral responses
were modulated by SVO. Studies have found that compared

with proselfs, prosocials tend to prefer equal outcomes in eco-
nomic decision-making, suggesting that fairness is more impor-
tant for prosocials than for proselfs (Van Lange, 1999; Eek and
Gärling, 2006); therefore, fair offers induced more positive emo-
tional experiences for prosocials. However, unfair offers vio-
lated their inner norms of pursuing equality in outcomes and
thus induced more negative reactions for prosocials than for
proselfs, as indicated in fMRI studies wherein amygdala activa-
tion was significantly stronger for prosocials than for proselfs
when encountering unequal outcomes (Haruno and Frith, 2010;
Haruno et al., 2014). The trend of prosocials rejecting unfair
offers more frequently than proselfs was also consistent with
previous research, suggesting that prosocials are more willing
to sacrifice personal benefits to retaliate against unfair behav-
iors and enforce fairness norms (Haruno et al., 2014; Bieleke et al.,
2017). Unsurprisingly, as the correlation result implied, individ-
uals’ SVO could predict the likelihood of rejecting unfair offers
in the UG, with a more prosocial SVO indicating a higher chance
of rejection.
SVO modulates the early stage of fairness processing
The first stage of fairness processing is represented by the P2,
which reflects an initial, automatic and low-level processing of
outcomes (McPartland et al., 2011; Van der Molen et al., 2014; Luo
et al., 2015). Research has found that the P2 is sensitive to motiva-
tional information of stimuli, with larger amplitudes associated
with outcomes that meet motivational goals (Potts et al., 2006;
Boudreau et al., 2009). In this study, the fairness effect on the P2
was modulated by SVO: the fairness effect was only significant
for prosocials, who demonstrated a larger P2 in response to fair
offers than to unfair offers. Considerable evidence has suggested
that SVO is expressed automatically, and prosocials and pros-
elfs seem to possess different intrinsic motivations (Cornelissen
et al., 2011; Kuss et al., 2015). Specifically, prosocials tend to
internalize fairness norms as an intrinsic principle (Cornelissen
et al., 2011). An equal outcome is therefore optimal in prosocials’
decision-making pursuits, and they process fairness in outcome
allocations automatically as an intuitive response (Van Lange
et al., 2013). Proselfs prioritize maximizing self-interest as their
decision-making objective, which leads them to process their
own benefits preferentially (Balliet et al., 2009).
Compared with proselfs, prosocials were more sensitive to
fairness in outcomes given a stronger fairness principle; proso-
cials also demonstrated automatic processing of fairness at the
early stage. Fair offers in the UG met prosocials’ goal of pursuing
fairness and held stronger motivational salience, thus eliciting
a larger P2 than unfair offers. Comparatively, due to their pri-
mary processing of self-benefits, proselfs were not sensitive to
outcome fairness in the early processing stage; therefore, the
P2 patterns for fair and unfair offers did not reveal a differ-
ence in the proself group. These results support behavioral and
fMRI findings from previous studies indicating that SVO plays
an important role in automatic intuitive processing in fairness-
related decision-making (Haruno et al., 2010; Cornelissen et al.,
2011; Haruno et al., 2014; Bieleke et al., 2017).
SVO modulates the middle stage of fairness processing
The middle stage of fairness processing is represented by the
MFN, a critical ERP component related to outcome processing;
it reflects a rapid, coarse and semi-automatic coding of ongo-
ing events (Yeung and Sanfey, 2004; Hajcak et al., 2006; Leng
X. Hu and X. Mai | 677
and Zhou, 2010; Hu et al., 2017; Kimura et al., 2018;). Consistent
with prior research, unfair offers elicited a more negative-going
MFN than fair offers in this study, implying that individuals
considered unfair offers an unfavorable outcome that violated
social norms (Polezzi et al., 2008; Boksem and De Cremer, 2010;
Hewig et al., 2011; Van Der Veen and Sahibdin, 2011; Luo et al.,
2014; Mothes et al., 2016). We found the fairness effect on the
MFN to be modulated by SVO; specifically, the fairness effect
was more prominent in the prosocial group than in the proself
group, indicating that prosocials processed fairness in outcomes
more deeply than proselfs. Interestingly, the fairness effect on
the MFN (d-MFN) mediated the relationship between SVO and
behavioral responses to unfair offers in the UG. That is, a more
prosocial SVO led individuals to exhibit a stronger fairness effect
on the MFN, which made them less likely to accept unfair offers.
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Studies using fMRI have shown that receiving unfair offers
is associated with increased activation in the ACC, a brain
region involved in the processing of outcomes that deviate neg-
atively from expectations (Sanfey et al., 2003; Amiez et al., 2005;
Matsumoto et al., 2007; Boksem and De Cremer, 2010; Harlé
et al., 2012). According to the reinforcement learning (RL) the-
ory of the MFN, the key function of the ACC is the adaptive
control of behavior, and the ACC learns how to perform its
function better from discrepancies between actual and expected
positive outcomes (Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Holroyd et al.,
2008). Therefore, the RL theory postulates that when events
are worse than expected, the decrease of dopamine activity
trains the ACC to adjust the control of the motor system with
an enhanced MFN, which indicates an unexpected and unde-
sirable outcome (Holroyd and Coles, 2002; San Martín, 2012). In
the UG task, prosocials regarded fair offers as favorable ones
owing to the higher earnings and fairness, which elicited a gen-
tler MFN. However, unfair offers were regarded as unfavorable
outcomes because of their lower benefit and equality, which
were much worse than their expected ones and thus elicited a
larger MFN. In contrast, proselfs mainly focused on their per-
sonal interests in the UG and put less value on the fairness
embedded in the offers. Therefore, the fairness effect of the
MFN in the proself group was weaker than that in the prosocial
group.
On the basis of the RL theory, the predicted response–
outcome (PRO) model proposed by Alexander and Brown (2010,
2011) suggests that the general role of the ACC is to predict
the likely outcomes of actions and to signal unexpected non-
occurrences of events. Therefore, the MFN is larger when an
actual outcome does not match the expected one (Ferdinand
et al., 2012). According to the PRO model, prosocials in the
present study had strong internalized fairness norms and held
higher expectation for fair offers than proselfs. Therefore,
fair offers were expected and elicited a gentler MFN, whereas
unfair offers deviated far from their expectations and elicited
an enhanced MFN. Consequently, the prosocial group demon-
strated a stronger fairness effect on the MFN than proself group
did.
On the other hand, people tend to form expectations of
partners’ behavior in social interactions, especially in situa-
tions in which information about other social agents is lacking
(Kelley and Stahelski, 1970). The Structural Assumed Similar-
ity Bias model proposes that individuals with different SVOs
are prone to projecting their own dispositions onto others and
thus expect others to be similar to themselves (Kuhlman and
Wimberley, 1976; Ross et al., 1977; Declerck and Bogaert, 2008;
Pletzer et al., 2018). Accordingly, prosocials expected more fair
 678 | Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 2021, Vol. 16, No. 7
behavior from their partners in the UG, and this false consensus
effect elicited a stronger fairness effect on the MFN. Conversely,
proselfs assumed their partners were similar to themselves
and thus had lower expectations for fair behavior, generat-
ing a weaker fairness effect on the MFN relative to prosocials.
Subsequently, according to the goal-expectation hypothesis,
expectations about others’ behavior can influence individuals’
decision-making (Pruitt and Kimmel, 1977; Komorita et al., 1992).
Therefore, in this study, a more prosocial SVO caused individ-
uals to possess higher expectations for fair outcomes. When
confronted with outcomes violating this expectancy, partici-
pants were more likely to reject unfair offers. This mediating
effect has been partially supported by previous studies in which
the anticipated cooperation mediated the relationship between
SVO and cooperation in social dilemmas (Balliet et al., 2009;
Renkewitz et al., 2011; Balliet and Van Lange, 2013; Pletzer et al.,
2018).
In addition to evaluating whether outcomes deviated from
expectations, the ACC is recruited by affectively aversive pro-
cessing of social pain (Eisenberger, 2012; Rotge et al., 2015;
Dalgleish et al., 2017; Schmälzle et al., 2017; Chester et al., 2018).
The motivational/affective theory of the MFN holds that the MFN
reflects a motivational/affective evaluation of an outcome event,
and this evaluation is particularly sensitive to a negative out-
come (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Pailing and Segalowitz,
2004). That is, the MFN may represent evaluation of the subjec-
tive value of an outcome (Luo et al., 2014). Thus, for prosocials
who value fairness, unfair offers that violated fairness norms
elicited stronger negative feelings, reflected in more pronounced
MFN responses compared with proselfs (who had less regard for
such fairness norms). This result was in line with a previous ERP
study in which the fairness effect on the MFN was stronger in
participants with high moral identity (Boksem and De Cremer,
2010). Moreover, on the basis of the emotion model of fairness
processing, negative emotions induced by perceived unfairness
have been found to be predictive of rejection behaviors in the UG
(Pillutla and Murnighan, 1996; Sanfey et al., 2003). Accordingly,
individuals with higher SVO scores (i.e. who are more prosocial)
may experience stronger negative reactions to unfair offers and
be more prone to reject such offers to punish unfair behaviors.
SVO modulates the late stage of fairness processing
The late stage of fairness processing is represented by the P3,
another important ERP component reflecting elaborative and
sustained processing of a current outcome (Yeung and Sanfey,
2004; Philiastides et al., 2010; Hu et al., 2017). Research has indi-
cated that the P3 is related to processes of attentional allocation
and high-level motivational or affective evaluation, namely in
signaling the subjective awareness and importance of a desired
outcome (Schupp et al., 2004; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005; Wu and
Zhou, 2009; Mussel et al., 2018). Similar to earlier research, fair
offers evoked a larger P3 than unfair offers in this study; thus,
compared with unfair offers, fair offers were considered desir-
able outcomes consistent with individuals’ fairness preference
and allocated more attentional resources from them (Wu et al.,
2011; Qu et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2017a). Remarkably, the fair-
ness effect on the P3 was modulated by SVO: fair offers evoked
stronger P3 responses among prosocials than proselfs.
As proposed in the integrative model of SVO, relative to pro-
selfs, prosocials generally assign greater weight to equality in
outcomes and outcomes for others (Van Lange, 1999; Van Lange
et al., 2013). Scholars have also found that prosocials prefer equal
outcomes compared with proselfs when making decisions, and
this fairness preference is so strong that prosocials even pre-
fer to make personal sacrifices to attain equal outcomes (Eek
and Gärling, 2006). As such, in the current study, fair offers in
the UG carried different meanings for prosocials and proselfs.
For proselfs, a fair offer represented a more profitable outcome
that met these individuals’ motivation to maximize their self-
interests, thus evoking more attentional resources as reflected
by enhanced P3 responses. For prosocials, a fair offer indicated
greater benefit along with adherence to fairness norms, fulfill-
ing their primary goal of pursuing equality in outcomes. Prior
fMRI studies revealed that individuals reacted to fairness with a
positive hedonic response, and fairness preferences were asso-
ciated with reward-based regions of the brain including the
ventral striatum, vmPFC and orbitofrontal cortex (Tabibnia and
Lieberman, 2007; Tabibnia et al., 2008; Tricomi et al., 2010). There-
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fore, compared with proselfs, a fair offer appeared more reward-
ing and desirable for prosocials, who placed greater subjective
importance on such outcomes. Accordingly, the P3 response for
fair offers was stronger in the prosocial group, lending support
to inequality aversion theory (Chen and Vazsonyi, 2011; Harlé
et al., 2012).
In summary, this study unveiled a modulating effect of
SVO on individuals’ fairness processing during social decision-
making using an ERP technique. Behaviorally, prosocials were
more willing to reject unfair offers and had stronger negative
emotional experiences than proselfs; prosocials were more sat-
isfied with fair offers. Electrophysiologically, relative to proselfs,
prosocials exhibited automatic intuitive processing of fairness
at an early stage represented by the P2, suggesting that SVO
reflects stable individual differences in an inherent sense of
outcome fairness. In the middle processing stage, unfairness
greatly violated prosocials’ expectations and triggered stronger
negative emotional reactions than in proselfs as depicted by
the MFN. Importantly, participants’ SVO affected their rejec-
tion of unfair offers via the d-MFN evoked by unfair and fair
offers, which might reveal neural mechanisms underlying the
SVO effect on individuals’ behavioral reactions to unfairness.
Correspondingly, compared with proselfs, fair outcomes met
prosocials’ decision-making motivation and attracted more of
their attention as indicated by the P3. These findings shed light
on differences in the behavioral patterns and temporal char-
acteristics of neural activities among individuals with distinct
SVOs in fairness processing. Such results help extend the lit-
erature on behavioral responses and neuroimaging, offering
compelling evidence for classic models related to fairness norms
relevant to numerous perspectives and processing stages.
Limitations and outlook for subsequent research
There are several limitations in our study. First, we only con-
sidered disadvantageous inequality (DI) as unfairness in the
present study. However, advantageous inequality (AI) also plays
an important role in fairness-related decision-making. Although
human beings show aversion to both DI and AI, previous stud-
ies have found that individuals strongly oppose DI, while their
responses to AI are relatively modest (Falk and Fischbacher,
2006; Yu et al., 2014). In addition, studies have shown that eval-
uating AI requires more cognitive resources, such as reputation
management and sustainability of cooperation, than evaluating
DI (van den Bos et al., 2006; Fliessbach et al., 2012; Gao et al.,
2018). Since individuals’ SVO has an impact on the trade-off
between economic interests and fairness norm enforcement, it
is meaningful to explore the SVO effect of individual processing
AI offers in the UG.

Second, we only focused on highly unfair offers and fair
offers and excluded the moderately unfair offer (3–7 offer) in this
study. The moderately unfair condition is also worth exploring
due to its fuzziness and uncertainty (Polezzi et al., 2008; Duek
et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2017a). Are prosocials and proselfs’ eval-
uation criteria for moderately unfair schemes different? Could
this diversity affect individuals’ response patterns? These issues
are worthy of further exploration in the future.
Finally, other personal characteristics, such as gender dif-
ferences, should also be taken into account in future work.
Previous studies have shown that gender has an impact on
the level of trust in individuals such that women trust oth-
ers more than men in economic transactions (Chaudhuri et al.,
2013; Haselhuhn et al., 2015). In addition, signals of trustworthi-
ness influence the relationship between SVO and cooperation:
compared to proselfs, prosocials are more sensitive to informa-
tion signaling trustworthiness of others (Bogaert et al., 2008).
Therefore, it would be interesting to investigate how gender and
SVO interactively affect individuals’ fairness processing in social
decision making.
Funding
This work was supported by grants from the National Natural
Science Foundation of China (31970986, 31771206), the Major
Project of National Social Science Foundation (19ZDA363) and
the Outstanding Innovative Talents Cultivation Funded Pro-
grams 2019 of Renmin University of China.
Conflict of interest
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
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