The Right to Self-Determination vis-à-vis Irredentism: A Critical

Analysis on the Nature, Legal and Institutional Frameworks of the

Welkait Case in Ethiopia

ABERA ABEBE

School of Law

University of Gondar

June, 2019

i
 Title page
The Right to Self-Determination vis-à-vis Irredentism: A Critical
Analysis on the Nature, Legal and Institutional Frameworks of the
Welkait Case in Ethiopia

Thesis
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree
of Master of Law (LLM) in Human Rights Law, at the School of
Law, University of Gondar

By

Abera Abebe

Advisor

Teramed Tezera (Assistant Professor of Law)

June, 2019

i
 Thesis approval page

The thesis titled “The Right to Self-Determination vis-à-vis Irredentism: A Critical Analysis on
the Nature, Legal and Institutional Frameworks of the Welkait Case in Ethiopia” by Mr. Abera
Abebe Zegeye is approved for the degree of Master of Laws (LLM)

Board of Examiners

Name Signature

Advisor Teramed Tezera (Assi. Professor) ____________

Internal Examiner _____________ ____________

External Examiner _____________ ____________

Date: ________________

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 Declaration page

Declaration:

I, the researcher, affirm that the thesis comprises my own work. In compliance with widely
accepted practices, I have duly acknowledged and referenced all materials used in this work. I
understand that non-adherence to the principles of academic honesty and integrity,
misrepresentation/fabrication of any idea/data/fact/source which does not properly cited or
acknowledged will constitute sufficient ground for disciplinary action by the University and can
also evoke criminal sanction from the State and civil action from the author.

_______________________

Signature

___________Abera Abebe_

Name of Student

________GUR/1012/10_

University Id. Number

_____03 June, 2019

Date

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 Acknowledgment
First and foremost my thank goes to my Lord, the Almighty God for all in my life; and to the
mother of my Lord St. Mary. I am run out of word to speak anymore except to say thanks for all.

My advisor, Teramed Tezera, I am really grateful to your compassion and commitment in

advising me; without which I couldn‟t accomplish this work as such. I am proud of being
advised by you. Thank you! Wish you all the best in your life!

My family, you are always with me in promoting my schooling; and it is your love, support and
prompts which enables me achieving my tasks. My parents; lovely father Abebe Zegeye and
kind mother Ayal Achenef, you are irrepressible to me and wish you a long live. My siblings;
Messay Abebe, Zebenay Abebe, Daniel Abebe, Teckto Abebe and Kidist Abebe, you are all my
bests in my life and I am always with you. May the Almighty God furnish you with love, peace,
prosperity and long live. Emaway Aragaw, my sister in law, you are not exception to my
siblings; that my gratitude be also to you. Above all, my Sister Zebenay Abebe, I am in debt of
your unfettering help in my schooling since my undergraduate class which I really owe it in my
life. For me, it is ungraceful to take you as only my sister; you are rather beyond that. I
dedicated this paper to you. Again, I decline my authorship of this work to you! You are special
to me! Love you! May the Almighty God let me to pay my debt to you!

All my friends, you know who you are! I am grateful to your prompt and support in my life.
Here, my special thank is to my mentor Bebzuh M. I am proud of knowing you! Regarding your
passion to knowledge, you are a kind of person whom I want to be in my future. You introduce
me with books and the habit of reading. Thank you!

Again, my special thanks be to Zyin Shibabaw, my sister, you are the one whom I have a close
friendship in my live at Gondar. You are a kind and compassionate person. I am really thankful
to your accompany by which you demised my loneliness.

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 Accronyms and abbreviation
TPLF Tigray People Liberation Front

EPRDF Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front

HoF House of Federation

FDRE Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

Art Article

ACHPR African Charter on Human and Peoples„ Rights

ICCPR International Convention on Civil and Political Rights

ICESCR International Convention on Economic Social and Cultural Rights

UN United Nations

RSA Regional State of Amhara

RST Regional State of Tigray

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Table of Contents
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................ viii
Chapter One .................................................................................................................................... 1
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1
1.1 Background of the Study .................................................................................................. 1
1.2 Statement of the Problem ................................................................................................. 5
1.3 Objective of the Study ...................................................................................................... 6
1.4 Research Questions .......................................................................................................... 7
1.5 Review of Literatures ....................................................................................................... 7
1.6 Significance of the Study ............................................................................................... 14
1.7 Purpose of the Study ...................................................................................................... 14
1.8 Delimitation of the Study ............................................................................................... 15
1.9 Limitation of the Study .................................................................................................. 15
1.10 Research Methodology................................................................................................... 15
1.10 Ethical Considerations.................................................................................................... 17
1.11 Operational Definitions .................................................................................................. 17
1.12 Organization of the Study .............................................................................................. 17
Chapter Two.................................................................................................................................. 19
2 The Emergence and Development of the Right to Self-Determination and Irredentism in the
International System: Legal or Political Concepts? ...................................................................... 19
2.1 The Emergence of the Right to Self-Determination as Peoples‟ Right.......................... 19
2.2 The De-Facto Emergence and Development of Irredentism in the International System
23
2.3 Irredentism versus other like Cases ................................................................................ 27
2.4 Comprehensiveness of the International Legal Framework in Addressing Irredentist
Claims........................................................................................................................................ 31
Chapter Three................................................................................................................................ 34
3 The Nature and Peculiarities of the Welkait Case ................................................................. 34
3.1 Introduction: Welkait in History and Demographic Status ............................................ 34
3.2 The Nature and Elements of the Welkait Case .............................................................. 35
3.3 Peculiarities which Characterize the Welkait Case as an Irredentist Case .................... 39
3.4 Comparative Analysis of the Welkait Case with Other Likely Cases............................ 41

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 3.5 Approaches Pursued by Different Stake-Holders in the Welkait Case .......................... 46
3.6 Characterizing the Experience and Dimension of Ethnic Conflicts in other Federal
Country: the case of India ......................................................................................................... 48
Chapter Four ................................................................................................................................. 50
4 Comprehensiveness of Legal and Institutional Frameworks in Ethiopia to Settle Irredentist
Cases ............................................................................................................................................. 50
4.1 Introduction: The Ethiopian Federalism ........................................................................ 51
4.2 Legal Frameworks of the Right to Self-determination and Irredentism in Ethiopia ...... 52
4.3 Institutional Frameworks in Umpiring Self-Determination and Irredentist Cases in
Ethiopia ..................................................................................................................................... 55
CHAPTER FIVE .......................................................................................................................... 61
5 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................. 61
5.1 Conclusion...................................................................................................................... 61
5.2 Recommendations .......................................................................................................... 62
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. 64

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 Abstract
Since the coming in to power of the current regime (EPRDF) and the adoption of federalism as a
form of state structure in Ethiopia, Welkait people, alleging their Amharan identity, have been
opposing their incorporation in to the regional state of Tigray and quest to secede from Tigray in
order to unit/move into their ethnical kin Amhara people within the Regional State of Amhara.
Notwithstanding the persistent quest and prolonged process undergone by the people, their claim
is unanswered yet. Beside the complexity of the quest which blends legal and political aspects, its
irredentist nature per se plays significant role to the delay/deny in settling the case. Irredentism
is the simultaneous desire of the trans-border ethnic kin people and the adjacent parent state to
their socio-political unification. Despite it is a real phenomenon and has distinctive features
from the normative contents of the right to self-determination in its existing context, irredentist
cases has rarely addressed in the contemporary legal discourses.

The right to self-determination, the right of people as a group, is alleged as an unsettled right in
terms of its normative contents. This study is of a doctrinal research; which, by analyzing
relevant national and international legal instruments and scholarly literatures concerning with
the right to self-determination, it appraised that the self-determination clauses stipulated both in
international instruments and domestic legal frameworks are incomprehensive to address
irredentist cases. The study particularly is a case study which scrutinized the Welkait case and
pursued qualitative method in conducting some key informant interview as an attempt to
supplement the theoretical analysis. In so doing, the study revealed as the Welkait case is an
irredentist case which hardly has legal and institutional frameworks in Ethiopia to settle it.

Keywords: Ethnic groups, Federalism, House of Federation, Identity, Irredentism, Regional

States, Secession, Self-Determination, Territory

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 Chapter One

1. Introduction
1.1 Background of the Study
The right to self-determination, conceived as a fundamental right of people to freely decide their
political status and to pursue their own choice of economic, cultural and social development, is
stipulated in different international legal instruments,1 though it is alleged as contentious in terms
of its normative contents and status.2 The idea of the right to self-determination has been
officially implanted in the signing of the United Nations (UN) Charter in 1945.3 The charter,
being pioneer in guaranteeing this right, has declared it under its Art 1(2). Eventually, the idea of
self-determination has developed from principle into an enforceable human right through
subsequent UN human rights instruments and national legislations. The right to self-
determination is conceived and developed as the right of „people‟ but not only its contents and
normative status but also the subjects of the right or the question what constitutes the term
„people‟ also lacks a straightforward consensus.4

There is an ostensibly self-determination idea known as irredentism which is defined as “the

bilateral and simultaneous pursuit by both parent state and its ethnically kindred brethren
outside its territory for ethno-territorial retrieval”.5 Irredentism as a political allegation is not an
uncommon phenomenon. Irredentist assertions were at the root of many territorial disputes
during the twentieth century and most significantly after the Second World War that irredentist
cases has being alleged almost in every continent.6 For instance, the dispute between Russia and
Ukraine over Crimea, Sudan and South Sudan over the Abyei area, and between Ethiopia and
Somalia over Ogaden; were all irredentist cases. However, notwithstanding it is a factual
phenomenon across the world, irredentist cases are rarely covered in the contemporary legal
discourse of the international legal frameworks.
1
Common art 1 of ICCPR & ICESCR, infra note 74.
2
Matthew Saul, The normative status of self-determination in international law: A formula for uncertainty in the
scope and content of the right?, 11:4 HRLR, 609,643 (2011).
3
U.N. Charter art. 1(2).
4
Saul, Supra note 2, at 616.
5
Julianna Christa Elisabeth Fuzesi, Explaining irredentism: the case of Hungary and its trans-border minorities in
Romania and Slovakia, A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of PhD in
Government, London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London (2006),
6
Pronto, infra note 8, at 106.

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There is a resembling idea called revanchism which is mostly juxtaposed with irredentism.
However, they are different concepts, that while revanchism refers to the desire to regain
territory lost to a neighbor or that has gained independence regardless of ethnic or cultural
considerations, irredentism is the uniting of territories culturally or ethnically related to its/their
“mother” culture or ethnic nation.7

Despite it is hardly addressed under the normative contents of the self-determination clauses,
irredentism could be embraced under the umbrella of self-determination in its wider
interpretation; by which it is mostly blended with secession. Nevertheless, irredentism has its
own distinct features different from secession in number of aspects.8 Despite both irredentism
and secession are the two main forms of ethnically induced territorial adjustment incidences, 9
while secession involves the withdrawal of a group with its occupying territory from the
authority of a given state, irredentism on the other hand is the retrieval of the trans-border ethnic
kindred people and their inhabited land by the parent state.10 Unlike secession which is the
unilateral claim of the secessionist group, irredentism needs a bilateral and simultaneous pursuit
both by parent state and the trans-border ethnically kindred minority group to be unified.
Nevertheless, both of such scenarios are commonly known as secessionist claims,11

If it is the risk of instability and ethnic conflict which nudges states and the global community to
recognize the right to secession, the history of irredentist cases too gives even greater reason to
recognize and creating legal framework without going viciously to ensure the peaceful settlement
of such claims. In terms of its causal effect, irredentist cases and conflicts have had significant
contribution to the political instability at the root of the Second World War.12,13

By analyzing the normative contents of the right to self-determination as stipulated in

international and domestic legal instruments, this paper tries to appreciate the legal and

7
Revanchism or Irredentism? - Alpha Dictionary, available at: https://www.alphadictionary.com/blog/?p=1831,
accessed on 5 February 2019, at 4:36 pm.
8
Arnold N. Pronto, Irredentist secession in international law, 40: 2 FFWA, 103,103 (2016).
9
Donald L. Horowitz, Self-determination: Politics, Philosophy, and Law, 39 Nomos, 421, 423 (1997).
10
Ibid.
11
Stephen M. Saideman and R. William Ayres, Determining the causes of irredentism: Logit analysis of minorities
at risk data from the 1980s and 1990s, 62: 4 JP, 1126, 1136, (2000).
12
Pronto, Supra note 8, at 107.
13
The immediate cause of WWII was Germany‟s invasion of Poland prompted by ambitious additional demands
based on Nazi ideology in uniting all Germans (and further all Germanic peoples) in Europe in a single nation.

2
institutional frameworks of the prolonged and ongoing quest of Welkait people in Ethiopia. The
Welkait people, that are currently incorporated within the Regional State of Tigray (hereafter
RST), has a prolong opposition to their incorporation in to the RST and claim to secede from
Tigray and to join/move to the Regional State of Amhara (hereafter RSA). The quest has the
element of both identity recognition and border claim. The case is highly complicated as it is not
only the claim of the concerned Welkait people but also the rest of Amharan nation/State
Government to redeem the people with their occupying territory in to its Regional State of
Amhara.14 Hence, the claim is that of irredentism than neither secession nor self-rule or identity
recognition.

Art 39(1) of the FDRE Constitution states that “every nation, nationalities and people in Ethiopia
has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession” (emphasis
added).15 Here one may wonder the wording „including the right to secession‟ as inclusive of
other like cases short of secession. But still it is hardly possible to argue that irredentist cases can
be embraced in this provision of the Constitution because while the Constitution further
stipulates the rules and procedures to effectuate the right to secession (external self-
determination)16 and the right to the right to self-rule (internal self-determination)17 it has
nothing to say on the rules and procedures to effectuate irredentist cases.18

14
Interview with Dessie Tilahun, Infra note 210.
15
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Constitution, Negarit Gazeta, proc. No. 1/1995, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
(1995), art 39 (1). (hereafter FDRE Constitution)
16
External self-determination has three dimension which bases on; the principle of non-interference into the
domestic affairs of states and thus is linked to the notion of state sovereignty, law and practice of decolonization,
and the rights of indigenous peoples to secession. Here while the first two principles are stipulated under art 1(2), 55
and Chapters XI and XII of the UN charter respectively, the third scenario (secession) is granted conditionally only
when there is colonial annexation and violation of fundamental human rights; see also, Kristina Roepstorff, Self-
Determination of Indigenous Peoples within the Human Rights Context: A Right to Autonomy.
lawanddevelopment.org (unpublished manuscript), available on:
http://www.lawanddevelopment.org/docs/selfdetermination.pdf. Accessed on: 25 May 25, 2019 at 1:40 pm. The
FDRE Constitution provides unconditional right to secession of nation, nationalities and peoples as it is stipulated
under Art 39/1 of the FDRE Constitution; and art 39(4) provides rules and procedures to be pursued to effectuate
this right.
17
Internal self-determination has two aspects: the right of a people to determine their constitution including
autonomous status and the right to have democratic governance. Leaving to the domestic affairs of the state as its
sovereignty, the international system has a rarely regulation on internal self-determination. See also, Kristina
Roepstorff, Self-Determination of Indigenous Peoples within the Human Rights Context: A Right to Autonomy.
lawanddevelopment.org (unpublished manuscript), available on:
http://www.lawanddevelopment.org/docs/selfdetermination.pdf. Accessed on: 25 May 25, 2019 at 1:40 pm. The
FDRE constitution provides the right to internal self-determination (self-rule) of nation, nationalities and peoples as

3
Hence, even though art 39 FDRE Constitution provides the right to self-determination of each
nation, nationalities and people in a range of series from simply identity recognition to external
secession, it looks incomprehensive to embrace claims like what is made by Welkait people;
irredentism. This can inferred from the very nature of the Welkait case per se which has its own
peculiarities that outcast the case from the normative contents of the right to self-determination
stipulated under art 39 of the FDRE Constitution. Because, the case, though it can be conceived
as a self-determination claim from the perspective of the claimant Welkait people to the
recognition of their Amharan nationhood identity claim, it has another dimension when we figure
out the claim of the Welkait people to secede from the RST in order to be incorporated within the
RSA. And when of the rest of Amhara nation/ and State Government quest to retrieve Welkait in
to its administration. In this instance, the case is beyond „a self‟ matter as the desired outcome of
the case couldn‟t be realized by the self-interest of the claimant Welkait people; it rather needs a
simultaneous desire of the Amhara nation/ and State Government.

On the other hand, self-determination is a general expression used as a folder to other specific
rights. Self-determination per se cannot be demanded as a claim; it rather needs to be specified to
the kind of self-determination. Hence, in a wider interpretation, self-determination as a general
expression may embrace irredentist claims. But, Art 39 of the FDRE Constitution specifies three
elements of peoples‟ right under the umbrella of self-determination; identity recognition, self-
administration, and secession. That, characterizing its peculiarities from the three elements of the
right to self-determination stipulated under art 39 of the Constitution, one can possibly argue that
irredentist claims are not explicitly recognized under the FDRE Constitution.

Here, one may question the existence of irredentism in intra-country level as most of the prior
cases and experiences are inter-country cases. But what matters is the phenomenon existed
between constitute states in a federal country like Ethiopia because constitute states of the
Federation in federal system are considered as independent and sovereign in their mutual

stipulated under art 39(3) and 47(2) of the Constitution. Again, the procedures to be pursued are stipulated under art
47(3) of the constitution.
18
Due to its distinctiveness from secession and self-rule, it is inconvenient to apply the rules and procedures
stipulated under art 39(4) and 47(3) of the constitution in settling irredentist cases.

4
relations for all legal effects19,20 and corollary it is a modus operandi to analogize inter-country
phenomenon to intra-country incidences. Accordingly, the term irredentism, which is asserted by
different politico-legal scholars for inter-country cases of retrieving trans-border ethnic kindred
peoples together with their inhabited territory, can be used to similar phenomenon of intra-
country incidences between constitute states of the federation mutatis mutandis.21

Though there are different similar cases emerging across the country which greatly being
challenging the country‟s federal structure and also the government too; this study is limited in
analyzing the quest of Welkait people with a view to the applicability of the outcome of the
study to other similar cases mutatis mutandis.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Despite its reality as a legal and political claim and being a reason to conflicts among different
groups and states, irredentism has no addressed in the contemporary legal frameworks both at the
international and domestic level. Due to this legal lacuna, irredentist cases in different parts of
the world are being backed by armed resort which is an anachronic act for our time. And in some
instances it is evidenced, when the self-determination clauses are used to settle irredentist claims;
as alleged in the Welkait case. But, despite some similar features, irredentism is distinct from the
normative contents of self-determination clause as stipulated in the contemporary international
legal instruments and domestic legislations. Hence, it is erroneous to adjudicate irredentist claims
using laws regulating self-determination claims.
The prolonged and ongoing claims of Welkait people for the recognition of their Amharan
identity and to secede from the RST in order to join/move to their ethnically kindred brethren
Amhara nation is beyond a self-determination claim of the concerned Welkait people. Because it
is also the claim of the rest of Amhara nation/ and State Government to redeem its ethnic kin
Welkait people with their inhabiting land. Nonetheless, most peoples and the claimants

19
Due to their sovereign nature in their mutual relationship, the rules of conflict of law used in the private
international law is also applicable to states with in federal country; Lea Brilmayer, inter-state federalism, Yale law
school legal scholarship repository, faculty scholarship series, BYU L. Rev. 949, 949 (1987)
20
Hannah L. Buxbaum, Determining the Territorial Scope of State Law In Interstate and International Conflicts:
Comments on the Draft Restatement (Third) And on the Role of Party Autonomy, Research Paper Number 372, 27
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 381, 386 (2017)
21
For this assertion, the intra-state application of the right to self-determination, as used in art 39 of the FDRE
constitution, can be used as a good example because this right is primarily emerged and developed in the
international law regime particularly to supplement decolonization movements and internal sovereignty of the
people in a given country.

5
themselves as well as the umpiring organ (the HoF) superficially appreciate the quest as an
ordinary self-determination claim of Welkait people. Had it been so, the quest could be answered
in accordance to the FDRE Constitution simply by recognizing their Amharan identity within the
RST and by providing them a minority protection or by letting them to self-rule through
establishing a distinct Zonal or Woreda administration within the same Region. The Country has
two or more such prior experiences.22 What makes the Welkait case as such complicated and
unanswered yet?
The misapprehension of the Welkait case by all the stake-holders as a simple self-determination
claim of Welkait people and the corollary attempts made to settle the case in accordance to the
rules and procedures of self-determination clauses of the Constitution and Proc. No. 251/2001
results to the subjective partiality up on the umpiring organ and political instability in the country
due to the dissatisfaction of the claimant people. This is attributable to the ignorance of the
nature, jurisprudence and uniqueness of case vis-à-vis superficial blending of the irredentist case
with simple self-determination claims. This all consequentially makes the outcome of the claim
unease.
No previous study is conducted in appraising the very nature of the Welkait case and evaluates
its irredentist feature. As assessed in doing this study, prior studies on the Welkait case concerns
with raising arguments to justify whether Welkait belongs to Amhara or Tigray without
appreciating its peculiarities and legal frameworks in Ethiopia to settle such a case.

1.3 Objective of the Study

II. General Objective
The general objective of this study is to appraise the nature and peculiar features of the Welkait
case which blends a claim to identity recognition and border adjestment.

III. Specific Objectives

This study have the following specific objectives:

 Appraising the comprehensiveness or otherwise of the the Self-determination clause in

addressing irredentist cases.
 Exploring the nexsus between Self-determination and Irredentism

22
The case of Silte people in the SNNPR is a good example; see የኢ.ፌ.ድ.ሪ የፌደሬሽን ምክር ቤት፣ የኢ.ፌ.ድ.ሪ
የፌደሬሽን ምክር ቤት ያሳለፋቸዉ ዋና ዋና የህገ-መንግስት ዉሳኔዎች፣ የህገ-መንግስታዊ ፍርዶች መጽሄት፣ ቅጽ 1፣ ቁ 1፣
(ሀምሌ 2000) ገጽ 40-101.

6
 Analyzing the place of irredentism in the contemporary legal system both at the international
and domestic level.
 Scrutinizing whether or not irredentism falls within the normative contents of the self-
determination clause.
 Examining the relevancy & applicability or otherwise of self-determination rules and
procedures to irredentist claims.
 Examining the legal and institutional frameworks in Ethiopia to adjudicate cases like what is
claimed by Welkait peoples.
1.4 Research Questions
i. General Research Question
What really is the quest made by Welkait people petitioned as “the Welkait peoples‟ Amharan
nationhood identity and border claim”?
ii. Specific Research Questions
A) Do the self-determination clauses of the contemporary international legal frameworks
address irredentist claims?
B) Could irredentism be a right at all? What a kind of right? Legal? Or Moral?
C) Can rules and procedures of self-determination be feasible and proper to be applicable in
settling irredentist cases?
D) Are there any legal and institutional frameworks in Ethiopia to resolve inter-state
irredentist cases?
E) Unlike other similar cases in the country, what makes the prolonged quest of Welkait
people as such complicated and unanswered yet?
1.5 Review of Literatures
The right to self-determination, not necessarily in the notion of what is actually stipulated in
different international and domestic instruments, can be used as a domain in dealing with the
idea of irredentism. In defending the territorial integrity and sovereignty of states regardless of
how and when they were determined, the international legal and political system, though dictates
about the right to self-determination,23 refrain from defining exactly who is entitled to claim this

23
Primarily, this right is emerged to guarantee the efforts of decolonization movements; Matthew, supra note 2, p.
613.

7
right – a group, a people, or a nation- and what exactly the right confers.24 The committee of the
international convention on civil and political rights in its general comment 12 (general comment
on the right to self-determination) also affirms that in their state reports many of states are
completely ignoring article 1of the convention (the right to self-determination of peoples) or
provide inadequate information in regard to it or confine themselves to a reference to their
national laws.25

The failure of defining what constitutes the right to self-determination and who can enjoy it,
perhaps intentionally,26 not only left the international community and states concerned without
guiding principles in reacting with the right which gives a leeway to suppress the claims as they
wish27 but also make it a matter of interpretation to determine whether or not the irredentist
claims can be embraced under the spectrum of self-determination. Except academic attempts to
incorporate in the spectrum of self-determination, it is not only irredentism but also the idea of
secession is hardly stipulated in any of the international legal instruments.28 But the fact of being
neglected by the international legal instruments is not sufficient and reasonable to skip any
dealing with secession and irredentism because while different states lay down secessionist laws
domestically and the realistic phenomenon nature of irredentist claims across the world both at
inter-state and intra-state level justifies any of the studies, discussions, arguments, and reflections
concerning secession and irredentism. This includes the different facets of such secessionist
claims.29

Since there is no existing authoritative judicial ruling from either the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) or the United Nations to follow, irredentist claims can‟t bring the desired outcome
by submitting it to international legal arbitrates except using strong secessionist and liberation
movements.30 Irredentist claims, being a real phenomenon in different parts of the world, attract

24
Patricia Carley, Self-determination, Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, and the Right to Secession, a report from
roundtable held in conjunction with the US department of state‟s policy planning staff, United States institute of
peace, peace works No.7. (1996), p. V.
25
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, General Comment No. 12: The right to self-
determination of peoples (Art. 1), Twenty-first session, 1984, Geneva, Switzerland.
26
Carley, Supra note 24, at 1.
27
Saul, Supra note 2, at 612.
28
Carley, Supra note 24, at 4.
29
Michael Amoah, Ethno-nationalism versus Political Nationalism in Ghanaian Electoral Politics 1996- 2000, A
thesis submitted to Middlesex University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy, University of Ghana (April 2001), p. 55.
30
Id. at 56.

8
the attention of scholars to deal with it though some scholars overlooked it as one and the same
with secession.

Contemporarily, there is a greater international movement by different groups in demanding the

right to secede and irredentist claims which due to the illicit definition and normative content of
the right to self-determination, violence and insecurity prevails across the world. Then, as this
scenario is unlikely to stop easily, it looks necessary to states and the international community to
explicitly define and determine the normative contents of the right to self-determinations and to
amicably settle such claims of the people.31

In dealings with group rights particularly the right to self-determination, it may be the first step
to define what constitutes „peoples‟ because the right to self-determination is stipulated as the
rights of peoples without determining what denotes the term people. As there can be different
kinds or attributes of peoples, it may be difficult to have a simply definition of peoples. But
tentatively seven different kinds of peoples are identified each of which corresponds to different
forms of attributions.32 Accordingly, one may see him/herself belonging to an ethnic, cultural,
civic, socio-political, diasporic, multisocietial, and multiterritorial people. Then, based on the
circumstance of the case, such groups of persons may be identified as people and can claim or
enjoy the right to self-determination.

Though inadequate, the idea of irredentism is conceptually analyzed by some scholars. Inter
alios, a scholar called „Julianna Christa‟ is the one who extensively study on irredentism. The
author of this paper is also highly reliant on scrutinizing the work of Julianna to appraise the case
of Welkait which is the theme of this study. Julianna, in her dissertation, has critically analyzes
irredentist claims of Hungary from its trans-border minorities in Romania and Slovakia.33 She
defines irredentism as “the bilateral and simultaneous pursuit by both parent state and its
ethnically kindred brethren in a foreign state of ethno-territorial retrieval across inter-state
borders”.34

31
Carley, Supra note 24, at 5.
32
Michel Seymour, Internal Self-determination and Secession, Research Gate, available at:
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/292030160.
33
Julianna, Supra note 5.
34
Id. at 18.

9
Irredentism can be of two types; conventional and unificationist.35 While the conventional form
of irredentism has three actors from different side; the sovereign parent state which claims to
incorporate its ethnically kin peoples together with the territory they live in, the minorities live
outside the territory of their ethnically kin people‟s state, and the host state which the claim is
made against it.36 In case of unificationist irredentism on the other hand there are only two
parties; ethnic minorities dispersed across different states claiming to create their new state
without having existing sovereign parent state and the host states against which the claim is
made.37

Due to the absence of straightforward conceptual understanding and legal framework of

irredentism, it is mostly evidenced when irredentist claims are framed in terms of state
secession.38 As a response to this misconception to the very notion of irredentism, Arnold N.
Pronto has explained his scholarly view on the distinct nature of irredentism from the notion of
secession in terms of application of the principle of self-determination, the question of
recognition by third states and the international community as a whole, and the role of consent. 39
Again, looking the legal frameworks of the international system, the distinction of irredentism
from state secession is become more evident because while state secession has been tolerated in
international law to some degree, some principles of international laws like the principle of
territorial integrity and non-intervention, prohibition on forceful territorial acquisition, and
sanctity of international boundaries significantly constrained irredentist secessions.40

Above all, the very notions of these ostensibly similar cases are different because irrespective of
any theoretical or practical difficulties in the classification, while „irredentism is more or less `a
movement by members of an ethnic group in one state to retrieve ethnically kindred people and
their territory across borders',41 secession is an attempt by an ethnic group with claims to a
homeland to withdraw its territory from the jurisdiction of a larger state to which it belongs with

35
Id. at 36.
36
Id. at 39.
37
Ibid.
38
Pronto, Supra note 8, at 107.
39
Id. at 108.
40
Id. at 120.
41
Horrowitz 1991, p. 10; as cited in Amoah, Supra note 23, at 56.

10
the aim of creating its own independent state than to join/move in to another ethnically kin
state.42

The other important thing in relation to irredentism which is usually ignored by scholars is the
nudging factor which instigates groups either to join with their ethnic kin elsewhere or to create
independent state.43 These factors of which determine the patterns of ethnic groups‟ separatism
movement are critically analyzed by Stephen M. Saideman and R. William Ayres in their work
titled as “determining the causes of irredentism: logit analysis of minorities at risk data from the
1980s and 1990s”.44

It is a natural phenomenon that when claims of individuals or groups are hasty resisted, it will be
the reason to conflicts. But, some scholars, without appreciating the legal and political elements,
viewed irredentism as a source of conflict between bordering states with territorial claims based
on the ethnic origin of populations.45 In this regard, irredentism may be defined as “state support
for annexing neighboring territories inhabited by ethnic kin”.46 In affirmation to this, some
scholars also insist that “irredentism is not only an issue frequently escalates into armed conflict
but also a type of conflict that is not easily resolved”.47

It is also argued that the mere fact of separation of people is not itself an immediate condition for
the emergence of irredentism rather it is exacerbated due to dissatisfaction of trans-border
minorities by the socio-economic and political of condition in the host state and some
exclusionary rules and practices made against them.48

Irredentism, besides its mistakenly overlapping with secession, there is also a foggy area in the
distinction between irredentas and Diasporas but irredentas and Diasporas are different based on
the attitude to their inhabited territory.49 That, while irredentas have the attitude of aboriginal

42
Amoah, supra note 23, at 56.
43
Saideman & Ayres, supra note 11, at 1127.
44
Id. at 1144.
45
German Kim, Irredentism in disputed territories and its influence on the border conflicts and wars, 3:1 The
journal of territorial and maritime studies, 87,88 (2016).
46
Stephen M. Saideman, Inconsistent irredentism? Political competition, ethnic ties and the foreign policies of
Somalia and Serbia, 7: 3 security studies, 1998. P. 53.
47
Markus kornprobst, Dejustification and dispute settlement: irredentism in European politics, 34: 4 European
journal of international relations, 459, 459 (2007).
48
Natalia Horlo, Reason for emergence and ideological explanation of the irredentist policy, 8: 3 journal of
geography, politics and society, 45, 47 (2018).
49
kim, supra note 45, at 93.

11
population to the territory they inhabited; Diasporas have not such attitude.50 Again, while it is
economic and political consequences of international migration and Diasporas on the country of
origin which tempts the given state to have a certain kind of relation with its Diasporas,51
territorial retrieval and unifying of kindred peoples in a single authority is the pushing factor to
irredentism. The policy which the country of origin pursues towards its Diasporas is also
different from the policy of the parent state towards its irredentas.52

It is not also unusual when irredentism is juxtaposed with nationalism. Irredentism is labeled as a
sub-type or phase of nationalism.53 Irredentism is expressed in a language of nationalism by
which it seeks to form a nation-state.54 But, despite some overlaps, nationalism is different and
broader concept which mainly holds the attitude that members of a certain nation have when they
care about their national identity55 and it is not limited on territorial unification of ethnically
kindred peoples in a single authority; rather it also seeks non-territorial consolidation of nationals
living across different states.

In Ethiopia, there is a rarely legal framework which regulates irredentist claims unless we use the
secession clause provided under art 39 of the FDRE Constitution56 though it is not apposite. The
Constitution guarantees the right to self-determination in a more liberal manner to the extent of
unconditional secession.57 The idea of irredentism may fall within the wide spectrum of self-
determination; but, since irredentism is different from secession, it is unsound to apply rules and
procedures of secession stimulated under art 39/4 of the Constitution to irredentist claims.

There are fair enough literatures written by different scholars concerning art 39 of the FDRE
Constitution. Irrespective of the arguments and analyses on secession, it is also argued that it is

50
Ibid.
51
Srinath Raghavan, the Diaspora and India, 11:1 India Review, 65, 69 (2012).
52
The policy which country of origin follows towards its Diasporas includes measures like creating a special
ministry to deal with diaspora affairs, allowing forms of dual citizenship for members of the diaspora and so on; on
the other hand the policy of the parent state towards its irredentas aims to incorporate it in to its authority.
53
Julianna, Supra note 5, at 67.
54
Ibid.
55
Miscevic, Nenad, "Nationalism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N.
Zalta (ed.), p. 1, available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/nationalism/, accessed on 04 Feb
2019, at 9:44 Am.
56
Habtu, Infra note 58, at 320.
57
FDRE Constitution, supra note 15.

12
possible to ethnic groups to secede from one Regional State and join another one.58 This
assertion is made by referring examples at the Woreda and Zonal level arguing that an ethnic
group could demand to be transferred from one district to another district or from one Zone to
another Zone.59 But there is neither substantive nor procedural law in the country which
regulates such kind of cases. Elements of self-determination clause stipulated under art 39 of the
Constitution embrace only identity recognition, self-administration, and secession; which in no
case includes irredentist cases.

Coming to the case of Welkait, before the coming in to power of the current regime, it is alleged
that Wolkait had been administered under the province of Begemider (now Gondar, part of the
RSA)60 but since the coming in to power of the current regime and even before the adoption of
Federal system in the country by the 1995 FDRE constitution, Welkait has demarcated in to
RST. Since then, the Welkait people have a prolonged claim of their Amharan nationhood
identity and recently the question became the claim of the rest of Amhara nation/and State
Government aiming to redeem Welkait from the RST.61 This is the centerpiece of the Welkait
case which makes it an irredentist claim than a simple self-determination claim of the Welkait
people alone. Even though the quest has been raised since the coming in to power of the current
regime in 1991, it was in 21 November 2008 E.C which formally brought to the House of
Federation.62 Nevertheless, no satisfactory response is given by the House as an attempt to settle
the case; rather the house denies as no such claim comes to it.63

Due to the prevalence of identity claims and border disputes, which jointly constitutes an
irredentist case, across the country, recently the Federal Government has established a
Commission to investigate such and other similar quests by different groups of people across the
Country.64 But since no new substantive law is made and the Commission is empowered only to

58
Alem Habtu, Multiethnic federalism in Ethiopia: a study of secession clause in the constitution, 35: 2 Publius,
313, 328 (2005).
59
Ibid.
60
I, ያሬድ ጥበቡ፣ ወጥቼ አልወጣሁም፣ P. 183 (2010).
61
የአዴፓ እና የህወሓት ፍጥጫ፣ በረራ፣ 1ኛ ዓመት ቁጥር 03፣ ታህሳስ 25 ቀን 2011 ዓ.ም፣ ገፅ 6.
62
A written petition submitted to House of federation by Committee of “Wolkait people Amharan nation-hood
identity question titled as „Welkait peoples‟ Amharan identity and border claim‟ (unpublished subscript) (2008E.C.)
63
Supra note 61.
64
Proc. No. 1101, Administrative boundaries and identity issues commission establishment proclamation, Federal
Negarit Gazeta, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (December 2018).

13
provide recommendation to the House of Federation, there sees a rarely solution to the prevailed
identity claims and border disputes arisen in different part of the country.

1.6 Significance of the Study

 The very idea of irredentism has no clear conceptual understanding even by scholars.
Different scholars define it differently with a common coincidence on a particular kind of
territorial dispute.65 Again, there is an overlap between irredentist and secessionist
movements in case of ethno-territorial cross-border conflicts.66 Then, it is noteworthy to
study on irredentism in order to appreciate the nature, characteristics, and peculiarities of
irredentist claims.
 Irredentism, beside its fusion with secessionist claims, also has some sort of obscurity with
Diaspora protection movements.67 Then, it is also significant to analyze the difference and
similarities of irredentist claims with Diaspora protections and other likely cases.
 Though it can be embraced under the sphere of self-determination, due to its distinctiveness,
the self-determination rules and procedures (as used now) looks incomprehensive to settle
irredentist claims. Then by conducting scholarly studies, it is important to display the
distinctiveness of irredentism which enables to come up with appropriate laws regulating
irredentist claims.
 The Welkait case is looks more of an irredentist claim. Beside some alleged denial by the
government, the quest per se is complicated which lacks legal frameworks in Ethiopia to
settle it in the satisfaction of the claimants. Then, it is important to appreciate the nature of
the claim made by Welkait people accompanied by the rest of Amhara nation/ State
Government to attest the possible outlays and outcomes of the case.
 By conducting such a kind scholarly researches to analyze the relevant legal frameworks (if
any), it is also important to show predictability of irredentist claims.
 The study can be also used as an input to other interested scholars to conduct similar
research.
1.7 Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this analytical study is to understand the very nature and peculiarities of
irredentism which is mostly blended with the idea of secession for politico-legal scholars and

65
kim, supra note 45, at 89.
66
Ibid.
67
Ibid.

14
policy makers generally and to the stake-holders of the Welkait case in Ethiopia. At this stage in
the research, irredentism is defined as “the bilateral and simultaneous pursuit by both parent
state and its ethnically kindred brethren outside its territory for ethno-territorial retrieval.”68

1.8 Delimitation of the Study

The concern of this research is limited to the examination and analysis of the quest of Welkait
people to their Amharan nationhood identity and border claim which is now becoming the quest
of non-Welkait Amhara nation/ and the State Government. In doing so, the study critically
scrutinizes the nature and peculiarities of the claim as well as the comprehensiveness of art 39 of
the Constitution in addressing the Welkait case. Hence, the study will not concern in examining
and investigating whether Welkait belongs to Amhara or Tigray. It rather concerns on the
arguments and all the steps undergone after the initiation of the claim. In assessing the legal
frameworks, the study is limited in analyzing national and international laws of self-
determination clauses to appraise its comprehensiveness in addressing irredentist cases.

1.9 Limitation of the Study

In conducting this research, the following were the challenges which hinder the researcher from
smoothly carry out this research; among which the non-incorporation of irredentism in the
contemporary legal system and the insufficient scholarly literatures thereto are the foremost
limitations. In this regard, beside reviewing relevant literatures, the researcher tries to cope with
up such challenges by critically analyzing the normative contents of the right to self-
determination clauses stipulated in international instruments and domestic legislations. Besides,
there are also some potential shortcoming attributable to the researcher including time constraint
and involvement in other official tasks which erodes not only the time but also due attention of
the researcher in carrying out this study. Nevertheless, to minimize such constraints, the
researcher primarily concern with this study.

1.10 Research Methodology

This study is a doctrinal research which pursues an exploratory design.

The study is a doctrinal research; which, by analyzing relevant laws and scholarly literatures,
appraised the normative contents of the right to self-determination and the nature & peculiarities
of the Welkait case.
68
Julianna, supra note 5.

15
It is an exploratory design as it is apposite to identify the boundaries of the environment in which
the problems, opportunities or situations of interest are likely to reside and to identify the salient
features or variables that might be found in the study subject. It is also the appropriate form of
research design to address uncertainties and ignorance about the subject. Hence, this study
pursued an exploratory design by which it assessed the comprehensiveness or otherwise of self-
determination clauses in addressing irredentist claims. And to this end, it had been supplemented
with opinions of some concerned key informant persons.

1.10.1 Sources of Data

In conducting this study, both primary and secondary sources of data is used.

Primary data: Legal instruments (both the relevant national and international laws), and data
collected using interview, and a petition filed to the house of federation by the committee of the
Welkait peoples‟ Amharan nationhood identity and border claim together with the response of
the House of Federation to the claim are of the main primary sources of data.

Secondary data: Soft laws, recommendations of human right bodies, scholarly literatures, and
internet sources are used as secondary sources of data.
1.10.2 Data collection Mechanism

As to primary sources of data, the researcher critically analyzed the relevant national and
international laws. Besides, interview had been also conducted with some of the members of the
“committee of the Amharan nationhood identity and border claim of Welkait people” and some
other concerned officials. In this regard a key informant interview is conducted to get the
necessary information from persons who have knowhow about the Welkait case. To this end, the
researcher employed unstructured interview which enables to be flexible in conducting the
interview without the need to stick with predetermined or pretested interview questions.

Similarly, Concerning to secondary sources of data, the relevant material sources had been
assessed thoroughly.

1.10.3 Data Analysis and Interpretation

The data collected using primary and secondary sources of data had been interpreted in
triangulation and analyzed thematically in a manner which answers the research questions.

16
 1.10 Ethical Considerations
The researcher assured that this study comprises his own work; that any source referred from the
work of another person had been cited properly. Concerning some interviewed data, the
researcher had used such data properly in the original sense of the interviewed persons‟ idea.

1.11 Operational Definitions

 ‘Welkait case’ denotes the ongoing quest of Welkait people to their Amharan nationhood
and border claim; and the consequent contestation over Welkait between the Amhara and
Tigray nations/State Governments.
 The phrase ‘Welkait people’ used in this paper represents portion of the residents of
Welkait who identify themselves as indigenous to the land and an Amharan nationals.
Because it is mainly this groups rather than the whole society of the area who are the
claimant of the case petitioned as “the Amharan nationhood identity and border claim of
Welkait people”. Due to this unrepresentative nature of the people, the terminology
Welkait people used in this paper denotes such portion of the claimant people. The
claimant group of Welkait people alleges that others are new settlers coming from Tigray
who are not indigenously Welkait people; and this resettlement program is purposely
made by the current Government (oligarchy of TPLF) since the eve of its coming in to
power aimed to change the demography of the area in order to incorporate it in to the
upcoming RST (in the then time).
 Irredentas: Means a territory historically or ethnically related to one political unit but
under the political control of another.
 Irredentism: Is a political principle or policy directed toward the incorporation of
irredentas within the boundaries of their historically or ethnically related political units.
 Region = State = Regional State (these are used interchangbly for the same meaning to
describe the constitute unit of the Federation in a Federal Country /Ethiopia/.

1.12 Organization of the Study

This study is organized under Four Chapters; the First Chapter is what has provided here above
generally termed as the introduction part. The Second Chapter generally discussed the
emergence and development of the right to self-determination vis-à-vis irredentism as a legal and
factual element respectively in the international system. Under this Chapter, the normative
contents and its comprehensiveness or otherwise of the right to self-determination in addressing

17
irredentist claims has been assessed. Chapter Three analyzed the nature, features and
peculiarities of the quest of Welkait people to their Amharan nationhood identity recognition and
border claim. The comprehensiveness of legal and institutional frameworks in Ethiopia to settle
irredentist claims had discussed in Chapter Four. Finally, the study winds up with a thoughtful
Conclusion and Recommendations.

18
 Chapter Two

2 The Emergence and Development of the Right to Self-Determination and

Irredentism in the International System: Legal or Political Concepts?
Under this Chapter, the idea of self-determination and its evolution from its very underpinning to
its contemporary normative status will be thoroughly discussed. Similarly, in an attempt to
appraise the nature and peculiarities of a resembling factual phenomenon what is called
irredentism, the Chapter will again assess the normative contents of the right to self-
determination and its comprehensiveness or otherwise in addressing irredentist claims.

2.1 The Emergence of the Right to Self-Determination as Peoples’ Right

Finding the exact emerging date of the right to self-determination is generally conceived as a
controversial issue. While some picked it back to the treaty of Westphalia,69 others generally
assert as the idea of self-determination had emerged and recognized as principle of international
relations before WWI without specifying its emerging date. 70 But, the idea of self-determination
prior to the adoption of the UN Charter was simply an extensional formation of other concepts
like sovereignty and territorial integrity of states or a mere factual struggle of people to their
liberation.

Though it is alleged that, art 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations of the 1919 implicitly
embodied the idea of self-determination, it was explicitly included in the UN Charter as the
“principle of equal rights and self-determination of people” as provided under Art 1 and 55 of the
charter and to the Non-Self-governing Territories (“NSGT”) as under Chapters XI, XII and
XIII.71 By this fact, the idea of self-determination is quoted as the norm of the modern legal
system.72 Despite the arguments on its emerging date, the right to self-determination, as pursued

69
Jenny Nguyen, Whose self-determination?, a critical examination on the right to self-determination and its role
during the process of decolonization, LAGF03 Essay in legal science Bachelor thesis, Master of laws Programme 15
higher education credits, Supervisor: Christian Häthén, FACULTY OF LAW, Lund University (2016), p. 8,
(unpublished).
70
S. Kwaw Nyameke Blay, Self-determination: Its evolution in international law and prescriptions for its
application in the post-colonial context, a dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Law, University of Tasmania in
fulfillment of the requirements for the Award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Law): submitted to; Faculty of
Law, University of Tasmania, Tasmania. Australia, (1984), p. XIII (unpublished).
71
M. Ya‟kub Aiyub Kadir, Application of the Law of Self-Determination in a Postcolonial Context: A Guideline, IX
JEAIL 1, 7, 8 (2016).
72
Blay, Supra note 70, at iii.

19
by various groups today, is principally articulated in instruments of the United Nations.73 Under
the umbrella of United Nations, subsequent human rights conventions have guaranteed the right
to self-determination as a (human?) right of people.74

In United Nations covenants, self-determination is defined as the „right‟ “by virtue of which a
people „freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and
cultural development.”75 But, due to the ambiguity on the question „who are people‟?76, the right
to self-determination is being interpreted broadly depending on the peculiar disposition of the
beneficiaries.77 Accordingly, for a people under colonial rule (or any form of alien rule or
occupation) the principle implies the right to freely create an independent state of their choice or
to merge or associate with an existing state.78 In the case of an independent state, self-
determination used to acquire equal status with other like entities in international relations and
freedom from external interference in the administration of its internal affairs or to control over
its natural resources as an aspect of its economic sovereignty.79

For the people of the sovereign state, self-determination implies the right of the majority to
determine the government they want through periodic election or through revolution.80 When the
right claimed against the state by minorities or ethnically disadvantageous groups, self-
determination implies the right to identity recognition and/or the right to participate in the
national political, economic and social affairs or self-administration in their own province.81
Again, groups of people may claim the right to self-determination to secede from one state and
associate or merge to another state.82 As a last resort and extreme form of the right to self-
determination, groups may also quest to external self-determination (secession) to form their
73
Ibid.
74
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and
accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entry into force 23 March 1976, art
1 (hereafter ICCPR). And; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Adopted and opened
for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 and
entry into force 3 January 1976, art 1 (hereafter ICESCR).
75
ICCPR & ICESCR, Supra note 74; and also the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Adopted
27 June 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force 21 October 1986, art 20(1).
76
Maria João Barata, Self-determination, Identity and International Relations, Paper prepared for the
Isa annual convention 2011, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 15-19 March, p. 1 (unpublished).
77
Blay, Supra note 70, at xiv.
78
Ibid.
79
Id. at xv.
80
Id. at xvi.
81
Ibid.
82
Id. at xiv.

20
own independent and autonomous state; for such secessionist groups, the right to self-
determination implies the right to separate from the parent state to form their own sovereign
state.83

Nevertheless, not all these spectrums of the right to self-determination are recognized in
international legal instruments. Because the very initiation of the right to self-determination as
envisaged from art 1(2) of the UN Charter aims to pursue the development of friendly relations
among nations.84 It is in the late 1960 which the right to self-determination is interpreted to grant
the freedom of peoples to be liberated from colonial dominance by the 1960 UN General
Assembly resolution 1514 (xv), declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries
and peoples. 85 While paragraph 1 of this declaration states that the subjection of people to alien
subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, and
is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations; paragraph 2 specifically concerned on the right
to self-determination of people by dictating that all people have the right to self-determination by
virtue of which they can freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development.86 The two human right Covenants of the 1976 (ICCPR &
ICESCR) have also similar notion in determining the concept of the right to self-determination.87

The very essence of the right to self-determination as stipulated in the relevant international laws
signifies freedom from subjugation or colonial dominance88,89 and sovereignty of the overall
people of the given state to determine their political status and to pursue their economic, social
and cultural development.90,91 It is also confirmed by the committee of the international
convention on elimination of all forms of racial discrimination that the right to self-determination
has two phases; internal self-determination which denotes the rights of all people to pursue freely
their economic, social and cultural development without outside interference, and external self-
determination which signifies that all people have the right to determine freely their political

83
Id. at xvi.
84
U.N. Charter art. 1(2).
85
G.A. Res. (xv), (14 December 1960).
86
Id, Para. 1 & 2.
87
Supra note 74.
88
G.A. Res. (xv), Para. 1 (14 December 1960).
89
Saul, Supra note 2, at 613.
90
ዉብሸት ሙላት, አንቀጽ 39: የራስን ዕድል በራስ መወሰን, (2007), ገጽ. 80.
91
G.A. Res. (xv), Para. 2 (14 December 1960).

21
status and their place in the international community based upon the principle of equal rights and
exemplified by the liberation of people from colonialism and by the prohibition to subject people
to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation.92

Then, once the era of colonialism is over, the application of the right to self-determination as
provided in relevant international law is limited only in the sense of the rights of all peoples to
pursue freely their economic, social and cultural development without outside interference and to
determine freely their political status and their place in the international community based upon
the principle of equality.

In the post-colonial period, except in a manner as provided in common art 1 of ICCPR &
ICESCR93 and the recommendation given by the committee of ICERD as provided above, the
international law neither recognizes nor prohibits self-determination as a right in the post-
colonial context, and that the law is in this sense "neutral”.94 The indication is that any
secessionist claims by any ethnic or minority groups against the sovereign state is denied by the
international laws.95 The international law rather emphasizes to the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the existing states.96,97 Because to apply the right to self-determination in the sense of
decolonization to secessionist claims, it would be a misjudgment to consider separatists as
colonial people and separatism as anti-colonial movement98 As envisaged under art 27 of
ICCPR, the rights of minorities and other ethnic groups provided under international laws is
short of secession which guaranteed their right to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice
their own religion, or to use their own language. The international system left to individual states
to determine the self-determination rights of different ethnic and minority groups in their

92
Committee of the convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discriminations, General Recommendation
No. 21: Right to self-determination, (Forty-eighth session, 1996), Para 4.
93
The right to self-determination of peoples provided in these conventions denotes the right of the overall people of
the state to determine their political status, foreign affairs, and to pursue their own social, economic and cultural
development without alien interference. See, also ዉብሸት, supra note 90.
94
Blay, supra note 70, at iii.
95
Ibid.
96
ዉብሸት, supra note 90, at 251.
97
This standing of the international system is also envisaged from the UN General assembly resolution; that under
its caption titled the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, it gives more emphasis to the
territorial integrity and political unity of sovereign and independent states which represents the whole people
belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or color.
98
ዉብሸት, supra note 90, at 251.

22
jurisdiction.99 But, once the state on its own free will guarantees the right to secede of ethnic
groups in its territory, the international community may force such state to respect its law based
on the principle of pacta sunt servanda which constitutes as a contractual liability.100

2.2 The De-Facto Emergence and Development of Irredentism in the

International System
The term "irredentism" originates from Italy nationalist movement of 1877 aimed to bring the
large Italian-speaking communities of Trentino, Istria, Trieste and the Tyrol into the arms of a
newly unified Italy.101 During the then time, these regions, neighboring Italy but were subject to
Swiss and Austrian rule, were referred to as terra irredenta, or "unredeemed land."102 Since then,
the word irredentism has being used to encompass "any political effort to unite ethnically,
historically, or geographically related segments of a population in adjacent countries in to a
single political unit.103

Thought it is not unusual to see when overlooked with the idea of nationalism and secessionism,
irredentism is defined as “the attempt by one state to detach land and people from another to
achieve incorporation within its boundaries”.104 But there is also another tension asserted by
different scholars in defining irredentism. While some insist that irredentist aspirations tend to be
focused on territory, with the ethnic group in question often a mere pawn in an expansionist plan,
others differently argue as irredentism is primarily an attempt to retrieve ethnically kindred
people across borders.105 By this case, various scholars offer their own definition of irredentism,
and they do not always agree on the movement's precise characteristics.106

This conceptual uncertainty of irredentism is attributable to different character it has when seen
from different point of view. Meaning, on the one side it may be understood as the realization of
the right to self-determination of ethnic groups; and on the other hand, it may be also conceived

99
Id. at 254.
100
Ibid.
101
Laura Murray, EXAMINING IRREDENTISM, 45: 2 Journal of International Affairs, 648, 648 (1992).
102
Ibid.
103
Ibid.
104
David Carment and Patrick James, Internal Constraints and Interstate Ethnic Conflict: Toward a Crisis-Based
Assessment of Irredentism, 39: 1 The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 82, 83 (1995).
105
Murray, Supra note 101, at 650.
106
Ibid.

23
as a scenario to state‟s territorial disintegration which is detrimental to maintain territorial
integrity of states.107

Irrespective of its conceptual and definitional imprecision, irredentist claims or movements have
being arisen in different parts of the world since its emergence in the early 1877 in Italy to the
recently Russia‟s incorporation of Crimea in 2014. Among such irredentist claims, the
movements raised in Armenia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Somalia, and Serbia are the
prominent cases.108 By its nature, irredentism has both centrifugal and centripetal tendencies
which are manifested simultaneously.109 Accordingly, while centric tendencies entails that
irredentism contributes to the unification of the separated people within the boundary of one
state, centrifugal tendencies shows the desire of the national minorities to withdraw from the
state in the form of separatism.110

There are of two types of irredentism; conventional and unificationist (pan-movement).111 In the
conventional irredentism there are three actors; the host state, parent state, and ethnic groups in
the host state kindred with the people of the parent state. To explain graphically;

Where:- A
C
B

 A is the host state

 B is the parent state
 C is the ethnic group living in state A and are kindred with the people living in state B.
The conventional type of irredentism is characterized by tri-party involvement in the case.
Meaning, while the host state (A) fiercely insists on the legitimacy of the status quo,112 the parent
state (B) on the other hand tries to incorporate the ethnically kindred peoples living in the
adjacent state,113 again the ethnic group living in the authority of the host state (C) claims to

107
Horlo, Supra note 48, at 51.
108
David S. Siroky and Christopher W. Hale, Inside Irredentism: A Global Empirical Analysis, 61: 1 American
Journal of Political Science, 117, 117 (2017).
109
Horlo, Supra note 48, at 50.
110
Ibid.
111
Julianna , Supra note 5, at 36
112
For its assertion, the host state raises its own national laws or international laws of sovereignty and territorial
integrity of states.
113
For its assertion, the parent state alleges the historical attributions and the fact of homogeneity of the people
which it tries to incorporate with its own people.

24
secede from the host state to move/join its ethnically kindred people of the parent state. 114 The
conventional type of irredentism is the most common form of irredentism which peculiarly needs
a relatively equal and active reaction of the parent state and its ethnically kindred groups living
in the host state to achieve the required result.115

It is the tri-parties reaction and most importantly the involvement of the parent state which
makes irredentism something different from and beyond the idea of self-determination or at least
only a special kind of self-determination.116 Because, as envisaged from the very term, self-
determination signifies the determination of one‟s own affair simply using own free will;
irredentism, on the other hand necessarily needs the direct or indirect involvement of the parent
state to achieve the required outcome.117

Without active and equal involvement of the parent state and the ethnic group the situation will
have another scenario; that if it is only the interest of the parent state, the situation becomes
simply annexation and if it is only the interest of the ethnic group, it becomes an implausible
irredentism or a pure self-determination claim.118 The genuine irredentism is then inconceivable
without active and a relatively equal involvement of the parent state and its ethnical kin living
under the authority of the adjacent host state. By this bi-party interest that determines the cause,
course and outcomes of irredentism, it is also impracticable to conceive irredentism as a simple
self-determination case of any nature.119 Then, it would rather preferable to term irredentist cases
(the conventional one) bilateral-determination than self-determination.

114
For its assertion, such ethnic group raises the right to self-determination claim.
115
Julianna , Supra note 5, at 22.
116
Ibid, at 34.
117
Saideman & Ayres, supra note 11, at 1140.
118
It is a pure self-determination case because it is the unilateral determination of the group on their status but the
contemporary self-determination clause does not embrace such kind of claims.
119
Self-determination, as discoursed contemporarily, constitutes claims like; identity recognition, self-
administration, and secession; each of these aspects of self-determination needs the vested interest and wills of only
the concerned groups to guarantee the rights claimed.

25
The second type of irredentism, unificationist or pan movement, is best known on its lack of the
parent state.120 This type of irredentism consists of the movements of different ethnic groups
dispersed across several host states to create their own common state by detaching and unifying
lands together with kindred peoples from several states.121 To explain graphically;

Where:-
A D C
 A, B, C are host states;
 D is the imagined state to be created; B
 The shaded parts are irredentist groups;

Unlike the conventional type of irredentism which aims joining in to or incorporated within the
political unit of the pre-existing parent state, the unificationist irredentism on the other hand aims
to creating an imagined state yet existed.122 Though there are several ongoing unificationist
irredentism movements across the world, this type of irredentism is mostly implausible to
achieve the required result.123 It is also known as the Kurdish style irredentism.124

Again, this type of irredentism is different from and broader than a simple self-determination
claim because it is not the affair of single group and its unilateral will which determines the
imagined outcome rather it is a multilateral affair and their common struggle which can achieve
the required result. Then, the unificationist irredentism cases are better to be termed as
multilateral determination than self-determination.

When we see causes of irredentism, though it may not be the same to all cases, there are
commonly alleged causes of irredentism. These causes inter alia includes ethnic discrimination,
ethnic kindred with the people of adjacent state, economic relation, power relation and economic
status of the parent state are identified as calculus of irredentism.125 On the other hand, as
critically analyzed by Stephen M. Saideman and R. William Ayres, causes of irredentism are

120
Julianna , Supra note 5, at 37.
121
Ibid.
122
Ibid.
123
Id. at 38.
124
The Kurdish movement is the claim of Kurdish people living in Iraq, Iran, turkey and Syria to establish the
Kurdish state by taking the land together with the people from such host states.
125
Siroky and Hale, supra note 108, at 118.

26
identified in the categories of group characteristics, ethnic kin‟s influence, contagion, ethnic
security dilemmas and the end of empires.126

Accordingly, group characterization includes the numerical, political, economic and

demographical situation of the group which can influence the group‟s desire to raise irredentist
claims.127 The existence of ethnic kin in the adjacent state together with active of such ethnic kin
in assisting and supporting irredentist claims of the ethnic group in the host state have also a
significant influence up on ethnic groups to raise irredentism.128 Contagious factors are the
corrupting influences happened in another place which deters groups in the host state to raise
similar irredentist claims.129 Ethnic security dilemmas are discriminations or neglects made
against the group which will lead the group to raise irredentist claim to join/move in to its ethnic
kin people of the adjacent state to seek better protection.130 The other cause of irredentism is the
end of the empire which results to disintegration of the empire like the former USSR and
Yugoslavia. Corollary newly divided state will emerge and ethnic groups bordered in to one state
which kindred to the people of an adjacent state will raise irredentist claims.131

2.3 Irredentism versus other like Cases

The idea of irredentism is neither well developed conceptually nor regulated both in international
instruments and domestic legislations. Since it has the effect of changing the territorial and
demographical status of states, the international legal regime denied it by availing the territorial
integrity and sovereignty of states. Due to this cause, irredentist cases are mostly blended with
other similar cases like self-administration, secession, nationalism, revanchism, and the like.
However, as irredentism has its own peculiarities, any attempt to describe and regulate it using
the above mentioned like cases is all a superficial juxtaposition.

A. Irredentism versus Self-Administration

As discussed under 2.2 above, irredentism is a claim of one state to detach land and people from
another to incorporate within its boundaries.132 Self-administration on the other hand is the right
of the people to determine their political status and to administer themselves by their own
126
Saideman & Ayres, supra note 11, at 1127-33.
127
Id. at 1127.
128
Id. at 1128.
129
Id. at 1129.
130
Id. at 1130.
131
Id. at 1132.
132
James, Supra note 104.

27
choice.133 Hence, while irredentism is a mere factual phenomenon, self-administration is a
recognized legal right of the people of a given state. Again, while irredentism is an incidence
alleged by the state, self-administration is a right which could be claimed by the people. Besides,
while irredentism is an allegation of a state and the trans-border ethnic groups to their
unification, self-administration is a claim of the people to their self-rule.134

On the other hand, while irredentism needs the simultaneous desire of the parent state and the
trans-territorial ethnic kin people to be unified made against the host state of the irredentas,135
self-administration is a unilateral claim of a certain group of people against the host state.

B. Irredentism versus Secession

Though it ostensibly looks similar with secession, irredentism is basically different from
secession in different grounds; firstly, while irredentism is a bilateral or multilateral
affair/decision (i.e. it needs the collaboration of the parent state)136, secession on the other hand
is a unilateral decision of secessionist group only; meaning, while secession is a group-led
movement, irredentism on the other hand is a state initiated though the group has also an
indispensable involvement in lobbing the retrieving state to take irredentist action and operating
the secessionist claim against the host state.137 Secondly, while irredentism is to join with another
pre-existing state, secession inversely is to establish own independent state. Thirdly, while
irredentism is different from or broader than self-determination of a certain group of people,
secession on the other hand is conceived as a self-determination claim of certain group of
people.138 Besides, the causes of irredentism are different from grounds to secession. 139 Above
all, while states and the international system pursue three approaches concerning secession by
which it could be express denial, silence, or to authorize it;140 by which secession is authorized
under international law when the territory is incorporated into a State by a decision of the UN

133
At the international level, this can be inferred from the self-determination right of the people provided under
common art 1 of ICCPR and ICESCR from the wording “… by virtue of that right they freely determine their
political status …”. On the other hand in Ethiopia the right to self-administration of people is explicitly stipulated
under art 39/3 of the FDRE Constitution.
134
FDRE Constitution, Art 39/3.
135
Saideman & Ayres, supra note 11, at 1140.
136
Id. at 1136.
137
Horowitz, supra note 9, at 423.
138
At least the FDRE constitution under art 39 (1) recognizes secession as a self-determination rights of peoples.
139
Saideman & Ayres, supra note 11, at 1136 – 1137.
140
MARCELO G. KOHEN (ed), SECESSION: International Law Perspectives, Cambridge University Press, United
States of America, New York (2006), p. 19.

28
General Assembly under certain conditions and if these conditions are not respected, if entities
had been illegally incorporated into a State, and if states expressly recognized a right to secession
in domestic law.141 Irredentism on the other hand is rarely allowed neither in international nor in
domestic laws.142 Despite such differences, both irredentism and secession are known as
secessionist claims; especially unificationist irredentism greatly resembles with secession as it
aims to create an imagined new state.

C. Irredentism versus Nationalism

Nationalism is an ideology or social and political movement which holds a consciousness of
belonging to the nation, together with sentiments and aspirations for its security and prosperity as
its national will.143 Hence, the melody of nationalism embraces a broader spectrum of socio-
economic and political life of the people belonging to a certain nation irrespective of their
whereabouts. To say in another word, nationalism is not limited to the territorial retrieving of
trans-border ethnic kin; rather it further aspires to mobilize the people belonging to a certain
nation to the socio-economic prosperity and aims to create a sense of nationhood sentiment up on
the members. Therefore, nationalism is a broader concept which could embrace irredentism.

To reiterate, though it is not unusual to see when an irredentist incidence is juxtaposed with
nationalism, irredentism, which is a political movement of an aspiration to retrieve the trans-
border ethnic kin people together with the land they reside in to a unified territory, is a sub-set of
nationalism.144 Irredentism is expressed in a language of nationalism by which it seeks to form a
nation-state.145 That nationalism is used as an instrument to effectuate irredentist claims. But,
nationalism is a broader concept which is not limited on territorial unification of ethnically
kindred peoples in a single authority; rather it also seeks non-territorial consolidation of nationals
living across different states. Of course, there can be civic or ethnic nationalism; that while civic
nationalism ascribes to belongingness to a state and loyalty to it, ethno-nationalism on the other

141
Ibid.
142
Saideman & Ayres, supra note 11 at 1139.
143
WAYNE NORMAN, Negotiating Nationalism: Nation-building, Federalism, and Secession in the Multinational
State, Oxford University Press Inc., United States; New York (2006). P. 5.
144
Julianna, Supra note 5, at 67.
145
Ibid.

29
hand presupposes belongingness to a certain ethnic groups and asserting a claim as (historic)
right to self-determination for local autonomy or independence.146

D. Irredentism versus Revanchism

Revanchism, a term originated in 1870s Franco-Prussian war, is a political manifestation of the

will to reverse territorial losses incurred by a country, often following a war or social
movement.147 Though the idea of revanchism greatly resembles with irredentism, the latter
concerns to the cultural and ethnic nation remain unredeemed outside the border of its
appropriate nation state. Meaning while revanchism concern to retrieve the lost territory which is
mainly claimed by the state that lost its territory sometime in the past, irredentism on the other
hand has equal concern to the lost territory and the ethnic kindred people live in it alike.148
Again, irredentism requires an active involvement of the trans-border ethnic kindred people to
unite with their parent state which could be considered as a self-determination claim from their
perspective.

E. Irredentism versus Diaspora Politics

The idea of irredentism has also some resemblance with a related scenario of diasporic people.
But these two ideas are basically different when critically look to their essence; that on the one
hand while irredentist group need to live in the adjacent state, diasporic peoples could live
anywhere outside their home land; and, on the other hand while irredentist groups define
themselves as native to the land they live, diasporic peoples consider themselves as nonnative to
the land they live.149 Again, while diasporic politics aims at finding solutions within the
framework of the status quo, irredentism seeks to alter it which is to secede from the host state
and join/united with the parent state by changing the territorial demarcation exited between the
two states.150 From the perspective of the parent state, in case of irredentism, the state considers
as retrieving its ancestral land irrespective of whether the land is inhibited all with the irredentist
ethnic kin or shared with other groups; but in case of diasporic people, the parent state simply

146
Nityananda Kalita, RESOLVING ETHNIC CONFLICT IN NORTHEAST INDIA, 72, II Proceedings of the
Indian History Congress, 1354, 1364 (2011).
147
Robert Jay, the spy and the legacy of the Franco-Prussian war, 19 metropolitan museum journal, pp. 151, 152
(1984).
148
Supra note 7.
149
Julianna, Supra note 5, at 42.
150
Id. at 66.

30
provide protection to its people living outside through diplomacy or other sin quo non
mechanisms.

F. Irredentism versus Territorial Dispute

Irredentism, as it has the effect of changing the territorial status demarcated between the parent
and the host states, it looks as a mere border dispute between states. But territorial dispute, which
is a disagreement over the possession/control over land between two or more territorial entities,
resulted from a vague border treaty or a mere de-facto demarcation. Meaning, while territorial
dispute is a claim over contesting area, irredentism is a movement to retrieve area of land from
the rightful holder despite whatever a manner it hold that area of land. Again, while territorial
dispute is a claim over a plot of land disregard of the people live in it, irredentism on the other
hand is a movement to unify ethnic brethren living across adjacent states.

2.4 Comprehensiveness of the International Legal Framework in Addressing

Irredentist Claims
The idea of self-determination was imbued with a qualified moral status in international relations
after the First World War as a principles of „government by consent‟ for certain national groups
in Europe.151 The principle of self-determination was extended to non-Europeans by the
Universalist claims of the UN Charter of 1945, where Articles 1(2) and 55 enshrined the
„principle‟ (not the „right‟) of „self-determination of peoples‟.152 Chapters XI and XII of the
charter stipulated that colonial powers should promote „self-government‟ of „territories‟, not
ethnic groups. The shift from principle to enforceable right of self-determination in international
law came in 1976 with the entry into force of two international covenants agreed in 1966: the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. The first article of both covenants declared, „All peoples
have the right to self-determination‟. The binding legal effect, however, was accompanied by a
number of ambiguities, most importantly over defining „peoples‟, which created conceptual
incoherence.153

151
James Hughes & Gwendolyn Sasse, Comparing Regional and Ethnic Conflicts in Post-Soviet Transition States,
Regional & Federal Studies, p. 17. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/714004705 (Published online: 08 Sep
2010) (2001)
152
Ibid.
153
Ibid.

31
Contemporarily, self-determination is the most rhetoric concept in legal and political discourses
despite the controversy concerning its normative contents and on the question whether self-
determination is a merely principle or a right.154 The right to self-determination, as stipulated
under different international instruments like; the Charter of United Nations,155 the 1960 UN
Declaration on Self-determination of Peoples,156 the 1970 Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance
with the Charter of United Nations,157 International Convention on the Elimination of all forms
of Racial Discriminations (ICERD),158 the 1976 two International Covenants159 is short of
granting any territorial autonomy to group of peoples within a given state. The right to self-
determination provided under such international instruments is made the whole people of a given
state than to other sub-group of people within the state.160

In this regard, the international system emphasizes on the state sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the status quo which for most purposes is state dominated even though there is a post
facto rationalizations and recognition of territorial separations in particular case. 161 Again, no
doctrine of minority rights is adequate to embrace self-determination of such groups in the
territorial expression.162

Irredentism too, is hardly regulated in the international legal framework.163 On the ground of
general obligation to resolve disputes through peaceful means and emphasizing on the principle
of non-intervention and territorial integrity of states, the international system greatly constrains
irredentist claims as a legal and political phenomenon.164 Unlike state secession which in some
circumstance is tolerable at least in the post fact case,165 irredentist claim is hardly tolerable by

154
Horowitz, supra note 9, at 445.
155
U.N. Charter art. 1(2).
156
Declaration, Supra note 85.
157
United Nations General assembly resolution No. 25/2625, declaration on principles of international law
concerning friendly relations and cooperation among states in accordance with the charter of United nations (24
October 1970),
158
International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted by the general
assembly resolution 2106 December 1965 and entry into force on 4 January 1969, preamble, Para. 4.
159
ICCPR & ICESCR, common art 1.
160
Horowitz, Supra note 9, at 446.
161
Ibid.
162
Id. at 453.
163
Pronto, Supra note 8, at 120.
164
Ibid.
165
Ibid.

32
the international system irrespective of the circumstances of the retrieval as envisaged in
Russia‟s retrieval of Crimea which the UN general assembly denounced it as an illegal
annexation by its resolution 68/262 (2014) though the retrieval is made by referendum. 166

Conclusion

The idea of self-determination has undergone a long evolution since its very underpinning in the
aftermath of the First World War in Europe. This evolution results to important development of
the idea in terms of its spatial reach by which it was extended to non-Europeans by art 1(2) and
55 of the UN Charter, and normatively it has shifted from a principle to enforceable right
through the 1976 two international covenants. However, its normative contents and subjects of
the right lack a consensus yet. The notion of the right as stipulated under common art 1of ICCPR
& ICESCR is limited to the right of the people in a given country to freely determine their
political status and pursue their choice of socio-economic and cultural development; which in no
way guarantees self-determination rights of sub-national groups in a manner of territorial
autonomy. The 1960 UN Declaration on the other hand grants self-determination right of
colonized peoples to their liberation from colonial rule.

Irredentism, which is the simultaneous quest of the parent state and trans-border ethnic kin
groups to their political and territorial unification, is barely regulated under international legal
framework; that the international system stacks with the principle of sovereignty and territorial
integrity of states. Based on the pre-existence of the parent state, two types of irredentist cases
are identified; the conventional and unificationist. While conventional irredentism presupposes
the presence of pre-existed parent state, unificationist irredentism aims to create an imagined
new state. Despite the denial of the contemporary legal frameworks, irredentist cases could be
embraced under the notion of self-determination. Irredentism, though is only a factual
phenomenon, has its own distinctive features by which it is different from other likely cases of
secession, self-administration, nationalism, border dispute, and so on.

166
Horlo, supra note 48, at 49.

33
 Chapter Three

3 The Nature and Peculiarities of the Welkait Case

This Chapter is devoted in discussing; the very fact of Welkait peoples‟ quest to their “Amharan
nationhood identity and border claim” petitioned to the House of Federation by the Committee
of the claimant Welkait people, the process undergone by the Committee and the response of the
House of Federation, the nature of the claim and its distinctive feature with other self-
determination and like cases.

3.1 Introduction: Welkait in History and Demographic Status

Before the adoption of Federal State structure in 1995,167 Ethiopia had been a unitary state
despite a de-facto decentralization of power by delegation to different provincial nobilities from
the central authority. But it was hardly possible to get ethnically delaminated administrations.
The provincial administrations were more of territorial delaminated based on their administrative
convenience and then different areas had been incorporated in to a certain provincial
administration according to their vicinity to such administrations. Accordingly, Welkait had been
under the administration of Begemdir, centered at Gondar.168 But, demographically, Welkait has
a cosmopolitan population constituted of Amharans, Tigreans, and Eritreans though Amharans
overwhelm others and the area had been administered under the rule of Amhara nation under the
administration of Begemdir centered at Gondar.169 Literatures reveal that Wlkaite people are
Amharans and the land belongs to Amhara.170

In 1995, when the country adopted Federal system, the FDRE Constitution establishes an ethnic
federalism.171 Though art 46 of the FDRE Constitution provides that states shall be delimited on
the bases of settlement patterns, language, identity and consent of the people concerned, these

167
FDRE Constitution, art 1.
168
ያሬድ Supra note 60.
169
Ibid.
170
For detail, refer Achamyeleh Tamiru, Forceful Annexation, Violation of Human Rights and Silent genocide: A
Quest for Identity and Geographic Restoration of Wolkait-Tegede, Gondar, Amhara, Ethiopia, (unpublished
manuscript), available at: https://ecadforum.com/2016/08/12/ethiopia-a-quest-for-identity-and-geographic-
restoration-of-wolkait-tegede/, accessed on 25 may 2019, at 12:39.
171
This is envisaged from art 46 and 47 of the FDRE constitution. However the federal structure of the country had
been framed prior to the adoption of the constitution in the transitional period; that the constitute federations of the
country had been delimited under fourteen administration by Proclamation No. 7/1993 which later the constitution
re-affirms the transitional period delamination with some modification by which the federations are reduced in to
nine constitute units.

34
criteria are not sufficiently complied on the ground and the delimitation of states is formed
basically on language pattern despite its overlaps in some areas. Coming to Welkait, though it is
alleged that indigenous peoples are Amharans,172 demographically there is a cosmopolitan
population.173 Again, due to its vicinity to Tigray and Eritrea, and a large scale resettlement
program made by TPLF in the eve of its coming to power, the demography of Welkait is
purposely changed by the Government and now the area is populated by the majority of Tigrgna
speaking people.174 On the other hand, there is also a counter arguments asserted by those who
wants to perpetuate the current status quo insisting that Welkait people are Tigreans.175

3.2 The Nature and Elements of the Welkait Case

In 1991, when Federalism had been adopted as a state structure in Ethiopia, using the simplistic
fact of language which even the indigenous people are fluent in Tigrigna due to the geographic
vicinity of the area to Tigray and Eretria, Welkait had been incorporated in to the RST.176 Since
then, Welkait people had a prolonged and ongoing quest to secede from RST and to move/ join
to their ethnic kin people of the Amhara nation with in the RSA.177 After all, the claim had
formally appealed to the House of Federation on 21 November 2008.178 However, the House of
Federation rejects the petition on the ground of non-exhaustion of remedies at the State level in
accordance to art 20(1) of Proclamation No. 251/2001.179 The decision of the House in returning
the case back to be pleaded to the administration of the RST amounts as denial of justice at it
doesn‟t consider the arguments of the Committee on the reluctance of the RST officials to give a
positive response to the claim of the people.180

172
Interview with Christen Tadele, Executive Member and Public Relation Director of the “National Movement of
Amhara” party, interviewed by Zelalem Dereje, hosted by LTV, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pUreUoSMYKk, uploaded on Nov 11, 2018 - Uploaded by EthioViral, accessed
on 21, juanary 2019, at 4:46 pm.
173
Interview with Atalay Zafea, Committee member of the “Welkait peoples‟ Amharan nationhood identity and
border claim”, interviewed on May 2018.
174
Interview with Christen Tadele, Supra note 172.
175
Interview with Kidane Amene, Excutive Member of Arena Tigray, interviewed by Zelalem Dereje, hosted by
LTV, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pUreUoSMYKk, uploaded on Nov 11, 2018 - Uploaded by
EthioViral, accessed on 21, January 2019, at 4:46 pm.
176
Interview with Atalay Zafea, Supra note 173.
177
Ibid.
178
Supra note 62.
179
Interview with Atalay Zafea, Supra note 173.
180
Ibid.

35
Though the case could be regarded as a self-determination claim from the perspective of the
claimant Welkait people, it would have another dimension when the non-Welkait Amhara nation
and /State Government raise similar claim to retrieve Welkait into the RSA; that there are
overlapping actors on the case beyond the people concerned. Besides, the claim of the people is
to secede from the RST and to join/move into the Regional State of Amhara; such a kind of
claim is best to be termed as irredentism.181 This scenario of legal and/or political claim is
regulated neither in the international law,182 nor in the domestic laws.183

Beside the nature of the claim, there is also another setting which demonstrates the validity to
assert the claim as irredentism; which is the involvement of different actors in the case. Beyond
the Welkait people who are the legitimate claimant of the right to self-determination, there are
two other actors involved in the process of Welkait peoples‟ self-determination claim; the RST
and the RSA Governments.

As the term itself denotes, self-determination implies determining one‟s own status
autonomously. Then, if we conceive the case of Welkait as a simple self-determination claim of
the people concerned, there would not be conflicting interest on the outcome of the case between
the RSA and RST governments. Because in self-determination claims there could be only two
actors whose interest be in stake; the claimant group of people and the State which the claimant
group of people lives in.

Accordingly, in the process of the case, while the claimant group quest to any of self-
determination it needs (identity, self-rule or secession) against the state, the host state on the
other hand may willfully grant the quest claimed to the group184 or it may deny by alleging its
territorial integrity.185 Then, in terms of actors involved, self-determination claim is known for
the involvement of two actors; the state and the claimant group. Hence, irrespective of any

181
The term generally denotes a scenario by which group people having similar ethnic kin be governed with in a
single authority.
182
Not only such kind of claims (irredentism) but also the self-determination right of ethnic groups in the sense of
territorial autonomy is not guaranteed in the relevant international laws. Self-determination of peoples in the sense
of autonomy is recognized only to colonial peoples.
183
The right to self-determination of ethnic groups (expressed as nation, nationalities and peoples) is principally
stipulated under art 39 of the FDRE constitution. But this right, as stipulated in this art includes only identity
recognition (39/2), self-administration (39/3), and secession (39/4); by which, claims like what is made by Welkait
people (irredentist claim) is not addressed as a right.
184
Mostly when the claim of the group is short of secession.
185
This is mostly when the claim of the group is a quest to secession.

36
historical and cultural allegations, currently Welkait is administered under the governance of the
RST. Then, the Welkait case, if it is a pure self-determination claim, it needs to be claimed only
by the people concerned and the reaction need to be limited between the claimant Welkait people
and the RST. But what is seen in Welkait case is different.

If any third party is actively involved in determining the case particularly in an attempt to
retrieve the claimant group into its authority, the case is something beyond and different from
self-determination claim of the concerned group; which is what we call as irredentism.

Thus, in Welkait case, the involvement of the RSA Government186 makes the case one of
irredentism than self-determination claim of Welkait people alone. Until recently the
involvement of the RSA Government was seldom but after the incidence of reform in 2018
which greatly erodes the power of the oligarchy government dominated by TPLF, the RSA
Government starts to actively react with the Welkait case as an attempt to retrieve it.187

The effort and attempt to retrieve Welkait looks greater from the side of the Amhara nation as
people than the State Government. The people of Amhara nation living within and outside the
state are curious with Welkait case and explicitly manifested it in different demonstrations which
show the aspiration of the people to retrieve Welkait into the RSA.

Though currently the demography of Welkait is changed and superseded by Tigreans, the
Amhara people fiercely insist in retrieving Welkait by asserting the historical status of the area
which is allegedly known as an Amharan land and the ingenious people of the area were
Amharans.188 Here, the mere fact of demographical change does not affect irredentism because
the allegation presupposes the Amharan nationhood identity of Welkait people by which they are
indigenous people of the area. Hence, irrespective of demographic change, indigenous peoples
have the right to self-determination.189 The RSA officials also confirm that the current
demographic change of Welkait does not impede the Welkait peoples‟ Amharan nationhood
186
Refer a speech made by Gedu Andargachew, president of the regional state of Amhara, available at:
www.hahudaily.com/top/watch.php?vid=37e7c21a9, accessed on 25/01/2019, 11:16 am.
187
Interview Dessie Tilahun, infra note 210.
188
Tamiru, supra note 170.
189
United Nations Declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on
13 September 2007, art 3 & 4. Again, the committee of ICCPR in its concluding observation on Australia, the
Committee observed that state parties should take the necessary steps in order to secure for the indigenous
inhabitants a stronger role in decision making over their traditional land and natural resources. (see; Concluding
Observations on Australia, UN Doc CCPR/CO/69/AUS (2000)).

37
identity and the redeeming of Welkait into the RSA.190 Hence, the idea is redeeming the trans-
border ethnic kin people and their inhabiting ancestral land; that demographical change has
nothing to do with irredentist cases. Accordingly, such kind of claims cannot be settled by
referendum; or if referendum is opted, the voter would constitute the indigenous peoples by out
casting new settlers. In so doing, once Welkait is redeemed in to the RSA, Tigraians living there
will be provided a minority protection by the RSA Government likewise other ethnic minorities
living in the Region State.191

Beside the concerned Welkait people, the rest of Amhara nation particularly the Gondar people
are the prominent advocators of the Welkait case to retrieve it into the RSA. One may possibly
wonder that any public assembly in Gondar may not be closed without raising the issue of
Welkait case.

Then, the fact that the non-Welkait Amhara nation and particularly Gondar peoples‟ active
reaction and being interested with the Welkait case implies the irredentist nature of the case than
a self-determination claim of Welkait people alone because the quest is not only the claim of
Welkait people but also the rest of the Amhara nation and RSA government too.

To reiterate, the quest made by Welkait people to their Amharan nationhood identity and to join
with their alleged Amharan ethnic kin which simultaneously accompanied by the rest of Amhara
nation/ and RSA Government is better characterized as irredentist claim of retrieving Welkait
into the RSA.

Let alone the international system which denies self-determination rights of ethnic groups living
in a given state in the sense of territorial autonomy,192 the normative contents of the right to self-
determination provided under art 39 of the FDRE Constitution is not comprehensive to embrace
irredentist claims.193

190
Interview Dessie Tilahun, infra note 210.
191
Ibid.
192
The protection provided by the international system to different groups of peoples in a certain state is short of the
right to territorial autonomy; which includes identity recognition and protection of minority groups (art 27 of
ICCPR), guarantee against discrimination (ICERD), identity protection and sentimental interests of indigenous
peoples (the united nations declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples adopted on September 13 (2007).
193
Supra note 183.

38
It is not clear whether irredentism is a legal case or political phenomenon; by which, due to its
rarely coverage in the contemporary legal discourses194 and the high Governmental involvement
in effectuating the outcome of irredentist claims,195 irredentism is usually conceived as a political
phenomenon.196 The same legal and political overlapping is evidenced in the case of Welkait.

3.3 Peculiarities which Characterize the Welkait Case as an Irredentist Case

The right to Self-determination, as provided under art 39 of the FDRE Constitution, embraces
identity recognition, self-rule, and secession; among these traits of self-determination,
irredentism is commonly blended with secession. Though it may be conceived as a special form
of self-determination, irredentist claims have its own distinct peculiarities which distinguish it
from elements of the right self-determination provided under art 39 of the FDRE Constitution.
There are five peculiarities of irredentist claims;

Firstly, unlike secession which aims to seek autonomy, irredentism is a claim to secede from one
state and unite with another state.197 Secession and irredentist claims, not only have different
goals, but they are also determined by different casual factors.198 This is what happened in
Welkait case; that the claim, as manifested from different public opinions in demonstrations held
in various part of RSA and envisaged from the petition filed to the House of Federation by the
Committee, the quest is to secede Welkait from the RST and to move into/or reunited with the
RSA.

Secondly, the involvement of tri-party actors;199 of the two forms of irredentism, the Welkait case
could be categorized as the conventional form of irredentism. Because, there is a parent state
which is the RSA, the host state which are the RST, and the irredentas which is the claimant
Welkait people. Accordingly, the quest is the claim of Welkait people to secede from the RST;
and to unite with their alleged ethnical kindred people of Amhara nation in the RSA.

Thirdly, bilateral desire for retrieval;200 there must be two distinct parties actively involved in
determining the outcome of the case; the parent state and the trans-border ethnic kin

194
Pronto, supra note 8, at 108.
195
David, Supra note 108, at 117.
196
Horlo, Supra note 48, at 50.
197
Julianna, Supra note 5, at 66.
198
Ibid.
199
Id. at 36.
200
Id. at 43.

39
community.201 On the other hand it is the consensual wish for retrieval between the parent state
and the irredentist group living in the adjacent state. In the absence of this simultaneous desire, it
is improbable to conduct a successful irredentism. The same is true in Welkait case because the
Welkait people and the Amhara nation/ and RSA Government are both interested to be united or
retrieve Welkait with in the RSA.

Fourthly, antagonist parent-host states relations;202 as it is a cross-territorial claim, it is inevitable

that irredentism will create a hostile relation between the host and the parent States. 203 The host
State, beside its measures taken to suppress the claim of irredentist groups living within its
territory, will have a hostile relation up to threat and wage of war against the parent state by
alleging the violation of its territorial integrity.204 Similarly, since recently, there is a hostile
relation between the RST and the RSA. The hostility also extends to the relation between the
people of Amharan and Tigrean nationals.

Fifthly, an inclusive and open-ended political strategy of the parent state; The parent state aims
for a border adjustment in the adjacent host state in an attempt to retrieve the irredentist ethnic
kin living in the host state. The parent state also extends citizenship to the trans-border ethnic
kin.205 Positive attitude of parent state public opinion and manifesting some kind of popular
mandate for irredentist group is the other peculiarity of irredentism. 206 Besides, there is also a
significant electoral approval of irredentist party in the parent state.207 These behaviors are
unequivocally manifested in the Amhara people and RSA Government since recently. Again,
there is a great popular approval of the newly established nationalistic Amharan party called
„National Movement of Amharan‟ which fiercely advocates to the re-incorporation and re-
demarcation of Regional states aiming to retrieve the allegedly lost adjacent Amhara‟s lands and
ethnic kindred peoples into the RSA.208

201
Ibid.
202
Id. at 65.
203
Id. at 69
204
Id. at 63.
205
Id. at 57.
206
Ibid.
207
Ibid.
208
Interview with Yesuf Ebrahim, Research and Strategy affairs Director of the “Amhara National Movement”
Party, interviewed on 24-May 2019.

40
 3.4 Comparative Analysis of the Welkait Case with Other Likely Cases
As discussed above under 2.4, irredentist cases are different from other likely cases. Likewise,
the Welkait case is different from other resembling cases. That;

a) The Welkait case is not a claim to self-administration

The claim made by the committee of the Welkait people which is quested as “the Amharan
nationhood identity recognition and border claim of the Welkait people”209 which is
simultaneously accompanied by the rest of Amhara nation/ and the RSA government 210 to
redeem Welkait is not a claim to self-administration. Had it been a self-administration claim, it
would be the claim of the concerned Welkait people alone because, let alone the international
system which guaranteed only the right to self-determination of people of a colonized state or
people of a given country as whole to pursue their own choice of economic, cultural and social
development,211 art 39 of the FDRE constitution guaranteed the right to self-administration to the
concerned nation, nationalities and people of Ethiopia. Again, if it is a claim to self-
administration, it would be answered within the RST by granting internal self-rule to the
claimant people within the Region.

Hence, what a legal ground justifies the involvement of non-Welkait Amharan nation/ and the
State government in the Welkait case? The RSA Government had been pursued a linnet approach
concerning the Welkait case conceding that the case is an exclusive affair of the RST as the area
is demarcated and administered under the RST.212 But since recently, the RSA Government is
being actively involving in the Welkait case by raising the issue to the Federal Government in
different occasions.213

Now, it is understood that the Welkait case is the quest to the Amharan nationhood identity
recognition of Welkait people and consequent territorial re-demarcation which concerns not only
the claimant Welkait people but also the rest of Amhara nation /and the RSA Government.214
Besides, the RSA Government also alleges that the indigenous Welkait people are Amharans and
the land also belongs to Amhara. Accordingly, the RSA Government needs the re-demarcation
209
Supra note 62.
210
Interview with M/r Dessie Tilahun, the Political affairs director of the “Amhara Democratic Party”, interviewed
on 30 April 2019.
211
ICCPR art 1(1).
212
Interview with M/r Dessie Tilahun, Supra note 210.
213
Ibid.
214
Ibid.

41
and re-institutionalization of the area into the RSA.215 Hence, the Welkait case, while it has the
feature of self-determination when claimed by the concerned Welkait people to the recognition
of their Amharan identity, it would have a different dimension when the non-Welkait Amharans
/and the RSA Government directly involve in the case to determine its outcome; which is what
we call irredentism.

To reiterate, saving the procedures it needs to be pursued with the host state, the right to self-
administration needs the unilateral desire of the concerned people.216 Contrarily, in Welkait case,
the desired outcome of the claim needs the bilateral interest and effort of the irredentist Welkait
people and the parent Amhara nation/ and RSA Government. Accordingly, it is hardly possible
to say that the Welkait case is a self-administration claim. It would rather be named as a bilateral
claim of the irredentist Welkait people and the Amhara nation/and RSA Government against the
RST; which is technically termed as irredentism.

b) The Welkait case is not a claim to secession

The Welkait case, which is claimed to be secede from the RST in order to be united with the
RSA, is a different scenario than a state secession. Because, while secession seeks to establishing
own independent state, the claim in the Welkait case is to secede from the RST in order to Merge
with the RSA. Again, while secession requires the unilateral interest of the concerned people to
its reaction with the host state, in the case of Welkait the outcome of the case requires the mutual
interest of the irredentist Welkait people and the parent RSA.

c) The Welkait case is not a claim to identity recognition

As described from the petition made by the committee of Welkait people to the House of
Federation,217 in fact the Welkait case has a claim to identity recognition to their Amharan
nationhood. But this identity recognition claimed by the people is to be used as a means to
another end; to be unified with the Amhara nation and to be administered under the RSA. Had it
been a claim to identity alone, it would had been claimed independently like the quest of

215
Ibid.
216
FDRE constitution, art 39(4).
217
Supra note 62.

42
Kemant218 and could have been answered accordingly by the RST219 or intervention of the House
of Federation.220

On the other hand, the Amharan identity is an already recognized identity under the FDRE
Constitution.221 That, an already recognized identity cannot be re-claimed despite the claimant
peoples are living in the territory of another nation.222 The claimant people would rather claim to
the protection and enjoyment of their identity within the RST based on their human right to
minority protection.223

Again, as stipulated under art 39/2 of the FDRE Constitution, it is the concerned people who had
the right to claim for the recognition, protection and enjoyment of its identity. Hence, had it been
a claim to their identity alone, the Welkait case would rather had been claimed only by the
concerned Welkait people independent of any accompany from the non-Welkait Amharan
nationals/ and RSA Government.

Contrary to the rules and procedures to identity recognition stipulated under the FDRE
Constitution and Proc. No. 251/2001, the Welkait case is claimed for the re-recognition of the
already recognized identity which has also an inconsistent claim to territorial re-demarcation;
altogether aimed to be unified with the alleged ethnic kindred Amharan people and to be
administered under the governance of the RSA. And this claim would rather known as an
irredentist claim.

d) The Welkait case is not a movement of Nationalism

Though there is a recent popular mobilization to Amharan nationalism campaigned by different
Amhara activists both privately and institutionally, the case of Welkait is a prolonged claim since
its demarcation within the RST.224 In another word, it is convincing to say that it is the prolonged
denial and injustice to the Welkait case which triggers for the born of Amhara nationalism than

218
Yeshiwas Degu Belay, Kemant (ness): the quest for identity and autonomy in Ethiopian federal polity, 4:18
developing country studies, pp. 157-167 (2014).
219
Proclamation 251/2001, art 20(2).
220
Id. art 20(1).
221
FDRE Constitution, art 47/3.
222
Zeray W/Senbet, the Welkait identity claim – History and the Constitution, Horn Affairs, available at:
http://hornaffairs.com/am/2016/06/02/ethiopia-wolqait-identity-history-constitution/, accessed on 22 May 2019, at
4:18 pm.
223
ICCPR art 27.
224
Interview with Atalay Zafea, Supra note 173.

43
accrediting the Amharan nationalism to the Welkait case. Again, nationalism does not always
seek retrieving territories and ethnic kindred in a single authority. It rather aims to developing the
sentiment and aspiration of the people for their belongingness to the concerned nation by which
it mobilizes the people to secure their common socio-economic and political interest;225 and this
can be achieved irrespective of their whereabouts.

The case of Welkait on the other hand is something different from this, that it seeks to retrieve
the area and the people within the RSA alleging that the land belongs to Amhara and the
indigenous people of the area are Amharans.226 This retrieving effort of the RSA Government is
simultaneously accompanied by the quest of the irredentist Welkait people to be recognized as
Amharans and to be administered within the RSA.227 Though it has some feature of ethno-
nationalism, the Welkait case, ipso facto is an irredentist case than a movement of nationalism.

e) The Welkait case is not a revanchist case

Unlike revanchist cases which aim to redeem the lost territory disregard of the people therein, 228
the Welkait case is a mutual claim of both the irredentist Welkait people and the RSA
Government to be united together in one administration. The two claimant groups have the same
interest in different sides against the host RST. Besides, unlike revanchism in which the claim is
made only by the retrieval state, the Welkait case is claimed primarily by the irredentist Welkait
people which latter accompanied by the non-Welkaite Amhara nation/ and the RSA Government.
Again, the retrieval RSA Government aims not only to redeem the land in question but also to
incorporate the allegedly ethnically kindred people living there within its administration. Hence,
the Welkait case is not a revanchist claim; rather it is an irredentist case.

f) The Welkait case is not a case of diasporic politics

Diasporic politics is a movement or policy of the mother state to protect its nationals living in
another state. Hence, the home state tries to protect its nationals living outside at distance using
different diplomatic approaches. But in Welkait case, the RSA Government strive for the
redemption of the land in question which corollary seeks to incorporate the ethnically kindred

225
Norman, supra note 143.
226
Interview with Dessie Tilahun, Supra note 210.
227
Supra note 62.
228
Robert Jay, supra note 147.

44
people living there within its administration.229 Meaning, here there is the aim of direct
administration of the people and the land rather than giving protection at distance. Moreover,
unlike diasporic people who do not consider themselves as aboriginals to the land they
inhibited,230 in the case of Welkait, the claimant Welkait people consider themselves as
indigenous to the area in question.231 Hence, the Wlkait case is not a diasporic politics; rather it
is an irredentist claim which aims to redeem the land and direct administration of the people
living therein.

g) The Welkait case is not the case of Border Conflict

Border conflict is a contestation between two or more territorial entities on certain plot of land
bordering them. Accordingly, border conflict is a matter of political affair and it is an exclusive
interest of one state against another state rather than the right of the peoples living in the
contested area. This scenario of territorial conflict can possibly arise at intra-state level among
the constitute units of the federal state as what is happening in north-east India.232 However, the
case of Welkait is the claim of Welkait people to the recognition of their Amharan identity and a
quest to unify with their ethnic brethren Amhara nation accompanied by similar interest from the
rest of Amhara nation and the RSA Government to retrieve the irredentist Welkait people in to
its administration. Hence, the Welkait case is not the case of border conflict rather it is an
irredentist claim to the unification of allegedly ethnically kindred people with in single
administration. However, since recently, as a spillover effect, it is observable when the Welkait
case triggers a sense of hostility between Amharan and Tigrian peoples / State Governments.

h) The Welkait case is not a scenario of state expansion

State expansion is a mere annexation of extra-territorial areas irrespective of the interest and
ethnic status of the trans-border peoples.233 It aims to territorial expansion of the state against a
neighboring state which is mainly devised using economic, political or military superiority of the
expansionist state against a relative less positioned adjacent state. On the other hand, irredentism

229
Interview with M/s Werknesh Mamo, the Spokesman of the Regional State of Amhara State Council, interviewed
on 29 April 2019.
230
Julianna, Supra note 5, at 42.
231
Interview with Atalay Zafea, Supra note 173.
232
Border Disputes in North-Eastern India, available at: https://www.jagranjosh.com/general-knowledge/border-
disputes-in-north-eastern-india-1550566981, accessed on 20 may 2019 at 10:46 am.

233
Julianna, supra note 5, at 65.

45
requires not only the presence of trans-border ethnic brethren but also the desire of such trans-
border ethnic kin to be unified with the retrieval parent state. Hence, unlike state expansion,
irredentism can‟t be exercised by unilateral desire of the retrieval state. Similarly, in the Welkait
case, the alleged existence of trans-border Amhara ethnic kin living in the RST and their claim to
the recognition of their Amharan identity together with the desire to be incorporated within the
RSA outcasts the case from being a mere state expansion approach of the RSA Government.

i) The Welkait case is not a mere diversionary war

Sometimes irredentism might be conceived as a strategy of the parent state to its weak
governance as a mechanism to divert the attention of its people outward. Despite irredentism
hardly escapes from such kind of suspicious interpretation, Nevertheless this instrumental use
would be impossible without the mainland populations‟ enthusiastic support and positive
response of the trans-border minorities.234 Hence, attempts being made by the RSA Government
to retrieve Welkait do not constitute a diversionary war as the action has high popular support
from the Amhara nation which is even greater than the desire of the RSA Government itself.

3.5 Approaches Pursued by Different Stake-Holders in the Welkait Case

One peculiarity of irredentist case is the involvement of tri-party actors;235 the host state,
irredentist group and parent state. Each of these parties has a commonly identified strategies and
allegations in an attempt to realize their respective goal.

The host state’s character: The host state is known to its countering irredentism acts by which it
de-legitimizes irredentas groups and pursues voluntary or coercive system of ethnic
domination.236 Similarly, the RST Government de-legitimizes the very claim of irredentist
Welkait people by denying any response to petition made by the Committee237 both in their
initial approach and by the direction of the House of Federation for the exhaustion of state level
remedies as provided under art 20(1) of proc. No. 251/2001.

Again, it is also alleged that the RST Government had undergone a long process doing on
changing ethnic demography of the area since around 1970s.238 Forced re-settlement programs as

234
Ibid.
235
Julianna supra note 5 at 36.
236
Id. at 60.
237
Interview with Atalay Zafea, Supra note 173.
238
Tamiru, supra note 170, at 29.

46
a state-directed demographic engineering is also another approach of the host state239 as what has
been done by the RST Government (TPLF) since the eve of its coming to power.240

Besides, the host state mostly applies a less tangible but powerful instrument of forced
assimilation by which the host state harasses the irredentist minorities through linguistic
repression, biased schooling, banning minority culture and its national symbols.241 This approach
of the host state is not an exception in the Welkaite case too.242

On the other hand, to its reaction with the parent state, the host state is known to its counter
irredentism approach by which it alleges as the territory in question is its lost territory and raise a
counter claim of even a further and extended area to be under its jurisdiction.243 This is also an
approach of the host RST in its reaction with the parent RSA in the Welkait case.244

The trans-border minority strategies: due to the repressive measures from the host state, the
trans-border minority‟s action is more of restrained.245 As a response to the host state‟s
retaliation, the trans-border minority collaborates with the parent state in terms of its identity and
political action.246 This approach is what observed on the relation of the irredentist Welkait
people with the Amhara nation/ RSA Government. Again, refusal of consent to the legitimacy of
the host state and self-segregation as community is also another instrumental approach of the
trans-border minority groups.247

Similarly, the irredentist Welkait people identified themselves as Welkait Amharans and fiercely
invoke their opposition to their administration under the RST in different occasions.248

Parent state’s approach: the parent state is mainly known in its campaign at home and abroad
for boarder adjustment and provocation of irredentist questions in domestic politics.249 There is
also an overall positive attitude of parent state public opinion with a manifest popular mandate to

239
Julianna supra note 5, at 60.
240
Interview with Christen Tadele, Supra note 172.
241
Julianna supra note 5, at 62.
242
Tamiru, supra note 170, at 30.
243
Julianna supra note 5, at 63.
244
Interview with Kidane Amene Supra note 175.
245
Julianna supra note 5, at 57.
246
Ibid.
247
Ibid.
248
Interview with Atalay Zafea, Supra note 173.
249
Julianna supra note 5, at 57.

47
the wellbeing of trans-border irredentas.250 Besides, convinced with the trans-border minority‟s
ethnical kindred, the parent state extends civic and political loyalty to such irredentist groups.251

Likewise, the parent RSA people and Government manifests similar behavior in its reaction with
the host RST people and Government in terms of invoking the Welkaite case as its agenda in
different occasion, owning positive attitude and public opinion towards the irredentist Welkait
people and alleging as Welkait belongs to Amhara and the indigenous people are Amharans.252

3.6 Characterizing the Experience and Dimension of Ethnic Conflicts in other

Federal Country: the case of India
Despite her success in sustaining democracy, India still faces inter-state conflicts among
different ethnic groups mainly in the north-east part of the country.253 The conflict revolves
around claims like identity, autonomy and resources which aimed to reinforce their respective
ethnic identity by expanding the ethnic boundaries; demanding group-specific rights, especially
exclusive territories; and projecting outside groups as others.254 Every group clearly undertakes
efforts to expand their respective ethnic boundaries by bringing in more communities into their
fold.255

There is also overlapping constituents of ethnic groups living across neighboring states; which
corollary results to the claim of each ethnic group to incorporate its ethnic kin and their
inhibiting land in to its boundary by all means: persuasion, force or both. 256 Thus, this approach
of expanding boundaries is resulting to the effect of further complication of the existing issues of
internal diversity and differences as well as to the likelihood of deconstruction of the aimed

250
Ibid.
251
Ibid.
252
Interview with Dessie Tilahun, Supra note 210.
253
Nameirakpam Bijen Meetei, State‟s Response to Intra-state Conflicts: The Case of North-East India, published
online: April 30, 2018, available at: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2230807518770257?icid=int.sj-full-
text.similar-articles, accessed on 21 May 2019, 9:19 am.
254
Nameirakpam Bijen Meetei, Emerging Trends in Ethnic Nationalism: Territoriality and Conflict in Manipur,
published online: August 17, 2016, available at:
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2230807516655414?icid=int.sj-abstract.similar-articles, accessed on 21
May 2019, 10:41 am.
255
Ibid.
256
Aheibam Koireng, „Growth of Sub-nationalism and Displacement in the North East India with Special Reference
to Manipur‟, The Orient Vision 2, no. II (2005): 6–13.

48
nation itself.257 It also becomes a major source of conflict between major groups in the
country.258

On the other hand, other small groups living in the contesting area often assert their opposition to
the political agendas of the larger groups and demanding their right to determine themselves
either to be part of other kindred group or to be autonomous group.259 There is also a claim made
by some ethnic groups like Nagas in the northeast India to their ancestral land regardless of the
demographic composition of the contested area260 and considering others as immigrants.261
Despite unwavering interest of the competing ethnic groups, it is asserted that, neither granting
territorial autonomy nor re-drawing of contesting borders, will not resolve inter-ethnic conflict in
states until the issues of internal differences are adequately addressed.262 The situation is further
compounded by the fact that the Indian states and the federal government have failed to resolve
the conflict through negotiations, dialogues and peace; instead countered by launching a massive
counter insurgency offensive through its military and intelligence.263

Thus, despite the decade long ethnic and militancy related violence, the government of Manipur
state has not achieved any lasting solutions to the claims of various ethnic groups in the north
east India.264 As a result, the Indian army has being deployed to manage an internal conflict in
the north-east part of the country though instead of resolving the problem, it led to an ongoing
escalation of the conflict by bringing it on a military level. 265 And, the consequently regular
violations of human rights has led to a radicalization and militarization of the region and
weakened the amicable legal and political solution of the problem.266

257
Meetei, Supra note 253.
258
Ibid.
259
Ibid.
260
Ch. Sekholal Kom, ETHNIC MOBILIZATION AND MILITANCY IN NORTHEAST INDIA: A Case of
Manipur, 71:3 The Indian Journal of Political Science, 669, 676 (2010).
261
Kamei Gangumei, Glimpses of Land and People of Ancient Manipur, in Manipur: Past and Present, Vol. I. ed.
Naorem Sanajaoba, PP. 3–22 (1988).
262
Meetei, Supra note 253.
263
Kom, Supra note 260, at 877.
264
Ibid.
265
Conflict in Northeast India: Issues, Causes and Concern, available at: https://in.boell.org/2009/02/28/conflict-
northeast-india-issues-causes-and-concern, accessed on 20 may 2019, at 10:59 am.
266
Ibid.

49
Here, what we understand is that, despite its success to economic development, India has fallen
to properly handle the competing interests of its ethnic groups which corollary led to political
frustration and human right violation in its north-east part. This gives us a negative experience
and dimension of different ethnic groups‟ claim and the respective state response in India which
is attributable to the incomprehensive law and weak institution of the country.

Conclusion

The Welkait case which is quested as “Welkait peoples‟ identity and border claim” petitioned to
the House Federation is the claim of the people to the recognition of their Amhara identity and
corollary border adjustment through seceding from the RST to be incorporated within the RSA.
The quest has also simultaneously claimed by the rest of Amhara nationals/and State
Government to retrieve the alleged trans-border ethnic kindred Welkait people. As discussed
under 3.2 above, this scenario is referred to as an irredentist case. An irredentist case could be
regarded as a quasi-self-determination claim as it has the element of both a human right quest to
identity claim and consequent political claim of border adjustment by simultaneous claim of the
trans-border ethnic kin and the parent state. The idea of self-determination, though it can
embrace irredentist claims in its wider interpretation, its present context both at the international
and domestic level, fails to regulate such a kind of scenario in its normative contents. The
Welkait case, as discussed under 3.3 above, is different from other likely cases as it has its own
peculiar features which other like cases couldn‟t have. The mere demographic change of the area
does not affect irredentist claims and the outcome could not be determined through referendum
unless in a special mechanism which out casts the new settlers.

Chapter Four

4 Comprehensiveness of Legal and Institutional Frameworks in Ethiopia to

Settle Irredentist Cases
In this Chapter, the paper will address issue in relation to the federal structure of the country in
relation with state formation and the manner how state demarcation is made at the very
formation. Again, the normative contents of art 39 of the FDRE Constitution and proclamation

50
no. 251/ 2001together with the House of Federation‟s umpiring power in settling the right to self-
determination claims of nation, nationalities and peoples in Ethiopia will be assessed.

4.1 Introduction: The Ethiopian Federalism

Ethiopia starts to pursue Federalism as a state structure since 1994 inaugurated by the FDRE
Constitution267 though the bases of the Federation were laid as early as the Conference for
Democracy in July 1991.268 The FDRE Constitution is best known to its complete departure from
the past age old monarchical system and its immediate preceding Military Regime. The
ideological setting of the Ethiopian Constitutional model is largely the Stalinist notion of „self-
determination of nationalities‟ that was part of the leftist political movement leading up to the
late 1980s.269 This is envisaged from the spirit of the Constitution which grants, unconditional
right to self-determination up to secession270 beside its attribution of state sovereignty271, to the
nations, nationalities and peoples than to Ethiopian people. It is asserted that, the “national
question” was the fundamental driving force behind the Federal structure.272

Federalism in Ethiopia is a post-conflict Constitutional reform devised as a solution to manage

ethnic conflict in the country.273 The Federal structure is basically organized along ethno-
linguistic and cultural lines274 and it accepts a dual form of power division between the federal
and the State Governments which lacks an express textual recognition of federal supremacy.275
On the other side all State Governments are constitutionally symmetrical having equal formal
relationship to the Federal Government.276

267
FDRE Constitution (1995).
268
Didier Morin, the federal experiment in Ethiopia: a socio-political experiment, Arnault Serra-Horguelin (1999),
p. 1.
269
Semahagn Gashu Abebe, The dilemma of adopting ethnic federal system in Africa in light of the perspectives
from Ethiopian experience, 4:7 Journal of African Studies and Development, 168, 170 (2012).
270
FDRE Constitution, art 39(1).
271
FDRE Constitution, art 8.
272
Nahusenay Belay, The New Federal Experiment and Accommodation of Diversity in Ethiopia: Exploring a
Novel Experience, p.1 (unpublished manuscript).
273
Sujit Choudhry and Nathan Hume, Federalism, devolution and secession: from classical to post-conflict
federalism, Comparative constitutional law, 356, 356 (2017).
274
FDRE Constitution, art 46.
275
Tsegaye Regassa, Comparative Relevance of the Ethiopian Federal System to other African Polities of the Horn:
First Thoughts on the Possibility of “Exporting” Multi-ethnic Federalism, 1:1 Bahir Dar University Journal of Law,
5, 5 (2010).
276
Semahagn, supra note 269, at 171.

51
Based on the basic notion of self-determination rights of nations, nationalities and peoples, the
constitution established nine regional units.277 Despite the fact that the Constitution claims
regional units are to be delimited on the basis of settlement, language, identity and consent of the
people,278 they are largely structured following language and ethnic lines.279 Despite their evident
difference of population size, all the regions are heterogeneous consisting of two or more ethnic
groups.280 Though the Federation consists of solely nine regional units that have regional
autonomy; the constitution grants every „nation, nationality and people‟ unconditional right to
self-determination by which each nation, nationality and people have the right to self-
administration including the right to secession. Currently, despite about 86 ethnic groups are
recognized in Ethiopia,281 only few ethnic groups have full territorial self-rule.

4.2 Legal Frameworks of the Right to Self-determination and Irredentism in

Ethiopia
As argued at 3.1 above, despite its some distinctive features, irredentism can be conceived within
the notion of self-determination. Beside international legal instruments which Ethiopia is a party,
the FDRE Constitution explicitly regulates self-determination rights of all ethnic groups282 as
provided under art 39 of the Constitution. Accordingly, this part scrutinizes the normative
contents and comprehensiveness of art 39 of the Constitution in addressing claims like what is
quested by Welkait people; irredentist claims.

Despite some disparities on the scope and normative contents, secession as element of self-
determination is contemporarily accepted a legal right belonging to nation, nationalities and
peoples.283 Though the international system favors to territorial integrity and sovereignty of
states, it is asserted that this right to territorial integrity of states is assumed only against another
277
FDRE Constitution, art 47.
278
FDRE Constitution, art 46.
279
Semahagn, supra note 269, at 171.
280
Ibid.
281
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Population Census Commission, summary and statistical report of the
2007 population and housing census, December 2008 (Addis Ababa)
282
Ethnic groups in the language of the constitution represent nation, nationalities and peoples. As provided under
art 39(5) of the FDRE Constitution, nation, nationalities and peoples are 'a group of people who have or share a
large measure of a common culture or similar custom, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a common or
related identities, a common psychological makeup, and who inhibit an identifiable, predominantly contiguous
territory'; which has both subjective and objective elements. See also infra note 192, P. 340.
283
Francesco capotorti, Study on the rights of persons belonging to ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, UN
Doc. E/Cn.4/sub. 2/384/rev.1 (1979); as cited on Ahmednasir M. Abdullahi, art 39 of the Ethiopian constitution on
secession and self-determination: A panacea to the nationality question in Africa?, 31: 4 Verfassung und Recht in
ubersee / law and politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America, 440, 447 (1998).

52
state not against its own nationals.284 Then, particular groups of peoples within a given state can
have the right to self-determination which could be exercised against the host state to determine
their status.285

The FDRE Constitution depicts the spirit of the African Charter on Human and People‟s
rights,286 by which it equally recognized and guaranteed first, second and third generation
rights.287 Thus, the FDRE Constitution is peculiarly known to its emphasis on the recognition
and protection of ethnicity.288,289 But, it is also alleged that the right to self-determination
provided under art 39 of the FDRE Constitution is for rhetorical and ideological purpose that
there seems no intention of relinquish the power of the central Federal Government.290
Particularly the secession clause is provided as a symbolic value that there is unlikelihood of
actually exercising this right by ethnic groups as stipulated in the paper.291

Irrespective of any disparity between the wording and the practice, what actually is the right to
self-determination provided under art 39 denotes is the concern of this paper. The right to self-
determination stipulated under art 39 of the FDRE Constitution which entitles nation,
nationalities and peoples as the holder of the right to self-determination is different from what is
provided in the international system. Because while the later guaranteed the right to self-
determination to colonial peoples to liberated themselves from the alien domination on the one
hand and the right of the whole people of a given state to determine their political status and
pursue the socio-economic and cultural life they prefer on the other hand.

As envisaged from the wording of the provision, art 39 of the Constitution guaranteed three basic
rights of ethnic groups (termed as nation, nationalities and peoples)292; the right to the

284
Ibid.
285
Ibid.
286
The African charter on human and peoples‟ rights, (Adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986.
The charter, as its name “human and peoples‟ rights” per se envisages, it provides individual and group rights alike.
287
Under the heading of fundamental rights and freedoms, Chapter three of the FDRE Constitution provides first,
second and third generation rights alike.
288
This is manifested from art 8 of the constitution which gives sovereignty to the nation, nationalities and people of
Ethiopia; and from its stipulation to unconditional self-determination up to secession clause as dictated under art 39
of the same constitution.
289
Jon Abbink, Ethnicity and constitutionalism in contemporary Ethiopia, 41: 2 Journal of African law, 159, 166
(1997).
290
Id. at 169.
291
Habtu, Supra note 58, at 329.
292
FDRE Constitution, art 39/2.

53
recognition and enjoyment of own identity and values,293 the right to self-rule and equitable
representation in the regional and federal governments,294 and the right to secession.295 The right
to secession of ethnic groups has two facets; the right to internal self-determination within the
Federal structure, and the right to external self-determination to secede if they so wish and form
their own independent state.296

Nevertheless, there is an assertion that, despite its guarantees of wide range of rights, the
application of these rights is hardly realizable297 mainly in relation to the right of ethnic groups to
assert itself as a nation, nationality or people in a Regional State in which it is a minority and
exercise its right to political self-determination, the right of an ethnic group to assert itself as
nation, nationality or people outside of its mother state while it has been considered as a nation,
nationality or people within its own Regional State, and the right of ethnic groups that do not
have their own mother states to exercise their right to self-determination.

The right to self-determination stipulated in the Constitution under the current political context
and its practical application thus seem to suggest that the right will only apply to an ethnic group
where that ethnic group inhabits only in one of the nine regional states in which it is either a
majority or the dominant ethnic group.298 This is the core problem encountered by minorities
living across different Regional States in asserting their constitutionally guaranteed right to self-
determination.299

Hence, it is open to conclude that the competing interests of different ethnic groups residing in
the different parts of the regions is to be entertained only within the context of the nine regional
states.300 This is the main gap of the Constitution in addressing all spectrums of self-
determination claims of ethnic groups and also the reason which leads to the misapprehension of
the Welkait case as a self-determination claim to identity recognition, or self-rule or if any more

293
FDRE Constitution, art 39/2.
294
Id. art 39/3.
295
Id. art 39/1.
296
Ahmednasir M. Abdullahi, Art 39 of the Ethiopian constitution on secession and self-determination: A panacea
to the nationality question in Africa?, 31:4 Verfassung und Recht in Ubersee / law and politics in Africa, Asia and
Latin America, 440, 445 (1998).
297
Beza Dessalegn, Comment on Ethnic Minority Rights under the Ethiopian Federal Structure, 6:2 MLR, 333, 341
(2012).
298
Id, at 343.
299
Ibid.
300
Id. at 342.

54
secession and tries to solve it accordingly using the existing legal frameworks. In this regard,
neither the claimant (the Committee of the Welkaite people)301 nor the officers of the arbitral
organ (the House of Federation)302 properly appraise the nature of the case. Nevertheless, as
discussed above under 3.2, the Welkait case has a different dimension which is hardly embraced
under the normative contents of the self-determination clause of the Constitution.

As elaborated above under 2.3.2, irredentism is different from secession in number of

peculiarities. Then, the right to self-determination stipulated under art 39 of the FDRE
Constitution has no clue to embrace irredentist claims particularly when we scrutinize the
procedural rules stipulated under art 39(4) of the Constitution.303 Then, it is possible to assert that
there is a lacunae in the Constitution to regulate irredentist claims which could arise between the
constitute States of the Federation like what is happening between the RST and the RSA on
Welkait case.

The other legal framework having relevance to self-determination right of nation, nationalities
and peoples in Ethiopia is Proc. No. 251/2001 which is made to determine the Powers and
Responsibilities of the House of Federation.304 Nevertheless, as this Proclamation concerns with
the procedural aspects and powers of the respective organs of the Federal and State Governments
in umpiring self-determination claims of nation, nationalities and peoples, it would be
appropriate to be discussed under institutional frameworks hereafter.

4.3 Institutional Frameworks in Umpiring Self-Determination and

Irredentist Cases in Ethiopia
Coming to the institutional frameworks in adjudicating self-determination claims of ethnic
groups in Ethiopia, though it is only for procedural aspects, 305 there is both State level and

301
The committee simply loads its claim as “Welkait peoples‟ Amharan nationhood identity and border claim” and
asserts art 39 and 48 of the constitution for their allegation. Interview with Atalay Zafea, Supra note 173.
302
Concerned officials of the House of Federation assumed the Welkait case as a self-determination claim to their
identity alike other cases petitioned to the House such as the Silte case; Telephone interview with M/r Yawuqal
Bekele, Delegate chairman of Constitutional interpretation and identity affairs Commission, interviewed on 18 May
2019.
303
Article 39(4) of the FDRE constitution stipulates procedural rules to effectuate secessionist claim of a certain
ethnic group. The procedural rules stipulated there simply needs the unilateral determination of the concerned ethnic
group which does not need the involvement of not only any parent state but also the host state itself.
304
Infra note 309.
305
The power to decide self-determination claims of nation, nationalities and peoples in Ethiopia is given to the
concerned claimant peoples themselves. Both the regional and federal level institutional organs have only the power
to follow up the procedural regularities of the process. See; የኢ.ፌ.ድ.ሪ የፌደሬሽን ምክር ቤት፣ የኢ.ፌ.ድ.ሪ የፌደሬሽን

55
Federal level organs authorized by the Constitution to umpire self-determination cases. In case of
internal self-determination, the power to umpire /follow up/ the quest of the claimant group is
given to the state Council under which the claimant group lives.306

On the other hand in case of external self-determination /secession/, the power to umpire /follow
up/ the claim of secessionist group is given to the Federal Government. 307 Though at this point
the provision of the Constitution is not clear to identify which organ of the Federal Government
is empowered to do so, it become clear when appraise art 62 of the Constitution; that as organ of
the Federal Government, the House of Federation is empowered to umpire the self-determination
claims of nation, nationalities and peoples in Ethiopia.308 In all cases, the substantive power to
determine the self-determination claims of the ethnic groups in Ethiopia resides up on the
concerned nation, nationality or people both in their representative and direct participation

Proc. No. 251/2001 which determines the power and responsibility of the House of Federation
further elucidates the task of the House in adjudicating self-determination claim of nation,
nationalities and peoples in Ethiopia.309 The House decides on self-determination claim of the
claimant group based on the peoples‟ interest and settlement patterns.310

Here, the problem is that as discussed under 4.2 above, the substantive self-determination rights
of nation, nationalities and peoples provided under art 39 of the Constitution embraces only
identity recognition, self-rule and secession. Accordingly, the power of both the Regional and
Federal level institutions in umpiring self-determination claims of ethnic groups is limited to
such claims only. Irredentist claim on the other hand is different kinds of self-determination
claim which is not addressed in the normative contents of the self-determination clause of the
Constitution. Consequently, neither the Regional nor the Federal level institution has a legitimate
power to umpire irredentist claims.

ምክር ቤት ያሳለፋቸዉ ዋና ዋና የህገ-መንግስት ዉሳኔዎች፣ የህገ-መንግስታዊ ፍርዶች መጽሄት፣ ቅጽ 1፣ ቁ 1፣ (ሀምሌ 2000).

ገፅ 50-60.
306
FDRE Constitution, art 47/3.
307
Id. art 39/4.
308
Id. art 62/3.
309
Proclamation No. 251/2001, Proclamation on the consolidation of the house of federation and definition of its
powers and responsibilities, Federal Negarit Gazeta, Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa (2001),
art 19.
310
Ibid.

56
The power to umpire short of secession self-determination claims of ethnic groups is given to the
concerned state; as provided under art 47(3) of the Constitution and art 20 of Proc. No.
251/2001. However, irredentist claims are not only omitted within the normative contents of self-
determination clause of the Constitution but also impracticable to be umpired by the host
Regional State. This is because unlike a claim to self-rule which could be quested by pre-existed
and recognized ethnic groups, irredentist claims are made by group of peoples who alleges a new
identity. Hence, how states could have positive approach to effectuate such claims knowing that
the claimant group consequently aimed to secede from it and move to its allegedly ethnic kin
people? Such a claim create a conflict of interest on the host State as the case requires the State
to be impartial in umpiring the case which could have an effect of losing its people and land. For
this reason, the host State will act differently aiming to obstruct the claim of the people. This is
what happens on Welkait case too.311

On the other hand, the Welkaite case has an element of border adjustment between RST and
RSA. Hence, it is unsound to let one of the States (the host RST) to umpire such a case as this
contravenes the natural law principle that “no one be a judge on his own case”. Again, in
accordance to art 48 of the FDRE Constitution, it is the House of Federation which is
empowered to arbiter border disputes between states.

In general, the RST has no legal and moral grounds to umpire the Welkait case.

Coming to the Federal level umpiring organ, except the claim to secession,312 the House of
Federation is empowered to umpire self-determination claims of nation, nationalities and peoples
in its appellate jurisdiction.313 Nevertheless, these self-determination claims recognized both in
the FDRE Constitution and Proc. No 251/2001 are limited to identity recognition, self-rule and
secession; that irredentist case, which has its own peculiarities distinct from other elements of
self-determination, is not embraced under the normative contents of the self-determination
clauses of the Constitution. Accordingly, it would be an ultra-virus power to the House of
Federation to assume umpiring power on irredentist cases; Welkait case.

311
When the committee had loaded their claim to the Regional State of Tigray and to the House of Federation, the
response from the officials of the host state ware intimidation, abuse and detain of the claimant committee members;
interview with Atalay Zafea, supra note 173.
312
In accordance to art 39(4) of the FDRE Constitution, it is the House of Federation which has a first instance
jurisdiction to umpire secessionist claims of nation, nationalities and peoples.
313
Supra note 309, Art 20(1).

57
Constitutionally speaking, the House of Federation could have the power to umpire the Welkait
case only by splitting the case in to two; identity claim and border dispute. Accordingly, saving
the steps at the Regional level, the House firstly could umpire on the claim of the people to their
identity. Then, if the identity of the people is answered positively and corollary given the right to
administer themselves,314 the House will again decide on the corollary border contestation
between the RSA and RST; by which, Welkait, either it would be incorporated within the RSA
or stay as it is within the RST by owning its self-administration and in short of this minority
protection.

Regarding to border disputes, art 48 of the FDRE Constitution empowers the House of
Federation to settle border disputes which could be raised between states.315 The House has a
final power to decide on such border disputes which arise between States of the Federation if the
concerned States fail to reach at consensus in settling their disagreement.316 But this is different
from self-determination rights of ethnic groups; rather it is a border dispute between states.
Because on the one hand the claim could be raised by the State Governments not by ethnic
groups; and on the other hand the right to self-determination provided under art 39 of the
Constitution is to nation, nationalities and peoples /ethnic groups/ not to states as there is no
mono-ethnic state in Ethiopia.317 Again, had the two provisions (art 39 & 48) of the Constitution
are dealing on the same mater; there would be a redundancy in the Constitution which is
somehow superficiality to say so.

When we see the process undergone in an attempt to adjudicate the Welkait case, though the
quest of the people informally starts from the very time when the area is demarcated in the RST
in 1991, the claim had formally petitioned to the House of Federation on March 26 2008 E.C.318
But the HoF, citing art 20 of Proc. No. 251/1993,319 had referred the case to the RST State

314
In its decision in the Silte case, the house of federation assert that identity recognition claim of people would
follow with granting them the right to administer themselves. See; የኢ.ፌ.ድ.ሪ የፌደሬሽን ምክር ቤት፣ የኢ.ፌ.ድ.ሪ
የፌደሬሽን ምክር ቤት ያሳለፋቸዉ ዋና ዋና የህገ-መንግስት ዉሳኔዎች፣ የህገ-መንግስታዊ ፍርዶች መጽሄት፣ ቅጽ 1፣ ቁ 1፣
(ሀምሌ 2000). ገፅ 50-60.
315
FDRE Constitution, art 48.
316
Ibid.
317
Tsegaye Regassa, Sub-national constitutions in Ethiopia; towards entrenching constitutionalism at state level, 3:
1 Mizan law review, 34, 58 (2009).
318
Supra note 62.
319
This provision stipulates the condition of exhausting state level remedies to load a petition to the house of
federation.

58
Council. The Council gave them an oral direction to present their case to the Western Zonal
administration of RST. But, the Zonal and Woreda Administration, though it has nothing to do
with such irredentist case, were not willing to settle the question. Then, the Committee, being
unsatisfied with the response of the Zonal Administration, re-approached the RST State Council
once more.320

Again, the Regional State Council was unwilling to resolve the case amicably (though it is also
unexpected to do so mainly due to the nature of the claim); rather various authorities of the RST
pursued to suppress the claim of the people by intimidating the Committee members through
arresting, kidnapping, exiling etc.321 Nevertheless, the Committee members, enduring with all the
challenges once again petitioned their claim case to the House of Federation.322

The Committee asserts Art 39 and 48 of the FDRE Constitution as a legal ground to their case. 323
However, these two provision of the Constitution can‟t be used simultaneously to the same case
because while art 39 provides self-determination rights of nation, nationalities and peoples of
Ethiopia, art 48 on the other hand provides a mechanism of border dispute settlement between
states which is further elucidated under art 27 of proc. No. 251/2001. The Welkait case, despite it
ostensibly looks a border dispute between the two states, is a special form of self-determination
claim of the Welkait people to the recognition of their identity and to merge with their alleged
ethnic brethren Amhara people.

It is because of this special nature of the case that recently an ad-hoc Border and Identity Issues
Commission is established by the Government to inquiry similar case. 324 As envisaged in the
preamble of the establishment Proclamation, though it has only the power to provide
recommendation, this Commission is established to solve issues of Administrative Boundaries
and Identity questions that repeatedly raised by different ethnic groups across the Country.

320
Interview with Dessie Tilahun, Supra note 210.
321
Ibid.
322
Ibid.
323
Supra note 62.
324
Proc. No. 1101, Administrative boundaries and identity issues commission establishment proclamation, Federal
Negarit Gazeta, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (December 2018).

59
Nevertheless, though it counts about four months since its establishment, the Commission has
not start its assignment yet.325

The establishment of such an ad-hoc Commission in an attempt to settle identity and territorial
disputes among ethnic groups in the country has its own implication on incomprehensiveness of
legal frameworks and institutional incompetence in settling self-determination claims of peoples
in the Country. This is evident particularly in irredentist cases; the Welkait case. Because the
Welkait case plays the lion share in alarming the Government and instigate the establishment of
the Commission. Due to the delay/and deny by the concerned organ in settling the case, the
Welkait case is being changed in to an ethnic conflict between the Amhara and Tigray nations.
Hence, the Welkait case, being an ethnic conflict, is a political problem which requires a political
solution within an institutional context.326

Conclusion

The Welkait case, being an irredentist claim, has no legal frame work in Ethiopia. Because
neither the internal self-determination provision of the Constitution nor the Secession clause is
comprehensive to regulate the peculiarities of the Welkait quest which is made to the recognition
of their Amharan nationhood identity and corollary aims to secede from the RST and join/unite
with the RSA. Again, the quest is not only the claim of the concerned Welkait people it rather is
also the quest of Amharan people/ and RSA Government too to retrieve Welkait into RSA by
alleging as Welkait belongs to its ancestors and the indigenous peoples of the area are Amharans.

Then, it is the thought of the author of this paper that the very reason which complicated and
makes unresolvable the welkait case is the misconception of the very nature of the claim by all
the stake-holders. Not only the alleged adjudicative organs but also the claimant group had
blended the quest as self-determination and border adjustment claim which can‟t be adjudicated
simultaneously as such two different quests need to be claimed by different organs and answered
differently. That while self-determination claim can be claimed by the welkait people, the border
adjustment quest need to be claimed by the RSA Government. But irrespective of this misjoinder
of case, the Welkait case is neither a pure self-determination claim nor a border dispute

325
Interview with Wubshet Mulat, Member of the „Administrative Boundaries and Identity Issues Commission‟,
interviewed on 24 May 2019.
326
James, supra note 151, P. 5.

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settlement rather it is an irredentist claim which could be regarded as of a special form of self-
determination case.

CHAPTER FIVE
5 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 Conclusion
The right to self-determination is a right of people formally underpinned in the 1945 UN Charter.
In the contemporary legal discourses, the right to self-determination is the most rhetoric right in
academic and scholarly discourses but the normative contents of the right is not yet clearly
defined which corollary became source of intra-Country and inter-Country conflicts across the
world. Though it does not fit the contemporary conception of the right to self-determination, the
normative content of the right to self-determination as stipulated in the international instruments
is limited to the liberation of colonial peoples from alien dominance and to pursue their
economic, social and cultural affairs as they wish. The international system, except in the manner
of protecting minorities‟ rights, does not recognize the right to self-determination of ethnic
groups within a given state in a manner of territorial autonomy. Irredentism is unaddressed issue
in the international legal system. Though it is factually existed in different Countries across the
world, no international law regulates about Irredentism.

Ethiopia adopted a FDRE Constitution which peculiarly known for its unique and liberal
approach in guaranteeing the right to self-determination of nation, nationalities and peoples
(ethnic groups). The normative contents of the right to self-determination of people guaranteed in
the FDRE Constitution includes; the right to recognition and protection of identity, the right to
self-administration, and the right to secession. Again, the Constitution provides the mechanism
to settle border disputes which could be arisen between states. But, neither the self-determination
nor the border dispute settlement clauses of the Constitution are comprehensive enough to
address irredentist claims. Because, irredentist claims are special form of self-determination
cases which blend both identity recognition and a corollary border adjustment claim among the
tri-party actors; the host state, parent state and trans-border ethnic minority group.

Irredentist case has its own peculiar features by which it become impracticable to settle such
claims using rules and procedures of the self-determination clause in its present context.
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Concerning to institutional frame works; it is an ultra-virus act to the House of Federation to
umpire irredentist case since the Constitution has a lacuna in this regard. The Welkait case,
which is claimed to the recognition of Welkait peoples‟ Amharan nationhood identity and the
corollary border adjustment aiming is to secede from the RST and join/move to the RSA, is an
irredentist case. However, it looks as all the stake-holders involved in the Welkait case
misapprehend the very nature of the case and tries to settle it in accordance to the rules and
procedures of self-determination clauses of the Constitution and Proc. No. 251/2001 which
corollary results to the complication of the case and unanswered yet.

The welkait case is peculiar in challenging the FDRE Constitution; mainly the highly provoked
discourse of the ruling Government (EPRDF) on its devotion to the unconditional right to self-
determination of nation, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia.

5.2 Recommendations
Since irredentist cases are real phenomenon in inter-state relations both across countries and
within a Federal Country among Federations, to come up with a comprehensive law which
regulates such kind of cases is indispensable both at the international and national levels.

The self-determination clause of the FDRE Constitution is incomprehensive to address

irredentist cases. Then the Constitution need to be amended accordingly to embrace irredentist
cases in its self-determination clause.

In short of Constitutional amendment, the lacuna in the Constitution needs to be filled through
Constitutional interpretation by the House of Federation.

As the idea of self-determination, in its wider interpretation, can embrace irredentist cases, rules
and procedures to effectuate such claims need to be regulated beneath the Constitution. And this
should be carried on through amending Proc. No. 251/2001 in a manner it could address rules
and procedures to be pursued in settling irredentist cases which would arise among the
constituent Federations in the Country.

In relation to the institutional frameworks, as neither the host RST nor the House of Federation is
explicitly empowered to umpire irredentist cases, such a gap need to be filled similarly in a ways
suggested to fill the legal gap.

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Coming to the Welkait case, the principal problem which complicates the case is the
misapprehension of the very nature of the case both by the claimants and the umpiring organs.
Then, in accordance to the maxim that „understanding the problem is half of the solution‟, to
solve it amicably, all the stake-holders need to understand the irredentist nature of the case and
need to pursue a new way than the existing legal and institutional systems to settle the case. The
new way could be a political solution or an alternative means of dispute resolution mechanisms;
negotiation, mediation, arbitration or conciliation.

Through the recent measure taken by the government in establishing a Commission to inquiry
identity claims and territorial disputes could have a rarely solution in settling cases like what is
claimed by Welkait people as the Commission has no any umpiring power and no new
substantive law is made. Hence, the Commission would rather suggest the incomprehensiveness
of the legal and institutional frameworks in the Country to address all forms of self-
determination claims; and accordingly recommend to the amendment of the existing relevant
laws or promulgation of a new law which could address irredentist claims.

In Ethiopia, the territorial demarcation of regional states is not delaminated both at the FDRE
Constitution and the Constitutions of the Federations. The worst is that the border demarcation of
the country with its neighboring Countries is not delaminated too. According to art 2 of the
FDRE Constitution the territory of the Country comprises the territory of the member of the
Federations. This is a lenient approach to the territorial integrity of the country and then the
Country‟s border with its neighboring Countries needs to be delaminated. Likewise, the
territorial demarcation of the constitute Federations comprises has been skipped simply by listing
their respective neighboring States. Due to the growing and expansionist nature of people in a
given area and consequential demographical change, irredentist claims and territorial
contestation between adjacent states could be inevitable unless the border between neighboring
states be demarcated. Hence, the territorial boundary of states of the Federation, particularly
between the RSA and RST, need to be demarcated in accordance to art 46 of the Constitution.

Different from the opinions suggested above to reinforce legal and institutional pitfalls, the other
solution to the dilemma of an ostensibly self-determination cases of ethnic conflicts in the
country could be the de-ethnification of the politics. That is, the removal of ethnicity from
politics and adopting a territorial based Federal system.

63
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18 May 2019.

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 6. Interview with Wubshet Mulat, Member of the „administrative boundaries and
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