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YEBRA, Orlando Jr.o O. Number: 140736'
Re: Gross Incompetence
(Appeal) Promulgated: rT X StP Zglq
(D-2014-03070)
X-------------------------------X

DECISION

Orlando O. Yebra, Jr., Police Superintendent, Manila Police District, United Nations
Avenue, Ermita, Manilar, files an appeal from the Decision dated October 30,2013 of the
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), finding him guilty of Gross Incompetence and
meting upon him the penalty of one rank demotion; and ihe Resolution dated -January 14,
2014 also issued by NAPOLCOM which denied his motion for reconsideration and affirmed
the Decision dated October 30, 2013.

On one hand, material portions of the assailed NAPOLCOM Decision dated October
30,2013 read, as follows:

"We agree with the prosecution that indeed PSupt. Yebrafell short of
his duty to alert his superior to be on guard when it-became manifest that
Mendoza had grown agitated and angry after reading the letter
from the
ombudsman considering that Mendoza was shouting and evei
fired a
warning shot.

"It must be stressed that Mendoza's rejection of the letter comingfrom

the Office of the Ombudsman signals the breakdown of the negotiation. flry X
further manifested by the acts of Mendoza in shouting and firing a warning
shot while PSupt. Yebra, PCInsp. salvador and spo2 Giegoio Mendo)a
were returning to the Advance Command post. This being so, it was
incumbent upon PSupt. Yebra to have immediately informed-his superiors
about this in order that the appropriate action could have been taften to
salvage the negotiations, including the use of force as a
final option to
neutralize Menloza. However, upon returning to the commind post, pSupt.
Yebra focused on sPo2 Gregorio Mendoza by charging the same as
conspirator and accessory to the crime. This resulted in Mayor Lim's order to
arrest sPo2 Gregorio Mendoza, Iooking for handcuffi, and confening on
how to handle SPO2 Gregorio Mendoza. Because of this, precious tiie to
salvage the negotiations and to save lives was lost. This led to the chain of
events that became the tipping point that pushed the hostage taker to start
shooting the hostages.

"The Commission believes that psupt. yebra

fett short of his duty as a
negotiator when he pulled SPO2 Gregorio Mendoza in
front of his brother
and lost his composure when SPO2 Gregorio Mendoza in|ormia his brother

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rAssigned pNp Anti-Kidnapping Group, Carry Crame,
at
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InaR,A.{1.8. toSertte:Resfonsive,Accessible,CourteousandEffectiuePubltcseruice

E CSC Building, IBP Road, Constitution Hills, 1126 Quezon City . I 931-79351931-79391931-8092 . E cscphil@webmail.csc.gov.ph . rg www.csc.gov.ph
 Yebra.,/p.2ofll
x- -------- -- - - --- -- -x

not to yield until and unless his service firearm is returned. As a negotiator,
he lvtew fully well that in the hostage negotiation and crisis management, it is
a cardinal rule not to agitate the hostage-taker because he literally calls the
shot. Respondent,+failed to live up to this rule. The act done by PSupt. Yebra
further infuriatril Mendoza because he felt betrayed as PSupt. Yebra earlier
told Mendoza that the [sicJ his brother's gun has already been returned and
this act further inflamed the situation.

xxx

"WHEHEFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission finds

PSUPT. ORLANDO O. YEBRA culpable for Gross Incompetence and is
hereby meted the penalty of One (1) rank demotion there being no
aggravating circumstance pleaded or invoked and no mitigating
c ircums tance s appre c iate d. "

On the other hand, the Resolution dated January 14,2014 of the NAPOLCOM reads
in part, as follows:

"It must be styessed that the Movant xxx was .found culpable for his
failure to alert his superior to be on guard when it bec.ame manifest that the
hostage taker had srown agitated and ansry a-fter reading the letter -from the
Ombudsman. xxx.

"xxx that the afore'quoted act of the Movant constitules gross

incompetence defined under Rule 21, Section 2 (C) of NAPOLCOM
Memorandum Circular No. 2007-001. Thus:

"5) Gross Incompetence - llhen the ffinse or negligence is

committed by reason of manifest lack o-f adeguate abilitv and -fitness on the
part qf the respondent member for the satis.factory pefformance o.f police
duties. the erring member shall be guilty of Gross Incompetence. Xxx.

In his Appeal Memorandum2, Yebra alleged that he was denied his right to
administrative due process. He further asseverated, as follows:

"Through the negotiation skills of appellant Yebra, seven (7) hostages were
released and their lives saved. As stated in the statement of facts four (4) hostages
were initially released to appellant at I2:20 p.m (par. 9 of the stotement offacts); one
(1) old man wes released at about I ;40 p.m. (par. I 1, i.d); one (1) more hostage was
released at about 2 p.m.(par. 14, i.d); and another one (1) was released at about
4:30 p.m. (par. 18, i.d.)

"Thus, no less than His Excellency Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III had ruled
out gross incompetence on the part of Yebra. We quote the President as follows:

t
Dated February 5,2014
 I'ebra../p.3ofll
x - - - - - - - - - -- -- - - - - -- x

'The mere fact that the negotiation failed and the hostage taker shot his
hostages does not-iustifii holding Yebra liable -for gross incompetence as a negotiator.
There was nQlhlns that indicates that the decision qf the hostagg taker to shoot the
hostages was due to anv act or $tatemeryt qf Yebra. It appears tkat the hostage taher
shot his hoslages due to what was done to his brQther and not due to .faulU
negotiation bv Ye.bra. It should be noted that Yebra is not even an fficial but merely
an ad hoc negotiator of the PNP. Being a negotiator is not his primary function, but
only an additionalfunction given to him occasionally." (page l1 of the Memorandum,
underlining ours for emphasis) "

xxx

"There were no additional evidence presented against Yebra during the hearing of
the case before the NAPOLCOM. The pieces of evidence presented at the
NAPOLCOM hearingwere the same evidence submitted by the De Lima Committee to
the Office of the Pres'ident.

"If there are no additional evidence presented during the hearing of the case,
except the rantings of the Hongkang and Chinese governments, it is grave error on
the part of the NAPOLCOM to conclude dffirently. Clearly, then, NAPOLCOM
capriciously declared Yebra to be grossly incompetent as a negotiator in order to
appease foreign governments at the expense of its own fficial who did his best to
save lives of the hostages.

xxx

"It
ironic that NAPOLCOM would still find him grossly incompetent.
is, thus,
At ito po ay masokit na tanggapin."

Culled in the records of the caseo the antecedent facts are stated, as follows:

In the morning of August 23, 2010, a tourist bus of the Hong Thai Travel Services
Limited which was carrying 2l Hongkong nationals and accompanied by four (4) Filipino
staff of the Direction Travel and Tours Incorporated went to Fort Santiago, Intramuros,
Manila, for a tour. At around 9:30 a.m., when the group was about to leave the place, former
PS/Ins. Rolando Mendoza, who was then armed and in police camouflage uniform,
approached Alberto Lubang, the bus driver. Mendoza requested Lubang that he be allowed to
board the bus. While on board, Mendoza held the passengers as hostages. He directed Lubang
to take the bus to Quirino Grandstand which is within the premises of the Luneta Park in
Manila. Upon arriving at Qurino Grandstand, Mendoza directed one of the staff of the travel
agency on board in the bus to call the office of the agency and inform the latter of the
situation. The police and the Manila City officials were alerted at 10 a.m. about the hostage-
taking incident. Senior Supt. Alex Gutierrez reported the incident to then Manila Mayor
Alfredo Lim and Vice-Mayor Francisco Moreno Domagoso a.k.a. Isko Moreno. Then Mayor
Lim immediately instructed Sr/Supt. Gutierez to cordon the area and isolate the bus. He also
instructed Moreno to proceed to the scene and assess the situation in order to determine the
necessary assistance that the city govemment can provide.
 l'ebra../p.4ofll
x- -- -- - - - ---------- -x

The hostage-taking incident at the Quirino Grandstand had reached the knowledge of
the Malacafrang Palace, thus, the Office of the Executive Secretary (OES) called up then
DILG Undersecretary Rico Puno. Thereafter, the Office of the President (OP), directed Puno
to report to Malacaffang Palace and bring with him a police officer who has knowledge about
the incident.

At 10:10 a.m., Police Chief Supt. Rodolfo Magtibay, then Director of the Manila
Police District (MPD), set up an Advanced Command Post at the Luneta Police Community
Precinct (PCC). On even time, P/C Supt. Magtibay instructed Police Chief Insp. Romeo
Salvador to inform P/Supt. Yebra to act as negotiator in the hostage-taking crisis.
Simultaneously, then PNP Chief Director General Jesus Versoza called Police Chief Director
Leocadio Santiago Jr. of the National Capital Region Police Office (NCRPO) to create a
Crisis Management Committee. A Crisis Management Task Force was then created. P/C
Supt. Magtibay was designated as the ground commander and other PNP officers, namely:
PS/Supt. Gutierrez, PS/Supt. Robert Po, and PS/Supt. Fidel posadas, as members.

At around 10:30 a.m., policemen have taken positions around the area. Around that
time, Ei Tsui Fung-Kwan, a Hong Kong national told Mendoza that she had stomach upset.
Mendoza ordered Diana Chan, staff of the travel agency, to accompany Fung-Kwan to the
comfort room. Mendoza also informed Chan to call the NCRPO and informed them that he
took hostage of the bus passengers. That was the first set of hostages which was released by
Mendoza.

At
11:00 a.m., P/C Insp. Romeo Salvador of the MPD was able to speak with
Mendoza through the cellphone of the bus driver (Lubang) and introduced himself to
Mendoza. Apparently, Mendoza remembered him as one of his "talking buddy" while he was
still on a floating status at Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan. Mendoza then allowed Salvador to
approach the bus on the condition that Salvador should first remove his bullet proof vest.
Salvador then approached the driver's window and talked to Mendoza. Mendoza demanded
that an Order be issued for his immediate reinstatement in the service. He informed Salvador
that if his request shall be granted, he would have himself handcuffed and surrender. He also
informed P/C Insp. Salvador that he is in possession of 2 grenades. Thereafter, he told P/C
Insp. Salvador to copy his demands written on a cartolina paper which he posted on the
windshield of the bus, and to relay the same to Secretary Leila De Lima of the DeparLment of
Justice (DOJ) and then Ombudsman Mercedita Gutierrez. Before leaving the bus, Salvador
offered food and drinks for Mendoza as well as for the hostages. However, Mendoza declined
the offer stating that he might be drugged with the food.

During the course of the conversation between P/C Insp. Salvador and Mendoza,PlC
Insp. Salvador saw P/Supt. Yebra waving at him 50 meters away. P/C Insp. Salvador
informed Mendoza that P/Supt Yebra arrived and he will be taking over as negotiator.
However, Mendoza uttered," Ayaw ko sa kanya. Ikaw ang gusto kong kausap." p/C Insp.
Salvador then approached P/Supt. Yebra and informed him of the demands of Mendoza and
he reported to him the weapons which Mendoza possessed. He also informed P/Supt. Yebra
that Mendoza refused to talk to anyone except to him. P/Supt. Yebra then called the cellular
phone of the bus driver and he was able to convince Mendoza to let him approach the bus and
talk with him. At this point, P/Supt. Yebra commenced his duties as ad hoc negotiator in the
hostagecrisis.
fvr
 7'ebra../p.5ofll
x- - - ------ ------- - --x

Both P/C Insp. Salvador and P/Supt. Yebra then approached the bus. P/Supt. Yebra
o'Rol, ano ba ang problema? Baka puwede nating pag-usapan? Mendoza
asked Mendoza,
replied, "Sige sir, baka puwedeng maipadala itong mga papeles ko sa Ombudsman at sa DOJ,
kay Secretary De Lima, para mamaya lang ay malaman ko ang sagot." P/Supt. Yebra told
Mendoza, "Sige, padala natin. Baka puwede naman magpalabas ka diyan kahit dalawa."
Mendoza uttered, "Sige, pag-isipan ko sir, basta bigayan tayo."

After the conversation between P/Supt. Yebra and Mendoza, the latter gave
documents to P/Supt. Yebra and P/C Insp. Salvador to be reproduced and delivered to
Secretary De Lima. The documents apparently pertain to the case of Mendoza with the Office
of the Ombudsman. These documents were photocopied and thereafter indorsed to P/C Supt.
Magtibay and Vice Mayor Moreno. However, both P/C Supt. Magtibay and Vice Mayor
Moreno said that the documents should be brought to the Office of the Ombudsman instead
of delivering the same to Secretary De Lima. Vice Mayor Moreno volunteered to take the
documents to the Office of the Ombudsman.

During the course of the negotiations with Mendoza, P/Supt. Remus B. Medina, the
Chief of the Regional Police Intelligence and Operations Unit of the NCRPO proceeded to
the Office of the President and briefed President Aquino on the status of the hostage crisis.
He informed the President that negotiations were going well, and so far, more hostages were
being released by Mendoza. On the other hand, then USEC Puno informed the President that
the task force was in place, and P/C Supt. Magtibay as well as Mayor Lim were helping in the
supervision of the hostage crisis. The President then instructed P/Supt Medina to tap the PNP
Special Action Force Crisis Response Group (SAF-CRG) in the event that an assault will be
made on the bus, and to prepare a standby ambulance. The instructions of the President were
immediately relayed by Medina to P/C Supt. Magtibay.

At 2:00 p.m., Mendoza released

another hostage. Several minutes thereafter, Yebra
negotiated the release ofanother hostage in exchange for a gas for the bus.

At2:.30 p.m., PNP Chief Versozaleft. for Cagayan de Oro to attend to a multi-sectoral
forum. Thus, Police Deputy General Belarmino took charge as the highest-ranking police
officer in command. On even time, SPO2 Gregorio Mendoza, brother of Rolando Mendoza,
approached the bus. He was escorted by P/C Insp. Salvador. P/C Insp. Salvador, however,
disarmed Gregorio Mendoza. Thus, Rolando Mendoza shouted from the bus that the gun of
his brother should be retumed to him.

Meanwhile, Vice Mayor Moreno met with Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez and
other officials of the Office of the Ombudsman. Moreno relayed to them the demands of
Mendoza. Thereafter, Moreno called P/Supt. Yebra and sought clearance for him to talk with
Mendoza. Mendoza informed Moreno that he want to speak with Emilio Gonzales III, the
Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Agencies. While Mendoza
and Gonzales were talking over the phone, Moreno allegedly heard Mendoza berating
Gonzales while asking the latter on why was there a need to demand from him an amount of
Php 150,000.00 to supposedly settle his case. After the conversation between Mendoza and
Gonzales, then Ombudsman Gutierrez talked with Mendoza and assured him that the Office
of the Ombudsman will review his case.
 Yebra../p.6ofll
x- -- -- --------- -- - --x

directed P/Supt. Medina to proceed to the Quirino

At 5:00 p.m., P/C Supt. Santiago
Grandstand andioordinate with the SAF team who were earlier deployed in the area. At 5:10
p.m., Mayor Lim arrived at the Luneta PCP, and saw Gregorio Mendoza seated on the sofa.
Li* qu.rtioned Gregorio Mendoza on the crisis created by his brother Rolando which posed
a threat to the lives of the tourists who are on board the bus.

At 6:00 p.m., Vice Mayor Moreno arrived at the Luneta PCP and he handed the letter
from the Office of the Ombudsman to then Mayor Lim. Thereafter, Gregorio Mendoza was
allowed to approach the bus together with P/Supt. Yebra and P/C Insp. Salvador in the hope
that the former can assist in paciffing and persuading his brother to peacefully surrender and
end the hostage crisis. Thus, Yebra, Salvador, and Gregorio Mendoza proceeded to the bus
and handed over to Mendoza the letter from the Office of the Ombudsman. After reading the
letter, however, Mendozabecame agitated and felt rejected while claiming that it is a mere
garbage as the Office of the Ombudsman only promised to review his case.

P/Supt. Yebra attempted to paciff Mendoza by asking him if he would be satisfied

with a provisional reinstatement in the PNP. Mendoza answered, "Alright. Alright."
However, Gregorio Mendoza intervened in the negotiation and complained to his brother that
his service firearm was confiscated by the PNP, thus, he urged his brother not to deal with the
negotiators anymore until his gun will be returned to him. The sudden intervention of
Gregorio Mendoza prompted P/Supt. Yebra to pull him back to the command post. As Yebra,
Salvador and Gregorio Mendoza were on their way to the command post, Rolando Mendoza
fired a warning shot.

Upon arrival at the command post, P/Supt. Yebra reported to then Mayor Lim and
Magtibay what Gregorio Mendoza did, and he recommended that the latter should be charged
as accessory to the hostage-taking. Acting on the report of P/Supt. Yebra, then Mayor Lim
directed that Gregorio Mendoza be handcuffed and be taken to the MPD Headquarters for
investigation. Later, however, then Mayor Lim recalled his earlier directive and ordered to
remove the handcuff of Gregorio Mendoza. Consequently, Gregorio Mendoza was escorted
out of the Luneta PCP, however, he managed to escape from his escorts and rushed towards a
group of media. His family who happened to be within the vicinity of the Luneta joined
Gregorio Mendoza and locked arms with him. His family cried and prevented the police from
taking Gregorio Mendoza out of the Luneta area. As the police tried to forcibly put Gregorio
Mendoza inside a police car, a footage of the scene was captured live on atelevision and the
incident was witnessed by Rolando Mendoza inside the bus.

Thereafter, Michael Rogas, a news anchor of radio station DZXL, interviewed

Rolando Mendoza over the phone. Rogas told Mendozathat the police could hear whatever
his statements would be, and he was asked about his next course of action. Mendoza
threatened to shoot the hostages if the police will not release his brother, Gregorio Mendoza.

Also, DZXL reporter Erwin Tulfo attempted to talk to Mendoza, however, the police
prevented him from doing so. Nonetheless, Tulfo managed to talk to Mendoza over the
phone. Tulfo even informed Mendoza that he was prevented by the police from talking with
him.
 Yebra../p.7ofll
x- --- -- -- - -- -- --- --- x

Meanwhile, Vice Mayor Moreno left the Luneta PCP as he already saw members of
the Special Forces with sniper rifles coming from the back of the Manila Hotel. Moreno
thought that the situation is already a police matter, thus he proceeded to the Manila Pavillon
Hotel and monitored the incident through the ANC Channel's coverage.

Shortly before 7:00 p.m., gunshots were heard inside the bus. P/Supt. Yebra tried to
contact Mendoza through the phone but he could no longer connect with him since his
telephone is busy as he was still being interviewed by Rogas. Shortly thereafter, gunshots
were again heard from inside the bus, and the bus driver was seen running from the bus while
shouting that all the hostages were killed.

At 7:45 p.m., P/C Supt. Magtibay directed the SWAT headed by PIC Insp. Santiago
Pascual III to assault the bus. The SWAT tried to rift the bus with the use of sledgehammem.
However, Mendoza fired at the assault team which prompted them to withdraw. Thus,
NCRPO Chief Santiago directed Medina to take over the operations. P/Supt. Medina directed
the SWAT to assault the bus from the front while the SAF-CRG assaulted the bus from the
back portion. Tear gas canisters were also thrown by the team into the bus. Thus, Mendoza
was forced to moved to the front of the bus where he was killed by a PNP sniper. That ended
the hostage crisis.

Out of the 2l Hong Kong nationals who were held hostage by Mendoza, 6 were
earlier released while out of the 15 who were left in the bus,7 survived and 8 were killed.
The 4 staff of the local travel agency who are all Filipinos were also earlier released by
Mendoza during the course of the negotiation.

In the aftermath of the hostage-taking, President Aquino directed the DOJ and the
DILG to conduct a thorough joint investigation of the incident.

On August 30, 2010, the DOJ and the DILG through their respective Secretaries
issued a Joint Department Order No. 01-2010 creating an Incident Investigation and Review
Committee (IIRC). Secretary De Lima of the DOJ was designated as the Chairperson of the
IIRC while then Undersecretary Puno of the DILG was designated as the Vice-Chairperson,
and with one representative each from the Filipino-Chinese Community, the Kapisanan ng
mga Broadkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), and a representative from the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.

On August 3I, a Joint

Department Order No. 02-2010 was also issued
2010,
appointing Teresita Ang-See as the representative of the Filipino-Chinese Community, Atty.
Roan I. Libarios as the representative of the IBP, and Herman Basbaflo as representative of
the KBP.

The IIRC issued its report dated September 17, 2010. In the said report, it was no
longer then DILG Secretary Puno who signed as the Vice-Chairman of the IIRC, instead it
was then DILG Secretary Jesse M. Robredo, however, with a notification that he did not
participate in the deliberation of the accountabilities of the persons cited in the report. As far
as Yebra is concerned, the IIRC recommended that Yebra be charged for gtoss incompetence.
The IIRC report was subsequently indorsed to the Office of the President.
 Yebra../p.8ofll
x- ---- - --- -- ----- - --x

Acting on the report of the IIRC, Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. and Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel, Eduardo V. De Mesa, jointly issued a Memorandum dated
October 8, 2010 for President Aquino with a conclusion, inter alia, that it is not justifiable to
find P/Supt. Yebra liable for gross incompetence due to the failure of the negotiation. It
further stated that Mendoza shot some of the hostages because of statements which came
from other persons but not from P/Supt. Yebra nor from his own acts. It was also concluded
therein that Mendoza shot the hostages not because of the faulty negotiation by P/Supt. Yebra
but because of what was done to his brother Gregorio. Said Memorandum also mentioned
that P/Supt. Yebra was merely an ad hoc negotiator and being a negotiator is not his primary
function. Said Memorandum, however, recommended that P/Supt. Yebra may found liable
forNeglect of Duty.

On October 12,2010, the Office of the President through Executive Secretary Ochoa
adopted the Memorandum dated October 8, 2010, and directed the NAPOLCOM to conduct
formal investigation against some PNP officials involved in the August 23,2010 hostage-
taking incident.

On November 24, 2010, the NAPOLCOM as represented by Benjamin DA

Florentino, Director of the Inspection, Monitoring and Investigation Service, issued a Formal
Charge against Yebra for Serious Neglect of Duty, Serious Inegularity in the Performance of
Duty and Gross Incompetence. Salient portions of the formal charge read, as follows:

"He may be faulted for failing to appropriately alert his superiors to

be ready to take the necessary action when it appeared that Mendoza had
already become more agitated and violent afier reading the letter from the
Ombudsman considering that Mendoza was shouting and even fired a
warning shot. It appears that Yebra lost his focus/composure after Gregorio
Mendoza told his brother not to yield unless his gun was returned.

"He allowed his attention to be diverted to charging Gregorio

Mendoza as an accomplice of his brother instead of keeping focused on how
to convince P/S Insp. Mendoza to yield."

. The pre-hearing conference of the case commenced on January 20, 2011. The
continuation of the hearing was set on February 3,2011. During the said hearing, both the
prosecution and P/Supt. Yebra manifested to dispense with the formal hearing and to submit
the case for decision by way of a position paper.

On one hand, the prosecution submitted its position paper dated March 21,, 20ll
alleging, inter alia, that P/Supt. Yebra deliberately failed to perform his duties and functions
as Chief Negotiator. That, his acts manifested his lack of ability and fitness to satisfactorily
perform his police duties particularly when he failed to coordinate with the Ground
Commander as to the proper nature of the demand of the hostage taker; failed to alert his
superiors to be on guard when it became manifest that Mendoza had grown agitated and
angry after reading the letter from the Ombudsman; and he lost his focus/composure when he
instead diverted his attention in accusing Gregorio Mendoza as an accomplice of Rolando
Mendoza.
 febra../p. 9 of 1l
x- -- --- - -- -- - --- - --- x

On the other hand, P/Supt. Yebra filed his position paper dated March 10,2011
denying the allegations that he failed to alert his superiors when Mendoza was agitated after
reading the letter from the Office of the Ombudsman. He argued that upon retuming to
Luneta PCP at about 6:20 p.m., he reported to P/C Supt. Magtibay that Mendoza got mad
after reading the letter of the Office of the Ombudsman. As evidence, he attached a copy of
the IIRC report which states as part of the facts in the report that he reported to PiC Supt.
Magtibay the violent reaction of Mendoza upon learning the position/stand of the Office of
the Ombudsman regarding his case.

On October 30,2013, the NAPOLCOM issued its Decision exonerating P/Supt. Yebra
on the charges of Serious Neglect of Duty and Serious Irregularity in the Performance of
Duty, for lack of substantial evidence. However, he was found guilty of Gross Incompetence
and meted the penalty of one rank demotion. He moved for the reconsideration of the same,
however, the NAPOLCOM denied his motion in its Resolution dated January 14,2014.

Hence, the instant appeal.

The issues posed for resolution are, as follows:

1. Whether Yebra was denied of his right to due process; and

2. Whether there is substantial evidence to hold Yebra liable for Gross
Incompetence.

Anent the first issue, the Commission holds that Yebra was afforded his right to due
process. In the case of Larin v. Executive Secretary, 280 SCRA 713, the Supreme Court
ruled that on the aspect of procedural due process, it to sufficient that the petitioner is given
every chance to present his/her side. The rule is well settled that the essence of due process
in administrative proceedings is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard
and to submit any evidence he/she may have in support of his/her defense.

In the instant case, the records clearly show that Yebra was accorded all reasonable
opportunity to counter the charges against him.

As regard the second issue, the NAPOLCOM ascribes gross incompetence to Yebra
on the ground that he fell short of his duty to alert his superior to be on guard when it became
manifest that Mendozahad grown agitated and angry after reading the letter from the Office
of the Ombudsman. That, he diverted his attention in charging Gregorio Mendoza as an
accessory, thus, precious time was lost in salvaging the negotiation and in saving the lives of
the hostages.

Gross Incompetence is committed in the PNP when there is a manifest lack of

adequate ability and fitness on the part of its member for the satisfactory performance of
police duties. (Section 2 (C) (5), Rule 21 of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No.
2007-001)

A review of the instant case shows that there is no substantial evidence to prove that
the failure of Yebra to alert his superior about Mendoza's violent reaction upon reading the
letter of the Office of the Ombudsman, and for subsequently reporting to then Mayor Lim
 Yebra../p. l0 of I I
x.- -- ---- - - -- --- - - ---x

that Gregorio Mendoza is an accessory to the hostage-taking, are acts which amount to Gross
Incompetence. As defined in the NAPOLCOM Memorandum No. 2007-001, for one to be
found guilty for Gross Incompetence, there must be a manifest display of lack of ability and
fitness to perform one's duty.

In the instant case, the acts imputed against Yebra are not manifestation of his
inability and being unfit to have performed his duties as chief negotiator. As culled from the
Memorandum dated October 8, 2010 jointly issued by the Office of the Executive Secretary
and the Presidential Chief Legal Counsel, and which was subsequently adopted by the Office
of the President in a Memorandum dated October 12,2010, there was no justifiable ground to
hold Yebra liable for Gross Incompetence. The findings of said Offices further show that the
failure in the negotiation during the AugustZ3,2010 hostage crisis in Manila was not due to
the faulfy negotiation by Yebra. It was further stated that the failure of the negotiation does
not justifu holding Yebra liable for Gross Incompetence as a negotiator as nothing is
indicated in the records of the case that Mendoza shot some of his hostages due to the acts
and statements of Yebra. Instead, Mendoza started shooting because of the statements of
other persons. Said memorandum further identified Yebra as a mere ad hoc negotiator which
means that negotiation was not his primary duty.

The Memorandum dated October 8, 2010 which was jointly issued by the Office of
the Executive Secretary and the Presidential Chief Legal Counsel, and the Memorandum
dated October 12,2010 issued by the Office of the President through Executive Secretary
Ochoa, were used as evidence by the NAPOLCOM in finding Yebra guilty of Gross
Incompetence. Thus, the Commission notes that said evidence are patently insubstantial to
support the findings of the NAPOLCOM against Yebra for Gross Incompetence since said
evidence contains the contradicting findings of the Office of the Executive Secretary,
Presidential Chief Legal Counsel, and the Office of the President, stating, among others, that
there was no justifiable ground to hold Yebra liable of Gross Incompetence.

Thus, while it is an established rule in administrative law that the courts of justice
should respect the findings of fact of administrative agencies, the same is not absolute and
there are recognized exceptions thereto. Courts may not be bound by the findings of fact of
an administrative agency when there is absolutely no evidence in support thereof or such
evidence is clearly, manifestly and patently insubstantial.(Pleyto v. PNP-Cil)G, G.R. No.
L69982 dated November 23,2007 citing Blue Bar Coconut Philippines v. Tantioco, Jr.,
G.R. No. L-47051 dated July 29,1988). Ergo, the Commission is not bound by the findings
of fact of NAPOLCOM when the evidence is not substantial.

It is noted that in administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of

proving, by substantial evidence the allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence is that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justiff a
conclusion. In the instant case, there are more than enough pieces of evidence to prove that
Yebra possesses the ability and fitness in performing his duties as police officer. It is
undisputed that the failure of the negotiation during the August 23, 2010 hostage crisis in
Manila is not imputed to the acts or statements of Yebra, but to the statements or actions of
other persons.
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Given the foregoing factual circumstances of the case, including the pieces of
evidence on record, which show lack of substantial evidence to hold Yebra liable of Gross
Incompetence, the Commission has no other recourse but to grant his appeal.

WIIEREFORE, appeal of Orlando O. Yebra, Jr., Police Superintendent, Manila

Police District, United Nations Avenue, Ermita, Manila, is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Decision dated October 30, 2013 of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), finding
him guilty of Gross Incompetence and meting upon him the penalty of one rank demotion;
and the Resolution dated January 14,201.4 also issued by NAPOLCOM, denying his motion
for reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Philippine National Police
(PNP) is directed to immediately restore the original rank of Yebra as Police Superintendent.

Quezon City.

T. DUQUE III

ROBERT S.

M Commissioner

Attested by:

DOLOR

Commission Secretariat and Liaison Office

O Ltl 3 /Y4 8/mc c/cs I o. bernie

D-20 I 4-03070
T-20 I 4-03070
Yebra Final Draft/2}14 Decision