Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Asia-Pacific Security: Contending Cooperation

ROUTLEDGE SECURITY IN ASIA PACIFIC SERIES
Bilateralism, Multilateralism and

Asia-Pacific Security
Contending cooperation
Edited by
William T. Tow and Brendan Taylor
Bilateralism, Multilateralism and
Asia-Pacific Security
Many scholars of international relations in Asia regard bilateralism

and multilateralism as alternative and mutually exclusive approaches to
security cooperation. They argue that multilateral associations such as
ASEAN will eventually replace the system of bilateral alliances that were
the predominant form of US security cooperation with Asia-Pacific allies
during the Cold War. Yet these bilateral alliances continue to be the primary
means of the United States’ strategic engagement with the region. This book
contends that bilateralism and multilateralism are not mutually exclusive,
and that bilateralism is likely to continue strong even as multilateralism
strengthens. It explores a wide range of issues connected with this question.
It discusses how US bilateral alliances have been reinvigorated in recent
years, examines how bilateral and multilateral approaches to specific pro-
blems can work alongside each other, and concludes by considering
how patterns of international security are likely to develop in the region
in future.
William T. Tow is Professor and Head of the Department of International

Relations at the Australian National University.
Brendan Taylor is Associate Professor and Head of the Strategic and

Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University.
Routledge Security in Asia-Pacific Series
Series Editors
Leszek Buszynski, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre,
the Australian National University, and
William Tow, Australian National University
Security issues have become more prominent in the Asia-Pacific region

because of the presence of global players, rising great powers, and confident
middle powers, which intersect in complicated ways. This series puts forward
important new work on key security issues in the region. It embraces the
roles of the major actors, their defense policies and postures and their
security interaction over the key issues of the region. It includes coverage of
the United States, China, Japan, Russia, the Koreas, as well as the middle
powers of ASEAN and South Asia. It also covers issues relating to envir-
onmental and economic security as well as transnational actors and regional
groupings.
1. Bush and Asia

America’s evolving relations with East Asia
Edited by Mark Beeson
2. Japan, Australia and Asia-Pacific Security

Edited by Brad Williams and Andrew Newman
3. Regional Cooperation and Its Enemies in Northeast Asia

The impact of domestic forces
Edited by Edward Friedman and Sung Chull Kim
4. Energy Security in Asia

Edited by Michael Wesley
5. Australia as an Asia Pacific Regional Power

Friendships in flux?
Edited by Brendan Taylor
6. Securing Southeast Asia

The politics of security sector reform
Mark Beeson and Alex J. Bellamy
7. Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons
Bhumitra Chakma
8. Human Security in East Asia

Challenges for collaborative action
Edited by Sorpong Peou
9. Security and International Politics in the South China Sea

Towards a co-operative management regime
Edited by Sam Bateman and Ralf Emmers
10. Japan’s Peace Building Diplomacy in Asia

Seeking a more active political role
Lam Peng Er
11. Geopolitics and Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia

Ralf Emmers
12. North Korea’s Military–Diplomatic Campaigns, 1966–2008

Narushige Michishita
13. Political Change, Democratic Transitions and Security in Southeast Asia

Mely Caballero-Anthony
14. American Sanctions in the Asia-Pacific

Brendan Taylor
15. Southeast Asia and the Rise of Chinese and Indian Naval Power
Between rising naval powers
Edited by Sam Bateman and Joshua Ho
16. Human Security in Southeast Asia

Yukiko Nishikawa
17. ASEAN and the Institutionalization of East Asia

Ralf Emmers
18. India as an Asia Pacific Power

David Brewster
19. ASEAN Regionalism

Cooperation, values and institutionalisation
Christopher B. Roberts
20. Nuclear Power and Energy Security in Asia
Edited by Rajesh Basrur and Koh Swee Lean Collin
21. Maritime Challenges and Priorities in Asia

Implications for regional security
Edited by Joshua Ho and Sam Bateman
22. Human Security and Climate Change in Southeast Asia

Managing risk and resilience
Edited by Lorraine Elliott and Mely Caballero-Anthony
23. Ten Years After 9/11 – Rethinking the Jihadist Threat

Arabinda Acharya
24. Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Asia-Pacific Security

Edited by William T. Tow and Brendan Taylor
Bilateralism, Multilateralism
and Asia-Pacific Security
Edited by
First published 2013
by Routledge
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Bilateralism, multilateralism and Asia-Pacific security: contending
cooperation / edited by William T. Tow and Brendan Taylor.
p. cm. – (Routledge security in Asia Pacific series; 24)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Security, International – Asia. 2. Security, International – Pacific
Area. 3. National security – Asia. 4. National security – Pacific Area.
5. Asian cooperation. 6. Pacific Area cooperation. 7. Asia – Foreign
relations. 8. Pacific Area – Foreign relations. I. Tow, William T. II. Taylor,
Brendan, 1974–
JZ6009.A75B55 2013
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ISBN: 978-0-415-62580-7 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-0-203-36708-7 (ebk)
Typeset in Times New Roman

by Cenveo Publisher Services
Contents
Figure and tables ix

Contributors x
Preface xii
Abbreviations xv
PART I
Setting the context 1
1 Introduction 3
WILLIAM T. TOW AND BRENDAN TAYLOR
2 Conceptualizing the bilateral–multilateral security nexus 8

BRENDAN TAYLOR
PART II
The nexus and America’s Asian alliances 19
3 Bridging alliances and Asia-Pacific multilateralism 21

AJIN CHOI AND WILLIAM T. TOW
4 Stretching the Japan–US alliance 39

RIKKI KERSTEN
5 The US–Philippines alliance: moving beyond bilateralism? 53

RENATO CRUZ DE CASTRO
6 Thailand’s security policy: bilateralism or multilateralism? 68

CHULACHEEB CHINWANNO
viii Contents
PART III
The nexus and Asian multilateralism 85
7 The role of the Five Power Defence Arrangements in

Southeast Asian security architecture 87
RALF EMMERS
8 Territorial and maritime jurisdiction disputes in East Asia:

comparing bilateral and multilateral approaches 100
AILEEN S.P. BAVIERA
9 The bilateral–multilateral nexus in Asia’s defense diplomacy 115

DAVID CAPIE
PART IV
The nexus and Asian security order 133
10 The rise of China and the transformation of Asia-Pacific

security architecture 135
RYO SAHASHI
11 Alliances and order in the “Asian Century” 157

HUGH WHITE
12 Conceptualizing the relationship between bilateral and

multilateral security approaches in East Asia: a great power
regional order framework 169
EVELYN GOH
13 Conclusion 183
WILLIAM T. TOW
References 193
Index 214
Figure and tables
Figure
10.1 The spiral dynamics of US–China security relations 153
Tables
5.1 Managing the US–Philippines alliance 54
6.1 China’s arms exports to ASEAN, 2001–11 (US$ million) 70
Contributors
Aileen S.P. Baviera is Professor at the Asian Center, University of the

Philippines, and editor-in-chief of Asian Politics and Policy (Wiley-
Blackwell).
David Capie is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Victoria

University of Wellington.
Chulacheeb Chinwanno, a former Vice-Rector in International Affairs at

Thammasat University, is Associate Professor in the Faculty of Political
Science, Thammasat University, Bangkok.
Ajin Choi is Associate Professor of International Relations in the Graduate

School of International Studies, Yonsei University, Seoul.
Renato Cruz De Castro is Senior Professor in the International Studies

Department, De La Salle University, Manila, and the holder of the
Charles Lui Chi Keung Professorial Chair in China Studies.
Ralf Emmers is Associate Professor and Coordinator of the Multilateralism

and Regionalism Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of Inter-
national Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
Evelyn Goh is Reader in International Relations and an ESRC Mid-

Career Development Fellow (2011–12) at Royal Holloway, University of
London.
Rikki Kersten is Professor of Modern Japanese Political History in the
Department of Political and Social Change, College of Asia and
the Pacific, at the Australian National University, Canberra.
Ryo Sahashi is Associate Professor of International Politics, Faculty of Law,
Kanagawa University.
Brendan Taylor is Associate Professor and Head of the Strategic and
Defence Studies Centre, College of Asia and the Pacific, at the Australian
National University, Canberra.
Contributors xi
William T. Tow is Professor and Head of the Department of International
Relations, College of Asia and the Pacific, at the Australian National
University, Canberra.
Hugh White is Professor in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre,
College of Asia and the Pacific, at the Australian National University,
Canberra. He is also Visiting Fellow at the Lowy Institute for Inter-
national Policy.
Preface
Asia-Pacific countries have reached a crossroads on what form of order-

building they will pursue. The region’s two major powers – the United
States and China – favor bilateral approaches to security and diplomacy to
realize their “core” national interests. Recently, however, both of these states
have “hedged” their respective bilateral strategies and their participation
in multilateral security initiatives has intensified to a degree where Beijing
and Washington are determined not to be marginalized when such initiatives
arise. Such “contending cooperation” has emerged as a key strategic
priority for the region’s great powers and for their middle and small power
counterparts.
The imperative to better understand this dimension of regional security
politics was recognized by the MacArthur Foundation in May 2009 when it
launched its Asia Security Initiative (MASI). Research funds were directed
toward a worldwide (but predominantly Asia-Pacific) network of 27 policy
research institutions and was aimed at understanding key trends and devel-
oping new ideas for overcoming the security challenges faced by Asia-Pacific
states. This volume is the product of a three-year project underwritten
by MASI and focusing on “Policy Alternatives for Integrating Bilateral and
Multilateral Regional Security Approaches in the Asia-Pacific.” Our major
concern was how traditional security ties between the US, its treaty partners,
and other states in the Asia-Pacific fit into that region’s growing and
increasingly crucial multilateral security politics. Our project incorporated
four “focus groups” dealing with processes for achieving a bilateral–
multilateral security nexus in the Asia-Pacific; alliance/coalition initiatives
on “broader security” challenges; the intersection of economics and security;
and arms control and nuclear non-proliferation. The output from the first
two groups is reflected in the pages that follow; the research findings of the
economics–security intersection will be published in a special issue of
the Pacific Review and the conclusions reached by the arms control
and nuclear non-proliferation group will appear in a future issue of the
Australian Journal of International Affairs.
As is usually the case with a task of this scope and duration, there are too
many individuals who contributed to our project efforts to list within this
Preface xiii
limited space. Those who are acknowledged below, however, merit special
mention and the heartfelt thanks of this book’s editors.
Along with Professor William Tow, Professor John Ravenhill was
co-manager of the Australian National University’s (ANU) partnership
with MASI. We owe him a special debt of gratitude for asking the tough
questions that enhanced the project’s research credibility and relevance, and
for providing commensurate levels of inspiration to his project colleagues.
We are also immensely grateful to Adm. Chris Barry (Ret.) and Professor
Steve Lamy for playing key roles in a project simulation exercise on Asian
security that they largely designed and delivered during a November
2010 workshop, and in which a significant number of Australian security
analysts and policymakers participated. Dr David Envall coordinated this
exercise and has served as editor of the ANU–MASI Policy Background
Paper series, initiated in August 2011, which delivers short papers electro-
nically and aims to give readers a concise background analysis of key
issues driving security developments in the Asian region today. A number of
postgraduate students in the ANU’s Department of International Relations
(IR) and the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre were also instrumental
in providing research and logistical assistance throughout the project. The
efforts of Jacob Berah, Madeline Carr, Greg Collins, Matt Davies, Jason
Hall, Christine Leah, Beverley Loke, Lachlan McGoldrick, Jake Northey,
Michael O’Shannassy, and Jeff Wilson in this context were especially
valuable and highly appreciated.
Various academic colleagues and administrative personnel at the ANU
and elsewhere were instrumental in ensuring that the four major workshops
involving (and combining) the two focus groups whose papers appear in
this book convened and transpired smoothly. We are especially grateful to
Ansonne Belcher, Sheila Flores, Chizuko Horiuchi, HyeRim Kim, Kana
Moy, and Satomi Ono in this context. We also wish to acknowledge
the efforts of Professor Wang Jisi, Professor Zhu Feng, Liu Xinxin, and
Zhang Dee at Peking University; Tom Christensen, Alistair Iain Johnston,
and Rosemary Foot who attended the May 2011 Beida workshop and con-
tributed greatly to the discussion that transpired there; and Professor Kiichi
Fujiwara and Miyuki Otsuka at the University of Tokyo for their efforts
in organizing the ANU–MASI organizational meeting in September 2009.
We are also very much indebted to Ambassador Barry Desker, Dean of the
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, who graciously and effec-
tively served as this project’s “senior mentor.”
As has been the case for most of the publications generated by IR
colleagues at the ANU, manuscript preparation has been in the very capable
hands of Ms Mary-Louise Hickey. The editors owe her a special note of
thanks. We are also grateful to Professors Chris Reus-Smit and Hugh White.
As heads of department for our respective units throughout much of the
project’s duration, they extended special understanding and critical support
at key junctures of the project’s duration, without which this publication
xiv Preface
may not have seen the light of day. As always, we are grateful to the
Routledge Press and to both Peter Sowden and Leszek Buszynski (who
co-edits Routledge’s Security in the Asia Pacific series) who have been highly
supportive of the publication of this book.
We would also like to acknowledge the following for permission to reprint
material:
Figure 10.1 from K. Jimbo, R. Sahashi, S. Takahashi, Y. Sakata, T.
Yuzawa, T and M. Masuda, “Japan’s Security Strategy toward China:
Integration, Balancing, and Deterrence in the Era of Power Shift,” Tokyo:
Tokyo Foundation, 2011, p. 28. Reprinted with the permission of the Tokyo
Foundation.
The editors intend that the following pages will contribute to the Asia-
Pacific security debate in a timely and useful way. The stakes for the world’s
most prosperous and dynamic region of “getting the balance right” between
bilateral and multilateral security politics are immense. We are hopeful
that the assessments of this volume’s contributors might facilitate thinking
about those critical issues that will make a difference in achieving regional
peace and stability.
William T. Tow
Brendan Taylor
August 2012
Abbreviations
ADMM ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting

ADSOM ASEAN Defence Senior Officials’ Meeting
AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines
AMDA Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement
ANZUS Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AUSMIN Australia–United States Ministerial
CARAT Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training
CEPS Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security
CSCAP Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific
CUP Capability Upgrade Program
DOE Department of Energy
DPJ Democratic Party of Japan
EAS East Asia Summit
EEZ exclusive economic zone
EU European Union
FPDA Five Power Defence Arrangements
IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies
JCC Joint Consultative Council
JDA Joint Defense Agreement
LDP Liberal Democratic Party
MDB Mutual Defense Board
MSP Malacca Strait Patrol
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PACOM Pacific Command
PAMS Pacific Armies Management Seminar
PDR Philippine Defense Reform
PLA People’s Liberation Army
PLAN People’s Liberation Army’s Navy
xvi Abbreviations
RIMPAC Rim of the Pacific
SARS severe acute respiratory syndrome
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
SDC Sub-Committee on Defence Cooperation
SDF Self-Defense Forces
SEATO South East Asia Treaty Organization
SEB Security Engagement Board
SLD Shangri-La Dialogue
TSD Trilateral Strategic Dialogue
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNSC United Nations Security Council
USAID US Agency for International Development
VFA Visiting Forces Agreement
WPNS Western Pacific Naval Symposium
Part I
Setting the context

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1 Introduction
Bilateralism and multilateralism have long been regarded as dichotomous

modes of security cooperation, with scholars and practitioners of Asian
security politics traditionally conceiving of them in starkly zero-sum terms.
Throughout the Cold War, for instance, bilateralism was regarded as
the dominant mode of Asia-Pacific security cooperation, as epitomized
by the US-led “San Francisco System” of alliances and the so-called
“spiderweb bilateralism” that was especially prevalent in Southeast Asia
during this period. With the passing of the Cold War, multilateral frame-
works such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Regional Forum (ARF) began to emerge, and with them much speculation
that bilateralism was fast becoming an outdated mode of security coopera-
tion. Contrary to those predictions, however, bilateralism and multi-
lateralism are now flourishing simultaneously in Asia. America’s alliances
with Australia, Japan, and South Korea are arguably as strong as they have
ever been. Speculation is also growing that America’s longstanding alliance
with the Philippines will take on renewed significance in an era defined
largely by an intensification of strategic competition between the US and
China. Against that backdrop, the US is deepening bilateral security ties
with other emerging regional players, such as India, Indonesia, Singapore,
New Zealand, and Vietnam. Concurrently, Asian multilateralism is bur-
geoning with the emergence of a raft of new and potentially influential
regional bodies including the recently expanded East Asia Summit (EAS)
and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+) process.
As Asian multilateralism continues to blossom, many scholars continue
to predict the eventual demise of exclusive bilateral structures such as
the US-led bilateral alliance system (Menon 2007). A handful of analysts
have forecast the eventual convergence of the two modes of security coop-
eration as their proximity intensifies (for example, see Tow 2001). A third
line of thinking points toward a “peaceful coexistence” between bilateralism
and multilateralism, suggesting that existing structures can effectively
be knitted together to form a “patchwork-like” regional architecture that
contains elements of each (see Cha 2011). Yet the relationship between
Asia’s persistent bilateral structures and its newly emergent multilateral
4 William T. Tow and Brendan Taylor
processes remains underexplored. This volume redresses that shortcoming
in the literature by offering the first empirically comprehensive and con-
ceptually systematic treatment of the emerging “nexus” between bilateralism
and multilateralism in Asian security politics.
The book is divided into four parts. The first locates the study and
conceptualizes the nexus – an important task not least because bilateralism
and multilateralism are each highly contested concepts in political science
and international relations scholarship. In the chapter immediately following
this introduction, Brendan Taylor outlines four possible conceptual approa-
ches to the so-called “nexus” between bilateral and multilateral modes
of security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. The first approach – which
Taylor terms bilateral or multilateral – assumes that bilateralism and multi-
lateralism are mutually exclusive modes of cooperation. The second
approach – bilateral–multilateral – suggests that synergies between the two
modes can and do exist, but that multilateralism is ultimately a smokescreen
for enhanced bilateral interaction. The third – the multilateral–bilateral –
reverses this causal arrow and views bilateralism as largely a “stepping
stone” or “building block” to multilateralism. The fourth conceptual
approach to the nexus – bilateral and multilateral – suggests that greater
complimentarity and perhaps even convergence can ultimately be realized
between bilateral and multilateral structures and processes.
Part two takes as its central focus the US-led alliance network, analyzing
how emergent multilateral processes are impacting upon this set of strategic
relationships and with what ramifications. Ajin Choi and William Tow “set
the scene,” pointing to the apparent inability of America’s Asian alliances to
meet many of the region’s emergent security challenges. At the same time,
Choi and Tow contend that burgeoning multilateral structures and processes
seem destined to be found equally wanting due to their large size, coupled
with the tendency of their members to often work at odds with one another.
Choi and Tow seek to address this conundrum by proposing a “middle
ground” approach that potentially bridges the gap between exclusivist
bilateral and overly inclusivist multilateral pathways. Modeled on the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization experience, Choi and Tow’s “inclusive but
qualified” membership model of multilateral security politics is one they
regard as transferable to an Asian context. Indeed, they make the case
that elements of this “inclusive but qualified” model are already evident in
South Korea’s approach to regional security politics.
In contrast to Choi and Tow, Rikki Kersten’s analysis of the Japan–US
alliance – referred to by generations of American policymakers as the
“lynchpin” or “cornerstone” of security in the Asia-Pacific – questions
the capacity of this longstanding strategic relationship to accommodate
Tokyo’s increasing desire to engage more deeply with Asia via multilateral
means. Kersten illuminates the interplay and the inherent tensions between
Japan’s emerging bilateral and multilateral policy choices, concluding that
these ultimately cannot be accommodated within the Japan–US alliance,
Introduction 5
which in turn carries significant implications for the prospects of achieving
a bilateral–multilateral nexus in the Asia-Pacific.
Renato Cruz De Castro examines the revitalization of the US–Philippines
alliance that has occurred over the decade or more since the 11 September
2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. De
Castro attributes this alliance revitalization partly to the threat of global
terrorism, but also to the more recently perceived security challenges that
China’s rise poses to both Manila and Washington. Yet while these twin
threats may have served as the glue to bring the US and Philippines closer
strategically, De Castro also concludes that they alone will not be sufficient
to ensure a deepening and enduring alliance relationship. Instead, he
proposes a greater “institutionalization” of this alliance relationship and,
indeed, the San Francisco System writ large, but on a multilateral basis
underwritten by the shared economic interests and the shared values of
its constituent members.
In the final chapter of part two, Chulacheeb Chinwanno provides a case
study of Thai security policy, which has arguably seen that country strike the
most judicious balance of all between bilateralism and multilateralism.
Chinwanno illustrates that Thailand’s policy of “balanced engagement”
is historically rooted, deriving from a strong desire to avoid repeating
past mistakes that have left Thailand unduly dependent upon a single, extra-
regional power for its protection. It is a strategy currently manifested in
Thailand’s three-pronged approach of continued bilateral engagement with
the US, concurrent development of informal bilateral defense cooperation
with China, and active support for multilateral security arrangements
such as the ARF and the ADMM. In an increasingly fluid and complex
Asian security environment, Chinwanno predicts a continuation and per-
haps even an intensification of these preferences on the part of Bangkok.
Part three reverses the causal arrow established in part two, and examines
how Asian multilateralism is being both supported and potentially chal-
lenged by the emerging nexus between bilateral and multilateral modes
of security cooperation. Ralf Emmers begins by highlighting these com-
plementarities and overlaps via a case study of a “minilateral” defense
coalition – the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) – and its rami-
fications for broader security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. Emmers
concludes that since its inception in 1971, the FPDA has succeeded in
reinforcing both the US bilateral alliance network and the multilateral
operations of ASEAN, thereby suggesting that a peaceful coexistence
between these modes of security cooperation remains feasible.
Aileen Baviera then compares bilateral and multilateral approaches to
territorial and maritime jurisdiction disputes in the South China and East
China seas. Baviera’s analysis is conducted at two levels: first, at what
she terms the “claimant-centered” level where her primary focus is upon
whether bilateral or multilateral approaches have thus far proven optimal
from the perspective of the various claimant parties to these disputes.
6 William T. Tow and Brendan Taylor
Second, like Emmers, she undertakes a broader “security architecture-
centered” analysis wherein she asks whether US bilateral relationships can
either coexist or eventually integrate into more comprehensive multilateral
security approaches in direct response to these disputes.
Complementing Baviera’s analysis, David Capie explores Asia’s defense
diplomacy, a subject that has thus far received a markedly lower degree
of scholarly attention relative to other forms of economic and security
cooperation in this part of the world. In his contribution, Capie traces the
evolution of Asia’s defense diplomacy and identifies the factors that have led
states to prefer bilateral or multilateral approaches. He also seeks to account
for the relatively rapid rise of high-level multilateral defense diplomacy
in Asia over the past decade and examines what might be done in future to
further encourage synergies between bilateral and multilateral approaches
to defense diplomacy in Asia.
Part four considers the larger question of how the interaction between
bilateralism and multilateralism is shaping Asia’s emerging security order.
Ryo Sahashi posits that Asia’s security order is currently experiencing a
period of profound transformation occasioned largely by the rise of China.
In Sahashi’s view, the uncertainties that this development is generating
is encouraging small and middle powers to deepen their interactions
with China and the US – both via bilateral and multilateral avenues – who
are also competing for security cooperation with these regional powers in
both bilateral and multilateral settings. Sahashi concludes, however, that
the shape Asia’s security order ultimately takes will be influenced most pro-
foundly by the balance of competition and cooperation in the US–China
relationship and that the means through which such cooperation is pursued
is largely a second order issue.
In a similar vein, Hugh White examines the role of US alliances in shap-
ing Asia’s emerging security order and, contrary to conventional wisdom,
contends that this set of strategic relationships will have little role to play
in shaping this process. White’s argument is essentially threefold. First,
alliance relationships have historically reflected rather than created inter-
national orders. Second, America’s Asian alliances will likely weaken in the
face of China’s rise as divergence between the US and each of its junior
partners becomes more pronounced. Third, and consistent with this, unless
China’s foreign and security policies take a significantly more aggressive
turn, White believes that the prospects for any “multilateralization” of
America’s presently bilateral alliances are extremely remote.
In keeping with the great power emphasis provided by both Sahashi and
White, Evelyn Goh examines the place of bilateral and multilateral modes
of cooperation in the security strategies of the US, China, and Japan. In
contrast to other chapters in this section, however, Goh’s analysis leads her
to challenge the continued utility of the distinction between bilateralism and
multilateralism – and, indeed, the very concept of the bilateral–multilateral
nexus itself – on the grounds that a marked convergence between these two
Introduction 7
modes of cooperation is occurring in the individual strategies pursued by
Washington, Beijing, and Tokyo. This bilateral–multilateral convergence
within US, Chinese, and Japanese security strategies is, in Goh’s view, a
natural product or extension of emerging great power strategic competition.
Against that backdrop, Goh concludes that the underlying tension in Asia’s
emerging security order is not between bilateral and multilateral approaches.
Rather, it is divergence in the larger visions of international order as con-
ceived of and pursued by this region’s great powers that presents the greatest
challenge for practitioners of Asian security going forward.
An impressive range of themes emerge from the contributions to this
volume. These are addressed in greater depth by Tow in his concluding
chapter. One is struck, for instance, by the subtly different approaches taken
by each of the contributors to the bilateral–multilateral security nexus. This
divergence notwithstanding, however, it is also interesting just how little
support for the fourth of Taylor’s proposed conceptual approaches – the
bilateral and multilateral approach – is evident amongst the contributions.
This, in turn, perhaps reflects the fairly pervasive sense of pessimism
emanating from contributions to the volume as to where the future of Asia’s
strategic order – and particularly the relationship between the region’s
two heavyweights, the US and China – is headed. Consistent with this, the
centrality afforded by virtually all contributors to the US-led alliance
network is striking, although in the eyes of some this set of strategic rela-
tionships will not be free from its own set of quite formidable challenges. Yet
it is also revealing that so little emphasis in the contributions is placed upon
other modes of bilateral cooperation outside of the US-led alliance network,
notwithstanding the fact that these are also clearly intensifying.1 Last but
not least, the emergence of “minilateralism” both as a facilitator of greater
bilateral–multilateral synergies and as a mode of security cooperation
not always easily reconciled within the bilateral–multilateral conceptual
dichotomy suggests that this too is an emerging cooperative mode in
pressing need of much closer and more rigorous analysis.
Note
1 In his keynote address to the 2012 Shangri-La Dialogue, for instance, Indonesian
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2012) made the observation that
Five decades ago, if you drew a matrix of countries in the region and tried to
map out bilateral partnerships between them, you would see lots of empty
boxes. Beyond Cold War alliances, and normal bilateral relations, there was
not much else. However, today that same matrix is full of checked boxes,
showing one important fact: that almost every country in the region has
established an elaborate web of diplomatic, security or economic partner-
ships with other countries.
2 Conceptualizing the
bilateral–multilateral security
nexus
Brendan Taylor
Throughout the Cold War period, bilateralism remained the dominant mode
of security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. Its leading institutional manifes-
tation took the form of the US-led network of bilateral alliances, which
was and still is often referred to as the San Francisco System (for further Bilateralismo era el
modo dominante de
reading, see Calder 2004). Efforts were made to implement multilateral cooperación después
de la Guerra Fría.
security structures – such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization – yet

these efforts ultimately failed to gain much traction. The region for much
of this time was generally regarded as being too diverse and too distrustful
to accommodate such ventures. Indeed, the prospects for multilateral
security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific remained bleak until at least the
early 1990s.
The removal of the ideological strictures imposed by the superpower
stalemate dramatically altered this situation. Multilateral cooperation
quickly blossomed in Asia, as epitomized in the security sector by the
establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Regional Forum in 1993–94. According to one estimate, by the mid-1990s
approximately 50 to 60 channels for multilateral security dialogue had
sprung up in the Asia-Pacific, at both the track-one and track-two levels
(Japan Center for International Exchange 2008). This trend has intensified
in recent years with the establishment of a further raft of new and prominent
groupings, such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM)
and the ADMM+, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and the much
heralded East Asia Summit. In the face of this burgeoning multilateralism,
some commentators began questioning the continued viability of the San
Francisco System of alliances, particularly in view of the fact that its raison
d’être – balancing against the threat of Soviet power and influence – had
been removed.
Yet such predictions have yet to materialize. If anything, the most promi-
nent of America’s bilateral security relationships in Asia – the US–Japan,
the US–South Korea, and the US–Australia alliances – have strengthened
during the period since the ending of the Cold War. A case can even been
made that Washington is not only reinforcing existing elements of
the system, but is also seeking to extend its geographic reach through the
Conceptualizing the security nexus 9
establishment of deeper strategic ties with India, Indonesia, Singapore, and
Vietnam as part of a historic American “pivot” towards Asia (Clinton
2011a).
Against that backdrop, this chapter examines the interaction between
bilateral and multilateral modes of security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific
at a time when each is apparently flourishing. In so doing, the chapter
attempts to conceptually unpack the bilateral–multilateral security nexus.
It outlines four possible conceptual approaches to it. The first “bilateral or
multilateral” approach to the nexus suggests that bilateralism and multi-
lateralism are essentially two separate and mutually exclusive modes of
security cooperation. The second “bilateral–multilateral” approach posits
that synergies do exist between bilateral and multilateral modes of security
cooperation, but that bilateralism is ultimately the dominant form and that
multilateralism exists largely to facilitate it. Conversely, the third “multi-
lateral–bilateral” approach assumes that such synergies revolve around the
fact that bilateralism is ultimately a “stepping stone” or a “building block”
to multilateralism. Finally, the “bilateral and multilateral” approach to the
nexus contends that greater complementarity and ultimately perhaps even
a synthesis can be realized between bilateral and multilateral security struc-
tures and/or processes in the Asia-Pacific. While a range of examples
from regional security politics are used in this chapter to illustrate each of
these four approaches to the bilateral/multilateral security nexus, to facilitate
comparison across all four, examples are also drawn specifically from the
range of diplomatic processes that have been applied to the protracted
North Korean nuclear crisis.
The central argument of this chapter is that manifestations of all
four approaches to the nexus will remain in evidence into the foreseeable
future. Instances will remain where the relationship between bilateral and
multilateral modes of security cooperation will retain a zero-sum quality,
particularly during an era of emerging and, indeed, intensifying strategic
competition between the US and China. Reflecting the fact that these two
strands of security cooperation are coming into increased contact with one
another, however, the chapter argues that the second and third approaches
to the nexus are likely to be most prevalent. Due to the aforementioned and
increasing incidence of great power competition, the chapter also speculates
that any genuine bilateral–multilateral synthesis is most unlikely. Instead, the
best that can be hoped for in relation to the fourth approach to the nexus
is a more deliberate division of labor between bilateral and multilateral
Procesos
processes. Such functional differentiation would likely see multilateral pro- multilaterales se
cesses continuing to focus largely on non-traditional security challenges, enfocan en
asuntos no
whereas bilaterally based structures would be geared towards more tradi- tradicionales,
tional security concerns. The chapter argues that the conditions of such mientras que las
estructuras
an approach are already in place, but that these are not yet being fully bilaterales se
and explicitly exploited. Yet even if they were, the chapter concludes that enfocan en
preocpaciones
the nature of the relationship between bilateral and multilateral strands of tradicionales,
10 Brendan Taylor
security cooperation is still likely to remain a rather loose, bi-directional and
multi-dimensional one.
Bilateralism and multilateralism are, of course, each contested concepts
and require further explication here. Following David Capie and Paul
Evans, this chapter defines bilateralism as “a relationship, event, or institu-
tion involving just two parties” (Capie and Evans 2002: 39). The defining
characteristics of this relationship are its dyadic structure coupled, in quali-
tative terms, with its exclusive, compartmentalized, and discriminatory
nature. The US–Japan alliance provides an obvious practical example. This
is juxtaposed against multilateralism, wherein three or more parties
are generally involved in the relationship, the event, or the institution in
question. Unlike bilateralism, the defining qualities of multilateralism are its
indivisible and non-discriminatory character, coupled with the expectations
of “diffuse reciprocity” – meaning equal benefits flowing to all members
across time – which it generates amongst those party to it. A practical
example is ASEAN. It is worth noting that additional distinctions can be
drawn within these two analytical categories. It is possible to think, for
example, of “shallow or deep” bilateralism, just as it is relatively easy to
contemplate “narrow” (limited to a specific issue) or “broad” (extended to a
range of issue-areas) multilateralism (see Capie and Evans 2002: 39–42
on bilateralism, 165–70 on multilateralism). In recent times, the term
“minilateralism” has also emerged as a fashionable, albeit still rather
imprecisely defined conception of security cooperation involving “the smal-
lest number of countries needed to have the largest possible impact on
solving a particular problem” (Naím 2009: 135).
The bilateral or multilateral approach

The “bilateral or multilateral” approach to the nexus posits that bilateralism
and multilateralism are mutually exclusive modes of security cooperation,
with each exhibiting specific strengths and weaknesses. Multilateralism,
for instance, is regarded as more appropriate for addressing many of the
emergent security challenges associated with the so-called “new security
agenda” such as transnational terrorism, disease-based threats, environ-
mental security challenges such as climate change, and weapons of mass
destruction proliferation. Because such threats are of a transnational nature
and cut across state borders, bilateralism is seen by many analysts as an out-
moded form of security cooperation in terms of its capacity to address
them. Multilateralism is also regarded as beneficial to the extent that it
allows international support to be built and directed against recalcitrant
actors. The downside to multilateralism, of course, is that meaningful con-
sensus notoriously becomes more difficult to achieve the greater the number
of parties involved. Hence, because the lowest common denominator must
inevitably be accommodated in multilateral processes, bilateralism is regar-
ded by some commentators as the superior mode by virtue of the fact that it
more readily facilitates deeper and, arguably, more meaningful forms of
security cooperation.
This line of thinking often assumes a dichotomous and essentially zero-
sum attitude towards the bilateral–multilateral nexus, as evidenced most
clearly in the pronouncements of Chinese policymakers. These will often
describe bilateralism as being synonymous with the US-led system of bilat-
eral alliances, which is frequently characterized by Beijing as indicative
of America’s “Cold War mentality” (see, for example, Spegele 2011). Juxta-
posed against this, Chinese prescriptions for Asian security include ideas
such as “harmonious world” and its “new security concept,” which empha-
size multipolarity and multilateral approaches to security politics. The
implementation of this perspective is epitomized by China’s engagement
with ASEAN over the past one-and-a-half decades (Arase 2010) – an
engagement that has also focused on security cooperation addressing non-
traditional security challenges on the grounds that, while pressing and
relevant to both parties, are also those which are less likely to raise the
same level of sensitivity that more traditional security issues such as Asia’s
burgeoning military modernization or the increasing frequency of incidents
at sea are apt to generate. Interestingly, however, a strong case can be made
that China itself is increasingly embracing a two-pronged, dichotomous
approach to Asian security politics by emphasizing multilateralism in
its dealings with ASEAN, while at the same time constructing its own net-
work of bilateral strategic ties with such countries as Iran, North Korea, and
Pakistan.
Similarly, in the context of the North Korean nuclear crisis, US policy has
historically had an air of the “bilateral or multilateral” approach to it.
During the Bill Clinton years, for instance, bilateralism was the favored
approach for dealing with North Korea, as epitomized by the 1994 Agreed
Framework. This approach was premised largely on the assumption that
Pyongyang was ultimately most concerned with the threat posed to it by the
US and most interested in reaching a bilateral solution to the crisis with
Washington. The downside of that particular approach, of course, was that
it periodically drove a wedge between the US and its allies as North Korea
sought to play Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul off against each other. Indeed,
countering this tactic was one of the primary rationales behind forming the
Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group in 1999.
For much if its time in office, the George W. Bush administration shifted
away from bilateralism and towards seeking a multilateral solution to the
North Korean crisis, namely in the form of the Six Party Talks. History
will certainly not remember Bush for his affection towards multilateralism,
but the logic for that particular shift can be found in Victor Cha’s oft-cited
2002 article, which introduced the concept of “hawk engagement” in the
context of the North Korean nuclear crisis. According to Cha, the primary
function of the Bush administration’s multilateral engagement vis-à-vis
North Korea (which was implemented the following year with the 2003
12 Brendan Taylor
establishment of the Six Party Talks involving China, Japan, Russia, North
Korea, South Korea, and the US) was essentially threefold: to expose
Pyongyang as a malevolent actor, to demonstrate that non-coercive strate-
gies had been tried and failed, and to build support for punitive actions
amongst the members of the multilateral process (Cha 2002). The Bush
administration ultimately backed away from that strategy in October 2008,
when it conducted a bilateral meeting with Pyongyang and removed North
Korea – much to the chagrin of Tokyo – from its “state sponsors of terror-
ism” list. Notwithstanding the rhetorical support that the current Barack
Obama administration continues to afford to the Six Party Talks process, a
strong case can be made that bilateralism remains its preferred approach
in dealing with this crisis, as epitomized by the 2009 Bill Clinton and
Stephen Bosworth visits to North Korea. Consistent with this, the Obama
administration’s first interactions with the new Kim Jong-Un regime
in February 2012 were bilateral rather than multilateral, following on
from similar bilateral rounds of dialogue in July and October 2011
conducted prior, of course, to Kim Jong-Il’s death in December of that year
(Snyder 2012).
The bilateral–multilateral approach

The “bilateral–multilateral” approach to the nexus accepts the existence of
synergies between bilateral and multilateral modes of security cooperation.
The end result of these synergistic effects, according to this line of reasoning,
is to further deepen bilateral cooperation via the multilateral route, where
otherwise such cooperation would not be as viable. A useful practical
illustration of this logic is the Shangri-La Dialogue, an annual gathering
organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and held
in Singapore. One of the primary drawcards for policymakers attending this
gathering is the extraordinary number of bilateral meetings that are held on
its sidelines. Indeed, the IISS now sets aside an entire day of this three-day-
long dialogue specifically to allow time for those meetings to take place.
Practitioners regard these bilateral meetings as advantageous for at least two
reasons. First, it allows a significant number of such meetings to take place
within a compressed time period, when otherwise this would not be feasible
for simple reasons of geography. For instance, a national delegation might
typically arrange 15–20 of these encounters over the duration of the dialo-
gue (for further reading, see Capie and Taylor 2010a). Second, the high level
of privacy and discretion surrounding these meetings means that senior
policymakers have the option of conducting high-level meetings which might
otherwise attract an unwanted degree of media attention and may be unduly
provocative to other parties. The multilateral Shangri-La Dialogue thus
potentially provides cover for deepening bilateral security cooperation.
The bilateral–multilateral approach to the nexus is also highly relevant to
the area of alliance politics. Whereas the emergence of multilateral processes
during the 1990s was conceived of as a potential threat to the very existence
of the US alliance network, for at least two interrelated reasons multi-
lateralism can be seen as a tool that has reinforced these bilateral relation-
ships in the present context through reassuring other countries in the
region of their relatively benign character. The involvement of the US
in Asian multilateralism, for example, arguably serves as a constraint of
sorts on American unilateral tendencies that were so prominent for much
of the George W. Bush period. Similarly, one could also make the case that
Japan’s multilateral engagement has also served to dampen regional con-
cerns regarding that country’s growing assertiveness, thereby reinforcing the
resilience of the US–Japan alliance in the process. As Cha observes:
For the United States, key to facilitating an upgrade of the alliance is to

mute regional security dilemmas emerging from a more active Japanese
military and political role. A useful way of accomplishing this is to
integrate Japan in multilateral regional institutions such that it can
strengthen political ties, reduce suspicions, and legitimize its role as a
leader. Others who were formerly fearful of Japan would grow accus-
tomed to it through participation in these institutions. “Enmeshing
Japan” thereby creates regional legitimization of Japan’s enhanced
presence. This, in turn, is good for alliance robustness.
(Cha 2003: 113–14)
From this perspective, multilateral processes serve as a useful supplement

that reinforce bilateral cooperation.
In at least two important respects, a bilateral–multilateral variant of
the nexus is arguably at work in the North Korean nuclear crisis. First, the
multilateral Six Party Talks can be seen as a vehicle for facilitating dialogue
between the US and North Korea. At various times during the crisis
Washington has held what technically amount to bilateral talks with Pyong-
yang on the sidelines of the Six Party Talks. The Six Party process provided
the US with a useful vehicle for conducting such bilateral discussions –
particularly during the George W. Bush years – by allowing them to
be portrayed as part of its favored multilateral solution and not in any way
as a repudiation of its stated commitment not to hold one-on-one talks with
the North Koreans. Second, in the broader regional and global strategic
context, the Six Party Talks can also be seen as a mechanism for deepening
US–Sino cooperation. As the architects of this process, the US and China
each arguably have a stake in its eventual fate. A constructivist line of
argument might even go so far as to suggest that the multilateral Six Party
Talks provide an opportunity for trust to be built in the bilateral relationship
between China and the US and that a degree of socialization might even
occur as American and Chinese policymakers, in the process, develop a
greater degree of familiarity with one another and a greater understanding
of their respective national perspectives (see, for example, Johnston 2008).
14 Brendan Taylor
The multilateral–bilateral approach
The “multilateral–bilateral” approach to the nexus, by contrast, sees multi-
lateralism as the ultimate end game. It regards bilateralism as a useful
“stepping stone” or “building block” for reaching that end point. This logic
has certainly been applied to the US alliance network, with suggestions
that this could form the basis for a multilateral security structure raised
periodically. At the beginning of this decade, for instance, US Pacific
Command proposed what some analysts have referred to as an “enriched
bilateralism” approach wherein the US would increase policy coordination
and consultation with regional allies, including military cooperation on a
multilateral basis (for further reading, see Jimbo 2003). As William Tow
(2004: 25) recalls, “PACOM visualized a gradual evolution of existing Asia-
Pacific bilateral collective defense alliances into a formal network postulat-
ing regional peace and stability as those conditions are interpreted by
Washington.”
An increasing “multinationalization” of traditionally bilateral US military
exercises in the Asia-Pacific has certainly occurred during the period since
(for further reading, see Tow and Loke 2009: 446–47). Consistent with this,
an analogous proposal that the US multilateralize its strategic ties with
Australia, India, and Japan to form a quadrilateral grouping – the begin-
nings of an Asian North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the eyes of some
commentators – has also been floated. However, although these countries
have conducted military exercises and cooperated most famously in
responding to the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami as part of the
so-called “core group,” this approach has yet to materialize due to Chinese
opposition, which subsequently generated a high level of reticence towards
the proposal in Australian and Indian policy circles.
In at least two respects, the logic of the multilateral–bilateral approach to
the nexus can also be applied to the diplomacy surrounding the North
Korean nuclear crisis. The first of these involves the efforts of outside powers
to deal bilaterally with North Korea, but specifically with the intention
of encouraging it to return to the Six Party Talks. That is certainly the
official rationale that the Obama administration presented for Bosworth’s
December 2009 visit to North Korea, as well as the aforementioned talks of
July and October of 2011, and February 2012. A similar logic was advanced
when Christopher Hill visited Pyongyang for the first time in June 2007. On
that occasion, Hill’s visit was officially designed to press the North Koreans
to honor the 13 February 2007 agreement that Pyongyang had signed
up to at the Six Party Talks. The October 2009 visit to North Korea by
Wen Jiabao can be seen in a similar light, with the Chinese premier also
reportedly urging North Korea to return to the Six Party Talks. Indeed, the
Six Party Talks can themselves be seen as a practical manifestation of
the “building block” approach, started as they were in 2003 by the US and
China, and gradually drawing in the other members of the “group of six.”
Second, the logic of Amitav Acharya’s concept of “spiderweb bilateral-
ism” can also be applied to the North Korean nuclear crisis. According to
Acharya, Southeast Asian countries during the 1960s and 1970s compen-
sated for the lack of multilateral security structures in that subregion by
developing an interlocking “spider web” of bilateral agreements. In response
to the perceived communist threat, bilateral agreements pertaining to joint
police operations and cross-border “hot pursuits” targeting communist
guerillas were reached between, for example, Malaysia and Indonesia,
and Malaysia and Thailand. Over time, in Acharya’s view, these bilateral
agreements served as an important confidence-building measure that subse-
quently enhanced the prospects for multilateral cooperation in Southeast
Asia (Acharya 2003: 221). The same is true of the North Korean case. The
nuclear crisis is without question one of the key factors that has served to
solidify the US–Japan and US–South Korea alliance relationships over
the past decade and a half. More recently, there have been indications of
nascent trilateral cooperation emerging between the US, Japan, and South
Korea as a direct consequence of the North Korean nuclear conundrum,
particularly in the aftermath of the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong crises of
March and November 2011 (for further reading, see Schreer and Taylor
2011). At the 2009 Shangri-La Dialogue, for instance, Seoul, Tokyo, and
Washington held a trilateral meeting on the sidelines of that gathering
to reaffirm and to further coordinate their respective national positions
vis-à-vis North Korea. A strong case can be made that such cooperation
would not have occurred in the absence of this crisis.
The bilateral and multilateral approach

A fourth approach to the bilateral–multilateral security nexus suggests that
these two modes can peacefully coexist and, indeed, that a harmonization
of these two forms of security cooperation can be realized. A leading expo-
nent of this view is Tow. His “convergent security” approach contends that
synthesizing bilateral and multilateral approaches to security cooperation is
not only desirable but also necessary. Against the backdrop of structural
change in the Asia-Pacific – characterized by the rise of China, growing
speculation regarding the decline of American power, and a somewhat
paradoxical increase in Japanese insecurity and assertiveness – hardline
adherence to the alliance-based formula that served as the foundation of
Asia’s security order throughout the postwar period is likely, according to
Tow, to be inherently destabilizing. Equally, in Tow’s view, moving to an
exclusively multilateral solution to the region’s security problems is likely
to be equally disadvantageous, particularly if that new structure were to
be dominated by Beijing and came at Washington’s expense. Striking a
judicious balance between bilateral and multilateral modes of regional
security cooperation thus lies at the heart of Tow’s convergent security
approach (Tow 2001: 2).
16 Brendan Taylor
The closest approximation to the “bilateral and multilateral” approach in
the context of the North Korean nuclear crisis takes the form of efforts to
convert the Six Party Talks into a formal security mechanism for Northeast
Asia. Such proposals generally do not suggest that such a mechanism would
take the place of America’s Asian alliances. Rather it would sit alongside
them and the two structures would complement each other. The logic
underpinning this approach is essentially twofold. First, regional institutions
are regarded as too weak to adequately address the looming security chal-
lenges of the Asian century, in large part due to the high level of historical
distrust that persists between the region’s major players. Second, US support
is regarded by many as integral to the viability of such a venture and, hence,
America’s bilateral alliance arrangements must be allowed to remain in
place for the time being given the benefits that Washington continues to
derive from these. Over time, the “bilateral and multilateral” approach as
applied in the context of the North Korean nuclear crisis does assume,
however, that the new multilateral mechanism could eventually take on
many of the functions currently performed by the American alliance system
(Fukuyama 2005).
While a complete synthesis of Asian bilateral and multilateral security
structures seems improbable at present given the prevailing and, indeed,
apparent intensification of great power strategic competition in the region –
over a range of issue areas and regional flashpoints, such as the South China
Sea and the Korean peninsula – a case can be made that the makings of a
“convergent security” approach are evident in the division of labor to
security challenges that seems to be emerging – largely incidentally at this
stage – between multilateral and bilateral processes. As alluded to earlier
in this chapter, multilateral institutions in the region have tended to show
greater enthusiasm for tackling so-called non-traditional security issues –
such as disease-based threats, natural disasters, and transnational crime. US
alliances, by contrast, continue to be directed towards reassuring American
friends and, indeed, the region more generally vis-à-vis more traditional
challenges, particularly those of a military variety. In many respects, such a
division of labor is sensible given the fact that bilateral alliances are not
particularly well-suited to addressing challenges of a transnational nature –
which have little regard for state borders – while multilateral cooperation on
more traditional security challenges is often difficult to achieve given the
sensitive nature of many of the issues involved and the inevitable difficulties
in reaching consensus that this factor creates.
Conclusion
None of the four approaches outlined in this chapter can claim dominance
at present, and there are arguably elements of each present in contemporary
Asian security politics. Notwithstanding the fact that bilateral and multi-
lateral modes of security cooperation are increasingly interacting in often
interesting ways, this interaction retains a zero-sum character in some
instances. Reflecting the growing proximity of these two strands of security
cooperation, however, the second and third approaches to the nexus that
have been outlined in this chapter are likely to emerge as the most prevalent
amongst the four, at least into the foreseeable future. The persistence and
likely intensification of great power strategic competition in Asia, however,
will likely preclude the emergence of any genuine synthesis of bilateral and
multilateral security cooperation. Instead, the best that can be hoped for is
a more explicit and deliberate division of labor wherein multilateral pro-
cesses focus increasingly on addressing non-traditional security challenges,
whereas bilaterally based mechanisms are directed more towards addressing
threats of a more traditional military variety, which they are arguably better
suited to tackle.
Taken together, the findings of this chapter lead to the conclusion that the
bilateral–multilateral security nexus can best be characterized as a relatively
loose, bi-directional, and multi-dimensional one. Against that backdrop, one
thing remains clear. The bilaterally based security order that has served Asia
for the past several decades is coming under strain, both as a raft of new
threats of a transnational nature emerge, and as the region undergoes a
period of structural change. That said, as former Australian Prime Minister
Kevin Rudd’s ill-fated efforts to advance his Asia-Pacific Community
proposal also vividly demonstrates, the prospects for readily achieving an
overarching, all-encompassing multilateral solution to this plethora of
impending regional security challenges are not particularly promising at this
juncture. Bilateralism and multilateralism are thus likely to remain with
us for some time yet. Exploring how these modes of security cooperation
relate and might optimally interact with one another thus constitutes an
exciting and important research endeavor.
Part II
The nexus and America’s

Asian alliances
3 Bridging alliances and Asia-Pacific
multilateralism
Ajin Choi and William T. Tow
Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, a number of efforts have been made to
develop multilateral regional security regimes in the Asia-Pacific. Rapidly
changing relationships among regional powers have mandated such efforts
to transform that region’s predominantly bilateral security architectures to
more comprehensive forms of regional order building. Although bilateral
alliances led by the United States have significantly contributed to regional
security and stability in Asia for many decades, the very complexity of
emerging security issues and threats beyond the parameters of bilateral
security politics has become increasingly apparent. To cope with these new
challenges, states in the region increasingly realize the imperative of working
together to achieve conflict avoidance and regional prosperity. In this
context, they have become more interested in forming and sustaining multi-
lateral security arrangements.
A variety of multilateral security institutions or organizations have been
created and maintained in the region, and even more ambitious institution-
alization has been proposed. Among the existing organizations are the
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Regional Forum (ARF)
launched by ASEAN in 1994, and the more recent East Asia Summit (EAS)
founded in 2005. To date, however, neither of these institutions has fully
realized the original criteria underscoring their creation – that is, providing
a body of norms that would generate consensus and full adherence by their
member states and acting decisively to prevent or to intervene in a regional
crisis. Accordingly, individual national political leaders in the Asia-Pacific
region have advocated that more comprehensive multilateral security insti-
tutions be established. In his inaugural address in 2003, South Korean
President Roh Moo-hyun declared “the Age of … Northeast Asia” and
proposed building a “community of peace and prosperity,” positioning the
Korean peninsula as the hub connecting the Eurasian continent and the
Pacific Ocean (Roh 2007: 12). Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd
pushed in 2008 for an “Asia-Pacific Community” that would embrace
“the entire Asia-Pacific region – including the United States, Japan, China,
22 Ajin Choi and William T. Tow
India, Indonesia and the other states of the region.” Rudd argued that there
was a strong need for a multilateral Asia-Pacific institution to “underpin
an open, peaceful, stable, prosperous and sustainable region” (Rudd 2008).
Not long after the Asia-Pacific Community initiative was tabled, Japanese
Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio presented his vision of an “East
Asian Community” – “countries sharing a common vision [to] promote
cooperation in various fields … based on the principle of ‘open regional
cooperation’” (Hatoyama 2009b).
Despite these diverse initiatives, various observers have criticized them as
being largely impractical. Even those who have supported them have tended
to view their significance as largely “functional,” reflecting what they view
as the somewhat placid style characterizing the “ASEAN way,” – informal,
loosely organized, and seldom leading to concrete results (see Narine
1997; Solingen 2005). Such critics often yearn for the infusion of “more
European” approaches to Asia-Pacific multilateralism. What is missing in
contemporary Asian multilateral security politics, they believe, is a requisite
assimilation of those assets found in the more “mature” European security
models such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) political
component that has sustained security on the continent where it is still
operating a full two decades after the demise of the Soviet Union (Gilson
2002: 122).1
Indeed, in the aftermath of the Second World War, major European states
founded NATO in order to deter threats and maintain peace. This institu-
tion has remained an indispensible attribute for security and stability
in Europe in the post-Cold War era and this enduring situation can be
interpreted as reflecting a de facto European “zone of peace.” Underlying
this environment are three distinctive pillars: (1) democratization; (2) greater
economic prosperity and intensifying interdependence; and (3) a viable
institutional involvement by the United States. Their efficacy is not only
evident in Europe’s modern history. Various international relations theories
have suggested that these conditions can promote and strengthen multi-
lateral security regimes in general. This remains the case, notwithstanding
the recent predicament of the euro precipitated by the global financial
crisis. European societies are unlikely to experience outright civil wars
commensurate to what have recently transpired in the Middle East as
part of the “Arab Spring” process.
The relative strength of Asian multilateral security regimes may be related
to the extent to which these three “pillars” operate in the Asia-Pacific
region. We argue here that the viability of ongoing and burgeoning Asian
multilateral security regimes could be linked to the extent that these
three pillars are operative in their development. The chapter proceeds as
follows: first, it briefly considers the recent evolution of multilateral security
politics in the Asia-Pacific security environment. Second, it examines
the various typologies (based on institutional scope) and constraints that
Bridging alliances 23
underscore multilateral security initiatives. Third, it examines in greater
depth the concept of “inclusive but qualified” membership as the basis
for pursuing multilateral security in the region and discusses the possible
policy implications for this alternative approach to regional security
institution building. Fourth, it reviews South Korean involvement in multi-
lateral security politics as a “mini case study” of the “inclusive but
qualified” formula’s relevance. We conclude that an “inclusive but qualified”
membership in an Asia-Pacific specific multilateral security institution,
based on the extent to which the three pillars designated above are present,
may well serve as an effective and legitimate institutional design for future
multilateral institution building in the region. This formula is hardly a
panacea for all security problems in the region, however, and must overcome
still substantial ideological and structural challenges if it is to be applied
effectively.
Asia-Pacific multilateral security: evolutionary factors

The pace of multilateral security politics has recently intensified across the
Asia-Pacific region. Several key factors have contributed to this acceleration.
First, the geographic dimension of “Asia-Pacific” is expanding. The
concept of “region” in this context is understood no more as predetermined
but instead as porous. Beyond geographic proximity, the region can be
reconstituted by reflecting the patterns of states’ interaction and power. If
states increase interaction, sharing goals and values with each other, they
can be regarded as belonging to the same region via their engagement in
community building. Therefore, the level of the projection of state power,
the type of identity and institution of states, and the process of inter-
dependence and globalization can all affect the scope and character of
a region (Adler and Barnett 1998; Deutsch et al. 1957: 3; Katzenstein 2005:
1–2). Ellen Frost (2008: 35) has noted that “Asia is an especially porous
region that can be defined in different ways for different purposes. Its
boundaries have always been subject to interpretation and imagination.”
Some Asian countries do not pursue their identity within a limited regional
space such as Northeast Asia, but increasingly aspire to act or be recognized
as global actors and powers.2 In fact, as both material and nonmaterial
interactions have increased across the Asia-Pacific, countries in the region
are regularly involved in dialogues on regional economic and security issues
through diverse forums and organizations. Other states, historically viewed
as “extra-regional powers,” have thoroughly penetrated what has been tra-
ditionally viewed as Asian geography. The projection of US hard power and
soft power across the Pacific in the form of military bases and information
dominance is illustrative (for analysis on the latter factor, see Nye 2002).
This expanding boundary of Asia has attracted more countries to work
together and provided favorable conditions to cope with new security chal-
lenges together.
Second, an array of security issues and threats whose resolution requires
interstate cooperation are developing and becoming more serious in this
region. The impact of non-traditional security threats such as terrorism,
state failure, nuclear and biological weapons proliferation, climate change,
environmental degradation, resource and energy crisis, refugees, piracy, and
pandemic diseases truly transcend national boundaries and deteriorate
the stability of the entire region. Even if bilateral alliances have been
able to deter or manage traditional threats successfully to date, these non-
traditional threats cannot be managed or controlled solely with existing
bilaterally based mechanisms. For these reasons, it is imperative that the
Asia-Pacific region develop multilateral mechanisms to facilitate approaches
and solutions for these new security problems.
Third, due to the rapid rise of China, the distribution of power is
changing in this region. Realists argue that states respond to changes in the
distribution of power by forming alliances with other states in addition
to the build-up of their own capabilities (Mearsheimer 2001; Waltz 1979).
Many of China’s neighbors, for example, are too small to balance it
with their own capabilities. They are therefore likely to pursue security
cooperation with other major powers, especially the United States. For this
reason small Southeast Asian countries, along with their bilateral allies,
have actually supported the continued presence of the United States in Asia
(Goh 2007/08). By doing so, however, they run the risk of triggering another
Cold War between the existing US superpower and a rising Chinese one.
Multilateral security approaches are specifically designed to modify such
security dilemmas by introducing normative ground rules into the regional
order-building process. If both the United States and China ascribe to these
standards, regional stability increases commensurately.
Fourth, the precedent of multilateral politics not shaping Asia-Pacific
security to the same extent as it has underwritten European stability is
giving way to new factors that may be more conducive to Asian multi-
lateralism. Christopher Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein (2002) may be
correct to cite US foreign policymakers’ ignorance and ethnic prejudice
about Asia as equal and cooperative partners at the end of the Second
World War as an underlying cause of multilateralism’s lack of appeal as a
security approach. Victor Cha (2009/10) may be on equally solid ground in
a historical sense by claiming that the considerable disparity of power
between the US and its Asian counterparts during the early Cold War
period hindered a multilateral security arrangement in Asia. Increasingly,
however, these negative elements that reflect both cognitive and structural
dimensions are softening. Regarding the first point, as interactions involving
trade, investment, and cultural exchanges increase between most Asia-
Pacific states and the US, the factors of ethnic bias and distance are waning
significantly. Asian populations in the US, for example, have steadily
increased; in 2008 more than 33 per cent of the persons obtaining legal
permanent resident status stated China, Japan, and Korea as their countries
of last residence (US Department of Homeland Security 2009). Regarding
the second point, key US allies have moved impressively to take their
places among the forefront of the world’s most important economies and
strategic actors. Japan is the third and South Korea, consistently rivaling
Australia, is the fifteenth largest economy in the world as of early 2012
(see Central Intelligence Agency 2012). Australia’s economy is currently
ranked thirteenth in the world. All three countries now have a long history
of not only interacting with the United States strategically, but also of
spearheading multilateral economic and security initiatives such as the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping, the ARF, and the EAS.
Recently, expressing strong interest and bonds in this region, US President
Barack Obama stated in his first presidential visit to Asia that “for genera-
tions we also have been a nation of the Pacific. Asia and the United States
are not separated by this great ocean; we are bound by it” (Financial Times,
14 November 2009).
Fifth, and as intimated above, the United States has shown increased
interest in multilateral security arrangements across the Pacific. It has
done so without relinquishing its two key preconditions for doing so: that
fundamental US national security interests will not be jeopardized in the
process of Washington becoming a more active multilateral security player,
and that those multilateral organizations in which the United States will
be active must be “rules-based” and “results-oriented” (Clinton 2010b,
2011b). According to hegemonic stability theory, the willingness as well
as the resources of a hegemon is often critical in the formation of a
viable multilateral security regime. As shown in the European case, in
order to balance against Soviet expansion, the US initiated the creation of
NATO and has consistently supported it since its founding. Following
President Obama’s stated commitments to multilateralism, Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton announced that “this new [Asia-Pacific] landscape
requires us to build an institutional architecture that maximizes our pro-
spects for effective cooperation, builds trust, and reduces the friction of
competition” (Clinton 2010b).
However, despite this growing US tendency to support multilateral
security politics in the Asia-Pacific, Washington has yet to propose its own
specific institutional design for the new multilateral security regime in a
manner reminiscent of the Korean, Australian, and Japanese proposals
cited above. This could be viewed as part of the Obama administration’s
“lead from behind” posture that worked so well in galvanizing its European
NATO allies to spearhead recent NATO military operations in Libya. It is
possible that as the US becomes more accustomed to interacting in the
new Asia-Pacific security environment, it will work with other likeminded
states to shape an institutional design that can establish more authoritative
rules and norms and deliver more concrete results for achieving regional
stability. A preliminary indication of this was President Obama’s effort at
the November 2011 EAS to support the ASEAN members’ inclusion of the
South China Sea territorial disputes with China on the EAS agenda.
While not spearheading the discussion or taking a formal position on the
specific dispute, Obama strongly supported other regional leaders’ efforts
to generate dialogue with the Chinese representatives about the issue –
a gesture that has, again, been described as the US leading from behind on
a regional security issue. Before assessing the prospects of success for future
multilateral security politics in the Asia-Pacific, a brief review of how rele-
vant this approach can actually be in this region is warranted.
Asia-Pacific multilateral security: typologies and constraints

Although most countries in the region view the United States’ bilateral
alliance system as enhancing regional stability, they agree that multilateral
security arrangements can potentially contribute to Asia-Pacific peace
and stability through the gradual strengthening of confidence building and
comprehensive security measures within such frameworks. In this context,
multilateralism is not regarded as opposing or replacing existing American-
led bilateral arrangements but as complementing them. This works both
ways. Existing US bilateral arrangements, for example, keep Japanese
military capabilities in check, constrain extensive North Korean aggression
on the Korean peninsula, and provide a foundation for US offshore
balancing in the region. Formal or informal multilateral groupings provide a
setting for dialogues between potential disputants for modifying security
dilemmas (i.e., the Six Party Talks), and add new layers of deliberation and
policy formulation. They do so, however, without disrupting “existing bilateral
constituencies” that support deterrence postures, military assistance arrange-
ments, and other forms of strategic collaboration (Cha 2011; Yeo 2011).
Each regional state maneuvers within this framework of bilateral–
multilateral networks according to its international position, strategic inter-
ests, and domestic politics. Each state, as well, combines realist calculations
about its national security interests with a longer-range aspiration to forge a
regional security community capable of underwriting Asia-Pacific stability
and prosperity. Accordingly, who actually belongs to a multilateral grouping
and the motives for a state’s affi]liation can actually affect the function and
viability of that grouping. If large states with particular national security
interests assert those specific and often contending interests without com-
promise within such a specific multilateral security institution, the chances
of that organization generating an enduring normative legitimacy decreases
commensurately. If middle and small powers are able to apply effective
entrepreneurial leadership consistently with at least the tacit approval of
their larger counterparts, that organization’s appeal and effectiveness
intensifies, other states are more likely to join it, and the inclusiveness of
that body will enable it to cover broader goals and issues (Young 1991). The
challenge of middle or smaller powers who aspire to lead institutions is
to persuade great powers that they should exercise such a leadership
role. ASEAN members have at least partially achieved this status in
a Southeast Asian context; for obvious geopolitical reasons, South Korea
and Japan have been less successful in convincing their Northeast Asian
neighbors that they should do the same.
In recent years, multilateral security arrangements have evolved along
different lines in terms of scope and accessibility. With respect to the size of
membership, small or “minilateral” groupings such as the Australia–Japan–
United States Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) have been formed in
contrast to relatively large groupings such as the ARF or the EAS. On
the other hand, while some arrangements include more than three or four
states (typical of a minilateral grouping) they still remain fundamentally
“plurilateral” rather than multilateral because their membership remains
“exclusive” in nature. For example, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
(SCO) is based on a smaller boundary of the region; ASEAN+3 (China,
Japan, and South Korea) emphasizes Asian ethnicity and excludes the
United States and other non-Asian Pacific states such as Australia, Canada,
and New Zealand.
In contrast, the region’s large multilateral security institutions in this
region generally contain a larger number of heterogeneous members.
The extent to which multilateral institutions endeavor to control member
state behavior remains comparatively limited to the bilateral, minilateral,
or plurilateral variants, and their rules and obligations tend to be less
tightly defined. For example, the ARF was established as a mechanism for
facilitating comprehensive multilateral security dialogues in the Asia-Pacific
in 1994 and its membership has since expanded to 27 states. With respect
to their membership limitations, the ARF just stipulates that “a new
participant should be admitted only if it can be demonstrated that it has
an impact on the peace and security of the ‘geographical footprint’ of key
ARF activities” (ASEAN Regional Forum 2011). Accordingly, the ARF
does not insist upon any binding commitments from its members, and
its objectives and activities are limited to fostering “constructive dialogue
and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and
concern” (ASEAN Regional Forum 2011). Critics have intermittently poin-
ted to this form of inclusiveness as rendering the ARF as topheavy or
stalemated in many cases to just a “talking shop” (Emmers and Tan 2011;
Garofano 2002).
The recent proliferation of minilateral and plurilateral groupings warrants
further comment insofar as they may initially be viewed as “middle-ground”
approaches to regional order building relative to the usually exclusivist
bilateral and inclusivist multilateral organizational pathways. Members of
these groupings normally try to integrate and expand beyond their current
security associations by pooling and sharing information about, and gen-
erating resources in response to, a wider diversity of security challenges
(many of them in the “non-traditional” category) amongst themselves.
The TSD is a good example. This dialogue was upgraded to the ministerial
level in March 2006 after an initial “false start” that witnessed Australian
and Japanese dissent with an original American probe for using this initia-
tive to target the rise of Chinese power. All three members subsequently
agreed on specific goals for the TSD related to neutralizing a relatively
wide body of “human security” contingencies such as disaster relief,
counterterrorism, and maritime security. Discussions about North Korea’s
nuclear behavior remain “in-bounds” as an organizational concern because
such deliberations fall within the boundaries of conventional, nuclear non-
proliferation politics and are thus not perceived by China as directed
towards undermining its national security.
As a complement to its longstanding bilateral alliances with Japan and
Australia, the United States has expected increased support and cooperation
for its non-proliferation policy and war on terrorism from these two allies
in a rapidly changing regional security environment. Australia and Japan
view their TSD involvement as a means to further solidify traditional US
guarantees to their own security via continued and reliable access to
US intelligence and technology (Tow 2008b). In the case of the TSD,
therefore, initial Chinese concerns that the TSD could serve as a contain-
ment mechanism against China were addressed (Feng 2008). South Korea,
as a longstanding ally of the United States and preoccupied with security
on the Korean peninsula, was not readily amenable toward expanding this
trilateral exclusive arrangement into a quadrilateral one (having observed
China successfully block Indian accession to the TSD as a “Quadrilateral
Initiative” through vigorous diplomacy targeted toward Canberra and
New Delhi). It began to discuss the necessity of other trilateral plurilateral
groupings involving the United States, Japan, and itself, even while moving
independently to upgrade independent bilateral security ties with Australia.
Seoul had little interest in alienating Beijing in the process, however,
given the latter’s key role in sustaining the Six Party Talks for stablizing
the Korean peninsula – a process that, if successful, would clearly mark
South Korea as the major beneficiary. In the end, due to each member’s
sensitivity toward a rising China and changes in its domestic politics, the
three US allies pursued minilateral security politics with visibly different
emphases (see Brewster 2010; Soeya 2007: 87).
A potential multilateral security pathway: “inclusive but

qualified” membership?
As noted previously, when it comes to institutional design of multilateral
security groupings, the scope or nature of membership is a central issue. For
example, given NATO’s already cumbersome decision-making process,
serious concerns have surfaced about that institution’s recent enlargement
with the entry of East European member states (Carpenter and Conry
1998). The OSCE, which has 55 members, also cannot be a serious alter-
native for European security architecture in the post-Cold War era.
In the Asia-Pacific, some multilateral groupings have a large membership
and decision making is based on consensus building or unanimity.
Implementation of any meaningful or binding security postures in the region
would be difficult, if not impossible. New security institutional initiatives,
therefore, may be more effective if a reasonable number of founding
members are able to interact in ways that reflect well-targeted objectives and
policies. It is suggested here that an “inclusive but qualified” membership
model may be worth considering as an alternative institutional design for
future multilateral security institution building in this region. The rationales
of this alternative membership formula are assessed below.
States are more likely to be cooperative when they are able to choose
those security allies and partners with whom to interact. Realists claim
that sharing common threats constitutes such a basis for cooperation;
liberals argue that states are more likely to form a security regime when they
share mutual values or similar economic interests. Moreover, states with
similar domestic and political institutions are more likely to cooperate
with each other. In this context, “democratic peace theory” anticipates that
democratic countries usually prefer interacting with democratic allies
than with states maintaining other kinds of political systems. From the
constructivist perspective, states are better able to form a security
regime or community when they share certain norms, principles, and
experiences. All three theoretical perspectives emphasize that in order to
be able to form a security regime and work together effectively, its
member states should share a judicious combination of power, interests,
or values.
The history of NATO generally conforms to this pattern. That alliance
was originally founded by 12 members. Although it has since expanded to
28 members over time, it has done so in conformity with Article 10 of
its founding treaty. Membership is not automatically granted to all the
aspirant countries and requires them to fulfill certain conditions for
the implementation of alliance goals and missions. These requirements
include member states cultivating democracy, fostering market economies,
and observing the imperative of sound democratic civil–military relations
(NATO 2012). For this reason, the nature of its members has remained
relatively homogeneous in a political and economic sense, even though the
size of institutional membership has increased.
The track record of existing Asian multilateral security regimes is decid-
edly more mixed. The ARF exemplifies what was previously a relatively
tight system of ASEAN members engaging in bilateral dialogues on mostly
economic issues blowing out to include most regional and several extra-
regional actors pursuing arguably amorphous goals of preventive diplomacy
and comprehensive security in diverse and, at times, contradictory ways. The
EAS and the SCO have to date been more restrictive in enforcing member-
ship qualifications (the former requires that all member states sign ASEAN’s
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation). The size of institutional membership,
however, is further complicated by their diverse politico-economic nature –
varying from authoritarian to democratic, from poor to rich, and from
market economy to planned economy states. The relative ineffectiveness of
the Asia-Pacific security regimes as opposed to the NATO legacy or to that
of the European Community is at least in part due to this heterogeneous
nature of the members.
However, a more restrictive or homogeneous nature of membership is not
necessarily synonymous with exclusiveness of membership. Instead, by
emphasizing the principle of “reasonableness” in determining the number of
members, the inclusive but qualified membership formula appears to have
substantive merit in terms of achieving initial commonality of purpose and
success in institutional policy formulation. It enables members to contain
(if not moderate) sensitive bilateral issues such as historic and territorial
differences (e.g., within the NATO framework, Greece has not gone to war
with Turkey, while Second World War combatants France and Germany
have mutually led European integration). Furthermore, the inclusive but
qualified membership formula not only helps member states pursue
more compatible goals and values, but it is also able to foster deeper trust
among members. While institutional membership “in principle” is open
to all potential members, aspirant states know they are more likely to be
accepted as a member only if they meet certain institutional expectations
and conform to specifically demarcated norms that have previously shaped
institutional deliberations and behavior. Due to this process, as well, a
multilateral security institution can moderate concerns from non-member
states about its exclusivity. For example, the EAS has already “conditioned”
China to move toward greater acceptance of a reasonably inclusive model
underpinning that multilateral grouping’s membership criteria, while the
TSD has retained its sensitivity to Chinese concerns that this minilateral
initiative would turn into a containment body directed against Beijing if,
for example, India were to join it. The EAS has expanded its membership
“reasonably” in the eyes of Chinese policymakers; the TSD was “reason-
able” in limiting the size of its membership in deference to Chinese concerns
that any overt “League of Democracies” type of grouping would metamor-
phose into a Cold War (threat-centric) NATO model rather than a post-
Cold War (order-centric) NATO typology.
Potential effectiveness of the “inclusive but qualified” formula

To what degree can regional policymakers who embrace the “inclusive but
qualified” formula actually pursue it? The answer to this question depends
on who would promote it and what material attributes they could actually
bring to the cause. If the inclusive but qualified membership formula
is based on the three pillars of democracy, economic prosperity, and
meaningful US involvement, the obvious candidates for initiating this
type of multilateral security grouping would be Australia, Canada, Japan,
New Zealand, South Korea, and the United States. It is unlikely that a new
organization would immediately emerge on its own given the already crow-
ded array of multilateral institutions operating in the Asia-Pacific. At the
outset, however, such a grouping could be formed as an informal adjunct of
an existing institution (APEC or, less likely, the EAS). If it were to demon-
strate sufficient cohesion in its deliberations in a “sidetalk” or “outpost”
format, however, it may well gain the status of a separate and meaningful
organizational entity over time. This would depend upon the extent to which
each of the three pillars proved to be truly integral to any such process.
Democratic states are often regarded as “powerful pacifists” and reliable
allies. This is because, according to various international relations theorists
who adhere to the democratic peace theory, democracies tend not to fight
each other, and even if a conflict between democracies occurs, it is likely
to be resolved peacefully (Maoz and Russett 1993). History, moreover,
predicates that democratic states have more often than not prevailed over
non-democratic ones in international crises and wars (Choi 2004; Lake
1992; Reiter and Stam 2002), and have been able to sustain more enduring
alliances (Gaubatz 1996). Democracies are also relatively transparent and
generally pursue more compatible norms and policy objectives. This quality
renders the historically strong norm of “non-interference in internal affairs”
in Asian security politics to a less central position and facilitates a multi-
lateral security institution’s capacity to operate more effectively (Kahler
2000). APEC is illustrative – ten of its member states are democratic and its
“leaders’ meetings” have deliberated and acted on issues of “high politics”
(e.g., Timor-Leste and counterterrorism after 11 September 2011) in recent
years.3 The “Vision 2020” charter adopted in Kuala Lumpur during the
ASEAN Heads of State meeting in 1997 is a remarkably liberal document
given its endorsement by non-democratic ASEAN members and is evidence
of how democratic principles can underwrite institutional trust building and
community building even when the governance within various member
states is not fully democratic (ASEAN 1997).
Economic prosperity often minimizes the probabilities for conflict, parti-
cularly among developed or industrialized states. The risk of conflict is even
lower among economically interdependent states (Rosecrance 1986). Among
the ten democratic APEC countries, eight are also in the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Six out of eight of
these wealthy countries are in the Asia-Pacific region: Australia, Canada,
Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and the United States (OECD 2012).
At the same time, wealthier states are usually able to spend larger
amounts of their economic wealth on military expenses, and therefore
maintain stronger military capabilities that can deter or contain potential
threats. The sum of military expenditures of Australia, Canada, Japan,
New Zealand, South Korea, and the United States match or exceed any
combination of other countries’ military spending in this region (SIPRI
Military Expenditure Database 2012). Furthermore, beyond traditional
security threats, member states possess economic and human resources to
cope with non-traditional security threats as well as to pursue comprehen-
sive security goals. In particular, both Canada and Japan strongly advocate
and promote human security politics. Finally, these six countries are
members of the Proliferation Security Initiative and have accumulated exp-
erience in working together through this multilateral security mechanism.
Even given its current budgetary difficulties, meaningful US involvement
would add preponderant strength and experience to any existing or emer-
ging multilateral grouping adopting the inclusive but qualified formula. It is
likely, of course, that China would initially view any sign of the US asserting
leadership in such a body as potentially threatening to its own strategic
interests. Yet China’s views alone cannot be considered as a determinant
for such an initiative moving forward. During the post-Cold War era,
other regional actors have feared US regional abandonment. The ARF was
largely formed on the basis of sustaining a US regional presence after
speculation about US force reductions taking place during the early-to-mid-
1990s. More recently, the Obama administration’s so-called “pivot strategy,”
announced in November 2011, demonstrated a renewed American will-
ingness to play a leading security role in the Asia-Pacific region after years
of low-key involvement there, given its preoccupations with Iraq and
Afghanistan (Foreign Policy Initiative 2011).
The challenge Washington confronts in accelerating its strategic involve-
ment in an Asia-Pacific institutional context is facilitating institutional out-
comes that will satisfy “founding” member states among and beyond the
other democratic core states cited above and while minimizing negative
reactions from non-member states in general and China in particular. This is
a challenging but not necessarily impossible task. That China has been
socialized into accepting the legitimacy of multilateral institutions such as
APEC, the ARF, and the EAS, where the US is playing a key role, affords
at least some prospect that the Chinese could gradually accept another
multilateral institution as long as US involvement reflects appropriate dip-
lomatic finesse and sensitivity towards Beijing’s regional security concerns,
and US “leadership” is at least initially projected in those areas where
China’s material capabilities may not be sufficient to meet a pressing security
contingency. An illustration of the former could be a reduction of US sur-
veillance operations off China’s coast, while American military assistance in
major regional disasters exemplifies the latter condition. By continuing to
work with China both bilaterally and multilaterally, the US could build on
already promising results largely generated by ASEAN members, since
the early 1990s, of inducing the Chinese into participating in Asia-Pacific
multilateral politics and projecting “soft power” in terms of intensifying its
economic and diplomatic interaction with its regional neighbors. Even
beyond the “China syndrome,” exercising a balanced leadership role will be
no easy task for the US. America’s democratic allies, Japan and South
Korea, for example, have unresolved territorial disputes as well as historical
antagonisms; however, under US leadership, both sides could reduce that
insecurity (Cha 1999).4
Potential legitimzation of the “inclusive but qualified” formula

The legitimacy of the “inclusive but qualified” formula rests hand-in-hand
with the effectiveness question. Without legitimacy, no multilateral order-
building regime can be effective. Several key points about legitimization can
be raised in this context.
First, even if a multilateral grouping initially includes only six advanced,
industrial democratic states as members, it does not need to remain exclu-
sive for long. It would be “in principle” open to any potential members if
they are willing to commit to its accession rules. Second, any such multi-
lateral grouping would clearly be more inclusive than bilateral alliances and
trilateral dialogues. Nor would this new multilateral security initiative
be designed to replace other multilateral counterparts in the region – as
evidenced by a number of multilateral regimes already co-existing in the
Asia-Pacific. Rather, it could foster more integration or at least “bridging”
among these existing institutions on those occasions where building such
linkages would be appropriate or useful. While working toward greater
regional integration, however, the new grouping would not dilute or com-
promise its own significance by making its admission rules and membership
conditions explicit and consistent. Open decision making within the new
institution may give direction for attentive and interested states, but, as
importantly, reduce fear and suspicion from the outside states. In general,
openness and transparency can increase the quality and legitimacy of deci-
sions made and avoid criticisms related to exclusivity.
The legitimacy of any such grouping would also be underscored if it
provides a concrete vision for the future of the region. The founding
members are not only relatively wealthy and powerful, but have also
accumulated good reputations in the international system, whereas many
countries in the region still suffer because of their political and economic
underdevelopment. Promoting peace, stability, and increasing interactions
with the latter countries, the multilateral security grouping we have in
mind could encourage those emerging states to become committed to
broader strategies of political and economic development involving their
own populaces. Myanmar’s recent shift toward greater pluralism is a case
in point. Over time, these developing states would gain more direct access
to the multilateral grouping via acceding to membership and helping to
shape its future policy directions.
South Korea and multilateral security

South Korea constitutes an appropriate test case of a regional security actor
that pursues multilateral security through the tacit adoption of the inclusive
but qualified formula. Although it has dealt with North Korea and China
as Northeast Asian security actors who are at ideological and geopolitical
odds with its own political identity security interests in the Six Party
Talks (an ad hoc form of multilateral security negotiations), it does so
by normally coordinating such multilateral interactions with its American
ally. This is consistent with the democratization criterion of the formula – a
gradual shaping of interaction with undemocratic societies, but one accom-
panied by a hedging of primary strategic affinity with likeminded states.
With allied backing, however, recent South Korean governments have been
more free to explore their country’s involvement in multilateral arrange-
ments for underwriting regional prosperity involving countries with diverse
political systems, including ASEAN+3 and the trilateral summit (with
China and Japan). Intermittent strains in US–South Korea bilateral alliance
relations since the end of the Cold War have never reached such an impasse
that South Korea has contemplated entering into multilateral security
arrangements in Northeast Asia or in the greater region independently of
the US. This conforms to the “US involvement” criterion of the “inclusive
but qualified” formula.
Several benchmarks highlight the evolution of South Korea’s recent
multilateral security politics and underscore the relevance of that middle
power’s sensitivity to balancing its quest to integrate Northeast Asia more
closely without relinquishing its traditional security postures and guarantees.
In an October 1988 address to the United Nations, President Roh Tae-woo
proposed a six-party consultative conference to address outstanding North-
east Asian security issues. Although both China and the US initially
opposed this initiative, it served to bolster Roh’s Nordpolitik policy, con-
summate the normalization of South Korea–USSR and South Korea–China
relations, and compelled North Korea to negotiate the Agreement on
Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation Between
South and North Korea (the so-called “Basic Agreement”) in December
1991 (Wonhyuk 2009: 81–82). This, in turn, reinforced the South Korean
dual strategy of deepening multilateral security dialogues in Northeast Asia
while intensifying bilateral security relations with the United States. This
was acknowledged by South Korean President Kim Young-sam in a keynote
speech to the 1993 APEC summit. As one analyst has since noted, Kim’s
strategy reflected the challenge of “[m]aintaining a strong bilateral alliance
with the United States and developing good relations with former adver-
saries in Northeast Asia” (Wonhyuk 2009: 82). Kim’s government followed
up his keynote address with proposals to the ARF to establish a Northeast
Asian Security Dialogue, modeled on the Conference for Security and
Cooperation in Europe and applying various European norms in the
process, including respect for democracy and human dignity (Wonhyuk
2009: 82; Calder and Ye 2010: 190–91). The Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization was formed in October 1994 to coordinate
American, Japanese, South Korean, and other partners’ contributions to
North Korea’s development of light-water nuclear reactors and related
energy sources.
Kim Dae-jung’s presidency (1998–2003) marked the apex of South
Korean “independent” multilateral diplomacy designed to enhance regional
economic and politico-security integration. Bill Clinton’s administration
interpreted his efforts with intermittent skepticism (believing that Kim
underestimated the seriousness of the North Korean nuclear weapons and
missile programs but concluding that his “sunshine policy” was commensu-
rate with its own engagement policies toward the North). The George W.
Bush administration was far more skeptical regarding Kim’s strategy of
reconciliation with Pyongyang, interpreting it as a strategy for driving
a wedge in the American–South Korean bilateral alliance, partially in
response to South Korean public pressure to distance South Korea from
traditional bilateral alliance politics (Kim 2006: 217–20, 222–24, 229–32).
At the ASEAN+3 Hanoi Summit in December 1998, Kim advocated
the creation of an East Asia Vision Group to study long-term regional
cooperation, and this body was launched in Seoul the following year.
Between 1999 and 2001, it convened five times and produced recommenda-
tions that included the formation of an East Asia Summit – which came
into being in 2005. Again, a posture resembling the inclusive but qualified
formula was very much at the core of these findings: to advance good
governance, to bolster common prosperity, and to create an “East Asian
community of peace, prosperity and progress based on the full development
of all peoples in the region.”5
In 2004, Kim’s presidential successor, Roh Moo-hyun, created the
Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative to
promote South Korea’s status as a middle power and as a catalyst for
regional community building. Roh strained ties with the United States,
however, by characterizing South Korea as a “balancer” in Northeast Asia,
which the Bush administration initially interpreted as a posture intended
to establish Seoul as an arbitrator between the United States and China.
Subsequent tensions with China over how to historically interpret the
sovereign identity of the ancient kingdom of Koguryo and territorial
disputes with Japan further complicated Seoul’s geopolitics during this
period, which had already been undermined by Washington’s continued
suspicions over the Roh government’s attitude toward the US–South Korea
alliance (Wonhyuk 2009: 92–93). As demonstrated by his most definitive
speech on regionalism – “Policy of Peace and Prosperity” – Roh’s version of
multilateralism clearly embodied the first two components of the “inclusive
but qualified” formula – participatory democracy and the building of greater
regional wealth. American involvement was also sought through Roh’s
vigorous pursuit of a free trade agreement with the US. The alliance policy
dimension of his multilateral approach, however, remained muddled and
thus was largely unsuccessful in attracting the Bush administration into
supporting his broader regional diplomacy (Kim 2008: 122).
Lee Myong-bak won office in 2008 determined to rectify this perceptional
anomaly and to strike a “pragmatic” balance between clearly supporting
the US alliance and pursuing regional multilateralism. Accordingly, as one
observer has noted, “[f]or South Korea, the challenge will continue to be
how to establish mechanisms for promoting regional cooperation in Asia but
in a way that is non-threatening to the United States … These challenges
can best be met by adopting a US-in-Asia approach” (Wonhyuk 2009: 95).
The Lee government has played a major role in formalizing the trilateral
summit with China and Japan, pursued a “Global Korea” strategy to
justify, among other things, his country’s participation in international
peacekeeping, and has orchestrated South Korea’s increasingly central role
in international economic forums. It has been inhibited, however, by an
intensification of inter-Korean tensions and an aggressive bilateral posture
toward North Korea. This has spurred the North Koreans to raise tensions
on the peninsula through a series of provocative actions, and has arguably
undermined South Korea’s middle power quest to realize greater influence
as a regional and global player. In this context, the short-term salience of
the “inclusive but qualified” formula may be tested by an increasing South
Korean preoccupation in dealing with its North Korean rival.
Conclusion
Observing the activities of the existing multilateral security regimes in Asia,
this chapter has identified two major areas of policy concern. One is the
relative ineffectiveness of large multilateral institutions in the Asia-Pacific
due to their large size and diverse members often working at odds with
one another. The other is that the recent spawning of minilateral and
plurilateral groupings – if not carefully managed in terms of their sensitivity
to outsiders’ perceptions of their roles – tends to be exclusivist and limited
to non-traditional security missions. Our South Korean case study has
demonstrated that despite the aspirations of a significant middle power to
shape multilateral security relations in its own subregion, unanticipated
vagaries and oscillations in alliance relations may challenge the best-laid
plans for exercising such leadership. This chapter suggests that any future
multilateral security regime coming into play should consider adopting a
new institutional design based on the “inclusive but qualified” membership
model. It has also explained the potential benefits of such an initiative by
focusing on how it might be both effective and legitimate if it focuses on
promoting democratization, cultivating regional prosperity, and encouraging
US leadership in initiating any such grouping, but also in reaching out to
China and other non-democratic states via exercising strategic reassurance
through transparency and other modes of interaction.
This vision does not replicate the League of Democracies proposal that
found its way into the presidential campaigns waged by both major US
political parties in 2008. As became evident through the nearly simultaneous
failure of the “Quadrilateral Initiative” (where democratic states such as
India and later Australia summarily rejected any designs of containment
that may have been entertained by some conservative forces in the US), any
move toward establishing such a highly charged and blatantly ideological
organization would be destined to fail.6 The timing seems propitious, how-
ever, for the United States and its traditional democratic allies to adopt an
“inclusive but qualified” membership formula for shaping a new multilateral
security institution regime in the Asia-Pacific region. Intensive economic
interdependence between China and the United States, as well as within
the greater Asia-Pacific region, should ensure that the basis for continuing
economic and politico-security cooperation will be sustained. Indeed,
the web of existing diverse bilateral, minilateral, and multilateral channels
found within the region should ensure that key channels of communication
will remain open, and that different opportunities for mutual growth and
community building will remain appealing to all who inhabit the region.
The challenge for national political leaders and foreign policy decision
makers is to project the creativity and diplomacy required to realize the
visions that continue to underwrite the promise of multilateralism and
community building.
Acknowledgement
An initial draft of this chapter was presented at the Australian National
University–MacArthur Asia Security Initiative Partnership Conference,
Focus Group 2 Meeting, Beijing, 16–18 May 2011. Dr Choi would like to
thank the Australia–Korea Foundation of the Department of Foreign
Affairs for its financial support for research and presentation of this chapter,
the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School for its support for research,
and Hyo Joon Chang and Jennifer Frost for excellent research assistance.
Notes
1 Desmond Ball (2012: 1) has concluded that “I am not persuaded that the pur-
poses, structures, operational modalities and achievements of these [European]
organisations are central to any consideration of East Asian security architecture.
On the other hand, their recent experiences in important areas such as peace-
keeping, missile defence and cyber security warrant serious reflection.” Katja
Weber (2007: 3) is more forthright in discussing Europe–Asia parallels:
“considering the multi-faceted nature of security threats, the main ingredient of
the European success strategy, namely the institutionalization of trust on multiple
levels, and hence the creation of a complex web of governance … is likely to be
emulated in the long run.”
2 For example, China emerged in the eyes of some American policy analysts as a
logical “G2” partner with the US for creating a global conundrum (Brzezinski
2009), while South Korea recently advanced a “Global Korea” posture. The latter
is assessed in more detail later in this chapter.
3 The democracy score is greater than eight in the Polity IV Project. See Marshall,
Jaggers and Gurr (2012).
4 Initial reports of Japan and South Korea moving toward low-key intelligence
exchange agreements are also illustrative. South Korea, however, ultimately
declined to sign the accord in June 2012.
5 Extracts from the East Asia Vision Group report presented to the ASEAN+3
Summit in November 2001 and reproduced in Tanaka (2007: 65).
6 For a balanced assessment of the League of Democracies proposal, see Carothers
(2008).
4 Stretching the Japan–US alliance
Rikki Kersten
Since 11 September 2001, Japan’s security policy has undergone remark-

able change (Kersten 2011b), involving the breaking of precedents, the
consolidation of a normative commitment to proactive pacifism, and a
questioning of Japans’ postwar security policy framework. These transfor-
mations have themselves occurred in a dynamic and unstable context. In its
domestic politics, since the departure of Koizumi Junichiro- in 2006, Japan
experienced a succession of short-term conservative prime ministers,
followed by a historic election in 2009 that saw the defeat of the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) at the hands of the relatively progressive hybrid
political force, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). The regional and
global context has added to the drama and urgency of Japan’s security shift,
with the rise of China and the continued menace of North Korea forcing
Japan to critically re-examine its regional and global foreign and security
policies. Already mired in long-term economic stagnation, burdened
by national debt, and experiencing the beginnings of a demographic time
bomb, Japan has been further destabilized by the triple emergency of
11 March 2011. While a focus on domestic problems can be expected in the
short term in the aftermath of the earthquake, tsunami, and radiation leaks
from Fukushima, the underlying concern with Japan’s existential dilemma
in the realm of foreign and security policies will persist, and can be expected
to intensify.
Driven by insecurity and accompanied by instability, the debates over
Japan’s foreign and security policy stance since the Koizumi administrations
have exhibited two basic preoccupations: how Japan can improve and
upgrade its engagement with the economically dynamic Asian region,
and how Japan should reposition its military alliance with the United States
in the post-11 September security environment of transnational threats, in
a region that has not entirely emerged into a post-Cold War threat environ-
ment. Indeed, it is the interplay between these two issues that requires
exploration. Debates over Japan’s multilateral engagement with the Asian
region, and its bilateral commitment to the alliance with the US, have
displayed an underlying assumption that there is a degree of dissonance
between these two policy directions. It is the impulse to resolve this
40 Rikki Kersten
perceived discomfort that will shape Japan’s future multilateral and bilateral
policy choices.
This chapter addresses how Japan’s changing global and regional strate-
gies and outlook in the post-Koizumi era are envisioning and repositioning
the Japan–US alliance. In particular, it investigates the extent to which
Japan’s shifting perspectives on multilateralism and security can be accom-
modated within the Japan–US alliance.
Assumptions
Interpretations of Japan’s post-Koizumi foreign and security policies,
including those produced by Japanese and US commentators, have incor-
porated the following core assumptions:
! that Japan’s proactive and enthusiastic embrace of East Asian regional-

ism requires some kind of adjustment in its alliance with the US, and
therefore, exposes a fundamental tension between regional multi-
lateralism and the bilateral alliance with the US;
! that Japan’s motivation in turning towards Asia (and by implication
away from the US) is primarily to counter the rise of China, and
Chinese influence in the evolving regional institutional landscape;
! that Japan is attempting to secure greater strategic independence
from the US, without actually breaking away from the bilateral alliance
(that is, it is hoping to “stretch” the alliance); and
! that Japan is attempting to lead the process of forging new regional
institutions, or at least, to exert decisive influence over the direction
regionalism takes, as an independent actor.
Some of these assumptions posit extreme choices, while in reality the

alternatives are much more nuanced and entangled. We need to ask what
are the factors driving Japan’s new regional foreign and security policy
thinking, and in particular, how do these factors relate to each other in
Japanese thinking? We can then contemplate whether tension necessarily
exists between Japan’s bilateral and multilateral policy aspirations. Can
Japan’s impulse towards Asia-first diplomacy reinforce its alliance with the
US? If so, how? Finally, it is important to consider what Japan’s evolving
regional policy and reassessment of its alliance with the US implies for
the prospects of achieving a bilateral–multilateral nexus in the Asia-Pacific.
Asia versus America
Koizumi and his predecessors

The US–Asia paradigm is a recurring framework accompanying postwar
Japanese thinking about its regional diplomacy. In the post-Second World
Stretching the Japan–US alliance 41
War era, Asia-first diplomacy has been juxtaposed with Japan’s alliance
with the US in a manner that underscores the assumption of a degree of
incompatibility between these two entities, almost as if they were poles. This
is conveyed most powerfully through the packaging of the notion of an
“Asian community” in terms of identity, together with norms such as
pacifism that are implicitly tied to that identity. The Second World War has
been a factor on both sides of the policy spectrum, with the “pull” factor
towards Asia offering the prospect of overcoming the past accompanied by
the need for Japan to articulate remorse for the past war, and the “push”
factor from the US alliance presenting the alliance as a reminder of Japan’s
defeat and conditional independence. In this sense we might say that
the Japan–US alliance appears to have a “future deficit” compared to the
prospect of a rejuvenated diplomatic presence for Japan in the Asian region.
The Fukuda Doctrine of 1977 was the first clearly delineated philosophy
of Asia-first foreign policy in postwar Japan. A diplomatic strategy that was
seen as a response to the unreliability of the US following the “Nixon
shocks” earlier in the decade, Fukuda Takeo’s 18 August speech delivered in
Manila based its proposal for community building in normative terms,
pointing to Japan’s “heart to heart” approach to the region accompanied by
remorse for Japan’s actions during the Second World War (Fukuda 1977).
Hashimoto Ryu-taro- (1997) attempted another Asia-first diplomatic strategy
in the late 1990s, this time with a heavy emphasis on security as one of the
binding elements of an East Asian community. But without an expression of
contrition for Japanese aggression in the past, Hashimoto’s attempt at a
“doctrine” fell flat. One could argue that Hashimoto was also motivated to
turn to Asia because of “abandonment” fears after the 1980s Japan bashing
in the US, but the decline of Japan’s banks in the mid-1990s made Japan
seem a less attractive prospect to the region even before Hashimoto could
build momentum for his plan. Koizumi (2002) also made an attempt to
attach his name to Asia-first diplomacy, with his 14 January 2002 speech in
Singapore calling for community building in Asia. Like Hashimoto before
him, Koizumi sabotaged his own initiative through his repeated visits to the
Yasukuni Shrine, which regional counterparts took as a sign that Koizumi
was not yet attuned to regional feelings.
In these earlier forays into regional multilateralism, Japan’s leaders
combined a clear notion of identity politics (Japan as an Asian nation) with
a desire to initiate, and in Koizumi’s case even lead, regional community-
building. The alliance with the US was not excluded from these attempts at
vision building, but it was moved from the center to the periphery when
Asian community creation was discussed.
The Abe interlude

Koizumi’s successor Abe Shinzo- is often portrayed as a conviction neo-
nationalist politician whose hyperactive but brief term in office was
42 Rikki Kersten
remarkable for his attack on the icons of postwar Japanese political life: the
pacifist constitution, and education (for additional analysis on Abe, see
Kersten 2012; Abe’s term went from 26 September 2006 to 26 September
2007). But the advent of Abe can also be seen as laying the groundwork for
Japan’s relative distancing from the US. Analysts have judged Abe as a
driven individual who took on the unfinished business of Koizumi’s term,
namely Koizumi’s failure to institutionalize precedent-breaking security
policy and behavior through revision of Japan’s 1947 constitution (Watanabe
2007: 30; Okadome and Sasato 2007: 13). Abe’s aspiration to legitimize
collective self-defense through constitutional revision incorporated expres-
sions of distancing from the US concurrent with the privileging of Asia-first
diplomacy, and was therefore essentially ambivalent where the US alliance
was concerned.
Abe implied a pro-US attitude through his commitment to collective self-
defense, and his embrace of values that the US associates itself with as an
enlightened global power. When Abe invoked the values of democracy,
human rights, the rule of law, and the liberal market economy as those that
would drive Japan’s new diplomacy, this resonated with the self-image of
the US. When Abe nominated the “arc of freedom and prosperity” as the
vehicle through which Japan’s alliance with the US could become
“an alliance for the world and for Asia” (Abe 2006a), Abe fulfilled US
aspirations for its ally as one that “the US could rely on” (cited in Watanabe
2007: 47) in a global context. Abe’s ideological “arc” can also be seen as an
attempt at normative containment of China. But Abe’s messages served
multiple purposes.
Concurrent with these pronouncements, after the fallow years under
Koizumi, Abe made reconciliation with China his top priority upon assum-
ing office in September 2006. Abe also made a point of making overtures
to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on behalf of Japan. Although
Abe’s positive attitude towards collective self-defense and constitutional
revision were encouraging to the US, Abe inserted more sobering qualifica-
tions into those positions. The constitution needed revision, according to
Abe, because it was the product of an alien hand (that of the US) delivered
under occupation (by the US), and represented nothing less than “spiritual
impoverishment” for the people of Japan (Abe 2006b: 128). Not only
Japan’s independence, but its national identity, depended on rewriting this
constitution with its own hand. And while Abe was proactive in tasking
a think tank in May 2007 to explore the potential for collective self-
defense under the present official interpretations of Article 9, he specifically
requested that the committee identify particular instances where Japan
would be able to engage in collective self-defense actions (Anzen Hosho- no
Ho-teki Kiban no Saiko-chiku ni Kan Suru Kondankai 2008). In other words,
Abe was not offering carte blanche. Instead, he remained mindful of the
dangers of entrapment in a US agenda, and signaled his qualified enthu-
siasm for the alliance in the process.
When we consider that it is the alliance with the US that facilitates
Japan’s implementation of its right to collective self-defense, and that argu-
ably it is precisely Japan’s alliance with the US that softens a potentially
stronger Japanese presence in regional community building and institutio-
nalization, we could also package Abe’s nuanced approach in another way.
Abe’s ambiguity could also constitute a demonstration of the utility of
entrapment with the US for the sake of the longer-term objective of securing
greater independence for Japan within the widened parameters of the
alliance with the US. In other words, Abe could be seen as the first Japanese
leader to articulate the rationale and mechanism for “stretching” the US
alliance. This adds another layer of meaning to Abe’s calls for “equality”
within the context of the alliance with the US. If “equality” is a cipher for
“greater independence” for Japan as a security actor, then the utility of the
US alliance is transitory, and not an end goal in itself. As Richard Katz
and Peter Ennis (2007: 79) note, for Abe – as for Koizumi – diplomatic
independence is natural for a nation that aspires to “normality.” But the lure
of utility associated with alliance relations may also degenerate into a
vicious cycle. As Soeya Yoshihide (2003) argues, the freer Japan becomes to
exercise its independence in the form of collective self-defense, the more
available Japan appears to be to fight alongside the US.
In seeking to exploit the utility of the alliance with the US for the sake of
enhanced independence in diplomatic and security terms, Abe was moving
one step beyond the legacy of Yoshida Shigeru, architect of the Yoshida
Doctrine. Yet in moving Japan’s sphere of benefit beyond the economy and
into the area of security, Abe exposed the extent to which the downside of
utility in the alliance with the US was counterbalanced by the upside
of facilitation in helping Japan achieve its aspiration to stretch that alliance.
The Fukuda correction

Upon finding himself in the seat of power as the LDP entered into its
death spiral as the ruling party of postwar Japan in September 2007,
Fukuda Yasuo deliberately invoked his father’s legacy. The so-called
“new Fukuda Doctrine” unambiguously affirmed regional engagement
instead of excessive reliance on the US alliance, and in this sense represented
continuity with the thrust of Abe diplomacy. Fukuda made even greater
progress than Abe in restoring positive vibes to Japan’s relationship with
China, by harnessing the thirtieth anniversary of the Japan–China Treaty of
Peace and Friendship in 2008 as a historical pivot, and stepping away from
the normative depiction of Japan’s regional vision. In this respect, Fukuda’s
term in office can be seen as a “correction” to Abe’s Sino-Japanese
diplomacy, which had been tainted by its embrace of US-style norms in its
Asia-focused diplomacy.
In his pathbreaking visit to China in December 2007, Fukuda invoked the
rhetoric of “strategic reciprocity” and “mutual benefit” to depict the positive
44 Rikki Kersten
turn in the bilateral relationship. What became known as the “Spring” in
Sino-Japanese relations even saw both sides agree to military personnel
exchanges and talks over the East China Sea gas fields. This Spring-
like exuberance was in stark contrast to Fukuda’s November 2007 visit
to the US, which prompted the Japan Times to ponder the “growing
perception gaps” between Japan and the US, and the sense that “the other
country does not share its priorities” (Japan Times 2007). In this way,
Fukuda’s 363 days in office consolidated the impression that Asia-first
diplomacy was designed to counter over-reliance on Japan’s alliance rela-
tionship with the US.
Fukuda nailed his colors to the mast in his first prime-ministerial state-
ment on 26 September 2007. After confirming the “cornerstone” role
performed by the alliance with the US, Fukuda (2007) declared that he
would “proceed with active diplomacy for Asia, so that the strengthening of
the Japan–US alliance and the promotion of diplomacy for Asia resonate in
harmony and yield even better results.” In his inaugural policy speech to the
Diet in January 2008, Fukuda (2008a) dubbed this approach “synergy
diplomacy.” While this formulation of words attempted to dismiss any
notion of distancing from the US alliance, commentators were quick to seize
on Fukuda’s shift towards “Asia-focused policy” (Economist 2007). In effect,
the positive turn in Sino-Japanese relations under Fukuda, accompanied
by the shunning of normative rhetoric in Japan’s Asia-oriented diplomacy,
became the barometer for the degree of distancing between Japan and the
US (for an analysis of the decline of normative rhetoric in Japan’s regional
diplomacy, see Hosoya 2011).
The impression of “distancing” was given added emphasis by Fukuda’s
failure to push through the extension of its Anti-Terrorism Special Measures
Law provisions that legitimized Japan’s refueling operations in the Indian
Ocean in support of the US mission in Afghanistan. Japan ordered its
Maritime Self-Defense Forces (SDF) vessels home as the legislation expired
on 1 November 2007. Alliance-related controversy extended into 2008, as
the Fukuda administration dealt with vexed problems such as increasing
Japan’s “host nation” support for US forces stationed in Japan, and the
aftermath of widely publicized crimes committed by US military personnel
based in Japan (Economist 2008). All of this presented a great contrast
to the Sino-Japanese relationship in 2008, which saw President Hu Jintao
visit Japan for the first Sino-Japanese summit in ten years, basking in the
continuing warmth of a favorable “Spring” breeze. Severe adverse events
erupted that highlighted the disparity between elite and popular perceptions
of the Sino-Japanese relationship, such as the poisoned gyo-za affair
in February (when poisoned Chinese dumplings were exported to Japan,
causing widespread illness), protests against the Olympic torch as it made its
way through Japan to Beijing, and the Sichuan earthquake (when China
revoked its request for Japanese SDF assistance, but accepted Japanese aid).
However, the positive aura that enveloped Sino-Japanese relations at the
elite level in 2008, in spite of dissonant feelings at the popular level, was
undeniable (for one perspective on this phenomenon, see Przystup 2007).
The most striking and widely referenced depiction of Fukuda’s “Asia-
first” diplomacy occurred in his May 2008 speech to the Future of Asia
Conference. Known as his “inland sea” speech, it saw Fukuda openly
acknowledge the centrality of China to Japan’s Asia-focused diplomacy.
He referred to the fact that Japan and China were now “standing at a new
starting line,” and most importantly, he associated this with the fact
that “Japan–China bilateral relations have adopted a global viewpoint
for the first time.” Fukuda described his vision where the Pacific Ocean
ceased to be divided into spheres of Eastern and Western influence, and
instead became “an inland sea.” However, the peace and stability of this
“inland sea” was premised on the existence of synergy between “the policies
of the strengthening of the Japan-US Alliance and the promotion of
Asian diplomacy” (Fukuda 2008b). What emerges here is what amounts to
Fukuda’s deconstruction and reformulation of the Asia versus US paradigm
in Japan’s diplomacy: the incorporation of Asian and regional diplomacy
as an integral counterbalancing mechanism to Japan’s alliance with the US.
In other words, under Fukuda the paradigm was collapsed and converted
into a linear continuum.
The Hatoyama shock

Following Fukuda, the short-lived administration of Aso- Taro- significantly
did not attempt to reintroduce the normative thrust of Japan’s Asia-first
diplomacy. But with Hatoyama Yukio’s election as the first prime minister
of a DPJ-led government in August 2009, a new and reckless configuration
of the utility-facilitation nexus became evident.
Hatoyama’s vision of an East Asian community sounded familiar in that
it was phrased in terms of identity politics, presenting Japan as an Asian
nation that had a role in defining and leading the institutionalization of
East Asian security (Hatoyama 2009b). Moreover, this Asian identity
was juxtaposed with Japan’s status as an alliance partner of the US, clearly
conveying the impression that leading an East Asian community meant a
degree of distancing from the US. Hatoyama’s September 2009 article
in Voice, poorly translated and published only in excerpts in English in
August, made token mention of the Japan–US security pact as “the corner-
stone of Japanese diplomatic policy” before going on to state that “we must
not forget that our identity as a nation [is] located in Asia” (Hatoyama
2009c, 2009a). He declared that the era of US unipolarity was coming to
an end, and that the age of Asian multipolarity was upon us. Hatoyama
tied Japan’s Asian affinity to the prime symbol of postwar Japanese nation-
hood, the pacifist constitution, by asserting that Asian multilateralism was
consistent with the principles of the Japanese constitution, particularly
pacifism, making “regional integration and collective security” the logical
46 Rikki Kersten
path for Japan to follow. Foreign Minister Okada Katsuya clarified
Hatoyama’s regional vision soon afterwards, explicitly excluding the US
from an envisioned East Asian community (see Nakauchi and Sasato
2010: 53).
In Beijing in October 2009, during the trilateral summit between China,
Japan, and South Korea, Hatoyama controversially referred to Japan’s
hitherto “excessive reliance” on the US, and its desire “as an Asian nation
to emphasize Asia in its foreign policy from now on” (see, for instance,
Takahara 2011). Commentary on Hatoyama’s East Asia community pro-
posal likewise trumpeted the end of Japanese “followership” of the US in its
foreign and security policies (see, for instance, Ohmae 2006). Following
some blunt high-level responses from the US at the level of officials,
Hatoyama modified his rhetoric and even backtracked completely, repeat-
edly invoking the importance of the US alliance (Japan Times 2011).
This became even more pronounced after President Barack Obama’s
Suntory Hall address on 14 November 2009, where Obama presented
the US as an “Asia-Pacific nation,” indicating that the US regarded its
exclusion from regional institution building even in hypothetical terms
as unacceptable (Obama 2009). Hatoyama’s 15 November 2009 speech,
“Towards the Realization of an East Asian Community,” did not explicitly
distance the US from regional institution building, but this impression was
conveyed clearly in subsequent speeches by Hatoyama and Okada.
In the name of seeking greater “equality” within the relationship, Japan
under the Hatoyama cabinet embarked on a destructive course of question-
ing the 2006 roadmap for the realignment of US forces within Okinawa,
proposing the renegotiation of the Status of Forces Agreement, and feeding
public dissatisfaction with the amount Japan was paying to host US bases
(omoiyari yosan). None of this was a total surprise for US policymakers,
who had tracked the imminent demise of the LDP and assessed the impli-
cations of a DPJ government before Hatoyama implied to the people of
Okinawa that he might rid the island of American troops (Chanlett-Avery
and Konishi 2009: 11–12). Having been unable to deliver on his promises,
Hatoyama was bundled out of office in June 2010. His successor Kan Naoto
rapidly backtracked in a spectacular fashion, supporting US membership of
the East Asia Summit and openly welcoming the US as a member of any
new regional grouping. It is worth noting that the second Kan administra-
tion’s positive response to the prospect of Japan joining the Trans-Pacific
Partnership infuriated Hatoyama, who went on the record lamenting Kan’s
US-centric policy at the expense of Asia (Sharp 2011).
But Kan’s seemingly pro-US stance did not lead to a breakthrough in the
Okinawa bases issue, and cannot be taken as indicative of a full rebuttal of
Hatoyama’s Asia-first diplomacy. Moreover, following the collision between
a Chinese trawler and a Japanese Coast Guard vessel in the vicinity of the
Senkaku Islands on 7 September 2010, Japan-based commentators professed
dismay at how long it took the US to reaffirm that the Senkaku Islands fell
under the auspices of the Japan–US Security Treaty (see Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America
1960: Article 5). While Kan has worked hard to neutralize the damage
inflicted by Hatoyama, he did not give any indication that the tension
between the impulse of distancing Japan from the alliance with the US,
and Asia-first diplomacy, has decreased. Instead he made his mark in the
sphere of apology politics, setting Japan–South Korea relations back on a
positive trajectory with his historic 2010 apology for Japan’s annexation
of Korea in 1910 (Kan 2010). This implied that the Japanese government,
despite regime change and the rapid transition between administrations, was
holding steady to the Asia-first line. Kan’s gesture pointed towards an
entrenchment of the view that Japanese leadership of Asian community
building cannot progress unless Japan comprehensively addresses its
responsibility for the aggression and atrocities of the past war.
Bipolarity versus multipolarity

While the rise of China and Japan’s relative decline are significant factors
influencing Japanese security policy thinking, it is clear that in Japanese
policymaking circles the China factor is mostly considered in concert with
other issues. In particular, policy debates consider issues such as how
the new strategic and geopolitical context of the twenty-first century is
impacting on Japan’s alliance with the US, and Japan’s conviction that
the age of multipolarity has arrived. A powerful example of this can be
found in the three-year study conducted by the House of Councillor’s
International Issues Research Committee between 2004 and 2006, where
the question of China, the region, and the alliance with the US are
considered relative to each other, as intertwined dynamics (Kokusai
Mondai ni Kan Suru Cho-sakai 2007). The matrix of factors in Japanese
policy development on East Asian regionalism is a significant indicator
of Japanese thinking on how it can reconcile its bilateral and multilateral
policies.
In its lengthy deliberations, which included testimony from 40 expert
witnesses, the committee set itself the task of examining “New Japanese
diplomacy in the age of increasing multilateralism.” Its principal concerns
were: Japan’s Asia diplomacy and its relationship to Japan–US relations; the
situation of US diplomacy and Japan’s responsibility to international
society; and rejuvenating Japan–China relations in a context of ongoing
instability in Northeast Asia (Kusumi 2007: 41). Four themes emerge from
the vast amount of material considered by the committee.
Proactive diplomacy
Japan needs to gear its diplomacy towards a more proactive engagement
with the issues in its region (institution building), as well as in specific
48 Rikki Kersten
issue areas on a global level, notably in environmental diplomacy. Japan’s
international contribution, the report notes, must now go beyond merely
refraining from employing military means. The inherently multilateral
nature of most peacebuilding operations makes this a clean and obvious
area for Japan to embark on its proactive diplomacy, but even here – as
we have seen with Japan’s experience in Iraq – Japan is seen to lose face
precisely because it cannot employ military means. Invariably, the logic of
the quest for more equality for Japan in its alliance with the US leads
to the equation of equality with militarization (“normalization”). It is this
conclusion that bedevils Japan’s aspiration for an enhanced role in regional
leadership. Despite this, Funabashi Yo-ichi testified to the committee that
while the US–Japan alliance had to date shown itself to be a stabilizing force
in the region, “now it is time for Japan to show that it too can be a powerful
force for stability on its own” (Funabashi 2005).
Quadrilateralism
Japan should approach regional problems through forming a quadrilateral
mechanism with Japan, the US, China, and South Korea. Yet at the same
time, the report tries to “fuse” the bilateral and multilateral visions by
depicting the US as a vertical thread in the fabric of a multilateral region,
and Japan as the horizontal thread. Although rudimentary, this idea of a
post-bilateral regime confuses the message of distancing as the proof of
Asian identity for Japan. The tapestry metaphor might also be taken as an
accurate representation of the bilateral–multilateral puzzle for contemporary
Japan: they are intricately intertwined, but heading in opposite directions.
Altruism
One of the more curious positions stated in the committee report is the
advocacy of altruism over national interest in Japan’s regionalism (Kokusai
Mondai ni Kan Suru Cho-sakai 2007: 38, 57). It is argued that Japan needs
to “rise above” national interest-driven policies in its regional engagement,
and instead pursue policies that are relevant to the region as a whole. Not
only does this display a wild abandonment of realism in the face of real and
evident threats in the region, but it betrays the presence of a residual fear
that Japan will not be accepted in its own right in its own region unless it
abandons its own concerns. The simmering lack of self-confidence that this
reveals not only reverses momentum back to the US alliance and away from
Asia; it also undermines Japan’s impulse to garner “equality” within the US
alliance through activating its right to collective self-defense.
Japan as intermediary
The report states that in the Asian region, Japan ought to act as a bridge
to improve connections between individual countries. This represents not so
much an acknowledgement of “middle power” status, but instead a potential
“middle man” functionalism behind Japan’s external policies: “through
our relations with both the US and China, our country can enhance its
profile as a regional player and with our strong industrial and technological
brand we can perform the role of coordinator and thus underpin regional
stability” (Kokusai Mondai ni Kan Suru Cho-sakai 2007: 23). In his expert
testimony, Fujiwara Kiichi argued that Japan could indeed be an effective
player as a middle power, if it took the initiative as Canada and Australia
had done. But the report does not distinguish between influence (middle
power) and power; instead reference is made to the fact that both Japan and
China are “great powers” (Fujiwara 2006). For his part, Funabashi flips
the perspective, suggesting that perhaps Japan is the only country that could
persuade the US to allow regional multilateralism to exist meaningfully
alongside Japan–US bilateralism. He states: “[i]t is possible that only Japan
can convince the US [of these] potentialities” (Funabashi 2005). But as
another expert witness stated, if Japan is a bridge, then it cannot at the same
time be part of Asia (Sakamoto 2006).
Underpinning these four policy directions are some assumptions that
require elaboration. While conveying a degree of inconsistency and contra-
diction, the committee’s deliberations are very revealing about what is driving
Japan’s hand wringing over policy. Although the sense of being caught in a
predicament – between two ill-fitting policy directions – remains evident, the
report and the discussions on which the report are based expose important
core drivers behind Japan’s vacillation. These drivers are as follows.
Asia as a “multilateral pole”

The report is unambiguous in its assertion that the age of US unipolarity
is over, and that the nature of post-11 September threats has led to a
decline in the influence of state actors. It concludes that the multilateral
dynamic ought to be reflected in multiple ways, and on multiple levels:
through incorporating non-governmental actors, and by working towards
establishing Asia as a “multilateral pole” (Kokusai Mondai ni Kan Suru
Cho-sakai 2007: 16). Significantly, the report posits that this multilateral
Asian pole should be inclusive, naming the US, along with Australia
and New Zealand, as potential members. But at the same time, the report
stipulates that Japan’s diplomacy and security should henceforth be framed
in a multilateral instead of a bilateral context (Kokusai Mondai ni Kan Suru
Cho-sakai 2007: 80). Japan’s embrace of multipolarity has another implica-
tion too, according to the report, that of Japan’s own national identity
as a pacifist state. Already convinced of the need for Japan’s pacifism to
be more “proactive,” this report displays an inclination to elevate pacifism
to a multilateral endeavor, instead of the particularistic signifier of Japan’s
own postwar national identity (Kokusai Mondai ni Kan Suru Cho-sakai
2007: 24–25).
50 Rikki Kersten
Conflict is now driven by culture and values
The committee reaffirmed the importance of norms to the framing of
Japan’s foreign and security policy by asserting that conflicts in the post-
unipolar era mainly emanated from issues informed by culture and values.
This reinforced the propensity already evident in Japanese policymaking
constituencies to create policy frameworks that bring identity and policy
into closer proximity. It also implies that there is a difference between
cultural identity, and political identity, when it comes to the role of norms.
In fact, there is evident tension throughout the document between cultural
identity (Asian) and political identity (US liberal democracy). Funabashi’s
expert testimony noted that when the US tries to intervene in East Asian
community building, it does Japan a disservice: “this makes Japan look less
like an Asian country.” As a result, “Japan looks like it is more isolated and
independent from Asia” (Funabashi 2005).
Bilateral relationships should be coupled/interconnected

In the committee’s report, we can glimpse what Japan’s vision of multi-
lateralism entails. In essence, the report suggests that existing pivotal
bilateral relationships need to be coupled together in order to ensure their
ongoing impact in the multipolar world scene:
The diplomacy of the 21st century must transcend the separation of

Japan–US and Japan–China relations, and must aspire to achieve a
greater goal (the national interest) by connecting those two relation-
ships. In other words, the Japan–US alliance and cooperation between
Japan and China must be fused together.
(Kokusai Mondai ni Kan Suru Cho-sakai 2007: 23)
Conclusions
When one attempts to portray an integrated picture of Japan’s strategic
outlook, one emerges with little of substance, and much that is confused,
blurred, and self-defeating. The multiple doubts that pervade official think-
ing on matters of policy outlook imply that Japan is undergoing a kind of
national identity crisis as it questions its foreign and security policy future.
Indeed, what Japan is seeking in its turn towards Asian multilateralism, and
its turn away from a confined manifestation of bilateralism with the US,
is as much a matter of self-interrogation as it is a critical questioning
of its international policy. It has become evident in Japan that its pacifist
identity must undergo essential transformation if anything is to change in its
international posture, and that being merely an economic superpower is not
enough in a region that Japan describes as inherently unstable, and in a
world that will not return to unipolar certainty. Can Japan be proactive
in its diplomacy without leading? Does Japan need to militarize to demon-
strate sufficient independence? If international policy is national identity
projection, how can Japan be both Asian and attached to subordinate bila-
teralism? If pacifism gives way to greater security and defense independence,
what then would the signature dimension of Japan’s identity projection be?
Emotion has played an important role in Japan’s impulse to distance
itself from the US. Funabashi openly acknowledged this in his statement to
the committee, recognizing that Japan needs more independence “in an
emotional sense” within the US alliance without destroying it altogether.
For Funabashi, the question of defense is an identity issue, and unless the
US recognizes this, the alliance will deteriorate: “without a firm desire or
spirit to defend one’s own territory, in reality the Japan–US alliance will
become difficult” (Funabashi 2005).
We can summarize Japan’s self-made predicament as follows:
! Japan is unable to embrace the self-image of middle power; its distorted

self-image as a great power is clouding its ability to articulate a revised
international strategy.
! This has led Japan into the subjective arena of national identity
projection instead of clear strategic planning. Instead of asking “what
should we do,” Japanese are asking, “who are we and how should our
policy portray us?”
! Unless Japan wholeheartedly and strategically adopts a middle power
role and repositions itself within the US alliance through this policy
framework, the tension between Asian identity/distancing from the US
and the need for protection under the US nuclear umbrella will lead to
further irrational challenges to the US–Japan relationship, and to the
kind of isolation in its Northeast Asian region that Japan fears.
The realization is dawning in Japan that the formula for post-Second

World War recovery, the Yoshida Doctrine, has had implications for Japan’s
national identity at home and abroad. As Okazaki Hisahiko (2006) noted
in his testimony to the committee, “many believe that Japan is isolated in
Asia. This is a structural problem, one that Japan has chosen to impose
on itself.”
Ironically, the assumptions underpinning Japan’s current policy
dilemma – proactive diplomacy, quadrilateralism, altruism, and mediation –
represent a sound formula for a middle power role. It is Japan’s redundant
self-image that throws the debate over future international policy into con-
fusion. Perhaps we can also point to the persistence of the postwar formula
for a Japan denuded of substantial military power, yet endowed with
the label of economic superpower, as another psychological and emotional
barrier to clear-headedness in the twenty-first century. Japan is belatedly
coming to realize that a one-dimensional superpower, even one endowed
with the normative transcendence of unilateral pacifism, cannot pretend to
52 Rikki Kersten
full-fledged superpower status. The questions being asked in Japan today
about its foreign and security policies will not elicit the answers that Japan
is seeking. It is time for Japan to accept that the Yoshida Doctrine is not,
and possibly never was, a path towards independent great power status in
the post-Second World War world.
Acknowledgement
An abridged version of this chapter was published in the ANU–MASI
Policy Background Paper Series. See Kersten (2011a).
5 The US–Philippines alliance
Moving beyond bilateralism?
Renato Cruz De Castro
This chapter examines the management of the US–Philippines alliance over

the past decade. The rise of global terrorism and the reconfiguration of
regional security politics in response to the evolving security challenge
posed by the People’s Republic of China’s growing power in East Asia have
largely shaped this bilateral relationship. Specifically explored here is how
the US–Philippines alliance is shifting its focus from one of counterterrorism
to territorial defense aimed at enabling the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) to address the China factor in the South China Sea. The chapter
addresses the following questions: using the concept of alliance manage-
ment, how do the Philippines and the US manage their alliance to face the
changing security challenges of the twenty-first century? What factor(s)
account for the durability of US–Philippines security relations? What are the
institutions that effectively underpin this alliance? What strategies are in
place to keep the alliance relevant in a rapidly changing regional security
environment? Addressing these issues should provide us with a more com-
prehensive understanding of the bilateralism dimension in US strategy.
Explaining the “hub and spokes” durability: alliance management?

“Alliance management” refers to the process by which an alliance sustains
cohesion. It is successful when a point is reached where the original alliance
rationale is either embedded or expanded in ways that strengthens the
purpose and utility of that relationship. Alliance management involves joint
actions by allies to prevent alliance dissolution due to the passage of time,
to changes in the member states’ political leadership, or to a changing
international security environment. Studies on alliance management reveal,
however, that a single general purpose shared by its members is rarely
enough to guarantee alliance durability. Rather, a viable alliance is realized
via maneuvering through a combination of convergent and divergent
tendencies that constantly pull against each other. On one end, the conver-
ging forces include the member states’ common perception of a security
threat, the mutual objectives underpinning institutional arrangements within
an alliance, and an alliance hegemon’s prerogative to preserve the alliance.
54 Renato Cruz De Castro
Divergent forces subsume sovereign allies’ predispositions to pursue mutual
security interests and these must be overcome by alliance managers’ efforts
to subordinate sovereign autonomy and individual sets of national security
goals for the sake of collective defense and joint decision making.
An important factor that can enhance an alliance’s cohesion and
dynamism is threat emergence and threat intensity. New threats can appear
in the form of a particular allies’ unrestrained behavior entrapping its other
allies (see Snyder 1984). Threats to alliance can also materialize from
the transformation of previous military challenges into something more
comprehensive and systemic – such as the changing regional security
environment and the uncertainties it generates – or more significantly, the
emergence of a new power that can cause systemic changes in the global
society. An existing or emerging threat often compels allies to set aside their
differences and adjust their alliance relationship accordingly. Usually new
security threats bind the allies together, although dealing with them does not
always provide the preconditions for them to cooperate. Yet allies usually
know that the cost of non-compromise – alliance dissolution or alliance
strain – is more often than not greater than the cost entailed by compromise.
In addressing new threats, allies must take into account five interacting
variables – a reformulated threat perception, the hegemon’s prerogative,
a process of institutionalization, strategies of institutionalization, and an
intra-alliance bargaining process. Table 5.1 summarizes how the US–
Philippines alliance has been managed in this context since the mid-1990s.
A new raison d’être for an old alliance

Alliance revitalization entails the incorporation of existing and new security
interests between and among allies, and the prevention of inter-ally disputes
Table 5.1 Managing the US–Philippines alliance

Reformulation of the From China’s assertive moves in the South China Sea
alliance’s raison d’être to terrorism and facing up to the changing nature of
the China challenge in East Asia.
Hegemonic prerogative From facing up to China’s naval activism in the
mid-1990s to counterterrorism and a hedging strategy
against an emergent China.
Institutionalization Convening of the Mutual Defense Board and formation
of the Security Engagement Board; conduct of military
exercises and the Visiting Forces Agreement; Mutual
Logistic Support Arrangement; and the Joint Special
Operation Task Force–Philippines.
Strategies of Joint efforts at improving the AFP’s counterterrorism
institutionalization and territorial defense capabilities.
Intra-alliance bargaining The long and tedious two-year negotiation and signing
of the Visiting Forces Agreement, which provides for
the political/legal basis of the alliance.
The US–Philippines alliance 55
or disagreements. Moreover, it requires a reconfiguration through institu-
tional arrangements to address new security challenges.
An emerging or existing threat often makes allies set aside their differ-
ences and adjust their existing accord. The tragic events of 11 September
2001 underscored radical jihadist terrorism as an urgent and, in many ways,
unheralded new security challenge. As a form of asymmetric conflict,
terrorism involves the use of force for political goals so as to generate
fear, draw public attention to a political grievance or issue, and elicit
dramatic responses from a targeted state (Kiras 2002: 221). Most major
terrorist acts in the twenty-first century have been motivated by trans-
national or transcendent goals, which enable those perpetuating them
to capture international attention and assume global importance by cir-
cumventing traditional limitations imposed by territorial boundaries of
states. The impact of the 11 September terrorist attacks that inflicted
more casualties in the continental US than any other war, except the
American Civil War, proved how lethal well-orchestrated terrorist acts can
be (Sarkesian, Williams, and Cimbala 2002: 49–50).
Terrorism has bedeviled the Philippines throughout the early 1990s and
beyond. In the late 1990s, a relatively new and notorious terrorist group,
Abu Sayyaf, staged several spectacular high-profile hostage seizures in
Mindanao. Abu Sayyaf called for the establishment of an Islamic state
in Mindanao governed by Sharia law, and proffered a religious agenda far
more radical than the one espoused by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(Bale 2004: 34), which had been active in this locale for decades. Abu Sayyaf
launched a series of bombings, murders, kidnappings, massacres, and extor-
tions to the extent that its members were aptly branded as successful
“entrepreneurs of violence” (Turner 2003: 399). Also, it linked with inter-
national terrorist networks, prompting the Philippines government to allot
enormous resources to achieve its eradication (Quilop and Moya, with
Ordinario-Ducusin 2007: 28). The 11 September attacks and the subsequent
American-led counterterrorism coalition provided a powerful impetus
for the revitalization of the US–Philippines alliance. President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo’s declaration of support of the United States’ global
anti-terrorism campaign put Manila back on the radar screen of Washing-
ton’s key policymakers. Consequently, the Philippines was granted the status
of a “major non-NATO ally,” became one of the priority countries that
received American security assistance, and was designated as a key site for
the US military’s expanded counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda
and affiliated factions throughout Southeast Asia.
The US and the Philippines are now confronted by a type of traditional
security challenge – China’s growing naval presence and assertiveness in the
South China Sea. Over the past few years, Washington and Manila have
jointly tracked Chinese naval and commercial maritime activities in waters
claimed by the Philippines and have noted intensified Chinese diplomatic
and political pressure relative to China’s territorial claims over the Spratly
Islands. A recent study on Chinese activism in the South China Sea notes:
“[o]ver the past several years … China has reverted to a more assertive
posture in consolidating its jurisdictional claims, expanding its military
reach and seeking to undermine the claims of other states through coercive
diplomacy” (Schofield and Storey 2009: 1). In March 2009, Chinese naval
and fishing vessels harassed the USNS Impeccable, which was openly
conducting surveying operations in the South China Sea. The following
year, China warned the US to respect its extensive claims in the South China
Sea. In March 2010, Chinese officials conveyed to two visiting US Depart-
ment of State senior officials that China would not tolerate any US inter-
ference in the South China Sea since it is now part of the country’s “core
interests” of sovereignty on a par with Taiwan and Tibet (Wong 2010).
China’s assertiveness continued to intensify during the period 2011–12.
On 2 March 2011, two Chinese patrol boats confronted a survey ship com-
missioned by the Philippine Department of Energy (DOE) to conduct oil
exploration in Reed Bank (now called Recto Bank), 150 kilometers east
of the Spratly Islands, and 250 kilometers west of the Philippine island of
Palawan (prior to this incident, the British-based Forum Energy – in a joint
exploration venture with its Philippine partner, Philex Mining Corporation –
announced completion of a geographic survey of a potential gas field near
Reed Bank, off the western island of Palawan) (McIndoe 2011). The survey
ship was identifying sites for possible appraisal wells to be drilled in the next
phase of the DOE–Forum Energy–Philex Mining Corporation contract
when it was accosted by the two Chinese patrol boats. According to
Philippine sources, the boats moved dangerously close to the Philippine
vessel, apparently threatening to ram it (Aning and Bordadora 2011).
The Chinese patrol boats, however, left the area before two Philippine Air
Force reconnaissance planes arrived.
In early June 2011, the Chinese foreign ministry told the Philippines
to stop “harming China’s sovereignty and maritime rights and interests,
which leads to unilateral actions that expand and complicate South China
Sea disputes” (Bangkok Post 2011a). This was Beijing’s response to the
Philippines diplomatic protest against China’s plan to construct an oil rig
deep within the Philippines exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The Philippines
also sought clarification on the recent sightings of China Marine Surveil-
lance and the People’s Liberation Army’s Navy (PLAN) ships near the
Kalayaan group of islands. Beijing went on to demand that Manila should
first seek Chinese permission before it conducts oil exploration activities
even though these activities were clearly within the Philippine’s EEZ. China
was pressuring the Philippines and other claimant states to recognize
China’s sovereign claim over the South China Sea. At the same time, the
Chinese ambassador in Manila characterized the 2 March incident as
an exercise of jurisdiction over an area that is part of China’s territory (Lee-
Brago 2011). He further said the Philippine surveying activity in the area is
a “violation of Chinese sovereignty and that is something that we [China]
are against” (BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific 2011). Thus, the series of
Chinese assertive actions against the Philippines (and also against Vietnam,
another regional claimant) in the first half of 2011 intensified tensions in the
South China Sea. More importantly, it made the Benigno Aquino III
administration realize that the Philippines is potentially on a collision course
with an emergent China in the South China Sea (Wong 2010).
In April 2012, the Philippine Navy’s flagship vessel, BRP Gregorio Dal
Pilar, confronted two Chinese surveillance ships that were blocking the arrest
of Chinese fishermen that Manila claimed were operating illegally in the
Scarborough Shoal, not far from the Philippines’ main island of Luzon. China
ordered the Philippines ship to leave and the crisis further intensified when
the US and the Philippines conducted joint naval exercises adjacent to the
area in conflict. It should be noted, however, that the US continues to adhere
to its longstanding position that the US–Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty
cannot be immediately invoked during future such standoffs unless there is an
“armed attack on the Philippines’ metropolitan territory and armed forces,
public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific” (Balana and Cabacungan 2012).
Chinese aggressiveness in enforcing its territorial claims is supported
by the massive build-up of PLAN. PLAN has enhanced its operational
capabilities across the waters surrounding Taiwan and has deployed two
new classes of ballistic and attack submarines. The long-term goal of this
dramatic naval build-up lies beyond just controlling key sea lanes of
communication and littorals adjacent to contested territories in the South
China Sea and in the Taiwan Strait. China intends to develop its sea denial
capability to prevent the US Navy from operating in waters that comprise
what Chinese naval analysts call the “Second Island Chain,” stretching from
the Japanese archipelago to Guam and the Marshall Islands (Hu 2007: 29).
Indeed, PLAN now receives more than one-third of the overall Chinese
defense budget, which reflects the priority Beijing places on its navy as an
instrument of achieving its national interests (Wong 2010).
These trends underscore the volatility of Southeast Asia’s contemporary
geopolitics and the tension that it can cause between China and the
Philippines despite intermittent efforts by both countries to shape an entente.
During President Macapagal-Arroyo’s term (2001–10), Philippine–China
trade and investment relations improved dramatically, causing Manila to be
more responsive to Beijing’s growing political and strategic interests
(De Castro 2011: 236). This consequently led to a general improvement in
the two countries’ bilateral relations. President Aquino tried to continue his
predecessor’s policy of an entente with China. Philippines Foreign Secretary
Alberto Rómulo was the only Association of Southeast Asian Nation’s
foreign minister who voiced his objection to US Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton’s 24 July 2010 declaration on the South China Sea dispute. In
December 2010, the Philippines joined 19 states that refused to send a
representative to the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Chinese dissident
Liu Xiaobo in Oslo (Wall Street Journal 2011).
The overall pattern of Sino-Filipino ties, however, remains marked by
increased strains and tensions and this has directly affected the context and
development of US–Philippines alliance relations. During the height of
the Philippines’ territorial row with China in mid-June 2011, for example,
President Aquino explicitly acknowledged the need for US assistance. The
US Ambassador to the Philippines, Harry Thomas, readily pledged US
support to the Philippines, and declared: “[t]he Philippines and the US are
longstanding treaty allies. We are strategic partners. We will continue
to consult each other closely on the South China Sea, Spratly Islands and
other issues” (Torode 2011). Further expression of support came from US
Secretary of State Clinton. During her meeting in Washington on 23 June
2011 with the Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Albert del Rosario,
she expressed America’s wariness about China’s intrusion into the
Philippines’ EEZ and declared that the US honors the 1951 Mutual Defense
Treaty between the US and the Philippines, and strategic alliance with its
Southeast Asian ally. She reaffirmed American support of the Philippines,
even if it meant providing “affordable” material and equipment to enable
the AFP to defend the country (Bauzon 2011). She also suggested that the
two allies should work to identify the military hardware needed by the AFP.
Del Rosario later announced that US military and defense officials would
visit the Philippines to assess the AFP’s requirements for the country’s
territorial/maritime defense requirements.
In late January 2011, the Philippines and the US held their first bilateral
strategic dialogue to affirm the alliance and discuss new areas for coopera-
tion. US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Kurt Campbell, told Filipino officials “that the Obama Administration was
committed to boosting Philippine maritime capacities to patrol its waters
as part of a larger goal of keeping Asian sea lanes open” (Simon 2011b: 3).
The two sides discussed the need to upgrade their mutual capabilities in
maritime security through US funding support to the AFP’s Capability
Upgrade Program (CUP), which includes acquisition of equipment, as well
as extensive refurbishing and maintenance of existing AFP materiel; and the
provision of additional funding of US$40 million for Coast Watch South to
boost the Philippine military’s surveillance, communication, and interdiction
capabilities in the western part of the country (Embassy of the United
States, Manila 2011: 10). Assistant Secretary Campbell formally announced
US military assistance to the Philippines in February 2011, particularly “the
provision of equipment through excess defense sales, training of elements of
their coast guard and navy, and deeper consultations at a strategic, political,
and military level” (Simon 2011b: 3). The first US–Philippine strategic
dialogue also resulted in the formation of working groups to explore coop-
eration in the rule of law and law enforcement, economics and trade, global
diplomatic engagement, and territorial defense and maritime security.
In April 2012, the US and the Philippines held its first “2+2” security
talks in Washington. Clinton and US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta
met with their Philippines counterparts del Rosario and Defense Secretary
Voltaire Gazmin. In a 30 April joint statement, the efforts of both the
Bilateral Strategic Dialogue Defense Working Group and Mutual Defense
Board (MDB)–Security Engagement Board (SEB) were praised while con-
tinued adherence to the Mutual Security Treaty and the two allies’ Visiting
Forces Agreement was pledged (Rappler.Com 2012). The US promised
to cooperate in building up the Philippines maritime defense capabilities
but declined to explicitly state that it would intervene militarily if territory
claimed by the Philippines came under external attack. The talks immedi-
ately followed a substantial US–Philippines joint exercise conducted in
Palawan, which featured a mock assault to recapture a small island occu-
pied by an external power (Auslin 2012; Hookway 2012).
Both allies are aware that no amount of American material and technical
assistance, however, will enable the Philippines to confidently confront
an assertive China in the South China Sea. The Philippines’ moves to
redirect the AFP from internal security to territorial defense are aimed
at developing a comprehensive border patrol system, but not naval war-
fighting capabilities. The development of the Philippine Navy’s and Air
Force’s capabilities for early warning, surveillance, and command, control,
and communication is designed for “joint operations capabilities” in mar-
itime defense and interdiction operations. Thus, it merely complements the
deterrence provided by US forward deployment and bilateral alliances
in East Asia. In the final analysis, the Philippines’ territorial defense posture
is predicated on the US’s assertion of its position as the dominant naval
power in the Pacific.
US strategic prerogatives in an alliance context

Another factor that can mitigate the legitimate clash of interests within
an alliance is a strong leader, able and willing to exercise its strategic
prerogative. This alliance leader often bears a higher proportion of the alli-
ance costs, frequently offers inducements to member states, and on occasion
punishes any disloyal ally (Walt 1997: 167). The American counterterrorism
policy in Southeast Asia after 11 September 2001 clearly illustrates how
these prerogatives can unfold in response to emerging threats.
Following al-Qaeda’s attacks in New York and Washington, the George
W. Bush administration declared a low-intensity war against terrorist
networks in East Asia. Indeed, US foreign policy was radically transformed
as earlier post-Cold War priorities, such as economic diplomacy, democra-
tization, and human rights, became peripheral to the main goal of
eradicating international terrorism. Throughout the ensuing years, the
United States pursued an active, limited, but sustained counterterrorism
campaign in East Asia as it dangled financial, security, and diplomatic
assistance to engage and mobilize allies and supporters in joint counter-
terrorism efforts to demolish terrorists’ training facilities, financial assets,
and political sponsorship. The senior ally in the American-led regional
bilateral security network thus opted to exercise its prerogative to prioritize
and wage an asymmetrical campaign against a non-state-centric threat.
More recently, however, the counterterrorism campaign has mutated into
an overarching diplomatic/security gambit that serves as a hedge against
an emergent China. With its long civilization and central geographic
location, China has always considered itself as a traditional power in East
Asia. Given its considerable military capability and rapid economic growth
over the past two decades, it now sees itself as capable of eroding US
strategic and political clout in East Asia. However, it does not intend to
confront the US head-on at present, nor in the immediate future. China
concentrates on economic development as a means of achieving its com-
prehensive security, without subordinating its overall national efforts to meet
direct challenges from any superpower. Its security agenda is economically
driven, as exemplified by its dynamic economic relations with Japan, South
Korea, and the US. Nevertheless, in its pursuit of security, and economic
and financial ventures, China creates a situation of “unstable balancing”
in East Asia without directly undermining American pre-eminence in the
region (Ong 2002: 54).
In this complex situation, Washington has adopted a proactive hedging
strategy to manage China’s emerging capabilities and influence its inten-
tions. This strategy is primarily a reaction to China’s self-avowed campaign
to promote its peaceful emergence in East Asia through such diplomatic
initiatives as the “new security concept” and “harmonious world” (Tow
2001: 34; Medeiros 2009: 48). In its initial form, this US hedging strategy
assumes that among the emerging powers, China has the greatest potential
to compete militarily with the US in the future. The US, however, does not
regard China as an immediate threat or as a Soviet-style rival. Instead,
it envisions China as inching its way towards a more direct contestation of
the US and its alliance system in the region. Thus, Washington openly
communicates to Beijing that America intends to remain a dominant Pacific
power and that China can ill-afford a miniature arms race or geopolitical
rivalry with the US (King 2006). This approach has been most recently
underscored by President Barack Obama’s so-called “pivot strategy” – the
US emphasizing its Asia-Pacific force presence and geopolitical influence
in the aftermath of its interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan (Miles 2012).
The strategy also requires the US and its allies to strengthen and tighten
their bilateral ties, limit Chinese influence among its allies, and steer China
away from the path of confrontation with the US. In addition, the hedging
strategy predicates that the US and its allies nurture an East Asian envir-
onment in which China can, over the longer term, become “socialized” into
acting as a constructive and responsible power (Revere 2005: 47).
In the case of the US–Philippines alliance, this hedging policy involves
the Pentagon’s material and technical assistance to develop the AFP’s
capabilities. One senior US Department of Defense official noted in 2009
that the Department would “support Philippine forces fighting terrorist
groups in the southern part of the country. And … the United States would
like to look at ways to go beyond that help” (Baker III 2009). Washington’s
medium-term goal is to assist the Philippines military in its counter-
insurgency/counterterrorism efforts, maritime security concerns, and shift
from internal security to territorial defense. This agenda was reiterated in
the aforementioned April 2012 “2+2” talks held in Washington. In the long
run, the US hopes that the Philippines can enhance America’s key strategic
interest in Southeast Asia – the maintenance of a regional balance of power
that favors the US.
Institutionalization
Emerging threats by themselves are not sufficient to hold an alliance toge-
ther. Fostering continued cooperation between or among allies needs formal
organizational structures and organs tasked with decision making and other
specific intra-alliance functions. These structures provide the allies with
incentives to maintain open channels of communication within the alliance.
In the long run, institutionalized organs create capabilities and benefits that
can ensure the alliance’s survival in a changing international environment.
Prior to 1992, US–Philippines security relations were kept intact by
several bilateral defense arrangements. The two countries became formal
allies in 1951 when they signed the Mutual Defense Treaty. They
also became members of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in 1954.
However, the most important of these bilateral defense arrangements was
the 1947 Military Bases Agreement, in which the Philippines hosted major
American naval and air facilities on its territory. With the withdrawal of
the American presence from these facilities in 1992, the alliance appeared
in danger of becoming more tentative and lethargic. Current alliance
instrumentalities remain viable, however, given the annual convening of the
MDB and the Bilateral Strategic Dialogue Defense Working Group as well
as the creation of the SEB.
The MDB (set up as part of the 1958 Bohlen-Serrano Exchange of Notes)
is tasked by the Council of Foreign Ministers of the US and the Philippines
with formulating measures or arrangements to more effectively carry out
the Mutual Defense Treaty’s specified purposes and objectives. To provide
strategic guidance for the alliance, the MDB drafted a five-year work plan
in 2002 for increased and sustained security cooperation between the
two allies in their counterterrorism/counterinsurgency campaign. The plan
called for the creation, training, and deployment of well-equipped rapid
deployment forces and enhancement of the AFP’s capability and compe-
tence for joint operations with the US Armed Forces. During the August
2010 MDB meeting in Manila, the two allies discussed a number of con-
temporary security challenges: counterterrorism; insurgency and maritime
security as internal concerns; potential flashpoints for the Philippines such
as the volatile situation in the Korean peninsula, and the contentious Spratly
Islands issues; non-traditional security challenges; and the mechanics of
building up the allies’ military strength and interoperability, and enhance-
ment of the AFP’s limited territorial defense capabilities with US military
assistance.1
The Philippine–US Bilateral Strategic Dialogue was first held in Manila
on 27–28 January 2011. The annual dialogue aims to strengthen the two
allies’ strategic relations by facilitating discussion and cooperation among
their senior foreign and defense officials on bilateral, regional, and global
issues (Embassy of the United States, Manila 2011). It also intends to
strength the Philippine–US alliance as a dynamic partnership for peace,
prosperity, and security in the region. The second dialogue was held in
Washington, DC on 26–27 January 2012 where both sides reaffirmed their
commitments under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty and formulated
a vision for this multifaceted alliance for the twenty-first century (US
Department of State 2012b).
SEB was formed in March 2006. It provides the political framework
and mechanisms for direct liaison and consultation work to tackle non-
traditional security concerns pertaining, but not limited, to terrorism, trans-
national crimes, maritime security and safety, and natural and man-made
disasters.2 It proposes joint response activities ranging from consultations,
military exercises, and humanitarian and disaster relief operations.
Another important arrangement in the alliance is the conduct of joint
military exercises. Prominent among these are the annual Balikatan
(shoulder-to-shoulder) military exercises to improve the two allies’ combined
planning, combat readiness, and interoperability, and to demonstrate
American resolve in guaranteeing the Philippines’ external security. This
annual military exercise consists of three major components: humanitarian
civic action/civil military operations, field exercises, and staff exercises. Other
military exercises include the multilateral maritime Southeast Asia exercise
for search and rescue operations, and the bilateral HANDA (readiness)
exercises to strengthen military-to-military cooperation in the event of an
external attack against the Philippines.
To facilitate the conduct of these military exercises, the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA) was negotiated and signed from 1996 to 1998, and
was eventually ratified by the Philippines Senate in 1999. The agreement
regulates the circumstances and conditions under which American forces
may enter the Philippines for bilateral military exercises. It also establishes a
legal procedure for resolving differences between the two allies regarding
implementation of the agreement. The VFA facilitates large-scale military
exercises between the two allies, which in turn enhances military-to-
military cooperation at the staff level, and combat readiness for combined
operations and long-term interoperability (Quilop 2010: 17–18). The VFA is
deemed important to the revival of US–Philippines security relations for two
reasons: it paved the way for the resumption of large-scale military exercises
between the two allies’ armed forces; and it provided the political frame-
work for American involvement in the AFP’s program to modernize and
upgrade its military hardware.
The Mutual Logistics Support Arrangement of 2002 (renewed in 2007)
provides the administrative structure for the provision of logistic support,
supplies, and services between the AFP and the US Armed Services.
The agreement is similar to the 76 US Acquisition and Cross-Servicing
Agreements with several countries all over the world. It allows American
forces to source logistics such as food, fuel, ammunition, and equipment
from the host state on a reimbursement basis. Thus, it effectively lowers the
cost of alliance cooperation by minimizing administrative outlays, enabling
both allies’ militaries to develop interoperability during combined opera-
tions, peacekeeping missions, and other multilateral military operations
under the United Nations.
Another alliance institutional effort is the temporary deployment of the
Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines in the southern Philippine
island of Mindanao. This small unit of American Special Forces from
the US Army, Marines, Navy, and Air Force was formed in 2002 by the
Special Operations Command of the United States Pacific Command
(PACOM) in Hawaii to support the AFP’s counterterrorism campaign in
Mindanao. The unit undertakes humanitarian assistance projects in villages
suspected of harboring terrorists, facilitates effective communication support
to AFP operations, and shares intelligence and combat experience with
selected AFP units through tactical training programs.3 It is also PACOM’s
implementation arm in the combined US–Philippine Kapit Bisig (arm-
to-arm), a comprehensive counterterrorism program in Mindanao. This
program has three components: civil military operations activities, which
includes humanitarian assistance and civil action; AFP capability upgrade
through combined security assistance; and combat-related operations that
include air-and-sea evacuation of AFP casualties incurred during combat
operations. The success of the Philippine military’s Operation Ultimatum
against the Abu Sayyaf Group’s leadership was largely attributed to the
US combat service and combat-related support that included intelligence-
sharing (Austriaco 2007: 15).
Strategies of institutionalization
Institutionalization strategy is directed toward minimizing or eliminating the
so-called “alliance security dilemma,” particularly the fear of abandonment.
This dilemma is partly addressed by the constant flow of communication
between or among the allies, expressing their intention to support each other
and strengthen each. Kim Edward Spiezio described the process of trans-
forming “alliance inertia into cybernetic-like programmatic response,
the content of which reflects those policy instruments that decision-makers
find to be familiar and accessible” (Spiezio 1995: 3).
American–Philippines security relations improved dramatically after 11
September. The AFP was granted access to the US military’s excess defense
articles (see below). As importantly, the AFP has institutionalized several
large-scale training exercises with American forces. Balikatan and HANDA
have already been cited. Other training exercises between the AFP and
US counterparts have focused on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism
warfare, logistics and equipment maintenance, intelligence training, and
civil–military operations. The US has also trained three Light Reaction
Companies to form the AFP’s 1st Special Forces Group.
Aside from providing military equipment and training to the AFP, the US
formulates guidance and policy directions through the Joint Defense
Agreement (JDA). Formulated in 1999, the JDA commits the US to assist-
ing the Philippines Department of Defense to develop a systematic and
comprehensive defense program that will enhance the AFP’s capability
to respond to national security challenges. The JDA’s findings led to
the formulation of the Philippine Defense Reform (PDR) Program and the
AFP’s CUP.
The PDR Program provides the “software” for reforms in the Philippine
defense establishment while the CUP is the “hardware” and the operational
art. The PDR Program is primarily based on the findings and recommen-
dations of the JDA to foster institutional, individual, and professional
competence in the resource management of the defense establishment. The
centerpiece of US security engagement with the Philippines is the PDR
Program, described by PACOM as a broad-based, multi-year, cooperative
defense undertaking to identify and rectify systemic, strategic, and opera-
tional deficiencies of the Philippines military. Meanwhile, the CUP
is designed to improve and maximize the AFP’s operational capacity as
a military organization. The CUP pursues the AFP’s elusive goal to develop
its external defense capability, which jibes with the concept of “retooling
the force” as stipulated in the 2001 National Military Strategy (Ardo
2007: 16). The program stipulates an 18-year defense acquisition and
resource management period divided into three, six-year phases (Capabilities
and Weapons System Division 2007: 2).
Under the Excess Defense Articles Program, excess American military
materiel deemed excess articles are shipped to recipient states either at
reduced price or for free, on a grant basis. From 1991 to 2007, the Pentagon,
through the Excess Defense Articles Program, has provided the AFP a total
of US$117.8 million worth of essential defense materiel such as M-16 rifles,
helicopters, a transport plane, several patrol crafts, and even trucks. And
through the Foreign Military Sales Credit, the Pentagon supplied spare
parts for the AFP’s V-150 and V-300 armor fighting vehicles and UH-1
helicopters, assorted rifles and squad machine guns, combat life saver kits,
communication equipment, ammunition for small arms and artillery pieces,
night-vision devices, armored vests as well as training manuals for combat
operations. As mentioned earlier, US security assistance to the AFP is
primarily instructive (training and technical knowledge), consultative,
and advisory in nature. It focuses on combating terrorism in particular,
and other internal security challenges (insurgencies and crimes) in general.
From Manila’s perspective, American military assistance is more important
than the planned (or aborted) modernization program in terms of refurb-
ishing the AFP’s materiel needs. This is because transferred American
secondhand equipment is cannibalized for spare parts to address the AFP’s
pressing logistics requirements (Franco 2007: 12).
Another effort to institutionalize the alliance is a big-ticket defense item in
the form of Coast Watch Project, which has dual functions – internal and
external security purposes. The project is aimed at providing the AFP the
means for systematic and centralized maritime surveillance and interdiction
capabilities in the waters of the southern Philippines. From Washington’s
perspective, US–Philippines security ties are still evolving as they are not yet
shaped by major broader geostrategic developments in East Asia. Defense
relations between Manila and Washington are barely influenced by broader
changes and security challenges that already have major effects on the lat-
ter’s bilateral ties with Tokyo, Seoul, and Canberra (Karniol 2007).
The intra-alliance bargaining process

Intra-alliance bargaining in the post-Cold War era is a case of redistribution
of the long-term alliance payoffs. This kind of alliance bargaining is
not directed toward the allies’ respective contributions to military prepared-
ness against a common enemy. Rather, it centers on the distribution of
the alliance’s cost and long-term benefits. The focal point of the US–
Philippines alliance’s bargaining process is the reconfiguration of a security
relationship that goes beyond the stationing of forward-deployed US forces
on Philippine territory. China’s emergence as a regional power in East
Asia and its occupation of Mischief Reef inside the Philippines’ EEZ drove
both allies to reassess their alliance and security relations after 1992. In
late 1996, Washington and Manila engaged with each other in a complex
bargaining process for an agreement that would provide legal guarantees
to American servicemen deployed in the Philippines during military
exercises and ship visits. Both sides found themselves locked in very tense,
protracted, and passionate negotiations which took two years to conclude.
Pursuing the long-term, politico-strategic goal of hedging in the face of
China’s growing economic and political clout in East Asia requires
Washington to foster greater cooperation and cohesion among its bilateral
security partners in East Asia. This makes intra-alliance bargaining to
realize optimal outcomes in collaborative security cooperation all the more
imperative. Moreover, in the current Asia-Pacific geopolitical setting,
the US–Philippines alliance will need to be linked more coherently with
other US bilateral alliances in East Asia (US–Japan, US–South Korea, and
US–Australia). Such a development will be best realized by the engendering
of shared political identities and visions of a common East Asian commu-
nity, since these countries simply have no common cultural, religious, or
historical bearings. Nevertheless, given that Washington and these three
Asian allies are all liberal-democratic states, a pluralistic security community
may be a viable means of ensuring that the US remains as East Asia’s major
strategic player and security guarantor.
Any such community-building process, however, will need to be nego-
tiated painstakingly and with maximum sensitivity towards preservation of
sovereign interests that usually underpin the national security interests driv-
ing alliance cooperation. This necessitates, first and foremost, increasing
economic and social cooperation with its Asia-Pacific allies. The US must
also reiterate and reinforce those primary factors that have enabled
its bilateral alliances to remain intact and transpose them – adroitly – to
cooperation in a multilateral context. Due to the Asia-Pacific’s rapidly
shifting threat environment, America’s Asia-Pacific alliances can still be
properly regarded as “alliances of necessity” compared to the North Atlan-
tic Treaty Organization (NATO), which has become an “alliance of choice.”
Creating NATO-style legal and organizational structures, however, may not
be the most appropriate means of linking these three alliances. These struc-
tures are simply too legalistic in nature and too expensive to maintain. What
is possible is to transform these bilateral alliances into a loose association
or network of liberal democracies that can engage each other in increasingly
dense and multifaceted ways (via upgraded diplomacy, as well as through
more coherent patterns of trade and investment). The promotion of
common political values (democracy and respect of human rights), and the
mutual pursuit of shared strategic interests (preventing the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, containing international terrorism, ensuring
reliable supplies of vital strategic materials, and constraining any aggressive
move from hostile powers) should also be central to alliance institutionali-
zation and bargaining processes.
Conclusion
With the withdrawal of the US facilities from the Philippines in 1992, spec-
ulation that the US–Philippines alliance was rapidly becoming obsolete
became very pervasive. Fueling this speculation were developments in the
alliance from 1993 to 1995: the United States’ declaration that it could
no longer guarantee the external security of its ally because of the closure of
the American bases in the country; US efforts to widen its network of access
arrangements with other Southeast Asian countries; and Manila’s rejection
of an access agreement with its ally, and its lukewarm attitude toward
negotiation of a Status of Forces Agreement with Washington. However,
regional and international developments from the mid-1990s onward led to
the revival and revitalization of the alliance. China’s promulgation of its
Territorial Law and occupation of Mischief Reef prompted the two allies to
reassess their alliance and negotiate a VFA that facilitated the resumption
of US–Philippines large-scale military exercises. The 11 September terrorist
attacks on the continental United States and the formation of an interna-
tional coalition against global terrorism further reinvigorated the alliance.
Washington provided security assistance to strengthen the AFP’s counter-
terrorism/counterinsurgency capabilities, and initiated reforms to transform
the political context of the Philippine defense community, enabling its
alliance partner to better face the security challenges of the twenty-first
century.
The US–Philippines alliance is currently being reconfigured to strengthen
the two countries’ collective ability to confront new regional challenges.
China’s emergence as a regional power, increasingly resolved to project
material power in ways that may challenge both Washington’s and Manila’s
national security interests, generates uncertainties. Given the long-term
nature of this evolving security challenge, just strengthening this bilateral
alliance on its own may not be enough. To ensure the cohesion and
durability of their security relationship, the Philippines and the US need to
link this alliance with other American bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific.
Connecting to the San Francisco System (“hub and spokes”) requires the
reaffirmation of these security relationships as alliances of necessity and
their reconstitution as alliances that are interlocking. This can happen
if these partnerships collectively form at least a loose security association
predicated on democratic values, economic growth and on the need
to cooperate with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and other
institutions in ways to promote regional stability and prosperity. This asso-
ciation, hopefully, will come into being through these states’ multifaceted
transactions of diplomacy and free trade, sustained by their shared values of
respect for human rights and adherence to democracy, and bound together
by an enduring strategic goal of ultimately encouraging China’s peaceful
evolution into a broader community of democratic states as this century
continues to unfold.
Notes
1 Interviews with mid-level AFP officers, Manila, 17 September 2010.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
6 Thailand’s security policy
Bilateralism or multilateralism?
Chulacheeb Chinwanno
The evolving strategic landscape of East Asia has been dynamic and
unpredictable as the shift of power relations among the key Asia-Pacific
states intensifies. The United States’ position of strategic supremacy is no
longer insurmountable. It still remains the hegemonic power, but the two
costly and unsuccessful wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, along with the global
financial crisis, has affected the US in such a way that it can no longer
unilaterally set the region’s or the world’s agenda. With its economic success,
China has become a major economic power with a more assertive foreign
policy. Confronting many domestic uncertainties, Japan has been competing
with China to maintain its economic dominance in Southeast Asia. India,
another rising power, is looking for opportunities to increase its influence
in East Asia. These changes will have a great impact on Southeast Asia,
including Thailand.
This chapter briefly assesses Thailand’s security policy within a rapidly
changing East Asian geopolitical landscape. First, it discusses the chang-
ing security landscape in the East Asia region, especially the power shift
among the major states. Second, it reviews the security policy of Thailand
during the Cold War and beyond. Third, it concentrates on the internal,
external, traditional, and non-traditional security challenges presently
confronting Thailand. Fourth, it evaluates Thailand’s responses to these
challenges through bilateral arrangements or multilateral mechanisms
under the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional
Forum (ARF).
Changes in the strategic landscape in East Asia

The East Asian region has generally not been affected by the sub-prime
crisis in the United States, or by the high public debt of some European
Union (EU) members. However, the region is confronting significant emer-
ging challenges including the assertiveness of a rising China, strategic rivalry
between the US and China, economic competition between Japan and
China, the “look east” policy of India, tension over maritime sovereignty,
and East Asian regionalism. If regional order building is not managed
Thailand’s security policy 69
carefully and collaboratively, the potential for policy miscalculations leading
to tensions and possible conflicts is great.
China has become a major economic power with at least US$3,000 billion
in reserve, the largest amount in the world (Qing 2012). It is now the second
biggest economy, surpassing Japan and just behind the US, and it is
the world’s largest exporter. China’s economic interests and influence in
Southeast Asia have also expanded. It is the largest investor in Cambodia,
Laos, and Myanmar. Bilateral trade between China and Thailand exceeds
that between the US and Thailand. China is Thailand’s fourth-ranked
trading partner behind ASEAN, Japan, and the EU. The ASEAN–China
Free Trade Area, which came into effect in 2010, will further increase the
economic interdependence between China and ASEAN. In the past, China
has been the rule follower, but in the future, it may want to become the
rule maker. China has already suggested to its Asian trading partners that
they trade in local currencies, bypassing the US dollar.
China’s rise as an economic power has increased its regional and inter-
national political influence (Shambaugh 2005; Tsunekawa 2009). Moreover,
it has the resources with which to modernize its armed forces, the People’s
Liberation Army, and its navy. The Chinese defense budget has grown
enormously in the last 20 years. Military spending was reported by the
International Institute for Strategic Studies in 2011 to be as high as US$89.8
billion, second behind the US but ahead of Britain and France, but
the actual figure might be higher (Economist 2012). This has caused some
concern among states in maritime Southeast Asia, as well as among extra-
regional powers. The Chinese have also initiated high-level military visits,
have conducted joint military exercises (both on land and at sea) with
various Southeast Asian countries (including Thailand) and have expanded
arms sales in the region (see Table 6.1) (Gill 2007: 60–70; SIPRI Arms
Transfers Database 2012).
Moreover, China has recently displayed increased diplomatic and strategic
assertiveness, especially on the issue of territorial disputes. It imposed a
unilateral three-month fishing ban in the South China Sea, which caused
hardship to Vietnamese fishermen. In 2009, Chinese fishery patrols harassed
Vietnamese boats, forcing them to leave the area. In September 2010, China
protested about the Japanese detention of a Chinese boat captain in the
collision between the Japan Coast Guard vessel and a Chinese trawler in
the East China Sea near the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Territorial
conflict with neighbors continued to be a major source of tension (Storey
2011b). Recent Chinese assertiveness, which is quite different from a “charm
offensive” or “peaceful development,” has brought concerns among smaller
neighbors.
The United States, on the other hand, under the administration of
President Barack Obama, has pursued active engagement with Southeast
Asia after years of American neglect. At the East–West Center in Hawaii
on 12 January 2010, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton indicated that the
Table 6.1 China’s arms exports to ASEAN, 2001–11 (US$ million)
Year
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total
Brunei
Cambodia 56 4 60
Indonesia 12 4 3 10 2 31
Laos 7 7
Malaysia 5 5
Myanmar 53 8 58 18 73 2 70 282
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand 11 11 12 25 30 89
Vietnam
Total 53 8 58 18 84 23 62 10 31 27 100
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (2012).
US is “back to stay” and would work with the existing regional institutions
in Asia. She committed to regularly attending the annual ministerial
meeting of the ARF that her predecessor had so often missed.
The strategic rivalry between the US and China became clear at the ARF
meeting in Hanoi on 23 July 2010, where Secretary Clinton stated that
the US had a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to
Asia’s maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South
China Sea (Severino 2011). Chinese officials retorted that Chinese sover-
eignty over the South China Sea was a “core interest.” The Chinese were
furious at Clinton’s remarks, as they were interpreted as being an American
strategic challenge to China’s sovereignty and an attempt to internationalize
the dispute.
A summit between President Obama and ASEAN leaders in New York
on 24 September 2010 (the second such annual meeting) advanced the US–
ASEAN relationship to a closer and higher level. A joint statement released
after the summit was comprehensive, demonstrating goodwill and friend-
ship, with the clear message that ASEAN and the US are “strategic
partners” and that an eminent persons group would be set up to prepare
a five-year action plan for 2011–15. This action was not aimed at any
third country, much less China, but was meant to further regional peace and
stability.
The strategic rivalry between the US and China over the South China
Sea may have some impact over their influence on ASEAN. The active
engagement of the US in Southeast Asia was well received by ASEAN, but
the capacity of existing regional mechanisms to manage this rivalry remains
limited and no overarching strategic architecture capable of doing so are
likely to surface anytime soon.
Japan, a regional economic power and a close ally of the US, continues to
face domestic difficulties, averaging a change of prime minister every
year and a weak economy. Japan has tried to redefine its role in Southeast
Asia and its relationship with the US (Green 2008). When the Democratic
Party of Japan won a majority in the Diet in August 2009, Prime Minister
Hatoyama Yukio tried to shift the direction of Japanese foreign policy away
from the US, and towards Asia and China, especially by attempting to
reduce the US military presence in Okinawa. He met with strong resistance
from the US and had to resign. His successors, Kan Naoto and Noda
Yoshihiko, shifted Japan’s security posture back toward intimate ties with
Washington and focused on resolving Japan’s economic problems and the
challenges imposed by the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami.
The Japanese dispute with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
became very tense as a result of the Japanese detention of the Chinese boat
captain, as mentioned earlier. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao refused to meet
and talk to the Japanese prime minister at the East Asia Summit (EAS)
meeting in Hanoi in October 2010. Moreover, in the past decade, Japan and
China have competed for regional leadership. When ASEAN leaders agreed
72 Chulacheeb Chinwanno
in Vientiane in November 2004 to convene an EAS, there was disagreement
between China and Japan about its membership. China only wanted leaders
from the ASEAN+3 (China, Japan, and South Korea) grouping, while
Japan wanted to include Australia, India, and New Zealand. Japan finally
got its way and the first EAS meeting included all six countries in addition
to ASEAN members.
The leadership competition between China and Japan is manifested in the
varying free trade arrangement proposals. China preferred the East Asia
Free Trade Area in the ASEAN+3 framework, while Japan wanted the
Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia with the ASEAN+6 or
the EAS framework (Jiji Press 2007). Even with these differences, Japan and
China could agree on the financial cooperation with ASEAN through the
Chiang Mai Initiative – a series of bilateral currency swap arrangements
(Rajan 2008) – being developed into the Chiang Mai Initiative Multi-
lateralization, which was implemented in 2010 with the total amount of
US$120 billion. Triangular relations between the US, China, and Japan will
have some impact on ASEAN and the East Asian region.
Until recently, India, the world’s largest democracy with a population of
over one billion people, has been regarded as a regional power in South
Asia, with only a marginal influence on other parts of Asia, including
Southeast Asia. However, India began to liberalize its economy in the 1990s,
which contributed to a gross domestic product growth rate averaging 6 to 7
percent per annum. Moreover, India’s perception of the world, along with
a change in strategy towards East Asia, led to the “look east” policy in
the 1990s, reorienting India toward Southeast Asia, whose economy was
growing and expanding (Chinwanno 2005).
Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao visited Thailand and other
Southeast Asian countries during a landmark trip in 1990. This renewed
interest toward Southeast Asia allowed India to become a sectoral dialogue
partner of ASEAN in 1992. In 1995, ASEAN upgraded its relations with
India to the level of a full dialogue partner. Economic transactions between
India and ASEAN have since increased significantly. In 1995, bilateral trade
was only US$5.3 billion, yet exceeded US$10 billion in 2002. The India–
ASEAN Free Trade Agreement signed in 2009 has further enhanced
trade between the two partners. According to the Associated Chambers of
Commerce and Industry of India (2012), trade between India and ASEAN
jumped 30 percent in 2010–11 to US$57.89 billion and is likely to reach
US$70 billion in 2012.
India has also shown interest in the Greater Mekong Subregion trans-
portation networks, such as the East–West corridor linking the Indian and
Pacific Oceans through Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam, and the
North–South Axis connecting Southern China through Laos and Thailand
via the Kunming–Bangkok highway. New Delhi has, moreover, been looking
for an alternative logistics network in its trade with China so as to avoid the
congested Malacca Strait.
Strategically, India has been courted by all major powers. Japan once
proposed to establish a group of democratic countries, including India,
called the “arc of democracy,” presumably to counter the expanding influ-
ence of China. Ultimately, India refused to join any such grouping because
it was determined to maintain its status as a non-aligned power (Brewster
2010: 3–4).The US has nevertheless worked closely with India on nuclear
cooperation. China, on the other hand, has tried to reduce border tensions
with India, while promoting bilateral trade and investment (Sanwal 2011).
Thus, it is likely that India will play a key strategic role in East Asia’s future
geopolitics.
In this context, maritime sovereignty will become a particularly important
issue in East Asia, as international trade must traverse through the South
China Sea and the East China Sea. Tensions could occur as a result of many
claimants’ policies concerning the fishery ban or the arrest of fishermen
“violating” sovereign claims. Contested territorial claims over the Dokdo/
Takeshima Islands, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the Paracel Islands, and
the Spratly Islands could destabilize the region. As claimants intensify
measures to reinforce their claims and pursue significant naval moderniza-
tion to complement this policy, regional tensions have intensified and the
prospects for bilateral conflicts have risen. It is in the common interest of all
to maintain free and safe sea lanes of communication through these waters,
but it remains to be seen whether the existing multilateral regional security
architecture is able to manage the cooperation and conflict related to mari-
time sovereignty.
East Asia regional cooperation or “regionalism” is therefore becoming more
important. “Regionalism” means that the states in the same region cooperate
with each other for mutual benefits, as well as for regional stability and pros-
perity. It also refers to the political arrangement, organizational structure,
and collaborative processes among states in the same region for coherent
interaction in political, economic, sociocultural, and security dimensions.
The significance of East Asian regionalism lies in the fact that the inte-
gration process between Southeast and Northeast Asia is gaining momen-
tum as many important developments have taken place against the
backdrop of global economic vitality. Although ASEAN has been playing
an active role in intra and inter-regional integration, ASEAN also faces
several internal challenges, some of which include territorial border conflict
and the development gap, as well as differences in political and economic
systems among the ASEAN members.
These changes will have a great impact on the future of Southeast Asia, as
well as on Thailand’s security policy.
Thailand’s security policy: background

Thailand has dual characteristics. It is a small state at the global level, and a
medium state at the regional level. As a small state in an international
community comprised of more than 190 states, Thailand is limited in how
it can react to changes in the strategic environment and adapt for its long-
term survival. In the Southeast Asian region, however, only Indonesia
is bigger than Thailand; the other countries are equal or smaller. As a
medium-sized state, Thailand can raise new initiatives to affect regional
changes. Accordingly, Thailand has frequently pursued proactive policies in
the region in order to enhance its interests, such as the establishment
of ASEAN in 1967, the policy to pressure Vietnam into withdrawing its
military forces from Cambodia 1979–89, the initiative to set up the ASEAN
Free Trade Area in 1992, and the creation of the ARF in 1993–94.
Thailand and its leaders have not usually aspired to become a leading
regional power (with perhaps the exception of Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra), because it may elicit distrust and suspicion among its neigh-
bors. Thailand only aspires to play a leading role from time to time
as opportunities arise. Thai leadership – when imposed – has been effective
because it has been temporary and only occurs when the region faces
a genuine crisis. Thailand not only plays a leading role when necessary in
the region, but also plays a coordinating role between regional and key
extra-regional actors. Thailand has been quite effective in the region because
its policies are moderate and pragmatic.
Throughout the postwar timeframe, Thai security policy has been affected
by both internal and external challenges. Cold War tensions certainly
affected regional stability in Southeast Asia, with the Soviet Union and
China sponsoring communist insurgency movements there, and with the
United States setting up an extensive military basing system in the region.
Internally, the overthrow of a constitutionally elected Thai civilian govern-
ment in 1947 brought to power the military regime under Field Marshall
Plaek Pibulsongkram who became very much concerned with the commu-
nist threat.
The Thai military elite perceived the establishment of the People’s
Republic of China in 1949, and the conflict between the two Koreas in 1950,
as a sign of the expansion of communist influence. In addition, the Thai
government viewed the Vietminh victory over the French forces at Dien
Bien Phu in 1954, and the subsequent establishment of communist North
Vietnam, as threats to Thailand’s national security and to overall regional
stability. Thailand thus looked to the US as the extra-regional power most
appropriate for providing security support and guarantees (Chinwanno
2004). The United States was already perceived as a reliable security partner
that had supported Thailand against pressure from the British (who believed
Thailand was a de facto Japanese wartime ally) after the Second World War,
and again had supported Thailand in its effort to gain admission to the
United Nations. It seemed only natural, therefore, for Thailand to join the
US-led collective defense alliance in Southeast Asia by signing the Manila
Treaty and becoming a member of the South East Asia Treaty Organization
(SEATO) in 1954. It did so notwithstanding that organization’s own
divisions over whether it should primarily support its Asian members’
internal security concerns or serve as an adjunct to the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization in Washington’s global strategy of containing Soviet
and Chinese power (Modelski 1962; Nuechterlein 1965).
SEATO’s collective defense strategy against communism was tested with
the Laotian crisis of 1961–62. The Thai elite considered a free Laos as
vital to national and regional security. Moreover, the Thais wanted Laos to
remain as a buffer state between Thailand and communist North Vietnam
and China. Thus it requested that SEATO intervene militarily. However,
other SEATO members, especially the United Kingdom, saw the situation
differently and were unwilling to have SEATO take forceful action. SEATO
did not intervene and Thailand, disappointed with what it viewed as the
unreliability of multilateral collective defense, turned to a new security
approach – strengthening bilateral relations with the US to reinforce exten-
ded deterrence guarantees for its own security. The result was the Thanat–
Rusk Joint Communique of 1962 in which the US reaffirmed its security
commitment and obligation to Thailand (Morrison and Suhrke 1978:
115–18). Under this upgraded arrangement, Thailand became more
confident of the US security commitment, while America gained access
to Thai soil to facilitate its containment of communist expansion in South-
east Asia.
Although Thai military leaders were generally satisfied with their bilateral
collective defense relationship with the US, some civilian officials, especially
Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, became uneasy with their country sus-
taining such a close alliance and with the high level of strategic dependence
it implied. The establishment of ASEAN in August 1967 can be seen as the
development of an alternative approach to regional security that served
long-term Thai security interests by incorporating a judicious combination
of two security approaches – collective defense, with the US as the primary
mechanism, and regional cooperative security.
The external strategic environment started to change radically in the
1970s. At the global level, the triangular relationship among the US,
China, and the Soviet Union was transformed as a result of the Sino-Soviet
conflict and the subsequent normalization process between America and
China. At the regional level, the US started to withdraw militarily
from South Vietnam. Thailand had to adapt to the new environment and
established diplomatic relations with China on 1 July 1975. It also requested
the Americans to discontinue their operations at U-Tapao Royal Thai Navy
airfield, which occurred in December 1975.
Sino-Thai antagonism was reduced, but suspicion remained until the
Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia in 1979 (with the support
of the Soviet Union), which threatened Thai national security and regional
stability. Thailand and China became closer strategically and their interests
converged in opposing Vietnamese influence in Cambodia (Chinwanno
2008). Security cooperation between Thailand and China was informal,
as no agreement was signed, but growing bilateral collective defense
arrangements with China were reached that enabled the two armed forces to
cooperate in their assistance to Khmer resistance. Thailand also began pur-
chasing military equipment from China (Gill 1991: 530). The burgeoning
security partnership between Thailand and China allowed mutual trust and
confidence to develop, and strengthened bilateral political and economic
relations between the two countries. Vietnamese troop withdrawals in 1989,
however, signaled the end of this unusual period of close security coopera-
tion between Thailand and China.
During much of the postwar era, therefore, Thailand pursued a combi-
nation of security approaches – multilateral collective defense under SEATO
in the 1950s, with a shift to bilateral collective defense with the US in the
1960s, and informal collective defense with China in the 1980s. The demise
of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989, and the break-up of the Soviet
Union, contributed to the end of the Cold War, and generated new oppor-
tunities for Thailand to explore different types of security approaches and
arrangements. As threats from external sources receded, Thailand saw little
need for resuscitating the American–Thai bilateral alliance (but nor did
it want to eradicate it), or accelerated military cooperation with China. It
instead sought new security arrangements in the region that focused on
great external powers respecting the sovereign integrity and regional stability
of Southeast Asian states. Thailand supported the expansion of regional
multilateral security cooperation via the creation of the ARF and hosted the
inaugural ARF meeting that was convened in July 1994 (Chinwanno 2004).
Security challenges to Thailand in the twenty-first century

Thailand currently sustains multiple dimensions of its relatively complex
national security policy. It retains its bilateral formal alliance with the US
and operationalizes that position by conducting annual military exercises
(such as Cobra Gold) with US forces and other regional security partners. It
allows selective US access to Thai military bases but counterbalances this by
undertaking annual strategic consultation and small-scale military exercises
with China, and by deep-ending the multilateral security interaction with its
regional neighbors under the ARF.
What are the rationales behind this posture? In the post-Cold War
era, Thailand does not have an obvious external enemy. This does not
mean, however, that this country is devoid of any conflict or tension.
The security challenges to Thailand come from a number of internal and
external sources.
One internal source of conflict is the ethnic violence in the three southern
provinces of Thailand – Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. The mishandling
of the Malay ethnic minority issue during the Thaksin administration in
2004 heightened ethnic tension. Violence broke out in the bombing and
torching of government buildings, as well as the shooting and sniping of
government officials. Among the Thai–Malay ethnic minorities, there were
small groups of separatists who wanted the three southern provinces
to secede and set up a “Free Pattani State.” The violent activities were con-
tained and did not spread to other areas. The ethnic conflict and violence
are now localized, but will take longer to be solved (Liow 2006).
Terrorism is another important security threat with which Thailand
is concerned. Violent attacks in the three southern provinces were local in
nature as some Thai Muslims felt that they were not treated respectfully or
fairly by local officials and they therefore wanted to secede. The torching
of schools and other government buildings was transformed into armed
attacks and bombings. Since 2004, more than 3,000 people have died from
this violence. This is indeed a major challenge for Thailand.
Another internal security challenge came from the divisive conflict
between the pro-Thaksin and anti-Thaksin supporters, also known as the
“red-shirt” and “yellow-shirt” groups. Although Thaksin was quite popular
in the rural areas of North and Northeast Thailand, he was also seen by
many opponents – particularly in urban areas – as corrupt. In 2006, these
critics formed the “yellow-shirts” faction to protest against him. He
lost power when the military staged a coup d’etat on 19 September 2006.
Elections in 2008 brought his party, Thai Rak Thai, back to power. Thaksin
returned to Thailand, but later left the country because the Supreme Court
ruled on 28 February 2009 that Thaksin was guilty of corruption and his
assets were seized.
Thaksin continued to rally his supporters from abroad, urging them
to demonstrate against the democrat-led coalition government. The demon-
strations turned violent as the government used the military to end the
protests in May 2010. Many buildings in the commercial areas of Bangkok,
as well as in the northeast provinces, were destroyed. “Red-shirt” leaders
were arrested and the situation returned to normal (Dalpino 2011). In
July 2011, national elections were conducted and Yingluck Shinawatra,
Thaksin’s younger sister, was elected prime minister and the pro-Thaksin
Pheu Thai Party formed the country’s new government. Yingluck’s man-
agement of Thailand’s flood disaster came under harsh criticism and forced
her to initiate a comprehensive reshuffle of her cabinet in early 2012,
including the appointment of a prominent “red-shirt” activist as her deputy
minister of agriculture. Internal tensions remain high and could erupt again.
The external security challenges to Thailand emanate from traditional
as well as non-traditional threats. Traditional security issues include border
tensions over territorial conflict with neighbors. Border demarcation
between Thailand and Malaysia is almost complete, and between Thailand
and Laos is more than 80 per cent finished. The joint technical border
demarcation committees are working on the Thai–Cambodian and Thai–
Myanmar borders.
However, there is a dispute over the exact location of the Thai–
Cambodian border, which has worsened relations between Thailand and
Cambodia. Although both countries agreed to solve the dispute by peaceful
negotiations, several clashes occurred in 2011. Thailand and Cambodia
blame each other for starting the clashes in February 2011 along the
disputed border near Phra Viharn Temple in Sri Sa Ket province. The artil-
lery exchanges continued between 4 and 7 February, killing two Thai
soldiers and one civilian, and at least three Cambodian soldiers (Bangkok
Post 2011b). While the local commanders of both sides negotiated a cease-
fire, Cambodian Foreign Minister Hor Nam Hong asked ASEAN and the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to intervene.
Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen later sent a letter to the UNSC
urging an emergency meeting to stop the “Thailand invasion.” Thai Prime
Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva also sent a protest note to the UNSC accusing
Cambodia of provoking the border conflict and proposing to use bilateral
negotiations to end the conflict. As Chairman of ASEAN, Indonesia tried to
mediate. The UNSC asked the foreign ministers of Cambodia, Indonesia,
and Thailand to present their views on the conflict, confirmed the role of
ASEAN as a good office, and urged both Thailand and Cambodia to be
restrained as well as to solve the conflict peacefully (Bangkok Post 2011c).
Thailand and Cambodia agreed to solve the conflict through negotiation,
and by having Indonesian observers along the disputed border. However,
clashes occurred again at Ta Muen Thom temple in Surin province between
22 and 29 April 2011 (The Nation 2011). Thai leaders perceived that
Cambodia did not want to solve the problem peacefully and tried to main-
tain a strategic advantage in the disputed border through initiating
calibrated armed provocation. The Thai–Cambodian border conflict will not
be easily solved as Hun Sen is likely to continue exploiting Thai weakness,
but the limited scale of this dispute means it will not destabilize the region.
The conflicts will be intermittent with artillery exchanges and small arms
clashes. ASEAN must try harder to end this conflict, or its reputation may
become compromised.
Non-traditional security threats are also major concerns for Thai leaders,
as they arise from non-military sources and often are transnational.
Thailand needs the cooperation of its neighbors in the region to help
manage them effectively. These threats include illegal migration, transna-
tional crime, pandemic disease, natural disasters, and terrorism. The afore-
mentioned August 2011 flood crisis is a case in point. International money
laundering likewise remains a major non-traditional security concern as
does food security and maritime security (Thitinan 2010: 92).
As the Thai economy is more developed than its three neighbors
(Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar), inhabitants of these three countries
illegally cross the borders to find work and opportunities in Thailand. The
Office of Foreign Workers Administration in Thailand reported that there
were about 1.3 million illegal migrants in Thailand in 2010 (Office of
Foreign Workers Administration 2011; see also Mahidol Migration Center
2011), 70 per cent of them from Myanmar, and the rest from Laos and
Cambodia. Among the Burmese, two-thirds belong to minorities, including
Karen, Kachin, and Shan. The males work in the fishing or construction
industries, while the females work in food shops or as housemaids. Their
large concentration in one particular province could become a security risk,
as well as causing an overload of the public service, especially health services.
Linked to the problem of migration is transnational crime along the
border. This covers a wide range of criminal activities including drug, arms,
and human trafficking, especially of women. Thailand is most concerned
about the linkage between the illicit trade in small arms and drug smug-
gling. The lucrative drug trade along the northern Thai border has enabled
narcotics producers, mostly ethnic minorities in Myanmar, to purchase small
arms to protect their operations. Women from neighboring countries have
been lured to work in restaurants, but end up working in upcountry brothels.
These transnational crimes are a threat to human as well as state security.
Pandemic diseases are a growing danger as they develop quickly and
spread rapidly. The SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) epidemic
in 2003 infected almost 8,400 people and caused more than 700 deaths in
some 29 countries. Although SARS infections were comparatively rare
in Thailand, the fear of its spread damaged the Thai tourist industry (there
was more than a 7 percent decline in foreign tourists to the country during
2003), and extensive prevention measures were put into effect. In 2007, avian
flu spread throughout Asia with several hundred deaths. The recent H1N1
influenza also damaged people’s health and the economies of many nations,
but Thailand again avoided major repercussions by deploying thermal
scanners at all major airports, and stocking up on anti-viral medicines from
the beginning of the outbreak.
Natural disasters have occurred more frequently in Thailand and have
become more severe. Earthquakes, tsunamis, and typhoons have caused
terrible damage and loss of lives. Thailand suffered tremendously in
December 2004 from the tsunami in the Andaman Sea. A realization
developed that this type of non-traditional threat needs multilateral coop-
eration to manage the early warning system as well as post-disaster search
and rescue operations.
Threats to the security of Thailand in the twenty-first century are
quite different from those during the Cold War. Thailand has managed to
establish diplomatic and close relations with all major powers. Thailand
has tried to pursue a good neighbor policy with all of its ASEAN neighbors.
The recent conflict with Cambodia appears to be the only external,
traditional threat to Thailand. Other external threats are non-traditional
and transnational.
Thailand’s future security policy: bilateralism versus multilateralism

The fundamental contemporary security challenge for Thailand is to
find the most appropriate and cost-effective ways to respond to these various
threats. Should Thailand continue to rely on the bilateral security arrange-
ment, formal treaty-based alliance with the US, or on informal defense
cooperation with China? Will Thailand be better off with the emerging
multilateral cooperative security arrangement under the ARF? How
will these relationships apply to traditional and/or non-traditional security
challenges previously discussed?
Thailand continues to value the bilateral alliance with the United States
as an appropriate response to traditional security threats and concerns. As
part of its role in an alliance context, Thailand has supported most US
international security operations. Thai naval ports and airfields played
a crucial role in assisting the US to maintain the flow of troops, equipment,
and supplies during the Gulf War of 1991, and the Iraq War of 2003.
Thailand also contributed 130 soldiers to Afghanistan to assist in the
reconstruction of a runway at Bagram Air Base in 2002, and dispatched
some 450 troops, including engineers and medics, to the southern city
of Karbala, Iraq, for humanitarian activities in 2003. Consequently, in
October 2003, President George W. Bush designated Thailand as a “major
non-NATO ally,” allowing Thailand more access to US foreign aid and
military assistance.
The US connection has also proven to be relevant in the non-traditional
security policy arena. Thailand served as the logistics hub for much of
the American and international relief effort after the 2004 Indian Ocean
tsunami – relief operations were directed out of Thai U-Tapao air base
and Sattahip naval base, to which Thailand granted the US full access.
Under the auspices of the 1999–2000 US East Asia Environmental Initia-
tive, the United States has provided Thailand with several million dollars
funding to enhance biodiversity and preserve its coral reefs (Thayer 2010).
It has also worked with Thailand to develop long-range policies for
developing the Mekong River Basin. The US Agency for International
Development (USAID) has extended program assistance to assist Thailand
in tracking infectious diseases and improve border control measures for
safeguarding national health. In 2003, USAID established its Regional
Development Mission for Asia in Bangkok to coordinate a wide range of
non-traditional security issues, including climate change, human trafficking,
and infectious diseases.
The most important bilateral US–Thailand security activity is the annual
military exercise, Cobra Gold, first conducted as a bilateral exercise in
1982. It has now evolved into the largest multilateral exercise in the region.
In 2010, Indonesia, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, and the US
took part in the 30th Cobra Gold exercise, and more than 14 nations
attended as observers. Other security cooperation between Thailand and the
US includes military training under the International Military Education
and Training program, foreign military financing program, intelligence-
sharing and cooperation, counter narcotics, and law enforcement, which
straddles both the traditional and non-traditional security policy sectors.
However, there have been some complaints amongst the younger genera-
tion, including military officers, that Thailand has done more for the US
than vice versa. For example, Thailand was instrumental in arresting the
suspected Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist leader, Hambali, in Ayuthya, in
August 2003, and arrested and deported Russian “merchant of death”
Victor Bout, charged with arms trafficking, back to the US, while the US
seemed to fall short when Thailand needed assistance or support. During
the financial crisis of 1997, the US did not offer Thailand any help. The US
opposed the nomination of Dr. Supachai Panichpakdi, former Thai Minister
of Commerce, for Director-Generalship of the World Trade Organization in
1998. Moreover, some journalists detected a gap in strategic perception
between Thailand and the US concerning the role of China in East Asia
(Chongkittavorn 2010a, 2010b).
Nevertheless, Thailand and the US seem to agree on one strategic objec-
tive: they do not want to see Southeast Asia dominated by any one, hostile,
major power. Thailand and the US can use their alliance partnership to
cooperate in many ways to realize this objective.
Another aspect of Thai security policy is the informal, bilateral, defense
cooperation with China. As noted above, this emerged as the result of
a convergence of security interests in opposing the Vietnamese invasion
and occupation of Cambodia in the 1980s. Thailand has also purchased
small arms from China at a “friendship price.” Recently, Thailand and
China have agreed to jointly develop the DTI-1G, a new multiple rocket
launcher with a range of between 60 and 180 kilometers in a three-year
project worth 1.5 billion baht. A high-level military delegation from
Thailand visited China in April 2012 and indicated that Thailand would stay
closer to China as a “close relative” than to its “close American friend” due
to “present circumstances” (Bangkok Post 2012). Security partnership and
consultation has brought about mutual trust and confidence between
the Chinese and Thai armed forces. The partnership continued into the
post-Cold War era, even after the Vietnamese withdrawal of troops from
Cambodia.
Thai policymakers have long recognized that China is destined to be
a major military power and a dynamic actor in the Asia-Pacific region.
Thailand was the first to sign a bilateral agreement – the China–Thailand
Joint Statement on a Plan of Action for the 21st Century – in February
1999, which laid out the plan of cooperation in various fields, including
security. Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont, while visiting China in
May 2007, witnessed the signing of the procès-verbal to launch the Joint
Action Plan on Thailand–China Strategic Cooperation from 2007 to 2011.
During her official visit to China in April 2012, Prime Minister Yingluck
Shinawatra witnessed the signing of the second procès-verbal that will
continue the Joint Action Plan from 2012 to 2017.
Moreover, from 2002, security consultations between the ministries of
defense of the two countries were institutionalized and became an annual
event, which usually includes the exchange of views on global and regional
strategic conditions, as well as planning for military cooperation between
the two countries. China also proposed joint military exercises, but Thailand
was initially reluctant, citing language difficulties and different military
doctrines. However, Thailand finally agreed to hold a joint naval exercise
in December 2005. In July 2007, a joint military exercise (Strike 2007)
was inaugurated in Guangzhou with a focus on counterterrorism, and with
participation of the special forces officers of both countries (Minnick 2007).
The momentum for joint exercises has since increased visibly. The “Blue
Strike” marine exercise entered its second year in 2012 with 150 marines
from Thailand scheduled to join their Chinese counterparts in Guangdong
province to carry out maneuvers. A joint exercise between the Thai and
Chinese air forces under the name of “Lightning Strike” are also scheduled.
Both countries have acknowledged that the two countries will need to
overcome their language barriers and the different rules of engagement
of their forces (Bangkok Post 2012). In addition to security consultation,
military exercise cooperation, and joint military training and exercises,
Thailand and China also cooperated in military educational exchanges.
Each year Thai military officers have been sent to the National Defense
College in China to learn about Chinese strategic thinking and military
plans. Bilateral security cooperation with China became another important
pillar of Thai security policy.
In addition to the American and Chinese “conduits,” Thailand and
ASEAN saw opportunities in the post-Cold War era to set up another
kind of security framework – a multilateral arrangement based on the
cooperative security concept. The ARF is a multilateral security dialogue
forum comprising 27 members with geographical coverage of the Asia-
Pacific region. It includes the ten ASEAN members, ten dialogue partners
(Australia, Canada, China, the EU, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia,
South Korea, and the US), two observers (Papua New Guinea and Timor-
Leste), and two others (Mongolia and North Korea). In 1995, the ARF
ministers approved a concept paper setting out three phases of development:
confidence-building measures, preventive diplomacy, and conflict resolution
(the latter has since been changed to “elaboration of approaches to
conflict”). Since then, ARF activities have been carried out on the basis of
inter-sessional groups and inter-sessional meetings on transnational crimes,
peacekeeping, confidence-building measures, and preventive diplomacy.
Thailand fully supports and actively participates in this multilateral security
arrangement, based on a cooperative security concept through which
dialogue among participants would reduce suspicion and enhance mutual
trust, which could lead to peaceful coexistence and regional stability.
However, the progress of the ARF has been very slow, with many agreed
plans difficult to put into operation. Thus, the ASEAN Defence Ministers’
Meeting (ADMM) met for the first time in May 2006, and began the
process of institutionalizing defense cooperation on a regional basis.
The military dimension has complimented the diplomatic processes.
In Hanoi in 2010, the ADMM developed further into the ADMM+8
(Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea, and
the US). The ARF and the ADMM have formed the foundation of an
ASEAN Security Community scheduled to be established by 2015.
Thailand’s security approaches have become increasingly more sophisti-
cated, unlike during the Cold War. Thailand no longer puts its security in
the hands of any single, major power. Moreover, threats now are more
complicated than in the past. Thailand pursued three different security
approaches: continuing the bilateral alliance with the US, the informal
security cooperation with China, and actively supporting the multilateral
security arrangement under the ARF and the ADMM.
Conclusion
To manage internal challenges, Thai leaders and people must work together
to reform the Thai socioeconomic structure and political system to
make them more equitable and accessible to all Thai citizens, to resolve
the inequalities inherent in the system as well as the consequence of
past development, and to redefine the roles and relationships of the major
institutions in Thai society. In this sense, the Thais acknowledge that emer-
ging multilateral security frameworks in this region may take time to
develop in order to manage external threats more effectively. Nevertheless, it
can still be useful to help manage non-traditional security challenges.
Moreover, whilst they may not be able to prevent the traditional territorial-
based conflicts, they may prevent escalation of these conflicts. On the other
hand, bilateral security frameworks may be in the process of transformation
as major powers are increasingly participating in the new regional security
architecture such as the ARF and the ADMM+. Bilateral commitments
will need to be redefined and restructured to accommodate the new regional
realities. Thailand must be prepared to adapt to the dynamic regional
strategic landscape.
Confronting many security challenges in the twenty-first century,
Thailand’s preference for a security strategy involves multiple security
approaches or a combination of several security arrangements. Thailand
does not want to be left with no choice or to be forced to depend on a
single, extra-regional power, as in the past. In fact, Thailand still adheres to
bilateral collective defense with the US and continues informal security
cooperation with China. In other words, Thailand assiduously maintains
bilateral defense cooperation both with the dominant power, the United
States, and with the rising power, China. On the other hand, Thailand
also seeks new multilateral alternatives under the ASEAN framework of the
ARF and the ADMM as a supplement to bilateralism.
Yet Thailand realizes that the bilateral alliance with the US is in the
process of transformation as the US becomes more fully engaged in
the evolving regional security architecture of the Asia-Pacific through the
ADMM+, the EAS, and the ARF. In this context, security convergence
between bilateralism and multilateralism may well be reconciled in Thai
security thinking over time. That said, the strategic competition between the
US and China continues to evolve as well. Thailand’s policy of “balanced
engagement” with all major powers is designed to help Thailand manage
these new challenges in such a way that their competition will not destabilize
the region. How well Thailand meets this challenge will greatly determine its
own future security and stability.
Part III
The nexus and Asian

multilateralism
7 The role of the Five Power Defence
Arrangements in Southeast Asian
security architecture
Ralf Emmers
Introduction
Southeast Asian security architecture has traditionally been discussed
through two sets of security approaches that have characterized the inter-
national relations of the region; namely, bilateral alliances/ties on the one
hand, and multilateral cooperative security arrangements on the other.
Southeast Asia is therefore often said to accommodate a dual security
system, one ranging from bilateral military arrangements to multilateral
expressions of cooperative security. These forms of bilateral and multilateral
security cooperation have been centered respectively on the United States
and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
This chapter seeks to make a contribution to the existing literature by
examining the Southeast Asian security architecture through a different lens.
It focuses on the role of minilateral defense coalitions in complementing and
overlapping with bilateral and multilateral security structures in Southeast
Asia. Rory Medcalf (2008: 25) defines minilateralism as the “self-selection
of small subgroups of countries” that seek to complement “bilateralism
and region-wide multilateralism.” A large membership, so the logic goes,
confines the capacity to maintain internal coherence and move ahead.
William Tow (2008a: 31) explains that the agendas of minilateral arrange-
ments “are usually less extensive than those pursued by their fully-fledged
cooperative security counterparts, and they are less likely to expand into
inclusive multilateral institutions.” Advocates of minilateralism contend that
such arrangements tend to be more effective at providing collective solutions
to common problems facing the members of a multilateral grouping (Naím
2009; Wright 2009).
Special attention is given here to the Five Power Defence Arrangements
(FPDA) that has been part of the Southeast Asian security architecture
since 1971. Superseding the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA)
originally formed in 1957, the FPDA has involved Malaysia and Singapore
as well as Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. In contrast
to AMDA and its commitment to the external defense of Malaysia and
Singapore, the FPDA has been defined by a provision for consultation in the
88 Ralf Emmers
event of external aggression against the two Southeast Asian states. The
FPDA can be defined as a minilateral defense coalition. It operates as a
loose and subgroup structure focusing on a specific set of security issues of
direct concern to its participants. As highlighted by the plural noun
“arrangements,” its activities can involve two or more of its five members,
thus incorporating a flexible and in-built “FPDA minus x” formula (see
Khoo 2000).
The chapter studies the ongoing relevance of the FPDA to the Southeast
Asian security architecture and examines how this minilateral defense
coalition may be affecting ongoing security cooperation in the region.
In other words, it seeks to determine how, if at all, the FPDA has continued
to fit in the evolving Southeast Asian security architecture. Significantly,
the chapter claims that the FPDA has sought, over the last 40 years, to
complement and overlap with, rather than compete or replace, the tradi-
tional US bilateral alliance/coalition network, more recently established
minilateral arrangements, as well as the operations of ASEAN in the pro-
motion of peace and stability in Southeast Asia.
Examined from the Singaporean and Malaysian points of view, the
chapter investigates whether the FPDA complements or is being gradually
supplanted by other regional security instruments in Southeast Asia.
The other mechanisms covered in the chapter include the activities under-
taken by Malaysia and Singapore with the United States bilaterally, mini-
laterally with Indonesia through the Malacca Strait Patrol (MSP), and
multilaterally through the emerging ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting
(ADMM) and the ADMM+ processes. It should be noted that other
instruments that overlap with the FPDA in terms of scope and activities
include the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Cobra Gold exercise espe-
cially since the multilateralization of its participation, as well as the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF) and its embryonic exercises. That having been said,
the case selection can be justified by the need to maintain continuity
with the Singaporean and Malaysian participation as well as the scope and
defense element of the FPDA. Moreover, US ties, the MSP, and the ADMM
can be neatly classified as bilateral, minilateral, and multilateral arrange-
ments, further rationalizing the comparative case selection. The overall
argument of the chapter is that for Malaysia and Singapore, the FPDA
continues to complement these bilateral, minilateral, and multilateral secur-
ity instruments, yet each in very different ways. In that sense, the FPDA
plays a clear, although limited, role in Southeast Asian security architecture.
Origins and institutional evolution of the FPDA
The formative years

The British Labour government announced its new policy of military with-
drawal East of Suez in 1967. Originally expected for the mid-1970s, the
Five Power Defence Arrangements 89
military disengagement was eventually moved to the end of 1971. This
decision surprised Malaysia and Singapore, as they were dependent on
their military ties with London. After assuming office in June 1970, the new
Conservative government modified the decision taken by the previous
Labour government. It decided to maintain some military engagement in
the region by proposing to supersede the 1957 AMDA with a “loose con-
sultative political framework” (Chin 1991: 193). Consequently, the defense
ministers of Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United
Kingdom concluded the formation of the FPDA in London on 16 April
1971. East Malaysia was excluded from the ambit of the agreement as
Australia wanted to prevent getting involved in territorial disputes with
the Philippines and Indonesia over the island of Borneo. On 1 September
1971, the Integrated Air Defence System was established within the FPDA
framework to safeguard the air defense of the Southeast Asian states. The
FPDA formally entered into force on 1 November 1971, the day after
AMDA had ceased to exist.
The commitments undertaken by the FPDA were restricted to mere
consultations and should thus be properly distinguished from the ones
formerly provided by AMDA. In contrast to its predecessor, the FPDA
simply linked the security of the two Southeast Asian nations to consultative
defense arrangements with Australia, Britain, and New Zealand, and
did not provide concrete security guarantees. In particular, the automatic
commitment to respond to an external attack under AMDA was substituted
under the FPDA by an obligation to consult in such an event. The five
nations simply declared that:
in the event of any form of armed attack externally organized or

supported or the threat of such attack against Malaysia or Singapore,
their Governments would immediately consult together for the purpose
of deciding what measures should be taken jointly or separately in
relation to such attack or threat.1
Furthermore, the FPDA did not include a commitment to station troops

in Malaysia and Singapore (Khoo 2000). The original tripartite military
structures found under AMDA were gradually denuded during the 1970s
(Leifer 1995: 106). Canberra withdrew its battalion from Singapore in
February 1974, and the United Kingdom removed its naval and ground
troop presence by 1975 and 1976 respectively. The New Zealand military
battalion eventually left Singapore by the end of 1989. Unsurprisingly,
therefore, the US presence in the region, rather than ambiguous consultative
arrangements, was perceived by Singapore and Malaysia as the primary
source of countervailing power to possible malign hegemonic aspirations.
That said, despite the absence of clear military commitments, analysts
have often referred to the political and psychological deterrence provided
by the FPDA to Singapore and Malaysia. Ang Wee Han (1998) explains, for
90 Ralf Emmers
example, that the “multi-layered interests of military powers outside the
region would complicate the plans of any would-be aggressor and thus
provide a valuable psychological deterrent.”
Beyond offering some form of psychological deterrence, the arrangements
were also expected to play a confidence-building role in Malaysian–
Singaporean relations (Khoo 2000). Singapore’s traumatic separation from
the Federation of Malaysia in 1965 continued to severely affect its ties with
Kuala Lumpur. Singapore perceived the FPDA as an additional means to
regulate its relations with Malaysia and to constrain its potential aggressive
disposition towards the city-state. Despite recurrent tensions in bilateral
ties in the decades that followed the formation of the FPDA, the defense
cooperation has been sustained and the military exercises have continued.
For instance, while Malaysia withdrew from the annual Stardex exercise
in 1998 due to the consequences of the Asian financial crisis and a
worsening of relations with the city-state, it resumed its participation the
following year.
Besides tense bilateral relations between Singapore and Malaysia,
the formation of the FPDA followed the Indonesian opposition to the
formation of the Federation of Malaysia in September 1963. Viewed as a
British neo-colonial design, Sukarno had started a campaign of Konfrontasi
(confrontation) to oppose the new federation. While the downfall of
Sukarno in 1965 and the establishment of ASEAN in August 1967 had
symbolized the end of the period of Konfrontasi, regional relations
continued to be characterized by mistrust and sources of tension. Despite
the political reconciliation between Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta, Malaysia
remained fearful of Indonesia. Likewise, Singapore had suffered attacks
during the period of Konfrontasi and mistrusted Jakarta. The city-state
was fearful of Jakarta’s regional intentions and potential hegemonic
ambitions. Indonesia and its potential regional aspirations were therefore a
clear referent of the FPDA.
The structure and activities of the FPDA remained limited in the 1970s
and 1980s (Ang 1998). The Joint Consultative Council (JCC) was initially
established to act as a senior consultative group, bringing together senior
officials from the ministries of defense of Malaysia and Singapore, as well
as the high commissioners of Australia, New Zealand, and the United
Kingdom (Rolfe 1995: 7). In the event of an external threat to the security
of Malaysia and Singapore, the JCC would “provide a convenient forum for
initial consultation between the Five Powers.”2 The FPDA was organized
around a regular series of combined but limited exercises. Its central opera-
tional structure was the Integrated Air Defence System, located at the Royal
Malaysian Air Force Base Butterworth in Malaysia, and put under an
Australian commander and the supervision of an Air Defence Council. Still,
the FPDA remained under-institutionalized during most of the Cold War
period. Jim Rolfe explains that in “the first 10 years of the organization’s
existence, for example, Ministers had never met, and there were only four
meetings of the JCC.” While air defense exercises had been held annually
since 1972, regular land and naval ones were only initiated in the 1980s
(Rolfe 1995: 7). This was in response to Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia
and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
The widening of activities since the end of the Cold War

The role of the FPDA has deepened and strengthened since the end of the
Cold War. The five powers saw the emergence of an uncertain multipolar
structure in the early 1990s as a possible source of concern. For Singapore
and Malaysia, the threat perception moved away from Indonesia to China
and the uncertain distribution of power in the Asia-Pacific. Andrew Tan
(2008: 292) explains that the “unwillingness of the ASEAN states to coop-
erate militarily resulted in Singapore and Malaysia turning to other vehicles
to improve transnational military cooperation. Conveniently, the FPDA
provided such a vehicle.” Indeed, the ASEAN members decided not
to multilateralize their bilateral collaborations over defense and security
issues developed outside of the ASEAN framework. The absence of an
ASEAN defense focus thus highlighted the ongoing strategic relevance
of the FPDA for Malaysia and Singapore as well as for Australia, New
Zealand, and the United Kingdom.
The perception of the nature of the threat in Southeast Asia was further
transformed by the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September
2001, and the Bali bombings on 12 October 2002. The attacks increased
the fear of transnational terrorism in Southeast Asia and overshadowed
other sources of regional instability. Jemaah Islamiyah was identified as a
significant grouping with links to al-Qaeda. In particular, the threats of
piracy and maritime terrorism in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore were
further securitized post-11 September.
In response to these strategic transformations, the FPDA has, since the
late 1980s, gradually deepened and broadened its institutional structures and
activities (Tan 2008: 294). In 1988, it was decided that the FPDA Defence
Ministers’ Meeting would be held every three years while the FPDA Chiefs’
Conference would meet more regularly. The latter have coincided since 2002
with the annual International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Asia Security
Conference, also known as the Shangri-La Dialogue, held annually
in Singapore. By 1994, the JCC and the Air Defence Council were trans-
formed into the FPDA Consultative Council, which brings together senior
diplomats and defense ministry officials from the five powers. The FPDA
Activities Coordinating Council was formed the following year, while the
Integrated Air Defence System was upgraded into the Integrated Area
Defence System, integrating air, naval, and land forces, with its headquarters
in Butterworth in the late 1990s. Since 1997, Singapore and Malaysia have
also alternatively hosted the FPDA Professional Forum, which has become
“the main format in which members of the arrangements come together to
92 Ralf Emmers
discuss new ideas, concepts and the way ahead, including the future shape
of the operational element of the FPDA and the role of HQ IADS
[Headquarter Integrated Area Defence System]” (Bristow 2005: 6).
These institutional transformations have been matched by more sophisti-
cated and encompassing military exercises. Tan (2008: 294) writes that from
“a basic single-service air defense focus, FPDA exercises evolved throughout
the 1990s and early 2000s to include complex combined exercises involving
major platforms.” When meeting in Singapore in 2004, the five defense
ministers announced that the FPDA would broaden its military exercises to
address terrorism, maritime security, and a series of other non-traditional
threats (MINDEF Singapore 2004). In sum, in light of these post-Cold
War developments and focus on new security challenges, Carlyle Thayer
(2007: 79) correctly defines the FPDA as “the ‘quiet achiever’ in contribut-
ing to regional security.”
The FPDA and its role in the changing security architecture

The chapter has so far discussed the historical origins and institutional
evolution of the FPDA. This section explores the role that the arrangements
play in contemporary Southeast Asian architecture. In other words, how, if
at all, does the FPDA fit in the wider regional security architecture? To
tackle this question, one needs to examine whether the FPDA currently
complements and overlaps with bilateral, minilateral, and multilateral
mechanisms operational in Southeast Asia, or alternatively, whether the
FPDA is gradually being supplanted by these other regional cooperative
instruments. Damon Bristow (2005: 16) writes, for example, that
the FPDA is a hangover from a bygone era, which is being overtaken by

other regional structures, and is diminished in importance by the
strength of US commitments. Another way of looking at it is that
the FPDA overlaps with existing bilateral alliances, exercise pro-
grammes and other security structures, rather than competes with them,
and helps to strengthen regional security as a result.
This section takes the latter view. It claims that the FPDA continues to
complement the existing bilateral ties with the United States, both in terms
of tackling traditional and non-traditional security concerns, as well as the
activities of the MSP and the ADMM, yet each in very different ways.
Complementing bilateral ties

Let us examine how the FPDA activities have overlapped with the special
ties maintained by Singapore and, to a lesser extent, Malaysia, with the
United States. A distinction needs to be made first between how the United
States distinguishes its security ties with the two Southeast Asian nations.
The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, the first to be released by the
Barack Obama administration, refers to three groups of security partners,
namely, formal allies, strategic partners, and prospective strategic partners
(US Department of Defense 2010). The Philippines and Thailand are
defined as US treaty allies. The report identifies Singapore as a strategic
partner while Malaysia, together with Indonesia and Vietnam, is classified
as a prospective strategic partner. The reference to the three categories
in security partnerships in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report,
with Singapore and Malaysia belonging to the second and third one
respectively, needs to be highlighted (Long 2010).
Singapore has historically considered a continued US involvement in
the region as pivotal to its own security. Despite its often anti-Western
rhetoric, Malaysia has also perceived the US presence as necessary to
preserve regional stability. These strategic calculations have often been
translated into concrete policies. For instance, in response to the US
withdrawal from its bases in the Philippines, Singapore offered an agreement
to Washington in November 1990, allowing its Navy and Air Force to
use its military facilities more extensively. By offering the United States
compensating facilities, Singapore sought to mitigate the strategic con-
sequences of the American departure from Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark
Air Base. While initially critical of the memorandum, Malaysia was
prepared, following the American withdrawal from the Philippines, to pro-
vide access to the US Navy, thereby enhancing its military ties with
Washington. A US Navy logistics facility was also transferred in 1992 from
Subic Bay to Singapore. In January 1998, the city-state declared that
US aircraft carriers would have access to the Changi Naval Base after its
completion in 2000. In more recent years, Singapore has further developed
strong military relations with the US Pacific Command, including through
war games, map planning, and maneuver exercises like Cobra Gold. Estab-
lished in 1982, the Thai–US Joint Military exercise (Cobra Gold) now also
involves Singapore, Indonesia, Japan, and South Korea. While not part
of this multilateral mechanism, Malaysia trains with the US Air Force in
Exercise Cope Taufan (Long 2010).
In terms of non-traditional security issues, Singapore and Malaysia have
closely collaborated with the United States on the war on terror since the
11 September attacks. In Singapore, the arrest of Jemaah Islamiyah
militants in December 2001 and the discovery of bomb plots fueled the city-
state’s sense of vulnerability. Since 11 September and the Bali bombings in
October 2002, Singapore has promulgated the doctrine of “homeland
security” and introduced a series of other domestic measures. Similar
arrests in Malaysia highlighted the threat of radical Islamist terrorism to the
country. In response, Bridget Welsh (2004: 143) explains that from 2001
onwards, “Malaysia began to exercise a more vigorous enforcement role
in addressing terrorist issues, which mirrored stronger regional enforcement,
particularly in Singapore.” Internationally, both Singapore and Malaysia
94 Ralf Emmers
have cooperated closely and shared intelligence with Washington. Singapore
was even the first Asian country to sign the Declaration of Principles
for the Container Security Initiative with the United States in September
2002, and joined the Proliferation Security Initiative core group in
March 2004. While Malaysia has been a close partner of the United States
since 2001, Kuala Lumpur has had to balance the demands of its Muslim
majority while ensuring its engagement in the international anti-terrorism
campaign. Moreover, unlike Singapore, Malaysia did not support the
US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.
The functions of the FPDA and of US security ties with Malaysia and
Singapore are somewhat comparable; namely, to enhance their external
defense in the changing regional strategic context. In light of the shift
in provisions from AMDA to the FPDA, the arrangements only guarantee
consultations in the event of external aggression. Likewise, as Malaysia and
Singapore are not formal allies of the United States, an American military
response to an external attack against the two Southeast Asian nations
is not guaranteed. The special ties with Washington have, however, acted as
a credible diplomatic and psychological deterrent. Moreover, the FPDA
and US ties have, over the years, focused on similar traditional and non-
traditional threats, most recently terrorism and maritime piracy. Hence,
while they clearly overlap, it could be argued that the FPDA and its military
exercises have simply been eclipsed by the American presence in the region.
The latter have, to a large extent, overshadowed the former in terms
of strength, impact, and military involvement. One possible conclusion,
therefore, might be that the FPDA has been supplanted by existing bilateral
ties with Washington.
Nevertheless, while the FPDA is of a lower military intensity than
bilateral ties maintained by Malaysia and Singapore with the United
States, it is asserted here that the arrangements still complement the US
bilateral network in two specific ways. First, and in sharp contrast to
the bilateral approach, the security of Malaysia and Singapore have been
defined by the FPDA as indivisible. Hence, rather than deliberately exam-
ining them as two separate strategic entities, the FPDA has worked on the
premise that pursuing the security of one nation separately and possibly
at the expense of the other would be counter-productive. From its inception,
therefore, the FPDA was meant to act as a set of arrangements that
permitted two or more parties to consult one another regarding the joint
external defense of Malaysia and Singapore (Khoo 2000). Michael Leifer
(1995: 106) explains that the arrangements were “predicated on the indivi-
sibility of the defence” of the two Southeast Asian nations, and that they
were intended to enhance regional stability by engaging them both “in
a structure of defence cooperation.” A caveat to be noted is that the FPDA
would have no clear role to play in the event of aggression by one of
the Southeast Asian countries towards the other. That said, it is in that
context that the FPDA has, over the years, succeeded in playing a significant
confidence-building role in Malaysian–Singaporean relations. When exam-
ined in that light, one can argue that the FPDA and its flexible consultative
model, based on the premise of indivisible security, have not only enhanced
bilateral ties between Malaysia and Singapore, but also complemented
security relations that the two Southeast Asian nations maintain separately
with Washington.
Furthermore, the FPDA has successfully complemented the US network
by providing Singapore and Malaysia with a useful avenue to maintain and
deepen bilateral ties with Australia, Britain, and New Zealand. This parti-
cular function of the FPDA needs to be examined in the broader post-Cold
War context. The emergence of an uncertain multipolar structure in the
Asia-Pacific, combined with a rapidly changing security environment, has
encouraged Singapore especially to cultivate ties with external powers
with the aim of deepening their benign involvement in Southeast Asian
security. While US deployment in the region has continued to be regarded
by the city-state as the best guarantor for a stable distribution of power,
Singapore has actively strengthened relations with other external actors with
security interests in the region. For example, Singapore and its Ministry of
Foreign Affairs played an important role in the establishment of the ARF
in 1994, eventually bringing together the United States, China, India, Japan,
and others into a structure for security cooperation led by ASEAN. It can
be argued that the FPDA plays a similar “cultivating” role with regards to
Australia in particular and, to a lesser extent, Britain and New Zealand.
Australia is particularly important to Singapore as a result of its deep
interest in regional stability. During his visit to Australia in March 2007,
Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew indicated that Singapore and Australia
share “a common strategic view” (Lim 2007: 25). Leifer writes that the
city-state values its relationship with Canberra due to “the professional
competence in training and advice of Australia’s armed forces and diplo-
matic service set within a common strategic perspective,” as well as due
to “Australia’s sustained strategic partnership with the USA” (Leifer
2000: 129). Singaporean–Australian military ties are strong. This is best
illustrated by Canberra making training facilities available to the Singapore
Armed Forces in Australia. The FPDA enables Singapore to further
strengthen this important bilateral relationship.
Complementing other minilateral instruments

Let us now discuss how the FPDA complements rather than competes with
the MSP initiative, which can be characterized under Medcalf’s definition
as a minilateral instrument. Established in July 2004, the MSP consists
of coordinated naval and air patrols involving Indonesia, Malaysia, and
Singapore to increase maritime safety and security in the Strait of Malacca.
The MSP is composed of the Malacca Strait Sea Patrol, the “Eyes in the
Sky” operation, which was launched in September 2005 and consists of
96 Ralf Emmers
cooperative air surveillance missions in the Strait, and the Intelligence
Exchange Group, which was formed in 2006. It is worth noting that
Bangkok expressed early interest in cooperating with the littoral states in
Malacca Strait surveillance. Thailand eventually became the fourth state to
join the MSP in September 2008.
The military exercises undertaken by the FPDA since the early 2000s,
with their maritime and non-traditional security dimension, clearly overlap
with the objectives of the MSP. The latter was established in response to a
spike in the number of piracy attacks in the Malacca Strait in the late 1990s
and early 2000s, and the fear of maritime terrorism in a post-11 September
environment. Nonetheless, rather than being overtaken by this more recent
initiative, the FPDA complements the MSP in two particular ways.
The first concerns the level and intensity of military collaboration. Within
the MSP context, the establishment of effective bilateral and trilateral
cooperation has been complicated by lingering mistrust among the littoral
states and significant gaps in naval capabilities. In particular, the Indonesian
Navy is poorly equipped to address sea piracy while its air force has not
been able to contribute much to the “Eyes in the Sky” combined maritime
air patrols. In contrast, the complexity and scope of the FPDA exercises
have been significantly expanded over the years to address a series of new
challenges. The combined exercises have enabled the five powers to enhance
professionalism, personal relationships, capacity building, as well as inter-
operability, especially in the areas of maritime security (Boswood 2007: 36).
The exercises are designed to enhance the capability of the five powers to
plan and execute complex multinational operations. Having developed their
own defense capabilities, Singapore and Malaysia have continued therefore
to regard the FPDA as an instrument “to promote professionalism, rapport
and to deepen knowledge of one another’s strengths, capabilities and orga-
nizations” (Jamaluddin 2006: 7). Consequently, rather than being gradually
supplanted by the MSP, the FPDA provides through its combined annual
exercises a form of military collaboration still lacking in this newly estab-
lished minilateral instrument.
Beyond its purely defense dimension, the FPDA complements the MSP
at a more diplomatic level as well. The MSP is meant to accommodate
the divergent positions adopted by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore to
tackle non-traditional maritime threats. The city-state has often linked
sea piracy to the threat of terrorism and called for the assistance of the
user states in guaranteeing maritime security in the Malacca Strait.3 In
contrast, Malaysia and Indonesia have preferred to examine the issue
in terms of law enforcement due to concerns over the respect for sovereignty
and the prevention of external interference by the great powers (Mak 2006).
In 2004, then Malaysian Defence Minister Najib Abdul Razak declared that
“there will be no foreign presence in the Straits of Malacca or anywhere in
Malaysian waters except during exercises” (The Star 2004). Significantly,
therefore, the FPDA constitutes the only cooperative instrument active in
enhancing maritime security in the Strait that involves both Malaysia and
external powers.4 The arrangements offer a unique platform for naval exer-
cises diplomatically acceptable to Kuala Lumpur, despite its concerns over
sovereignty and external interference in the Strait of Malacca.
Complementing multilateral instruments

Finally, let us discuss how the FPDA may complement the ADMM and the
ADMM+. The ADMM was inaugurated in Kuala Lumpur on 9 May 2006,
as an emerging expression of defense regionalism in Southeast Asia. It seeks
to enhance dialogue as well as practical cooperation between the ASEAN
militaries and defense establishments, especially in the area of humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief (see ASEAN 2009). The ADMM needs to be
examined in the wider context of ASEAN and its security community pro-
ject. ASEAN was not formed as a direct response to an external adversary
and has never evolved into a formal or tacit alliance. It has traditionally
rejected any form of military cooperation and concentrated instead on
confidence building, dialogue, and conflict avoidance rather than dispute
resolution. In the absence of joint military capabilities and a common
external threat perception, the member states have sought to enhance their
domestic socioeconomic security and to generally improve the climate of
relations in Southeast Asia. In response to a series of transnational threats,
the Southeast Asian leaders announced at an ASEAN Summit in Bali in
October 2003 the formation of an ASEAN Security Community by 2020.
The latter stresses the willingness of the member states to “rely exclusively
on peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-regional differences”
(ASEAN 2003).
The ADMM, and its focus on non-traditional security issues, should be
examined in that light. Its specific objectives are:
(a) to promote regional peace and stability through dialogue and coop-
eration in defence and security; (b) to give guidance to existing senior
defence and military officials dialogue and cooperation in the field of
defence and security within ASEAN and between ASEAN and dialogue
partners; (c) to promote mutual trust and confidence through greater
understanding of defence and security challenges as well as enhance-
ment of transparency and openness; and (d) to contribute to the estab-
lishment of an ASEAN Security Community (ASC) as stipulated in the
Bali Concord II and to promote the implementation of the Vientiane
Action Programme on ASC.
(ASEAN 2006)
As in the case of the MSP, the FPDA naturally complements the ADMM
by offering to Malaysia and Singapore a defense component still lacking in
this latest process. Indeed, the ADMM does not cover the issue of combined
98 Ralf Emmers
military exercises. Furthermore, it is argued here that it is precisely in the
overlapping area of military preparedness and humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief that the FPDA can be most relevant to the ADMM in terms
of information sharing. The FPDA is well ahead of ASEAN in this parti-
cular area. Following the tsunami disaster of 26 December 2004, the FPDA
defense ministers already decided to further broaden the scope of the
arrangements by including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as
well as incorporating non-military agencies into future exercises (Tan 2008:
295). At the 2006 FPDA meeting, Singapore’s Defence Minister Teo Chee
Hean declared that the ministers had agreed to explore how the five powers
could cooperate “in developing capacity for humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief so that if in future should member countries participate
in such mission, capacity building and interoperability can be developed
and will enhance effectiveness” (quoted in Tunku Abdullah 2006: 6). At
the Shangri-La Dialogue that preceded the meeting, then Malaysian
Defence Minister Razak had even called for the creation of a joint coordi-
nating center for relief operations. It is yet to be seen whether such a center
will be established, however.
With its inaugural meeting held in Hanoi in October 2010, the ADMM+
(Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea, and the
United States) is the very latest arrangement that overlaps with the FPDA
structures. The ADMM+ is meant to enhance regional defense cooperation
among the militaries of its member states in the areas of humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief efforts, maritime security, and others. Yet it
still faces a series of challenges that it will need to address in the short-to-
medium term (Capie and Taylor 2010b). ASEAN’s centrality and the
adoption of its cooperative modalities will presumably be resisted by some
members. Moreover, agreeing on an ADMM+ work program that focuses
on non-traditional security challenges but also includes some pressing
conventional issues will be problematic. Hence, it is simply too soon at this
early stage to speculate on whether the ADMM+ may eventually over-
shadow or complement the FPDA activities.
Conclusion
The chapter has reviewed the origins and institutional evolution of
the FPDA and discussed its ongoing role in the Southeast Asian security
architecture. It has argued that the FPDA has continued to complement
and overlap with, rather than substitute or be replaced by, other bilateral,
minilateral, and multilateral mechanisms. In particular, the chapter has
distinguished and justified its relevance from the US bilateral relations, the
MSP initiative, and the ADMM.
The wider East Asian region has observed, since the end of the Cold War
era, a proliferation of cooperative institutions and mechanisms. The creation
of new multilateral instruments has been spectacular since 1989, including
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the ARF, and ASEAN+3
(China, Japan, and South Korea). Finally, in December 2005, heads of
state and government from ASEAN+3, as well as Australia, India, and
New Zealand, gathered in Kuala Lumpur for the inaugural session of the
East Asia Summit. Associated with these developments have been trends in
policy and academic circles to streamline such groupings and to recommend
a “division of labor” approach among them.
Nonetheless, rather than speculating on the future role of the FPDA in
this ever more complex security architecture and debating where it fits
among the alphabet soup of emerging regional groupings, it might be best
to highlight again its greatest strength and accomplishment; namely, its
flexibility as well as its consultative and complementary attributes. Bristow
(2005: 6) rightly argues that, “largely because of its flexible and consultative
nature, the FPDA has also proved remarkably capable at adapting to
the changing security environment in the region, thereby retaining its rele-
vance.” The arrangements should continue to play an important role in
Southeast Asian security as long as they preserve their inner flexibility,
consultative nature, and ability to complement other instruments in tackling
regional security concerns.
Notes
1 Communiqué issued at the conclusion of the Five Power Ministerial Meeting
on the External Defence of Malaysia and Singapore, London, 15–16 April 1971,
paragraph 5.
2 Five Power Ministerial Meeting on Defence: Five Power Consultative Arrange-
ments After 1971, FPM (L) (P) 2/71, in Ministry of Defence file 1/2/4: Treaties
and Agreements: Five Power Arrangements.
3 For example, at the 2003 Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore’s Deputy Prime
Minister, Dr. Tony Tan (2003) declared: “Singapore views the regional piracy
situation and the possibility of maritime terrorism in regional waters very
seriously.”
4 Established in Tokyo in 2004, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combat-
ing Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia brings together Bangladesh,
China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Sri Lanka and all the ASEAN members
with the notable exception of Indonesia and Malaysia.
8 Territorial and maritime
jurisdiction disputes in East Asia
Comparing bilateral and
multilateral approaches
Aileen S.P. Baviera
Security challenges in maritime East Asia

There are at least four interlocking layers of potential conflict and therefore
security challenges in the East Asian maritime domain. These are territorial
and sovereignty disputes over certain islands, rocks, and atolls in the East
China Sea and the South China Sea; undefined or overlapping maritime
boundaries and legal jurisdiction issues; threats to maritime safety and
sea lane security such as piracy, terrorism, smuggling, and trafficking;1
and military competition for sea control among major regional and extra-
regional powers.
The territorial and sovereignty disputes where armed conflict is still
deemed possible include those over the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands
in the South China Sea involving Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Taiwan, and Vietnam; the dispute between Japan and China over the
Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands in the East China Sea; the disagreement between
Japan and South Korea over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands in the East
China Sea; and the persistent problem of Taiwan affecting cross-Straits and
China–United States relations.
Apart from the territorial disputes, undefined maritime boundaries arise
from overlapping exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and extended legal
continental shelf claims by various littoral states following the entry into
force of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
These first two layers of security challenges have become so organically
intertwined that the exacerbation or resolution of one is bound to impact on
the other. There are common stakes and interests in both the territorial and
maritime jurisdiction disputes: access to resources (in particular fisheries,
and oil and gas), security against potentially hostile neighbors, influence
over strategic sea lanes, and – not least of all – national pride. Territorial
disputes aggravate the problems over maritime jurisdiction because they
complicate the determination of maritime jurisdiction zones, as stipulated
by UNCLOS. On the other hand, the desire to enlarge jurisdiction and
control over ocean spaces and resources motivates states to assert their
territorial claims.
Territorial and maritime jurisdiction disputes 101
Territorial disputes and overlapping maritime zones also become con-
flated with the security issues of the third layer – maritime safety and
security issues – because many of the challenges (for example, piracy or oil
spills) occur within EEZs and territorial seas of coastal states, therefore
under UNCLOS giving the coastal states primary duties to regulate such
activities. Moreover, in the case of semi-enclosed seas such as the South
China Sea and the East China Sea, coastal states have the obligation to
cooperate in managing these waters and ensure that their exercise of rights
and duties does not lead to conflict.
There are currently various cooperative initiatives that seek to prevent or
control piracy, maritime terrorism, transfers of weapons of mass destruction,
or to otherwise ensure safety of the sea lanes of communication, but these
are confronted with issues of sovereignty and coastal state jurisdiction. One
case is the insistence by Indonesia and Malaysia that they, together with
Singapore, should patrol the strategically important Straits of Malacca
and Singapore rather than allow the United States or other external powers
to do so.
Finally, the fourth layer of security challenges in the East Asian maritime
domain – military competition among the major powers – is the most
worrisome over the long term because of its potential to lead to large-scale
conflict. One of the most contentious questions of the law of the sea has to
do with what are acceptable and legitimate military uses of the ocean
in areas other than high seas in times of peace or in war, leading to frictions
such as those between China and the United States over the EP-3 spy plane
incident in Hainan in 2001, and the USNS Impeccable incident in 2009. The
military rise of China and its growth in power projection capabilities,
the vigorous interest of the United States in asserting naval primacy even
while promoting what it calls freedom in the “global commons,” and the
growing assertiveness and security activism of Japan threaten to undermine
the cooperative security institutions and norms that East Asian multilateral
diplomacy has been painstakingly trying to develop since the end of the
Cold War.
These four, interrelated layers of security challenges create a complex
maritime environment in the seas of East Asia. While modest progress has
been made in the management of territorial and jurisdictional disputes,
such as the 2000 Sino-Vietnamese Agreement on the Delimitation of the
Territorial Seas, the Exclusive Economic Zones and Continental Shelves
in the Beibu Gulf (Gulf of Tonkin), and the Agreement on Fishery Co-
operation in the Beibu Gulf, the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties
in the South China Sea signed by the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) and China, and the 2008 “principled consensus” between
China and Japan on the East China Sea, more recent events demonstrate
the fragility of these agreements and a hardening of the sovereignty stance
of major stakeholders. China’s military rise and assertiveness are causing
great concern among its neighbors. Growing competition among dominant
102 Aileen S.P. Baviera
and rising powers for sea control, for access to supply lines to energy
resources, for influence over strategically located states of Southeast Asia,
and for a voice in shaping the regional security architecture, are also bound
to further complicate the management of the territorial and jurisdictional
disputes.
This chapter explores various bilateral and multilateral security approa-
ches to the territorial and maritime jurisdiction disputes in the South China
Sea and the East China Sea, having in mind the conflation of these disputes
with broader maritime safety and security concerns, and the influence of
China’s rise on regional security.
The bilateral–multilateral dichotomy – or nexus – of security approaches,
viewed from a regional perspective and with particular regard to territorial
and maritime jurisdiction disputes, may be divided into two levels of
analysis.
First, what I call the “claimant-centered analysis” examines whether the
best way to address the disputes will be through bilateral solutions, which
usually include negotiations on sovereignty questions, boundary delimita-
tion, or joint development; or through multilateral processes oriented
toward building a cooperative management regime. This claimant-centered
analysis is relevant to the study of a bilateral–multilateral nexus of security
approaches because among the various territorial disputes and EEZ
overlaps in East Asia, some are bilateral (Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands,
Paracel Islands) while others are multilateral (Spratly Islands), implying
a natural bifurcation of approaches. Bilateral dispute-settlement approaches
typically involve protracted political negotiations between pairs of claimant
states, whereas multilateral approaches may entail participation of three or
more claimants, but potentially also other stakeholders. Both bilateral
and multilateral approaches may be guided by international legal principles.
Interestingly, some claimants – for example, China and Malaysia –
emphasize bilateral approaches even when the dispute is multilateral. This
raises questions such as whether such bilateral cooperation can provide
building blocks for eventually more inclusive approaches, or whether bila-
teralism ultimately undermines multilateralism by aggravating mistrust
among the stakeholders.
Second, a “security architecture-centered analysis” asks: can US bilateral
relationships either coexist or eventually integrate into more comprehensive
multilateral security approaches in the Asia-Pacific in response to the
territorial and maritime jurisdiction disputes?
The maritime disputes are interesting case studies for the nexus of
“US bilateral relationships” and “comprehensive multilateral security
approaches.” China, its rising power already reshaping US Asia-Pacific
strategy, is a major party to the territorial and maritime jurisdiction
disputes. Its rival claimants are either US allies (Japan and the Philippines)
or its emerging security partners (Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia), thus
also testing the supposed neutrality of the United States with respect to the
claims, and the value of alliance politics in guaranteeing stability in the
maritime arena. Moreover, the maritime disputes – particularly those in
the Spratly Islands – have been the subject of close to two decades of
multilateral diplomacy between ASEAN and China, from which lessons
may be drawn about the efficacy of multilateralism.
Defining bilateralism and multilateralism

This chapter employs John Gerard Ruggie’s (1993b) definition of multi-
lateralism that stresses that coordination takes place on the basis of
indivisibility, generalized principles of conduct, and where benefits are
enjoyed by participants not immediately but via diffuse reciprocity. James
Caporaso (1992: 602) moreover explains that such generalized principles
come in the form of “norms exhorting general if not universal modes of
relating to other states, rather than differentiating relations case-by-
case on the basis of individual preferences, situational exigencies, or a priori
particularistic grounds.” These conceptions of multilateralism apply both to
the multilateral dispute-settlement efforts among the claimant states (in our
claimant-centered analysis), and to multilateral security cooperation efforts
of the region at large (in our architecture-centered analysis).
Bilateralism, in contrast, is described as a “belief that inter-state relations
are best organized on a one-on-one or dyadic basis,” which implies exclu-
sivity and a specific reciprocity, or a transactional relationship based on
quid pro quos (Capie and Evans 2002: 39). Brian Job (quoted in Tow and
Acharya 2007: 3) also states that bilateralism arises from the belief by
two states that “the combination of their security interests, their relative
capabilities and the systemic context in which they operate is such that
dyadic relationships will be most effective.” Moreover, bilateralism is exclu-
sionary in character because states interacting with each other in this mode
“seek to keep separate their relationships with other actors.”
This definition describes well our claimant-centered analysis, with its
focus on negotiations between two rival states trying to gain maximum
advantage with regard to their respective, competing interests. Bilateralism
is a logical approach for territorial and maritime disputes that involve
only two states. With respect to the security architecture-centered
analysis, bilateralism refers mainly to the operation and impact of the US
network of formal bilateral alliances, also known as the San Francisco
System, but now expanding to involve new security partners. Writing in the
context of US security networks in the Asia-Pacific, William Tow
and Amitav Acharya (2007: 3) describe bilateralism as “largely con-
tained to two actors with sufficient collaborative interests to be labelled
‘allies’ (if a treaty commitment is involved) or ‘coalition partners’ (more
informally).”
I have argued elsewhere that the more relevant dichotomy of security
approaches for the region is not between multilateralism and bilateralism
per se, but a normative or philosophical distinction between a Ruggie-type
multilateralism (with emphasis on the “ism”) that is grounded on inclusive-
ness and cooperative security concepts founded upon positive security,
shared interests as well as norm agreement on the one hand, and exclusivist,
zero-sum, or negative security-oriented military alliances (which may be
bilateral or multilateral in form) that are implicitly or explicitly directed
against third parties, on the other hand (Baviera 2011). By contextualizing
the territorial and boundary disputes in the broader regional security
architecture dynamic and then deconstructing them into the two levels of
analysis, this chapter shows that security bilateralism is as relevant
to adversaries as it is to allies and partners. Thus, the bilateralism–
multilateralism dichotomy, as well as its nexus, will have to be understood in
its varied contexts.
Bilateral–multilateral nexus: a claimant-centered analysis

To what extent have bilateral and multilateral approaches involving claimant
states succeeded or failed in mitigating conflicts? Is there a nexus between
the two, or could one evolve that might better contribute to security of
the parties and the region as a whole? These questions have become very
relevant, especially in relation to the Spratly Islands disputes. China has
been adamant that the disputes should only be resolved bilaterally, ASEAN
has pressed for a multilateral process to address them, and the US, in mid-
2010, called for a multilateral, collaborative process.
Three test cases of bilateralism

Three cases of bilateral negotiations – between China and Vietnam
(the Gulf of Tonkin), between China and Japan (the Senkaku/Diaoyutai
Islands), and between China and the Philippines (the Spratly Islands) –
tell us that successful outcomes of bilateralism are possible under certain
conditions. These conditions include both sides focusing on mutual benefits
that can only be gained by setting aside the disputes (for example, fisheries
cooperation, or oil and gas exploration), both committing to a specific
timeframe to accomplish limited objectives in a step-by-step manner,
and both delinking or isolating the territorial and/or maritime boundary
dispute from other aspects of relations (for example, economic ties) either to
prevent added stresses or to ensure that normal interactions can continue
regardless of negotiation outcomes.
The Gulf of Tonkin talks resulted in good outcomes only after 17 rounds
of negotiations between representatives of China and Vietnam. An agree-
ment was reached on the demarcation of waters, EEZs, and continental
shelves that divided the gulf along an equidistant line, while a separate
agreement on fishing cooperation delineated exclusive and common
fishing areas. After the agreements were ratified in 2004, however, conflicts
continued to occur, at one point with nine Vietnamese fishermen killed by
the Chinese in 2005. However, rather than allowing this to lead to an
escalation of tensions, the two sides agreed to a series of measures designed
to prevent further incidents and enhance cooperation in the area, including
joint naval patrols, a joint survey of fishing resources, joint exploration for
oil and gas, and even a commitment to start negotiations on demarcating
areas outside the Gulf of Tonkin (Storey 2008).
In relation to the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands dispute between China
and Japan, 14 rounds of talks before 2003 (on fisheries, marine research
activities, and the law of the sea), and 11 rounds of bilateral negotiations
from 2004 to 2007 to demarcate maritime boundaries, led to a 2008
“principled consensus.” This was an agreement to conduct cooperation in
the “transitional period prior to delimitation” without prejudicing their
respective legal positions (for a detailed account of the negotiations, see Au
2008). The respective countries identified an area for joint development of
petroleum resources, and set up hotlines between the Japan Coast Guard
and China’s State Oceanic Administration. In the course of discussions,
China appeared open to Japanese participation in the development of
the Chunxiao gas fields (on China’s side of Japan’s notional median line that
China refuses to accept), but retreated when the issue became controversial
to both sides as too much of a concession to the other (Manicom 2008).
Throughout the negotiations, a number of incidents tested the will of
both sides. These incidents included the Japanese apprehension of Chinese
fishing vessels, Chinese naval intrusions (including that of a nuclear
submarine) into Japan’s territorial waters, and nationalists from both
sides attempting to land on disputed islands. Both sides, however, tried
to downplay tensions and restrained their own nationalists from making
provocative actions (Fravell 2010). Tensions escalated again in September
2010 following the collision of a Chinese trawler and a Japan Coast Guard
vessel, which led to large-scale mass protests by citizens of both countries.
China also expressed its opposition to Japan’s artificial enlargement of its
southernmost island of Okinotorishima.
China and the Philippines had their first serious diplomatic confrontation
after the Chinese occupation of Mischief Reef in early 1995. Tensions
continued until 1999, with the Philippine Navy apprehending Chinese
fishermen and attempting to internationalize the issue in the face of the
Chinese upgrade of military facilities and presence on and around Mischief
Reef. During the peak of the tensions, ASEAN issued collective criticism
of Chinese behavior at the ASEAN–China Senior Officials Consultations
in 1996.
While there appeared to be great hostility in some of the rhetorical
exchanges between the Philippines and China, the two governments did not
allow the disputes to disrupt the normal course of relations, as evidenced by
growth in trade and continuing high-level exchanges. Only months after
the Mischief Reef occupation, Manila and Beijing issued a joint statement
that laid out “principles for a code of conduct” in the South China Sea.
The statement notably expressed an open mind toward future multilateral,
non-traditional security cooperation in the disputed areas. In the end, this
agreement was insufficient to manage the tensions, was unable to restrain
unilateral acts of sovereignty, and did little to build mutual trust. Thus, the
Philippines continued to work through ASEAN to help mitigate tensions by
pressing China for a regional code of conduct.
Departing from its earlier preference for a multilateral approach, in 2004
the Philippines decided to cooperate with China on a joint seismic survey of
disputed areas in the Spratly Islands to determine the presence of oil and
gas resources. Vietnam, whose claims also overlap with those of the
Philippines and China, was later persuaded to come on board, thus trans-
forming the joint development initiative into a trilateral one. Subsequently,
the project ran into stiff domestic opposition in the Philippines and had to
be suspended. Since then, Philippine passage of a new baselines law and
renewed exploration activities have been met with strong pressure from the
Chinese.
Based on the foregoing three cases, bilateral conflict management may
be deemed successful to the extent that no armed exchanges have transpired
despite, at times, high-level tensions, and channels for dialogue and con-
sultation on the issue have been strengthened. Bilateral dialogue also helped
the claimants recognize that cooperative solutions can avoid the question of
sovereignty, challenging the traditional zero-sum approach. It may be recal-
led that since 1984, China under Deng Xiaoping had been calling for such
an approach, to “shelve sovereignty and go for joint development.”
However, bilateralism has shown itself to be insufficient for building
mutual assurance, given traditional animosities in some cases, but also
power asymmetry and the gap between words and actions of certain
claimants. Other than in the Gulf of Tonkin example, it has led only to a
temporary de-escalation of tensions in the specific area of dispute. Similarly,
promising attempts at bilateral accommodation between Japan and Korea
(over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands) eventually collapsed (Selden 2011).
In the Spratly Islands, the fact that there are multiple parties was also a
major structural obstacle to any exclusively bilateral approach.
Efforts at multilateralism
Multilateral cooperation on the territorial and jurisdiction issues has like-
wise had only limited achievement. For disputes involving Northeast Asian
countries, no multilateral approach has yet been established, reflecting
the general state of diplomacy and mutual hostility in the subregion. The
countries preferred to enter into separate bilateral fishing agreements in
the late 1990s rather than discuss the East China Sea together.
In contrast, the South China Sea has been the subject of multilateral
official as well as track-two diplomacy, involving claimants, other parties,
and ASEAN for the last two decades. From 1990 to 2002, the Indonesian-
organized “Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China
Sea” did not attempt to address sovereignty or boundary issues, but instead
focused on resource assessment, marine scientific research, safety of naviga-
tion, shipping and communication, and legal matters, under the principle of
addressing the less sensitive issues first. Proposals were developed but
not many were implemented. However, certain parties were inspired to
explore functional cooperation with each other, such as the Philippines
and Vietnam, which then organized joint scientific expeditions in the
disputed areas.
An ASEAN–China dialogue began to look at the disputes. In the wake of
the Mischief Reef incident, China began in 1995 to discuss the Spratly
Islands dispute multilaterally with ASEAN. The disputes have since become
part of the agenda of annual ASEAN–China meetings. In 1998, ASEAN
members resolved to press China for a regional code of conduct to prevent
the further escalation of conflict. The resulting 2002 Declaration
on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, signed by ASEAN and
China, was the first official multilateral agreement on the South China Sea
involving China, ASEAN, and non-claimant ASEAN members, but
its potential significance had been diminished by failure to agree on imple-
menting guidelines until nine years later. Apparently reversing its support
for ASEAN’s central and proactive role on the issue, China has objected to
a provision that ASEAN claimants or ASEAN itself hold prior consulta-
tions before sitting down with China and discussing implementation of
the Declaration. Beijing wants to discuss the disputes only bilaterally with
other claimant countries. It argues that the Spratly Islands issue “does not
concern the four ASEAN claimants collectively, or ASEAN as a group”
(Chalermpalanupap 2010).
Outside the region, the territorial disputes were also discussed during the
1999 United Nations General Assembly, after the Philippines called for UN
assistance for their resolution. China, supported by Malaysia, stressed that
it advocated settlement through peaceful means, but opposed intervention
from nations outside the region. Vietnam and the Philippines, meanwhile,
called for peaceful settlement, but asserted their rights as coastal states
(Deen 1999). Such disagreement among the four major claimants prevents
the United Nations from playing a role. Notably, the parties have not
brought the matter to the International Court of Justice, or to the Interna-
tional Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (the latter because UNCLOS does
not have jurisdiction over territorial disputes).
Other multilateral initiatives related to maritime concerns, and focused
not on the territorial or boundary issues but on cooperation in promoting
maritime safety and security, have emerged from the Council for Security
Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), the ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF), and the Shangri-La Dialogue. CSCAP has issued six memoranda,
while the ARF organized 13 activities on maritime security from 1998 to
2009, focused on training, capability building, and improving coordination.
It was on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue that the proposal for a
joint patrol of the Malacca Strait by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore
was first touted. The maritime security discussions in the region have thus
far had no meaningful impact on the claimants’ efforts to manage the
territorial and boundary disputes. However, from a security architecture-
centered perspective, the maritime security agenda is a critical element for
regional stability, and big powers are competing for leadership in shaping
this agenda.
Neither bilateralism nor multilateralism has attained desired outcomes in
helping resolve the territorial and maritime jurisdiction disputes, indicating
that a combination of approaches may be what is needed.
Exploring the nexus

From the claimant-centered perspective, there may be an emerging nexus
of bilateralism and multilateralism. China articulated its understanding of
this nexus in Premier Wen Jiabao’s 29 October 2010 statement that
China “will jointly work toward the maintenance of peace and stability
in the South China Sea and work to bilaterally resolve the dispute in
an appropriate manner” (Agence France-Presse 2010; my emphasis). This
position correctly distinguishes the territorial and boundary issues from
the larger question of the region’s maritime security environment, and
emphasizes the need to address both in parallel processes, leading to the
same goal of enhancing security and stability. The difficulty of this position
is in its practical implications – that for all claimants other than China,
agreeing to hold bilateral negotiations only with China is tantamount
to acceding to the superiority of the Chinese claim while ignoring that of all
others. Moreover, assuming that bilateral solutions may ultimately lead to
joint development activities, the exclusion of other claimants can only spell
trouble. The approach may then work between China and Vietnam for
the Paracel Islands (assuming Taiwan is not a separate party) but not for the
Spratly Islands.
One reason the bilateral approach has proven unsustainable is that it
is vulnerable to changes in the overall political climate of relations, to pres-
sures from domestic interest groups (including the military and nationalists),
as well as to opposition from states whose own rights may be infringed.
Joint development projects and other functional cooperation arrangements,
which are pursued bilaterally in expectation of mutual gain, can thus easily
fall apart even though both parties may have already invested heavily
in them. Therefore, embedding bilateral cooperation efforts within broader
multilateral conflict management processes can help preserve the momen-
tum for cooperation.
One view is that multilateral solutions can be more effective because by
collectively tying behavior to generalized principles and norms (for example,
equality, fairness, and commitment to peaceful settlement) as well as to
rules (for example, international law), rather than mainly to particularistic
interests (for example, a greater share of potential oil and gas), claimant
states can expect greater predictability in the actions of others, and can
themselves begin to exhibit greater restraint. This is the raison d’etre behind
ASEAN’s pursuit of a binding code of conduct with China.
Moreover, the multilateral agenda for security cooperation tends to be
more comprehensive, emphasizing shared interests and common goals, in
contrast to the emphasis on competitive goals typical of bilateralism. For
example, if bilateral negotiations focus on competition for fishery resources,
multilateral arrangements might look instead at conservation or common
sustainable development of fishing grounds and the safety of fishermen from
natural hazards. In a bilateral setting, the competition for oil and gas
may seem intractable, involving a higher risk of armed confrontation that
ultimately prevents either party from accessing the coveted resource.
A multilateral code of conduct may in this case help provide more stable
foundations for conflict avoidance, in part because the behavior of
states becomes subject to the scrutiny of a group. Rather than having
two parties endlessly trading accusations of violations of agreements, the
disputants become accountable to a collective to which they belong.
However, codes of conduct by themselves are no more capable of solving the
territorial conflicts and maritime jurisdiction disputes than the bilateral
negotiations have been, thus far.
Another potential nexus is to expand from bilateralism to multilateralism.
In 2007, building on the Sino-Vietnamese agreement on the Gulf of Tonkin,
China proposed to ASEAN the establishment of a Pan-Tonkin Gulf Regio-
nal Economic Cooperation scheme. Vietnam, Singapore, the Philippines,
and Indonesia immediately supported the concept, which entails developing
a network of ports, cooperation in fisheries, maritime energy, maritime
environment, and tourism around the South China Sea, involving all of the
ASEAN members except Laos and Myanmar (Li 2008). Such a project
could eventually be a useful transition to a multilateral joint development
or co-management scheme for the South China Sea, avoiding contentious
sovereignty issues for as long as China will not be perceived as solely in
charge. However, its current priorities are land-based projects under
the framework of the ASEAN–China Free Trade Area rather than maritime
ones. Likewise, in 2005, the Philippines and China agreed to invite Vietnam
to participate in their seismic research in the Spratly Islands, transforming
bilateral into tripartite cooperation, albeit one that was short-lived.
Regional architecture, maritime security, and the

role of US alliances
To what extent has the US-centered system of bilateral alliances and security
partnerships contributed to mitigation of the security threats relating to
territorial and maritime disputes in East Asia? What is the impact of
multilateralism on the relevance and need for the alliance system? How do
the interactions between bilateralism and multilateralism contribute to the
shaping of East Asia’s security order, where maritime disputes and security
issues are concerned?
US “neutrality” on territorial claims

For a long time, as the territorial disputes between China and its neighbors
brewed, the United States did not consider it necessary to take a formal
position other than to state its interest in freedom of navigation and peace-
ful settlement in accordance with international law. It had also indicated
in the past that it would be willing to help in the peaceful resolution of the
competing claims if requested by the parties (Valencia 1995). In fact,
a closer look at the history of the disputes shows that the seeds of
contemporary conflicts were sown when the San Francisco Peace Treaty in
1951 was negotiated without the participation of many of the affected
countries. The treaty, led by the US, chose to keep either silent or ambig-
uous about the status of then Japanese-occupied territories, including
Taiwan, Southern Kuriles, the Paracel Islands, the Spratly Islands, the
Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands, and the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands. The result-
ing divisions among the neighboring countries, it has been argued, provided
favorable geopolitical conditions for the United States to enhance its influ-
ence over individual states (Selden 2011).
During the Cold War, the US consolidated its alliances with Japan,
South Korea, South Vietnam, and the Philippines, and built a strong
defense relationship with Taiwan. But it avoided entanglement in territorial
disputes among them, as well as between them and China (at that time,
an ally against the Soviet Union). One exception was US recognition of
Japan’s sovereignty over the Kuriles Islands disputed by the Soviet Union/
Russia, which was reiterated in February 2011 amid indications of
cooperation between Moscow and Beijing on development of the islands,
causing great concern to its key ally, Japan. Clearly, any US position
would be defined by the role of individual claimants in American security
strategy.
In the East China Sea, the posture of US neutrality regarding territorial
disputes was more myth than reality. The US had administered the Senkaku/
Diaoyutai Islands directly from 1945 to 1971, and continued to use one
of the islands as a firing range until 1978. Upon the reversion of Okinawa
to the Japanese in 1971, a statement of neutrality was necessary because the
islands were in dispute between Japan and Taiwan, both close allies. The
US then declared “non-interference” and said it was up to the two parties
to settle the question of sovereignty. Despite Japan’s efforts to obtain US
support for their sovereignty claim, the US then only acknowledged that
Japan “effectively administers” the islands (Valencia 2007). In the midst of
new tensions between China and Japan in 2010, the US signaled to Japan
that it would not make any public statements about the Senkaku/Diaoyutai
Islands being covered by the security agreement, in order to avoid adding
to Japan’s problems with China (Japan Today 2010). However, only two
months later, after meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Maehara Seiji,
US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that the islands do fall
within the scope of the defense treaty (Nikkei.com 2010).
The US is in a quandary over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands. Inasmuch
as it is committed to supporting its key ally against threats from North
Korea, China, or Russia, it must be careful not to provoke any resurgent
nationalism in any of these states (including Japan) over such a sensitive
historical issue. That Taiwan is a silent party – dependent on the US
for security, but closing ranks with China on this issue – is a further
complication. In the meantime, Washington supports Japan’s recent adop-
tion of a more proactive dynamic defense posture that will entail greater
surveillance in waters surrounding Japan.
The Dokdo/Takeshima Islands dispute is even more problematic for
the alliance system, as both parties (Japan and South Korea) are vital US
partners for important regional security concerns. During the long negotia-
tions for the San Francisco Peace Treaty (in the absence of North or
South Korean representatives), there was considerable disagreement over
who should enjoy sovereignty over the islands. In the end, the treaty was
silent on the matter and the US took a position of neutrality that stands
to this day.
In contrast to the Kuriles and the Senkakus/Diaoyutai Islands, Washington
neither recognizes the Philippine claim to the Kalayaan Islands (a part of
the Spratly Islands group), nor has any obligation to defend the Philippines
if any aggression were to occur against it in relation to its claims. Histori-
cally, during many instances of negotiating the “extension of stay” of US
military facilities in the Philippines, the Philippines sought US assurances
that the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951 would apply to its contested terri-
tories. However, the United States would not tie itself to this interpretation.
In 1995, some Filipino military officials believed that the US had forewarn-
ing of the Chinese occupation of Mischief Reef that it did not share with its
treaty ally. To them, it seemed that without the US military bases on
Philippine territory, the alliance did not have a deterrent effect on Chinese
behavior, and did not give the Philippines the leverage it needed in its sub-
sequent, difficult diplomatic dealings with China.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the South China Sea disputes were perceived
to be mainly a Sino-Vietnamese problem, therefore of little bearing to
US security interests and its alliances in the Asia-Pacific. Eventually, the
Mischief Reef occupation led to domestic political pressures on Washington
to take a stronger stand against China’s “creeping assertiveness,” but
relatively low-key tensions since the late 1990s until 2009 again relegated the
issue to the US backburner.
In short, the alliance system thus far has been largely irrelevant to a
resolution of the disputes, and in fact many of the disputes can be traced
to the negotiations that established the San Francisco System in the first
place. The alliance system may arguably have contributed to self-restraint by
the parties or even to some deterrence, but this does not seem to be borne
out by the recent escalation of tensions and China’s growing assertiveness.
China appears to be taking calculated risks and testing US resolve, knowing
that the US cannot support outright the territorial claims of any of its
allies, particularly those against China, for fear of getting drawn by
its junior partners into unnecessary and potentially costly conflicts. The
US also sees some of the allies’ claims as standing on questionable
legal grounds, or – in the case of their EEZs and continental shelf claims –
contrary to the US’s own freedom of navigation interests. At the same time,
the US could not engage in the relevant regional discussions because it
is thus far not a state-party to UNCLOS, which all the other parties have
acceded to.
A turning point for the US?

Much has changed recently, with the United States showing greater readi-
ness to engage China diplomatically on the issue, more explicitly siding
with Japan on the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands, demonstrating greater inter-
est in working together with Southeast Asian states (including Vietnam and
the Philippines) to strengthen their capabilities for maritime security
and territorial integrity, and offering to support multilateral collaborative
management of the South China Sea issues. Among conservative American
think tanks, there have been some calls for their government to rethink
its position of neutrality with respect to the maritime disputes, as well as
calls to finally join the UNCLOS regime. During the 17th ARF meeting
in Hanoi in July 2010, US Secretary of State Clinton took Washington’s
position significantly forward when she announced that the South China
Sea had become a “leading diplomatic priority,” which would be “pivotal
to regional security” (Kate and Gaouette 2010). The full meaning and
impact of these apparent changes in US policy have yet to be determined,
but China and the US, as well as ASEAN, have subsequently exercised
caution so as not to further inflame or provoke nationalist emotions on
the issue. Statesmanship of the highest order is needed lest the territorial
disputes eventually become proxies for US–China competition for sea
control.
Building a maritime security regime as a nexus of

bilateralism and multilateralism
While it may be premature to predict the way forward, there are indications
that the territorial and maritime boundary disputes will continue to be
addressed primarily among the claimants themselves, and that the role of
US bilateral alliances will be primarily based on US efforts to level the
playing field by improving its partners’ capacities to address maritime
security concerns, as well as encouraging self-restraint and moderation by
the parties and claimants.
The US is now actively engaged in maritime security cooperation against
piracy and proliferation, and the Pacific Command is helping train and
equip Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines with radars and patrol
craft to secure waterways against smugglers and terrorists, and to protect
and improve transit routes in the region (Scher 2010). The US has also
renewed its commitment to the ARF, pledging to help streamline and
strengthen the ARF’s institutional processes and create a more action-
oriented agenda, especially with respect to transnational and non-traditional
security challenges (Campbell 2010).
There are constraints, however, that the US will have to confront, includ-
ing the consequences of its non-ratification of UNCLOS, which affects not
only its legitimacy to influence discourse on maritime norms, but aggravates
the perceptions that it is not part of the region (instead of being a “resident
power,” “of Asia but not in Asia”), inasmuch as most countries have agreed
to be bound by this body of international law. In the process of engagement,
the US must also clarify what its intentions are in the pursuit of its “global
commons” strategy in the maritime theater, and how this relates to state
sovereignty as well as sovereign rights that littoral states hope to exercise
under the law of the sea.
One challenge in finding a nexus of bilateralism and multilateralism is
how to bring the regional states together to collectively design an inclusive
maritime security regime for East Asia, one that allows China to sit at the
rule-making table, acknowledges the legitimate maritime security concerns
of all states involved, and provides a balance between coordinated responsi-
bility and state sovereignty or autonomy in dealing with common security
challenges. Initiatives to support multilateral dialogue among China, Japan,
and both Koreas on maritime security cooperation should be seriously
considered. Binding codes of conduct both for the South China Sea and
the East China Sea can better assure stability and predictability of the
security environment, paving the way for joint development of resources as
well as cooperation in the management of other concerns in the shared
ocean spaces.
Acknowledgements
Research for this chapter was undertaken with the support of the
MacArthur Foundation and the Australian Research Council’s Centre
of Excellence in Policing and Security (CEPS). The author thanks the
Department of International Relations at the Australian National
University, and CEPS at Griffith University, Australia, for hosting the
author as visiting scholar, and the University of the Philippines, Diliman, for
the sabbatical grant.
Note
1 From a non-traditional security perspective, additional challenges include threats
to the marine environment and dangers to ocean vessels from natural hazards.
9 The bilateral–multilateral nexus
in Asia’s defense diplomacy
David Capie
The vast literature on Asia’s regional institutions says surprisingly little

about the identity or backgrounds of the actors involved in multilateral
security dialogues. It assumes for the most part that politicians, diplomats,
and foreign ministry officials are the only important participants. But
alongside institutions like the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian
Nations) Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN+3 (China, Japan, and South
Korea) and the East Asia Summit (EAS), in the last decade there has been
rapid growth in bilateral and multilateral interactions that bring together
defense officials and military personnel. The rise of what has come to be
called “defense diplomacy” took a major step forward with the launch
of the Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD) in 2002, the creation of the ASEAN
Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) in 2006 and the ADMM+ process
in 2010. But unlike the ARF or the EAS, these arrangements have attracted
strikingly little scholarly attention. How important is military and defense
diplomacy? How have these arrangements evolved? What is the relationship
between bilateral and multilateral defense diplomacy?
This chapter explores these questions in three parts. It opens with a
discussion of definitions of defense diplomacy in the regional security
lexicon. For the most part, this writing is highly descriptive and focuses on
the kind of activities that should be included under the rubric of defense and
military diplomacy. While useful, I argue it does little to help us under-
stand the institutionalization of defense diplomacy. Instead, I outline a
framework that allows us to see defense diplomacy as an activity that varies
in terms of the seniority of representatives involved and in the number of
participant states.
In the second part of the chapter, I employ this framework to trace the
development of defense diplomacy in Asia over the last several decades
and try to identify the factors that have led states to prefer bilateral or
multilateral interactions. Orthodox accounts of defense diplomacy have
a teleological quality in which arrangements like the ADMM and the
ADMM+ emerge as a result of a series of gradual, progressive, almost
inevitable steps towards multilateralism (see, for example, Singh and Tan
2011). In these explanations, a strong preference for bilateralism gradually
116 David Capie
gives way to subregional defense multilateralism, which then reaches its
logical conclusion with multilateral defense institutions created at the regio-
nal level in 2010. I argue these arguments oversimplify defense diplomacy by
overlooking a number of successful multilateral defense interactions at the
working level that have functioned successfully, in some cases for decades.
Where there has historically been resistance to multilateral defense diplo-
macy, it has been at the highest levels, such as formal institutionalized
interactions between defense ministers or chiefs of defense forces in a
multilateral setting. However, high-level defense diplomacy contacts between
ministers and senior military officers have been less problematic at the
bilateral level, even among non-allies and rivals, as I show with a number
of examples from Southeast Asia.
In the third part of the chapter, I ask why high-level multilateral defense
diplomacy has become so popular in the last decade and close with
some thoughts about the relationship between bilateral and multilateral
defense diplomacy and how synergies between the two might be encouraged
in the future.
Conceptualizing defense diplomacy

What is defense diplomacy? Like many expressions in the security studies
lexicon, the precise origins of the term are unclear and contested. The
notion that military personnel might play a role in international relations
other than through the threatened or actual use of violence is hardly new.
But as a distinct concept, defense or military diplomacy seems to have
grown in prominence in the last decade (Cottey and Forster 2004). Accord-
ing to Stephen Blank, the idea emerged in post-Cold War Europe. The belief
was that by “establishing relationships of trust and mutual confidence
among former rival militaries, confidence could be built, generalized
standards could be achieved with regard to the interoperability of militaries
and a broader democratization of civil–military relations could take part in
what was once the Soviet Bloc” (Blank 2003).
As a distinct form of state practice, defense diplomacy’s origins are often
traced to the 1998 British Strategic Defence Review. The UK Ministry of
Defence described the concept as involving the use of military forces
“to dispel hostility, build and maintain trust and assist in the development
of democratically accountable armed forces, thereby making a significant
contribution to conflict prevention and resolution.” It said “we require
armed forces which can operate in support of diplomacy alongside
economic, trade and development levers, to strengthen security and avert
conflict” (Ministry of Defence, UK 1998: 106–7, 18).1
The British approach included three broad sets of activities: arms
control, non-proliferation policies, and confidence and security-building
measures; outreach designed to encourage stability, particularly in Russia,
through bilateral assistance and cooperation programs; and other assistance
Asia’s defense diplomacy 117
programs aimed at relationships beyond Europe (Ministry of Defence,
UK 2000). Under these general headings it noted the important role of
education and training programs, the provision of short-term advisory
teams, ship and aircraft visits, seminars, as well as visits and interactions
between ministers, and military and civilian personnel at all levels.
In Asia, a number of states picked up on the concept and began to use its
language in their national security policies. Singapore, for example, said
its defense policy stands on the twin concepts of deterrence and defense
diplomacy. In a 2006 statement to parliament, Defence Minister Teo
Chee Hean said the objectives of defense diplomacy are “to develop positive
and mutually beneficial relationships with friendly countries and armed
forces, [and] to contribute to a stable and cooperative regional environment
and international order” (Teo 2006). Another Singaporean analyst has
said that defense diplomacy connects the armed forces to a broader range
of non-traditional military tasks, including “the opportunity to reach out to
the civilians … in … Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR)
operations” (Chong, Khoo, and Yeo 2008).
New Zealand officials have also embraced the term, likening defense
diplomacy to preventive diplomacy, and describing it as:
all the varied activities undertaken … to promote peace and security

through constructive engagement and confidence building. Its aim is to
dispel hostility, build and maintain trust, and assist in the development
of democratically accountable armed forces, thereby making a sig-
nificant contribution to conflict prevention and resolution.
Borrowing language directly from the British Ministry of Defence 2000

paper, they ambitiously assert that the aim of defense diplomacy is to
“disarm the mind” (New Zealand Ministry of Defence 2000: 41).
The Indonesian military has also linked defense diplomacy to preventive
diplomacy. Interestingly, in one use at least, the concept is given an
important domestic element. According to Major General Dadi Susanto,
fostering notions of patriotism and citizenship and connecting them
to “total defense” are key means for achieving defense diplomacy (Susanto
2007).
Most analysts, however, see defense diplomacy as part of the outward-
facing practice of a state’s foreign relations. Kristen Gunness argues that
China’s “military diplomacy” is intimately linked to its wider foreign policy
goals. She notes that the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) conduct of
foreign military relations is “considered to be a strategic-level activity by the
Chinese leadership. It is expected to support the larger foreign, diplomatic,
political, economic and security agenda set forth by the leadership of the
Party/State.” She argues that PLA interactions with foreign militaries
are seen by both the military and China’s civilian leadership as a “political
undertaking using military means for strategic reasons, not as a freestanding
118 David Capie
set of military initiatives conducted by military professionals for explicitly
military reasons” (Gunness 2006: 2).
Much of the literature on defense diplomacy in East Asia describes the
kind of activities that support the goal of confidence building. Looking at
China’s military diplomacy, Gunness includes “high-level strategic security
dialogues, military functional exchanges, professional military education
exchanges, the import and export of military weapons and equipment, and
participation in peacekeeping operations” (Gunness 2006: 3). In a discussion
of Indo-US defense diplomacy, Saroj Bishoyi stresses the role of education
and training “in areas such as defence management, civil-military relations
and military justice” as well as a “wide range of military-to-military con-
tacts with other states; foreign military financing in the form of grants and
loans; joint combined exchange training of special forces; [and] military
sales” (Bishoyi 2011: 65). Richard Bitzinger (2011: 113–14) argues that of
all the defense diplomacy activities undertaken by the United States, its
International Military Education and Training program plays a particularly
important role.
Broadly understood then, the growing profile of defense diplomacy can
be linked to the expanding range of actors involved in international
relations. Once claimed as the preserve of professional foreign service
officers, diplomacy, or rather what Stuart Murray calls “unconventional
diplomacy,” is now as likely to be practiced by police officers, soldiers, and
officials from ministries of education, trade, or culture (Murray 2007).
Defense diplomacy turns military professionals into instruments of soft
power and persuasion, blurring further the lines between security and
development (Hills 2000).
But if the literature offers rich descriptions of the kinds of activities that
fall under the ambit of defense diplomacy and the goals that drive them, less
has been said about the institutionalization of the practice. Instead, a largely
unquestioned consensus has emerged in East Asian international relations
scholarship that asserts that multilateral defense diplomacy has emerged
only recently and is almost without precedent in the region. Reflecting a
broader assumption about the key structures of regional order, the claim
is frequently made that bilateral military-to-military interactions have long
been acceptable, whereas multilateral defense and military diplomacy were
(until very recently) not. For example, one recent report on the subject
asserts that Southeast Asia “has been averse to discussing regional defence
cooperation for a long time” (Guan 2010: 5). A leading Indonesian analyst
concludes that, “ASEAN countries … have continued to avoid multilateral
military cooperation at the level of ASEAN, preferring instead to engage
in bilateral or at the most trilateral military exercises” (Anwar 2001).
But while this has become accepted wisdom, it rests on a limited and
narrow understanding of defense diplomacy. To explore the institutionaliza-
tion of defense diplomacy in East Asia we need to recognize that the
concept has both “vertical” and “horizontal” elements. Vertically, defense
and military diplomacy can include a wide range of actors from defense
ministers and senior generals who meet for formal talks, down to low-level
uniformed personnel who participate in training and education exchanges.
Horizontally, it can be based on, at minimum, a dyadic interaction between
two states, or it can include multiple states meeting in a subregional or
regionally focused forum. If we consider these two dimensions when looking
at the historical record in Asian security cooperation, a much richer picture
emerges. It challenges the myth that defense diplomacy has proceeded in
a teleological fashion from bilateral interactions to smaller, subregional
Southeast Asian institutions through to a fully fledged regional ADMM+
forum.
Defense diplomacy in Asia: multiple forms, multiple levels

If the use of the term “defense diplomacy” has become fashionable
only recently, bilateral defense diplomacy in East Asia has a long pedigree.
Military and defense officials from across Asia have met, consulted, and
communicated for decades. Not surprisingly, the closest defense diplomacy
reflects the prevailing security structures of the region, in particular
the United States’ bilateral alliances with Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the
Philippines and Australia. As Carol Atkinson (2006: 520) notes:
Maintaining alliances necessitates a significant level of person-to-person

interaction, particularly at the more senior ranks, as well as continued
diplomatic exchanges between the US and allied military and political
leaders. Personnel of all levels interact on a daily basis within estab-
lished institutionalized security alliances.
Indeed, many of these alliances include formal provisions that establish

mechanisms or processes where defense officials and military officers meet
to discuss issues and share perceptions of security issues in the region. The
1951 Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America (ANZUS)
Treaty, for example, established the ANZUS Council, which annually
brought senior military officers together, along with foreign and defense
ministers from Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. Since the
mid-1980s, those interactions have carried on bilaterally between Australia
and the United States within the Australia–United States Ministerial
(AUSMIN) forum.
In the case of the US–Japan alliance, it took until the 1970s to institution-
alize high-level defense interactions. In an August 1975 visit to Tokyo, US
Defense Secretary, James Schlesinger, and his Japanese counterpart, Sakata
Michita, agreed that US and Japanese defense ministers should meet at least
once annually. They also agreed to create a Sub-Committee on Defence
Cooperation (SDC) within the US–Japan Security Consultative Committee
(a foreign ministry-led grouping). The SDC was formally established in 1976
120 David Capie
and on the Japanese side included: the director-general of American
Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the director-general of Defense
Bureau in the Japan Defense Agency, and the secretary-general of the Joint
Chiefs Council. The US members consisted of the deputy chief of mission
from the US Embassy in Tokyo, and the chief of staff of the US Forces in
Japan. Its primary focus was discussion of contingencies involving a possible
attack on Japan and conflict elsewhere in the region, but it also addressed
activities and consultations regarding the US–Japan defense relationship
(Green and Murata 1998). These interactions were further enhanced
following a review of Japan’s Defense Guidelines in the 1980s.
In other alliances, high-level bilateral connections are less institutionalized
and more ad hoc. When the US–Philippines Mutual Security Treaty
was signed in 1951, one of the few things the US military liked about it was
that it did not create an equivalent to the ANZUS Council, with one
senior general arguing that to do so would give the Philippines treaty
the “inappropriate status” of equality with ANZUS (Memorandum by the
Regional Planning Adviser in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs [Emmerson]
1950: 1362). This notwithstanding, bilateral consultations have continued,
although Robert Gates’s visit to the Philippines in June 2009 was the first
in a decade by a serving US secretary of defense (Baker III 2009). US–Thai
defense relations also include regular consultations and more than 40 joint
military exercises a year, including Cobra Gold, now the world’s largest
combined exercise. According to one report, “tens of thousands” of Thai
military officers, including some in leadership positions, have taken part
in US training and educational exchanges (Chanlett-Avery 2011: 13–14).
It is not surprising that bilateral alliances have incorporated high-level
defense interactions and provided opportunities for military personnel to
consult, share threat perceptions, and exercise together. But bilateral defense
interactions also have a long history among non-allies in the region, as can
be seen in several cases from Southeast Asia. Indeed, bilateral interactions
among “non-likeminded” states seem to be one of the fastest growing
aspects of regional defense diplomacy.
Bilateral defense diplomacy among non-allies

As noted above, ASEAN was reluctant to embrace high-level multilateral
defense diplomacy in its formative years. Rather, its preferred approach
was for its members to arrange overlapping bilateral collaborations on
defense and security issues. This approach, dubbed a “spider web” model
by Indonesian General Try Sutrisno, sought to build confidence and
trust through information sharing, training exercises, and cross-border
agreements – activities that can be fairly described as defense diplomacy
(Emmers 2004: 11). For the most part, these bilateral interactions focused
on countering subversion, fighting insurgencies, and dealing with border
issues. In some cases they were surprisingly institutionalized. For example,
under a series of agreements that date back to 1959, Malaysia and Thailand
maintained two committees, one of which formulated policy around defense
cooperation, while the other managed counterinsurgency operations
along the Thai–Malay border. These early connections grew into the
General Border Committee and the Regional Border Committee. The Gen-
eral Border Committee was co-chaired by the countries’ defense ministers,
while the Regional Border Committee was led by the head of the Thai
Fourth Army and the Malaysian Corps Commander. Planning, intelligence
sharing, and joint operations were coordinated by the Joint Border Com-
mittee Office based in Songkhla. Under this arrangement, Thailand and
Malaysia organized joint exercises against Communist Party of Malaysia
rebels, but the Joint Border Committee Office also provided an opportunity
for broader security cooperation based on mutual concerns about Vietnam-
ese expansionism in the 1970s.
Today, the General Border Committee continues to be a focus for Thai–
Malay defense cooperation. In addition to joint exercises along the
border, the committee oversees joint training of law enforcement officers,
including immigration officials (Xinhua 2010). An agreement signed in 2010
by General Prawit Wongsuwan, and his Malaysian counterpart, Dato’
Seri Dr Ahmad Zahid bin Hamidi, also included cooperation on extradition
issues.2
Malaysia and Indonesia maintain a similar approach with a joint border
committee created under a 1972 agreement and augmented with a 1984
security agreement (Simon 1992: 119). A General Border Committee headed
by the two defense ministers sits alongside a High Level Committee mana-
ged by the heads of the countries’ armed forces. Following a 2008 meeting
between Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Malaysian
Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi, the two countries committed to further
enhance bilateral defense cooperation, including: “intelligence exchanges,
coordinated naval patrol, reciprocal visits of defence, security and other
relevant officials, exchanges of programs by their respective command
and staff colleagues, joint disaster relief operations, and joint disaster
response, training and exercise” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia
2008: paragraph 8).
In 1997, Indonesia and the Philippines signed their own bilateral
agreement for enhancing defense cooperation. This established a Joint
Defense and Security Cooperation Committee that meets annually to
“implement, manage and monitor defence cooperation between the two
countries” (Department of National Defense, Philippines 2010). Their
defense diplomacy involves visits and exchanges, joint military activities,
and information sharing. A particular focus for discussions in recent years
has been the Armed Forces of the Philippines military operations in the
south of the country, as well as maritime border issues.
Other examples from inside ASEAN include a Malaysia–Philippines
defense agreement that provides for regular joint military exercises,
122 David Capie
exchanges of military information, and the possible use of each other’s
facilities for logistics and repairs (for an excellent survey of bilateral defense
interactions in Southeast Asia, see Singh and Tan 2011: 7). Singapore and
Indonesia have signed agreements that allow the Singapore Armed Forces to
train in Indonesian waters, and make use of helicopter training facilities and
an air-combat range in Sumatra. In January 1995, Singapore and Malaysia
held the first Malaysia–Singapore Defence Forum, which was designed to
provide a framework for the expansion of defense ties.
The one notable exception to this preference for bilateral defense diplo-
macy in Southeast Asia is the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA)
established in 1971. The FPDA brings together Singapore and Malaysia
with Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom in a loose con-
sultative framework. It was initially conceived as a transitional agreement to
provide for the defense of Malaysia and Singapore after Konfrontasi, but
over time it began to take on planning for broader conventional operations
and dealing with non-traditional and asymmetric security challenges. Its
institutionalization also evolved. During its first decade, the FPDA held just
a handful of exercises and began to fall into abeyance. After 1988, however,
chiefs of defense and defense ministers agreed to meet regularly (Thayer
2011a: 2–3). Carl Thayer notes that the FPDA has served a number of ends,
including building confidence between Singapore and Malaysia, and it has
also “enhanced professional military skills and contributed to developing
military-to-military relations among its members” (Thayer 2011a: 10).
Andrew Tan argues that a key function of the FPDA was for:
Singapore and Malaysia to discuss security matters of common concern.

This is of particular significance given the political and racial tensions
accompanying the split between Singapore and Malaysia in 1965
and the subsequent mutual distrust and poor relations between the two
countries.
He concludes that with the presence of third parties in the form of Australia,
New Zealand, and the UK, the FPDA “provided the forum for confidence
building, military transparency, defence diplomacy, and security coopera-
tion” (Tan 2008: 290).
But while the FPDA nominally involved more than two states, most
analysts distinguish it from a fully multilateral forum. Ralf Emmers argues it
is better described as “mini-lateral” rather than multilateral, in part because
of its size, but also because of its focus on a narrow set of security issues that
are of particular concern to the group’s members (Emmers 2010: 2).
What then made bilateralism the preferred arrangement for high-level
defense diplomacy in Southeast Asia? There are several reasons. First,
Southeast Asian states had few common threat perceptions beyond limited
border concerns. During the Cold War, some were more concerned
about Chinese-sponsored subversion, others about the threat from the Soviet
Union or Vietnam. Some, such as Indonesia, were more preoccupied
with state making and internal security issues than the region’s changing
security order. Second, suspicion and mistrust were a hallmark of several
bilateral relationships. Singapore and Malaysia had persistent rocky bilateral
ties over issues as diverse as water and contacts with Israel. Unresolved
territorial disputes between Malaysia and Singapore, and Malaysia and the
Philippines, also aggravated relations from time to time. Thai–Malay
defense cooperation stumbled over thorny issues such as the “hot pursuit”
of insurgents by Malaysian forces. Finally, multilateral defense diplomacy
appeared to offer limited practical returns. In most cases, defense coopera-
tion with neighbors offered only marginal benefits compared to engaging
with great powers such as the United States. There were also real
challenges in terms of capacity and interoperability between regional
militaries.
For these reasons there was, until recently, a general reluctance within
Southeast Asia or the wider Asia-Pacific region to expand bilateral defense
interactions into any broader form of inclusive, high-level, multilateral
defense diplomacy. As then Malaysian Defence Minister Najib Abdul
Razak put it, “ASEAN military forces are familiar with each other on
a bilateral basis. To me, that’s good enough” (cited in Acharya 2009: 174).
Amitav Acharya (2009: 174) describes a “norm against multilateral military
cooperation … [that] clearly survived into the post-Cold War period.” But
while this view has become a well-established orthodoxy, not all defense
multilateralism was off limits. Indeed, ASEAN members, along with other
countries, were regular participants in working level multilateral defense
interactions within the region, mechanisms that are rarely discussed in the
context of defense diplomacy.
Cooperation below the radar: working level defense multilateralism

While ministers and generals grab the headlines when it comes to defense
diplomacy, a longstanding series of multilateral defense interactions has
grown up at the working level in East Asia. These groups are inclusive, have
a broad membership, bring together allies as well as non-likeminded states,
and they consciously stress the objective of building a community based on
the identity of the participants as military professionals. They have provided
a forum for information exchange and confidence-building measures as
well as broader strategic dialogue for many years. As such, it is striking that
they have been ignored in analysis of defense diplomacy. Two examples
illustrate the success and longevity of these arrangements.
The first is the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), which has
taken place since 1988. The WPNS grew out of the International Seapower
Symposium when navy leaders decided they needed a regionally focused
Asia-Pacific forum for discussing maritime security issues. Its stated goal is
to “have the leaders of regional navies meet for frank and open discussions
124 David Capie
to promote mutual understanding and to discuss common challenges.”
Initially, it was decided to focus on “common issues affecting naval profes-
sionals and not on political issues, nor on the maritime confidence and
security building measures occupying the minds of those concerned
with second track diplomacy,” but over time, the WPNS has evolved both in
membership and ambitions (Sea Power Centre Australia 2006).
Held every two years, the WPNS was originally structured around sym-
posia, where service chiefs would receive briefings on a range of common
challenges and issues. However, at the second WPNS in 1992, the chiefs
agreed to establish a work program, with a series of workshops involving
mid-level officers. These meetings produce papers and non-binding
recommendations that are then considered by the chiefs at the subsequent
symposium.
As the WPNS has progressed, the range of activities it has embraced has
also expanded. In addition to a work program, it encourages “personnel
exchanges, attendance at overseas Staff Colleges, study visits and tours
(including visits by naval units), and senior officer visits” (Sea Power Centre
Australia 2006). As the WPNS members have grown more accustomed to
interacting, exchanges have also allowed service personnel to spend time
on one another’s ships at sea. As one Australian analysis concludes:
Collaboration through multilateral activities including disaster relief,

and search and rescue, provides an understanding of how each navy
thinks and operates, and of their capabilities. It also provides an
opportunity for personnel to interact, exchange ideas and professional
expertise, and gain an understanding of each other’s cultures.
(Sea Power Centre Australia 2006)
A second example of working level multilateral defense diplomacy is the

Pacific Armies Management Seminar (PAMS), which has been meeting
annually for more than three decades. Formed in 1978, PAMS has become
the “largest gathering of senior army/security forces officers in the Asia-
Pacific region.” It has expanded from an original membership of nine
(China, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea,
Thailand, and the United States) to 29 by 2010. PAMS has been described
as “a forum for senior-level officers from the Asia Pacific’s regional ground
forces to exchange views and ideas. It provides opportunities for future
leaders of regional armies to develop strong interpersonal relationships”
(US Army Pacific 2011).
The striking thing about these arrangements is that although they have
been ignored by scholars of Asian institutions, they display many of the
qualities of regional multilateralism that has been so heralded when
ministers are involved. First, like the ARF, for example, the WPNS and
PAMS are inclusive arrangements, involving US allies as well as non-
likeminded states like China. Second, they are mostly about building
confidence and habits of dialogue, stressing the importance of informality,
and relationship building. As Captain John Bischeri told the 2010 WPNS
in Sydney:
the value of building relationships and trust begins here, in formal

gatherings such as this plenary session, but just as importantly, in
the individual meetings and informal chats outside of these doors.
Dialogue is the necessary first step, and our ability to talk to each other
here or in other settings because of the relationships we build today will
put us in a better position tomorrow to work together to overcome some
of the challenges [we face].
(Bischeri 2010: 7–8)
Third, like the ARF, they have modest inter-sessional work programs
that feed practical suggestions for defense cooperation to service chiefs for
consideration by their respective militaries and governments. Crucially,
however, the WPNS, PAMS, the Asia-Pacific Defense Intelligence Con-
ference, and other similar fora, differ from high-level Asian security multi-
lateralism in one key respect: they are managed and organized not by an
ASEAN member, but by the United States military, albeit often in partner-
ship with an Asian state.
Although working level arrangements among military officers have been
neglected in the scholarship on regional institutions, until recently, East
Asia lacked any comparable multilateral defense diplomacy interactions at
the highest levels. There was, for example, no East Asian equivalent of the
annual North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Defence Ministers’
Meeting. This, however, began to change in 2002, with the creation of
the SLD.
Early connections
The Shangri-La Dialogue, formally known as the Asian Security Summit,
was developed by the London-based International Institute for Strategic
Studies in 2000. It was initially envisaged as an Asian counterpart to the
Munich Conference on security, which brings together European and
American policymakers and strategic thinkers for annual discussions. The
inaugural SLD was held at Singapore’s Shangri-La Hotel from 31 May to
1 June 2002. Twenty-two countries were represented, with 11 defense
ministers participating. While the SLD had strong supporters in Australia,
Japan, Singapore (which also contributed significant funding), and the
United States, it was greeted with skepticism by some regional states,
notably China, which did not send ministerial representation. Over time, the
SLD has grown steadily. At the tenth SLD in 2011, 28 countries were
represented, with the largest number of ministers yet, including, for the first
time, defense ministers from China, Myanmar, and Vietnam (IISS 2011b).
126 David Capie
As an example of defense diplomacy in practise, the SLD represents
an interesting accommodation between multilateralism and bilateralism.
From one perspective, the SLD appears to function as a loose, multilateral
framework in which defense ministers and military officials interact.
The primary multilateral event is a lunch for ministers held during the
conference. While this could be dismissed as trivial, the ARF began in much
the same way in 1994. By 2008 and 2009, there were also trilateral and
minilateral interactions occurring within the SLD, but these remained
informal and not part of the main meeting.
More valuable for participants than any multilateral or trilateral interac-
tions, however, has been the chance to arrange bilateral meetings during
the SLD. Australia, for example, organized more than 20 bilateral meetings
with other regional military and defense officials on the sidelines of
the 2009 SLD (Capie and Taylor 2010a). Singapore used the 2010 SLD
to conclude a defense cooperation agreement with Australia. It might
be argued therefore that the SLD simply serves to reinforce bilateralism
as the primary modality for regional security cooperation. Certainly there is
little appetite on the part of organizers to push the SLD towards a more
formal multilateral meeting with chairmen’s statements, action plans,
and so on. But even if it has retained an important bilateral focus, it is
important to acknowledge the demonstration effect that the SLD has had
in terms of encouraging other forms of multilateral cooperation. Specifically,
the success of the SLD in bringing defense ministers and officials together
proved to be a catalyst for the creation of additional multilateral mechan-
isms, including the ADMM and the ADMM+.
ASEAN’s regional defense diplomacy

In 2004, the ASEAN Secretariat was directed by a special ASEAN Senior
Officials’ Meeting to draw up a concept paper for an ADMM. This was seen
as supporting the objectives of the ASEAN Security Community, laid out
in the 2003 Bali Concord II declaration. An ADMM was intended to com-
plement the bilateral and minilateral non-ASEAN centered interactions.
The ADMM convened for the first time in 2006 and has slowly become
more regularized and institutionalized. Defense ministers now meet annually
and are supported by their own ASEAN Defence Senior Officials’ Meeting
(ADSOM). Indeed, given the earlier reluctance to institutionalize high-level
defense diplomacy in Southeast Asia, the growth of interactions among
ASEAN defense officials has been remarkable. As Bhubhindar Singh and
See Seng Tan note, in 2011 alone, ministers or senior officials met almost
once a month, and in a symbolically important step forward, ASEAN
militaries conducted their first multilateral exercise together (Humanitarian
Assistance and Disaster Relief Table-Top Exercise) in July 2011 (Singh and
Tan 2011: 9; Today 2011). There is also a growing sense of confidence in
engaging with outside powers as a collective on defense diplomacy issues.
In October 2011, for example, US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta held
an informal meeting with all the ASEAN defense ministers in the lead-up
to the EAS in Bali (Panetta 2011).
The final piece in the architecture of regional defense diplomacy came
in October 2010 when the ADMM was augmented with the creation of
the ADMM+, bringing in defense ministers from ASEAN+3 as well as
Australia, India, New Zealand, Russia, and the United States. This, along
with the expansion of the EAS to include Russia and the US, cemented
ASEAN+8 as an important new framework for cooperation in the region.
However, despite the enthusiastic welcome it received, the ADMM+ is a
modest process (Capie and Taylor 2010b). First, there are limited ministerial
interactions at the regional level. After meeting in Hanoi in 2010, ministers
will not assemble again in the ASEAN+8 format until 2013 (although there
are moves to make the meetings more regular after this date). Second, the
ADMM+ work plan is modest and focused on less sensitive, non-traditional
security issues. There are five Experts’ Working Groups, each co-chaired by
one ASEAN and one non-ASEAN member. The Working Groups address
peacekeeping, maritime security, military medicine, humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief, and counterterrorism. In addition, the members agreed to
create a senior officials process (ADSOM+) to coordinate the work program
and move suggestions forward for ministerial consideration. Finally, the
ADMM+ is yet to carve out a truly distinctive agenda. Many of the non-
traditional security issues that have been raised within the ADMM+ are
already being addressed by other institutions, for example the ARF or the
EAS. This raises a number of questions: how will the ADMM+ address
these issues differently? What will defense ministers and officials bring to
dialogue and discussions that diplomats do not?
But as is the case with the SLD, it is also possible to see the ADMM+ as
a nascent institution that allows potentially more important bilateral inter-
actions to take place within its confines. The October 2010 Hanoi meeting,
for example, gave US Secretary of Defense Gates and his Chinese counter-
part, General Liang Guanglie, a chance to meet bilaterally on the sidelines.
The same meeting also permitted Chinese and Japanese ministers to talk
at a time when there were deep tensions in their bilateral relationship after
incidents in the East China Sea (Li 2010). It remains to be seen if the
ADMM+ can grow into something more than a multilateral “shell” that
facilitates dialogue and bilateral contacts, but certainly many regional
defense officials are excited about the possibility of building a substantive
work program over time.
Why has multilateral defense diplomacy been a laggard?

This picture of multiple forms of bilateral and multilateral defense
diplomacy at both the highest and working levels raises a number of ques-
tions for theorists of multilateralism. Why is it that Asia-Pacific foreign
128 David Capie
ministers have been able to meet annually through the ARF since 1994, but
it took another 12 years before ASEAN defense ministers could meet in
their own forum, and 16 years before the creation of the ADMM+? Why
has high-level multilateral defense diplomacy been such a late bloomer?
First, part of the reason for the lag lies in the identity of the participants
themselves. Militaries did not meet multilaterally in an inclusive, dialogue-
focused forum because their primary task is not to discuss political issues,
but to manage violence. Unlike foreign ministries, talking about security and
political concerns is not a core function of militaries as organizations.
Second, bureaucratic politics has played its part. In a number of cases,
foreign ministries were reluctant to see defense officials and military officers
intrude upon their turf. In US–Japan relations, the Japanese Ministry
of Foreign Affairs long objected to closer ties between the Japan Self-
Defense Forces and the US military. According to one well-placed source,
bureaucratic politics also prevented Canada from participating in the SLD
until 2008, because “the Canadian foreign ministry didn’t want the defence
ministry stealing the limelight from them” in terms of taking on a more
prominent role in advancing Canada’s Asian regional engagement.3 Canada
was hardly unique in this respect. As one analysis of regional institutions
in Asia notes, “foreign ministries have jealously guarded their prerogatives at
multilateral meetings” (Japan Times 2002).
This begs the question of what changed to permit the ADMM and the
ADMM+ to emerge and flourish? Why have generals and defense ministers
welcomed the chance to now interact multilaterally?
There are broader permissive and more specific initiating factors. The
broader context is the rich institutional architecture that has emerged
since the mid-1990s. The creation of the ARF, ASEAN+3, the EAS, and
a range of other institutions have allowed states that were nervous
about multilateralism to establish a level of comfort and to get used to
participation. The fact that these institutions have focused on dialogue and
discussions rather than pursuing binding confidence-building measures
or intrusive preventive diplomacy initiatives has also eased the fears
of some. The gradual inclusion of defense officials in some limited ARF
activities also helped. For example, in 1997, heads of defense educational
institutions met under the ARF’s auspices, and since 2001, a Defence Offi-
cials Dialogue has been held on the sidelines of the ARF Inter-sessional
Group on Confidence Building Measures. A Chinese-sponsored mechanism,
the Security Policy Conference also brings together senior officials of vice-
minister rank through the ARF.
But if there was a greater level of comfort with multilateralism as an
institutional form after 1994, the success of the SLD also provided a more
specific “push” for greater action by ASEAN in shaping defense diplomacy
institutions. The SLD showed that there was a demand for high-level
defense interactions in the region, and the regular participation of the US
secretary of defense and chiefs of staff provided an incentive for regional
states to send high-ranking delegations. But the SLD also represented a
challenge to ASEAN and its much vaunted “driver’s seat” role. The SLD
was organized by outsiders, a subject of considerable grumbling in the
region, and Southeast Asian governments did not control its agenda or
modalities. A suggestion in 2002 by the head of the Japan Defense Agency
to convert the SLD into an Asian Defense Ministers’ Meeting was
blocked by ASEAN (Tan 2011: 30). ASEAN’s decision to convene an inter-
governmental defense diplomacy process through the ADMM and then the
ADMM+, was partly about filling a gap in the region’s security architecture,
but also partly about acting to retain control over what was becoming an
increasingly vibrant aspect of regional diplomacy.
Bilateralism and multilateralism in defense diplomacy

The above survey makes it clear that bilateral and multilateral diplomacy
are both an important if underappreciated part of Asia’s emerging regional
security order. Defense diplomacy is not new, nor has it followed
a steady incremental path from bilateralism into multilateralism. While
bilateral, high-level defense diplomacy has always been an important part
of alliance relationships across the broader region and among states in
Southeast Asia, it coexisted with inclusive and often intensive multilateral
interactions at the working level.
That notwithstanding, links between bilateral and multilateral defense
interactions have historically been uneven. Multilateral working level
arrangements such as the WPNS and PAMS were underpinned by the
United States military and designed to reinforce US alliance relationships
and partnerships, even when they expanded to include non-likeminded states
such as China. Although these mechanisms have been a useful confidence-
building instrument, there is little evidence that they acted as an inspiration
or a building block for higher-level multilateralism, either at the subregional
or regional level.
There is also little evidence of a connection between a growing range
of bilateral defense diplomacy relationships and the working programs
agreed under multilateral arrangements like the ADMM+. This seems to be
an area where greater synergies can be encouraged in the future. To give one
example, New Zealand has looked at peacekeeping (especially related
legal training) as an area where it has expertise and skills to share in its
regional defense diplomacy and in its bilateral military ties with Vietnam.
Resources, however, are one factor that limits what can be done. One
possibility would be to look at building connections to the better resourced
defense diplomacy activities of other regional states (particularly Australia,
which has its own large bilateral defense diplomacy relationship with
Vietnam) and ultimately link those to the work programs under the auspices
of the relevant ADMM+ Experts’ Working Group.4 The result would
be that bilateral ties would be complementary and serve to reinforce
130 David Capie
multilateral efforts at confidence building and help grow capacity relevant
for the advancement of regional public goods.
Without better coordination there is the risk that defense diplomacy
could fall victim to the problems of duplication that have affected multi-
lateral diplomacy more generally. Some have argued that overlapping
institutional arrangements can actually undermine regional order (Tow and
Taylor 2010). While it may have been possible to argue that during the
1990s institutions and alliances were heading towards the possibility of
“convergent security,” they raise the specter that new mechanisms may
actually become arenas for competition, not cooperation (on “convergent
security,” see Tow 2001).
Concerns about duplication of mandates and overlapping activities in
defense cooperation are cogent. The defense diplomacy space is becoming
increasingly crowded. For example, the inaugural Jakarta International
Defence Dialogue, held in February 2011, seemed to market itself as a
rival to the SLD, offering not just high-level political and military inter-
actions but also a significant link to defense industry (Jakarta Post 2011).
The agenda of the ADMM+, especially its focus on non-traditional security
issues such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, also overlaps
significantly with the ARF. But although it is hard to see many positives in
duplication, forums like SLD and the ADMM+ still seem to serve different
functions, and it remains to be seen if new arrivals on the scene, like the
Jakarta International Defence Dialogue, can generate the same degree of
attention and status and survive into the medium term.
For the time being, states seem to see bilateral and multilateral defense
diplomacy as largely complementary. In the SLD, for example, the
intense bilateral diplomacy that occurs on the sidelines of the meeting is a
more important rationale for participation than any multilateral interac-
tions. In the ADMM+, it may be that its inter-sessional work program
can bring new energy into multilateral defense interactions, even while
bilateral encounters will continue to be seen as a significant side benefit of
participation (see, for example, Bower 2010).
The pattern of institutionalization in defense diplomacy also seems to
contain some paradoxes. A reason sometimes given for ASEAN’s inability
to agree to a high-level multilateral defense forum until 2006 is the fear
that it might see third parties become involved in bilateral disputes. Yet, the
Southeast Asian experience also shows that some bilateral defense relation-
ships seemed to benefit from interactions within institutions that have a
broader membership. The most notable example is the fractious Singapore–
Malaysia defense relationship, which at times was smoothed over by being
able to work alongside Australia, New Zealand, and the UK in the FPDA.
Similar effects have been seen in the ADMM+, where it was less politically
sensitive for Japanese and Chinese defense officials to meet on the sidelines
in Hanoi in late 2010, than to try and schedule a separate bilateral meeting
so soon after a confrontation in the East China Sea.
How important then is Asia’s defense diplomacy? Despite the flurry of
activity in formal inter-governmental multilateralism, defense diplomacy
remains at an embryonic stage. There is little evidence that it will usher in a
dramatically different set of security relations, even as a new category of
actors comes to play a more important role in regional diplomacy. Although
there has been considerable excitement about the possibilities ushered in by
the ADMM and the ADMM+, these arrangements share a great deal in
common with earlier forms of multilateral security cooperation. They are
dialogue based and stress informality rather than rule making, they empha-
size sovereignty and non-interference, and so far they have been reluctant to
address the region’s most intractable security concerns. This is not to dismiss
their importance. As Alastair Iain Johnston has shown, even the much
criticized ARF performed a valuable function in encouraging Chinese
participation in multilateral discussions (Johnston 2008). There is the possi-
bility that the new multilateral defense diplomacy structures could have
a similar socializing impact on regional military elites, particularly those
who have traditionally had an inward-focused domestic security role. But
those anxious to see regional defense diplomacy rapidly lead to bold and
binding measures – for example arms control or transparency agreements –
are likely to be disappointed.
Notes
1 For a lengthy discussion of the British understanding, see Ministry of Defence,
UK (2000: 18).
2 In 2010, control of the General Border Committee shifted from the Thai
defense ministry to the foreign ministry. The Malaysian counterpart is now the
Permanent Secretary for Natural Resources and Environment.
3 Interview with former International Institute for Strategic Studies Council
member, cited in Capie and Taylor (2010a: 363).
4 Interview with New Zealand Ministry of Defence official, Wellington, May 2011.
Part IV
The nexus and Asian

security order
10 The rise of China and the
transformation of Asia-Pacific
security architecture
Ryo Sahashi
Over a decade has passed since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.
The American people are reassessing the global “war on terror,” as they
consider the tremendous expansion of their country’s defense spending
(now projected to shrink) and national debt (which remains frustratingly
protracted). They are at the same time observing with perhaps increasing
envy the economic status of the newly emerging countries (Apps 2011). US
interest in Asia is growing, reflecting the anticipation that Asia can serve
as the future engine for economic growth, but there is also concern over
latent instability in the region (German Marshall Fund of the United States
et al. 2011). In the wake of the recent global financial crisis, it seems as if
the moment for anticipating American “unipolarity” has passed, and the
focus is moving to discussions on the global power shifts and the potential
Cambios en el orden unipolar
changes to the international order that entails. President Barack Obama’s donde EEUU era el hegemón.
recent heralding of an American “pivot strategy” towards the Asia-Pacific

has reinforced these trends (Washington Post 2011). The United States
seems to be greeting the Asian “revival” with its own “return” to Asia.
This “American return to the region,” however, does not mean that US Parece que está
desactualizada la visión
bajo la cual la
primacy will dominate Asia-Pacific regional security politics as many ana- construcción de la
seguridad en Asia sigue
lysts anticipated at the turn of the century (Mastanduno 2003; Wohlforth estando EEUU.
sustentada en
1999). As countries with differing values have risen, there have been many
debates over how that will transform the liberal international order and the
regional order in the Asia-Pacific, both of which have been premised upon
US hegemony (see, for example, Ikenberry 2011). In order to contribute to
that discussion, it is important to consider in specific terms how the rise
of China will affect the international community, relations between countries
within the region, and regional architecture. Contrary to what would be
expected according to traditional international relations theory, up until this
point the rise of China has not produced attempts at simple balancing,
shifts in allegiances, or a concert of powers. Balancing and soft-balancing
acts emerge, but do so simultaneously with an accommodation of China’s
rising power. This phenomenon may be nothing more than a transitional
phase, and it is also important to look ahead and project what might Es necesario ver el
asenso de China
develop in the future. At the same time, however, if we can grasp the shifts como un fenómeno
que no
simplemente
produce
reacomodamientos
en el balance de
poder. Es más que
una fase de
transición.
136 Ryo Sahashi
that are occurring at this stage in inter-state relations, we will be able to
better understand the unique circumstances surrounding China’s rise.
The postwar security architecture in Asia-Pacific has been marked by the
coexistence of the American bilateral “hub and spokes” alliance system,
“special relations” between communist bloc countries, and the broader
regional frameworks – primarily centered on the Association of Southeast Arquitectura basada en el sistema
americano de alianzas bilaterales;
relaciones especiales entre países del
Asian Nations (ASEAN) – that encompass the whole region and encourage bloque comunista y marcos regionales
(ASEAN)
cooperation among member states. That architecture is now changing.

A great deal of attention has been paid to the increasing importance of non-
traditional security agendas as a factor in this transition, but this chapter
will focus on another firmly rooted factor, the rise of China and the power
shift that is now underway. The US alliance network has been building on
existing alliances to strengthen increasing cooperation between non-allied
countries as well. For example, the Strategic Survey 2011 noted that there
were clear efforts by countries to try to balance China’s capabilities and
strategic intentions by strengthening diplomatic and military cooperation
with the United States, engaging China in multilateral institutions, and
acquiring their own military capability. The report concluded that “China’s
military rise is an important contributory factor to the arms race which …
is increasingly apparent in the Asia-Pacific region” (IISS 2011a: 137).
At the same time, however, it is worth noting that while both the United
States and China are competing for securing diplomatic and security coop-
eration with small and medium-size states in the region, efforts are being
made by these regional powers to strengthen the inclusive bilateral and
multilateral negotiations and institutions that involve both China and the
United States. At this point, the rise of China has not yet tipped the scales
in favor of power balancing over institutional approaches to order-building.
It is a reality that a combination of security agreements and efforts that both
counter Chinese power and that “socialize” China into participating in
order-building processes is being pursued.
Why are these ambiguous trends prevailing to date? Why are we in a
continual state of strategic hedging? These questions will be addressed in
this chapter. First, given the deepening dependence on China in terms of
regional economic viability, counterbalancing the increasing complexity
of complementary and competitive national security interests at play in the Los dos intereses en
disputa en la región.
region, the United States and China, as well as small and medium states, are
trying to avoid overt political and military confrontations. The heightened
political influence of China is increasing the appeal and applicability of
institutions and negotiations in a way that conceals the potential for regional
conflict. Second, it is also possible that even in an era of power shifts, there
is an awareness that the predominance of the United States and its alliance
network endure, at least over the short-term. There is little rationale for any
regional country to accept China’s political influence to the extent that
it would entail relinquishing its own autonomy. At the same time, these
countries have expectations about the deterrence posture and common
The rise of China 137
goods that the United States needs to provide. The process through which
the United States and small and medium states have “mutually recon-
firmed” that the Obama administration’s “return” to Asia has offered at
least temporary satisfaction in this context. Finally, the degree of conflict
with China that small and medium states are facing is not presently a matter
of having their political and economic systems overthrown. It is rather
one of Chinese prevalence in ongoing territorial conflicts and Beijing’s
increasing political influence. For that reason, small and medium states
in the region are seeking outside support (most often from the United
States) to bolster their military capabilities while simultaneously channeling
the influence and resources of major powers into helping them achieve their
preferred versions of rule creation and soft balancing for the region.
Los países
Although concerned about the potential loss of their autonomy through pequeños y
cooperation with great powers, and in order to maximize their interests and medianos se
preocupan por
maintain the existing order, middle-sized and small regional states have pérdidas
potenciales de
adopted the line that they should maintain a distance that is “not too su autonomía a
partir de la
close and not too far” from the great powers. cooperación con
We are therefore now witnessing a transitional period, and the future grandes
poderes.
direction of change will be largely affected by the trends in US–China rela-
tions. While continuing to pursue regional stability, China and the United
States will probably undergo periods of both conflict and cooperation as a
result of the two countries’ different perceptions of the international order
and their desire to exercise a leadership role. Despite the aspirations of
ASEAN members and other regional actors, institutions can only play a
limited role under such circumstances. The Asia-Pacific regional order
will be stable if the areas of agreement between the United States and China
expand, and if inclusive rather than exclusive institutions develop in the
region. While bilateral cooperation between the United States and China
may at times raise concerns among small and medium states, if the two
countries were to begin vying for political influence over those small and
medium states, the result would be an increasingly unstable regional order.
Inclusivity underlying future order building is the key to regional stability
and this argument will be developed below.
The rise of China

What kinds of change is the rise of China bringing about in international
relations? In order to answer that question we must begin by clarifying the
scope of our discussion. For the purposes of this chapter, the focus will
be limited to the security aspects in the Asia-Pacific region. More specifi-
cally the concern is how the shifting balance of power that China’s rise
represents will change alliance-based cooperation as well as functional
diplomacy and regionwide security cooperation beyond alliances, and to
what extent such changes are interrelated (on this three-tier approach, see
Sahashi 2012a). After first discussing the theoretical reactions to a more
138 Ryo Sahashi
powerful China, the next three sections consider how that is reflected in
alliances, functional cooperation, and regionwide cooperation. Finally,
the security and order-building outlooks for the Asia-Pacific region will
be assessed in terms of this transitional period possibly leading to a long-
term power shift in China’s favor.
Responses to China’s rise

In the late 2020s, the Chinese economy is expected to surpass that of the
United States in terms of nominal gross domestic product. If the current
trend of a shrinking US defense budget and steadily growing People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) continues, it is possible that China will catch up to
the United States in military spending as well in the 2030s (Jimbo et al.
2011; Economist 2012). It is also predicted that the level of trade dependence
on China among countries in the region will increase. For example, it is
predicted that Japan’s trade with China will increase from the current
level of 20 percent of Japan’s total trade to more than 40 percent by 2030
(Mori et al. 2011).
In an era of globalization and rapidly deepening interdependence, what
type of response can be expected from great powers and small and medium
states to a China growing so strong (Chan 2010)? When thinking about how
the great powers will respond, power transition theory may provide a clue.
According to A.F.K. Organski, as the relative power of a dominant great
power and a rival nation becomes more similar and the latter tries to
achieve parity, it becomes difficult for the dominant nation to maintain the
status quo through deterrence or coercive diplomacy. The existing hegemon
therefore opts to create defensive alliances, while the dissatisfied challenger teoría de la
has the motive to bring about change in order to fulfill its own objectives. transición de
poder.
Opinions are divided over which of these developments comes first, but the preocupación
fundamental concern is that this situation can produce wars between great de guerra
entre ambos
powers. Power transition theory, however, does not adequately consider países.
economic interdependence or the existence of common interests between
hegemonic and rival states. In addition to looking at whether or not the
challenger nation is satisfied with the status quo, attention must also be paid
to the great power’s preferences, the extent of increasing opportunities for
negotiation, and the role of institutions, and those elements must be incor-
porated into the analysis as well (Organski 1958; Kugler and Lemke 2000;
Levy 2008).
To address these factors, Randall Schweller (1999) offers a useful frame-
work. If the intentions and actions of rising powers that are seeking to revise
the status quo remain limited, then a dominant great power that has
a propensity toward risk aversion will opt for engagement and binding
through negotiations and institutions. If the rising power has “revolut-
ionary” intentions, on the other hand, and makes those intentions clear
through its revisionist behavior, the risk-averse dominant power will act to
balance the power of its rival. Dominant powers are not always averse
to risk, however. A country may become willing to accept risk for
domestic political reasons, such as a change in leadership. Also, because
dominant powers need to create and maintain defensive alliances, one
cannot eliminate the possibility that a dominant power will act in a risk-
acceptant way in order to gain the trust of a small or medium state. In such
a case, the power-balancing actions toward the rising power would
become more provocative, and revolutionary actions by the rising power
would raise the danger of a preventive war. However, with increased inter-
dependence brought about by globalization and the high cost of war in
the nuclear age, the scope for risk acceptance has become substantially
narrower, and a preventive war in particular would be difficult.
How do small and medium states respond to a rising power? Noting that
Cómo
realists have different views on this question, Robert Ross asserts that in responden
areas where China’s relative power is increasing vis-à-vis that of the United los países
States, small and medium states are choosing to bandwagon with China and pequeños y
are not strengthening cooperation with the United States, while in areas medianos al
where the United States military power is still adequate for maintaining ascenso de
un poder.
the status quo – particularly in maritime Asia where America has naval
supremacy – they are choosing to cooperate with the United States (Ross
2006: 364). However, it would be a misinterpretation to conclude that the
response of small and medium states, including ASEAN members, is caught
in a dichotomy between allegiance to China and the promotion of security
cooperation with the United States.
Even today, we do not see countries in the region completely sacrificing
their ties to one country and allying themselves with the other. The stance
evident among Southeast Asian nations is to try to enmesh the great powers Los países
in regional institutions and norms where they are better able to control del Sudeste
Asiático no
order building. Evelyn Goh examines the diplomatic stance of Southeast
están
Asian nations and notes that they are not choosing one or the other escogiendo
great power, but rather are consciously promoting the formation of the bandos.
regional community as a whole, and pursuing both the “omni-enmeshment” Están
of great powers and a balance of influence. Since inclusive institutions can motivando
instituciones
contribute to this objective, they are expanding membership to the great
inclusivas.
powers (Goh 2007/08). Why are small and medium states trying to avoid
choosing sides? Because forming an alliance with one great power implies a
loss of autonomy. An alliance can be seen as a trade-off between autonomy
and security, and so if the small and medium states are trying to ensure
Evitan tomar
their autonomy, that provides them a motive for stopping short of an alli-
bandos
ance affiliation and instead pursuing loose security cooperation. Also, these porque esto
smaller nations tend to be more politically and economically reliant on both significa
China and the United States, and if they see a benefit in maintaining those perder
relationships, that provides an even stronger motivation (Morrow 1991). autonomía
Of course, small and medium states might not abandon efforts to enhance
their capability to provide for their own country’s security, but instead act to
140 Ryo Sahashi
achieve maximum gains at minimal cost. Cheng-Chwee Kuik, who writes
about hedging strategy, designates five diplomatic or strategic approaches
to guard against risk and uncertainty: indirect balancing, dominance
denial, economic pragmatism to maximize returns, binding engagement, and
limited bandwagoning. These are often undertaken simultaneously and
represent the essence of hedging (Kuik 2008). The objectives and measures
within these five approaches commonly overlap. The strategic hedging
behavior of small and medium states is probably best defined as the simul-
taneous pursuit of three objectives: the acquisition or strengthening of
deterrence and coping capabilities, soft balancing, and integration (Jimbo
et al. 2011). “Soft balancing” implies the creation of an equilibrium with Importante
the influence of great powers, while integration indicates the inclusion of
great powers in the regional and international order. Small and medium
states typically employ these options simultaneously, which lie in between
all-out balancing and bandwagoning, in an attempt to maintain their
autonomy to the greatest extent possible and at the same time maximize
their benefit. In cases where an alliance with a great power has already been
formed, the country has already accepted a loss of autonomy to a certain
degree. In order to meet the expectations of the allied great power, therefore,
the balance among its options will be weighted slightly toward adopting
a deterrence posture that leans more toward its ally than those countries
with which it does not have an alliance.
Soft balancing is indirect and is a control denial behavior. According to
Robert Pape, at the stage where small and medium states have not yet
been able to arrange a coalition against a great power, those states can apply
non-military means, such as international institutions, economic statecraft,
and neutrality, to prevent the use of force by the great power (Pape 2005).
Kai He presents institutional balancing as a form of soft balancing, stating
that in an age of interdependence, this option is frequently selected based
on cost–benefit considerations. In the same essay, He posits that under the
conditions of unipolarity, non-hegemonic powers will attempt exclusionary
institutional balancing to counter the hegemonic power, while under multi-
polar conditions they will pursue inclusive institutions to bind potential
threats (He 2008). The need to secure their interests and autonomy from
El ascenso de
any great power, and the difficulty of achieving cooperation, leads small and China ha
medium states to opt for soft balancing. The difficulty in cooperation stems incrementado
from asymmetrical information and differing threat perceptions. la
The rise of China has led to an increase in security cooperation among cooperación
the great powers and the small and medium states in the Asia-Pacific region, en materia de
seguridad
and to the development of inclusive institutions. This can be understood in entre
the context of the framework described above. If revisionist behavior by grandes
a rising China became evident, it would give the United States a motive poderes y los
to undertake regional order-building strategies that incorporate power- países
balancing components. However, at this point in time, small and medium medios y
pequeños.
states do not perceive a sufficient Chinese threat to make them choose to
create a formal alliance amongst themselves or to intensify alliance ties with
Washington. Since they are at a stage where they have not yet succeeded
at coordination, they thus favor the enmeshment of the great powers
through inclusive institutions. As a result, they are pursuing informal
security cooperation with the United States, while at the same time working
to develop inclusive regional institutions over the longer term. At the same
time they are also attempting to strengthen their relations with China in
order to maintain balance in their bilateral relations with Beijing. The
influence China holds is not strong enough, however, to prevent countries
from engaging in behavior that Chinese leaders may find to be undesirable.
China has not been able to gain concessions on territorial issues, let alone
stop rival claimants from strengthening their ties to the United States
(Goh 2011c). Even so, small and medium states are working to maximize
their interests – and their autonomy – by maintaining their relations with
China, and maintaining their autonomy by persuading China to become
integrated through regional institutions. While the great powers recognize
the benefit of trying to pull small and medium states away from other great
powers through diplomatic policies, they have still not been able to achieve
that objective (Morgenthau 1970). While the United States continues to
be dominant militarily, the political bipolarity between the United States
and China is increasing. Nonetheless, there has not yet been a division of
the small and medium states into two camps.
Background and status of shifts in the alliance network
The changing American posture

In its first three years, the Obama administration has forged a strong
strategy of a US “return” to the Asia-Pacific. US Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton has repeatedly emphasized that position, making more trips to the
region than her predecessors (Clinton 2010b). In July 2010, when attending
the ASEAN Regional Forum, she confirmed US support for the freedom of
navigation and open access to maritime commons in the South China Sea,
and called for a resolution of disputes in accordance with the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, a stance on which the foreign ministers
of the ten ASEAN members concurred (Glaser and Billingsley 2010). In
July 2011, the US commitment to the Asia-Pacific region was repeatedly
acknowledged and emphasized (Gates 2011; Muradian and Minnick 2011).
The US pivot to Asia has also progressed in the form of increased port calls
by naval vessels and assistance for capacity building. Even as its military
budget is shrinking, the US effort to secure its commitment and its budget
for its efforts as a “Pacific nation” was drawing attention.
In late 2011, Secretary of State Clinton reaffirmed the importance of Asia
policy and outlined the six pillars of that policy: strengthening bilateral
security alliances, deepening cooperative relations with China and other
142 Ryo Sahashi
emerging nations, engaging in the region’s multilateral institutions, expand-
ing trade and investment, pursuing a broad-based military presence, and
strengthening democracy and human rights. Clinton (2011a: 58) stated:
“[o]ur challenge now is to build a web of partnerships and institutions across
the Pacific that is as durable and as consistent with American interests and
values as the web we have built across the Atlantic.”
Interestingly, after touching on the importance of the US alliances
with Japan and South Korea, she described the alliance with Australia,
saying, “[w]e are also expanding our alliance with Australia from a Pacific
partnership to an Indo-Pacific one, and indeed a global partnership”
(Clinton 2011a: 59). She also noted that the United States was increasing the
number of ship visits to the Philippines and was working to train Filipino
counterterrorism forces through the Joint Special Operations Task Force
in Mindanao. In terms of US–China relations, not only did Clinton point to
the importance of military dialogue, but she also indicated the intention
to embed US–China relations in human rights issues, existing alliances, and
economic and social relations. She made it clear that the US goal was to
maintain a rules-based order. Clinton’s words emphasized the importance of
values in America’s desired order, and thus India and Indonesia were
lumped together and treated as important democratic countries with large
populations. In relation to Vietnam, Clinton emphasized encouraging
reform of governance capabilities, human rights conditions, and political
freedoms in the context of engagement (Clinton 2011a; Campbell 2011).
President Obama’s and Secretary Clinton’s visits to Asia-Pacific in Novem-
ber 2011, and her remarks, confirmed the US “return” to Asia. The President’s
announcement that US marines would be undertaking rotational deployments
near Darwin complemented a subsequent announcement about the relocation
of marine detachments from Okinawa to Guam in giving the so-called US
rebalancing strategy toward Asia actual substance (Manyin et al. 2012;
Sahashi 2012b). In June 2012, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced
that the US Navy would “reposture” its forces in favor of the Pacific over
the Atlantic including six aircraft carriers to be deployed (Panetta 2012).
The core security policy motivation for the United States is to maintain a
rules-based order, ensure access to sea lanes, and maintain its leadership
position based on strategic primacy. Reacting to the criticism that during the
George W. Bush administration’s global “war on terror” the United States
had neglected Asia, the Obama administration felt it important to show
its “return” to Asia to counterbalance China’s rise and growing influence
as well as the concern in the region that America’s foreign policy posture
had changed (Office of the US Secretary of Defense 2011).
Strengthening and expanding the alliance network

An alliance is defined as “a formal or informal commitment for security
cooperation between two or more states” (Walt 1997: 157). Realists have
observed that alliances are formed as a means of balancing power by
combining the national power of multiple like-minded countries. Small and
medium states in the Asia-Pacific have formed alliances with the United
States undoubtedly influenced by their perception of a benefit in bandwa-
goning with a “benign hegemon.” Since the end of the Cold War, countries
with similar values have continued to maintain alliance relations with
Washington because of their shared interest with US policy planners
in maintaining the international order and dealing with security risks.
Unlike the formation of the multilateral North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion, the bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific region were constructed in a
“hub and spokes” pattern with the United States at the hub. There were
a number of factors that contributed to this. Following the Second World
War, there were quite a few countries in Asia that were newly emerging
nations and who valued American security guarantees that may be extended
to them. There was also a lingering distrust of Japan, the defeated wartime
power, thus making it difficult to create a multilateral alliance that included
that country. There was also a hidden prejudice in the United States, which
viewed Asia as a politically immature region. In addition, because a number
of countries had a strong desire to change the status quo – for example,
South Korea, which became a “divided nation” during the Cold War; the
Republic of China after its relocation to Taiwan; and South Vietnam –
for the United States to be able to constrain its allies, bilateral alliances
were preferred. By creating alliance relationships that could remain asym-
metrical, it would lessen the opportunities for the other party to speak out
(Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002).
Even after the end of the Cold War and up until today, the “hub and
spokes” alliance system, along with forward deployment, have formed the
nucleus of America’s Asia strategy. Over the past several years as well,
there has been a notable strengthening of US–Japan, US–Australia, and
US–South Korea relations. In June 2011, the American and Japanese
Foreign and Defense Ministers expanded their common strategic objectives
at their Security Consultative Committee, incorporating many items on
the agenda that could be interpreted as reflecting an awareness of
China’s growing power and influence (Sahashi 2011). Similarly, at the 2011
Australia–United States Ministerial (AUSMIN) consultations that bring
together foreign affairs and defense officials from the two countries,
there were a number of items on the agenda that seemed to be largely
“China-centric,” such as cooperation on cybersecurity, renewed delibera-
tions on the increased deployment of US military and related facilities
to Australia, and the use of military force in the South China Sea
(AUSMIN 2011; The Australian, 17 September 2011). President Obama’s
November 2011 visit to Canberra also confirmed this trend with the afore-
mentioned plan of rotation of US marines on Australian soil. In US–South
Korea relations, the emergence of a conservative administration and
the escalating tensions on the Korean peninsula in 2010 provided incentives
144 Ryo Sahashi
to strengthen ties. China’s relatively tepid response after the sinking of
a South Korean naval vessel, the Cheonan, hardened popular opinion in
South Korea toward China.
The Philippines is involved in a dispute with China over territory in the
South China Sea, and tensions began to intensify around 2005. The
tripartite Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking, which was carried out by
the Philippines, China, and Vietnam, ended in 2008. In 2011, foreign and
defense ministry talks between the United States and the Philippines were
carried out at the bureau chief-level. President Benigno Aquino III’s gov-
ernment decided to purchase a US Coast Guard Hamilton-class cutter, and
in a speech in September 2011 in New York, he listed maritime security as
a “security imperative” for the Philippines, noting that the country had
committed 40 billion pesos (roughly US$925 million) to modernize its
armed forces over the next five years. President Aquino also visited China in
August 2011. While taking pains to maintain relations with that country,
he has refused to make any concessions on territorial issues with China and
has instead signed an agreement with the United States, Manila’s only
formal ally, to lease weapons and equipment. He has also pressed for a
clear commitment from Washington to intervene in any future crisis that
may erupt between his country and China (Aquino 2011; IISS Strategic
Comments 2011; Simon 2011a).
Singapore and the United States signed a Strategic Framework Agree-
ment in 2005. Although the two countries are not formally allied, US naval
vessels made approximately 150 port calls to Singapore in 2010 alone,
signifying a major military presence. Having recognized the power shift
underway in Asia, Singapore is proactively trying to use America’s engage-
ment in the region as a means to ensure its own country’s autonomy
(Tan 2009). At the June 2011 Shangri-La Dialogue, US Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates stated that the United States would deploy cutting-edge
Littoral Combat Ships to Singapore, demonstrating that the United States
also views Singapore’s geographic position as important and intends to
make use of that (Gates 2011; Storey 2011c; Simon 2011a).
India and the United States similarly have no formal treaty alliance,
and given India’s longstanding preference for non-alignment policies, the
prospects for such an alliance are slim. But the two countries are still
engaged in high-level security cooperation. Indeed, US–India collaboration
has been focused on the war against terror and many other non-traditional
security issues, and there are high expectations in that regard. India has
also been emphasizing agreements on technology cooperation in nuclear
energy and other relevant security areas. However, US–India military exer-
cises such as Malabar are related to operations at the tactical level and
are qualitatively different to multilateral exercises involving non-allied
nations that focus on humanitarian relief and disaster response and that
are carried out frequently in the Western Pacific (US 7th Fleet Public
Affairs 2011).
“Intra-spoke” security cooperation among US allies has also been evident
in recent years, creating what might be called an “alliance web.” One factor
underlying the intensification of such cooperation is the low “transaction
costs” created precisely because these countries are US allies. These efforts
are expected to handle activities that belong to a middle ground of capacity
building, warning and surveillance, and deterrence. Japan–Australia rela-
tions have experienced the most notable progress, as the Trilateral Strategic
Dialogue (US–Japan–Australia) has convened since 2006 and joint training
exercises are carried out. Japan–India relations are following a similar
trajectory, as in addition to US–Japan–India trilateral exercises, a US–
Japan–India strategic dialogue at the bureau chief-level was held
in Washington during December 2011 and plans for a joint Japan–India
bilateral naval exercise were announced in early May 2012. Japan and South
Korea have likewise been looking for ways to strengthen their relationship as
the situation on the Korean peninsula deteriorated in 2010. Recent reports
indicate that the two countries are close to signing agreements on military
cooperation in logistics, intelligence, and search and rescue operations
(Agence France-Presse 2012). In addition to the holding of a trilateral
meeting of the foreign ministers of the United States, Japan, and South
Korea, the strengthening of trilateral relations was confirmed in a joint
statement issued at the June 2011 US–Japan Security Consultative Com-
mittee (so-called “2+2”). In June 2009, Japan and the Philippines had
agreed to form a strategic partnership, and in September 2011, President
Aquino visited Tokyo and agreed with Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko to
bolster maritime security ties (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 2009).
Moreover, there have been efforts to broaden the scope of Australia–India,
Australia–South Korea, and South Korea–India relations through declara-
tions on security cooperation and other means.
A “mutual reaffirmation” of US engagement and the

management of relations with China
The US alliance network has become stronger in recent years. The United
States and its allies have included many non-traditional security issues
among the global security threats they are addressing, and the same trend
is evident in cooperation among the “spoke” countries as well. Such coop-
eration is one means being used to strengthen the network, and is also partly
aimed at maintaining the global order, but another important objective is to
balance the rise of China. In order to maintain viable relations with Beijing,
US allies and partners are avoiding any explicit indication of strengthening
their deterrence posture or securing political influence in the context of
China’s rise. However, by promoting cooperation on cybersecurity, maritime
security, and other issues, and by spelling out their burden-sharing with the
United States across a broad area, America’s allies are demonstrating
their intention of underpinning the US commitment to the region. By the
146 Ryo Sahashi
same token, the United States is also confirming its solidarity with its allies
and partner countries and promoting greater cooperation with them as
a way of preserving its own interests, the current order (which is inseparably
connected to its interests), and its regional strategic predominance and a
reasonably stable regional order.
The strengthening of the “intra-spoke” dimension of the US alliance
network does not really entail large-scale military expansion or strategic
shifts on the part of these allied states. The reason for that seems to be
that America’s allies recognize that the United States will continue to be the
predominant regional power for the foreseeable future (Cohen 2011),
and so despite their wariness over a decline in US engagement due to
domestic politics and recent preoccupations with the Persian Gulf and
Central Asia, they still retain confidence that US regional engagement
will persist (for example, see the comments of Japanese participants in
Finnegan 2009).
This underlying confidence in the “US insurance role” explains the
willingness of small and medium regional states to strengthen relations
with China as well. In particular, since the Thaksin Shinawatra administra-
tion, Thailand has been trying to strengthen military ties with China
through the observation of military exercises, arms purchases, education,
joint training, and other means. The Joint Action Plan on Strategic
Cooperation between Thailand and China, signed in 2007, intensified
security dialogues and joint military training between the two countries.
They have carried out joint training of special forces, and there has
even been a proposal to jointly develop weapons. In terms of economic
relations as well, Thailand is becoming increasingly dependent on China
(Storey 2011a: 134–42; also see Chulacheeb Chinwanno, Chapter 6 in this
volume).
Under the Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo administration, the Philippines
also at first accepted massive financing from China for railroad construction
and agreed to joint exploration in the South China Sea by state-owned
corporations from China and the Philippines. After the Philippines pulled its
troops out of Iraq in 2004, China made numerous proposals for military
exchanges. Subsequently, these projects were all halted due to increased
domestic instability in the Philippines. However, the country’s trade with
China continued to grow, and the importance of attracting investment
from China remains unaltered even under the Aquino administration. In
March 2011, after word spread that China had blocked a study of energy
resources in the disputed area by the Philippines, President Aquino used
a meeting with Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie to try to calm the
situation, and in August he visited Beijing to attract Chinese direct invest-
ment in the Philippines (Storey 2011a: 259–66). Throughout the second part
of 2011 and into 2012, however, the two countries’ territorial dispute in
the South China Sea dominated Sino-Philippines relations (see Renato Cruz
De Castro, Chapter 5 in this volume).
Australia, Japan, and South Korea are finding their economic inter-
dependence with China is deepening much in the same way as Southeast
Asia. Their policy actions are focused on using China’s growth for advan-
cing their own economic interests and drawing China further into the inter-
national order. Australia is emphasizing China’s integration into the
international community and its inclusion in the Asia-Pacific order-building
architecture. Although the Australian Labor Party administrations of Kevin
Rudd and Julia Gillard have been wary of China, their governments have
nonetheless carried out joint exercises with the Chinese navy. In 2010,
Japan’s and South Korea’s relations with China became increasingly tense,
given the North Korean situation and in terms of worsening Japanese and
South Korean public sentiment toward China. However, through exchanges
of government officials and other interaction, the two countries made efforts
to improve their ties with China, and in 2011 a Trilateral Cooperation
Secretariat opened in Seoul.
The deepening of non-alliance-based diplomatic and

security cooperation
The expansion of functionalist security cooperation

There has been a notable rise in what could be termed “functionalist”
security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region – cooperation that is not
based on an alliance and is not intended to develop into an alliance. Fearing
the loss of their autonomy and not being willing to accept the costs that
would be incurred by strengthening ties to one great power or the other,
small and medium states have increased their security cooperation with each
other. The primary goal is to address security challenges, but such coopera-
tion is also intended in part to balance relations with the great powers as
and when appropriate. Because international terrorism is using and targeting
not only land-based transportation routes but maritime routes as well, and
because there is a need to address issues such as piracy, international crime,
smuggling, and natural disasters, there has been an increase in maritime
security cooperation among countries in the region – from the littoral states
of the Western Pacific to those in the Indian Ocean. However, China’s
expanding strategic reach and its increasing friction with small and medium
states have encouraged the latter to acquire greater military capabilities of
their own (SIPRI 2011). In addition, an increasing number of small and
medium states are trying to strengthen their ties to the United States, in part
as a way to ensure a countervailing political influence. However, there is
little possibility of this trend developing into a full-fledged movement toward
alliance politics. Rather, the intent is still to combine this response with the
pursuit of an inclusive, comprehensive, regional framework.
Relations between the United States and non-allied small and medium
Asia-Pacific states are being strengthened. This is being done through
148 Ryo Sahashi
exchanges of visits by senior government officials and the issuing of joint
statements, enhanced staff-level exchanges, visits by naval vessels, participa-
tion in humanitarian missions, provision of training and technology related
to facilities and equipment, and other types of training (Bradford 2011).
In 2010, Indonesia and the United States reached an agreement on a
Defense Framework Agreement. Following a visit by President Obama to
Jakarta, the two countries launched the US–Indonesia Comprehensive
Partnership. Prior to this, Indonesia had participated in exercises led by
the US military through the RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific) exercise, Cobra
Gold, and CARAT (Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training). At the
2010 RIMPAC, land exercises were held together involving both Indonesia
and Malaysia for the first time. Also in recent years the United States has
provided Indonesia with rigid-hulled inflatable boats and improved its radar
facilities. In the fall of 2011, the Indonesian government set up a meeting of
the ASEAN defense ministers to correspond with a visit by US Secretary
of State Leon Panetta, and they agreed to purchase 24 used F-16 fighter
planes from the US military once they were upgraded to current standards
(Bradford 2011; Embassy of the United States, Jakarta 2011a, 2011b).
Various analysts point to improved US relations with Malaysia as a
successful example of its strengthening ties to Southeast Asian nations
(“2010: The Year in Review” 2011). There has been more increasing contact
between the Malaysian navy and the US 7th Fleet, including between
submarines, and the number of port calls by US naval vessels has tripled
over the past five years (Bradford 2011: 196). US–Vietnam relations have
also been improving. In August 2011 they signed an agreement between
the two militaries on medical cooperation – their first military agreement
since the Vietnam War. As Vietnam seeks to bolster its naval force, it has
purchased six kilo-class submarines from Russia, but on the other hand, it
has announced the opening of Cam Ranh Bay for port calls by foreign
military vessels. In June 2012, Panetta visited the Bay, the first secretary
of defense to do so since the Vietnam War, and showed his interest in
the US Navy accessing this port. CARAT – a series of bilateral training
exercises – was launched by the United States in 1995 with six Southeast
Asian countries as original participants – Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Cambodia began participating in
2010, while the US held similar but separate activities with Vietnam, and
in 2011 Bangladesh became the eighth CARAT participant (Navy Office
of Information 2011). The United States also held defense talks with
Cambodia in February 2011 and with Brunei in September 2011.
Two of America’s allies, Japan and Australia, are also increasing their
bilateral security cooperation with countries in the region. For example,
when Vietnam’s Defense Minister, General Phung Quang Thanh, visited
Japan, the two countries pledged to hold regular discussions between high
officials with a focus on maritime security. Japan’s Ministry of Defense has
established an office for the purpose of supporting capacity building in
Southeast Asian nations. In terms of maritime security capacity building,
Japan and Australia are enhancing their initiatives in the region by provid-
ing equipment, training, and education, and Japan has provided substantive
leadership for repeated meetings of head officials.
India’s diplomatic approach to Southeast Asia has likewise become
increasingly active in recent years. Its declaration in summer 2011 that
it would participate in planning Vietnam’s energy exploration in the South
China Sea suggests efforts to counter China’s influence in the region (Pant
2011; Thayer 2011b).
“Mutual reaffirmation” of American engagement and

managing China relations
Why has security cooperation outside of traditional alliances become
more prominent in recent years? As indicated by the South China Sea
issue, the acquisition of the capacity to defend coastlines and islands,
including paramilitary capabilities, has become increasingly important to
small and medium states in recent years. They are relying increasingly upon
the United States and Japan as sources of equipment and training to
help them develop that capacity, but also as a way of inducing the relevant
countries to participate in norm creation. The United States is staging
its “return” to Asia, possibly as a means of balancing China’s rising
political influence. Because there is a recognition that the United States is
still militarily dominant in the region, American diplomatic efforts towards
current and potential regional security partners are important (Simon
2011a: 56).
There are, of course, limits to how far middle and small regional powers
will align with the US at China’s perceived expense and their balancing
efforts involving selected ties with China are clearly visible. Vietnam is
engaged with China in a dispute in the South China Sea, and in order to
defend itself against the kind of pressure from China that would jeopardize
its autonomy, it has welcomed visits by US naval vessels and strengthened
political dialogue with the United States, while at the same time repeatedly
sending top officials to China in order to avoid excessive tension. Given the
historical background between the two countries, though, it is unlikely
that Vietnam will overcome its distrust of the United States to engage in
alliance level security cooperation in the near future (Storey 2011a: 114–23;
Vu 2010).
Indonesia has also, in recent years, strengthened its ties with China.
Following their 2005 strategic partnership declaration, the two countries
reached an agreement on defense cooperation in 2007, the details of which
were not made public. Those agreements were not followed up with
substance, and Indonesia has been “playing” the US relations card (Storey
2011a: 204–10). Indonesia served as the ASEAN Chair in 2011 and stressed
the importance of ASEAN playing a role in the integration of both the
150 Ryo Sahashi
United States and China into an indigenously generated regional order
building. Also, Indonesia conducted its first joint special force exercise with
the PLA in 2011, and their summit meeting in Beijing in March 2012
reconfirmed their defense cooperation through drills and mutual visits.
Following Mahathir Mohamad’s resignation as prime minister in Malay-
sia, Sino-Malay relations became more stable under Mahathir’s successor,
Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. In June 2009, Badawi’s successor,
Najib Abdul Razak – whose father had established diplomatic relations with
China when he was serving as Malaysia’s second prime minister – visited
Beijing and further strengthened ties between the two countries with an
agreement on a strategic action plan.
All-inclusive regional institutions
Development
A number of regionwide institutions have been developing with ASEAN at
the core, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, in which foreign ministers
participate. ASEAN+3 includes China, Japan, and South Korea, and the
East Asia Summit (EAS) includes Australia, India, and New Zealand as
well. In the fall of 2010, an expanded ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting
(ADMM) was held with the participation of 18 countries (the EAS partici-
pants plus Russia and the United States) and the underlying mechanisms for
this new ADMM+8 were created. Also in 2010, US Secretary of State
Clinton and her Russian counterpart were invited to attend the EAS as
guests, and it was decided that the United States and Russia would become
official members from 2011.
The United States has been negative about regionwide institutions up
until now partly because those institutions were developing at a sluggish
pace and partly because the United States was opposed to China’s use of
such institutions as venues for negotiations on issues such as Taiwan. At the
2011 EAS, the United States focused on maritime security. It is also worth
noting that US Secretary of Defense Panetta proposed in October 2011 that
the ADMM+8 be held annually rather than every three years. In July 2011,
China and ASEAN members agreed on guidelines for the implementation
of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,
although many question how effective that will be. As China’s influence
expands, the role of regional institutions centered on ASEAN is being
underscored once again as venues for achieving a balance between the
United States and China.
The United States and China

One factor behind the expansion of the EAS was a shift in the positions of
Singapore and Indonesia, countries that were initially negative about adding
participants. In the context of increasing calls for a substantive regional
framework centered on great and middle powers, for example in the pro-
posal by Australian Prime Minister Rudd for an Asia-Pacific community,
the expansion of the EAS can be seen as having been intended as a way of
maintaining the centrality of ASEAN as the driver for regional institution
building.
Against a backdrop of heightened tension among claimants in the
territorial disputes in the South China Sea, regional actors are seeking to
counter a militarily and economically overwhelming China, not only
through solidarity within ASEAN, but increasingly by encouraging US
participation in multilateral frameworks as a way to achieve balancing
within institutions. Japan’s ongoing political turmoil has inhibited its own
leadership capacity in shaping regional multilateral security architectures
and this gives increased importance to great powers from outside the region
such as the United States and, to a lesser extent, Russia.
In this context, China is also gradually becoming more bound by institu-
tions and norms. There is awareness among Southeast Asian policymakers
that those same institutions and norms can be used increasingly effectively
by small and medium states. In addition, there is recognition among these
states that as long as American military forces remain in the region, there
will be no sudden change to the regional order in the short-term.
The United States has been concerned that Asian countries may still
someday create a framework that would exclude it, thereby decreasing
American political influence and depriving it of economic opportunities.
This stance was most clearly seen in US opposition to the concept of an
Asian monetary fund that was raised during the Asian financial crisis,
and in the United States’ strong initial criticism of an “East Asian commu-
nity” proposed by Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio. The need
to avoid such trends provides the United States with a motive not only to
strengthen its bilateral ties but also to participate in pan-regional institu-
tions. Yet multilateralism is seen in Washington as no more than one of
a number of measures to be incorporated into the US foreign policy
portfolio. The US, for example, has been holding a regular US–China
Strategic and Economic Dialogue. Nor are the processes and mechanisms of
multilateral security politics still all that credible in the eyes of US officials
and independent observers. Will institutions that include both the United
States and China only mask the differences between the two countries,
or will they contribute to stabilizing the regional order? What sort of issues
will arise at that point? The next section will examine these questions from a
long-term perspective.
Beyond the transition period

What we are currently experiencing in Asia-Pacific regional order building
may be nothing more than a gradual transition period. If that is the case,
152 Ryo Sahashi
then what changes can we expect to see in the quest to establish Asia-Pacific
regional security over the longer term?
Although deep interdependence is developing quickly, the stability of
US–China relations will be affected by many factors, and small and medium
states will in turn be influenced by how Sino-American relations evolve.
Repeated violations of institutional or normative agreements, or shifts in
US–China power relations or their foreign policy postures, can substantially
change the status quo. Different political systems, human rights issues,
and recognition of the countries’ international positions can in particular
impact US–China relations (Friedberg 2011). Even if deterrence and inter-
dependence create a superficial stability, if a power shift continues, it
will undoubtedly lead to an intensification of a diplomatic tug-of-war. As
Michael Swaine (2011: 15) suggests:
In the absence of significant changes, China will become neither a sworn

enemy nor an ally or close and trusted friend of the United States.
It will remain both an increasingly important partner or interlocutor
and in many areas a difficult-to-manage competitor and potential
adversary.
However, Swaine further argues that although it may not suffice in

the long-term for the United States to lean toward offshore balancing,
selective engagement, cooperative security structures, and so on, it is
important that the United States “simultaneously” maintain alliance net-
works while still promoting bilateral and multilateral regional frameworks
that include China. That latter posture will also entail “granting China more
authority within these systems, and coordinating policies between the
United States, other key Asian democratic powers, and the democracies of
Europe” (Swaine 2011: 18). The United States will probably bolster its
efforts to achieve military and political balance, but since any order based
on a US–China rivalry would be detrimental to US interests, there will
always be a restorative force at work – such as bilateral economic colla-
boration or Sino-American cooperation on key global security and financial
issues – so that cooperation can be achieved (see Figure 10.1).
What are the expectations of small and medium states and what action
will they take? Since 2010, there have been many instances of claimant
nations engaged in territorial disputes taking a harder line toward China.
However, as has been noted above, the small and medium states in the
region are likewise taking the initiative in trying to co-opt China’s rising
power. They are “simultaneously” strengthening inclusive bilateral and
multilateral relations through direct state-to-state, one-on-one negotiations
and through the broadening of regional institutions. Their intention is to
avoid being drawn too far into the rivalry for influence between the great
powers, and to position themselves in a manner that benefits their
own national interests. In the long-term, they are likely to pursue strategic
US Supremacy
Hierarchical
Liberal Order
[A] Asymmetrical
Balance of Power
[B]
Cooperation Conflict
Concert of
Powers Cold War-type
[C] Bipolar System
[D]
US – China Parity
Figure 10.1 The spiral dynamics of US–China security relations.

Source: Jimbo et al. 2011: 28.
hedging during a time of power shifts between the great powers. Going
one step further, since the direction of US–China relations is affected by
changes in the regional order, some experts argue that whilst small and
medium states should provide inducements to their larger allies to avoid
conflict and thus enhance cooperation between the great powers, there are
probably few nations that could accept the risks and costs that would entail
(White 2010).
What are the determinants of the future direction of US–China relations?
Akihiko Tanaka introduces Organski’s power transition theory to analyze
the rise of China, and after stating that China’s military actions are being
deterred unilaterally by US military predominance, he raises two concerns:
“an overestimation within China of its own power” and “a rigid response
in the United States as the dominant great power.” For that reason, he
believes that “responsible behavior” should be sought from China, and
at the same time, the United States should be requested to “effectively
maintain its own deterrent force, while at the same time maintain principled
flexibility.” Since Tanaka is raising the question of “whether a fair order
can be created,” that “fairness” can be read as not making unprincipled
concessions to China (Tanaka 2011: 11–12).
But what is meant by “flexibility?” This is the crux of the issue. No matter
how much it may be benefiting from the free and open order, the newly
154 Ryo Sahashi
rising China may easily become dissatisfied with this system if it views
the existing rules as favoring the United States as the dominant great
power in the region. If the American response is to be flexible enough
that both the United States and China can transition peacefully, then
Washington would need to recognize demands that China considers just
and “fair.” In that case, in order to be “fair” in China’s view, to what
extent can the United States stick to its “principles?” Even if these two
great powers can come to an agreement, it does not necessarily mean that
the result will be “fair” to small and medium states. Evelyn Goh (2011d)
raises the concern that the collaboration between the US and China would
force Southeast Asian nations to back down and compromise on territorial
issues.
Moreover, the dramatic speed of China’s rise may not only fuel an
adventuristic, overconfident China, but could also create conditions between
the dominant great power – the United States – and its partners where
“coordination cannot be undertaken quickly.” Robert Pape claims that it
is precisely because the coordination issue is difficult that US allies and
friends as well as other regional actors settle on a soft balancing approach
(Pape 2005: 16–17). For example, is it possible for countries that are rapidly
increasing their defense spending, such as India or Russia, to coordinate
with the United States, Japan, Europe, or Australia in terms of their think-
ing on and approaches to China? It would seem that coordination would be
difficult given the distinct economic and special interests that each party has
in China. Even if some countries experience a heightened threat perception
or border disputes with China, other countries would weigh the costs and
benefits of the situation and refuse to interfere, or indeed may try to profit
from the circumstances. Coordinating on how to interpret “fairness” is not
a simple task.
Conclusion
What types of changes are we beginning to see in the Asia-Pacific
regional security architecture as a result of China’s rise? This chapter has
divided those potential changes that can be predicted based on a long-term,
theoretical perspective, from those changes that can be observed in today’s
transition period and in the near future. In the latter category, it would
be difficult to conclude that increasing interdependence or the nature of
ongoing or emerging threats have led to any one dominant trend – whether
it be simple collective balancing, bandwagoning, or movement toward the
creation of regional concerts of powers.
The slow progress of Asia-Pacific organizations based on ASEAN, which
is trying to retain its centrality in regionalist movements, the conservative
stance of the great powers toward regionalism, and the strength of the US
alliance networks in the region have been noted previously. However, this
chapter has outlined several additional points.
First, over the past few years, America’s alliance network has been streng-
thened, and the rise of China is one reason for that trend. The bolstering of
US–Japan and US–Australia relations are good examples of that. Coopera-
tion between America’s allies themselves (that is, nations that are not usually
direct allies) is progressing, and the “hub and spokes” relations on the whole
are becoming stronger. This backdrop provides a motive for a continued US
strategic commitment to the region.
Second, security cooperation outside the alliance network is also making
progress in functional areas, as is the case with cooperation between
Vietnam and Indonesia with the United States and Japan, primarily
in the maritime fields. Japan and Australia are also working to strengthen
their ties with these countries. However, ASEAN members are all
pursuing closer, parallel ties with the US and China, and that trend
is particularly strong in Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia. While
attracting assistance from America and other great powers, they are
continuing to act in ways that will ensure their political autonomy from
those great powers.
Third, a growing number of institutions are now including in their
membership both China and the United States, as seen in the 2010
ADMM+8 and the 2011 EAS. This trend is most likely being motivated by
a desire both for intra-institutional balancing and for ensuring America’s
continued commitment to the region. However, there is also a suppressive
element in these institutions, as they sometimes mask conflict, as was seen
in the lead-up to the 2011 EAS. It can become difficult to reach an agree-
ment on security issues that satisfies all participants.
Under these conditions, the shape of the regional order will likely be
most affected by the extent of cooperation and conflict in US–China
relations. Soft balancing by small and medium states is mitigating what
could otherwise be unbridled competitive behavior between China and the
United States. It is difficult to say to what extent the regional institutions
that both the United States and China have joined have to date contributed
to the kind of stability in US–China relations that the regional order
requires. It is clear that there is a limited propensity on the part of either the
US or China to forge ahead with substantive institution building if their
sovereign and national security interests would be seriously affected by
doing so.
The long-range regional goals of the United States in the Asia-Pacific
include confidence building with China, the formation of crisis management
mechanisms, the deterrence of China’s territorial expansionism, and the
recognition of America’s position in the Asia-Pacific region. China, on
the other hand, is seeking to attenuate the influence of the United States
and its alliance network, secure energy resources, and expand its influence
over small and medium states. By negotiating and forging agreements
in areas where agreement is feasible and building a common understanding
about the division of power over time, the United States and China could
156 Ryo Sahashi
ultimately advance the stability and integration of the region (for an
insightful discussion, see Kupchan 2010). They must work together and with
other regional actors toward reconciling these countervailing interests to
a sufficient extent, however, that such a vision can be viewed as just an
idealistic delusion.
11 Alliances and order in the
“Asian Century”
Hugh White
Introduction
This essay explores the relationship between alliances and the changing
international order in Asia over the coming decades. It starts from two
simple propositions. The first is that economic growth in Asia, especially
in China, marks a fundamental shift in the distribution of economic weight,
which is driving an equally fundamental shift in strategic power, and that
this, in turn, is putting great pressure on the international order that has
prevailed in Asia since the end of the Vietnam War (White 2008). The
second is that alliances, specifically the set of bilateral security alliances
collectively known as the San Francisco System, are the oldest and strongest
international institutions in the Asia-Pacific region. It is natural to expect
that if any of the region’s institutions – bilateral or multilateral – are going
to have a significant influence on how the Asian order responds to the
pressures of shifting power relativities, it will be these alliances that do
so (see, for example, Cha 2011). Nonetheless I argue in the following pages
that despite their impressive appearance of solidity and durability, the
alliances of the San Francisco System will do little to shape whatever
new order evolves in Asia, but will themselves probably be profoundly
changed by it.
Alliances and order

We need to start with a few remarks about the nature of alliances them-
selves. The term is often used loosely to refer to almost any kind of
connection or settled relationship between states. For our purpose – which is
consistent with the sense in which it is used in reference to the San Francisco
System – we need to define the term more narrowly: an alliance is an
understanding or agreement between states to go to war to support one
another under certain circumstances.1 The agreement may be bilateral
or multilateral, formal or informal, the circumstances may be precisely or
loosely defined, the scale of expected commitment may be large or small,
but the key factor which gives an alliance its distinctive and weighty nature
is the commitment that it entails to military operations. Even modest
158 Hugh White
military operations are among the most serious actions a state can take, and
the nature of war is such that what may seem to be a small operation at first
can easily lead to a much larger and more costly one later. A commitment
to go to war is therefore the most serious kind of undertaking that one state
can make to another, and alliances therefore have unique implications
and consequences for the conduct or relations between states. They bind
states more tightly and determine their actions more closely than other
forms of international commitment.
Alliances in this sense are not all that common.2 They are most promi-
nent in Europe, where the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
plays such a central role in regional affairs that it may be said to define the
European strategic order. East Asia is perhaps second only to Europe
in the significance of alliances to the regional order. It is often assumed that
the San Francisco System of American alliances in Asia has been the
mainstay of the Asian strategic order in recent decades, just as NATO has
been in Europe. Certainly America’s system of bilateral Asian alliances –
with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and Thailand – has
been more significant in shaping the regional order than any of the region’s
various multilateral institutions such as the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN+3 (China,
Japan, and South Korea), or the East Asia Summit. As has often been
noted, Asia’s multilateral institutions seem rather weak, and its bilateral
alliances appear very strong (see, for example, Cha 2011). That is why it
seems natural to assume that they will be critical in shaping whatever new
order emerges in Asia under the pressure of shifting relative power.
Before explaining why this might not be so in Asia over the next few
decades, it is useful to make a couple of general observations about the
relationship between institutions and order in the international system.
The question of whether institutions – including alliances – shape order,
or whether order shapes institutions, has a “chicken-and-egg” quality
about it: each shapes the other to significant degrees. Nonetheless, there are
some commonsense reasons to argue that ultimately, order exists prior to
institutions, and that in the long run, order shapes institutions more than the
other way around. An international order is nothing more or less than a
set of expectations among states about how they will behave towards one
another. Institutions work by consolidating and codifying those expecta-
tions, making states’ behavior more predictable and making expectations
about them more effective in shaping the decisions of others. They therefore
reinforce an order, but they do not in themselves create the expectations on
which the order is based.
This becomes clear in times of rapid change, when expectations shift
faster than institutions. Here, the institutions get left behind because they
reflect old expectations after they have been replaced by new ones. It takes a
while for new institutions that reflect the new expectations to emerge. This is
not surprising. Institutions are, by their nature, conservative. Their function
Alliances and order in the “Asian Century” 159
is to make conduct predictable and reliable by consolidating interstate
expectations, so inevitably as expectations change, institutions get left
behind. Orders change when expectations move far enough to break
the bounds imposed by the old institutions. The new institutions emerge to
reflect the new expectations and consolidate those expectations into a new
order. This happened at Westphalia in 1648, Vienna in 1815, Versailles in
1919, San Francisco in 1945, and Washington in 1949. It might also be said
to have happened with NATO’s expansion after 1989. In each case, big
changes in expectations of conduct between states produced a new order
that was eventually reflected in new or radically reshaped institutions.
All this is true of alliances as much as of other institutions. Alliances are
classic examples of institutions in the sense we are exploring here, because
they are designed precisely to consolidate expectations by making states’
conduct predictable. Indeed they are the most potent order-strengthening
institutions because they embody expectations about the use of force, which
is the ultimate recourse for preserving order. Equally, that means they are
the most vulnerable to shifts in expectations that occur with shifts in relative
power. That is what is happening to alliances in Asia today.
No Asian NATO
Let’s start by looking back at the alliance system that has apparently done
so much to support America’s power in Asia until now. The San Francisco
System was originally developed in the early 1950s primarily to resist
China’s emerging challenge to America’s presence in Asia. To American
eyes, the most striking thing about this system is how disconnected it is.
Compared to NATO’s closely integrated structures, the Asian alliance
system seems dysfunctionally loose and haphazard. Why, it is often asked, is
there no Asian NATO (see Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002)?
The reason why there is no Asian NATO equivalent is that, in view of
the fundamentally maritime nature of its strategic role there, America did
not want or need one. In Europe, America was prepared to fight a major
continental land war. It had to fight the war on the territory of its allies, and
it had to rely heavily on their forces because America could not sustain or
deploy land forces of its own large enough to match those of the Soviet
Union’s. Both these circumstances required the establishment of very close
integration of the forces and operations between and among America and
its allies, which NATO evolved to provide.
In Asia (except in the case of South Korea, where bilateral arrangements
with Seoul mirrored NATO arrangements), America planned to fight a
maritime war. It did not plan to fight on its allies’ territory, and relied on
them only to provide bases for American air and naval forces. It relied
much less on the forces of its allies for the campaigns it intended to fight, in
part because their air and naval forces were so insignificant, and in part
because America’s maritime forces were so formidable. All this meant that
160 Hugh White
the US had no need for a NATO equivalent in Asia: bilateral arrangements
to secure political support and basing were sufficient.
Status quo ante

To see how America’s Asian alliances will fare as power shifts in Asia, we
need first to get a clear view of the way in which they have developed
their position in Asia today. The conventional view is that America’s Asian
alliances, or at least the three core alliances with Japan, South Korea,
and Australia, are all very strong, and provide vital support to America’s
strategic position in Asia. By the same token, supporting these allies is often
seen as a first-order strategic objective for the US in Asia. They therefore
appear as both a principal means to achieve America’s strategic aims
in Asia, and as one of America’s primary ends. This muddle of ends
and means gives early warning that all might not be as it seems, or as it
should be. Nonetheless, the San Francisco alliance system gives the
impression of being very robust and durable. This appears to have been
demonstrated conclusively by the way the system survived the end of the
Cold War and has continued to flourish despite the disappearance of
the Communist threat that had originally inspired it. The system’s ability to
survive the end of the Cold War, often seen as the greatest strategic change
since the Second World War, affirms its ability to continue to thrive in
the new strategic transformation now looming in Asia, and to play a big
role in shaping how it plays out.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, however, this chapter advances
an alternative view that sees America’s Asian alliances as quite weak,
and as less central to America’s strategic position in Asia than is often
supposed. This view pays less attention to the way the alliances survived
the end of the Cold War after 1989, and more attention to the way they
were changed profoundly by the strategic transformations that occurred
20 years earlier, leading up to the end of the Vietnam War in 1975.
This somewhat unorthodox view requires a more lengthy and detailed
exposition and justification than space here permits, but I will at least sketch
the argument.
Let’s start with the differing views of the alliances’ recent history. The
argument that their ability to survive the end of the Cold War is proof of
their strength presupposes that the end of the Cold War had a profound
strategic impact on Asia. That is not necessarily true. In most of the ways
that matter, the Cold War ended in Asia in 1975 with the fall of Saigon, or
indeed in 1972, with President Richard Nixon’s visit to China. Nixon’s visit
marked the end of an era, which had started with the Communist victory
in China, during which the principal driver of the regional strategic
order was the rivalry between the US and China for power and influence in
Asia. Nixon’s visit also marked the beginning of a new era in which US
primacy in Asia was accepted by China as the foundation of the US–China
relationship and the basis of regional order. After 1972, the Soviet Union
never posed a serious strategic or political challenge to the US in Asia,
and its collapse did little or nothing to alter the region’s fundamental
strategic dynamics. So it was 1972 that marked the real break from the
regional order that had emerged after the Second World War, and which
had given rise to the San Francisco alliances in the first place. Nothing
much changed after 1989.
When we look at what happened to America’s Asian alliances after 1972,
we see a rather different story than when we look at their post-1989
trajectory. All of America’s Asian alliances changed profoundly after 1972.
The alliance with Taiwan disappeared as the price paid for normalized
relations with China. The alliance with Seoul ceased to serve America’s
wider regional interests in containing China, and became focused instead
solely on the direct threat to South Korea from the North. Australia aban-
doned its “forward defense” strategy, narrowed its strategic horizons to
the defense of its own territory, and downgraded the role of its US alliance
in its overall defense posture. New Zealand eventually walked away from
the alliance altogether. The alliance with the Philippines dwindled to the
point whereby the refusal to renew US basing access to Subic Bay
and Clarke Field in the late 1980s marked the end of the alliance. Even the
alliance with Japan went through an anxious period as Japan pondered
the implications of Nixon’s spectacular but disquieting diplomacy, and
as the long-expected development of a more active Japanese role supporting
America’s broader position in Asia failed to materialize. Moreover, after
1972, America’s alliance with Japan became as important in reassuring
China about Japan as it was about reassuring Japan about China. The
South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) was allowed to disappear
altogether, America’s European allies abandoned any strategic role in Asia,
and any attempts to forge the separate Asian alliances into a single
integrated system were abandoned.
Those alliances that survived did so on a much reduced basis. As the Cold
War with the Soviet Union entered its final stage, and America made a
major commitment to meet what was seen as an increasingly formidable
Soviet threat, none of America’s Asian allies undertook substantial com-
mitments to support the US in anything beyond the defense of their own
territories. The contrast with America’s European alliance system, therefore,
went much further than simply the lack of a multilateral structure. The
only concrete support America’s Asian allies offered to America’s broader
posture in Asia was basing, and not all even offered that.
Why did the US allow them to get away with this? One part of the answer
is that Nixon’s Guam Doctrine shifted the basis of America’s Asian alliances
and lowered expectations on both sides. This arguably left a deep impression
on the San Francisco alliances even after Washington started to retreat from
the Guam Doctrine. However, more importantly, the US did not need much
support in Asia from its Asian allies because its position in Asia was
162 Hugh White
not being contested by any significant Asian power. The Soviet Union
did not pose a significant threat to American primacy in this region.
America’s position in Asia after the Vietnam War depended less on
the support of its allies than on the forbearance of its former adversary.
China’s acceptance of America’s leading position made US primacy in
Asia uncontested and gave the Asian order its distinctive and highly
significant character. It also gave America’s Asian alliances their distinctive
character: America faced no strategic challenges in Asia except on the
Korean peninsula, and it demanded very little of its allies as a result, beyond
contributing to the defense of their own territories. Only the US–Japan
alliance could be said to have been really central to US primacy and
hence to the Asian order, and again this was less because of any support
Japan provided to the US in Asia, but because of the way it prevented
Japan evolving an independent strategic posture in a way that might have
challenged US primacy.
Australia’s US alliance
The trajectory of America’s Asian alliances after 1972 can be further
illustrated by looking in greater depth at how the US–Australia alliance
developed over this time. Australia would appear to have been the Asian ally
most likely, and best placed, to support the US strategically in Asia after
1972. Australia faced less direct threats to its territorial security than any
other US regional ally, except for New Zealand. For much of the period
it was substantially richer than any of America’s other regional allies,
except for Japan. And Australia identified more closely with the US in terms
of history, culture, and values than the other Asian allies, which meant a
stronger domestic acceptance of policies to support America in Asia and
beyond.
For the first two decades after the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand,
and the United States of America) Treaty was signed in 1951, Australian
forces were more or less continuously committed to support US and
British operations in East Asia. They saw action in the Korean War, the
Malayan Emergency, Konfrontasi with Indonesia, and the Vietnam War.
A substantial proportion of them were permanently based in Malaysia and
Singapore throughout this period, and these and other forces were assigned
to SEATO for collective action should the occasion have arisen. In this
“forward defense” era of Australian strategic policy, supporting the US
(and the UK) in Asia was Australia’s principle strategic objective and the
primary shaper of its force structure.
This changed quickly in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The Guam
Doctrine, British withdrawal east of Suez, failure in Vietnam, Suharto’s
New Order in Indonesia, the establishment of ASEAN, and above all
the opening up of China after 1972, all changed Australia’s strategic
outlook profoundly. By 1976, it had withdrawn almost all its forces from
Southeast Asia and had radically redefined its defense objectives and alli-
ance commitments. Australia no longer designed its forces to support the
US in Asia, or anywhere else. There was indeed no clear expectation that
they would do so if occasion arose, and if it did the policy envisaged
that Australia would make a token contribution, drawing on forces designed
for the self-reliant defense of the continent. Perhaps most remarkably, as
détente faded and Cold War tensions intensified again over the next few
years, Australia made no commitments to support the US in any material
way in the event of war with the Soviets, and faced no pressure from
Washington to do so. After 1972, Australia did virtually nothing material to
support the US strategic position in Asia. Australia’s only contribution
to the Western effort in the Cold War was to host a modest number of US
intelligence and communications facilities, and receive occasional naval ship
visits. This was a very modest alliance burden indeed.
What did Australia do instead? From the early 1980s, Australia fell
into an alliance management approach that proved to be very effective in
maintaining Australia’s standing as one of America’s closest allies at
very little cost or risk to Australia. It became clear in the late 1970s that
American strategic attention was moving to the Persian Gulf, where the
fall of the Shah of Iran upset America’s strategic position in an important
region. The Gulf rapidly became the part of the world where the US was
most likely to use armed force, albeit in much smaller quantities and against
much less formidable adversaries than in the Cold War’s European Central
Front. US operations in the Gulf were expected to be quick, cheap, and
successful, as they have indeed generally proved to be. But America
lacked an alliance structure in the region, so had to look for alliance support
from further afield. However, the relatively modest scale of operations
meant that the US looked to its allies to provide diplomatic and political
support to bolster the domestic and international legitimacy of the
operations rather than to provide any substantial operational contribution.
This was a niche Australia was happy to fill. For 30 years, Australia main-
tained its credentials as an unusually close US ally very cost-effectively with
small, quick, inexpensive contributions to US-led coalition operations in
the Gulf region, which provided little if anything by way of operational
impact, but had welcome diplomatic value. In this way Australia preserved
its place as one of America’s closest and most valued allies despite actually
doing very little to support the US – certainly when compared with
America’s NATO partners.
What happens now?

This brings us to the question of what will happen to America’s Asian alli-
ances over the coming decades, as the Asian order changes under pressure
from the shifting balance of relative power between Washington and Beijing.
The best way to explore this question is to look at the possibilities in terms
164 Hugh White
of the three basic ways in which America could respond to China’s chal-
lenge to its leadership in Asia.
US withdrawal from Asia?

The first possibility is that the US could withdraw from Asia. To be more
precise, the US could decide that it will no longer play a leading role
in Asian strategic affairs. Although many people dismiss this possibility as
too unlikely to be worth considering (see, for example, Clinton 2011a),
they are mistaken. Certainly the US is unlikely to withdraw as long as its
primacy remains uncontested by any major power. But as America’s
leadership becomes contested again by an unprecedentedly rich and there-
fore powerful rival, America is bound to think again. The costs of remaining
a key player in Asia will increase sharply while the benefits will quite possi-
bly decline. It is possible that the costs of Asian leadership will prove, over
time, to outweigh the benefits, at which time the US might well withdraw
from the region.
This presupposes that America’s basic interests and objectives in Asia
extend beyond the maintenance of a strong position and strong alliances
in the region for their own sakes, as ends in themselves. But it is surely the
case. It is always confusing to imagine that alliances are primary interests
in their own right, rather than as means that serve higher strategic ends. The
tougher America’s choices in Asia become, the clearer it will have to
be about those ultimate ends and about how important America’s tradi-
tional position and alliances in Asia are to upholding them. Is Taipei really
worth more to Americans than Los Angeles?
If the US does relinquish a leading strategic role, Asia’s strategic order
would most likely then evolve either into a classic balance of power system
in which the US would play no substantial role, or into hegemony by one
or other of its great powers. American interests would most probably
be best served by the first option, and even after withdrawal, Washington
could reengage to support it. In other words the US could withdraw from
Asia and rely on a regional balance of power to ensure that no one power
came to dominate the region, but stand ready to reengage strategically if
the balance of power looked like it could be overturned by a rising
hegemon. This is the “offshore balancing” model articulated most clearly
by Christopher Layne (1997). This kind of US reengagement might
revive some US alliances in Asia. But unless and until this happened, US
alliances would wither. US withdrawal from a substantial strategic leader-
ship role in Asia would seriously diminish the strategic significance
of America’s Asian alliances as factors in the regional order. In their place,
we would expect the kind of transient alliances typical of a fluid balance of
power system to emerge. Like Lord Palmerston’s Britain, the countries
of Asia would have no permanent friends or permanent enemies, but only
permanent interests.
US engagement in Asia?
The second possibility is that the US could stay engaged in Asia and
compete with China for primacy, resisting China’s challenge to the status
quo and attempting to preserve US leadership as the foundation of the
Asian order. Unless China gives way to American pressure and decides to
accept the status quo indefinitely – which is most unlikely – then US–China
rivalry will escalate and Asia will face a highly contested and polarized
future, with the real and growing risk of major conflict. If America does this,
its allies in Asia will face a stark choice. Either they would support the US
in its increasingly bitter rivalry with China, or they would choose to step
back and become neutral (assuming that they would not take the further
step of choosing to support China against the US). Which option each ally
might choose would depend on the level, if any, of China’s aggression.
If Beijing seemed clearly determined to impose a harsh hegemony on Asia,
its neighbors would be more likely to cling to the US. If on the other hand
China seemed satisfied with a more modest and acceptable leadership role in
Asia, and the source of rivalry emanated from US reluctance to make room
for China’s ambitions rather than from China’s determination to dominate,
then some US allies at least might opt for neutrality.
Whichever choice each ally made, their alliance with the US would be
very different from the way it has been until now. Those allies that did not
support the US would see their alliances disappear. The more intense rivalry
with China becomes, the more Washington will expect of its allies and
the more a clear willingness to side with Washington against Beijing will
be the sine qua non of an alliance relationship. Equally, however, those
allies that aligned closely with the US against China would find their
alliances changing into something very different and more demanding.
Again, the more intense US–China rivalry becomes, the more the US will
expect of its allies by way of direct political and military support. For
example, in the event of a clash in the military sphere, the US would
increasingly expect its allies to provide direct operational commitments to
join US combat operations against China beyond their own territory under
the Air–Sea Battle concept.
As the region becomes more contested, America’s alliance system in Asia
will start to become more like its alliance system in Europe during the Cold
War. The alliances will become increasingly integrated as the US aims to
bind the separate allies into a unified fighting coalition, and each ally will
find itself more and more in the position of a European NATO ally in
the Cold War. The more China’s forces grow, and the more US forces are
pressed by budget cuts and competing priorities, the higher this pressure will
become. Indeed, it seems likely that without such NATO-style direct and
automatic military support, the US would be unable to sustain the opera-
tional posture required to underpin strategic primacy in Asia. America’s
Asian alliances would look very different from what we have known.
166 Hugh White
The US shares power with China?
The third possibility is that the US might decide neither to withdraw
from Asia nor try to retain primacy, but instead seeks some kind of power-
sharing arrangement with China. This would mean that it remains a major
player in Asia, but not the dominant power it has been for the past 40 years.
How could such an arrangement be constructed, how might it work,
and would China be willing to take part? These questions require deeper
analysis than is possible here, but suffice it to say that this kind of outcome
is theoretically possible, and if it could be made to work it would offer
the best prospect of peace and stability in Asia over the coming decades.
But what would it mean for US alliances in Asia? The answer falls into
two parts.
For great powers, an alliance with the US would become impossible under
this model of Asia’s future order. Whilst space constraints preclude
a detailed analysis of this view here, essentially, the best and perhaps only
viable model for a stable power-sharing order in Asia is a “concert” system
modeled somewhat after the Concert of Europe. For a concert to endure, all
the great powers in the system must take part in their own right, as equals
in status if not in power. Japan will retain the basic credentials of a great
power in the Asian system for several decades, and India and possibly even
Indonesia will sooner or later acquire great power status. If this happens,
these countries must join a concert as great powers in their own right, not as
junior allies of another great power like the US. Therefore Japan’s alliance
with the US must be dissolved if the US and China are to find a way
to share power as equals in Asia, and no alliance with India or Indonesia
can be built.
These arguments do not, however, apply to countries that are not great
powers. So how might the US alliances with, for example, Australia
and South Korea evolve under a concert between Asia’s great powers? The
most likely outcome is that they would survive but weaken. There is
no reason why a great power in a concert should not run alliances with
middle and smaller powers within the system, but the benefits of such
alliances to both parties would be limited by the workings of the concert.
From the US point of view, alliances with middle and small powers would
do little to support US interests in Asia as long as a concert system could be
maintained. The US would not need the support of such allies because its
rivalry with other great powers would be constrained by the concert itself.
On the other hand, middle-sized and smaller countries would find that an
alliance with the US would do little to help them resist pressure from other
great powers. As long as the concert lasted, the US would be unlikely to put
the interests of smaller powers ahead of those of its great power partners
in the concert. The essence of a concert is that each great power must pay
careful attention to minimize disagreements with the other great powers,
except on major questions that threaten the survival of the concert itself.
Thus, as Australia discovered when dealing with Whitehall in the late nine-
teenth century, London was loathe to put Australian concerns ahead of
its need to maintain good relations with France and Germany. And so it
would prove for middle and small power allies of America in an Asian
Concert. Thus, alliance with the US would cost little, but would deliver little
too. Such alliances are likely to be weak and transitory.
Whichever of these three possible trajectories Asia’s strategic order takes
over the next few years or decades, it seems likely that America’s system of
alliances in Asia will do little to shape the emerging new Asian order, and
will instead be profoundly reshaped as the order changes. The key drivers
of change are not the institutions like alliances, but the shifting power
relativities, which in turn are driven by economic growth, and the choices
that the strongest countries make about how they respond to these shifts.
Conclusion: assets or liabilities?

This conclusion will surprise those familiar with much of the American and
Asian debate about Asia’s future, because alliances are so central to much of
the analysis. It is often assumed that America’s Asian alliances are assets
of immense value to both the US and its Asian allies, and that their value
should only increase as the challenge from China grows. This is under-
standable, but mistaken. As America addresses China’s challenge to its
power in Asia, it is perhaps inevitable that it looks back at the Cold War,
and thinks about approaching this new struggle in the same way. The idea of
NATO exerts a powerful grip on American strategic thinking, and offers an
irresistible model for dealing with China by marshalling Asian friends
and allies into a coalition to resist China’s challenge to US leadership. But
China is very different from the Soviet Union. It poses a different kind of
challenge to American power, and America’s interests are different too.
These differences make it very hard to apply the NATO model to Asia over
the next few decades.
America’s NATO experience has left it with a deep attachment to
alliances and a tendency to exaggerate their value. American policymakers
often speak as if maintaining America’s alliances and defending its allies is
an end in itself. Such a view is encouraged by talk of values as the founda-
tion of alliances. Such talk is all very well when the stakes are low, as they
are when strong states confront weak adversaries. But when strong states
compete with one another, as they are in Asia today, the stakes are very
high, and governments need to be crystal clear about what precisely their
objectives are, and how much they are worth. When push comes to shove,
an alliance never constitutes a first-order strategic interest in its own right.
Any alliance is ultimately a means to serve a higher order strategic impera-
tive. From this perspective, America’s alliances in Asia are more likely to
be liabilities than assets, both to America and to its Asian allies in navigat-
ing the dangerous and uncertain decades ahead in the “Asian Century.”
168 Hugh White
Acknowledgements
The author would like to acknowledge the contribution of this volume’s
editors to improving this chapter, while accepting full responsibility for any
imperfections that remain.
Notes
1 The term “alliance” remains one of the more contested in the lexicon and
discourse of international relations. For further reading on the range of defini-
tions that have been assigned to the term, see Snyder (1997), and Walt (1987).
2 Except perhaps for the United Nations Charter, which might be seen as entailing
alliance obligations in that member states are committed to providing forces
to support UN actions.
12 Conceptualizing the relationship
between bilateral and multilateral
security approaches in East Asia
A great power regional order framework
Evelyn Goh
Introduction
The East Asian security order has been in transition since the end of the
Cold War, and three myths underlie popular thinking about this changing
landscape. First, China’s ascendance is often greeted with suspicion and
apprehension because of a lurking sense that it is somehow illegitimate:
China, with its non-democratic system and its short recent record of
engagement with the Western liberal order, lacks the right to international
power. This sense is reflected in the tenor of the “power transition” dis-
course, which is centered upon a rising outsider seeking to overthrow the
existing hegemonic order. Yet, as China’s neighbors (in East Asia especially)
and successive US administrations have shown over the last 15 years, there
is no appetite for denying China’s great power status, there is caution about
directly containing Chinese power in case it breeds antagonism, and there is
an increasing consensus on the need to integrate China into the inter-
national order (see, for example, Shambaugh 2005; Zhao and Liu 2009).
The question, then, revolves around the conditions of this integration – with
what reassurances and constraints ought China’s rising power be accepted
by the international community? This is a normative question that cannot
adequately be captured by balance of power ideas.
The second common myth is that competition in the strategic or security
realm is bad because it is destabilizing and it portends armed conflict.
In this vein, talk of international “order” tends to connote “peace and
stability.” Yet order is not the absence of war; rather it ought to be under-
stood in the classic English School sense of sustained, rule-governed
interaction amongst a society of states that share common understandings
about their primary goals and means of conducting international affairs.
The maintenance of order must involve limits on behavior, the management
of conflict, and the accommodation of change without undermining the
common goals and values of this international society – in other words,
achieving international order is about agreeing on (eventually institutiona-
lized) limits to power and competition, rather than obliterating conflict
(see Hurrell 2007).
170 Evelyn Goh
The third myth about Asian security approaches is that “multilateralism
is good, and bilateralism is bad.” Rationalist theories have long established
the benefits of multilateralism in terms of helping self-interested state actors
to achieve functional effectiveness in collective action in terms of transpar-
ency, lowering costs, and promoting commitment to cooperation (Keohane
1984; Krasner 1983). Multilateralism also boosts the legitimacy of the
agreed actions so much so that many states seem to have a normative com-
mitment to collective action (Ruggie 1993a). Yet this does not necessarily
mean that multilateralism occurs at the expense of bilateralism, or that
bilateralism is normatively and functionally ineffective and unappealing. For
instance, effective multilateralism may require critical bilateral consensus
between key states, thus rendering bilateralism essential to collective action.
Furthermore, multilateralism is not necessarily order building in and of
itself: it is a channel of action, the results of which depend on substantive
and normative agreement that may or may not be achieved.
Flowing from these observations, this chapter explicitly analyzes bilater-
alism and multilateralism as channels of strategic interaction, rather than
as strategic goals in and of themselves. In so doing, it problematizes the
commonly accepted dichotomy between bilateral and multilateral security
approaches, and tries to advance the study of “convergent security” (Tow
2001) by focusing on the ordering functions of bilateral and multilateral
security cooperation. That is, rather than simply examining the synergies
and contradictions between these two approaches, it unpacks the bilateral–
multilateral nexus by asking how these two modes of security cooperation
affect the evolving security order in Asia. The following is in three parts,
beginning with the introduction of the great power regional order frame-
work for studying bilateral and multilateral security mechanisms. The main
analysis then examines, in turn, the approaches by the US, China, and Japan
in managing security and achieving security cooperation in East Asia,
paying special attention to the role of bilateralism and multilateralism as
ordering mechanisms within these states’ regional security strategies. The
final part presents key findings about the relationship between multilateral
and bilateral approaches amongst these main security actors, and explicitly
situates them against the context of the main faultlines in the ongoing
negotiation about a new regional order.
The great power regional order framework: assurance

and leadership
The East Asian security landscape possesses two apparently divergent and
even contradictory characteristics: on the one hand, the US-centric system
of bilateral alliances that outlived the Cold War and still underpins
American forward deployment and military superiority in the Asia-Pacific;
and on the other hand, the vibrant sprawl of multilateral institutions – often
“driven” by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – with
Conceptualizing security approaches 171
varying memberships, functions, and effectiveness in addressing political,
economic, and security issues. Given the gay abandon with which almost
every East Asian state pursues this range of security mechanisms,
the most fruitful of Brendan Taylor’s categories for conceptualizing the
bilateral–multilateral nexus to unpack is clearly the fourth, “bilateral and
multilateral” (see Taylor, Chapter 2 in this volume). The real challenge here
lies in how to conceptualize and synthesize the interaction between these
two modes. Bilateralism and multilateralism cannot be the dependent vari-
ables of such a study in and of themselves – they are merely the means of
strategic interaction. Since our aim is to add to the state of understanding
about Asian security in terms of stability and levels of cooperation that
outweigh conflict, the dependent variable needs to reflect this. Working from
an English School perspective, my preferred dependent variable is order,
specifically the question of how regional order is being created, negotiated,
or maintained,1 rather than functional issues.
Along with the rest of the world, East Asia has struggled since the end of
the Cold War with uncertainties about unipolarity, rapidly rising great
powers, and globalization. The imperative at both the global and regional
levels is to create a new, stable, international order. At the heart of this
process is the question of unequal power, since the international system is
characterized by inequalities and differentiation. The asymmetry of power
and authority in East Asia is marked particularly by US military pre-
ponderance and the diffusion of political and economic influence engen-
dered by China’s rise and regional states’ activism in engaging the great
powers. In a region that well accepts that order is predominantly determined
by great powers, the current challenge is to incorporate China peacefully
into the regional order while maintaining the US role in guaranteeing
regional security on terms acceptable to all.
Thinking about contemporary East Asian security this way, rather
than using the common balance of power framework, reflects the social
foundations of power: the privileged position of great powers is based not
just on material superiority, but on a bargain by which great powers
are conceded special rights in return for performing special duties and pro-
viding common goods. These special rights and duties must be negotiated,
but against the fundamental dilemma of how to tame on the one hand, and
to legitimize on the other, unequal power. For powerful states, there is
a constant need for what Martin Wight (1991: 99) called “the justification of
power”: the drive to turn brute capability for coercion into legitimate
authority, because force alone is a costly and ultimately unreliable instru-
ment of power. Smaller states are, in turn, preoccupied with how to bind
powerful states, to ensure limits to the potential use of great power so as to
maximize gains in terms of public goods but minimize costs in the form of
disruptions to the norms that regulate international life. The taming as well
as legitimizing of power is achieved using a variety of mechanisms along
bilateral and multilateral channels. These may involve balancing behavior
172 Evelyn Goh
to countervail rising power with similar opposing capabilities, but the
deeper challenge is how to embed great powers within stable structures of
cooperation – not just to prevent war between them, but more to protect
the orderly functioning of international life along agreed rules and norms
(Hurrell 2007: 31–32).
With this in mind, the varying emphasis on bilateralism and multi-
lateralism in East Asian states’ approaches to regional security can be
understood by analyzing their ordering functions – the ways in which and
extent to which these two modes are used to signal, negotiate, or facilitate
key aspects of the new bargain by which power can be tamed and legit-
imized, and stable security cooperation achieved. Here, I suggest that the
ordering functions of bilateralism and multilateralism can be analyzed along
two dimensions: great power assurance, and competition for leadership.
The shared imperative of placing limits on unequal power between the more
and the less powerful converges upon strategic assurance (see Goh 2008).
Here, we examine the extent to which regional great powers use bilateral
and multilateral means to extend strategic assurance to other states, through
signaling their commitment to providing and maintaining the existing order;
and demonstrating restraint in their exercise of power, through self-restraint
and/or through subjecting themselves to external constraints such as agreed
norms and the scrutiny and potential sanction of other states. But because
the East Asian order is populated by multiple great powers, we would expect
that bilateral and multilateral channels are also subject to and utilized for
negotiating and competing for status and leadership amongst these states.
Here, we pay particular attention to the different emphases and effectiveness
with which bilateral and multilateral means are used by each great power to
constrain others while boosting and legitimizing its own regional leadership.
The synergies and contradictions that we need to pay attention to do not
reside at the level of choices about the types of security mechanisms; rather,
they lie within these dynamics of assurance and competition. Bilateral and
multilateral mechanisms are means by which these competing dynamics may
erupt or be channeled or contained, but they are not by themselves causal
factors. As such, my concern is less about whether bilateral or multilateral
mechanisms are more important per se, than about how to encourage and
achieve the optimal combination of mechanisms to maximize great power
assurance to others; and which combination of mechanisms would optimize
the balance of status, power and assurance between the key East Asian
states in the ongoing negotiation of a new regional order.
The bilateral–multilateral nexus in East Asian security approaches
US hegemonic maintenance
Because the US security presence in East Asia continues to be dominated
by its “hub and spokes” system of bilateral alliances, it is difficult to
make the case that multilateralism sits on par with bilateralism in US
security strategy in the region. In this sense, the strong pre-existing
US security structures in the region present a “hard” case that multilateralist
proponents have to crack before they can convincingly argue that the US is
anything but primarily bilateralist. Furthermore, US security behavior
also often seems to fall into two of Taylor’s categories of conceptualizing
the bilateral–multilateral nexus: the “bilateral or multilateral” approach,
in which Washington swings from one mode to the other; and the
“bilateral–multilateral” approach in which multilateralism is a smokescreen
for bilateral interactions at the sidelines, in which the “real business”
is conducted.2 Yet, from the perspective of forging a new post-Cold
War regional order, US security approaches in East Asia are more appro-
priately read in two phases: in the initial uncertainty after the Cold
War, Washington was primarily concerned about signaling its continued
commitment to upholding order in the region; while after the 11 September
2001 attacks on New York and Washington, and the George W. Bush
administration’s unilateralism, Washington increased its attention to
exhibiting superpower restraint as well as to dealing with the leadership
challenge from China. Overall, assurance by commitment rather than
restraint plays the significantly larger role in US hegemonic maintenance.
The core elements of current US security approaches take a bilateral
form. Its San Francisco System of post-Second World War bilateral alliances
continues not only as the basis of US regional strategy, but also as East
Asia’s central security institution. Through this forward military presence,
Washington assures East Asian states about its commitment “to provide
geopolitical balance, to be an honest broker, to reassure against uncertainty”
(Baker 1991: 5). After the Cold War, Washington was able to recast the
terms of this alliance structure to manage contemporary security threats
while ensuring that the US still played the “crucial and indispensable” role
as “the principal guarantor of regional order” (Mastanduno 2003: 151).
Bill Clinton’s administration pledged to maintain US troop levels in
the region at 100,000, to reassure its allies that it remained “committed to
lead in the Asia-Pacific region” (Nye 1995: 102). In Southeast Asia,
Washington negotiated a series of new bilateral security arrangements to
provide facilities for maintenance, repair, and the relocation of supporting
infrastructure for the Seventh Fleet when the Filipino Senate refused
to renew the leases on US air and naval bases in September 1991. After the
terrorist attacks of 11 September, and the discovery of al-Qaeda-related
networks in the subregion, the Bush administration reinvigorated its
alliances with the Philippines and Thailand, deepened military and coun-
terterrorism cooperation with Singapore, and restored military-to-military
ties with Indonesia. More significantly, the core US–Japan alliance was
“revitalized” in 1997 to deepen the nature of allied military cooperation
by giving Japan a greater role in supporting operations; and to widen the
scope of the alliance beyond the defense of Japan to include enhancing
174 Evelyn Goh
regional security. After 11 September, the alliance was further strengthened
by constitutional revisions in Japan that allowed it to support US combat
operations and reconstruction in Afghanistan and Iraq.
These bilateral relationships have been used by the US and its partners as
the key channel to obtain great power commitment. Its allies and partners
have been motivated by the imperative of “security binding” the US, finding
new means and rationale for “tying down” the US to a predictable involve-
ment in the region’s strategic life and a commitment to managing and
solving its security problems (Ikenberry and Tsuchiyama 2002). The US
hegemonic assurance, then, has mainly taken the form of a recommitment
to play the “benign alliance leader” that would act to “preclude[e] the rise of
a hostile hegemon through selective crisis intervention and through deploy-
ments of superior military power in the region” (Tow 2001: 198). Over the
last decade, Washington has developed two supplementary, more limited
multilateral channels in effecting these commitments. First is the Trilateral
Security Dialogue with Japan and South Korea begun in 2002, which
has game-changing potential if it multilateralizes the alliances. While these
consultations have engendered joint military exercises and a strategic part-
nership between Japan and Australia, they have been geared largely to
exchanging information and finding common ground for the two sets of
bilateral alliances on issues such as missile defense, non-proliferation, and
counterterrorism. There has been relatively less emphasis placed on the
Trilateral Security Dialogue by Barack Obama’s administration, and its
development remains constrained by concerns about antagonizing China
(see Tow et al. 2008).
The second multilateral channel, aimed at conflict management on the
Korean peninsula, is the Six Party Talks started in 2003. Significant because
it marked a move away from the bilateral approach Washington had taken
to the North Korean nuclear problem since 1994, the Six Party Talks is a
key example of rationalist great power security cooperation. Washington
accepted China’s overture of brokering talks in recognition of Beijing’s
influence in Pyongyang and rising power in East Asia, and drew in South
Korea and Japan to allay their concerns about China’s involvement in
managing the direct threat of North Korea. In terms of institutional design,
the Six Party Talks promised greater functional capability and collective
legitimacy; unfortunately, it has enjoyed no clear success and has been
stalled since 2009.
The restraint element of great power assurance in US security approaches
in East Asia came to the fore in the 2000s as a result of the erosion of
American foreign policy legitimacy during the Bush administration’s “war
against terrorism,” and the intensifying strategic competition with rising
China. One important external constraint to great power is the creation of
multilateral security institutions that would use norms, rules, expectations,
and reputational effects to limit the scope of its power. Yet, East Asian
multilateral security institutions like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
were treated by the US as mainly constraining China, or as a means to
project its strategic imperatives like counterterrorism. The Obama adminis-
tration altered this stance somewhat in order to repair America’s reputation.
To demonstrate willingness to be restrained by common regional norms,
Washington joined China, India, Russia, and others in acceding to ASEAN’s
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2010 and participated in the East Asia
Summit (EAS) in 2011. While the effectiveness of this multilateral forum
remains to be seen, US membership prevents any potential Chinese dom-
ination of this regional security initiative. This renewed interest in regional
multilateral institutions, then, stems less from demonstrating US restraint
than using another channel to dilute Chinese strategic advantage and
competition. As Michael Mastanduno (2009: 83–84) reminds us, there is
a relative lack of principled commitment to multilateralism within US
foreign policy. Its tendency of using multilateralism and international insti-
tutions “pragmatically, more as instruments of convenience,” has been
exacerbated by the current polarization in American domestic politics and
the troubled state of leading global institutions like the United Nations,
International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization, and we
might expect at best an incremental and selective use of these multilateral
channels.
With regard to US efforts to restrain and limit great power competition,
we might pay more attention to its widening structure of regular bilateral
security dialogues and developing conflict management measures with
China. These include the US–China Strategic Economic Dialogue estab-
lished in 2006 and upgraded to the track-two Strategic and Economic
Dialogue since 2009; and in the military realm, hotlines between their
presidents and between defense ministers, and the initiation of bilateral
Defense Consultative Talks and the Military Maritime Consultative Agree-
ment in 1997 (see Kan 2011). While these measures have not always been
effective in avoiding crises such as the April 2001 EP-3 aircraft collision
incident and the March 2009 USNS Impeccable incident, their existence
and increasing institutionalization is a reflection of conscious great power
management of bilateral relations through ongoing testing and negotiation
of mutual constraints.
China’s rising power strategy

Since the end of the Cold War, China, like the US, has used a mixture of
bilateral and multilateral mechanisms to achieve its security interests in
East Asia. On the surface, it would seem that Chinese security approaches
are more overtly multilateralist compared to the predominant bilateralism
of the US. China started from a low point at the end of the Cold War in
that it did not have a significant degree of formal security interaction or
relationships with its neighbors. Bilateralism was thus a natural channel
of developing interactions, but this very quickly gave way to increased
176 Evelyn Goh
attention to multilateralism from the mid-1990s as regional institutions took
root and Chinese leaders prioritized the need to reassure their neighbors.
Since then, China’s rhetoric has focused on Taylor’s second category, the
“multilateral–bilateral” approach, which presses the expectation that bilat-
eralism is a stepping stone to multilateralism as the end game. Yet, Beijing
has simultaneously pursued critical bilateral mechanisms in its relations with
East Asia neighbors, both in political–economic engagement and conflict
management.
As a rising power, China has experienced an acute imperative to extend
assurance to other states in the region worried about its potential revision-
ism. Unlike US assurance, which is centered on a commitment to upholding
regional order, Chinese great power assurance has emphasized restraint.
Since the mid-1990s, Chinese policymakers have adopted multilateral
mechanisms as the crucial high-profile channel for demonstrating China’s
willingness to subject itself to external, institutionalized, restraint. The logic
is that China’s potential regional influence is diluted by being enmeshed
in interactive and institutional processes with other great powers and smaller
states; and China’s power is constrained by agreed norms, institutional
binding, and socialization (see Johnston and Ross 1999). But the dynamics
of restraint and commitment are more tightly intertwined for China than
for the US; the corollary of China’s restrained attitude is the demonstration
of support for the status quo by not flouting its norms. Thus, Chinese
commitment to regional order takes the form of compliance, in contra-
distinction to the US commitment to underpinning this order by providing
credible deterrence vis-à-vis potential challengers.
China’s approach to reforming the post-Cold War East Asian security
order initially included hopes of gradually diluting US domination, and
Beijing was motivated to ensure its place in this evolving order. Initially
defensive about the creation of fora like the ARF, Chinese policymakers
perceived multilateral settings as providing venues for other states to “gang
up” against it and interfere in its domestic affairs. In spite of its reservations,
Beijing agreed to become a member, to avoid regional isolation (Swaine and
Tellis 2000). Very quickly, Chinese officials began to appreciate the value of
ARF membership for demonstrating their status quo and cooperative
intentions, and for countering the “China threat” perception (see Johnston
2003). But Beijing also used the forum to question US alliances, and to
promote its own alternative vision of multipolarity as the best guarantee
of regional stability. China introduced its “new security concept” that rein-
forced the paradigm of cooperative security in the ARF, and lobbied for
membership for other regional powers like India (Emmers 2003). Beijing
clearly valued multilateralism “for its possible contribution to the weakening
of US ties with its Asian allies” (Foot 1998: 435), and tried to steer East
Asian multilateralism towards constraining US power.
The Asian financial crisis in 1997 spurred East Asian states into creating
more exclusive regional institutions and to seek self-help and a regional
community consisting of ASEAN+3 (China, Japan, and South Korea).
Within this climate, China’s demonstrations of self-restraint in pursuing
multilateral frameworks and in limiting its own interests, especially in inter-
actions with its small Southeast Asian neighbors, gained in effectiveness.
China’s increasing use of multilateralism contained a strong competitive
element – great power assurance and competition are linked, in that assur-
ance from one side can be interpreted by the other side in a zero-sum
manner – and China’s pursuit of East Asian regionalism was read by the US
as a means to exclude and replace its leadership. Yet, Beijing’s thinking is
somewhat more complex: its regional multilateral activism aims at avoiding
isolation and forestalling containment. In an international order that Beijing
strongly perceives of as yichao duoqiang (one superpower with many great
powers), Beijing uses strong reassurance mechanisms and economic ties to
persuade others that “Cold War-style containment of China simply could
not occur in this era of interdependence” (Foot 2006: 88). Chinese policy-
makers use the region as a “shield from pressure exerted by other great
powers” (Zhang and Tang 2005: 50–51). Instead of emphasizing the difficult
task of balancing against US power directly, China aims to reshape the
incentive structure of its neighbors so that they would not become complicit
in a putative attempt by the US to contain China.
Since 2000, Beijing also used multilateral channels to send important
signals that it would voluntarily restrain its power. Adding to the 2002
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea with
ASEAN, in 2003 China became the first non-member state to accede
formally to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, thus binding itself
to the norms of non-interference and non-use of force in settling conflicts. In
the same year, the two sides signed the Joint Declaration on ASEAN-China
Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity, addressing a wide variety
of economic, political, social, and security issues. In 2004, Premier Wen
Jiabao mooted an “East Asian community” that would entail expand-
ing ASEAN+3 discussions to political and security issues (Shambaugh
2004/05). Subsequently, Beijing tried to leverage on its growing influence in
the region to push for more exclusive multilateral channels that would
exclude the US. Even after they lost the fight over membership of the EAS
in 2005, Chinese officials remain adamant that the EAS is too amorphous
(see Liu 2010). They now evince “profound skepticism” about the prospects
for a regional community in view of the “apparently unnecessary geo-
graphical expansion of the region” and continued regional dependence on
US security ties and deference to US sensitivities (Li 2009: 3, 7). Since 2010,
when the Obama administration signed up to the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation and joined the EAS, while asserting US interest in maritime
conflicts in the South and East China Seas, Chinese analysts have read
“America’s return to Asia” seriously and extrapolated it to expect US
assertiveness in blocking East Asian regionalism and retrieving regional
leadership for itself (Song 2011).
178 Evelyn Goh
Thus, the dynamics of great power assurance as well as competition are
highly manifested in the multilateral channels of China’s regional strategy.
It seems that Beijing aims to create an exclusive East Asian economic and
security order that would institutionalize its growing power and leadership
without the US running interference. This goal is backed by strong bilateral
elements that facilitate and complement Chinese multilateral actions. Most
notable are China’s strategic dialogue with the US as discussed above, but
also its “strategic partnerships” with other Asian great powers (Russia and
India), which are bilateral assurance strategies to “re-mould great power
politics” to ensure an environment largely friendly to its rise by managing
great power competition and tensions and maintaining a “mutually positive
interactive pattern in their relationships” (Deng 2008: 166). In this vein,
since the 1990s, China has settled bilaterally some of its most significant
land border disputes with India, Russia, and Vietnam. It has also developed
bilateral military-to-military exchanges and relations to build confidence
(with the US especially, but also with Southeast Asian states) and set
up generous military assistance and supply relationships with neighbors
like the Philippines and Indonesia. And yet, the bilateral arena is also where
the limits of Chinese assurance strategies are most exposed. On the one
hand, China’s lasting preference for dealing with disputes bilaterally some-
times leads to grave suspicions from neighbors who have tended to hold up
multilateralism as a gauge for Chinese benignity – this is most marked in
the South China Sea disputes. On the other hand, the most significant
impediment to China’s attempts to shape or lead regional order lies in its
problematic bilateral relationship with Japan.
Japan’s strategic dilemma

The East Asian security landscape is striking not only for the dominance
of the US and China, but also because of their crucially important bilateral
relationships with Japan. The Sino-Japanese rivalry sits alongside the Sino-
American rivalry as the most potentially dangerous dyad in the region,
while the current regional order is constituted critically by Japan’s alliance
relationship with the US. More than in the case of China or the US, Japan’s
regional security approaches illustrate the complex interplay between
bilateralism and multilateralism. After the Cold War, Japan faced a two-
pronged strategic dilemma: how to maintain its US security umbrella while
avoiding conflict with China; and how to boost its regional influence while
reassuring its neighbors about its intentions. Dealing with this dilemma
pushed Tokyo into two sets of “bilateral and multilateral” dynamics.
First, it has tried to form a multilateral “shell” to legitimize its strength-
ening bilateral alliance with the US. The US–Japan alliance remains a
lynchpin of the East Asian security order: it facilitates in operational and
cost terms and – more importantly – it legalizes and legitimizes the very
significant US power projection in the region (Goh 2011a). Its security
dependence on the US because of its postwar constitutional constraints
makes maintaining the alliance Japan’s pre-eminent security imperative.
It also renders this alliance the ultimate means by which Japan assures its
neighbors against potential resurgent militarism and aggression. Thus,
Tokyo’s involvement in multilateral security enterprises in East Asia
is constantly tempered by the imperative of protecting this alliance.3 In
considering proposals for the creation of what eventually became the ARF,
Japanese leaders wanted a multilateral forum that would first and foremost
help insure a continued US presence in the region (Soeya 1994). Later,
Tokyo hoped that multilateral security institutions would provide a forum to
discuss regional fears about Japanese security strategy and to allow Japan
to reassure its neighbors about its expanded burden sharing within the
alliance (Midford 2000). This translated into strong support for “open”
regionalism – most significantly in the form of an inclusive EAS encom-
passing other US allies and now the US itself – and multiple overlapping
security arrangements to forge East Asian acceptance of the alliance as a
permanent feature of a cooperative security order. Significantly, Japan finds
support in this endeavor – Singapore and Australia have been particularly
vocal about the legitimizing effects of US participation in regional multi-
lateral security institutions.4
Second, Japan has extended its deep-seated bilateral conflict with China
by channelling their strategic competition into the multilateral realm. The
post-Cold War Sino-Japanese relationship has been characterized often and
aptly as “hot economics, cold politics.” It suffers serious bilateral nationalist
conflicts over history and territory, which have exploded periodically at the
high political and mass public levels. More worrisome is the growing threat
perception between them because of the changing nature of the US–Japan
alliance: Beijing now sees that Japan, instead of being restrained, is unlea-
shed and facilitated by the alliance to contain China (Midford 2004). This
deepening security dilemma is exacerbated by China’s expansive military
activities in disputed maritime zones, and US expectation of greater
Japanese burden sharing (see Goh 2011a). Yet, Japan and China are also
engaged in strategic competition in the form of a “mutual denial of status
recognition” (Deng 2008: 273). At the international level, for instance,
China has blocked Tokyo’s bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations
Security Council; but this dynamic is most intense within East Asia. Since
Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro- successfully opposed China’s initiative
for an exclusive ASEAN+3-only EAS, the battle lines have been drawn. In
a spate of competitive multilateralism, Japan has tried to check Chinese
influence by pushing for inclusivity and open regionalism, functional coop-
eration, human rights, democracy, and conformity with global regimes.
As Christopher Hughes (2009: 855) points out, Japan has been using
regional multilateral institutions to counter China’s rising influence by
“deliberately ‘over-supplying’ regionalism so as to diffuse China’s ability to
concentrate its power in any one forum.”
180 Evelyn Goh
One might argue that diverting Sino-Japanese strategic competition
into the multilateral realm helps to mediate this problematic bilateral rela-
tionship and to subject the conflict to institutional restraints. Certainly,
Japan’s activism in multilateral institutions and push for inclusive regional-
ism has stemmed partly from Tokyo’s desire to assure the region by
eschewing blatant leadership roles. At the same time, this institutional com-
petition has also been aided and abetted by the sophisticated Southeast
Asian strategy of “omni-enmeshing” all the major powers in regional
institutions to promote a “complex balance of influence,” in which “major
power competition and balancing are channelled to take place within the
constraints of norms and institutions” (Goh 2007/08: 139, 143), thereby
weakening the traditional military aspect of balancing. Yet, Japan’s regional
security practices at the bilateral–multilateral nexus ultimately combine
to limit the ongoing negotiation of regional order. Crucially, the battle over
exclusive or “open” regionalism remains unresolved and stalled at a super-
ficial level of dialogue and overlapping functional cooperation, without
progress on how to reconcile US security dominance and bilateral relation-
ships with security regionalism. Correspondingly, Japan’s strategic dilemma
remains acute.
Conclusion: patchworks and the limits of convergence

The foregoing discussion suggests that the great powers in East Asia – the
US as incumbent hegemon, China as rising power, and Japan with its
unresolved security identity – have fundamentally different strategic empha-
ses, which are served differently (and sometimes contradictorily) by bilateral
and multilateral means. Along with the smaller states in the region, these
great powers strive for different strategic assurances from each other, and are
taking security competition into more complex arenas that fudge previous
normative assumptions about bilateralism and multilateralism. Together,
these dynamics push towards an unexpected potential “convergence”
between bilateral and multilateral security approaches, one that in fact
questions the useful distinction between them when trying to understand the
evolving East Asian security order.
This chapter highlights three characteristics about the bilateral–multi-
lateral nexus in the East Asian security order. First, key bilateral relations
and interactions often underpin or limit multilateral security cooperation.
Notably, the US security commitment to the region, forged via revitalized
bilateral alliances and partnerships, provides the foundational strategic
deterrence that facilitates regional engagement of China and multilateral
regionalism. This is evident, for instance, in the way Japan and the South-
east Asian states turned to Washington for strategic assurance rather than
the regional multilateral institutions at the height of tensions with China
in the East and South China Seas in 2010.5 The potential for building an
East Asian regional order is further hampered by the inability of China
and Japan, the two indigenous great powers, to turn their strategic
competition into more constructive realms than the mutual blocking of
regional leadership.
Second, the dynamics of assurance and competition between the East
Asian great powers are intimately linked. This is most starkly manifest
in the developing nature of security multilateralism in the region, which
belies the cosy, positive-sum game assumed in the liberal rationalist litera-
ture. Multilateral institutions have been used by China, Japan, and the US
as a natural component or extension of zero-sum strategic competition. This
has occurred with the complicity of other states in the region, especially
ASEAN, which suffers the small states’ imperative of constraining great
powers using institutional means. At the same time, ASEAN also has
an interest in maintaining a certain degree of great power friction so as to
sustain its own strategic relevance and position as the “driver” of regional-
ism (Goh 2011b).
Third, therefore, this chapter suggests that the real conflict within
the current East Asian security order does not reside in a clash between
bilateral and multilateral approaches, but rather in divergent visions
of regional order. Conflict arises at the bilateral–multilateral nexus when
multilateral security developments diverge from the general dynamic of
reinforcing the existing US-dominated security order, and especially when
multilateral developments touch on alternative or reformist or supplemen-
tary order building (such as “exclusive” regionalism stressing self-help
amongst East Asian states led by China and/or Japan), as opposed to func-
tional or “talk-shop” confidence building.
Where does this leave the evolving East Asian security order? At base, it
points to a continued layering of a “patchwork” of different security
arrangements and relationships – yet, this will not be a happy, positive-sum
patchwork as Victor Cha (2011) argues, but rather a competitive and at
times conflictual one. As other historical cases have shown, the process of
negotiating new regional orders tends to be competitive, and the challenge
is to seek, over the medium-term, an optimal combination of mechanisms to
maximize great power assurance while optimizing the chances of power
sharing amongst the leading states.
Notes
1 Just as realists are likely to choose as their dependent variable the distribution of
power, liberal institutionalists the state of formal institutions, and constructivists
the development of regional identity and community.
2 Washington’s switch from initial opposition to support of the ASEAN Regional
Forum, and its subsequent use of the forum to conduct bilateral meetings with
China and North Korea, is a case in point (see Goh 2004).
3 Japan’s approach to regional economic multilateralism – a subject beyond the
scope of this chapter – is less constrained by the alliance.
4 The Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong notably argued that, through
the ARF, ASEAN had “exercised their sovereign prerogative to invite the US
182 Evelyn Goh
to join them in discussing the affairs of Southeast Asia,” so “no one can argue
that the US presence in Southeast Asia is illegitimate” (Goh 2001).
5 US Secretaries of Defense, Robert Gates, and State, Hillary Clinton, reiterated
that the US–Japan alliance covered the disputed Senkaku Islands, and the latter
declared a US national interest in the peaceful resolution of the Spratlys dispute –
see Japan Times (2010); Pomfret (2010).
13 Conclusion
William T. Tow
The project from which this volume emanates was shaped around several
key objectives. The first was to generate a critical assessment of the existing
US bilateral security network. Existing US alliances and coalitions need to
be assessed on how effectively they can respond to the emergence of such
rising powers as the People’s Republic of China and India, and how relevant
they may be in achieving joint security initiatives with these emerging great
powers. In this context US regional interests, and its current institutional
priorities and diplomacy, must also be evaluated with respect to the policies
and security objectives of key US allies and friends in the region.
Second, alternative or supplemental approaches to the postwar American
bilateral security network – the so-called “hub and spokes” system or “San
Francisco System” – must be evaluated. Any such evaluation must take
into account rapidly changing Asia-Pacific regional security dilemmas. An
operative assumption from the project’s outset was that US Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates was prescient when he observed in early 2008 that,
“against the backdrop of great shifts in the region as a whole,” the US
needed to move toward projecting a more comprehensive and complex
mix of hard and soft power in the region and toward a “good deal more
cooperation among our allies and security partners – more multilateral ties
rather than hubs and spokes.” Gates argued that this did not mean diluting
US bilateral ties but “rather enhancing security by adding to them multi-
lateral cooperation” (Gates 2008).
A third objective was to analyze how to move beyond an “either/or”
perspective of bilateral alliances and existing Asia-Pacific multilateral
security institutions, and to achieve Gates’s vision. Are there new appro-
aches or structures available but not yet implemented that incorporate an
effective bilateral–multilateral nexus to realize greater stability and sustain-
able prosperity in the Asia-Pacific?
As noted in this book’s introduction, some Asian leaders and independent
analysts have argued that a “regional security community” will only emerge
when alliance politics is disavowed or marginalized by regional security
actors. Others insist that the US bilateral security network must remain
intact and largely unchanged in the region because multilateral initiatives
184 William T. Tow
introduced there have, thus far, proven to be unfocused, unwieldy and
ineffective. Yet, if the observations of Gates and likeminded policymakers
and policy analysts are correct, that new multilateral security formulas are
urgently needed to complement the San Francisco System, more balanced
policy perspectives and prescriptions must be derived.
Over this study’s four-year timeframe, the effectiveness and adaptability of
the US bilateral alliance framework, and multilateralism’s applicability to
regional security politics, were analyzed. These analyses were not inherently
exclusive to each other but were sufficiently complementary and insightful to
provide understanding of a paradigmatic vision of a successful bilateral–
multilateral regional security network.
Relating concepts to reality

How has implementation of ongoing bilateralism and nascent multi-
lateralism, thus far, translated into key Asia-Pacific regional actors’ actual
security behavior? Many policy patterns have emanated from these actors’
changing strategic perceptions over our project’s four-year timespan,
but three major ones have assumed increasing prominence. These are: (1) a
gradual realization by the region’s key players that those security archi-
tectures that survive and evolve in the Asia-Pacific are likely to be “messy”
rather than precise even while they may reinforce each others’ purposes and
functions; (2) an increased propensity by the region’s two truly great
powers – China and the United States – to view multilateralism as a legit-
imate order-building strategy, but one that should be pursued for satisfying
their own national security interests rather than as a way of realizing genuine
“win–win” outcomes or absolute gains for all multilateral participants; and
(3) a gradual acceptance by US policy planners that their country’s potential
decline in global “hard power” (due to both fiscal and geopolitical con-
siderations) requires more balancing via the achievement of genuine alliance
burden sharing (or what the Barack Obama administration has labeled
“partner capacity-building”).
The term “security architecture” has been applied frequently but incon-
sistently in the theoretical literature dealing with Asia-Pacific multipolarity
(for example, see Acharya 2007; Buzan 2003; Maull 2007). The key pre-
conditions for realizing an “ideal type” of architecture are perhaps so
rigorous as to negate reasonable expectations that policymakers will meet
them in a real-world regional security environment. These include regional
actors’ acceptance of a leader able to shape the purpose and define the rules
for creating and maintaining an overarching entity that can incorporate
“institutions” or “arrangements” under its umbrella and is able to address
the most comprehensive understandings of security in an Asia-Pacific con-
text (Tow and Taylor 2010: 110). As other authors in this volume have out-
lined, several initiatives to define and shape such multilateral architectures
materialized over the past four years. Australia’s Prime Minister Kevin
Conclusion 185
Rudd introduced his “Asia-Pacific security” concept in 2008 as a means to
involve the region’s great and middle powers and the Association of South-
east Asian Nations (ASEAN) institutional commitment to a single grand
design for regional confidence building and adjudication. His Japanese
counterpart, Hatoyama Yukio, similarly proposed the formation of an “East
Asia Community” in late 2009. Both initiatives suffered from a lack of
clarity and from their originating countries’ identity gaps relative to “core”
Asian countries such as China, and to various ASEAN members who often
view Australia as an American proxy and Japan as an abnormal state
reluctant to acknowledge – and apologize for – its past historical transgres-
sions. China’s “New Security Concept” proposed in the late 1990s ran afoul
of those who viewed it as nothing more than a rationale for undercutting the
US alliance system, which many of its regional neighbors view as critical to
balancing intensifying Chinese power and ambitions. Until very recently, the
US, as an avowed skeptic of formal security institutions, stayed inherently
detached from multilateral security architecture politics.
As demonstrated by other authors in this volume, and especially by Ryo
Sahashi in Chapter 10, multiple levels of security organization co-existing
and tacitly complementing each other have become the default organiza-
tional pattern for Asia-Pacific security politics. This condition has been
described by Victor Cha as a “complex patchwork” of bilateral, plurilateral,
and multilateral networks, serendipitously rather than consciously meshing
together to maintain regional stability. Such a framework is tenuous, how-
ever, to the extent that Beijing views US alliance-initiated efforts to build
regionalism as really designed to contain China, while the US similarly
views China-initiated multilateral propositions as targeting Chinese regional
presence and power. Cha concludes that “ad hoc” institutional collabora-
tion, such as that by the “core group” of states (including Australia, India,
Japan, and the US) providing disaster relief to areas devastated by the
December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, and the Six Party Talks, have been
the more successful episodes of multipolar “architectural behavior.” They do
not involve “collective action problems” such as membership, extensive
debates over rule making, or a lack of transparency and confidence over
policy intentions (Cha 2011). The core group, however, has spawned
other plurilateral ventures such as the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue that
have precipitated Chinese suspicions because their announced objectives of
promoting maritime security and meeting future non-traditional security
contingencies have been unconvincing to Beijing, precipitating anxieties
over implementation of China containment policies by stealth. The Six
Party Talks have remained dormant from their suspension in December
2008 until the time of writing (July 2012). In this sense, the complex
patchworks paradigm seems less convincing than its proponents argue to
be the case.
These discouraging outcomes lead to an equally dour second general-
ization. The two states most capable of coordinating regional security
186 William T. Tow
cooperation through their support of multilateralism have turned the tradi-
tional logic of rational cooperation underpinning that approach on its head.
China has viewed ASEAN+3 (China, Japan, and South Korea) as a
mechanism for cultivating a relatively exclusive regional architecture and
a strategic culture based on promoting “Asian values” or the principle of
“Asia for Asians.” The United States, accustomed to exercising asymme-
trical power within its traditional bilateral alliance network, has been
equally adamant in supporting a broader or “pan-Asian” version of region-
alism that includes members situated outside East Asia proper and that
accommodates US alliance politics. The region’s small and middle powers
have either opted to maneuver between the Chinese and American
“elephants in the room” (Thailand and, to some extent, Australia), or to
reinforce their bilateral security networks with their great power patrons (the
two Koreas, the Philippines and, more subtly, Japan). They have adapted
existing plurilateral networks such as the Five Power Defence Arrangements
in ways designed to address clearly subregional security issues (counter-
terrorism and local maritime security issues) outside the purview of great
power competition.
Accepting and promoting multilateralism’s logic of “absolute gains”
(everyone is a winner over time if they strengthen an institution and
observe its rules) is one way that the US and China could circumvent
the security dilemma to which Cha has referred. Neither Washington nor
Beijing, however, has given much credence to such reasoning. Both have
instead prioritized bilateralism as the best way to secure their national
interests even while insisting that by doing so they are not targeting
each other as strategic rivals. This makes both great powers appear to be
harboring contradictory security policies.
US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, for example, emphasized her
country’s evolving vision of Asian regional security architecture as one
encompassing “a multilayered network of ties with Asia Pacific countries …
and regional institutions, with the goal of promoting stability and prosperity
across the region” (National Institute for Defense Studies 2012: 222; Clinton
2010b, 2011a). Yet she qualified the conditions under which the US would
pursue multilateral security politics by noting “the principle that will guide
America’s role in Asian institutions. If consequential security, political,
and economic issues are being discussed, and if they involve our interests,
then we will seek a seat at the table” (Clinton 2010a, emphasis added).
China’s leadership would understand that reasoning even if it disagrees
with Washington’s continued support for its bilateral security alliance
network as outmoded Cold War policy. In the meantime, officials and
independent analysts in both the US and China continued to fuel the Sino-
American security dilemma during 2011–12 by accusing each other of
hypocritical behavior at both the bilateral and multilateral levels. In a speech
delivered in early March 2012, Clinton criticized China for being a “selec-
tive stakeholder,” eschewing great power responsibilities on the grounds it
Conclusion 187
was still a developing state (Clinton 2012). The People’s Daily Online had
previously attacked a comprehensive essay that the Secretary of State
published in late 2011 on “America’s Pacific Century” as merely justifying
continued American regional hegemony in Asia at a time that any such
agenda was increasingly at odds with a changing regional power balance
(Wang 2011).
Prior to visiting the US in April 2012, Chinese Vice President (and future
President) Xi Jinping indirectly chided the Obama administration’s “pivot
strategy” designed to sustain US military power and traditional US military
alliances in the Asia-Pacific as destabilizing:
At a time when people long for peace, stability and development, to

deliberately give prominence to the military security agenda, scale up
military deployment and strengthen military alliances is not really what
most countries in the region hope to see.
(Washington Post 2012)
China’s preoccupation with the Asia-Pacific balance of power and how

the United States bilateral alliance network will continue to shape it is
understandable. The San Francisco System has been viewed as the
key instrument for sustaining postwar US primacy in the region and for
frustrating opposing forces contesting such supremacy. Washington’s use
of escalation control tactics and its nuclear superiority during the Korean
War in early 1953 and during intermittent Taiwan crises in 1955, 1958,
and 1995–96 has generated the resentment of an increasingly powerful
and nationalist China. From the American vantagepoint, bilateralism in its
traditional form is worth preserving. From China’s perspective it must
be eradicated or at least significantly modified relative to the original
“threat-centric” logic underlying its creation if Chinese visions of a new
security order embodied in the New Security Concept and “Harmonious
World” outlook – postures anticipating an Asia far more independent from
American strategic influence than is now the case – are to be realized.
Accordingly, viewing regional multilateralism within this frame of refer-
ence, its utility as a competitive enterprise to enhance power balancing
rather than as a liberal-institutionalist approach for facilitating the type of
regional integration that would inherently erode Chinese (and American)
sovereign prerogatives, has become more evident. This current interpretation
renders understandable both Clinton’s caveats about US “interest-oriented”
multilateralism and China’s preference for conducting one-on-one or bilat-
eral negotiations with ASEAN over territorial disputes. Their preference
is for a relatively amorphous multilateral framework that can retain the
advantage of size and apply divide and rule tactics over smaller state clai-
mants. This is despite the fact that the formation of the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) in the early 1990s spearheaded by various ASEAN members
was to ensure that the processes of regional confidence building would be
188 William T. Tow
underwritten by a continued US presence in an immediate post-Cold War
global environment that could otherwise create a regional power vacuum
that China could exploit.
The Obama administration’s pivot strategy is the latest case in ongoing
American efforts to strike an effective equilibrium between power balancing
and multilateral institution building. It differs from the ARF’s creation
because in this instance the United States is attempting to adapt its bilateral
security networks to accommodate changing structural conditions, rather
than ASEAN adjusting its institutional framework and mechanisms to
accommodate US global strategy. Changing structural conditions, however,
still underwrite the process of adaptation. These illustratively include
increasingly constrained US material capabilities for coping with China’s
rapidly growing physical assets; the shift of commercial, resource, and
hard power attributes from a predominantly East Asian circumference to
something more akin to an “Indo-Pacific region”; and the proliferation
of nuclear weapons to states ready to contest an increasingly fragile inter-
national order.
In these current conditions, bilateral alliances must be viewed as credible
by the US and allied/partner populaces across an ever wider geographic
spectrum and must fulfill collective defense objectives through effective
alliance planning, resource prioritization, and partner capacity building
(Clinton 2011b). Failure to meet these conditions will render bilateralism’s
strategic relevance increasingly questionable. President Obama discussed the
strategy during his visit to Australia in November 2011 with his announce-
ment that a small contingent of US marines would begin training in that
country over the next few years.
US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta offered a more comprehensive
breakdown of the current strategies’ objectives and implementation at a
definitive speech delivered to the International Institute for Strategic
Studies Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2012 (Panetta 2012). Noting that this
strategy would not be directed toward any other specific countries (read
China), Panetta identified its objectives as preserving a “basic set of
shared principles” that underlie the current international order. These
shared principles include:
[T]he principle of open and free commerce, a just international

order that emphasizes rights and responsibilities of all nations and a
fidelity to the rule of law; open access by all to their shared domains of
sea, air, space, and cyberspace; and resolving disputes without coercion
or the use of force.
(Panetta 2012)
The means for realizing these objectives were identified as including (1) a
strengthening of US regional and international diplomacy, including – most
critically – a more systematic Sino-American pattern of selective security
Conclusion 189
and defense cooperation; (2) the modernization and strengthening of
US alliances and partnerships; (3) the support of regional institutional
development that highlights the observation and promotion of common
rules and norms; and (4) the development of greater US and allied/partner
force projection capabilities.
The objectives and the strategies for realizing these objectives and imple-
menting their requisite strategies obviously entail implementing a judicious
combination of bilateral, minilateral, and multilateral approaches. If so
implemented, Brendan Taylor’s last scenario outlined in Chapter 2 –
one entailing bilateralism and multilateralism – could become a substantive
feature of Asia-Pacific security politics. Successful implementation is by
no means a self-evident process, as evidenced by the absence of higher
ranking Chinese officials attending the Shangri-La Dialogue where Panetta
outlined them.1
Findings
Several major findings emerged from this study. Japan’s alliance politics with
the United States will become more complicated as the traditional postwar
US extended deterrence strategy becomes increasingly tested by domestic
financial constraints. Japan’s propensity to explore regionally based multi-
lateral initiatives, with or independently from the US, will increase com-
mensurately but only if that country overcomes the challenge of sorting out
its own national security identity (see Rikki Kersten, Chapter 4 in this
volume). Confronted by an intensifying North Korean threat and increas-
ingly self-confident Chinese neighbor, South Korea, by contrast, will remain
more comfortable with US geopolitical primacy continuing in the Asia-
Pacific. It could explore multilateral security approaches but only within an
“inclusive but qualified” framework that underscores sustained US strategic
leadership (see Ajin Choi and William T. Tow, Chapter 3 in this volume).
The implicit “bilateral or multilateral” policy choice underlying Japanese
and South Korean calculations, respectively, has been accentuated
by a growing tension between traditional and changing rationales for
US extended deterrence guarantees to these two Northeast Asian allies.
In Japan’s case, as Kersten notes, this means adjudicating countervailing
pressures between Japan assuming more independent collective self-
defense postures without falling into the trap of diluting the American
deterrence commitment to itself by appearing to yearn for greater defense
self-reliance. For South Korea, as Taylor has observed in Chapter 2, it has
meant adjusting to shifts in US postures directed toward North Korea:
from the bilateralism epitomized by the 1994 Agreed Framework to the
multilateralism directed toward the denuclearization of the Korean penin-
sula embodied in the Six Party Talks.
Simultaneously, however, extended deterrence strategy in its most tradi-
tional forms still remains alive and well on the Korean peninsula and in
190 William T. Tow
Northeast Asia. An Extended Deterrence Policy Committee has convened
regularly since March 2011 for American and South Korean military plan-
ners to plan “concrete and effective extended deterrence measures against
North Korea” (US Department of State 2012a). Japan’s 2010 National
Defense Program Guidelines set out a “dynamic deterrence” strategy that
envisions Japan enhancing its contributions to intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance components of US regional deterrence strategies, collabor-
ating with the US in developing and deploying viable theater missile defense
systems, and facilitating multilayered defense cooperation with other allied
countries such as South Korea (Jimbo 2012).
Different perspectives on the proper mixture of bilateralism and multi-
lateralism that underwrite geopolitical order building in Southeast Asia
also surfaced in analysis provided by project participants from the ASEAN
subregion. Some (particularly Renato Cruz De Castro in Chapter 5 in this
volume) advocated a more distinct interlocking of the existing US bilateral
network in Southeast Asia to confront what they view as predominantly
competitive or threat-centric trends in the region. Others (such as
Chulacheeb Chinwanno in Chapter 6, and Aileen S.P. Baviera in Chapter 8
in this volume) concluded that strategies incorporating various forms
of “balanced engagement” would facilitate prospects for multilateral and
bilateral regional security integration. As both Ralf Emmers and David
Capie intimate, the recent evolution of Five Power Defence Arrangements
as a relatively informal “minilateral” security coalition might provide a
model for the type of strategic flexibility and consultation that is required
for greater viability in contemporary bilateral–multilateral amalgams.
Another finding of this study was that non-traditional security politics
is playing an increasingly critical role in determining whether bilateral,
minilateral, or multilateral approaches will be used by regional actors to
address an ever-widening array of contemporary Asia-Pacific security issues.
Chinwanno notes that non-traditional security contingencies such as disaster
relief operations and cooperation on environmental issues increasingly
provide a rationale for Thailand to continue its postwar bilateral alliance
with the US. Capie notes that “defense diplomacy” involving frequent
exchanges, dialogues, and informal collaboration between military profes-
sionals generates “soft power” components of security cooperation across
bilateral and multilateral spectrums and, it could be argued, blurs the lines
between security interaction and development politics. One could point to
US military personnel operating in Aceh following the December 2004
Indian Ocean tsunami as a catalyst for rejuvenated Indonesian–American
politico-security ties and Australian Defence Force personnel undertaking
similar disaster relief operations in Japan following the March 2011 earth-
quake, tsunami, and nuclear power plant disasters as a benchmark for the
intensification of formal bilateral defense ties between those two allies in less
traditional policy sectors. Maritime security and counterterrorist initiatives
initiated by ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
Conclusion 191
grouping exemplify more formal significant multilateral non-traditional
security collaboration.
Despite the growth of such functional cooperation within bilateral
networks and among regional institutions, however, the work of Sahashi,
Hugh White, and Evelyn Goh postulates that classical state-centric geo-
politics will most likely trump alternative visions for Asia-Pacific security
order building. The first two of these analysts focus on the Sino-American
relationship as the major determinant of this process. Goh includes Japan as
a central player in great power collaboration and competition. Sahashi
envisions such processes as “hub and spokes” reaffirmation by small and
medium-sized allies and partners of the United States in the Asia-Pacific,
and “intra-institutional balancing” involving most state-centric actors in the
region working together to generate the soft balancing required to modify
otherwise unbridled China–US strategic competition.
White anticipates a more direct arrangement of Sino-American power
sharing that would compel other regional powers to concede power
and authority to a great power concert adjudicated by a China and a United
States sufficiently compatible to successfully impose strategies for war
avoidance. As noted in this volume’s introduction, Goh anticipates that any
such outcome would inherently entail a convergence of bilateral and multi-
lateral security politics leading to a blurring or even the eradication of those
two distinct concepts within the Asia-Pacific. This finding is clearly provo-
cative and challenges Taylor’s suggestion in Chapter 2 that bilateral and
multilateral paradigms could converge under certain circumstances to rein-
force the strengths that each approach brings to order-building endeavors.
The extent to which bilateralism and multilateralism can converge to facil-
itate Asian regional security thus remains a debatable proposition.
Conclusion
The project discussions flowing from these issues have led its participants to
gain a better understanding of the critical role that the emerging bilateral–
multilateral nexus plays in Asia-Pacific security politics. They also raise
some key questions for further research. These include:
! What are the policy and diplomatic obstacles to integrating bilateral and
multilateral approaches to Asia-Pacific security?
! Have the United States’ bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific evolved
from “threat-centric” arrangements to “order-building” mechanisms?
! To what extent do values that have underpinned the Asia-Pacific’s
bilateral alliances in a postwar context relate to the security dilemmas
shaping the region’s multilateral security politics?
! Can bilateral allies function as true “partners” or is the asymmetry that
underscored their creation and management during the Cold War an
inherent and inescapable feature of US alliance politics in Asia?
192 William T. Tow
The chapters in this volume have provided extensive analysis in both a
theoretical and empirical context in an effort to begin answering these
questions, but much more needs to be done.
That said, we can advance some preliminary generalizations. The struc-
tural and ideational challenges impeding the development of an extensive
and coherent architecture employing “bi-multilateralism” remain formid-
able. Chinese nationalism and American exceptionalism are challenges in
point, but so too are Japan’s identity problem, the Korean peninsula’s
intractable division, and ASEAN’s propensity to veto any regional archi-
tectural blueprint that does not originate within its own domain.
However, tangible progress has been made by policymakers and indepen-
dent analysts within and beyond the region in understanding the potential
complementarity of the bilateral and multilateral approaches even if they
differ on how that complementarity would – or should – work. Washington
now better understands the appeal of such ideas as community building to
regionally indigenous elites and peoples, and that its own postwar concepts
of order building will need to be adjusted to accommodate such visions
(this factor is discussed in some depth by Green and Gill 2009). China
is still grappling with how multilateralism can be adjudicated between
calculations underwriting great power politics and “normative-based” com-
mitments embraced by institutional entities. The increased levels and greater
intensity of Beijing’s participation in the region’s multilateral politics yields
concrete evidence that China, along with the US, is gradually learning how
diplomacy and dialogue can trump competition and conflict escalation
without necessarily undermining “core interests.”
Our project’s culmination in mid-2012 coincides with important leader-
ship changes and elections taking place or about to take place in a good
number of Asia-Pacific states, including China and the United States.
Understanding and dealing with the complexities and dynamics under-
pinning Asia-Pacific strategic architecture building is imperative for policy
leaders who are intent on enhancing that region’s stability. Successfully
reconciling contending forms of regional security cooperation constitutes a
critical first step in meeting that requirement.
Note
1 The significance of this Chinese absence generated a vigorous debate over the
viability of the Shangri-La Dialogue as an ad hoc multilateral grouping relative
to purely government functions such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting.
See Cossa (2012), and responses from Huxley (2012) and Acharya (2012).
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Index
Abe Shinzo- 41–3 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

“absolute gains” 186 (APEC) grouping 31, 190–1
Abu Sayyaf terrorist group 55, 63 Asia policy of the US 141–3
Acharya, Amitav 15, 103, 123 Asian financial crisis (1997) 90, 151,
Afghanistan 68 176–7
alliances: definitions of 142, 157; “Asian values” 186
importance of 112, 158; Aso- Taro- 45
management of 53; nature of 6, Association of Southeast Asian Nations
139, 157–9, 164, 167; US network see ASEAN
of 13–14, 136, 142, 145–6, 152, 155, Atkinson, Carol 119
158–67, 170, 184–5 Australia 142–9, 162–3, 166–7, 179
“alliances of necessity” and “alliances autonomy of states 140–1
of choice” 66 avian flu 79
al-Qaeda 55, 91, 173
Ang Wee Han 89–90 Badawi, Abdullah 121, 150
Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement Baker, J.A. 173
(AMDA) 87, 89 “balanced engagement” 84, 190
Anwar, D.F. 118 Bali bombings (2002) 91
ANZUS Treaty (1951) and ANZUS bilateralism: definitions of 10, 103;
Council 119–20, 162 need for 170; as used by the US 174
Aquino, Benigno 57–8, 144–5 bin Hamidi, Ahmad Zahid 121
“Arab Spring” 22 Bischeri, John 125
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Bishoyi, Saroj 118
Asian Nations) 27, 31, 67, 71–5, 87, Bitzinger, Richard 118
101–9, 118–23, 128–30, 136, 151, Blank, Stephen 116
154, 170, 181, 185, 187, 190–2 Bosworth, Stephen 12, 14
ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Bout, Victor 81
Meeting (ADMM) 82–4, 88, 97–8, Bristow, Damon 92
115, 126–30, 155 “building block” approach to
ASEAN Defence Senior Officials’ multilateralism 14
Meeting (ADSOM) 126 Bush, George W. 11, 80
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 8, 21,
27, 29, 32, 71, 76, 82–4, 88, 107–8, Cam Ranh Bay 148
113, 126, 128, 130, 150, 174–6, 179, Cambodia 75–8, 148
187–8 Campbell, Kurt 58
ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Canada 128
Cooperation 29, 175, 177 capacity-building 184
“ASEAN way” 22 Capie, David 10, 103, 190; author
“Asia-first” diplomacy 41, 45, 47 of Chapter 9
Index 215
Caporaso, J.A. 103 Emmers, Ralf 122, 190; author of
Cha, Victor 11, 13, 24, 181, 185 Chapter 7
China: growing power and influence English School of international
of 69, 135–45, 152–4, 167, 169, relations theory 169, 171
175–8; increasing concern with Ennis, Peter 43
institutions and norms 151; policy “enriched bilateralism” 14
for the South China Sea 55–9, 69–70, Evans, Paul 10, 103
73, 105–8, 111, 144, 146, 149–50, exclusive economic zones (EEZs)
178, 180; relations with ASEAN 11; 100–1, 112
relations with the Philippines 105–6;
relations with Thailand 81–2, 86; Five Power Defence Arrangements
relations with the US 32, 136–7, (FPDA) 5, 87–99, 122, 186, 190
142, 150–6, 160–1, 165–6, 178, 191; Foot, R. 176–7
security agenda 60 Fujiwara Kiichi 49
claimant-centered analysis 102–3 Fukuda Doctrine 41
Clinton, Bill 12 Fukuda Yasuo 43–5
Clinton, Hillary 25, 57–9, 69–70, Funabashi Yo-ichi 48–51
111–12, 141–2, 150, 186–7 functional differentiation between
Cobra Gold exercise 80, 88, 93, 120 bilateral and multilateral security
codes of conduct 109 cooperation 9
Cold War 163; ending of 160 functionalist security cooperation 147–9
collective self-defense 42
“concert” system of great powers 166–7 Gates, Robert 120, 127, 144, 183–4
confidence-building measures 15, 26, Gazmin, Voltaire 58–9
129, 155 Gillard, Julia 147
constructivism 29 global financial crisis 68, 135
“convergent security” 15–16, 130, 170 Goh, Evelyn 154, 180; author of
Council for Security Cooperation in Chapter 12
the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) 107–8 great power politics 171–2, 192
crime, transnational 79 Guam Doctrine 161–2
Guan, K.C. 118
defense diplomacy 6, 115–23, 129–30, Guanglie, Liang 127, 146
190; bilateralism in 120–3, 129–30; Gunness, Kristen 117–18
definition of 116; institutionalization
in 130; multilateralism in 118, Hambali 81
129–30; vertical and horizontal Hashimoto Ryu-taro- 41
elements of 118–19 Hatoyama Yukio 22, 45–7, 71, 151, 185
Del Rosario, Albert 58–9 “hawk engagement” 11
“democratic peace theory” 29, 31 He, Kai 140
Deng, Y. 178–9 Hean, Teo Chee 98, 117
Deng Xiaoping 106 hedging, strategic 60, 136, 140
deterrence strategy 189–90 hegemonic stability theory 25
Diaoyu Islands see Senkaku Islands hegemony 140, 164, 173–4
“diffuse reciprocity” 10 Hemmer, Christopher 24
disaster relief 98, 185, 190 Hill, Christopher 14
Dokdo Islands 111 Hor Nam Hong 78
House of Councillors International
East Asia Community proposal Issues Research Committee 47–51
177, 185 Hu Jintao 44
East Asia Summit (EAS) 21, 25–6, “hub and spokes” structure of
29–31, 84, 99, 127, 150–1, 155, alliances 67, 136, 143, 145, 155,
175, 177 172–3, 183, 191
East Asia Vision Group 35 Hughes, Christopher 179
economic growth 157 “human security” contingencies 28, 32
216 Index
humanitarian assistance 98 Malaysia 93–5, 121–3, 130, 148
Hun Sen 78 maritime jurisdiction disputes 100–13
Mastanduno, Michael 173, 175
identity politics 45 Medcalf, Rory 87, 95
Impeccable incident (2009) 56, 101, 175 military expenditures 31, 69, 138
“inclusive but qualified” membership minilateralism 7, 10; definition of 87
formula 22, 29–37; potential Mischief Reef 65–7, 105, 107, 111
legitimization of 33 missile defense systems 190
India 72–3, 144–5, 149 “multilateral pole”, Asia as 49
Indonesia 148–51 multilateralism: benefits from 170;
“Inland sea” speech (Fukuda, 2008) 45 definitions of 10, 103; questions for
“institutional balancing” 140 theorists of 127–8; at the working
institutions, role of 158–9 level 116, 123–5
International Institute for Strategic Murray, Stuart 118
Studies (IISS) 12, 69, 125, 136 Myanmar 33
“intra-institutional balancing” 191
“intra-spoke” security cooperation Naím, M. 10
145–6 “new security” concept 10, 176, 187
Iraq 68 New Zealand 117, 129, 161
nexus between bilateral and
Jakarta International Defence multilateral security cooperation 4–7,
Dialogue 130 9–11, 102, 104, 108, 113, 170–81,
Jamaluddin, J.M. 96 183, 191
Japan 4–5, 13, 39–52, 71, 145, 148–51, Nixon, Richard 160–1
161–2, 173–4, 178–80, 189 Noda Yoshihiko 71, 145
Japan Times 44 “non-interference in internal affairs”
Jemaah Islamiyah 91 principle 31
Job, Brian 103 North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) 22, 25, 28–9, 42, 158–9, 167
Kalayaan Islands 111 North Korea 11–16, 36, 174
Kan Naoto 46–7, 71 nuclear weapons 188
Katz, Richard 43
Katzenstein, Peter 24 Obama, Barack 25–6, 46, 60, 71, 135,
Kim Dae-jung 35 142, 148, 188
Kim Jong-Un 12 “offshore balancing” model 164
Kim Young-sam 34 Okada Katsuya 46
Koizumi Junichiro- 39, 41–2, 179 Okazaki Hisahiko 51
Korea see North Korea; South Korea Okinawa 46
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Olympic Games 44
Organization 34–5 “omni-enmeshment” in regional
Kuik, Cheng-Chwee 140 institutions 139, 180
Kuriles Islands 110 order-building 171, 181, 184, 191
Organisation for Economic
Layne, Christopher 164 Co-operation and Development
League of Democracies proposal 36 (OECD) 31
Lee Kuan Yew 95 Organization for Security and
Lee Myong-bak 36 Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 28
Leifer, Michael 94–5 Organski, A.F.K. 138, 153
liberalism in international relations 29 overlapping institutional
arrangements 130
Macapagal-Arroyo, Gloria 55, 146
Maehara Seiji 111 Pacific Armies Management Seminar
Mahathir Mohamad 150 (PAMS) 124–5, 129
Malacca Strait Patrol (MSP) 88, 95–6 pacifism 49–50
Index 217
Panetta, Leon 58–9, 127, 142, 148, “San Francisco System” of alliances
150, 188–9 3, 5, 8, 67, 103, 112, 157–61, 173,
Panichpakdi, Supachai 81 183–4, 187
Pape, Robert 140, 154 SARS (severe acute respiratory
Paracel Islands 100, 102, 108 syndrome) 79
“patchwork” of security Schlesinger, James 119
arrangements 181 Schofield, C. 56
peacebuilding operations 48 Schweller, Randall 138
People’s Daily Online 187 “security architecture” 184
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) security order in Asia 6, 15; see also
117, 138 order-building
Philippines, the 3, 5, 53–67, 120–2, security regimes 29
142, 146, 161; bargaining process Senkaku Islands 46–7, 71, 73, 100–5,
with the US 65–6; relations with 110–12
China 105–6, 144; relations with September 11th 2001 attacks 55, 67,
the US 61–5 91, 173
Phung Quang Thanh 148 Shah of Iran 163
Pibulsongkram, Plaek 74 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
“pivot strategy” of the US 60, 135, (SCO) 27, 29
187–8 Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD) 12, 15,
“plurilateral” groupings 27–8, 91, 98, 107–8, 115, 125–30, 144,
36, 186 188–9
power transition theory 138 Shinawatra, Thaksin 74, 77, 146
proactive diplomacy 47–8 Shinawatra, Yingluck 77, 81
Proliferation Security Initiative 32 Sichuan earthquake 44
Singapore 93–5, 117, 122–3, 130, 144,
Quadrennial Defense Review Report 150–1, 179
(US, 2010) 93 Singh, Bhubhindar 126
Quadrilateral Initiative 36–7 Six Party Talks 11–16, 26, 28, 34,
quadrilateralism 48 174, 185, 189
small and medium-sized states,
Rao, Narasimha 72 security policies of 139–43, 146–52,
Razak, Najib Abdul 96, 98, 166, 186, 191
123, 150 socialization of states 32, 60, 136
realism in international relations 29, Soeya Yoshihide 43
48, 142–3 “soft balancing” 140, 155
“reasonableness” principle for “soft power” 32, 183, 190
determining membership of South East Asia Treaty Organization
multilateral groupings 30 (SEATO) 74–6, 161–2
Reed Bank 56 South Korea 4, 28, 33–6, 100, 143–5,
regionalism, definition of 73 159, 161, 174, 189
risk aversion 138–9 Soviet Union 161–2
Roh Moo-hyun 21, 35 “spiderweb bilateralism” 3, 15
Roh Tae-woo 34 Spiezio, Kim Edward 63
Rolfe, Jim 90–1 Spratly Islands 55–8, 61–2, 73, 100–9
Rómulo, Alberto 57 state sponsorship of terrorism 12
Ross, Robert 139 Storey, I. 56
Rudd, Kevin 17, 21–2, 147, 151, Suharto, Thojib 90, 162
184–5 Surayud Chulanont 81
Ruggie, John Gerard 103–4 Susanto, Dadi 117
Sutrisno, Try 120
Sakata Michita 119 Swaine, Michael 152
San Francisco Peace Treaty (1951) synergy between bilateral and
110–11 multilateral security cooperation 12
218 Index
synthesis between bilateral and United Kingdom Strategic Defence
multilateral security cooperation 9, Review (1998) 116
15–17 United Nations: Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
Taiwan 161 100–1, 107, 112–13, 141; Security
Takeshima Islands 111 Council 179
Tan, Andrew 91–2 United States Agency for International
Tan, Seng 126 Development (USAID) 80
Tanaka, Akihiko 153
Tang, S. 177 Vietnam 106–9, 142, 149
territorial disputes 178, 187; see also “Vision 2020” 31
maritime jurisdiction disputes
terrorism 12, 67, 77, 91; see also Walt, S.M. 142
“war on terror” “war on terror” 28, 59, 135, 142, 174
Thailand 5, 73–84, 190; relations with Welsh, Bridget 93
China 146; relations with the US 80, Wen Jiabao 14, 71, 108, 177
83–4; security policy 81–3 Western Pacific Naval Symposium
Thayer, Carl 92, 122 (WPNS) 123–5, 129
Thomas, Harry 58 Wight, Martin 171
threat emergence and threat Wongsuwan, Prawit 121
intensity 53 Wonhyuk, L. 36
Tonkin, Gulf of 104–5, 109
Tow, William 14–15, 87, 103, 174; Xi Jinping 187
co-editor and co-author of Chapter 3
traditional and non-traditional security Yasukuni Shrine 41
threats 24, 80, 136, 190 Yejjajiva, Abhisit 78
Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Yoshida Doctrine 51–2
Group 11 Yoshida Shigeru 43
Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) 28, Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang 121
30, 174, 185
tsunami disaster (December 2004) 14, zero-sum strategic competition 11,
185 17, 181
Turner, M. 55 Zhang, Y. 177

Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Asia-Pacific Security: Contending Cooperation

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Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Asia-Pacific Security: Contending Cooperation

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ROUTLEDGE SECURITY IN ASIA PACIFIC SERIES

Bilateralism, Multilateralism and

Many scholars of international relations in Asia regard bilateralism

William T. Tow is Professor and Head of the Department of International

Brendan Taylor is Associate Professor and Head of the Strategic and

Security issues have become more prominent in the Asia-Paciﬁc region

1. Bush and Asia

2. Japan, Australia and Asia-Paciﬁc Security

3. Regional Cooperation and Its Enemies in Northeast Asia

4. Energy Security in Asia

5. Australia as an Asia Paciﬁc Regional Power

6. Securing Southeast Asia

8. Human Security in East Asia

9. Security and International Politics in the South China Sea

10. Japan’s Peace Building Diplomacy in Asia

11. Geopolitics and Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia

12. North Korea’s Military–Diplomatic Campaigns, 1966–2008

13. Political Change, Democratic Transitions and Security in Southeast Asia

14. American Sanctions in the Asia-Paciﬁc

16. Human Security in Southeast Asia

17. ASEAN and the Institutionalization of East Asia

18. India as an Asia Paciﬁc Power

19. ASEAN Regionalism

21. Maritime Challenges and Priorities in Asia

22. Human Security and Climate Change in Southeast Asia

23. Ten Years After 9/11 – Rethinking the Jihadist Threat

24. Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Asia-Paciﬁc Security

ISBN: 978-0-415-62580-7 (hbk)

Typeset in Times New Roman

Figure and tables ix

2 Conceptualizing the bilateral–multilateral security nexus 8

3 Bridging alliances and Asia-Paciﬁc multilateralism 21

4 Stretching the Japan–US alliance 39

5 The US–Philippines alliance: moving beyond bilateralism? 53

6 Thailand’s security policy: bilateralism or multilateralism? 68

7 The role of the Five Power Defence Arrangements in

8 Territorial and maritime jurisdiction disputes in East Asia:

9 The bilateral–multilateral nexus in Asia’s defense diplomacy 115

10 The rise of China and the transformation of Asia-Paciﬁc

11 Alliances and order in the “Asian Century” 157

12 Conceptualizing the relationship between bilateral and

Aileen S.P. Baviera is Professor at the Asian Center, University of the

David Capie is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Victoria

Chulacheeb Chinwanno, a former Vice-Rector in International Aﬀairs at

Ajin Choi is Associate Professor of International Relations in the Graduate

Renato Cruz De Castro is Senior Professor in the International Studies

Ralf Emmers is Associate Professor and Coordinator of the Multilateralism

Evelyn Goh is Reader in International Relations and an ESRC Mid-

Asia-Paciﬁc countries have reached a crossroads on what form of order-

ADMM ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting

Setting the context

Bilateralism and multilateralism have long been regarded as dichotomous

security structures – such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization – yet

The bilateral or multilateral approach

The bilateral–multilateral approach

For the United States, key to facilitating an upgrade of the alliance is to

From this perspective, multilateral processes serve as a useful supplement

The bilateral and multilateral approach

The nexus and America’s

Asia-Paciﬁc multilateral security: evolutionary factors

Asia-Paciﬁc multilateral security: typologies and constraints

A potential multilateral security pathway: “inclusive but

Potential eﬀectiveness of the “inclusive but qualiﬁed” formula