1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties.

2. In D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1193/1997, the petitioner has questioned the validity of
Section 6(2) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (for short
'the Act') and has sought for quashing the said provisions as unconstitutional and void. He
has further sought permission to increase the rent as per the prevailing market rate and any
other appropriate writ, order or direction as deemed fit.

3. In S. B. Civil Revision Petition No. 986/96, the following points are referred to the Larger
Bench for decision:--

"(1) Whether a learned single Judge of this Court sitting in revisional jurisdiction can declare
provision of an enactment to be ultra vires the Constitution?

(2) Whether the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Act can be taken to have
been impliedly declared ultra vires as necessary effect of the decision of the Supreme Court
in Malpe Vishwanath Acharya v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1998 SC 602 and other cases
cited by the learned single Judge in Firm Khetsi Das Sheoji Ram's case?"

4. Thus, in substance, the principal question that arises for consideration is as to the
constitutional validity of Sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Act.

5. Shri D.S. Shishodia, the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner in D. B. Civil Writ
Petition No. 1193/1997 submitted that similar provisions in different Rent Control Acts of
different States are struck down as ultra vires the Constitution. He cited the following
decisions in support of his case :--

"(1) Firm Khetsi Dass Sheoji Ram, Sardarshahar v. Mohani Devi, 1994 (2) Raj LW 631.

(2) Issac Ninan v. State of Kerala, 1996 AIHC 857."

6. He further submitted that the controversy raised in the writ petition can be taken as
concluded by the pronouncement of the Apex Court in Malpe Vishwanath Acharya v. State
of Maharashtra, AIR 1998 SC 602.

7. The learned Advocate-General for the respondent No. 1 State of Rajasthan and the learned
counsel for the respondent No. 2 in the writ petition did not dispute the legal position in
regard to Section 6(2) of the Act. The learned Advocate General only added that the State is
interested and keen to bring a suitable legislation in this regard on the basis of the model law.
May be it may bring such legislation within about six months.

8. Since the constitutional validity of Sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Act is questioned in
these cases, we think it appropriate to extract the said provisions. Sub-section (2) of  Section
6 of the Act reads :
"6. Fixation of standard rent-

(1) ................

(2) The Court shall, after holding such summary inquiry as it may consider just and
necessary, determine the standard rent for such premises and shall, in doing so, act according
to the following principles, namely-

(a) Where the premises are let for residential purpose or for the purposes of the public
hospital, aushadhalaya or dawakhana, a recognized educational institution, a public library or
reading room or any orphanage the standard rent shall not exceed the basic rent increased by
fifty per cent thereof; and

(b) Where the premises are let for any other purposes, the standard rent shall not exceed two
and a half time the basic rent thereof:

Provided that where the premises have been (first) let after the first day of January, 1965 the
standard rent shall not exceed the basic rent thereof:

Provided further that where the fair rent or standard rent for any premises has been
determined or redetermined (by any Court under this Act or) by any authority under any law
or order repealed by Section 30 before the commencement of the Rajasthan Premises
(Control of Rent and Eviction Amendment) Ordinance, 1975 and the amount of such fair rent
or standard rent is the same as would be determinable as standard rent by the Court under
this Section, the fair rent or standard rent previously determined or redetermined, shall not be
disturbed.

Explanation.-- For the purposes of this sub-section, the basic rent of any premises shall mean
the rent at which the premises were let on the first day of January, 1962 and, if not let on that
day, the rent at which they were first let after that day."

9. In Firm Khetsi Dass Sheoji Ram, Sardarshahar v. Mohani Devi, 1994 (2) Raj LW 631, a
learned single Judge of this Court has clearly held that the provisions of Sub-section (2)
of Section 6 are hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. In paragraph 4 of the said judgment, it
is stated thus:

"There is no substance in the revision petition. The first proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section
6 of me Act states that where the premises have been first let out after the 1st day of January
1965, the standard rent shall not exceed the basic rent thereof. Explanation given in this sub-
section defines "basic rent" as the rent at which the premises were let out on the first day of
January, 1962 and, if not let out on that day, rent at which they were first let out after that
day. It means that if the premises have been let out for the first time after 1st January, 1965,
the agreed rent cannot be enhanced despite great price escalation and tremendous fall in the
value of the rupee. In other words, rent of the premises first let out after 1965 has been
freezed. If me premises have been let out prior to this date (1st January, 1965), enhancement
is permissible to the extent of 50% in the case of residential building and 150% in the case of
non-residential buildings. These provisions are highly unreasonable and are hit by Article
14 of the Constitution of India. It has been observed in Ratan Arya v. State of Tamil Nadu,
AIR 1986 SC 1444 : (1986 All LJ 1168) p. 1448, as follows :

"We are entitled to take judicial notice of the enormous multifold increase of rents
throughout the country, particularly in urban areas. It is common knowledge today that the
accommodation which one could has possibly got for Rs. 400/- per month in 1973 will today
cost at least five times more. In these days of universal day today escalation of rentals any
ceiling such as that imposed by Section 30(ii) in 1973 can only be considered to be totally
artificial and irrelevant today. As held by this Court in Motor General Traders v. State of
Andhra Pradesh, (1984) 1 SCC 222 : AIR 1984 SC 121 at p.130, a provision which was
perfectly valid at the commencement of the Act could be challenged later on the ground of
unconstitutionality and struck down on that basis. What was once a perfectly valid legislation
may; in course of time, become discriminatory and liable to challenge on the ground of its
being violative of Article 14. After referring to some of the earlier cases Venkataramiah J.
observed :

".............. The garb of constitutionality which it may have possessed earlier has become worn
out and its unconstitutionality is now brought out to a successful challenge."

10. In Issac Ninan v. State of Kerala 1996 AIHC 857, a Division Bench of the Kerala High
Court dealing with the similar provisions in paragraphs 16 and 17 has held thus at page 860-
861 :

"The intention in bringing a legislation like the Act was to regulate the lease of building and
to control the rent, and not to make the rent static. The situation which prevailed in the year
1965 when the legislation was enacted was far different. Supreme Court in Motor General
Traders v. State of A.P., AIR 1984 SC 121, has observed that what was once a non
discriminatory piece of legislation may in course of time become discriminatory and be
exposed to a successful challenge on the ground that it violated fundamental rights of the
Constitution.

We have given our anxious consideration to the various contentions raised by counsel on
either side. The Act, as already stated, is to regulate the leasing of buildings and to control
the rent of such buildings in the State of Kerala. As held by the Supreme Court in  Ganpat
Ram v. Gayatri Devi, AIR 1987 SC 2016, the Rent Control Act is a beneficial legislation,
beneficial to both the landlord and the tenant. It protects the tenant against unreasonable
eviction and exorbitant rent. It also ensures certain limited rights to the landlord to recover
possession on stated contingencies. Legislation does not confer any vested right on the
tenants. As held by the Supreme Court, in Inder Mohan Lal v. Ramesh Khanna, 1987 (4)
SCC 1 : (AIR 1987 SC 1986), there is no presumption in all cases that the tenants are weaker
sections. By lapse of time the tenants (at least many of them) doing business in commercial
buildings taken on rent are far more affluent financially than the owners of the building in
which they do business. Though the rent control legislation is stated to be a beneficial one, it
must be reasonable just and fair. It is true that there is a presumption as to the
constitutionality of the provisions of a legislative enactment and the Act should, be so read as
to prevent it from being exposed to the vice of unconstitutionality. But the presumption will
stand rebutted if the scrutiny of the impugned provision would unmistakably establish that it
violates a fundamental right."

11. We do not think it necessary to refer to other decisions of the point having regard to the
latest judgment of the Apex Court in Malpe Vishwanath Acharya v. State of Maharashtra,
AIR 1998 SC 602. In the said case, the Apex Court was dealing with the similar provisions
of the Bombay Rent Act. Section 5(10) of the said Act so far as it is relevant for the present
purpose reads :

"5(10) "Standard rent" in relation to any premises means -

(a) Where the standard rent is fixed by the Court and the Controller respectively under the
Bombay Rent Restriction Act, 1939, or the Bombay Rents, Hotel Rates and Lodging House
Rates (Control) Act, 1944, such standard rent; or

(b) When the standard rent is not so fixed, --subject to the provisions of Section 11, --

(i) the rent at which the premises were let on the first day of Sept. 1940,

(ii) where they were not let on the first day of Sept. 1940, the rent at which they were last let
before that day, or

(iii) where they were first let after the first day of Sept. 1940, the rent at which they were first
let or........"

12. In paragraphs 30 and 31 of the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has in clear
terms stated that the existing provisions of the Bombay Rent Act relating to the
determination and fixation of the standard rent can no longer be considered to be reasonable
and has further held that the decision of the High Court of Bombay upholding the validity of
the impugned provisions relating to standard rent was not correct. In the said case; the relief
was not granted, taking into consideration the facts and circumstances and in particular that
the existing Act then had to elapse on 31-3-1998.

13. In the light of the decisions aforementioned, particularly the decision of the Apex Court,
we have no hesitation in striking down the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the
Act as ultra vires and unconstitutional.

14. Accordingly, the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Act are struck down as
ultra vires and unconstitutional.

15. In S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 986/ 96, as already noticed above, the two questions
are referred for decision by the Division Bench.
16. In the light of our conclusion and striking down the provisions of Sub-section (2)
of Section 6 of the Act as ultra vires and unconstitutional, the question No. 2 stands
answered.

17. As far as the question No. 1 is concerned, it becomes academic, in view of our decision
that the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Act are ultra vires and
unconstitutional. Hence, it is not necessary to answer it.

18. Accordingly, the papers of S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 986/96 now shall have to be
placed before the learned single Judge dealing with such matter, for disposal in accordance
with law.

19. In the result, D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1193/97 is allowed and the provisions of Sub-
section (2) of Section 6 of the Act are struck down as ultra vires and unconstitutional. It is
open to the writ petitioner to get the appropriate rent fixed in accordance with law, in the
light of the striking down the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Act as ultra
vires and unconstitutional.

20. The papers of S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 986/96 shall be placed before the learned
single Judge dealing with such matters, for disposal in accordance with law, in the light of
what is stated above.

BOARD OF REVENUE, RAJASTHAN –

Land disputes are very complex. Land related facts can be properly understood only by experienced
officers on the solid basis of the facts available in the field. But since the land matters are directly
related to the majority of the agricultural dependent common people of the state, questions of peace
and order are also related to them, especially of the rural areas. To fulfill all these hopes and beliefs
that the poor and uneducated farmers in land disputes get cheap, speedy and accessible justice
without engaging in unnecessary legal formalities, the Revenue Board, Ajmer has been made an
establishment-court by the Government of Rajasthan. [1]
It is the highest court of appeal in Rajasthan for the disposal of revenue cases, whose decision can
be challenged only in the High Court of Jodhpur/Jaipur or the Supreme Court of Delhi. Its chairman
and members together settle all disputes related to land by studying revenue records etc.

Ajmer is the headquarters of the Rajasthan Revenue Board, with its circuit bench at Jaipur. The
members of the revenue board also organize their mobile courts regularly at the divisional
headquarters of the state so that the rural complainants do not have to come to Ajmer or Jaipur and
their cases are heard at their nearest place.

Zamindari system and farmer-exploitation in Rajasthan

Before independence, the king or ruler was the court of final appeal. He used to appoint and remove
judges voluntarily. The jagirdars had 60.7% of the entire land and the remaining 39.3 percent was
with the Khalsa, that is, the ruler. The Jagirdars were actually the source of all the problems related
to the peasantry. Other middlemen – Zamindars and Biswedars were also the means of their
exploitation. The common farmer was subjected to unrelenting atrocities on unjust revenue rates,
various taxes and ransoms, etc.

Establishment of Board of Revenue[edit]

To solve the previous problems, the high settlement and land records department of the princely
states that were included in Rajasthan were reorganized and integrated. At that time there was only
one officer of this department who worked in many forms, such as, Settlement Commissioner,
Director of Land Records, Inspector General of Registration of Rajasthan and Superintendent of
Stamps etc.
A year later, in March 1950, the Land Records, Registration and Mandra departments were
separated from the Settlement Department. The Director of Land Records Department was made
the ex-officio Inspector General of Currency and Registration. Three Assistant Directors of Land
Records were appointed to assist the Director of Land Records. All these bodies were constituted. It
was called the Revenue Board. Its function was to take decisions at the highest level without fear
and favoritism of revenue matters.

Inception date[edit]
After the creation of the United State of Rajasthan, His Majesty the Rajpramukh established the
Revenue Board of Rajasthan by the proclamation of the ordinance on 7 April 1949. And Shri
Brijchand Sharma became the first President.

Workspace[edit]
This ordinance came into force on 1st November 1956, replacing the revenue divisions of Bikaner,
Jaipur, Jodhpur, Matsya and erstwhile Rajasthan. These revenue circles were functioning in the
princely states under various laws. This work continued till the unified laws were made for the whole
of Rajasthan. These revenue circles ceased to function from 1st November, 1949. The pending
cases with them were transferred to the additional commissioners of the division.
The disputes related to appeal, revision etc. in these cases were transferred again to the new
revenue division, Rajasthan. Thus the Board of Revenue, Rajasthan became the Supreme Court of
Appeal, Revision and Reference in Revenue matters. He was also entrusted with the administration
of land records administration and other laws.

Major Work[edit]
Most of the revenue officers, being executive officers and courts, perform 'bipartite'
functions.Therefore, it is necessary that their individual decisions should be supported by decisions
from the deliberations of a plural body. The Board of Revenue has been made a very rich judicial
body of administrative experience, free from the bias of turbulent politics. This was done to protect
the interests of the poor, illiterate, innocent and remote tenants.
For him the well-known principle of 'separation of power' of keeping the judiciary and the executive
separate was also put aside.
The judicial process of civil courts is often slow, costly and full of complications. Because of that, the
common farmer cannot get the desired relief from his troubles and problems. Therefore, the Board of
Revenue has been kept separate as an authority. Its only aim and goal is to provide quick and cheap
justice to the poor tenants in land related disputes.