UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

The Berlin Crisis1

STUDY GUIDE

´’’
Erika Molinari, Flavio Pedroso Mendes

Camila Penna de Castro, Frederico de Faria e Silva

June 1948

1 An earlier, not as complete version of this article can be found in Portuguese in MENDES, Flávio Pedroso; MEIRELLES,

Ana Paula; JANUÁRIO, Guilherme Cintra. A Situação em Berlim (1948). In: QUEIROGA et al. Guia de Estudos 2003
(IV MINI-ONU). Belo Horizonte: Editora O Lutador, 2003.
 1

Welcome Letter
Representatives of the world,
The chair of the Security Council could not be more flattered in receiving you to the
fruitful debates that most certainly will take place in March this year. Not only does your decision
to play a role in an event of this nature – for TEMAS is only for a select few – fills us with
expectations, but also the choice of such a committee. We are sure we will deal with people that
bear special conscience and posture. Furthermore, the association between the reproduction of
multilateral discussions and the study and research of historical themes is shown to be quite
productive in expanding knowledge.
It is needless to say that the present Study Guide does not bear the purpose of exhausting
the discussions on the theme, nor to provide all necessary tools to properly assess the subject. It
traces guidelines for an initial understanding of the elementary points; the individual effort of
each delegation remains fundamental to produce enough knowledge so as to dominate the whole
complexity that involves the question. We are quitesure that we can count on that from the
TEMAS delegates.
For an appropriate introduction of the Chair, a brief presentation of its members follows:
Flávio Pedroso Mendes (Director): I am a student of International Relations at Pontifícia
Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais, I’m 22 years old and attending my 8th semester at the
institution. Since my earliest academic steps I discovered the modeling practice as one of the most
fruitful and interesting, not only for researchers and analysts of international themes but also for
all those interested in the relevant issues taking place in the international field. I’ve had many
happy opportunities to perform as delegate and director during all these years, six of them as
member of a contemporary or historical simulation of the Security Council. I’m quite sure that our
debates will be interesting in a pessimistic view and fantastic in a more plausible one. As a final
remark I would like to reiterate our welcome salutations expressed before and attest that I really
don’t believe to be overestimating your capacity when I expect extremely fruitful and coherent
discussions.
Érika Molinari (Director): I am co-director of the Security Council alongside Flávio. I am on
the 7th semester of International Relations at PUC Minas, and TEMAS is the 7tth model in which I
take part, either as a delegate or a staff member. Preparing for the sessions has been greatly
rewarding. Unfortunately, I will not be able to attend the conference, because I will spend this
semester studying in the Hague, in the Netherlands. In spite of that, my expectations for this
Security Council meeting could not be higher, and I am sure I will not be disappointed.
Camila Penna de Castro (Assistant Director): I am a sixth semester International Relations
student at PUC Minas. The first edition of TEMAS will be my 6th model – four of which having
participated at the Security Council – either as a member of the staff or as a delegate. I feel
honored to be chairing this committee along with my fellow colleagues, and I am certain that the
Council will hold an incredible high level of debates – to judge by its members. Therefore, I would
like to thank you all for your interest and dedication so far and I hope we can share a great time
and have lots of fun.
Frederico de Faria e Silva (Assistant Director): Representatives of the world! At the time
of TEMAS, I’ll be a 19-year old student of International Relations at PUC-Minas (on the 3rd
semester) and also of Social Communication at UFMG (on the 2nd semester). This will be my fifth
MUN - the second not as a delegate - and my second Security Council. I hope my work can bring
to you more than good humour and an overall good time, but some academical quality as well. I
am sure we will laugh and I hope we can also learn – exactly the contrary of what the other
members of the Chair feel, I suppose. Oh well. See you there!
Finally, we would like to offer just thanks to the whole administrative and academic staff
of TEMAS, for unconditional support and respect, and to the teachers of the Department of
International Relations, specially Prof. Paulo Esteves, who directly oriented the first version of
this Guide, then in Portuguese.
Distinguished delegates, in case you want to contact us for any elucidation, feel free to do
so at our official e-mail: 1948@temaspucminas.net
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INTRODUCTION

Model international organizations usually comprise two types of committees: those

which act on the present, in which questions that will be implemented in the future are
discussed; and historical committees, in which issues that already occurred are put into
discussion/debate – which makes them harder to assess, taking into consideration that
resolutions were already proposed, and it is already known whether they were implemented
or not. Besides those difficulties, there is the task of finding information on events that
occurred long ago – such as the case of the 1948 Berlin Blockade, and all other issues in this
first edition of TEMAS. Historical models are extremely interesting experiences
notwithstanding, since not only do they provide a unique way to look at History, as they
ultimately allow delegates to change what has already been decided – and, somehow, to
change the destiny of the world.

It is important to stress that in the days of simulation we will be in 1948 – more

precisely, on the 25th, 26th, 27th and 28th of June. Thus, it is important that delegates act as
if they were on such time – after all, such is our present time. Besides avoiding the obvious
mistake of referring to the crisis and related events as scenarios of the past, delegates must
also avoid the use of expressions and concepts created later on. Any action taken will
influence the unfolding of History. The future lies in the hands of the representatives of the
United Nations Security Council.
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HISTORY AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Hardly in any extension of time as short as this first half of the century has Humanity
suffered so much with the plight of war. Still under the heat of the Great War, delegates of
forty-nine countries gathered in San Francisco in an effort to design an organization powerful
enough to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”. Thus, in little over a
month - after the declaration of unconditional surrender of the German forces - the United
Nations Charter was signed and presented to the world as a hope for peace.

The Charter signed in San Francisco brings in its first article, as a purpose of the
organization,

to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the
suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by
peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law,
adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a
breach of the peace.

Diplomats, politicians and international analysts pointed that, contrary to its

predecessor - the League of Nations - the young United Nations can be successful in its
mission for it brings an innovating and ambitious mechanism of collective security: the
Security Council.

The Security Council is the very core of the United Nations system. The only organ in
which resolutions can be mandatory, the Council is the reservoir of the organization’s
ambitions for peace. It is up to it, among other functions:

• maintain international peace and security according to the principles and objectives of
the United Nations;

• investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or
give rise to a dispute;

• formulate plans for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments;

• determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression and make recommendations, and decide what measures shall be taken;

• decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give
effect to its decisions, and call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such
measures;

• take military actions against an aggressor.

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According to Article 24 of the Charter,

In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members
confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this
responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.

Thus, contrary to the other organs of the UN, the Council’s decisions can be
mandatory to the member-states.

To enforce its authority, the Council may discharge a number of sanctions. Such
measures “may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail,
sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of
diplomatic relations” (art. 41) .

In extreme situations, the Council may authorize the use of force for the imposition of
peace. According to the Charter,

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41
[mentioned above] would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take
such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade,
and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

The Security Council was thought so as to get a tighter grasp of the reality of the
international system than its predecessor, the League of Nations. It is comprised of five
permanent members (the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, the French Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the
Republic of China) and six non-permanent members2, which are elected by the General
Assembly paying regard to geographical criteria for a two-year mandate. So that consensus
between the permanent members is necessarily achieved , they are granted with veto power in
substantive matters. The veto should only be used as an extreme resort; the permanent
members should abstain in case they are not in favor of a decision, and at the same time are
not willing to veto it3.

Also in contrast to most committees and organizations of the UN, the Council does not
make decisions by a simple neither by a qualified majority. For a resolution to be approved, it
needs seven favorable votes and no veto, independently of quorum and abstentions. Hence,
the non-permanent members are entitled with a “sixth veto” - for if a group of five of those
countries votes against or abstains, the resolution will be rejected even if the five permanent
members vote in favor4.

2 In this year of 1948, the non-permanent members are Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Syria and Ukrainian SSR.
3 It should also be noted that the simple threat of vetoing a draft resolution can be more than enough to modify it so it
will not conflict with the permanent members’ interests.
4 For some extra information on the Council, including veto patterns, check <www.globalpolicy.org/security/index.htm>.

For a comprehensive report regarding the Council’s practices, check <www.un.org/Depts/dpa/repertoire/index.html >.
 5

HISTORY AND DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM

The éclat of Soviet troops at the Battle of Stalingrad (1942-1943) - at the height of the
Second Great War - most certainly planted the roots of the fatidic outcome of the German
nation. The global conflict’s aftermath, up to then iffy and uncertain, now had more
predictable and concrete outlines: the Allies would be granted with a definite victory in the
confrontation with the Axis – it was just a matter of time. Wherefore, imperious became
deliberations about the routes that would be imposed to the German state when the conflict
finally ended. And in fact, from 1943 on, discussions between the Allies in respect to the
establishment of a project of reconstruction of Europe - centered in the administration of
Germany and its capital when peace were again to reign in the Continent – intensified most
strongly.

The center of Allied vision was unarguably the city of Berlin, which possessed
immense political force and a considerable psychological charge: the metropolis was,
immediately before the start of the war, the largest in area in the world and the fourth in
population; moreover, it presented itself as the core of Europe’s industrial center and borne
the pomp of being Europe’s political and cultural center as well.

Several meetings and conferences among the representatives of the Allied nations
then succeeded, bearing in mind the establishment of the bases whereon post-war Europe
would be erected, and - with the increasing attention devoted - Germany would follow new
paths. In November 1943 a Conference of Ministers was held in Moscow5, which counted with
the presence of the Allied powers - except for the French state – and that determined the
creation of an Advisory Commission for Europe, to which it would be up to – among other
incumbencies – establish guidelines for the administration of Germany. The main
conferences, whereon the most elementary decisions were taken and whereby documents
were produced containing the most significant aspects of the control of the German state and
its capital, are individually highlighted and discussed below.

The London Conference

With the expectation that victory was near, representatives of the United States,
United Kingdom and Soviet Union met in London in September 1944 with the intention of
solidifying the points on Germany occupation policies. The London Protocol, elaborated
during this meeting, gathered the first determinations about the administration of the

5Full text of a previous conference (October 1943) - in Moscow can be found at

<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/moscow.htm>
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German state by the three participating powers and the bases on which would lie the control
of Berlin. Its dispositions were the following: the German territory would be divided in three
occupation zones, each one destined to the administration of one of the signing Allies (as
idealized by Clement Attlee, British Prime Minister in 1943); Berlin, even though inside the
Soviet zone of influence (more precisely 176 km inside such region) would also be divided in
sectors under direct influence of each power, and their administration would be conducted
jointly with the Inter-Allied Governmental Authority or Kommandatura.

Americans, British and Soviets would occupy, respectively, the southwestern,

northeastern and eastern regions of Germany, and most definitely the city of Berlin should be
given a special, independent treatment - never to be considered part of the Soviet occupation
zone, neither having its specific sector delegated to the USSR. Commanders responsible on
their respective sectors should have relative autonomy on the control of their areas and would
be entitled with veto power on the joint deliberations of the Kommandatura; such aspects
conferred the Berlin administration an unusual paradoxical mixture of unity and
fragmentation. To those that considered very generous the concession of a zone of influence
to the Soviet Union within which the capital of Germany was laid, many had the good sense of
remembering that, at the time of the negotiations, it was the shoulders of the Red Army that
mostly supported the weight of Nazi forces.

As it was later revealed, the American president Franklin D. Roosevelt did not fully
assent to Attlee’s project of Germany’s division. His intention was that a Soviet area ended in
Berlin and that it would be bestowed to the American government a zone of influence in the
north, so that sea access from the country were possible. However, it succeeded that - thanks
to some disorganization among negotiators and the obscurity around the American
administration’s areas of responsibility – the wills of the president were not transmitted in
habile time to his representative in London.

The Yalta Conference

In February 1945 in Yalta6, the Allies gathered once again with the intention to discuss
and decide the pending questions concerning the future of Europe - and, moreover, to
complement and refine what had been previously accorded about the administration of
Germany and its capital. In relation to the last arrangement, the following determination can
be highlighted: to the project of division and control of Germany - formalized in the London
Protocol - France was added. It would be entrusted with an occupation zone on the western

6 For information on this city in the Crimea, to the north of the Black Sea, check

<http://www.yalta.com.ua/yalta_engl/index_e.html>. For more about the Conference, check

< http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yalta_Conference>. More importantly, for the full text of the agreements reached, check
< http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/yalta.htm>.
 7

region (taken from the American and British areas), a sector of influence in Berlin, and a seat
on the joint-administration organ Kommandatura. Therefore, the Conference confirmed the
injunctions of previous negotiations, recognizing and reinforcing the established guidelines
and the authority exerted over Germany by the four Allied powers - to which it would be up
the implementation of a so-called 3D plan (disarmament, demilitarization and
dismemberment of Germany).

Furthermore, negotiations stipulated the destiny of the eastern European territories

previously invaded by Hitler. In fact, this was a theme that much worried the western Allies,
since they coped with the fact that the Soviets dominated much of the region – including the
Balkans and practically all of Poland, a fundamental country in the scope of the discussions
and negotiations. The decision was made for the establishment of provisional governments in
eastern Europe, headed by communist parties associated with local anti-fascist ones - a fact
that originated the prevalence of communist-oriented parties in the majority of these
countries. Such demand on part of the USSR was made in the sense of guaranteeing its
territorial security, since it was whereby those countries – and even with the support of some
of them – that Stalin’s territory saw itself invaded by Hitler’s troops. In retribution to the
western Allies’ concessions, the Soviet Union committed itself to wage war against Japan in
Manchuria, in two or three months after German rendition.

The Potsdam Conference

From July to August 1945, with Germany effectively subdued, the United States, the
United Kingdom and the Soviet Union organized what would be the last significant
conference concerning the negotiations over the administration to be imposed to the German
state. The document that resulted from the discussions of the Potsdam Conference was
probably the most relevant and conspicuous of the whole series of conferences and meetings
and its purpose was to serve as a guideline to the process of occupation and administration of
Germany until a peace treaty was effectively elaborated and implemented. The most
important deliberations that took place in the conference under scrutiny are the following:

• A Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was to be created and composed by the

ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, France and China (the
very countries that were granted with permanent seats and veto power in the United Nations
Security Council). The immediate and urgent incumbency of such a Council would be the
writing of several peace treaties regarding the situation of Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary
and Finland. These treaties, moreover, would be submitted to the analysis and acquiescence
of the United Nations and their main scope was to solve the territorial controversies that
arose after the European aftermath of the World War II. Furthermore, Potsdam authorized
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the preparation of a peace treaty for Germany, to be signed by a legitimate and proper
German government as soon as there were conditions for the establishment of one as such.

• The political principles that would guide the Allied conduct during the initial period
of administration were also set: i) the supreme authority over the German state would be
granted to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, the United
Kingdom, the Soviet Union and France in their respective occupation zones, and jointly, when
it is the case of matters related to Germany as a whole; ii) all efforts should be exerted in
order to offer an uniform treatment to the population of the entire German territory; iii)
complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany and the elimination or control of
German industries that could be employed for military purposes; iv) the preparations for the
reconstruction of a political structure in Germany based on democracy and as a means of
setting the country’s future in the international arena; v) the administration would be devoted
to the decentralization of the German political structure by the development of a system of
local responsibilities, with the exception of some competent deliberations assigned to the
departments of centralized administration, headed by the Secretaries of State, particularly in
reference to the fields of finance, transport, communication, international exchange and
industry.

• Some orientations regarding the management of the German economy, with

emphasis to the following: i) during the minimum necessary period the German economy
should be decentralized in order to eliminate the existent concentration of power on
monopolized sectors; ii) aiming at reorganizing the German economy, the agricultural and
industrial development for pacific ends should receive special attention; iii) during the
occupation Germany should be treated as an economic unity and, therefore, common
economic policies should be implemented in its entire territorial dominium; iv) the Allies
would have the right to determine the economic policies to be followed in the German
economy, however only in cases of strict necessity, as when related to the demilitarization
plan or to the reparations payment.

• Concerning the war reparations demanded by the Allies, some significant

deliberations should be spotlighted: i) the four occupying countries will have the right to take
from its respective occupation zones all the necessary resources for the payment of war
reparations, according to the demands of their governments; ii) besides the resources
extracted from its own occupation zone, the Soviet Union should additionally receive 25% of
all industrial material from the western zones, in retribution to which it should transfer to the
western zones the same amount of food, oil derivatives and other resources. It should be
mentioned, however, that the reparations payment was to be promoted in a reasonable way,
making sure that the German population did not experience difficulties and the need for
foreign help.
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• Finally, there were some dispositions regarding territorial distribution. The German
frontiers would be reestablished as they were back in 1937. The country’s south and west
demarcations, on the one hand, did not present controversies, whereas the eastern border
was object of deep and difficult discussions. The lands beyond the lines delimited by the Oder
and Naisse rivers would rest under the administration of Poland until a decisive treaty was
signed, and a considerable portion of East Prussia was incorporated? by the Soviet Union.

Conquering and Occupying Berlin

As firmly put by American General Eisenhower, during the Allied advance through the
West in June 1944, the conquest of Berlin was the utmost objective pursued. Nevertheless,
soon the American command perceived the region of Baviera as a more demanding cause for
action, based on reports of the CIA attesting that the region was a national remaining nest of
Nazism. A declaration of General Bedell Smith that from the military point of view Berlin was
not of major concern anymore reflects the new lens through which the American command
viewed the worldwide conflict in its final stage. Two other factors are commonly raised as
contributors to the American decision of staying out of the Berlin conquest: first, the
campaign would not be headed by an officer of the United States Armed Forces and the
Americans were anxious for a conquest of their own; secondly, it was widely believed that
such an operation would generate a significant amount of casualties, which, according to
General Omar Bradeley, would mean an excessively high price for an objective that then
involved only prestige.

Hence, it was exclusively up to the Red Army the conquest of Berlin, and the western
troops would invest only until the Elba was reached. Roosevelt’s optimism about a situation
in which the Soviets had an exclusive and total control of Berlin was not shared by Churchill.
While Roosevelt declared that if they gave to Stalin everything that was possible he would
work with them for the construction of a world of peace and democracy, Churchill skeptically
attested that the Red Army would invade Austria, reach Vienna and, moreover, if they
become the only responsible for the conquest of Berlin, the Soviets would feel they were the
greatest? artifices of the common victory, which could create some future difficulties.

When the German resistance finally had been put down and the Americans reached
the Elba — located about 85 kilometers from Berlin, the same distance that separated the Red
Army from the city on the opposite side — they stopped for almost two weeks, waiting for the
Soviet advance and the conquest of Berlin, which happened on May 2, 1945. William Shirer, a
war correspondent, described as follows the situation in Berlin a few days after the city was
taken:
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All over the place our sight can reach, in all directions from the plane flying over the
city, it can be seen a vast amount of ruins, here and there, of burned and roofless
buildings that look like little mousetraps illuminated by the autumn sun, which
penetrates them through spaces that used to be windows. Most streets I used to know
do not exist anymore, they were rid off the map, and the rail stations were rests of what
they used to be; the imperial palace of the Kaisers was roofless, with some of its lines
pulverized and, here and there, some demolished external walls. 7

For two months Berlin — or what remained of it — rested under Soviet occupation. As
suggested above, the city had emerged in profound disorganization and in chronic calamity.
The welfare of the citizens in the German capital hardly could be more precarious and a
shadow of terror haunted the city, as demonstrated by some fearful and alarming statistics:
230 victims of rape medicated in one hospital during the impressively short time of one day
and murder occurrence rates rising up to 500%. There were no telephones for civil purposes
nor mail service, and a vast number of families were crowded in small habitations that were
not destroyed or were ruined only partially. The incidence of destruction was so impressive
that in neighborhoods that used to have about 14.000 houses it was common to find only
about half that number in conditions to serve as a home. (The city’s economic picture was
also deplorable. The provisory monetary system employed by the Soviets contributed to
destabilize even more the Berlin market, which came to be increasingly dependant on the
black market. The most valuable trade resource were the cigarettes, reaching the anomalous
price of US$ 1.25 per unit. German communists were granted with the administration of the
city and the local militia was headed by an ex-Nazi officer captured by the Red Army in
Stalingrad and that later became a communist. Moreover, the Soviets also controlled all
newspapers and banks, as well as the local radio station.

During the conferences over the negotiations of the terms under which Germany and
its capital were going to be divided, occupied and administered one fundamental aspect was
systematically ignored, which resulted in a great deal of controversies when the accorded
terms were to be implemented. This aspect refers to the establishment of access routes that
connected Berlin to the western occupation zones, in a way that permitted the United States,
the United Kingdom and France to independently access the German capital from their own
occupation zones. It is widely believed that the reason that drove the western negotiators
away from putting this matter on the agenda was that it would demonstrate a lack of trust in
the Soviet intentions, which could jeopardize the cooperative and harmonic atmosphere that
they intended to create with their Soviet counterparts after the war was over. This belief is
corroborated by the words of British ambassador John Winnant, who attested that the
inclusion of clauses about access routes on the documents over the administration of Berlin
would create suspicion among the Soviets and make it more difficult for them to promote
mutual agreements8. In general, it was thought that the presence of all four victorious

7 Berlim: Pedra de Toque do Mundo Livre (other data not available).

8 Berlim: Pedra de Toque do Mundo Livre (other data not available).
 11

countries in Berlin would automatically imply that all of them would have unlimited access to
the city and, furthermore, the expectations were that as soon as the German territory was
divided the four zones would not be isolated from one another. Yet it is interesting to notice
the relatively reluctant conduct of the Soviets on discussing this subject during the Yalta
Conference, which resulted on the almost complete disregard of the matter.

Besides the atmosphere ofchaos and instability that characterized the situation in the
German capital, the western allies started in-depth negotiations with the Soviets about the
moment in which they would finally enter the city and occupy their administrative posts. As a
result of the campaigns back to the conquest of Germany, American and British troops were
stationed in the eastern part of the German territory, the very zone under Soviet control.
Thus, the Soviet Union demanded that these forces were demobilized and taken away from its
occupation zone. In June 1945 successive meetings were organized by the four occupying
countries to deal with this and other measures regarding the western presence in Berlin. In
the first one, on June 1, the Soviets declared to be willing to negotiate only the creation of an
intergovernmental authority, the Kommandatura for the joint administration of the city,
until the western troops were completely out of the Soviet occupation zone.

After three weeks, another meeting took place and the western allies impatiently
wanted to determine the way they would finally establish their control over Berlin. Only after
the western allies committed themselves to taking their troops out of the Soviet occupation
zone, a process that was initiated on July 1, the Soviets agreed to draw specific access routes
to Berlin. Two airports located in the western sectors of Berlin, Gatow and Tempelhof, were
made available, as well as a road and a railroad. The United States, the United Kingdom and
France initially objected this Soviet offer because they refused to accept having specific
itineraries to enter Berlin, willing as they were to have free and unrestricted access to the city.
The proposition was accepted, however, since the Soviets claimed it to be just a temporary
one.

It is generally recognized that the consummation of the western occupation of Berlin

had an important legal and symbolic nature. Legally, it confirmed the right of the United
States, the United Kingdom and France to individually administer their respective sectors of
the city and jointly the city as a whole, as agreed upon in a great deal of conferences and
meetings. Symbolically, the presence of the western allies in the German capital would reflect
the recognition that all four countries were responsible for the Allied victory over the Axis,
and not only the Soviets, for having fired off the last shot and arriving first in the scene.
Colonel Frank Howley, , described the entrance of the American troops in the German
capital:

On June 1, 1945, the road to Berlin was the main way to the madhouse. It was full of
tanks, trucks and other vehicles… all of them heading proudly to the city formerly
forbidden… an unpleasant summer rain was falling when, finally, we arrived in Berlin
in the end of the afternoon. The Soviets, contrarily to what had been agreed, did not
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allow us a previous exam of the sector we were about to occupy, and therefore none of
us knew exactly where to go… hundreds of officers and soldiers walked around looking
for a place for accommodation in the ruins… most ended up sleeping in the rain9.

On June 4 there was a ceremony to transfer the authority of the western sector of
Berlin, highly objected by the Soviets. They attested that, since the city administration organ,
the Kommandatura, had not been established yet, the occupation of the sectors could not be
made effective. Nevertheless, clearly disregarding the Soviet protests, the American troops
penetrated their sector and occupied its main buildings and cabinets. The Soviets did not
impose any resistance and withdrawn their forces. The first meeting of the members of the
Kommandatura was held on June 11.

The Unfolding of a Crisis: the Blockade

Wrong were those who believed that the formation of an alliance between the United
States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union, in face of a common threat, would
mean the end of multifaceted indispositions and mutual fear after the enemy had been
vanished. Even at the height of the conflict, when the alliance presented greater solidity,
evidence pointed to its ephemeral and circumstantial nature. A perfect proof of this statement
is the declaration of the American General Groves, responsible for the program of
development of the A-Bomb (the Manhattan Project), according to which what they were
building “would become a great weapon against the Soviet Union”10. In addition, one should
also take into consideration the secret Memorandum from Churchill - according to which,
once the Axis had been defeated, the Anglo-Saxons should consider the Soviet Union as their
“true enemy”11. Differences apart, the fact was that the four winning powers of the World War
II held in their hands an entrepreneurship to be operated by a team, and upon which laid the
future of a country and its population.

In the already mentioned meeting of the Kommandatura, the western Allies

considered valid the deliberations taken in Berlin by the Soviet Union during its two months
of exclusive occupation, leaving unchanged the nominations for positions in the municipal
administration. Later on, the Soviet Union began to influence the actions of the recently-
created political parties in its area of occupation, inciting the creation of a Socialist Party, by
merging the German Social-Democratic Party and the German Communist Party, a measure
that was followed by the prohibition to any other party to perform. Such impositions would
not apply to Berlin, once its administration was centered within the Allied controlling organ,
as it was previously stated.

9 Berlim: Pedra de Toque do Mundo Livre (other data not available).

 13

In a first moment, total disarmament was the simplest procedure to be accomplished,

amongst those promulgated in the Potsdam Conference. However, the processes of
denazification and democratization were object of constant debating and discord, their
accomplishments being promoted independently in each area of occupation. Questions
related to the payment of war reparations and the disassembling of industries led the four
powers to intense divergences and administrative crises. The Soviet Union would not
adequately supply data relating to the resources in its sector, and would disagree with the
goals defended by the western Allies concerning the industrial capacity to be granted to
Germany. Thus, at the dawning of the year 1946, faced by one of those disagreements, the
Soviet Union refused to transfer the agreed amount of food supply to the western areas,
arguing that the transferals of industrial equipments to its area of influence did not respect
the proportions accorded in Potsdam. In consequence, there was a complete interruption by
the United States in the transfer of industrial material to the Soviet zone.

In the political sphere, there were also some disagreements: in the same year, the first
free elections were carried out in Berlin. Such elections had the defeat of the Socialist Party as
its main outcome - (in spite of the tremendous support offered by the Soviets - and the victory
of the Democratic Party. However, as held in the legal parameters of former conferences, any
deliberation to involve the city of Berlin as a whole should go through assessment by the
Kommandatura, organ in which the four allied commanders have veto power. It was in this
manner that the elected mayor, Professor Ernst Reuter, had his entrance into office vetoed by
the Soviet Union representative in the Kommandatura.

Aiming at the prosperity of the western side of Germany - which faced serious
economic and structural shortcomings - and also attempting to strengthen the German state
so that it could become more resistant to eventual importunes by the USSR, the United States
and the United Kingdom decided to merge their respective zones of occupation in September
1946. The new area became known as the Bi-Zone and would be jointly administrated by both
countries in a common political and economic structure. France promptly opposed the
merging of the two zones and refused to annex its area of influence to the Anglo-American
entrepreneurship, fearing a possible upraise of a strong and unified Germany. France also
demanded the separation of the Rhineland from the Bi-Zone territory, claiming that the
region was the core of the process of arms-building used for aggression in both World Wars.
Such demand was not regarded by the United States nor by the United Kingdom.

After failed attempts to negotiate within two Conferences in Moscow (March-April

1947) and London (November 1947), the western Allies held a meeting in London at the

10 Berlim: Pedra de Toque do Mundo Livre (other data not available).

11 Berlim: Pedra de Toque do Mundo Livre (other data not available).
 14

beginning of 1948, together with the Benelux12 countries. In the Conference, matters of vital
importance for the future of Germany were established: i) formation of the Tri-Zone,
consisting of the French zone of occupation and the former Bi-Zone, instituting a central
administration in all of West Germany; ii) conclusion of an economic reform to be
implemented in all Germany. The western Allies viewed such reform as the only way to fix the
deep economic shorthand faced by Germany, and to avoid the definitive collapse of the
country’s structures. The promotion of the referred reform would be integrated to the
implementation of the Plan for European Reconstruction - also known as the Marshall Plan -
towards which the Soviet Union had already demonstrated a certain amount of hostility. The
Soviets did not recognize the legitimacy of the Conference held in London, and as an answer
they withdrew their representative from the Kommandatura on March 20, 1948.

The ensueing days were stained by the intensification of divergences between the
Soviet Union and the western Allies, and by actions that hindered the negotiations and the
attempts to achieve consensus. At the end of March, the limits of West Berlin had been
interdicted by the Soviets, that imposed inspections on civilians and militaries that wanted to
cross such limits. British and American trains were forced to return from the entrance of
West Berlin for refusing to allow Soviets to inspect their cargoes. The traffic of vehicles
between Berlin and the occidental zones of occupation was forbidden, which made it
impossible for the postal service to work between the capital and the Tri-Zone. Two important
railroads that provided access to the city - Bavaria-Berlin and Hamburg-Berlin - were
paralyzed. In the middle of April, the American and British military forces had to leave,
respectively, Weimar and Magdeburg, by imposition of the USSR.

The Western Allies, believing to be Soviet intention to explore a destabilized and weak
Germany, decided unilaterally (evidently considering the three powers that controlled the
Tri-Zone as one single side in the dispute) to implement the idealized economic reform in the
occidental German zone. The high point of such reform was the implementation - which
process was carried under great secrecy - of the Deutsche Mark, on June 20, 1948. In a last
sign of cooperation, representatives of the four great powers gathered to discuss the question
of the economic reform, but did not come to an agreement. The USSR then replied to the
occidental initiative with the implementation of a new currency in the German oriental zone,
extended to all four sectors of Berlin. Circumstances austerely deteriorated, and on the 23rd
and 24th of June the Soviets interdicted all accesses to Berlin, withal the prohibition of the
transferring of food, energy and raw material supplies to the western side of the city: the
blockade of Berlin was established.

12 Namely, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. For a small article on them, check
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benelux>. For the official Benelux site (available only in Dutch and French), check
<http://www.benelux.be/>.
 15

This is the delicate situation to be dealt with by the Representatives to the Security
Council on the sessions that begin on June 25, 1948. It is needless to state the complexity and
gravity of the matter. In the hands of the ambassadors gathered in Paris lays not only the
future of a population, but also the international stability. As time passes, the responsibility
bestowed on the Council - as the primary bearer of the maintenance of international peace
and security - increases. At this point, it is expected from this body no less than the necessary
conscience and pondering to skillfully handle this critical matter.

A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF POST-WWII GERMAN ECONOMY

World War II had several implications for the German economy. Such implications
range from the obvious effects of losing a war - such as the shortening of available workforce
and the destruction of cities - to more complex effects, due to the occupation of Germany by
the winning forces. The occupation forces of the occidental Allies kept tight control over the
economy, such as price controls and extensive regulation. As a result, Germans suffered from
effects such as famine, capital shortage, which are further explored below.

The eventual loosening of controls led to the expansion of monetary supplies, and to
consequent high inflation rates, which had been suppressed by price controls. A currency
reform was implemented in the occidental part of Germany in 1948, as stated before. The
Reichsmark was replaced by the Deutsche Mark, allowing conversion at 10 Reichsmarks to 1
Deutsche Mark, though with limits on the rights of conversion. Such limits are shown in the
table below:

TYPE OF ACCOUNT CONVERSION RATE

Individuals – first 600 Reichsmarks to be

1 Reichsmark: 1 Deutsche Mark
traded

Individuals - any amount exceeding the

10 Reichsmarks: 1 Deutsche Mark
600th Reichsmark

Companies 1 Reichsmark: 1 Deutsche Mark*

Public Authorities 1 Reichsmark: 1 Deutsche Mark**

All others 10 Reichsmarks: 1 Deutsche Mark

*Up to 60 Reichsmarks per employee
**Up to one month’s revenue
Source: < http://www2.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/germany.htm>

According to the table, balances that exceeded the amount of 600 Reichsmarks would
be converted at the ratio of 10:1. However, in practice, the method of payment had as a result
 16

an actual conversion ratio of 15.4:1. Debts were converted at the ratio of 10 to 1. Official prices
and pension payments, on their turn, were converted at a 1:1 ratio. Reichsmark balances and
bond holdings of commercial banks alike were blotted out – but these banks were given
equalization claims equal to 4% of debt - that is, at a 25:1 ratio. Additionally, they were given
deposits with the central bank of West Germany13 equal to 15% of demand deposits and 7.5%
of time and savings deposits – these required reserve ratios of half of those quantities so as
banks would have excess reserves to support lending.

Intense black market movement followed the government’s attempt to drastically

reduce the monetary supply through limits in the conversion to Deustche Marks. The
conversion ratio in the black market was around 1,000 Reichsmark to the Deutsche Mark. All
previous currencies became worthless.

When the western Allies introduced the Deutsche Mark, the Russians followed suit
with the Couponmark on June 24, 1948 – one day before the Council’s session begins. It
received its name from the coupons that were placed on Reichsmarks and circulated in the
German Democratic Republic.

The situation of the labor market in Germany after World War II is a mixed picture.
Labor requirements reflect not only the level of production, but also the level of labor
productivity. Labor productivity was increasing dramatically in the recovery period, which
presented the creation of some 600,000 jobs, which were thwarted by the loss of about
370,000 old jobs – amounting for a net gain of 230,000. Additionally, there was an influx of
9 million refugees (among expellees and immigrants).

A major problem resulting from the economic reform is capital shortage. In addition
to capital destruction during the war, reparation confiscations of capital equipment depleted
the capital stock, making entrepreneurs afraid to invest due to the possibility that their
investments might be confiscated in the future. On the other hand, profitability is rising, since
wage rates are not increasing as fast as prices and productivity. In other words, unit labor
costs are declining. Economists thought as liberal in Europe - but conservative in the United
States - recommend increasing interest rates so as to encourage savings.

In West Germany, there is a chronic shortage of housing, because of the rent control
program created during the days of the Weimar Republic and continued by the Nazis and
later by the Occupation. There have been attempts by the government to alleviate such
problem, through construction subsidies and public housing.

German foreign trade is recovering, despite the loss of Eastern European markets.
West Germany is very quickly wiping out its trade deficit and commencing to present a trade
surplus. Initial exports were raw materials such as coke from coal and scrap metal, but now

13 The central bank of West Germany is called the Bank Deutscher Lander.
 17

exports are becoming primarily manufactured goods. Also, Western Europe has become the
major customer and supplier for West Germany.

BLOC POSITIONS

It is important to stress that very solid alliances are expected to be formed even before
the negotiations take place. The three Western Powers will work very closely; the USSR and
the Ukrainian SSR will also be together at all times; and similarly, the six other countries will
work closely enough as to write draft resolutions together.

On the one hand, still traumatized by the Nazi aggression, the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics aims at having as much as possible power to intervene in Germany. Its
European strategy is based on the principle that only under its control will Germany not pose
threats to the USSR. Stalin believes that the division of Germany in zones is temporary – and
also that the fusion of the zones will most certainly happen under Soviet influence. One of the
main declared reasons to the so-called blockade is the economic reform imposed to the tri-
zone and the consequent implementation – by the western Allies - of the Deutsche Mark.
Therefore, a withdrawal on this currency’s circulation, as well as the implementation of the
Soviet Mark throughout Berlin, are central points of Soviet demands. Furthermore, the Soviet
Union shall harness the so-called blockade to force Allies’ concessions granting it interference
on the entire German capital.

In fact, the USSR goes as far as saying that the proposal to include the question of the
situation in Berlin in the agenda of the Security Council is completely baseless inasmuch as
the question does not fall within the competence of the Council; it should be taken to the
quadripartite Council of Foreign Ministers instead. The steps taken by the authorities of the
Soviet Union, against which complaints are made by the three Western Powers, are simply
counter-measures which they have been forced to take on account of a separate currency
reform introduced by the three Governments in the western zone of Germany. This measure
placed Berlin and the rest of the USSR occupation zone in danger of being flooded by the new
currency, as a result of the liquidation of the monetary tokens in the western zone. In these
circumstances, the Soviet authorities took measures aimed to protect the economic structure
of its occupation zone against the disorganization which threatened it as a result of the action
of the three Western Powers, which do not desire to take into account the interests of the
population of the Soviet Zone.

Moreover, according to the USSR there can be no question that the situation in Berlin
is closely linked to the situation of Germany as a whole, and that any separation of the two
questions would be completely artificial and lead to erroneous and unpractical decisions.
 18

(Furthermore, to refer to the Berlin question to the Council would be a violation of Article 107
of the UN Charter). The Berlin question, forming as it does a part of the question of Germany
as a whole, belongs to the competence of those Governments which are responsible for the
occupation of Germany – since a currency reform carried out in Germany by unilateral action
cannot be said it does not concern Germany - and consequently it is not a matter which can
be considered by the Security Council. Indeed, to do so would be a violation of the Yalta and
Potsdam agreements, since the question of Germany falls within the sole competence of four
countries, namely the four Powers bearing responsibility for its occupation. Notwithstanding,
the creation of a situation in Berlin threatening international peace and security does not
correspond to reality and is but a means of exerting pressure, an attempt to use the UN to
further the aggressive ends of the three Western Powers. The Ukrainian SSR is hoped to
have an automatic alignment with this position.

The United States of America, on the other hand, will try to mitigate Soviet
influence over Berlin. The circulation of a single currency on the city, under the coordination
of the USSR, will only be acceptable if the West has sufficient influence so as to avoid
excessive Soviet influence, under quadripartite control - thereby assuring the sprouting of a
capitalist society in Berlin. Americans do not recognize – with support of legal aspects
contained on treaties and protocols referent to German administration – the Soviet sector of
the city as part of the eastern zone under its influence, and neither the Soviet right to send its
forces to the sector. Hence, they do not accept that the Soviet Union decides by itself the
destiny of eastern Berlin. Americans will press, with all possible peaceful means, for the
immediate suspension of the blockade. Notwithstanding, they prefer to maintain airlift
supplies than to give in on crucial negotiation points.

The American delegation maintains that the USSR’s hostile and unlawful actions must
indeed to be reported to the Security Council, inasmuch as the blockade is a threat to the
peace – a point Americans stress.

A close ally to the United States, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland tends to follow this position - nevertheless, not necessarily in an
automatic way. It is hoped that they serve as a bridge between neutral countries and the
United States. The British wonder what happens if, after months of negotiation, the Powers in
the Council of Foreign Ministers still find themselves in disagreement. They also find
inadmissible that Article 107 be used to debar the Security Council from examining or
discussing the Berlin question, since the enemy State here is the subject or locale, not the
object. The object of USSR action in the case is clearly the three Western Powers.

Although positioning unequivocally on the Western bloc, the French Republic

usually has a more skeptic view of negotiations. Still suffering the aftermath of Nazi
occupation, this country fears the sprouting of a unified, strong and bellicose Germany. Like
 19

the United Kingdom, an alignment with Americans is surely hoped. Its stance on Article 107
is also that it can not be utilized in this matter. Also, if the situation in Berlin does not
constitute a threat to peace, as the USSR maintains, then this argument must be expanded
and fully explained to the Security Council. For that, the discussion must be allowed to be
developed fully; and if this is the argument of the USSR, then France cannot understand why
such pains are taken to prevent the question from being considered admissible. The French
delegation stresses that the only question before the Council is the use of force in order to
impose certain claims. It also points out that the first measures to blockade Berlin preceded
by several months the currency reform, although it is alleged to be the reason for the actions
of the Soviet Union.

The neutral countries bloc will undoubtedly play a significant role in an eventual
agreement between the Soviet Union and the other great powers. China, Belgium,
Colombia, Argentina, Syria and Canada should do more than try to propose technical-
related solutions to the pacific settlement of the conflict – as, for instance, the ones related to
financial matters resulted from the implementation, by the Soviet Union, of a single currency
for all Berlin in opposition to the creation, by Western Powers, of the Western Mark. To these
countries this was one of the main reasons to the beginning of the blockade, and it is hoped
that they work in a proposal to solve this controversy. They have as their purpose the full
gathering of information concerning the points of view of the parties concerned. In the view
of the gravity and complexity of these issues, they find that they bear the serious
responsibility of examining the matters in all their varied aspects and with the help of all
information they can acquire. Canada bears a very important role in serving as an
intermediary among this group, the Western great Powers, and the Soviet Union. It is
important to stress that four of the six neutral countries, while being partisans of the
establishment of a consensus between the conflicting parts, are situated on the area of
Western influence – Argentina, Belgium, Canada and Colombia. Thus, they tend to accept
more easily the proposals from the Western great powers and to defend their interests. They
will try - apart from promoting peace – to diminish Soviet influence over Berlin. Argentina
is in favor of putting the Berlin question in the agenda, even though by this vote it does not
express any opinion on competence, jurisdiction or substance of the matter. If there is a
leader among the neutral countries, it is either Argentina or Canada. This delegation also
maintains that the six countries are completely neutral and have no material interest in the
matter, but only spiritual – that is, to find a basis for constructive world peace. Syria is at
ease with the understanding that the blockade is neither against Germany nor against a part
of the inhabitants of Berlin, but made in opposition to the other partners in the occupation of
the city. It is also of the opinion that Article 107 does not apply in this case. It also wonders
how can there be no threat to peace if three great Powers submit a complaint to the Security
Council confirming so. It disagrees with Argentina on respect of neutrality, because if
 20

international peace and security were violated, the catastrophe would not be limited to those
directly involved, but it would perhaps overwhelm the whole world. Belgium is uncertain as
to how to imagine that the UN could fulfill its primary purpose if the principal Members of
the Organization were free to resort to threats or to the use of force so long as they did so on
German territory or on the territory of any other former enemy State. The operation of the
Security Council cannot be obstructed by the workings of private agreements, except where
the Charter itself may have provided private treaties for such action. It has not been proved,
however, that this is the case before the Council, and that its competence should thus be
denied. Colombia also states that before any concern is taken in producing any offer of
mediation or the drafting of resolutions, there must be preliminary exploratory work so as to
ascertain how far the attitude of both sides is justifiable and to analyze all likely causes of the
general uneasiness, so that the Council might be in a position to consider possible solutions.
China believes the neutral countries should work with the single purpose to relieve the
tension and to prepare the way for an eventual settlement. It is not a problem for the Chinese
delegation if in a draft resolution reference to past events, or any reference to currency
reform, political organizations and reparations is omitted; for if the Council takes good care
of the present and future, there will be time to consider the responsibilities as to past events.
After all, if the Council succeeds in preparing the way for an eventual settlement, it will be
found that other questions have become easier to solve.

ISSUES A RESOLUTION SHOULD ADDRESS

This section does not aim to restrict the scope of discussions to be held during the
Security Council’s sections. Considering the complexity of the crisis in question, it is
reasonable to suppose that varied aspects related to different issues and dimensions will be
raised in order to sufficiently explore the problem, and eventually exhaust it.
Notwithstanding, considering the Council’s competence - properly presented on the section
History and Decision-Making Process of the Security Council - and the essential points
entangled by the problem, it is worthy to stress a few questions, which must guide the debate.
This is justified in the sense to treat, in a first moment, the blockade’s lift and - as a
consequence - the resolution of controversies which originated it and that might trigger
future disagreements.

• The demanding problem, which delegates from the Security Council will have to
address, is the blockade imposed by the Soviet Union to the eastern part of Berlin.
Hence, it’s indispensable that questions regarding the legality of actions that
culminated on the blockade - including the means by which the blockade was made -
 21

should be in the agenda, through the observation of documents that accredit legal
nature to the Allied occupation of Germany.

• The lifting of the blockade is an immediate objective of negotiations, both to

guarantee the integrity of an institutional order – which at the time of negotiations is
still in formation – and for humanitarian reasons as well, bearing in mind the great
precariousness in which West Berlin’s population begins to live. Wherefore, terms to
the end of the blockade must heavily permeate discussions, entangling directives and
possible conditions that establish consensus and promote its prompt withdrawal.

• In addition to points directly related to the end of the blockade, more general aspects
that guide the presence of the four great powers in Germany should be considered –
bearing in mind that gaps and wrong interpretations were presumably responsible for
the action that lead to the conflict. Possible modifications of controversial points on
the agreements of German administration are in order, if on such points lies the
cooling of animosities and the solving of the problem. It’s evident that levels of
concession will strongly depend on the foreign policy and position of the country
involved, not being possible here to solidly determine such levels.

• As it is known, all that was accorded in respect to Germany’s control by the Allies has
a temporary character, and the endurance of the agreements depends on the signature
of a definite peace treaty – with a configuration still far from being known. Discussion
regarding such a treaty is perfectly pertinent in face of the unstable situation.

POSITION PAPER

Before the beginning of its activities in TEMAS, all delegations must handle a position
paper to the committee. On this document of approximately one page, the delegation must
formally express its country’s foreign policy in relation to the topic in discussion.

A position paper shall not have geographic or historical information on the country,
except in case of strict relevance to the topic. As an historical committee, a foreign policy
research is necessary, as it may and will change over the decades. Position papers will be
assessed by the chair, in the condition of indicators of coherence of the foreign policy and of
the position adopted during the debates, and will be available to all delegates during the
sessions.

Specifically about the topic The Berlin Crisis, a few questions must be approached. In
diplomatic language, delegates shall express their country’s position regarding the Soviet
Union and the world configuration in genesis; how they view the blockade and its legality;
and what view their country holds regarding the conditions imposed to Germany by the
 22

Allies; as well as how the country positions about the implementation of crucial measures that
triggered the crisis and how is their State reacting to Soviet actions - in sum, how the
government (or foreign affairs ministries) reacts to its causes, and eventual propositions the
country may pursue to deal with the problem.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES

DRIJARD, André. Alemanha: panorama histórico e cultural. Lisboa: Editora Dom

Quixote, 1972.

HOBSBAWN, Eric. Era dos Extremos: o breve século XX (1914-1991). São Paulo:
Editora Schwarcz, 1997.

MAN, John. Bloqueio de Berlim. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Renes, 1979.

SNYDER, Jack. The Second Berlin Crisis, 1958-1959. Institute for study of Diplomacy.
Case 411, Instructor Copy.

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL. Several Official Records. 1948.

VIZENTINI, Paulo Fagundes. A Guerra Fria. In: FILHO, Daniel Aarão Reis; FERREIRA,
Jorge; ZENHA, Celeste. O Século XX (v.2). Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira,
2000.

Berlim: Pedra de Toque do Mundo Livre. (other data not available).

On the Internet:

GLOBAL Financial Data, Inc. A global history of currencies - Germany. Available at:
<http://www.globalfindata.com/frameset.php3?location=/gh/124.html>

WATKINS, Thayer. The economy of Germany. Available at:

<http://www2.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/germany.htm>

http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/
http://www.tvcultura.com.br/aloescola/historia/guerrafria/guerra7/blocosocialista-
lesteeuropeu.htm
http://jbonline.terra.com.br/jseculo/1948.html

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berlin_blockade