Assess the cooperation of the Great Powers in the time of the Concert of Europe.

The French Revolutionary Wars and Napoleonic Wars between 1792 to 1815 resulted in
catastrophic political and social upheavals within Europe. Following the Congress of
Vienna in 1815, the Great Powers established a new European hegemony, successfully
creating new territorial lines and systems of diplomatic arbitration. Between 1818 and
1822, four Concerts of Europe were held in Aix-la-Chapelle, Troppau, Laibach and
Verona, displaying a willingness of the Great Powers to attempt to settle international
disputes. Debate exists over the applicability of term ‘concert’ in relation to subsequent
Great Power interactions, with Mark Jarrett defining 1822 as the end of the Congress
System.1 Conversely, Richard B. Elrod argues that in the period up to 1853, existed a
‘functioning and promising system of international relations, one that differed quite
radically from the balance-of-power politics’.2 This essay will dispute such a notion. By
assessing the cooperation of the Great Powers at the 1830-31 London conference
regarding the Belgian Revolution, it will be argued that the geopolitical conditions of the
crisis forced the other Great Powers to adopt a policy of appeasement against France.
The following themes will be assessed: unilateral intervention, ideological polarisation,
policy for the containment of France, divisions between representatives and central
governments, concurrent conflicts, and limited significance of agreements signed. It will
be concluded that the 1830-31 London Conference reflected attitudes of forced toleration
rather than cooperation.

A central factor in the Belgian Revolution was the unsanctioned use of unilateral
intervention by both France and Britain. When on August 2nd 1831 William I, King of the
United Netherlands, invaded Belgium following the crowning of King Leopold I, France
immediately sent an army without consulting any other European state. Field Marshall
Étienne Gérard crossed into Belgium the next day on August 3rd. This is in opposition to
Matthew Rendall’s belief that the doctrine of collective security was successfully
employed. By Rendall’s own admission, within a ‘collective security system, states…work
together to resist the use of force to change the international status quo’.3 Both points
lack credibility. France’s individual actions did not display the states working together,
nor resisting forced change. France supported the Belgian Revolution despite hostility
from Austria, Russia and Prussia for its undermining of the Vienna constitution of Europe.
The Times reported French political groupings demanding a force of 50,000 French
1
J. Kwan, ‘The Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815: Diplomacy, Political Culture, and Sociability’, The Historical
journal, 60/4, (2017), p.1130
2
R. B. Elrod, ‘The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System’, World Politics, 28/2, (1976),
pp.159-61
3
M. Rendall, ‘A Qualified Success for Collective Security: The Concert of Europe and the Belgian Crisis, 1831’,
Diplomacy and statecraft, 18/2, (2007), p.273
troops to ‘support existing institutions and to guarantee the present arrangement of
Belgic and Dutch limits’.4 While no Great Power formally denounced French actions, a
crucial difference exists between actually sanctioning intervention and retrospective
acceptance. Barry Steiner’s comparative study acknowledges the ‘problematic’ unity of
the Concert in its response to the Belgian Revolution. 5 It is unlikely Russia and Austria
would have supported France sending its army without further talks if informed prior. In
addition, Britain’s unitary action to send a fleet in November was as result of failed
attempts to agree on collective demands. Lord Grey, the Prime Minister, stated ‘if the
conference did not do…its duty, the English cabinet could use Admiral Codrington’s fleet
at England’s own discretion’.6 Therefore, both acts of intervention in the Belgium were
not products of cooperation or collective security, as Rendall argues. But individual Great
Powers showing commitment to their line of policy, which others did not wish to escalate
the conflict over.

The ideological divide splitting Europe limited cooperation. Austria, Russia and Prussia
had formed the Holy Alliance to preserve the conservative order on the continent.
However, Britain was moving political more liberal, as reflected by popular satire in
November 1830.7 The forming of a Whig government later that month and subsequent
re-election in 1831 amplified the issues. Metternich viewed Lord Grey’s government to
be as dangerous as that of the French to the political stability of central and eastern
Europe.8 This evidences the divergence of eastern and western Europe, which Paul
Schroeder describes as ‘split into two camps’ by January 1832.9 The July days in Paris
were the first of the 1830 revolutions, whereby Charles X was forced to abdicate in
favour of his cousin, who was crowned Louis Phillipe I. The conservative powers signed
‘Chiffon de Carlsbad’ in response, committing themselves maintaining the Vienna
settlement. Miroslav Šedivý points to Metternich losing the position of ‘coachman of
Europe’ from failure to solve the Greek crisis.10 Moreover, the dynamics of the Belgian
Revolution were acutely applicable to fears of conservatives. Rather than a workers’
movement, a coalition of the Liberal bourgeoise and Catholic clergy initiated the
challenge against monarchical authority. The position of the Belgian political elite

4
Our own correspondent, ‘French Ministry’, The Times, 2 June 1831
5
B. H. Steiner, ‘Preventive Diplomacy in the Endgame’, Global society : journal of interdisciplinary international
relations, 15/2, (2001), p.178
6
M. Rendall, ‘A Qualified Success for Collective Security’, pp.282-4
7
A Bait for John Bull:
https://www.britishmuseum.org/collection/object/P_1868-0808-9253
(accessed 9/5/2022)
8
F.R. Bridge & R. Bullen, The Great Powers, p.88
9
P. W. Schroeder, The transformation of European politics, 1763-1848, (Oxford, 1994), p.687
10
M. Šedivý, ‘Metternich's Plan for a Viennese Conference in 1839’, Central European history, 44/3, (2011),
p.397
resembled that of Polish and Ukrainian under the Tsar; Hungarians, Czechs and Slovaks
under Hapsburg rule; and the Rhineland and Saxony additions to the Prussian monarchy.
Hence, Belgium’s revolution was a beacon of modernity, traversing ethnic lines in its
rejection of overlordship. Whereas, for Britain, it drew parallels with attitudes towards
Ireland. Pieter François’s study of British conceptions towards Belgium presents it a ‘little
Britain’ on the continent, derived from constitutional monarchy and focus on economic
development through maritime trade.11 Further, the fusion of Liberalism and Catholicism
in Belgium validated the British approach to Ireland during the 1820s, supporting the
Whig interpretation that differences were not intrinsic. Hence, Britain rapidly became a
defender of Belgian independence. Contrary to Zolberg’s claim that the nation was
founded in spite of its ‘vulnerable’ geopolitical position, its was actually its proximity to
Britain and France which guaranteed it.12 As a result, Austria, Russia and Prussia did not
cooperate to support the developments of the revolutions but were also not positioned to
wield the casting influence. Thus, they had to pursue a less direct method of responding
to the revolution.

The policy in question was the containment of the French state. An article from The
Times explains ‘England, Prussia and Austria wish that our country[Belgium] should be a
strong bulwark against France’.13 All other major European states were concerned with
France’s potential to pursue expansionism once again, as reflected by the ‘buffer states’
within the Vienna settlement. B. H. Steiner highlights how the Great Powers supported
France’s interests in Belgium independence in an effort to restrain French
expansionism.14 Despite its liberal leanings, Britain was particularly paranoid of the
situation turning into another European conflict.15 F. R. Bridge and Roger Bullen describe
France not having expansionist aims despite having ‘pursued a policy which appeared to
be radical’.16 Schroeder points to this as essential to please the French populous.17
However, the impressions which France gave to the Great Powers were more important
than its actual intentions. The multilateral commitment to renounce Belgian territory,
clearly aimed specifically at France substantiates this.18 Likewise, the British
government’s decision to back the Belgian revolutionaries against the United
Netherlands, which itself was within Britain’s influence, reinforces the idea of a

11
P. François, ‘The construction of a Whig interpretation of the Belgium past: British travellers and their
attitudes towards the 'Belgian' past (1830-70)’, Dutch crossing, 31/1, (2007), p.44-5
12
A. R. Zolberg, ‘The Making of Flemings and Walloons: Belgium: 1830-1914’, The Journal of interdisciplinary
history, 5/2, (1974), p.189
13
Unknown, ‘Belgium: Private Correspondence’, The Times, 2 June 1831
14
B. H. Steiner, ‘Preventive Diplomacy in the Endgame’, p.187
15
E. Witte, J. Craeybackx, & A. Meynen, Political History of Belgium: From 1830 Onwards, (Brussels, 2009), p.24
16
F.R. Bridge & R. Bullen, The Great Powers and the European states system 1814-1914, (Oxon, 2005), p.92
17
P. W. Schroeder, The transformation of European politics, p.678
18
F.R. Bridge & R. Bullen, The Great Powers, pp.89-90
containment policy.19 Count Matuszewic, the deputy Russian delegate, stated ‘England
would, in the end, have the strongest grounds for declaring against France, if the cabinet
of the Royal Palace broke its promises, or could not fulfil them’.20 Therefore, the
agreements of the conference were a form of appeasement against France. The principal
priority of which was to prevent the possibility of France annexing Belgium. As reflected
by the sole demand the concert made to the French army in Belgium was to refrain from
being stationed there permanently.21 Incidentally, the Belgian political class while mainly
French-speaking, did not want to be absorbed into France. Municipal elections between
October and November 1830 show that revolutionaries were dominant in 9 out of 15
towns north of the language line, and 2 out of 5 south. 22 Hence, the Great Powers did
not cooperate foremost for Belgian independence, rather to prevent possibilities of
French expansion.

There were also cases of differences existing between representatives of the Great
Powers and their central governments. Rendell describes the London conference to have
‘freed’ the delegates from the ‘tight control’ of their superiors. Significantly, Tsar
Nicholas I was not pleased by the Russian signature on the ultimatums recognising the
Belgian provisional government. 23 Delays were also caused by the French Foreign
Minister Horace Sébastiani’s refusal to agree to proposals which Charles Maurice de
Talleyrand, the French ambassador had already signed on behalf of France, as reported
in the press.24 This creates an important distinction on where to define the actions of the
Great Powers. It is logical to expect greater collaboration when there is an absence of
physical divides from the prolonged duration of the conference. Although, Beatrice de
Graaf’s idea that collective emotions built the system of forum diplomacy neglects the
personal differences.25 Palmerston disliked Metternich, referring to the Austrian
statesman a ‘slave of Russia’.26 This struggle between Palmerston and Metternich
continued throughout the 1830s. The position of the conference in London was not as a
mediator, but for Britain to direct preceedings. Talleyrand also acted independently from
the French government, signing a protocol to bar the Duke of Nemours, Louis Phillipe I’s
son from the Belgian Crown.27 In addition, Talleyrand sent his own son, General Flahaut,

19
E. Witte, J. Craeybackx, & A. Meynen, Political History of Belgium p.24
20
M. Rendall, ‘A Qualified Success for Collective Security’, p.282
21
B. H. Steiner, ‘Preventive Diplomacy in the Endgame’, p.190
22
A. R. Zolberg, ‘The Making of Flemings and Walloons’, p.189
23
M. Rendall, ‘A Qualified Success for Collective Security’, p.279
24
Our own correspondent, ‘London’, The Times, 11 Aug 1831
25
B. A. de Graaf, ‘Bringing Sense and Sensibility to the Continent: Vienna 1815 Revisited’, Journal of modern
European history, 13/4, (2015), p.449
26
M. Šedivý, ‘Metternich's Plan for a Viennese Conference in 1839’, p.400
27
A. Sked, ‘Talleyrand and England, 1792-1838: A Reinterpretation’, Diplomacy and statecraft, 17/4, (2006),
p.658
back to France after he warned of Belgium’s partition should the selection of Crown
candidate be unacceptable to France. Palmerston, used the position of the conference in
London to his advantage, remarking the ‘only use of a plenipotentiary is to disobey his
instructions’.28 As a result, London conference of 1830-31 reflects Britain taking the
ascendancy in international relations during the 1830s, succeeded by 1832 London
conference regarding Greek independence, and the 1834 over Mohammed Ali’s rule in
Egypt. This was confirmed by Metternich’s failed plans for a concert in 1839 where he
was forced to use the more reserved title of ‘meeting’.29 Thus, the extent of cooperation
at the London conference was exploited by the British government, with the conservative
powers restricted and Talleyrand following his own Anglophile convictions.

A vital factor regarding the Belgian Revolution and London conference was the
importance of other concurrent conflicts. In dispute of Schroeder’s notion that between
1815 and 1848 ‘it was relatively easy and safe to promote revolution’, conservative
states resorted to strong reactionary measures.30 The Polish Uprising begun in November
1830 and was also spurred by the July Revolution in Paris. Nicholas I crushed the rebels,
before rescinding autonomy previously held. The actions of Russia with the cooperation
of Prussia and Austria to block borders for supplies exhibits desperation to maintain the
conservative order. Just like the Belgian Catholics, the Polish clergy were amongst the
strongest supporters of the independence cause. Nicholas I and Metternich coerced Pope
Gregory XVI to deliver a highly controversial speech in Warsaw, encouraging Catholic
Poles to obey ‘legitimate authority’.31 Likewise, Austria encountered revolts within Italian
provinces including Modena, Bologna, Ferrara, Ravenna, Forlì, Ancona and Perugia.
There was prospect of a conflict with France after Louis-Phillipe I had given his backing
to Italian revolutionaries, promising to protect them against Austrian intervention. This
was amongst renewed French interest in international affairs, following the success of
the North Africa expedition to conquer Algeria in June 1830. While no French support
was actually given to the Italian nationalists, it nonetheless represented a concerted
effort to display opposition to the Vienna settlement. Els Witte’s assertion that the
Belgian Revolution was settled by a ‘spirit of liberalism united several international
decision-makers’ neglects these wider conditions.32 Neither Metternich or Nicholas I
approved of the rebellion, nor France’s role in the proceedings, yet they felt unable to
counter considering the wider context. The Holy alliance knew the limit of its influence
and was acutely aware of the potential for a wider European conflict as well as other
28
M. Rendall, ‘A Qualified Success for Collective Security’, p.279
29
M. Šedivý, ‘Metternich's Plan for a Viennese Conference in 1839’, p.405
30
P. W. Schroeder, The transformation of European politics, p.673
31
A. J. Reinerman, ‘Metternich, Pope Gregory XVI, and Revolutionary Poland, 1831-1842’, The Catholic
historical review, 86/4, (2000), p.603 + p.697
32
E. Witte, J. Craeybackx, & A. Meynen, Political History of Belgium, p.24
revolts within its own territories. Further, its ‘holy’ aspect was in doubt after relations
with the Vatican became strained as a result of the Polish affair; in 1836 Pope Gregory
stated ‘Catholicism has no greater and more cruel foe than Emperor Nicholas’. 33 Hence,
the degree of cooperation from the conservative powers through restraint was a product
of the conditions within Europe during 1830-31, as such indicating the trend of depleting
conservative authority progressing through the 1830s.

Finally, the actual agreements the Great Powers succeeded in signing must be analysed.
Bridge and Bullen rightly point out that had the Dutch Kingdom accepted the terms of
Belgian independence, the crisis would have been solved by three months of conference
diplomacy.34 However, in reality, the conference only agreed on three separate points.
The first agreed ultimatum was presented to both Belgian and Dutch governments on
the 9th January 1831 was relatively tame in its demands. It only ordered the ceasing of
interference with commercial shipping travelling through the river Scheldt. 35 Further, the
agreement on Belgian neutrality was signed because it both pleased France, but also the
other Great Powers for how it restrained France through formal commitments. In
addition, the choice of Leopold I was from an election within Belgian National Congress,
which the Great Powers then assented to. These were hardly miracles of diplomacy and
cooperation which ‘may be unique in modern history’ as Rendall has argued. 36 William
Heath’s satire depicts the ‘peaceful appearance of Europe’ as exaggerated. 37 Further,
Rendall makes no mention of the Flahaut partition plan, which aimed to split Belgium
between France, Prussia and an Antwerp free-state serving as a British protectorate. Yet,
the discussions following the conflict displays the authority which the Great Powers
exerted on the smaller European states. Defeat of Belgian forces was followed by
tougher treaty conditions for Belgium, forced to cede Luxemburg and Limburg as well as
accept custom duties on shipping travelling through the Scheldt.38 This supports Sheldon
Anderson’s idea that Balance of Power was an excuse for the further imperial division of
the world.39 However, the restrictions of Belgium show a more rational attempt to
prevent further conflict between the United Netherlands and newly independent Belgium.
William I would refuse to recognise Belgium’s independence until 1839 but did not retake
to military action after the retreat from the Antwerp Citadel in 1832. Therefore, the

33
A. J. Reinerman, ‘Metternich, Pope Gregory XVI’, p.614
34
F.R. Bridge & R. Bullen, The Great Powers, p.90
35
M. Rendall, ‘A Qualified Success for Collective Security’, p.276
36
M. Rendall, ‘A Qualified Success for Collective Security’, p.279
37
Non-intervention or the peaceful appearance of Europe:
https://www.britishmuseum.org/collection/object/P_1868-0808-9344
(accessed 9/5/2022)
38
E. Witte, J. Craeybackx, & A. Meynen, Political History of Belgium, p.29
39
S. Anderson, ‘Metternich, Bismarck, and the Myth of the "Long Peace," 1815-1914’, Peace and change, 32/3,
(2007), p. 306
agreements which were signed at the London conference do not justify its reputation as
a masterstroke of diplomacy through the cooperation of the Great Powers.

To conclude, the initial reaction of the Great Powers to the Belgian Revolution in 1830
was not one of cooperation, but toleration on behalf of Russia, Austria, and Prussia given
Belgium’s geopolitical position at the heart of Europe. Due to these constraints, as well
as conflicts within Poland, Italy and German states, the conservative powers s adopted a
policy of French containment via appeasement, supported by Britain. While the unilateral
interventions on behalf of France and Britain cannot show the functioning of the
Congress system into the 1830s, the conference did aid in mediating the crisis by
declaring Belgian independence and assenting the Crown nomination. The notable
restraint displayed from all the Great Powers is somewhat attributed to the Balance of
Power and depleting conservative order. Significantly however, the personnel at the
conference succeeded in preventing a wider European armed conflict. Perhaps the
greatest achievement was the longevity of its settlement, with the ‘scrap of paper’
perfectly upheld until 1914.

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