Examine the sources of resistance to Francoism in the 1960s and the societal changes that explained

them.

The Franco era was one that spanned four decades, and came to a peaceful end in late 1975 with the
Generals death. The longevity of the regime and the peaceful nature of his death highlight the fact that
opposition to Franco was, by and large, unsuccessful. However, it was considered that after 1975 the
conditions no longer existed for a continuation of the regime, as the kind of Spanish society and
culture on which it had established itself no longer existed. Spanish society had been transformed,
coming to have much more in common with modern developed societies. (439 S.G Payne)
Understanding this societal transformation is an important process in examining the emergence of
resistance to Francoism during the 1960’s.

As it had been for some time, at the time of the regime’s conception, Spain was a very
backward country, both economically and culturally, in comparison to its European
neighbours. From the outset Franco made it clear that the much needed development of the
Spanish economy one of the regime’s key aims. Unfortunately for him, this was to prove
something of a difficulty during the early years of his tenure as, on the back of a devastating
Civil War, Spain was financially crippled. Franco’s subsequent association with Nazi
Germany only made matters worse. In conjunction with their own flawed commitment to
statist autarchy and hyper-regulated economics, the economic isolation that this brought upon
Spain ensured that it did not receive the foreign investment and aid that Spain needed.

A turning point for Spain came with the breakdown of the relationship between the allied
powers. The anti-communist stance of Francoism was well-known to U.S.A who began to see
the regime’s survival as an important part of preventing the Soviet Union from spreading its
communist hegemony. This resulted in U.S.A’s decision to provide financial aid in 1953 that
kick-started a recovery of the Spanish economy, bringing Spain a level of modernisation and
productivity than it had never before witnessed. More, however, was yet to come, as once
Spain dropped its policy of autarchy and opened up to the fast expanding global economy in
the early 1960’s, foreign investment came flooding in and brought with it unprecedented
economic growth. The impact this had on Spain over the course of the 1960’s was enormous.

Mass urbanisation was a logical consequence of the economic growth. The success of
Spanish industrial zones saw them expand into industrialised hubs as Spanish workers left
their rural lives behind them at the prospect of finding regular work. The number of
Spaniards living in cities in 1968 had almost doubled since 1960 and the number of people
employed in the agricultural sector had fallen to 30% by 1966. (19% - 32% living in cities
1960-1968), (agricultural workers 42% - 30% 1960 – 1966) Jose Maravall pg 25. This turn
around inevitably caused problems for a country that had forever been predominantly
agricultural and dominated by rural values.

One of the first issues to arise was found in trying to accommodate these city migrants. The
cities were unable to cope with the rapid influx of workers and were forced to construct
whole neighbourhoods very quickly and without much planning. The conditions for these
new urban dwellers were very cramped and they had insufficient provisions of local facilities
such as schools, hospitals and recreational land. In some cases the rate of immigration was
too fast for housing to be provided at all and, just as can be seen in many South-American
cities today, others had to construct their own homes on the outskirts.
Yet conditions could have been, and in fact had been, far worse for many of the Spanish
workers in the past. Until the economy took off in the 1960’s the vast majority of Spanish
peasants under Franco lived a desperate existence, concerned far more about getting food on
the table than with leisure. However, as people’s economic situation changed, so too did their
mind-set. With their basic needs taken care of they were able to get more ambitious and focus
their attentions on improving living and working conditions.

Workers, that had previously been sheltered and not particularly well-educated, became
increasingly exposed to a whole new world of modern consumerism that they did not
previously know existed. The Spanish workers, on seeing the potential of this consumer
society, naturally wanted greater access to it. In order to have this greater access, however,
their salaries needed to be improved considerably.

For the older generation, the thought of protesting would perhaps have been a difficult mental
obstacle to overcome. Having witnessed the brutal repression suffered by the Republicans
and those who opposed the Franco regime in its early stages, the desire to risk everything in
active resistance would have undoubtedly evaporated. The 1960’s, though, brought the first
generation to have grown up without memory of the Civil War. The younger generation of
workers new only the dictatorship and had developed a strong hatred of authority, without the
same fear of it.

To them the Franco regime represented a past era, and seemed to be stuck there. The Spanish
society was modernising and moving forward and the Spanish administration was not moving
with it. If they wanted to improve their living and working conditions then they would have
to act on their own behalf and force the state institutions to listen to them. This is exactly
what happened in the shape of the labour movement in the early 1960’s.

When the existing labour institutions that were provided by the dictatorship proved unable to
meet the new demands of the changing situations of the workers, the workers began to
organise themselves. What started as a few worker representatives in Asturias negotiating
with their employers for wage concessions; ignoring the legal channels provided via the state
Union (OSE); ended up with a trend being set and Workers Commissions (CCOO) being
established in 1962. This is effectively the beginning of a trade union movement which
organises waves of strikes from 1962 onwards and brings the workers some considerable
early successes.

The interesting thing to note about the labour movement and the CCOO in particular is the
fact that the government was originally quite tolerant of them. Equally, employers were quite
content to negotiate freely with them without the need to engage the government in
discussions. The key here is the expanding economy. The employers see it in their best
interest to give concessions in order to resume business and not miss out on the boom.

Aside from this, the CCOO found their strength from their unity. Whereas in the past trade
union movements had been divided by ideological differences, for the sake of achieving its
goals, these were put to one side. This may also have calmed government fears of
revolutionary militancy, and enabled it to survive.

If this was the case from until 1967, the declaration of that year that the Workers
Commissions were illegal put an end to this. After the government allowed free elections for
union representatives, it saw government candidates suffer heavy defeats and quickly
changed its tune. Its leniency toward the Workers Commissions was ended in
uncompromising fashion with a series of arrests and violence against protestors.

This disproportionate reaction, which was to become typical of the Franco dictatorship,
created more problems than it solved. Where much of the resistance until that point was fairly
peaceful and not particularly revolutionary, the reaction and counter-reaction to this initial
repression of the movement radicalised the Union members and they became more militant.

The repression of the Workers Commissions also made them more susceptible to the
influence of the Communist Party. In a way not out of place with its ‘entryism’ policy of the
1950’s, as the Union members radicalised, communist infiltration was facilitated and the PCE
gradually took control, making it potentially more threatening to the regime.  

It was more threatening not only in the sense that the Communist Party a sworn enemy of
Franco and his regime, but in that it was also the force of opposition to Franco that had the
greatest organisational presence. It was believed to have around 100,000 members working
clandestinely within Spain and its operations were well financed by Moscow.

In terms of the resistance it posed during the course of the dictatorship, however, it was not
particularly damaging or threatening to Francoism. One of the main reasons for this was that,
while it had a large presence within Spain, its decision makers were leaders of the Soviet
Communist Party. As a result, policies were dictated according to what was best for the
Soviet Union and showed a lack of understanding of what was going on in Spain at the time.

In failing to take into account the societal changes in Spain it was not able to tune in and
adapt accordingly to what the workers really wanted. Instead, it maintained the erroneous
belief that the worker militancy signified a desire for revolution and that the Franco regime
was on the point of collapse. This explains why strikes called by the PCE generally failed to
mobilise popular support.

A similar source of frustration was with the failure of its policy of ‘National Reconciliation’,
whereby it declared itself willing to put aside ideological differences to cooperate with other
parties for the sole purpose of ousting Franco. To its disappointment, the other parties refused
to accept this invitation to work with them, be it through their sheer hatred of the Communist
Party or through a lack of trust in it. Whatever their reasoning, the Communist Party, for all
its organisational capabilities and funding, was not given the chance it needed, and so
remained out of touch and ineffective.

Where the communist resistance was to be expected, a more surprising form emerged in the
shape of the Catholic Church.

Having suffered heavily at the hands of the Republicans, it was one of the main beneficiaries
of the Nationalist victory in the Civil War. As a catholic himself, Franco took pride in helping
it to recover, and hoped that in doing so it would once again establish a presence in society.
Over time, this proved to be the case. It gradually rebuilt its bridges with local communities
and began to get increasingly involved in local affairs. However, Franco came to feel a sense
of having been betrayed, as rather than the gratitude he felt he deserved, he was repaid with
their open criticism.
In time for the social upheaval of the 1960’s, a new generation of priests had arrived, with
ties to their communities that superseded any prior loyalties to Francoism. At a time when
world Catholicism was changing and developing a sense of social justice and responsibility,
the poor living and working conditions and the general social inequality in Spain became a
real concern.

The Spanish Catholic Church began to take up the struggles of its communities and even
protested on their behalf, calling for freer and fairer societies. On one notable occasion, the
Abbot of Montserrat attacked the regime by declaring it as ‘unchristian’. He was
subsequently forced into exile but was far from the only priest to harbour such an opinion,
and church protests continued to disturb the regime.

In regions with a separate cultural identity to Spain, like Catalonia or the Basque Country, the
resistance to the regime attracted broader support. Societal changes had affected them as
much as the rest of Spain, yet they were severely compounded by a repression of their
culture. Even the middle classes, which elsewhere were inclined to support Francoism, were
alienated as they had their very identities threatened. Therefore, far from erode the cultural
differences; Franco only managed to strengthen their resolve.

In terms of Catalonia, much of the regionalism and opposition to Franco was expressed
through defiance and a determination not to lose their cultural heritage. The 1960’s saw a
Catalan cultural renaissance with a surge in artistic expression (of Catalan identity) through
music and literature. (quote Jose Maravall) This was complimented by the church which
extended its sympathies to encompass the cultural struggles of its community and helped to
promote Catalan culture by publishing religious texts and giving sermons in Catalan, as well
as providing a venue to those interested in learning about Catalan history.

In terms of resistance, however, this was merely a nuisance in comparison to the situation
that emerged in the Basque Country. The Basques, considered an even more rural and
religious group than the Spanish, were particularly threatened by the impact of urbanisation
and the influx of secular non-Basque workers. The new urban values brought by these
immigrants were seen to be destroying their traditional way of life.

However, as preserving their cultural identity became more important, it continued to be

illegal for them to practise it. Consequently, Franco’s determination to create one culturally
hegemonic Spain was a never ending source of frustration that lent weight to a Basque
separatist movement that was far more threatening to Spanish Unity.

One group belonging to this movement, which would go on to pose a genuine law and order
problem in the Basque Country, was the separatist group ETA. However, years before ETA
became a violent organisation, its members were singled out for severe treatment by Franco.
ETA members were considered terrorist as early as 1960, and as such treated according to the
Decree-Law on Military Rebellion, Banditry and Terrorism promulgated in 1960, which (177
– Clark Basques and Beyond) denied them of their legal rights.

This harsh legal treatment, which was accompanied by police violence, meant the regime
played into ETA’s hands. It had the undesired effect of increasing the sympathy of the
general public towards them and, aided by a series of splits, which brought the defection of
those advocating less extreme measures, caused ETA to adopt more and more radical
policies.
One such policy was its action-reaction-action policy, established in 1967. ETA hoped to
provoke more and more severe repression from the police which would set in motion a spiral
of violence that would eventually bring about an uprising. This policy benefitted from a
radicalised work force which around the same time began to experience brutal police
violence in response to strike action. The combination of the two caused the rapid escalation
of violence in the Basque Country that led to ETA claiming its first police victim in 1968 and
going on to kill many more. By 1970, Franco’s control over the Basque Country was waning.

Nevertheless, the resistance to Francoism which emerged in the 1960’s and grew from 1966
onwards was never a major issue in terms of its potential to bring the collapse of the regime.
Even the lack of control over the Basque situation never seriously threatened this. The
resistance did show, however, the dissatisfaction of a society vastly different to that of 1939.
Unprecedented growth and a consumerism had only whetted its appetite. There were many
issues that arose from the rapid industrialisation and urbanisation and the dated institutions of
Francoism appeared unable to address.

and so the first signs of dissent under the Franco regime emerged.

Bibliography