What factors explain the polarisation of Spanish politics during the Second Spanish

Republic?
Of the 8.8 million votes cast in the 1936 General Elections in Spain only 800 thousand of
them went to parties of the centre. The rest were divided amongst left and right-wing
parties, belonging either to the victorious Frente Popular, or the defeated Frente
Nacional[1]. These two coalitions were representatives of two poles of highly
incompatible interests. A vote for the Frente Nacional was effectively a vote in favour of
maintaining the dominance of the established order in Spain and abolishing the Republic,
whereas one for the Frente Popular showed a longing for its preservation and for it to
continue its reforms with a view to diminishing the power of the elites. That Spanish
politics had been reduced to these two dominant forces by 1936 is evidence of the
polarisation that had occurred during the Second Republic.
This essay will look to highlight the key factors which brought about this polarisation. It
will look firstly at the social and economic issues that had plagued the country for
centuries and then at other factors more relevant to explain how and why it took until the
coming of the Second Republic for things to escalate. The prevailing international
environment will be shown to have been particularly influential. The atmosphere of fear
and desperation it created clouded the judgment of all those involved, causing the
intentions of both the left and the right to be misinterpreted. Consequently there emerges
a vicious cycle of mistrust, fear, frustration and radicalisation, all central themes
throughout this essay, which results in the steady abandonment of the middle ground. It is
important, however, to also take into account the actions of the leftist and right-wing
forces so as to dispel the idea that the polarisation and resulting Civil War were
inevitable.

Spain in the 1930‘s, in comparison to its European neighbours, was an extremely

backward society plagued by enormous social and economic inequality. It could almost
be said that there was not only one Spain but rather two. One belonged to the elite classes
consisting of the church, the army, and the industrialised and landed oligarchy, and the
other to the rest of the population. The existence of those of the former bared little or no
resemblance to those of the latter. The privileged position of the elite classes was
endorsed and, in terms of the army and the church, even funded by the State, whereas
many peasants lived bleak and desperate lives, working large estates belonging to rich
landowners who reaped all the rewards of the peasants’ hard work. The average
Andalusian peasant in 1930’s Spain for example could expect to earn around 5 pesetas for
a 12 hour day and was only in work for 4 months of the year[2].
The fact that many of the problems that needed to be addressed during the Second
Spanish Republic had been around for decades and even centuries shows the failure and
inability, or unwillingness in some cases, of previous governments and regimes to
successfully deal with them. Spanish political history is full of accounts of corruption and
fraudulent systems that meant that no government had ever really been elected based on
popular support. As a result, when it came to keeping order, they were reliant on the
army, a force against who the government was therefore powerless. With this in mind the
deep-rooted resentment toward the established order is understandable[3].

With all that the Coalition had to deal with and all the weight of expectation on their
shoulders, it was not helped in the slightest by the International context in which it was
governing. To describe the economic situation as unfavourable would be a significant
understatement. The Wall St Crash of 1929 had brought about the worst recession the
world had ever seen and it had disastrous effects the world over. In an unjust society such
as Spain was, however, the effects were much more severe amongst the underprivileged
Spanish peasant population. The Economic Crisis accentuated the difference in wealth as
the rich looked to minimise the damage it had on them, with the result often the heaping
of further social misery and hardship onto the Spanish working class.
The desperation of millions of peasants and working class men was channelled into the
optimism and euphoria of the Lefts victory in 1931. However, while the government was
full of good intentions it lacked the funding to back up its promises. Reforms that were
passed achieved very little without the money to enforce them. Past governments, most
notably the military dictatorship under Miguel Primo de Rivera, had borrowed heavily
from countries such as the U.S.A who demanded that the loans be repaid. This, in effect,
crippled the government in terms of spending and meant that the supporters of the left felt
let down and began to channel their enthusiasm into other more radical channels.

This was a large stroke of misfortune on the part of the Coalition, as should the reforms
have been made in times of greater prosperity they would surely have been more
successful in backing them up. Furthermore they would probably have not received such
fervent opposition from the right, given that were the economy moving in the right
direction the costs involved with increasing wages and conditions could have been easily
offset by increasing profits[4]. On the contrary, however, profits were falling and the
prospect of increasing wages required real sacrifice. This caused the efforts of the left to
be construed as a big threat to them. Naturally this increased the resolve of the right to
resist the changes imposed upon it as it felt victimised.
This sense of threat was heightened by the emergence of communism as an alternative
ideology. The right did not have to look far for evidence of what they stood to lose should
the working classes rise up against them. It had happened to Russia in 1917 and it was
not inconceivable to think that it could happen elsewhere. The thought of a red Spain
incited fear among the right just as the thought of a fascist dictatorship was terrifying to
forces of the left. The potential threat of fascism was equally if not even more real to that
of Communism with many countries throughout Europe succumbing to fascist dictators
around the time of the Second Republic, often as a reaction to reformist tendencies.
That neither the left nor the right as a whole wanted either of these extremes seemed to
go unnoticed as their intentions were misinterpreted out of blind fear. The judgment of
even the most educated of men was clouded into believing that the other side was more
extreme than was perhaps the case. This resulted in a war of perception whereby the
actions of both wings were dictated and driven by their fear. Mutual suspicions led to
radicalisation which in turn fueled greater suspicion and justified further radicalisation.
In light of all that has been mentioned, then, the polarisation during the Second Republic
seems a direct result of the times in which it took place. In spite of this, to suggest that
these factors alone are responsible for this polarisation would be a gross over-
simplification. It would negate the very possibility that the political powers had a role to
play in the process and this would serve so as to not tell the whole story.
We will concentrate first on what influence the left had on the polarisation process,
looking principally at the first two years of the Republic under the Republican-Socialist
Coalition. History tells us that reformist action is more often than not the catalyst for a
reactionary agenda. Spain was no exception to the rule. The reforms put through under
the Coalition, due to whom they were to affect, were always going to be controversial and
likely to be met with opposition from the established order. Driven by an erroneous
assumption that their victory spelt the demise of the old order, and encouraged by the
euphoria stirred up on the back of their victory, the Coalition government felt confident
that it could swiftly and finally put an end to the dominance of the elites[5].
This underestimation was to prove costly. In the space of two years the Coalition had
alienated all of the main conservative forces in Spain. The Church felt aggrieved by its
exclusion from education and reduced funding, the Army at being undervalued and
seemingly phased out of politics, and the land-owners at being stripped of their land. It is
easily said in hindsight but a wiser move would have been perhaps to isolate these groups
and not take them all on at once. In so doing the Coalition would not have given the right
a shared sense of victimisation which it could use to unify and pool resources.
Some historians highlight the Church reforms as particularly important. Gerald Brenan
proposes that were the Coalition leaders more astute they could have used the Church to
their advantage. While in general the Church had a leaning towards conservatism, and
much of its upper echelons did not look to hide its hostility toward the Republic[6], there
were many members of the Church who were sympathetic to the new regime. After all,
the priests in Spain were on the whole quite poor and it was only those higher up that
benefited from the funding. By withdrawing the funding the government effectively cut
off the income of many priests which had voted for them and with whom they could have
formed a powerful base. In 1931 these could have been considered to represent the
middle ground in Spanish politics. However, feeling harshly treated, the majority of the
sympathy towards the Republic soon evaporated and this middle ground quickly emptied
in favour of the right[7].
The reforms were construed as hostile anti-clericalism and acted as a battling cry to unite
the right. While the right was united, however, the left was anything but. The Socialists
faced competition from a numerically strong Anarchist party and even differed amongst
themselves on key issues such as whether or not to participate in government.[8] These
divisions were to prove decisive in the collapse of the coalition as a result of the decision,
largely as a result of the influence of Largo Caballero, to pull the Socialist Party out of
government. What remaining faith there was that the Republic alone could bring the
country what was needed had for many been lost.
In the ensuing General Elections the break up of the coalition and calls from anarchist
leaders for their followers to abstain from voting played into the hands of the right who
subsequently emerged victorious. Much of what was to follow by way of Reprisals by the
right-wing government was then a direct result of the divisions of the left.

The margin of right’s victory in terms of seats was however by no means representative
of the amount of votes, and the victory itself was in no small part down to the prudent use
of the economic backing available to it, one thing that characterised the right during the
Republic. In constituencies where the right stood little chance of winning money was
used to form coalitions and elsewhere, particularly in rural constituencies, it helped to
finance electoral fraud through bribery and coercion[9]. Nevertheless, the skilful use of
funds was not confined to election time. Before even the left could take to government,
forces of the right were establishing ways to combat the reformist challenge. Influential
figures such as CEDA leader Gil Robles and Angel Herrera (editor of propaganda
magazine ‘El Debate’) highlighted the importance of propaganda in light of the potential
impact it could have on an unsuspecting and impressionable population[10].
Some historians point to this propaganda machine as an instrumental factor in the
gathering of support for the right. Paul Preston for example draws attention to how it was
instrumental in convincing the majority of poor small-holding farmers that the legislation
to requisition land was to affect them in the same way it would large land-owners[11].
Similar distortions of the truth were used in response to all reforms introduced,
sensationalising the threat and preying on fears to bring differing elements together in a
sort of negative cohesion similar to that achieved by the Nazi’s.
Without this a victory in the 1933 General Elections would have surely been
unobtainable. From this moment on a reprisal culture was well and truly in place. The
Radical Party government, with Lerroux as its figure head yet with CEDA and Robles
pulling the strings, reversed all reforms that the previous government had made. Growing
resentment amongst the rank and file left saw them radicalise yet threats and efforts
against the government, were used as justification for the severity of reprisals and
increasing brutality employed to quash them. Propaganda was again important here as the
threat was exaggerated and used to fuel the right’s suspicions that the left wanted
revolution.
It seemed that anything went in terms of weakening the opposition. Many situations were
even engineered by CEDA to provoke leftist reaction so that the government could
‘legitimately’ use brutal force to quash it[12]. An example of such a scenario is the
admission of three CEDA ministers into government in October 1934[13]. By this time
the disloyalty of Robles toward a Republic was unquestionable and Socialist Leadership
had gone so far as to link the possibility of CEDA’s inclusion in government to the threat
of a Socialist revolution. Aware of both this and the fact that a Socialist revolution was
unlikely to succeed at the time, Robles pressured incessantly for precisely that which
would anger them most. The result was a General Strike which was put down in
uncompromising fashion.

In conclusion, while it is clear that the roots of the polarisation can be found in the years
of inequality and mutual resentments in Spanish society, it must be said that there are
other contributing factors. The most important of these is the unfortunate timing of the
Republics inauguration. International tensions between opposing undemocratic extremes
were at an all time high and their appeals were reinforced by the desperate economic
situation. Whether justifiably or otherwise, people were fearful of the possibility that
Spain could follow the example set by the U.S.S.R or Germany, and this led to a war of
perception and suspicions that escalated with increased militancy and radicalisation. This
gradually brought about the vacation of the middle ground in favour of which ever was to
be perceived as the lesser of the two evils. However, as this essay hopes to have shown,
the politicians of either side should not be exempt from blame on the basis of which,
intentionally or otherwise, they aggravated the situation.
[1] Dellacasa, G (1977): Revolucion y Frente Popular en España 1936-1939, Madrid
(p58)
[2] Brenan, G (1943): The Spanish Labyrinth: An account of the social and political
background of the Spanish Civil War, Cambridge University Press (pp120-121)
[3] Blinkhorn, M (1988): Democracy and Civil War in Spain 1931-1939, Routledge (pp5)
[4] Brenan, G (1943): The Spanish Labyrinth: An account of the social and political
background of the Spanish Civil War, Cambridge University Press (pp232)
[5] Carillo, S (1999): La Segunda República: Recuerdos y reflexiones, Plaza & Janés
Editores, S.A (p26) “…el pueblo republicano había obtenido con tanta facilidad aparente
el triunfo […que existía la ilusión de que…] bastaba proclamar para que todo lo demás se
resolviera automáticamente”
[6] Blinkhorn, M (1988): Democracy and Civil War in Spain 1931-1939, Routledge
(pp17-18) AND Lannon, F (1984): “The Church’s crusade against the Republic” from
Revolution and war in Spain, 1931-1939, Methuen & Co. Ltd (pp 37)
[7] Brenan, G (1943): The Spanish Labyrinth: An account of the social and political
background of the Spanish Civil War, Cambridge University Press (pp237-238)
[8] Blinkhorn, M (1988): Democracy and Civil War in Spain 1931-1939, Routledge
(pp11)
[9] Preston, P (1994): The Coming of The Spanish Civil War: Reform, Reaction and
Revolution in the Second Republic, Routledge (pp123-124)
See also Preston, P (1984): “The Agrarian War in the South” from Revolution and war in
Spain, 1931-1939, Methuen & Co. Ltd (pp 174)
[10] Preston, P (1994): The Coming of The Spanish Civil War: Reform, Reaction and
Revolution in the Second Republic, Routledge (Chapter 2: Building Barricades Against
Reform pp38-74)
[11] Preston, P (1994): The Coming of The Spanish Civil War: Reform, Reaction and
Revolution in the Second Republic, Routledge (pp44-45)
[12] Preston, P (1994): The Coming of The Spanish Civil War: Reform, Reaction and
Revolution in the Second Republic, Routledge (Chapters 4-5: The Politics of Reprisal & A
Bluff Called)
[13] Preston, P (1994): The Coming of The Spanish Civil War: Reform, Reaction and
Revolution in the Second Republic, Routledge (pp166-167)