Araullo v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014.

Nine petitions assailing the constitutionality of the DAP, the releases had been sourced from
savings generated by the Government, and from unprogrammed funds.
At the core of the controversy is Section 29(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, a provision
of the fundamental law that firmly ordains that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except
in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." Executive Branch of the Government. The DBM
listed several legal bases for the DAP’s use of savings, one of which is Section 25(5), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution, which granted to the President the authority to augment an item for his
office in the general appropriations law; Hence, the petition for certiorari and prohibition directly
to the Supreme Court.
the respondents contend that special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition are not proper
actions for directly assailing the constitutionality and validity of the DAP; that there is no
authorized proceeding under the Constitution and the Rules of Court for questioning the validity
of any law unless there is an actual case or controversy the resolution of which requires the
determination of the constitutional question; that the jurisdiction of the Court is largely
appellate; that for a court of law to pass upon the constitutionality of a law or any act of the
Government when there is no case or controversy is for that court to set itself up as a reviewer
of the acts of Congress and of the President in violation of the principle of separation of powers.
W/N Certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedy.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. When the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other department
but only asserts the obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims
of authority under the Constitution. Further, the Court has been entrusted expressly or by
necessary implication with both the duty and the obligation of determining, in appropriate cases,
the validity of any assailed legislative or executive action pursuant to Sec. 1, Art. 8 of the
Constitution.
Yes, Writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. To warrant the issuance of the writ.
The abuse of discretion must be grave, capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction.
Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or
person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said
entity’s or person’s jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is
no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the
writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only
by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the
latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional
issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.
Leynes v. Former Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 154462, January 19, 2011

In a case of forcible entry, Petitioner was ordered to file its answer on May 10, 2000 but belatedly
filed its answer on May 22, 2000, and their Motion to Admit Belatedly Filed Answer with attached
Answer with Counterclaim the day after, on May 23, 2000. The spouses Leynes explained that
they were not able to file their Answer with Counterclaim on May 20, 2000, even though there
were court employees on duty that Saturday, because they had to serve first a copy of said
pleading on the spouses Superales’ counsel, whose office was located in Davao City. Davao City
is approximately one-hour ride by bus from Digos City.
The spouses Superales opposed the spouses Leynes’ Motion to Admit Belatedly Filed Answer
contending that the answer should have been filed within 10 days from receipt of a copy of the
complaint; and the spouses Leynes’ motion to admit is in the nature of a motion for extension of
time to file an answer, which is a prohibited pleading in summary proceedings.

The MTCT rendered judgment against the petitioner which the RTC affirmed, petitioner then filed
a petition for certiorari with the CA but the CA dismissed the same for being the wrong remedy,
hence, the petition for certiorari.
W/N certiorari will prosper.
Yes, while generally where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will
not be entertained. Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are
mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a
substitute for an appeal, especially if one’s own negligence or error in one’s choice of remedy
occasioned such loss or lapse. For certiorari to prosper the following requisites must concur: (1)
the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal
or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
However, the acceptance of a petition for certiorari, as well as the grant of due course thereto
is, in general, addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The provisions of the Rules of Court,
which are technical rules, may be relaxed in certain exceptional situations. Where a rigid
application of the rule that certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal will result in a manifest
failure or miscarriage of justice, it is within our power to suspend the rules or exempt a particular
case from its operation.
Here, there was an error as to the computation of time to file because Saturday, Sunday and
Legal Holiday should be excluded and where the last day falls with the same days the filing should
be the immediate following working day.
Belmonte v. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, G.R. No. 197665, January 13, 2016.

Sandra Uy filed an administrative case against petitioner and other eight members of PNP
Regional Traffic Management for alleged extortion. The Ombudsman adjudged the petitioners
guilty of grave misconduct and grave abuse of authority warranting a penalty of dismissal from
service. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, pending the MR, the Ombudsman ordered
the execution of judgment hence the petitioner filed a petition for prohibition directly to the SC.
On the course of Petition for prohibition, the Ombudsman modify its decision, finding the
petitioners guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and imposing the
penalty of suspension from office for a period of six (6) months and (1) day without pay, instead
of dismissal from service.
W/N the petition for prohibition is proper.
No, for a party to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, he must establish the following requisites:
(a) it must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions,
judicial or ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Here, he Court does not find that public respondent gravely abused its discretion in issuing the
subject Decision. Grave abuse of discretion is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
because of passion or hostility. Further, petitioners filed the instant action when they clearly had
some other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A remedy is
considered plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious
effects of the judgment or rule, order or resolution of the lower court or agency.
True, the Court, the CA and the RTC have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. The concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does not grant
the party seeking any of the extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file a petition in any
court of his choice. The petitioner has not advanced any special or important reason which would
allow a direct resort to this Court.
Besides, even granting the propriety of the instant petition, the same can no longer be given
effect under the circumstances availing because the assailed Decision had already been modified
finding petitioners guilty, not of Grave Misconduct, but of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest
of the Service and imposing the penalty of suspension instead of dismissal from service.
Saint Mary Crusade to Alleviate Poverty of Brethren Foundation, Inc. v. Riel, G.R. No. 176508,
January 12, 2015.

On October 2004, the petitioner claimed in its petition for reconstitution that the original copy
of OCT No. 1609 had been burnt and lost in the fire that gutted the Quezon City Register of Deeds
in the late 80’s. Respondent RTC Judge dismissed the petition for reconstitution by citing the
opposition by the OSG and the UP, as well as the recommendation of the Land Registration
Authority (LRA). He pointed out that the petitioner did not present its purported Torrens title to
be reconstituted; that the petitioner’s claim was doubtful given the magnitude of 4,304,623
square meters as the land area involved; and that the UP’s ownership of the portion of land
covered by petitioner’s claim had long been settled by the Court in a long line of cases. The
petitioner then alleging that respondent Judge had unfairly abused his discretion and unlawfully
neglected the performance of an act which is specifically enjoined upon him and that it had no
other remedy in the course of law except through the present petition for certiorari and
mandamus.
W/N the petition for certiorari is a proper remedy.
No, the petition for certiorari and mandamus did not show how respondent Judge could have
been guilty of lacking or exceeding his jurisdiction, or could have gravely abused his discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Under the law on the judicial reconstitution of a
Torrens title, the Regional Trial Court had the original and exclusive jurisdiction to act on the
petition for judicial reconstitution of title. Hence, the RTC neither lacked nor exceeded its
authority in acting on and dismissing the petition. Nor did respondent Judge gravely abuse his
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction considering that the petition for
reconstitution involved land already registered in the name of the UP, as confirmed by the LRA.
Instead, it would have been contrary to law had respondent Judge dealt with and granted the
petition for judicial reconstitution of title of the petitioner.
The correct recourse for the petitioner was to appeal to the Court of Appeals by notice of appeal
within 15 days from notice of the denial of its motion for reconsideration. By allowing the period
of appeal to lapse without taking action, it squandered its right to appeal. Its present resort to
certiorari is impermissible, for an extraordinary remedy like certiorari cannot be a substitute for
a lost appeal.
Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014.

Petitioner is the president Boracay West Cove, the company applied for a zoning compliance with
the municipal government of Malay, Aklan while the company was already operating a resort.
The Municipal Zoning Administrator denied petitioner’s application on the ground that the
proposed construction site was within the no build zone demarcated in Municipal Ordinance.
Subsequently, a Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal government, enjoining the
expansion of the resort and thereafter, two more instances followed wherein respondents
demolished the improvements introduced by Boracay West Cove.
Alleging that the order was issued and executed with grave abuse of discretion, petitioner filed a
Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief with the CA. He argued that judicial
proceedings should first be conducted before the respondent mayor could order the demolition
of the company’s establishment; that Boracay West Cove was granted a FLAgT by the DENR,
which bestowed the company the right to construct permanent improvements on the area in
question. The CA dismissed the petition solely on procedural ground, i.e., the special writ of
certiorari can only be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions and since the issuance of EO 10 was done in the exercise of executive functions,
certiorari will not lie, hence, the petition.
W/N the CA is correct in dismissing the certiorari.
No, for certiorari to prosper, the petitioner must establish the concurrence of the following
requisites, namely: 1. The writ is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions; 2. Such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and 3.
There is no appeal or any plain speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The CA immediately dismissed the Petition for Certiorari upon determining that the first element
is wanting—that respondent mayor was allegedly not exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions.
It is not essential that the challenged proceedings should be strictly and technically judicial, in
the sense in which that word is used when applied to courts of justice, but it is sufficient if they
are quasi-judicial. To contrast, a party is said to be exercising a judicial function where he has the
power to determine what the law is and what legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes
to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties, whereas quasi-
judicial function is "a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative
officers or bodies required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings,
and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a
judicial nature."
Here, the assailed EO 10 was issued upon the respondent mayor’s finding that Boracay West
Cove’s construction, expansion, and operation is illegal. Such a finding of illegality required the
respondent mayor’s exercise of quasi-judicial functions, against which the special writ of
certiorari may lie.
Cudia v. Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy, G.R. No. 211362, February 24,
2015.

Petitioner, a graduating cadet, was dismissed from PMA due to alleged untruthful statements.
The PMA Cadet Review and Appeals Board upheld his dismissal which was concurred by the OP.
However, the CHR investigated the matter and ruled that there was probable cause as to the
violation of the rights of the Cadet to due process and grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the PMA officers. Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus against PMA officers to allow him to
be included in the graduating cadets and take part in the commencement exercise.
W/N mandamus is a proper remedy.
No, a petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station. It may also be filed when any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer, or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled. This is opposed to a discretionary act whereby the officer
has the choice to decide how or when to perform the duty.
With respect to the prayer directing the PMA to restore Petitioner of his rights and entitlements
as a full-fledged graduating cadet the same cannot be granted in a petition for mandamus on the
basis of academic freedom, therefore, beyond the province of the Court to decide. The powers
to confer degrees at the PMA, grant awards, and commission officers in the military service are
discretionary acts on the part of the President as the AFP Commander-in-Chief.
Resident Marine Mammals v. Reyes, G.R. No. 180771, April 21,2015.

The "Resident Marine Mammals" in the petition, are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises,
and other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait. They are
joined by Gloria Estenzo Ramos (Ramos) and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio (Eisma-Osorio) as their legal
guardians and as friends (to be collectively known as "the Stewards") who allegedly empathize
with, and seek the protection of, the aforementioned marine species.
Petitioner filed an original Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, and Injunction, which seeks to
enjoin respondents from implementing Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46), which allowed the
exploration, development, and exploitation of petroleum resources within Tañon Strait in
violation of the Constitution and to compel public respondents to provide petitioners access to
the pertinent documents involving the Tañon Strait Oil Exploration Project. Respondent
countered that the petitioner has no locus standi to file the petition, as regards the Stewards, the
respondents likewise challenge their claim of legal standing on the ground that they are
representing animals, which cannot be parties to an action.
W/N the petitioner has legal standing to the petition.
Yes, while the party in interest should be a natural or juridical person the Court had already taken
a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases such as in the case of
Opposa vs Factoran even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became
effective.
The need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated which allow
any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It
is worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in
representation of the named cetacean species.
Gios-Samar Inc. v. DOTC, G.R. No. 217158, March 12, 2019.

The DOTC and CAAP, posted an Invitation to Pre-qualify and Bid in the airport development of six
airports, the total cost of the Projects is P116.23 Billion with different allocation to each six
airports. The DOTC however, provided that the projects are now bundled into two groups costing
P50.66 Billion and P59.66 Billion.
Petitioner GIOS-SAMAR, Inc., represented by its Chairperson Gerardo M. Malinao, suing as a
taxpayer and invoking the transcendental importance of the issue, filed the present petition for
prohibition alleging among others that bundling would allow companies with questionable or
shaky financial background to have direct access to the Projects by simply joining a consortium
which under the bundling scheme adopted by the DOTC said Projects taken altogether would
definitely be beyond the financial capability of any qualified, single Filipino corporation and that
he DOTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction when it
bundled the projects without legal authority.
Respondents averred that the petition is premature because there has been no actual bidding
yet, hence there is no Justiciable controversy to speak of and that the petition violated the basic
fundamental principle of hierarchy of courts. Petitioner had not alleged any special and
compelling reason to allow it to seek relief directly from the Court.
W/N petition for prohibition directly to the Supreme Court is proper.
No, Petitioner's arguments against the constitutionality of the bundling of the Projects are
inextricably intertwined with underlying questions of fact, the determination of which require
the reception of evidence. The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving
factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot entertain cases involving factual
issues.
In a certiorari and prohibition case, like the instant case, only legal issues affecting the jurisdiction
of the tribunal, board or officer involved may be resolved on the basis of undisputed facts. The
Rules of Court require that in the verified petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition the
petitioner should allege "facts with certainty".
When a question before the Court involves determination of a factual issue indispensable to the
resolution of the legal issue, the Court will refuse to resolve the question regardless of the
allegation or invocation of compelling reasons, such as the transcendental or paramount
importance of the case. Such question must first be brought before the proper trial courts or the
CA, both of which are specially equipped to try and resolve factual questions.
Sadhwani v. Sadhwani, G.R. No. 217365, August 14, 2019

The dispute involves conflicting claims of ownership of the heirs Sadhwani over the estate of their
parents. The RTC dismissed the case and held, among others, that the complaint failure to state
cause of action because the Sps. Sadhwani as Indian nationals is prohibited under the
Constitution from owning or transmitting any rights over the subject property.
Petitioners thus filed a petition under Rule 45 to the SC asserting their rights as beneficiaries of
the resulting trust to the proceeds from the sale of the subject properties.
W/N Rule 45 is the proper remedy.
No, Rule 41, Section 1 expressly states that no appeal may be taken from an order dismissing an
action without prejudice. In such cases, the remedy available to the aggrieved party is to file an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are distinct grounds to dismiss a
particular action. The former refers to the insufficiency of the allegations in the pleading, while
the latter to the insufficiency of the factual basis for the action.
As applied to the instant case, lack of cause of action could not have been the basis for the
dismissal of the instant action considering that no stipulations, admissions or evidence have yet
been presented. The RTC's inaccurate pronouncement, however, should have been challenged
through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari and not through an appeal, as expressly provided in Rule
41, Section 1. Moreover, the challenge should have been brought to the Court of Appeals instead
of filing the same directly with the Court
Spouses Soller v. Singson, G.R. No. 215547, February 3, 2020

Petitioners are the owners of land located along a national highway at Oriental Mindoro. They
petition for the issuance of Permanent Injunction and damages with prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order for the commencement of the1 meter elevation project of the national
highway by DPWH and private contractors blocked floodwaters to the farmlands and submerging
houses and lands on the left side of the road including their properties.
The RTC dismissed the petition finding that it has no jurisdiction over the case as stated in RA
8975 which expressly vests jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court to issue any TRO, preliminary
injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government. The petitioner then
appealed to SC by certiorari under Rule 45.
W/N the remedy under rule 45 is proper.
No, but the Court relaxed the application of procedural rules because the strict and rigid
application of procedural rules would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice.
The remedy of resorting directly before the SC in cases covered under R.A. No. 8975 was
recognized in Philco Aero, Inc. v. Secretary Tugade. R.A. No. 8975 is explicit in excluding other
courts in the issuance of injunctive writs, however, in the prohibition applies only to TRO and
preliminary injunction. But the allegations and the reliefs prayed for in the complaint sought to
enjoin such construction; or if completed, to restore the affected portion thereof, to their original
state. Clearly, the principal action is one for injunction, which is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
The principal action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of
preliminary injunction which cannot exist except only as part or an incident of an independent
action or proceeding.
Heirs of Garcia v. Municipality of Iba, Zambales, G.R. No. 162217, July 22, 2015

The MTC ruled in favor of Petitioner in an ejectment case, the respondent filed its notice of
appeal, but the MTC denied due course to the notice of appeal. Thus, the Municipality of Iba filed
its petition for certiorari in the RTC to assail the denial of due course by the MTC which was
granted.
Aggrieved, the petitioners appealed to the CA by petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules
of Court. The CA dismissed the petition for review on for not being the proper mode of appeal,
observing that the assailed orders had been issued by the RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction.
W/N the CA’s dismissal is proper.
Yes, the appeal by notice of appeal under Rule 41 is a matter or right, but the appeal by petition
for review under Rule 42 is a matter of discretion.

The Rules is clear that the appeal in the judgment of RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction
is by ordinary appeal while petition for review is in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Here,
the assailed resolution is in relation to the petition for certiorari by the respondent which is in
the exercise of original jurisdiction of the RTC.
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 190660, April 11, 2011.

Private respondent Elizabeth P. Diaz filed a complaint against petitioner due to dissatisfaction in
the valuation of her property for expropriation under CARP. Private respondent demand is 5.2M
for the 10-hectare land, however, the special agrarian court decided the price at 197K.
Private respondent filed ordinary appealed to the CA but the petitioner argued that the appeal
should be dismissed because an ordinary appeal is the wrong remedy, the proper mode being by
way of a petition for review, citing Section 60 of Republic Act No. 6657, but the CA denied the
petitioner’s argument hence the petition for certiorari.
W/N ordinary appeal is not proper for remedy for decision of Agrarian Court.
Yes, following Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon,11 the proper mode of appeal from
decisions of Regional Trial Courts sitting as SACs is by petition for review under Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court and not through an ordinary appeal under Rule 41.

Section 61 of RA 6657 can easily be harmonized with Section 60. The reference to the Rules of
Court means that the specific rules for petitions for review in the Rules of Court and other
relevant procedures in appeals filed before the Court of Appeals shall be followed in appealed
decisions of Special Agrarian Courts.
The reason why it is permissible to adopt a petition for review when appealing cases decided by
the Special Agrarian Courts in eminent domain case is the need for absolute dispatch in the
determination of just compensation. Unlike an ordinary appeal, a petition for review dispenses
with the filing of a notice of appeal or completion of records as requisites before any pleading is
submitted.
Yatco v. Deputy Ombudsman, G.R. No. 244775, July 6, 2020

Petitioner filed a case against 4 officials of Binan Laguna to the Ombudsman but the Ombudsman
dismissed the case for lack of probable cause and lack of substantial evidence. She then filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA, assailing the entirety of the Ombudsman's
ruling. She explained that since the Ombudsman consolidated the decision for both the criminal
and the administrative aspects of the case, she filed the petition before the CA as a whole.
The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari "as regards the criminal aspect of the case." It held
that it has jurisdiction over decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases only,
and accordingly, it cannot review the Ombudsman's decisions in criminal or non-administrative
cases. Hence, the petition.
W/N the CA is correct in dismissing the criminal aspect.
Yes, the Ombudsman rulings which exonerate the respondent from administrative liability is
unappealable, unless on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, and the correct procedure is to
file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. In contrast, where the respondent is not
exonerated the proper remedy is to file an appeal under Rule 43 before the CA.
Meanwhile, with respect to criminal charges, the Court has settled that the remedy of an
aggrieved party from a resolution of the Ombudsman finding the presence or absence of
probable cause is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and the petition be before the
Supreme Court.
The fact that the Ombudsman had rendered a consolidated ruling does not - as it should not -
alter the nature of the prescribed remedy corresponding to the aspect of the Ombudsman ruling
being assailed. Consolidation is an act of judicial discretion when several cases are already filed
and pending before it. After the Ombudsman renders its consolidated ruling, the aggrieved party
is then required to take the appropriate procedural remedies to separately assail the
administrative and criminal components of the same.
Lihaylihay v. Tan, G.R. No. 192223, July 23, 2018

Petitioner wrote to Commissioner of Internal Revenue demanding payment of informer's reward

on the supposedly recovered by the Philippine government from the ill-gotten wealth of Marcos
pursuant to RA 2338. The demand worth 11 quadrillion was passed from different government
departments, without waiting for government’s official actions on his letters, Lihaylihay filed the
Petition for Mandamus and Damages, with a Prayer for a Writ of Garnishment on 50 trillion worth
of jewelries and government lands.
W/N Mandamus will prosper.
No, a writ of mandamus may issue in either of two (2) situations: first, "when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station"; second, "when any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person . . . unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled."
Petitioner's legal right must have already been clearly established it cannot be a prospective
entitlement that is yet to be settled, the duty subject of mandamus must be ministerial rather
than discretionary.
Petitioner's entitlement to an informer's reward is not a ministerial matter. Quite the contrary,
its determination requires a review of evidentiary matters and an application of statutory
principles and administrative guidelines. Its determination is a discretionary, quasi-judicial
function, demanding an exercise of independent judgment on the part of certain public officers.
Mark Anthony Zabal v. Duterte, G.R. No. 238467, February 12, 2019

In challenging the declaration of then President Duterte for the closure of Boracay, Petitioners
state that a petition for prohibition is the appropriate remedy to raise constitutional issues and
to review and/or prohibit or nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials. An
action for mandamus, on the other hand, lies against a respondent who unlawfully excludes
another from the enjoyment of an entitled right or office. Justifying their resort to prohibition
and mandamus, petitioners assert that this case presents constitutional issues whether President
Duterte acted within the scope of the powers granted him by the Constitution in ordering the
closure of Boracay.
Respondent argued that prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain future action. Here,
President Duterte had already issued Proclamation No. 475 and in fact, the rehabilitation of the
island was then already ongoing. Neither mandamus is proper because they were not neglectful
of their duty to protect the environment; on the contrary, they conscientiously performed what
they were supposed to do by ordering the closure of Boracay to give way to its rehabilitation.
W/N prohibition and mandamus will lie.
Yes, indeed prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that a judgment be rendered directing
the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal, it
is not intended to provide a remedy for acts already accomplished. Neither is mandamus
appropriate since there is no neglect of duty on their part as they were precisely performing their
duty to protect the environment when the closure was ordered.
However, that the use of prohibition and mandamus is not merely confined to Rule 65. These
extraordinary remedies may be invoked when constitutional violations or issues are raised. The
Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate
remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts
of legislative and executive officials, as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
But resort to prohibition and mandamus on the basis of alleged constitutional violations is not
without limitations. The petition must be subjected to the four exacting requisites for the
exercise of the power of judicial review, viz.: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b)
the petitioners must possess locus standi; ( c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at
the earliest opportunity; and ( d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
Hence, it is not enough that this petition mounts a constitutional challenge against Proclamation
No. 475. It is likewise necessary that it meets the aforementioned requisites before the Court
sustains the propriety of the recourse which the petitioner failed to prove.
Neri Colmenares, et al. v. Energy Regulatory Commission, G.R. No. 210245, August 3, 2021.

These are consolidated petitions filed before the Court assailing the Energy Regulatory
Commission's (ERC) approval of Manila Electric Company's (MERALCO) request to stagger the
collection of automatic rate adjustments arising from generation costs for November 2013.
ERC approved MERALCO's proposal for the staggered collection of the generation charge by way
of an exception to the Guidelines for the Automatic Adjustment of Generation Rate and System
Loss Rates by Distribution Utilities (AGRA Rules).
Petitioners through petition Certiorari and Prohibition sought to declare null and void the
provisional grant by the ERC of the rate increase for lack of due process and the issuances of the
ERC allowing the automatic power rate adjustments or increases imposed by MERALCO.
W/N the remedy availed will prosper.
Yes, the consolidated cases were commenced through petitions for certiorari and prohibition
under Rule 65. None of the parties seek this Court's competence to set the amount of generating
costs to be paid by the consumers, rather, all the petitions allege that respondents gravely abused
their discretion in the manner they approved the rates with such abuse amounting to having
ousted them of their jurisdiction.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply in this case because the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies where a claim is cognizable in the first
instance by an administrative agency alone. Here, the cases involve the judicial review of an
administrative action because there is no administrative action recourse which remains available.
Common for both remedies are the following requisites: (1) the board was exercising quasi-
judicial functions; (2) its action or proceeding was done with grave abuse of discretion; and (3)
there was no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.
In this case, the MERALCO proposed the staggering of the collection of the generation rate with
carrying costs. This letter triggered the ERC's quasi-judicial function to decide, with the governing
laws as its guide, on whether these factual questions on staggered collection and carrying costs
should be allowed. This brings the court to the question whether there was grave abuse of
discretion and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.
MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay. G.R. Nos. 171947-48, December 18, 2008.

Respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the RTC against several
government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and
protection of the Manila Bay. Respondents alleged that the continued neglect of petitioners in
abating the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of several environmental laws.
The RTC ordered the petitioners along with other executive agencies to rehabilitate the Manila
Bay. Petitioner challenge the RTC’s decision that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial
act which can be compelled by mandamus. But the CA sustained the RTC decision.
W/N the rehabilitation of Manila Bay may be compelled by mandamus.
Yes, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty which is one that
requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.
While the implementation of the MMDA’s mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process,
the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial
in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. Its duty being a statutory imposition; the
MMDA’s duty in this regard is spelled out in Sec. 3(c) of RA 7924 creating the MMDA which
include the establishment and operation of sanitary land fill and related facilities.
Further, the MMDA is duty-bound to comply with RA 9003 enjoining the MMDA and local
government units from using and operating open dumps for solid waste.
The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in the
Environment Code and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper waste
disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion
presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially according to
their judgment or conscience.
Segovia v. Climate Change Commission, G.R. No. 211010, 7 March 2017

Petitioners are Carless People of the Philippines, parents, representing their children, who in turn
represent "Children of the Future. This is a petition directly to the SC for the issuance of writs of
kalikasan and continuing mandamus to compel the implementation of the environmental laws
such as Climate Change Act and Clean Air Act.
Accordingly, the Petitioners seek to compel the public respondents along with other government
agencies to implement among others the to divide all roads lengthwise for all-weather sidewalk
and bicycling, the other half for transport vehicles; compel the government officials to reduce
their fuel consumption by fifty percent and to take public transportation fifty percent of the time;
and for Public respondent DBM to instantly release funds for Road Users' Tax.
W/N the Writ of Kalikasan and continuing mandamus will prosper.
No, it bears noting that there is a difference between a petition for the issuance of a writ of
kalikasan, wherein it is sufficient that the person filing represents the inhabitants prejudiced by
the environmental damage subject of the writ; and a petition for the issuance of a writ of
continuing mandamus, which is only available to one who is personally aggrieved by the unlawful
act or omission.
It is well-settled that a party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan has to
show that a law, rule or regulation was violated or would be violated. Here, apart from repeated
invocation of the constitutional right to health and to a balanced and healthful ecology and bare
allegations that their right was violated, the petitioners failed to show that public respondents
are guilty of any unlawful act or omission that constitutes a violation of the petitioners' right to
a balanced and healthful ecology. On the other hand, public respondents sufficiently showed
through various programs and projects that they did not unlawfully refuse to implement or
neglect the laws, executive and administrative orders as claimed by the petitioners.
Similarly, the writ of continuing mandamus cannot issue. The petitioners failed to prove direct or
personal injury arising from acts attributable to the respondents to be entitled to the
writ.1âwphi1 While the requirements of standing had been liberalized in environmental cases,
the general rule of real party-in-interest applies to a petition for continuing mandamus.
Moreover, the Road Sharing Principle is precisely as it is denominated - a principle. The duty being
enjoined in mandamus must be one according to the terms provided in the law itself.
Abines v. Duque, G.R. No. 235891, September 20, 2022.

A Petition for Mandamus under Rule 65 filed by 74 children, represented by their parents who
were inoculated with Dengvaxia, the dengue vaccine. The Petition, wich was directly filed before
the SC, seeks the issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus against Dr. Francisco T. Duque III
and all government officials involved in the implementation of the Dengvaxia vaccination
program. Among the prayers were, (1) to publicly disseminate the report of the school-based
immunization program involving Dengvaxia and submit the same to the House of Representatives
and Senate Committees on Health (2) create a registry or list of all those who had been inoculated
with Dengvaxia;
Petitioners claim that the Petition does not violate the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. They cite
the exceptions that the issue involved are of transcendental importance and claimed that they
had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy from the ordinary course of law.

Respondents assert that mandamus under Rule 65 and Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases does not lie because the reliefs demanded by the petitioners are not ministerial acts. That
the propriety of a review by independent and competent medical experts of the safety and
efficacy involves exercise of judgment. Respondents further claimed that a writ of continuing
mandamus is neither available to petitioners, considering that this may only be issued in
connection with the enforcement or violation of environmental law.
W/N petitioners are entitled to writ of continuing mandamus.
No, Mandamus does not lie unless the acts to be performed are enjoined by law. The duty of
respondent-government agencies to perform the acts must be clearly provided for by law. The
Court cannot order the respondent-government agencies how to perform their functions with
respect to any immunization program; otherwise, this Court will effectively usurp the power and
prerogatives of the executive.
Every petition for a writ of continuing mandamus should clearly allege: (a) serious and systematic
inability of the respondents to meet their constitutional or statutory obligations to protect and
preserve the environment despite repeated demands; (b) convincing circumstances that the non-
issuance of the writ will result to irreparable damage to our ecology within the scope provided in
our rules; and ( c) specific, measurable, attainable, realistic, and timebound objectives that have
rational relation to the irreparable damage sought to be avoided. The Petition fails to comply
with these.
Foremost, petitioners cannot pray for the issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus because
the controversy does not involve the enforcement or violation of an environmental law or right.
Moreover, even to treat the petition for mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, it must
still fail. The acts sought by the petitioners to be performed are not enjoined by law as a duty.
They are not ministerial acts.