PROPERTY & LAND TITLES

& DEEDS PREWEEK

POINTERS
Jurists Prof. Manuel R. Riguera
Bar
Review
25 Oct 2022, 8 am-12
noon
 Notice
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 2022 BY
MANUEL R. RIGUERA.
UNAUTHORIZED USE,
DISSEMINATION, UPLOADING, &
DOWNLOADING WILL BE
PROSECUTED CRIMINALLY.
• LRT carriageways and passenger
terminals are real property. (LRTA v.
CBAA, 342 SCRA 692 (2000).
 Old ruling
• Meralco steel towers or
posts merely personalty.
They can be removed
from the soil. (BOAA v.
Meralco, 10 SCRA 68).
Nor are they
machinery under Art.
415(5).
 • MERALCO steel towers and
MERALCO posts subject to realty tax
v. City pursuant to Sec. 199(o) of
LGC.
Assessor 1964 ruling in BOAA v.
Meralco, 10 SCRA 68,
of superseded. Transformers,
Lucena transmission lines, insulators,
and electric meters, are also
City, 5 Aug considered as realty under
2015 LGC. >
Section 199(o), Local Gov’t Code

Sec. 199(o) has no requirement

that machinery placed by owner and
no requirement that industry or
works carried on in a building or
piece of land. <
MRII essential for the
work/industry

• Essentials: Brewing
equipment in brewery,
welding equipment in
machine shop, projectors
in movie houses
Non-essentials:
delivery trucks and
typewriters, PCs, desks.
• OWNER. Placing must be made by
owner of the tenement or his agent.
So not by lessee. If so, personalty. >
 Exception: Vesting provision. If
after termination of lease, the
ownership of MRII shall vest in the
lessor without indemnity (here realty).
 Machinery may be
subject of real estate
mortgage
• Machinery &
equipment of Paper
City Corp. in its
factory are realty
under Art. 415(5) and
may be subject of
REM. (Star Two Inc. v.
Paper City Corp., 6
March 2013).
 Case
Filipinas Palm Oil Plantations, Inc. is
engaged in palm oil plantation. Thus, it
harvests fruits from palm trees for oil
conversion through its milling plant. By
the nature of respondent’s business,
transportation is indispensable for its
operations. >
 Hence, the mini-haulers and
road equipment are considered
realty for purposes of real property
tax. (Prov. Assessor of Agusan del
Sur v. Filipinas Palm Oil Plantation, 5
Oct 2016, Leonen, J.).
 Case
• Submarine or undersea
communications cables of Capwire
are real property subject to realty
tax pursuant to LGC. (Capitol
Wireless v. Prov. Treasurer of
Batangas, 30 May 2016, Peralta, J.).
 • Right of redemption by
corporation of
Real foreclosed property.
Rights Real property so
over gratuitous assignment
Realty should follow Art. 749.
(Peña v. CA, 193 SCRA
717).
 • Doctrine whereby real
property subject of
Doctrine of contract will be removed
mobilization from realty or converted
by to personalty upon
anticipation implementation or
consummation of
contract.
 1. Sale of house
for demolition.

2. Sale of coconut
Examples: trees for lumber.

3. Sale of
coconuts.
 • If the owner of machinery
executes a CHM or a
financial lease agreement
over them and receives
benefits, he is estopped
from arguing that these are
Estoppel real properties and may not
be seized by replevin.
(Makati Leasing v. Wearever
Textile Mills, 16 May 1983,
Serg’s Products v. PCI
Leasing, 22 Aug 2000).
 • International long-distance
calls are not the personal
property of PLDT since it
Long could not have acquired
distance ownership over such calls.
PLDT merely encodes,
calls are decodes, enhances and
not transmits the said calls
using its communications
property facilities. (Laurel v. Abrogar,
13 January 2009). >
 Telecomm business
However, the business of providing
telecommunications services is a
personal property which may the subject
of theft.
Interest in business, as well as the
business itself, is personal property and
hence may be the subject of theft.
(Laurel v. Abrogar, 13 Jan 2009).
• Real property which by special
provision of law is considered as
personal property.
E.g., Art. 1636, NCC: Sale of goods.
“Goods” includes growing fruits &
crops.
 PROPERTY OF
PUBLIC DOMINION

• PROPERTY OF STATE
may either be:

1. Of public dominion, or
2. Patrimonial property.
• Public agricultural land may be acquired
by CONE possession pursuant to Sec.
48(b) of the PLA and Sec. 14(b) of PRD, as
amended by RA 11573 (approved July
2021).
 Laurel v. Garcia (187 SCRA 797)
• The fact that the Roppongi site has not
been used for a long time for actual
embassy service does not automatically
convert it to patrimonial property. Any
such conversion happens only if the
property is withdrawn from public use by
virtue of a formal declaration on the part
of the executive or legislative dept. >
 President Aquino could not sell the
Roppongi property since there was no such
formal declaration. Here E.O. authorizing
its sale is not the formal declaration
contemplated by the law. <
 Libingan ng mga Bayani
• LNMB is a land of the public domain
devoted for national military cemetery
and military shrine purposes. Under the
Administrative Code, the President has
the power to reserve for specific public
uses lands of the public domain.
(Ocampo v Enriquez, 8 Nov 16, e.b.).
Añonuevo v. Court of Appeals, 244
SCRA 28
Open spaces in a subdivision are
properties of the public domain and
cannot be the subject of commerce
pursuant to PD No.1216.
 Liwag v. Happy Glen Loop
Homeowners’ Assoc., 4 Jul 2012
• A lot in a subdivision in which a water
facility & tank for the subdivision’s use
was located is considered an open space
and hence public property and beyond
the commerce of man. The sale by the
developer of the lot to a creditor is
therefore void.
• Open space is not automatically owned
by local government. (Mariano v. City of
Naga, 12 March 2018, Tijam, J.).
 • Fort Bonifacio remains
property of public
Fort dominion although
declared alienable and
Bonifacio disposable as it is
case reserved for the
development of the
national wealth. >
 Hence, it cannot be
acquired by prescription.
Fort
(Dream Village Assoc. v.
Bonifacio Bases Dev’t Authority, 24
case July 2013)
 • Property, even if registered
in name of province, is
presumed as property of the
public domain in the
absence of proof that it has
Case become patrimonial
property. (SP of Bataan v.
Garcia, 5 Oct 2016, Reyes,
J.).
LRTA v. CBAA, 342 SCRA 693 (2000)
LRTA carriageways and passenger
terminals are not exclusively for
public use since these are only
accessible to those who pay the
required fare and thus the LRTA does
not exist solely for public service but
is also a commercial endeavor. >
 Hence, LRTA carriageways and
passenger terminals are patrimonial
properties subject to the realty tax. <
 LRTA v CBAA (2000) overturned
• LRTA not a GOCC but a gov’t
instrumentality; hence exempt from
realty tax. (LRTA v. Quezon City, 9 Oct
2019, Lazaro-Javier, J.).
 MIAA v CA, 20 July 2006
• The Ninoy Aquino International Airport
(NAIA), consisting of land and buildings
of the Manila International Airport
Authority are property of the public
domain. These are intended for public
use. Ownership of property of the public
dominion is with the State or the
Republic of the Philippines. >
The fact that the MIAA collects terminal
fees and other charges does not remove
the character of the NAIA as property for
the public use if anyone can use the NAIA
under the same terms as the rest of the
public. The terminal fee is in the nature
of a “user’s tax” for maintenance not for
revenue. >
Under Section 234(a) of the LGC, real
property owned by the Republic of the
Philippines is exempt from the realty tax
unless the beneficial use has been
granted to a taxable person. <
Pasig City v Republic, 24 Aug 2011
• The “Payanig” properties surrendered by
Mid Pasig Land Development Corp to the
PCGG belong to the State and are thus
not subject to real property tax.
However, the portions which are leased
to business entities are not only subject
to realty tax, but they may also be sold at
public auction to satisfy the tax liability.
 • Mere passage of
municipal ordinance
cannot convert private
Case way to public road.
(Gatchalian v. Flores, 19
June 2018, Tijam, J.).
• ACCESSION
 GENERAL RULE IN
ACCESSION INDUSTRIAL
• Whatever is BPS on the land of another
belongs to the LO. (Art. 445).
All BPS are presumed made by the LO
and at his expense. (Art. 446).
 Art. 448 (FAQ)
• LO = GF
• BPS = GF
 Art. 448. Owner’s rights
• 1. Right to buy.
2. Right to sell to BP.⃰
3. Right to rent out to S.
4. Right to demolish or remove.
4.1. Sell to BP and unable to pay.
4.2. Expiration of forced lease.
5. Right to demand rent.
 Builder’s rights
• 1. Right of indemnification.
2. Right of retention. (re 1).
 Art. 448 n.a. to lessee
• Art. 448 does not apply to a lessee since
he is aware that land does not belong to
him. His rights are governed by Art.
1678: one-half reimbursement of useful
improvements and if refusal by lessor to
reimburse, absolute right of removal.
(Sulo sa Nayon Inc. v. Nayong Pilipino
Foundation, 20 January 2009).
 Where Art. 1678 n.a.
• Article 1678 does not apply to one whose
possession is by mere tolerance of the
landowner. (Aquino v. Aguilar, 29 June
2015).
• Art. 448 does not apply to a vendee a
retro who builds a house on the land he
bought. (Sps. Narvaez v. Sps. Alciso, 27
July 2009). >
 Reason is that vendee a retro built on
his own land. However, should the vendor
a retro want to exercise the right of
redemption, he must pay the vendee the
cost of the house pursuant to Art. 1616
which provides that necessary and useful
expenses on the thing sold are included in
the redemption price. (Id.)
 Case
• A transferee in an affidavit of
renunciation of land, wherein it is stated
that the transferor’s interest in the land
waived was based on a tax declaration,
cannot be a BGF entitled to the rights
under Article 448 of the Civil Code.
(Arangote v. Sps. Maglunob, 18 February
2009). >
 The transferee should have
inquired as to the basis of the
transferor’s right since a tax
declaration is not proof of ownership.
<
 Case
• A builder is not in good faith if the land is
titled in the name of a person other than
the one who allowed them to build
thereon. (Padilla v. Malicsi, 21 Sep 2016,
Leonen, J.).
• In case of a narrow encroachment of an
adjoining registered land, the encroacher
is still a BGF. (Technogas Phils. Mfg. Corp.
v. CA, 10 February 1997).
 Substantial encroachment = BBF
• Property developer guilty of substantial
encroachment over adjoining lot was a
builder in bad faith. (Princess Rachel
Dev’t Corp. v. Hill View Mktg. Corp., e.b.,
2 June 2020, Reyes, J.).
 G.R.: Article 448 n.a. to co-owner
who builds on co-owned land
• Exc.: Where co-ownership ended by
partition and house that had been built
by co-owner extends to or located on
portion allotted to another co-owner.
(del Campo v. Abesia, 160 SCRA 379
[1988]).
 Where possessor by
mere tolerance not a BGF
• Petitioner’s possession of the land was
by mere tolerance of the respondents.
Petitioner is not a BGF since he is aware
that his occupation of the same may be
terminated by the respondents at
anytime. (Del Rosario v. Manuel, 16
January 2004). >
Petitioner was allowed to build a
temporary structure of light materials but
what he built w/o consent of LO was a
house of strong materials. <
• Dep Ed a BGF although a possessor by
tolerance where O allowed construction
of school on his property. (Dep. of
Education v. Casibang, 27 January 2016,
Peralta, J.).
 Saberon v Ventanilla, 21 Apr 2014
• Notice of levy on execution was entered
in primary entry book but not annotated
on title. A buyer who relied on the clean
title is considered as having constructive
notice of the levy but will be considered
as a BGF under Article 448 of the Civil
Code.
 Art. 449

• LO: GF
BPS: BF
 Art. 449: Rights of O
• 1. Right to appropriate (w/o
indemnity) + D.
2. Right to sell to BP (even if value of
land considerably more than that of
building or trees) + D.
3. Right to rent out to S + D.
4. Right to demolish or remove + D.
 Right of BPS in BF
• None, except for necessary expenses
for preservation of land. (Art. 452)
 Case re Art. 449
• Buyer who bought not from the owner
but from an agent is not a BGF if the SPA
is defective, and he did not make the
proper inquiries. The principal’s cedula
was not indicated in the
acknowledgment portion of the SPA.
(Heirs of Sarili v Lagrosa, 15 Jan 2014,
Perlas-Bernabe, J.).
 Case
• Manila Seedling Bank which
occupied land in excess of which
it was allowed by owner NHA (7-
hectare usufruct) is a PBF with
respect to such excess and must
return rentals received for
leasing the excess. (NHA v
Manila Seedling Bank
Foundation, 20 June 2016,
Sereno, C.J.).
• ACCESSION NATURAL
 ACCRETION
• To the owners of lands adjoining
riverbanks (riparian owners) belong the
accretion which they gradually receive
from the effects of the current of the
waters. (Art. 457).
 Riverbank defined
• A bank is a lateral strip of
shore washed by water
during high tides but which
cannot be said to be flooded
or inundated. (Art. 73,
Spanish Law of Waters).
 • A riverbank is part of
the river and hence
deemed part of
Case “Philippine waters” for
purposes of defining
piracy under P.D. No.
532. (People v. Dela
Peña, 31 January 2018,
Del Castillo, J.).
 • Accretion applies also to
lands adjoining streams,
LSC lakes, and creeks. (Art.
84, Spanish Law of
Waters).
• Accretion does not apply to ponds and
lagoons (Art. 458, NCC).
Unlike ponds and lagoons, lakes are
fed by rivers.
 Foreshore

Midpoint between
high tide and low tide.
The point between
the foreshore and the
sea belongs to the State.
Foreshore
Accretion to foreshore

• Accretion to
foreshore belongs to
the State. (Art. 4,
SLW)
 Foreshore
• Foreshore belongs to the public
domain. The real party-in-
interest for filing a complaint for
recovery of possession is the
Republic, through the OSG.
(Gulla v. Heirs of Labrador, 27
July 2006).
• Accretion includes dereliction.
Dereliction: land uncovered by the
receding of the waters of the river. (2
Paras 212 [11th ed., 1984]).
• A river which dried up because of an
irrigation canal constructed by the NIA
remains property of the public dominion
since the drying up was not natural.
(Celestial v. Cachupero, 15 October 2003)
 Case
• The filled-up portion between the riprap
constructed by the government and the
riparian property is not an accretion
under Art. 457 nor an improvement
under Art. 445. (Daclison v. Baytion, 6
April 2016).
• The accretion even if it resulted from the
action of the two rivers was deposited
not on a riverbank but on foreshore land.
It thus belongs to the State pursuant to
Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters
(Estate of Navarro v. IAC, 268 SCRA 74).
 BAR FAQ
• The Supreme Court has held that the
registration of the riparian property does
not extend to the alluvium that may be
deposited thereon, and hence, the
alluvium may be acquired through
prescription by an adverse possessor.
 Alluvium along creek
Alluvium along the banks of a creek
do not form part of the public domain as
the alluvium automatically belongs to the
owner of the estate to which it may have
been added. The alluvium may be
acquired by prescription. >
 The filing of an application
for a sales patent over
alluvium does not estop
the applicant since the
State does not have
authority to convey
No private property though
estoppel the issuance of a grant or
patent. (Office of the City
Mayor of Parañaque v.
Ebio, 23 June 2010).
• The natural bed of a river/creek is the
ground covered by water during its
highest floods. (Art. 70 SLW) The west
fork of the river although under water for
only 3 months of a year and dry the rest
of the year is still considered part of the
river. (Binalay v. Manalo, 195 SCRA 374).
• QUIETING OF TITLE
• Cloud on title on realty arising from
PRICE.
 Illustration
• O’s land was sold by F (forger) to B. O’s
name forged by F in the deed of sale.
The deed is apparently valid but in fact
void. O has the remedy of an action to
quiet title.
 Quieting of title, not proper
• Quieting of title not the proper remedy
for a simple boundary dispute but accion
publiciana. A simple boundary dispute is
one where there is no overlapping of
titles. (De Aviles v. CA, 21 Nov 1996).
• Action for quieting of title not proper if
technical descriptions of titles referred to
distinct parcels of land; no overlap. (Yu v.
Topacio, 18 Sep 2019, Reyes, J.).
• Boundary dispute arising from metes and
bounds of Torrens title may not be
threshed out in a forcible entry case but
only through accion reivindicatoria.
(Martinez v. Heirs of Lim, 11 Sep 2019,
Bersamin, C.J.).
 In nature of QoT
• Action for correction of certificate of title
of defendant adjoining owner, on the
ground that the title’s technical
description erroneously included the
plaintiff’s land, is not barred even if
brought more than 10 years from the
issuance of the title. >
The action is in the nature of an action to
quiet title which may be brought by a
plaintiff at any time while he is in
possession. (Heirs of Waga v. Sacabin, 27
July 2009).
• An action to quiet title may be availed of
by the buyer of registered land in order
to cancel the title in the name of the
seller and to issue a new title in the
name of the buyer, where the seller’s
heirs refused to surrender the title and to
recognize their predecessors’ sale. (Oño
v. Lim, 9 March 2010).
• CO-OWNERSHIP
• Mere construction of improvement on
the lot of another does not create a co-
ownership, even if improvement’s value
greater than that of land. Art. 448
however may apply. (Pidlaoan v
Pidlaoan, 20 April 2016).
• Each co-owner full owner of his ideal
share and may sell or encumber it (Art.
493).
Exc: Art. 147, FC. Neither party can
dispose, without the consent of other,
property acquired during cohabitation and
owned in common, until after the
termination of their cohabitation.
 Art. 103, Family Code
• Upon the termination of the marriage by
death, the community property shall be
liquidated in the same proceeding for the
(judicial) settlement of the estate of the
deceased. >
 If no judicial settlement proceeding is
instituted, the surviving spouse shall
liquidate the community property either
judicially or extrajudicially within one year
from the death of the deceased spouse. >
 If upon the lapse of the one-year
period, no liquidation is made, any
disposition or encumbrance involving the
community property of the terminated
marriage shall be void. <
Case
• Widower sold the land which had
belonged to the ACP to X. Is the sale
valid?
• Widower could validly dispose of his ½
conjugal share and his 1/8 share of
deceased wife’s conjugal share (or 9/16
of subject property), even if no
liquidation of ACP w/in 1 year from
death. >
• Valid insofar as widower’s 9/16 share
was concerned but not insofar as the
7/16 share of the children are concerned.
X became a trustee of the 7/16 in favor
of the non-disposing heirs or the
children. (Heirs of Caburnay v. Heirs of
Sison, 2 Dec 2020, Caguioa, J.)
 The proviso on nullity under Article
103 is appropriately applied only insofar as
the disposition affects the portion of the
conjugal property pertaining to the non-
disposing co-heirs. Art. 103 FC must be
reconciled with Art. 493 of the NCC. >
 Article 487
• Any one of the co-owners may bring
an action for ejectment.
“Ejectment” is used in broad
sense of any action to recover
possession or title over real property.
 Re Art. 487
• Even just one of the co-owners, by
himself alone, can bring an action for
revival of judgment, where the judgment
to be revived is for the recovery of
property. (Clidoro v. Jalmanzar, 9 July
2014).
 Art. 491
• Art. 491. None of the co-owners shall,
without the consent of the others, make
alterations in the thing owned in
common, even though benefits for all
would result therefrom. >
However, if the withholding of the consent
by one or more of the co-owners is clearly
prejudicial to the common interest, the
courts may afford adequate relief. <
 • Second sentence of Art.
491 may not be used to
compel a co-owner to give
his consent to the sale of
the entire property. This is
Case because of the co-owner’s
absolute right of
ownership over his share
under Art. 493. (Arambulo
v. Nolasco, 720 SCRA 95
[2014], Perez, J.).
• Sale by a co-owner of entire co-owned
property is valid as against him but
unenforceable* as against other co-
owners. (Mactan Cebu IAA v Ijordan, 11
January 2016).
• A sale of the entire property by one co-
owner without the consent of the other
co-owners is not void. However, only the
rights of the co-owner-seller are
transferred, thereby making the buyer a
co-owner of the property. (Bulatao v.
Estonactoc, 10 Dec 2019, Caguioa, J.).
 • Each co-owner may
demand at any time the
Action for
partition of the thing
partition
imprescriptible owned in common,
insofar as his share is
concerned. (Art. 494)
 Art. 494 prevails over S3 R17
• Dismissal with prejudice under S3 R17
cannot bar co-owner’s right to ask for
partition at anytime, if there is no
adjudication of ownership of shares yet.
Between S3 R17 and the right granted to
co-owners under Art. 494 of the Civil
Code, the latter must prevail. (Quintos v.
Nicolas, 16 Jun 14, Velasco, J.).
• POSSESSION
• Art. 527. Presumption of good faith.

• Art. 529. Presumption of continuity of

character of possession. Presumed to
continue to be enjoyed in the same
character in which it was acquired.
• Tax declarations and realty tax payments
good indicia of possession in concept of
owner. (Bernas v. Estate of Yu, 15 August
2018, Caguioa, J.).
• Prior physical possession in forcible entry
not limited to physical possession but
also possession through legal acts &
formalities. (Madayag v. Madayag, 20 Jan
2020, Reyes, J.).
• Even public lands may be the subject of
forcible entry cases since the issue
involved is merely physical or material
possession, not ownership. (Lee v. Dela
Paz, 27 October 2009).
• Art. 559. Possession in GF of a movable
is equivalent to title. >
 Problem
•Q A orally donated a ₱50,000
watch to B. B donated the watch in
writing to C who also accepted in
writing. C now wears the watch.
May heirs of A recover watch from
C?
 A No, since C is a PGF. A did
not lose the watch nor was he
unlawfully deprived of it.
If B donated orally to C, C is not a
PGF and thus A may recover unless C
possessed 8 years.
 However, one who has lost or been
unlawfully deprived of a movable may
recover it even from a PGF.
If bought at a public sale, owner
cannot recover from buyer unless he
reimburses the purchase price.
 Exceptions: MVP NM
Article 1505 (Purchases made in a
merchant’s store, fairs, or markets)
• Article 1506 (Seller’s voidable title not
annulled judicially at the time of the
delivery of the object to the buyer).
 EDCA Publishing v. Santos,
184 SCRA 614 (1990)
• EDCA → Impostor → Santos

Q May EDCA recover from

Santos?
Article 1518 (Negotiable Document of
Title).

Sec. 57 NIL. A holder in due course

holds the instrument free from any
defect of title of prior parties.
• Money (US v. Sotelo, 28 Phil 147).

• Prescription. (Art. 1132). Take note

however that movables possessed
through a crime cannot be acquired
through prescription by the offender.
(Art. 1133).
• EASEMENTS & SERVITUDES
 Acquisition of Easement

Kind of C+A [C + A]
Easement
How T or P T
acquired
 Prescription
• 10 years regardless of GF/BF
 Acquisition of Easement
by Prescription (10 yrs)
Kind of Easement Reckoned from
Positive Easement When first exercised
v. servient estate
Negative Easement Notarial prohibition
on servient estate
 BAR FAQ
• Easement of right of way (ROW)
cannot be acquired by
prescription since it is a
discontinuous easement.
(Costabella Corp. v. CA, 193
SCRA 333).
 Existence of apparent sign of
easement between two estates
• Indication that the easement as a title
will continue if ownership is divided
unless the title of conveyance provides
otherwise or sign removed before the
execution of the deed of conveyance.
(Art. 624).
 Illustration
• Q X owns 2 adjoining lots. Lot 1
has windows overlooking Lot 2. Lot 1
sold to A and Lot 2 sold to B. B wants to
construct house in Lot 2 within 3 meters
from boundary. Can he do so?
______1______________________2______

X
______1______________________2______

A B
 No. He should observe the 3-meter
restriction in altius non tollendi. (Art. 673).
A notarial prohibition is not required from
A since the easement is acquired not by
prescription but by title. (Gargantos v. Tan
Yanon, 108 Phil. 888; Garcia v Santos, 17
June 2019).
• There is no law that the application of
Article 624 is restricted to situations
wherein the servient estate previously
contained improvements or structures at
the time the ownership of the two
estates was divided. (Garcia v Santos, 17
June 2019, Caguioa, J.).
Case
 Where title “provides otherwise”
• The adjoining lot was conveyed by Caruff
to the PMO “free from all liens and
conveyances.” No easement created
under Art. 624 since the title of
conveyance provides otherwise.
(Privatization and Management Office v.
Legaspi Towers 300 Inc., 22 July 2009).
Case
 Case
• X owns two lots, a back lot and a front lot
fronting a national highway. There is an
alley in the front lot to give to back lot
access to the highway. X mortgaged
front lot to PNB, who acquired it at
foreclosure. PNB sold to Y. >
 Y must respect the alley as a ROW
established by virtue of Art. 624 and not
deny access to X (Fernandez v. Delfin, 17
Mar 2021, Leonen, J.).
• Owner of servient estate retains
ownership over the property covered by
the easement. (Art. 630).
 • Servient owner in
ROW still remains
owner thereof and can
Case remove or demolish
encroaching house of
dominant owner.
(Mercader v Bardilas,
27 June 2016,
Bersamin, J.).
 FAQ: Non-registration of easement
on servient estate and bought by IPV

• VOLUNTARY EASEMENT: Extinguished.

LEGAL EASEMENT: Not extinguished.
• LEGAL EASEMENTS
Easement of natural drainage of lands
(Art. 637)
• Lower estates are naturally obliged to
receive the waters which naturally
descend from the higher estates, as well
as the stones or earth they carry with
them.
 Case
• Developer’s bulldozing of hills led to the
softening of soil which was easily carried by
rainwater. Thus, lower estate is not
anymore obligated to receive the waters &
earth coming from Hilltop City Subd and
can erect concrete fence which will block
flow. (Abraham v Golden Village
Homeowners Assoc., 15 Aug 18, Caguioa, J.)
 Easement of right of way (ROW)
• The owner, or any person who by virtue
of a real right may cultivate or use any
immovable, which is surrounded by
other immovables and without adequate
outlet to a public highway, may demand
a ROW through the neighboring estates,
after paying the proper indemnity. (Art.
649).
 Requirements: PISO
• PREJUDICIAL. Point least prejudicial.
• INDEMNITY.
• SURROUNDED and w/o adequate outlet
to a public highway.
• OWN ACTS. The isolation of the estate is
not due to the proprietor’s OWN acts.
 Test of Least Prejudice
• The test is least prejudice, not the
shortest distance. So even if the distance
is short but it will result in the
destruction of a building or store, the
ROW w/c will merely result in cutting
down a tree is preferred. (Quintanilla v.
Abangan, 12 Feb 2008, Nachura, J.)
• Fact that buyer knew that land was
enclosed did not mean that the isolation
of the estate was due to the proprietor’s
OWN acts. (Williams v. Zerda, 15 March
2017, Mendoza, J.).
 Case
• D’s land was surrounded by other
estates so he entered into a 10-year
agreement with S for a ROW over S’s
land. On the 5th year, an access road
was built by the government providing
passage from D’s land to the public
highway. S closed the ROW. May D
compel S to reopen the ROW?
 Yes. Availability of an adequate
outlet to a public highway does not
extinguish a voluntary easement of right
of way. (Unisource Comm. & Dev’t Corp.
v. Chung, 17 July 2009, Castro v.
Esperanza, 11 March 2020, Lazaro-Javier,
J.).
 Injunction as remedy
• Injunction is proper remedy to prevent
servient owner from closing a voluntary
easement of ROW. (Castro v.
Esperanza, 11 March 2020, Lazaro-
Javier, J.).
 Light & View
• Involves the opening of windows or
preventing the adjoining owners from
building higher than one’s windows.
• Required distances for window (2 m/60 cm)
• Mere non-observance of required distances
will not give rise to prescription. Has to be
coupled with notarial prohibition.
 EASEMENT OF LIGHT & VIEW
• Positive if opening is through a party
wall so prescriptive period counted from
such opening.
• Negative easement if the window is
though a wall on the dominant estate.
So prescriptive period begins only from
formal/notarial prohibition, in a public
instrument (acknowledged document).
 Easement of altius non tollendi
• When an easement of light & view is
acquired, the servient estate cannot
build an obstructing structure within 3
meters from the boundary line. (Article
673)
 TYPES OF WINDOWS
• RESTRICTED WINDOWS. Only to admit
light, not for view. At height of the
ceiling joists, 30 cm square , with an iron
grating and wire screen. Cannot be
closed unless part-ownership acquired.
May be obstructed unless easement of L
& V acquired.
• REGULAR WINDOWS. For light and view.
Observe distance in Art. 670: 2 meters
(direct view), 60 centimeters (oblique
view).
 Illustration

Dominant house (D) within 1

meter from the boundary line.
• NUISANCE
 • Anything which
prejudices or impairs:
Passage, Senses,
Morality or decency, Use
Nuisance of property, Safety,
Health.
(PS MUSH)
• Law on nuisance
interfaces with
environmental laws.
• Public nuisance:
That which affects a considerable
number of persons.

Private nuisance: One which does not

affect a considerable number of persons.
 Nuisance per se Nuisance per accidens
A nuisance under any & A nuisance only
all circumstances. because of certain
circumstances, e.g.,
location.
May be extrajudicially May be abated only
abated. judicially.
• Torre de Manila is not a nuisance per se.
(Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, 25 April
2017, Carpio, J.).
 Cellular Base Station
may be a nuisance
• SC held that a cellular base station may
be a nuisance. RTC’s dismissal of suit for
abatement of nuisance by summary
judgment improper. Case remanded for
reception of evidence. (Smart
Communications v. Aldecoa, 11 Sep
2013)
 Rana v Wong, 30 June 2014
• Elevation of a road adjoining
plaintiffs’ property not a nuisance
per se but a nuisance per accidens
which cannot be abated summarily.
 AC Enterprises v Frabelle Corp.
506 SCRA 625 (2006)
• LGUs have no power to declare a
particular thing as a nuisance unless such
a thing is a nuisance per se; nor can they
effect the extrajudicial abatement of
nuisance per accidens. This must be
resolved by the courts in the ordinary
course of law.
• Noise from air-con blowers not a
nuisance because within allowable limits
(Frabelle Corp. v. AC Enterprises, 3 Nov
2020, Peralta, C.J.).
• Bus and jeepney terminals are not
nuisance per se but nuisance per
accidens. They cannot be closed down
simply by a city ordinance but through
judicial proceedings. (Lucena Grand
Central Terminal v. JAC Liner Inc., 23 Feb
2005).
 Hotel on no-build zone
not nuisance per se
• A hotel built on a “no-build” zone is
not a nuisance per se but a nuisance
per accidens. Nonetheless the LGU
has the power to order its
demolition under the Local Gov’t
Code. (Aquino v. Malay, 29 Sep
2014).
 Hazardous Billboards
• Hazardous billboards although public
nuisances cannot be dismantled w/o
compliance with law. Abatement
without judicial proceedings must be
approved by local building official.
(DPWH v. Civil Advertising Ventures, 9
Nov 2016, Leonen, J.).
 Imprescriptible

• Lapse of time cannot legalize a

nuisance. The action to abate
nuisance is imprescriptible.
(Art. 1143).
• Remedies against a public nuisance. PCA
(Art. 699)
• Private. CA (Art.705).
• The district health officer shall determine
WON abatement w/o judicial
proceedings is the best remedy against a
public nuisance.
• Abatement w/o judicial proceedings
may be used only against nuisance
per se.
• Private person may file an action to abate
a public nuisance if specially injurious to
himself.
 Environmental
Actions
• Private or public
individuals or entities
may avail of the
environmental actions
provided under the RPEC
where the nuisance
impacts environmental
laws: >
 Some
Environmental Laws
Clean Air Act.
Sanitation Code.
Toxic Substances &
Hazardous Wastes Act.
 Citizen Suit
• Even if the nuisance is
not specially injurious to
a person, he may avail
of a citizen suit pursuant
to the Rules of
Procedure in
Environmental Cases.
• Extrajudicial abatement of nuisance by
private person. (Art. 704) DRAT(3k)
• DONATION
 Is there such a thing as
a compulsory donation?
• The provision of §31 of P.D. 957 which
compels subdivisions to donate roads,
alleys, sidewalks, and playgrounds to the
city/municipality is invalid. There is no
such thing as a compulsory donation.
(Republic v. Llamas, 25 Jan 2017, Leonen,
J.).
 Onerous donation
Petitioner donated a 41,000-square-
meter land to the Respondent with
condition that Respondent shall put up a
home for the aged and the infirm. The
SC held that the donation is an onerous
one. (C-J Yulo & Sons v. Roman Catholic
Archbishop of San Pablo, 31 March
2005).
 Onerous Donation
• Dr. Campos’ donation of a 12,800-
square-meter lot to the NHA but with the
obligation of the donee to build a 36-m-
wide access road is an onerous donation.
10-year prescriptive period for contracts
and not for donations applies. (Mun. of
Dasmariñas v. Campos, 17 July 2019,
Reyes, J.)
 Prov. Of CamSur v CamSur Teachers
Assoc., 7 Oct 2019, Caguioa, J.
• CamSur donated land to teacher’s assoc.
to construct bldg within 1 yr for use by TA
and not to encumber. An onerous
donation. The bldg was constructed w/in
1 yr but a portion of the land was leased
for 20 yrs to Bodega Glassware. Court
held that revocation was unwarranted
since violation not substantial.
 Danguilan v. IAC, 168 SCRA 22
• Elderly couple donated a lot 175m x
150m on condition that donees would
take care of donors till they die and
provide for their burial. SC held an
onerous donation, since a fair exchange
with the donor reaching the ripe old age
of 100. Valid even if not in a public
document.
 Lagazo v. CA, 5 Mar 1998
• The fact that the donee had to pay the
installments in arrears and the balance of
the purchase price of the lot donated did
not make the donation onerous since
such burdens were not imposed by the
donor.
 From the viewpoint of taking effect:

• DONATION INTER VIVOS (DIV)

DONATION MORTIS CAUSA (DMC)

 Donation mortis causa
• Actually, a testamentary disposition,
legacy, or devise. Hence, governed by
the formalities of wills under Articles
804-814.
 Distinctions (PRO)
Donation Inter Vivos Donation mortis causa
Donation not voided if Donation voided if
the donee predeceases donee predeceases
Irrevocable as a rule Revocable at will
Ownership transferred Ownership transferred
upon perfection of upon donor’s death
donation
 Bias for DIV
• If there is a doubt as to whether a
donation is a DIV or a DMC, it should be
resolved in favor of the former in order
to avoid uncertainty as to ownership of
property subject of deed.
• The deed of donation provides that the
donor reserved to herself the complete
usufruct of the properties and that the
donee cannot dispose of the properties
without the consent of the donor. Is this
a DIV or DMC?
• A stipulation provides that “if the herein
donee predeceases me, the property will
not be reverted to the donor, but will be
inherited by the heirs of the donee.”
The stipulation indicates a donation inter
vivos. (Villanueva v. Branoco, 24 January
2011).
• Q The deed of donation of a parcel of
land provides that the donor reserves the
right during her lifetime to sell the
property. Is this a donation inter vivos or
mortis causa?
• Q A deed of donation of land
provides that the same is irrevocable
(hindi na mababawi). However, there is a
provision that the donation will take
effect only upon the donor’s death and
that the donee cannot alienate the land
during the lifetime of the donor. Is the
donation inter vivos or mortis causa?
• Q The deed of donation of real property
stated that if the donee should die before
the donor, the donation shall be deemed
automatically rescinded and of no
further force and effect. Is the donation
inter vivos or mortis causa?
• Donation which states that it is a
“donation or gift that will be transferred
upon my death” is a donation mortis
cause which should comply with the
formalities of testamentary disposition. >
 Nonetheless, donation valid even if
attestation clause did not state number of
pages but acknowledgment did (Heirs of
Estella v. Estella, 9 Dec 2020, Carandang,
J.).
 Illegal condition
• Prohibition to alienate donated
property within a period of 100 years
is an illegal condition which is
disregarded per Art. 727. (Roman
Catholic Archbishop v. CA, 198 SCRA
300.)
 Prohibition to lease
Condition that donee should get the
written permission of the donor before
entering into a lease contract is an undue
restriction on the donee’s right of
ownership over the property and is thus
void and may be disregarded. (C-J Yulo &
Sons v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of
San Pablo, 31 March 2005).
• Perfection of donation: When the donor
gets to know of the donee’s acceptance.
(734).
Acceptance must be made during the
lifetime of the donor and the donee.
(746).
• Donor’s capacity determined as of the
making (perfection) of the donation.
If donor died before he gets to know
of acceptance, the donation is void.
• Donation to corporation which at that
time was still in process of incorporation
is valid by virtue of doctrine of
corporation by estoppel. (Peach Sisters v.
Alzona, 6 Aug 2018, Reyes, J.).
• FORMALITIES OF DONATIONS
 MOVABLES (ART. 748)
• O>5K
1. Donation may be oral or in writing.
Oral donation requires simultaneous
delivery of thing or document representing
the right donated.
2. Where > ₱5K, the donation and
the acceptance shall be in writing. <
• Oral donation and acceptance of a
movable > ₱5,000 may be made by email
or text or in any other electronic form
(See Electronic Commerce Act).
• Streaming audio/video of a donation of a
movable > ₱5,000 would be void since
not in writing. However, if recorded the
donation would be valid.
IMMOVABLES (PANN) ART. 749
1. PUBLIC DOCUMENT. Must be in
public document, specifying the property
donated and the value of the charges
which donee must satisfy.
2. ACCEPTANCE. The acceptance must
be in the same deed of donation or in a
separate public document. >
 If acceptance in a separate
public document
3. NOTIFICATION. The donor shall be
notified of such acceptance in an
authentic form (private or public
document).
4. NOTATION. The notification shall be
noted in the deed of donation and in the
separate acceptance document. <
Q The deed of donation of the real
property was acknowledged by the
donor. The donee however failed to
acknowledge before the notary public his
acceptance of donation. Is the donation
valid? >
A Yes. The fact that the donee was not
mentioned by the notary public in the
acknowledgement is of no moment. To
be sure, it is the conveyance that should
be acknowledged as a free and voluntary
act. (Quilala v. Alcantara, 3 Dec 2001).
• Donation of realty is void where
acknowledgment not by donor. (Mariano
v. City of Naga, 12 March 2018, Tijam, J.).
 Noncompliance with 3 & 4
may be excused
• The purpose of the requirement for
the notation of the notification is to
ensure that the acceptance is duly
communicated to the donor. >
 The donor’s actual knowledge of
the construction and existence of the
school building fulfilled the legal
requirement that the acceptance of
the donation be communicated to the
donor. (Republic v. Silim, G.R. 140487,
2 April 2001).
• While acceptance of a donation of realty
may be made at anytime during the
donor’s lifetime, there must be
compliance with the requirement of
notification and notation. (Arangote v.
Maglunob, 18 Feb 2009).
• A void donation may serve as the
basis for acquisitive prescription.
(Espique v. Espique, 28 June 1956).
 Art. 764
• Revocation of donation for donee’s non-
compliance with condition imposed by
donor upon the donee.
What is referred to here is a mode not
a suspensive or resolutory condition
(Tolentino). The non-compliance does not
automatically revoke the donation.
 Illustration
• “I donate my house to you on condition
that the house should be used only for
residential purposes within 5 years from
donation.” Donation was made in 2010.
If in 2014, the donee converted the
house to a restaurant, the action to
revoke the donation must be filed on or
before 2018.
 Automatic revocation clause
• Article 764 n.a. if there is automatic
revocation clause. The action for
reconveyance of the donated property is
imprescriptible since the revocation is
automatic and judicial intervention is not
necessary. (Prov. of Cam Sur v. Bodega
Glassware, 22 March 2017, Jardeleza, J.)
 Inofficious Donation (Art. 771)
• Donation > free portion
• Prescriptive period to revoke donations
on the ground of inofficiousness. 10
years from the death of the donor, since
the obligation to reserve the legitimes is
an obligation arising from law and the
right of action accrues only upon the
demise of the donor. (Santos v. Alana, 16
August 2005.)
• The ones who may bring the action to
revoke/reduce under Art. 771 are the
compulsory heirs and their heirs and
successors-in-interest.
The right to bring the action cannot
be renounced during the donor’s lifetime.
The reason is there’s nothing to renounce
yet.
• Q Donor has a legitimate child C.
Donor donates to X ₱5,000,000.
Donor dies in 2015 with properties
worth ₱1,000,000. May C file an
action for the revocation of the
donation?
 Yes. Taking into account that the
estate of donor at the time of his death
was ₱6,000,000, the disposable portion
was only ₱3,000,000. The donation of
₱5,000,000 may be reduced by
₱2,000,000. The action to revoke the
donation may be brought by C within 10
years from donor’s death in 2015.
LAND TITLES & DEEDS
• Registration is not a mode of acquiring
ownership but of recognizing and
recording ownership. A person who
applies for original registration is already
the owner (e.g., accretion) or has met
the conditions for the grant of ownership
(possession since 12 June 1945).
• A certificate of title covering inalienable
lands of the public domain like forest or
timber or mineral lands is void and can
be cancelled even in the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value. (Heirs of
Venturanza v. Republic, 27 July 2007).
• Sale of a portion of the Fort Bonifacio
Military Reservation to the NOVAI void.
The title issued to NOVAI is similarly void.
Registration under the Torrens System
does not, by itself, vest title as it is not a
mode of acquiring ownership. (Navy
Officers’ Village Assoc. v. Republic, 3 Aug
2015).
 Conclusiveness of Torrens titles
• Probate court cannot include in inventory
land covered by certificates of title in
name of persons other than the
decedent. (Lim v CA, 24 Jan 2000)
• Property titled in name of person other
than decedent cannot be included by
probate court in inventory because of the
incontestability of a Torrens title. (Mayor
v. Tiu, 23 Nov 2016).
• In unlawful detainer case, the heirs of
registered owner have better right of
possession as against transferees in
unregistered deed of sale, based on the
principle of indefeasibility of Torrens
title. (Endaya v Villaos, 27 Jan 2016, Del
Castillo, J.).
 No collateral attack
A certificate of title is not subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be
altered or cancelled except in a
direct proceeding in accordance with
law. (§48)
• The action filed by Yu Han Yat was not a
collateral attack just because it was
denominated as a "petition for quieting
of title" instead of a "petition for
annulment of title." The petition
specifically sought to annul TCT No.
336663. (Bernas v. Estate of Yu Han Yat,
15 August 2018, Caguioa, J.)
• An action for quieting of title is not a
proscribed collateral attack on a
certificate of title if its primary purpose
to nullify a certificate of title. (Filipinas
Eslon Mfg. Corp. v. Heirs of Llanes, 27
March 2019, Caguioa, J.).
• In accion publiciana case, affirmative
defenses (1) that plaintiff’s OCT was
obtained by fraud and (2) of acquisitive
prescription, are a collateral attack on
OCT. RTC w/o jurisdiction to order
reconveyance to defts and effectively
nullify the OCT. (Heirs of Cullado v.
Gutierrez, 30 July 2019, e.b., Caguioa, J.)
• A provisional determination of ownership
in an accion interdictal or accion
publiciana does not pose a “real attack”
on the Torrens title. (Macutay v. Samoy, 2
Dec 2020, Caguioa, J.)
 Direct attack on title
A direct attack on the certificate of title
may be in an original action or in a
counterclaim. A counterclaim is
considered a new suit in which the
Defendant becomes the Plaintiff in
respect of the counterclaim. (Leyson v.
Bontuyan, 18 February 2005).
 Direct attack
A third-party complaint seeking
nullification of the certificate of title
is also considered as a direct attack.
(Sarmiento v. CA, 16 September
2005).
• A cross-claim is a direct attack on CoT.
(Heirs of Sumagang v. Aznar Enterprises,
14 August 2019, Reyes, J.).
Collateral attack on certificate of title

Petitioners filed an action for

reconveyance against Respondents.
Respondents in their answer attacked the
validity of petitioner’s certificate of title
by claiming that their mother became
the true owner of the land even before
the issuance of the OCT. (Vda. de Aguilar
v. Sps. Alfaro, 5 July 2010).
 Green Acres Holdings v. Cabral
5 June 2013, Villarama, J.
• Cabral vs Moraga (PARAD > DARAB)

Filcon

Green Acres
 Green Acres Holdings v. Cabral
5 June 2013
• The DARAB in its judgment directed the
cancellation of the title of the Sps Filcon
but the latter had transferred the title
pendente lite to Green Acres. A motion
for execution of the judgment which
seeks the cancellation of Green Acres’
certificate of title would be a collateral
attack. >
 Clearly, seeking the cancellation of the
titles of Green Acres by a mere Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Execution of a decision
rendered in a case where said titles were
not in issue constitutes a collateral attack on
them which this Court cannot allow. <
 Rodriguez v CA, 13 June 2013
• Mandamus does not lie to compel the
LRA to issue a decree of registration over
land which already has a certificate of
title issued over it. Otherwise, the same
would be a collateral attack on the
certificate of title. Proper remedy is to
directly attack the extant title.
• In unlawful detainer suit, defense that
plaintiff’s certificate of title was
fraudulently obtained is a collateral
attack. (Tuason v. Isagon, 2 September
2015).
 Wee v Mardo, 4 June 2014
• An application for original registration of
land which is already registered would be
a collateral attack on the certificate of
title.
• Petition for reconstitution not proper to
cancel a TCT because it would be a
proscribed collateral attack. (Aquino v.
Estate of Aguirre, 14 Jan 2019, Del
Castillo, J.).
 Registered land not subject to
acquisitive prescription
No title to registered land in
derogation to the title of the
registered owner may be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession.
(§47)
• The owner of registered land may file
an accion publiciana even after 10
years from the accrual of the right of
action pursuant to Sec. 47 of the
PRD. (Supapo v. De Jesus, 20 April
2015).
• Sale of the entire co-owned property by
one co-owner to MCIAA was
unenforceable as to heirs who did not
consent. MCIAA could not claim
ownership by adverse possession since
property was covered by a Torrens title.
(MCIAA v Ijordan, 11 Jan 16, Bersamin, J.)
• Prescription is unavailing not only against
the registered owner but also against his
heirs because the latter step into the
shoes of the decedent by operation of
law. (Umbay v. Alecha, 18 March 1985,
Aquino, J.).
 3 proceedings in original registration

• 1. ADMINISTRATIVE.
2. REGULAR JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS.
3. CADASTRAL PROCEEDINGS.
 Administrative Proceedings
with the LMB of the DENR
1. Homestead patent.
2. Sales patent.
3. Free patent. (Since 12 June 1945;
may be done judicially through Sec.
48[b] PLA in rel. to Sec. 14[1] PRD)
 Administrative Proceedings with
the LMB of DENR; parity clause
A certificate of title shall be issued to
the grantee. (S103 PRD). A Torrens
title issued pursuant to a homestead,
sales or free patent has the same
force and effect as title issued by
way of judicial proceedings under PD
1529.
• LMB has no jurisdiction to issue patent &
certificate of title over private land
(Alberto v. Flores, 10 Feb 2021, Delos
Santos, J.).
 RA 11573 not covered in bar
• RA 11573, improving the confirmation
process for imperfect land titles and
amending Sec. 44 of the PLA and Sec. 14
of PD 1529, was approved on 16 July
2021 and thus not covered in 2022 Bar.
 Who can file application for original
registration? (S14) CoPAL
• 1. Those who by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest, have been
in continuous, open, notorious, and
exclusive (CONE) possession &
occupation of alienable land of public
domain from 12 June 1945 or earlier. >
 2. Those who have acquired
ownership of private land by prescription.
(10-30 years under Articles 1134 and 1137
of the Civil Code). >
 3. Those who acquire ownership by
accession or accretion. (Art. 457, Civil
Code; Art. 84, Spanish Law of Waters).
4. In any other manner provided by
law.
• A mere applicant of a homestead patent
is not a party-in-interest who can file an
action for reconveyance. (Demegillo v.
Lumampao, 10 Feb 2021, Hernando, J.)
 Boracay as forest land
Except for those already covered by
existing titles, Boracay was
unclassified land of the public
domain. Hence, pursuant to P.D. No.
705, Boracay was considered as
forest land. >
Hence, even if the resort owners could tack
their ownership back to 12 June 1945 that
would not confer title since public forest
land cannot be alienated or disposed of.
(Secretary of DENR v. Yap, 8 October 2008).
 Quasha overturned
Secretary of DENR v Yap overturns
the doctrine in Quasha v. Republic,
17 August 1972, reiterated as
recently in Chavez v. PEA, 9 July
2002, that unclassified public land is
deemed to be public agricultural
land.
• That land is alienable & disposable may
be the subject of a judicial admission
(Heirs of Delfin v. NHA, 28 Nov 2016,
Leonen, J.).
• CA cannot take judicial notice of identity
& location of land subject of application
for original registration. (Republic v.
Estate of Santos, 7 Dec 2016, Mendoza,
J.)
• While LMB has authority to determine
who should be awarded title to public
land, courts have jurisdiction to
determine who has better right of
possession. (Palacat v. Heirs of
Hontanosas, 2 Dec 2020, Zalameda, J.).
 Decision
Decision in application for original
registration – In favor of applicant or any
of oppositors
• The decision becomes final and
executory within 15 days from date of
receipt of notice of the judgment. Note
that decision of MTC in delegated
jurisdiction is appealable to CA. >
 After the judgment becomes final and
executory, the court shall forthwith issue
an order to LRA to issue/enter a decree of
registration and the original certificate of
title (OCT). >
The LRA will send the decree of registration
and OCT to the RD who will then send a
notice to the registered owner that he may
obtain delivery of the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title upon payment of the
proper fees. The owner’s original
certificate of title remains with RD.
• Nothing in law which limits the time in
which court may order the issuance of
the decree in land registration. S6 R39
n.a. (Republic v. Yap, 7 February 2018,
Velasco, J.).
• Court should issue order for decree of
registration even if lot was purportedly
registered per LRA records but no records
bearing cadastral case no. or decision or
decree of registration. Applicant should
not be held hostage by scarcity of records
(Republic v. Heirs of Sta. Ana, 15 May
2021, Lazaro-Javier, J.).
• COURT (order) ->
LRA (decree of registration &
OCT) ->
RD (notice) ->
RO
 Petition for reopening and review of
decree (S32)
• Filed with the RTC where land situated.
Ground: Actual (extrinsic) Fraud.
Period. One year from the date of
entry of the decree of registration and
provided no IPV has acquired the land or
an interest therein and whose rights may
be prejudiced.
Incontrovertibility of certificate of title

• Upon the expiration of said period of one

year, the decree of registration and the
certificate of title issued shall become
incontrovertible, meaning the decree of
registration can no longer be reopened
or reviewed.
 Example of petition
for review of decree
• The applicant for registration
intentionally failed to disclose the fact of
actual physical possession of the
premises by the party seeking to review
the decree (Nicolas v. Director of Lands, 9
SCRA 934 [1963]).
• Execution pending appeal not applicable
to a land registration proceeding and the
title issued pursuant thereto is void. (Top
Mgt Programs Corp. v. Fajardo, 15 June
2011).
 Action for reconveyance
• GROUND: Property acquired through
fraud or by mistake. The acquirer is
deemed a trustee for the benefit of the
person from whom the property came.
(Article 1456, Civil Code). >
 PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD: 10 years from
the issuance of a Torrens title in the name
of the acquirer. However, imprescriptible if
plaintiff in possession.
JURISDICTION: RTC/MTC. Real action.
Nature of action for reconveyance
• An action for reconveyance does not
seek to reopen the registration
proceedings and to set aside the decree
of registration but only purports to show
that the person who secured the
registration of the property in
controversy is not the real owner thereof.
(Sps. Lopez v. Sps. Lopez, 25 Nov 2009).
• In an action for cancellation of a TCT, the
RD is merely a nominal not an
indispensable party. (De Leon v. Chu, 2
September 2015).
• Final judgment in land registration
proceeding does not become extinct
even if not enforced within 10 years.
Hence, the same would still be the basis
of res judicata. (Ting v. Heirs of Lirio, 14
March 2007).
 Mirror Principle (§44)
• Every (1) registered owner receiving a
certificate of title in pursuance of a
decree of registration and (2) every
subsequent purchaser of registered land
taking a certificate of title for value and
in good faith (IPV), shall hold the same
free from all encumbrances except those
noted in said certificate.
 Whenever the phrase “innocent
purchaser for value” or an equivalent
phrase occurs in the PRD, it shall be
deemed to include an innocent lessee,
mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for
value. (§32).
EXCEPTIONS: Statutory liens affecting
title (PILAR) (§44)
1. LEGAL LIENS.
2. REAL ESTATE TAXES. (w/in 2 yrs
preceding acquisition)
3. PUBLIC/PRIVATE HIGHWAY/WAY
recognized by law.
4. IRRIGATION (GOVT) CANAL.
5. AGRARIAN REFORM LIENS.
• Annotation in subdivision lot that buyer
is automatically a member of the
homeowners’ association is binding.
(Cezar Yatco Real Estate Services v. Bel-
Air Village Association, 21 November
2018, Leonen, J.).
• City’s unregistered claim based on
donation cannot give better right of
possession as against registered owner.
(Mariano v. City of Naga, 12 March 2018,
Tijam, J.).
• Purchaser at execution sale of
(unregistered) land only steps into the
shoes of the judgment obligor as of the
time of the levy (S33 R39).
Hence, if the land had earlier been
sold by j. obligor to another prior to levy,
the buyer acquires no right.
• Levy on execution over registered land
prevails over a prior unregistered sale.
(Suntay v. Keyser Mercantile Inc., 20 Dec
2014).
The provisions of §44 & §51 of the
PRD prevails over S33 R39. (Radiowealth
Finance Co. v. Palileo, 197 SCRA 245
[1991]).
• Argument by plaintiff that buyers were
not IPV since there was a claim
annotated in real property tax
declaration is without merit. If a property
is registered, the buyer is not obliged to
look beyond the certificate of title to be
considered an IPV. (Aboitiz v. Po, 25 June
2017, Leonen, J.).
 “As is, where is” clause
• “As is, where is” clause in a deed of sale
does not place the buyer in bad faith for
the clause refers only to the physical
condition, not the legal situation of the
land. (Casimiro Dev’t Corp v. Mateo, 27
July 2011).
• A person who buys realty from someone
who is not from the registered owner
must make the appropriate inquiries and
cannot rely on a mere paper examination
of the title. (Gabutan v. Nacalaban, 29
June 2016).
• A buyer cannot claim to be an IPV when
at the time of the purchase there was no
certificate of title over the lot but only a
tax declaration. (Heirs of Lopez v. DBP, 19
Nov 2014, Leonen, J.)
Locsin v Hizon, 17 September 2014
• Knowledge by buyer’s agent that
registered owner was not in possession
and that ejectment case filed by a person
other than registered owner is imputable
to the buyer. Hence, buyer was not an
innocent purchaser for value.
• Due diligence on part of buyer of
subdivision lot includes inquiry with
homeowners’ association re unpaid
association dues (Ferndale Homes
Homeowners’ Assoc. v. Abayon, 28 April
2021, Lazaro-Javier, J.).
• Mirror doctrine not applicable to
assignee in deed of assignment of rights
over registered real property where the
assignor was not the registered owner.
(Bliss Dev’t Corp. v. Diaz, 5 August 2015).
• Protection to a mortgagee in good faith
extends to purchaser at public auction
even if he has notice of adverse claim
(Jimenez v. Jimenez, 10 Feb 2021, Lopez,
J.).
• Defense that buyer is an IPV will not lead
to failure of complaint to state a cause of
action; it is a (affirmative) defense to be
proved by defendant (Colmenar v.
Colmenar, 21 June 2021, Lazaro-Javier,
J.).
 Exception to Mirror Principle
• Mortgagees who are engaged in the real
estate or financing business cannot
simply rely upon a paper examination of
the title. (Adriano v. Pangilinan, 373
SCRA 544 [2002]).
• NHA is the government agency engaged
in direct shelter production and as such,
is expected to exercise more care and
prudence than a private individual in its
dealings, even those involving registered
lands. (NHA v Laurito, 31 July 2017,
Tijam, J.).
• Property developer guilty of substantial
encroachment was a builder in bad faith.
(Princess Rachel Dev’t Corp. v. Hill View
Mktg. Corp., 2 June 2020, e.b., Reyes, J.)
• Wife not an indispensable party if land is
registered as “Husband, married to
Wife.” (Onstott v. Upper-Tagpos
Neighborhood Assoc., 14 Sep 2016,
Perlas-Bernabe, J.)
• Where property shown to have been
acquired during marriage, it remains to
be conjugal property even if registered as
owned by “Husband, married to Wife.”
Hence, sale by husband w/o wife’s
consent was nullified. (Anastacio v. Heirs
of Coloma, 27 August 2020, Caguioa, J.).
 Why is it necessary to register a deed
affecting land or interest therein?
• §51. Registration is operative act to
convey or affect the land insofar as third
persons are concerned.
§52. Registration is constructive notice.
 Constructive knowledge
• 10-year prescriptive period to prosecute
falsification of public document (here a
board resolution as embodied in a
secretary’s certificate) starts from
registration of the secretary’s certificate
with the RD since that was time
constructive knowledge was obtained.
(Lim v. People, 23 April 2018, Reyes, J.).
• Constructive notice rule does not apply
in reckoning 6-year prescriptive period
for Assurance Fund cases. Period is
reckoned from actual discovery of fraud
by owner. (Manuel v. RD, 3 July 2018,
e.b., Perlas-Bernabe, J.)
 Requirements for registration of
voluntary transaction (S112)
• 1. The deed should be in public
instrument, that is, acknowledged before
a NP.
 2. 2-witness rule. Signed by parties
before two witnesses at least. (Id)
3. If 2 or more pages, each page,
including the acknowledgment, should be
signed on left margin by the parties and
the witnesses and all the pages sealed by
the NP, and these facts shall appear in the
acknowledgment. (ld).
 4. If relates to sale, transfer, or
encumbrance of two or more parcels of
land, this fact shall also be stated in the
acknowledgment. (ld).
 5. Payment of fees and the capital
gains tax and the DST.
 6. The owner’s duplicate title
should be presented to the RD. (§53) >
 The reason for this requirement (#6) is
that it serves as a proof of authority of the
registered owner to register the
transaction and for the RD to annotate
deed on the owner’s duplicate title.
Dealings over unregistered lands
Note that voluntary/involuntary
dealings over unregistered lands may be
registered pursuant to §113. The
dealings are entered in the primary entry
book and the registration book and are
binding upon third persons upon such
registration.
 Act No. 3344 superseded but
registration books still in force
• Upon the effectivity of the PRD in 11
June 1978, all dealings with unregistered
lands shall be registered under §113 PRD
and no longer under Act No. 3344.
However, the registration books under
Act No. 3344 shall continue to remain in
force. (§3 PRD).
Dealings over unregistered lands
Recording under Act No. 3344 or
under S113(b) of PRD is binding upon
third persons but “shall be without
prejudice to a third party with a better
right.”
• A “third party with a better right” is one
who has previously acquired a real right
over the property, e.g., by sale or
mortgage.
Registration under §113(b) protects
against future transactions/claims.
 Illustration: Double sale
of land to A & B
A (unregistered but
sale & delivery)

B (registered)
Unregistered land; registration under
S113 protects against future dealings
A (registered levy)

B (registered sale)
 RD’s duty to register ministerial
• The function of the RD to register
documents is ministerial. The RD passes
only upon the formal requirements for
registrability and not the intrinsic validity
of the underlying contract. The latter is
for the courts to determine.
• Since registration of documents is a
ministerial act, the RD is not authorized
to determine whether or not fraud was
committed in the document sought to be
registered. (OMB v Manalastas, 27 July
2016, Carpio, J.)
Exception: Patent nullity, e.g., a deed of
sale of a 4-hectare land to a foreigner.
 When is a deed considered as
registered?
• Upon entry in primary entry book upon
payment of entry fee. “They shall be
considered as registered from the time
so noted.” (§56)
Caviles v. Bautista, 24 November 1999

• P obtained a writ of attachment over

parcel of registered land owned by D. P
presented the writ of attachment for
registration with the register of deeds.
The RD entered the writ in the primary
entry book but failed to annotate it in the
certificate of title. >
B wishes to buy the land, examined the
title on file and bought it from D.
Certificate of title issued to B. Later on, P
who won his suit against D, claims that
he has a better right over the land. Who
between P and B has the better right
over the land?
P has the better right over the land. The
entry of an attachment over a parcel of
land in the primary entry book is
sufficient registration. (Caviles v.
Bautista, 24 November 1999).
 Registration of instrument, when
effective
Entry of a document in the primary entry
book of the Register of Deeds is sufficient
registration. (Caviles v. Bautista, 24
November 1999; NHA v. Basa, 20 April
2010). The ruling applies to both
voluntary and involuntary transactions.
(DBP v. Acting RD of Nueva Ecija, 162
SCRA 450).
 Saberon v Ventanilla, 21 Apr 2014
• Notice of levy on execution was entered
in primary entry book but not annotated
on title. A buyer who relied on the clean
title is considered as having constructive
notice of the levy but will be considered
as a builder in good faith under Article
448 of the Civil Code.
 Involuntary dealings
• Transactions or dealings affecting land
that do not require the consent of the
registered owner or that can be effected
even against his consent. E.g.
attachment, levy on execution, lis
pendens, adverse claim. (LALA) >
Precisely because the registered owner’s
consent is not needed, involuntary
dealings can be registered even without
presenting the owner’s duplicate title. <
 Adverse claim (§70)
Made by a claimant who claims an
interest in registered land adverse to
the owner.
 Example
• Claim that one has hereditary rights over
land fraudulently registered in name of
another may be the subject of an adverse
claim. (Gabriel v. RD, 118 Phil. 980).
Claim based on implied/constructive
trust may be subject of adverse claim.
• Adverse claim based on
prescription/adverse possession cannot
be registered because registered title is
not subject to prescription/adverse
possession. (Estrella v. RD, 106 Phil.
911).
 Adverse claim must be
based on valid real right
The basis of the adverse claimant’s right
was a waiver executed by a sibling when
their father was still alive, which is void
under Art. 1347 of the Civil Code. Thus,
the adverse claim is also void. (Ferrer v.
Sps. Diaz, 23 April 2010).
 Cathay Metal Corp. v Laguna West
Multi-Purpose Coop, 2 July 2014
• A claim based on a future right does not
ripen into an adverse claim. Here the
right of the claimant was still subject to
negotiations. The adverse claims should
be cancelled.
 When adverse claim available
The remedy of an adverse claim is
available only if there is no other
provision in the PRD for the registration
of the claimant’s adverse interest. (§70)
• Adverse claim not proper to register a
claim based on a contract to sell. (Logarta
v. Mangahis, 5 July 2016, Perlas-Bernabe,
J.). The CTS could be registered under
§54 of the PRD.
 L.P. Leviste & Co. v. Noblejas,
30 April 1979.
Q Villanueva filed an adverse claim over
the disputed lot, based on an agreement
to sell executed in her favor by Garcia
Realty. She did not present the owner’s
duplicate certificate of title, as required
by §53 of Property Registration Decree
nor did she register the agreement to sell
as provided in §54. >
Subsequently, Petitioner registered a
notice of attachment covering the
disputed lot, issued in a case he had filed
against Garcia Realty. As between
Villanueva and the Petitioner, who has a
better right over the disputed lot?
 Held
It is the Petitioner who has a better
right.
Under §70 of the Property
Registration Decree, the remedy of an
adverse claim is available only if there is
no other provision in the decree for the
registration of the claimant’s adverse
interest. >
 Here, there is a provision in the
Property Registration Decree for the
registration of the contract to sell [§54]
which was the basis of the adverse claim.
Hence, the remedy of an adverse claim
was not available to Villanueva and thus
could not confer a better right on her. <
 PCSO v. New Dagupan Metro Gas
Corp., 11 July 2012
However, if the seller in a contract to
sell refused to deliver the owner’s
duplicate title to the buyer despite
demands, the latter is justified in
resorting to an adverse claim. Court
distinguished this case from Leviste.
 Effectivity of Adverse Claim
• The AC is effective for a period of 30 days
after registration after which it may be
cancelled upon filing of a verified petition
with the RTC by the party in interest. >
 Adverse claim
A notice of adverse claim subsists
even after the lapse of the 30-day
period if not yet cancelled. A buyer
who purchases a land on which there
is a subsisting adverse claim is in bad
faith. >
 There should be a hearing with
notice to the adverse claimant before
the adverse claim is cancelled, even if
the 30-day period had already expired.
(Diaz-Duarte v. Ong, 298 SCRA 388).
• Pursuant to §70, an adverse claim may
be cancelled only by a court or by the
claimant himself. A person who buys a
property containing an AC cancelled by a
person other than the claimant is not an
innocent purchaser for value. (Mendoza
v. Garana, 5 August 2015).
 Notice of lis pendens
Notice that a particular land or the
building thereon is the subject of a
pending action. The action is a real
action, that is, one which affects title to
or possession of such land or building.
(S14 R13, Rules of Court; S76 PRD).
 N.A. to personal actions
Notice of lis pendens does not apply to
personal actions, such as one over
membership shares in a corporation. (MR
Holdings Ltd. v. Bajar, 10 October 2012).
• Filing of case and registration of notice of
lis pendens do not invalidate a prior
registration of an adverse claim over the
subject land. (Valderama v. Arguelles, 2
April 2018, Tijam, J.).
• A transferee pendente lite of registered
land, whose title bears a notice of a
pending litigation involving his
transferor’s title to the said land, is
bound by the outcome of the litigation,
even if he is not impleaded. (De la
Merced v. GSIS, 23 November 2011).
• A buyer who acquires land on which
there is a cancelled notice of lis pendens
is an IPV. One cannot say that the buyer
is deemed to have notice of the pending
litigation. >
 Lis pendens
The doctrine of lis pendens is not one of
constructive notice but of public policy
and necessity. The purpose is to prevent
litigating parties to give to others,
pending litigation, their rights over the
property in dispute as to prejudice
opposite parties. >
Hence, upon cancellation of lis pendens
the buyer cannot be said to have had
constructive notice of any defect in the
title. To hold otherwise would be to
render meaningless and useless the
cancellation of a notice of lis pendens.
(Po Lam v. Court of Appeals & Lim, 347
SCRA 86 [2000]).
 Lis pendens
A mortgagee is not in good faith
where the mortgage was executed
after the trial court had ordered the
cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens but before the registration
of the order of cancellation.
(Cunanan v Jumping Jap Trading
Corp., 24 April 2009).
 Public documents
• All records and papers relative to
registered land in the RD shall be open to
the public in the same manner as court
records, subject to reasonable
regulations as the RD, under the
direction of the LRA, may prescribe. (§56)
• The books in the Registry of Property
shall be public for those who have a
known interest in ascertaining the status
of the immovables or real rights
annotated or inscribed therein. (Art. 710,
Civil Code).
 What if duplicate title
lost or destroyed?
• Owner’s duplicate certificate of title is
lost. It is advisable to file an affidavit of
loss with the RD. This will serve to
protect the registered owner from the
transfer of the title to IPV. Then file a
petition in court for issuance of new
owner’s duplicate CoT under §109.
 Like faith and credit
• The new duplicate certificate shall
contain a memorandum that it is a
replacement but shall in all respects be
entitled to like faith and credit as the
original duplicate and shall be regarded
as such for all purposes of PD 1529.
(§109).
• RTC (not DARAB) has exclusive original
jurisdiction over petition for issuance of
new duplicate certificate of title, even
one emanating from a CLOA. Not an
agrarian dispute or agrarian reform
matter. (Patungan v. RD of Pangasinan, 28
June 2021, Inting, J.).
• In petition for issuance of new owner’s
duplicate certificate of title, the affidavit
of loss is hearsay. Petition denied where
the registered owner did not testify in
court (Republic v. Ciruelas, 17 Feb 2021,
Delos Santos, J.).
• In petition for issuance of new owner’s
duplicate certificate of title, notice to
heirs of registered owner is mandatory.
Otherwise, judgment is null and void.
(Heirs of Ramirez v. Abon, 24 July 2019,
Caguioa, J.)
• Registered owner of land not barred by
res judicata from filing second petition
for issuance of new owner’s duplicate
certificate of title. The reason is the
indefeasibility of the Torrens Title. (Phil.
Bank of Communication v. Register of
Deeds, 11 March 2020, Caguioa, J.).
 §109
The RTC has no jurisdiction to order the
issuance of new owner’s duplicate title if
the owner’s duplicate title was not
actually lost but was in the possession of
a person who had bought the property. >
The order of the RTC may be set aside
under Rule 47 of the Rule of Court and it
cannot become final and executory as
the order is void for lack of jurisdiction.
(Villanueva v. Viloria, 14 March 2008,
Azcuna, J.)
• When the Owner's Duplicate Certificate
of Title has not been lost, the
replacement certificate is void. (Dy v.
Aldea, 9 August 2017, Mendoza, J.).
 IPV’s rights to be tackled
in separate proceeding
• The rights however of one who
claims to be an IPV of the land covered
by the replacement duplicate certificate
cannot be adjudicated or determined in
the R47 proceeding but must be
threshed out in an appropriate
proceeding. (Billote v. Solis, 17 June
2015, Peralta, J.).
Reconstitution of certificate of title
• If owner’s original certificate of title on
file with the RD is lost, then the remedy
is reconstitution. The governing laws are
R.A. No. 26, as amended by R.A. No.
6732; and Sec. 110 of PD 1529.
Reconstitution may be judicial or
administrative.
• Actual and personal notice to actual
owners and possessors of land in a
petition for reconstitution is
indispensable to vest jurisdiction on the
court (Republic v. Manansala, 3 May
2021, Caguioa, J.).
• The required quantum of evidence to
reconstitute a certificate of title is not
mere preponderance of evidence, but
clear and convincing evidence (Republic
v. Manansala, 3 May 2021, Caguioa, J.).
• Administrative reconstitution may be
availed of only in case of substantial loss
or destruction of land titles due to fire,
flood, or other force majeure as
determined by the LRA Administrator. >
 The number of certificate of titles lost
or damaged should be ≥ 10% of the total
number in the RD’s possession and in no
case shall the number of certificates lost or
damaged be < 500.
• Petition for administrative reconstitution
filed with the RD concerned. The RD
shall refer the petition to the
reconstitution officer or the RD of
another registry.
 Reservation re administratively
reconstituted CoTs
• Reconstituted certificates of title shall
have the same validity and legal effect as
the originals thereof. >
• However, certificates of title
reconstituted extrajudicially shall be w/o
prejudice to any party whose right or
interest in the property was duly noted in
the original but was not carried over to
the reconstituted certificate of title. (S7,
RA 26)
• This reservation shall be noted as an
encumbrance on the reconstituted
certificate of title. (Id.)
• After 2 years from the reconstitution, if
no petition for annotation of right or
interest has been filed, the court shall, on
ex parte motion by the registered owner
or other person having registered
interest, order the RD to cancel the
reservation in S7. (S9).
 Arguable ruling
• Persons dealing with administratively
reconstituted titles should conduct
inquiry or investigation. Reconstituted
titles shall have the same validity and
legal effect as the originals, unless the
reconstitution was made administratively
(Jurado v. Chai, 25 March 2019, Perlas-
Bernabe, J.).
• When the reconstitution is based on an
existing owner’s duplicate certificate of
title, notice to the adjoining owners is
not necessary. (Angat v. Republic, 30
June 2009).
 Problems involving forged
title/deed
• GENERAL RULE: A forged certificate of
title/deed cannot be the root of a valid
title. “After the entry of the decree of
registration, any subsequent registration
procured by the presentation of a forged
duplicate certificate of title or a forged
deed or instrument shall be null and
void.” (S53).
 Chain of title doctrine
Exception: The Supreme Court has held
that a forged or fraudulently obtained
deed may be the root of a valid title if an
innocent purchaser for value, relying
upon the forger’s apparently valid title,
had purchased the land covered by the
same and the loss or fraud was
occasioned by the true owner’s
negligence or act of confidence.
O (Registered owner)
TCT in O’s name 1

X Forger
TCT in X’s name 2

Y (IPV)
Registration of sale in his favor 3
Requisites for application of chain of
title doctrine (NIRC)
1. Negligence on the part of the owner or
act of confidence on the part of the
owner which made the fraud possible
2. Certificate of title in the name of the
forger or some other person chosen by
the forger.
3. The one who acquires the title from
the forger is an innocent purchaser for
value.
4. The purchaser must register the deed
in his favor in good faith. <
• Where there is no certificate of title in
the name of the forger, the chain of the
title doctrine cannot be applied or
invoked.
• Purchasers cannot be considered as
IPVs if they did not register the deed
of sale in their favor. (Mahilum v.
Ilano, 22 June 2015).
• The chain of title doctrine will not apply
where the owner still holds a valid and
existing CoT over the subject realty.
(Torres v. CA, 264 Phil. 1062 [1990]).
BEST OF LUCK IN
THE BAR EXAM
FROM YOUR
JURISTS FAMILY!