SAN BEDA COLLEGE - ALABANG SCHOOL OF LAW

CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS 2022

ACADEMICS COMMITTEE

HANNAH KEZIAH T. MORALES

Chairperson for Academics

ANDREA JOSES P. TAN ADRIAN R. MACASAQUIT

Deputy Deputy

ELOISA FE C. BUÑO
Chairperson for Electronic Data Processing

SUBJECT HEADS

MARY GRACE B. DOMINGUEZ PAMELA A. PAEZ

Civil Law Legal and Judicial Ethics

DAVID GABRIEL V. PALLASIGUE BRIANT ALLEN S. ROSARIO

Criminal Law Mercantile Law

KARLA MARIE V. GABRIEL JOSHUA REED C. LOPEZ

Labor Law Political Law

JUSTINN ANTONIO ALON ALEXANDRE JANUS B. BIDO

Remedial Law Taxation Law

ASSISTANT HEADS

DAVE CHRISTIAN C. UMERAN MARIA ARIELLE SAMANTHA T. ALVAREZ

Civil Law Legal and Judicial Ethics

MAEIA MIKHAELA N. MAYUGA HANNAH MIKAELLA C. YAMIT

Criminal Law Mercantile Law

MIGUEL JULIO RAFAEL SORIANO III JESSICA LAURA C. SY

Labor Law Political Law

LANCE LIZOR A. PUNZALAN JAN EROS NIKE V. CABAUATAN

Remedial Law Taxation Law
 POLITICAL LAW TEAM

JOSHUA REED C. LOPEZ

Subject Head

JESSICA LAURA C. SY
Assistant Head

CHANELLE MAE ANN S. ABAGAT

ERYL AMRHEIN AGUSTIN
FRANCES LASHA T. ARANDIA
AILEEN ERICKA A. ARCEGA
CHRISTINA C. AURE
ELOISA FE C. BUÑO
GILLIAN AIA G. CAPILI
ALLYZA Y. CAPONPON
KARLA ISABELLA O. CERA
JENNA A. CORONADO
PIA MONICA B. DIMAGUILA
SYDNEY ROSE T. DOB
CHRISTIAN ECHAVEZ
MA.ANGELICA M. ENFECTANA
AL-KHWARIZMI R. INDANAN JR.
REGINE MARIE LANGRIO
STEPHANIE S. LINAJA
MARC EMIL D. NILLAS
ERICA P. RETUYA
FRENCH TEMPLONUEVO
IVANAH IRENE MICHAELA M. TOMO
EMMANUELLE GRACE L. VILLAS

1
 ADMINISTRATION

DR. ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III

Dean

ATTY. CARLO D. BUSMENTE

Vice Dean

ATTY. MA. ELIZA YAMAMOTO-SANTOS

Prefect of Student Affairs

ATTY. ROBEN B. CADUGO JR.

Administrative Officer

ATTY. PAULINO Q. UNGOS III

Adviser

SAN BEDA COLLEGE - ALABANG SCHOOL OF LAW

CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS 2022
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

KATHLEEN L. CAPULONG
Over-All-Chairperson

HANNAH KEZIAH T. MORALES ELOISA FE C. BUÑO

Chairperson for Academics Chairperson for Electronic Data Processing

LOUIE ANN S. SOMEROS ROZELLE DIANNE I. MATEO

Chairperson for Operations Chairperson for Secretariat

JOSEPH M. LIBROJO ROLEEN WENDEE N. GUINTO

Chairperson for Academic Operations Chairperson for Bar Matters

JULIUS ROBERT A. JUICO EDWARD JAYSON B. SANTILLAN

Chairperson for Communications Chairperson for Logistics

FEMME ANGELA C. ARMAMENTO JOSHUA REED C. LOPEZ

Chairperson for Finance Chairperson for Recruitment and Membership

ANNA MARIE N. OBESO

Chairperson for Bar Mentoring Program

2
 NOTICE

This work is the intellectual property of the SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG
SCHOOL OF LAW and SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG CENTRALIZED BAR
OPERATIONS 2022. It is intended solely for the use of the individuals to which
it is addressed – the Bedan community.

Publication, reproduction, dissemination, and distribution, or copying of the

document without the prior consent of the SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG
SCHOOL OF LAW CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2022
is strictly prohibited.

Material includes both cases penned by Justice Caguioa and recent landmark
cases decided by the Supreme Court.

Copyright © 2022
SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG SCHOOL OF LAW
SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG SCHOOL OF LAW CENTRALIZED BAR
OPERATIONS 2022
All Rights Reserved by the Authors.

3
 POLITICAL LAW
CASE DOCTRINES FOR THE 2022 BAR EXAMINATIONS

BASIC CONCEPTS UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION 9

STATE IMMUNITY 9
Philippine Textile Research Institute v. Court Of Appeals 9

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM 9

ANGKLA v. COE 9

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGES 10

Trillanes v. Honorable Castillo-Marigomen And Tiu 10

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; PROCESS OF LAW-MAKING; PRINCIPLE OF NON-

DELEGATION OF POWERS - EXCEPTIONS 11
COTS-UP v. SEC. OF EDUCATION 11

COURT LEGAL RESEARCHER FUNCTIONS 11

Ang Nars v. Executive Secretary 11

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; APPROPRIATION AND RE-ALIGNMENT 12

Dela Cruz v. Ochoa Jr. 12

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES; POWER OF CONTEMPT 13

Balag v. Senate 13

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; POWER OF IMPEACHMENT; EFFECTS 14

Re: Letter Of Mrs. Ma. Cristina Roco Corona Requesting The Grant Of Retirement And
Other Benefits To The Late Former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona 14

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 15
De Lima v. Duterte 15

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT; POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT; ARTICLE VII, SECTION 18 OF

THE 1987 CONSTITUTION;LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; RIGHT TO PROMULGATE ITS OWN
RULES TO GOVERN ITS PROCEEDINGS 16
Lagman v. Senate President Pimentel Et Al. 16

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT; POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT 17

Satur Ocampo v. Admiral Enriquez 17

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT; POWER OF CONTROL OF THE PRESIDENT 17

SSS v. COA 17

4
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT; EXTENSION OF THE PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL LAW AND
SUSPENSION OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 18
Lagman v. Medialdea 18

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; RULE-MAKING POWER OF SUPREME COURT 19

Pimentel v. LEB 19

TOPIC 20
Re: Consultancy Services Of Helen P. Macasaet 20

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 21

Knights Of Rizal v. DMCI 21

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS; POWER OF THE COA EN BANC; FILING FEES 22

BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS; FILING FEES 22
DFA v. COA 22

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 23

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION; POWERS OF COMMISSION ON AUDIT 23
Collado v. Villar 23

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY 24

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION; POWERS OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT 24
Celeste v. COA 24

BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND COMPETENT COUNSEL 24

In Re: Abellana v. Paredes 24

BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS 26

Maynilad v. Secretary of DENR 26

BILL OF RIGHTS; EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE/DUE PROCESS; LEGISLATIVE

DEPARTMENT; DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER 26
DOTR v. PPTSTA 26

BILL OF RIGHTS; EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 27

Ongsiako Reyes v. HRET 27

BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SEIZURE 28

People v. Cristobal 28

BILL OF RIGHTS; SEARCH AND SEIZURE 29

Picardal v. People 29

BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 30

People v. Sapla 30

5
BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES 30
Acosta v. Ochoa 30

BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS, FREE SPEECH AND EXPRESSION, TO BE

INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION, AND NON-DETENTION SOLELY
BY REASON OF POLITICAL BELIEFS 31
Calleja v. Executive Secretary 31

BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION 32

Valmores v. Achacosc 32

EMINENT DOMAIN 32
Republic v. San Miguel Vda. De Ramos 32

EMINENT DOMAIN AND EXPROPRIATION 33

Republic v. Decena 33

BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS IN A CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION 34

People v. Dacanay 34

BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 34

People v. Doria 34

BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 35

Cuico v. People 35

BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 36

Casilag v. People 36

BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL 37

People v. Domingo 37

BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES 38

DBP v. COA 38

BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY 38

People v. Sandiganbayan 38

BILL OF RIGHTS; WRIT OF AMPARO; WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 40

In The Matter Of The Petition For Writ Of Amparo And Writ Of Habeas Corpus In Favor Of
Lucena, Et Al. 40

CITIZENSHIP; FOUNDLINGS 40
ELECTION LAW; CANCELLATION OF CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY 40
Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission On Elections 40

6
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS 41
Domingo v. Ochoa, Jr 41

LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS; CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 42

Cerilles v. CSC 42

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION; APPOINTMENT 43

DDB v. Matibag 43

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ARTICLE XI OF THE CONSTITUTION; 43

POWERS OF THE LOCAL CHIEF EXECUTIVE; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 43
Lacap v. Sandiganbayan 43

LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS; POWERS OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN 44

Alaska v. Garcia 44

LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS; OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN 45

Ifurung v. Carpio-Morales 45

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; REFUND OF ALLOWANCES; UNLAWFUL EXPENDITURES; SECTION

52, CHAPTER 9, TITLE I, BOOK V, ADMINISTRATIVE CODE 46
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION; POWERS OF COMMISSION ON AUDIT 46
Madera v. Commission On Audit 46

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; DOCTRINE OF CONDONATION 47

BOTE v. SPCPI 47

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY FOR GRAVE MISCONDUCT 48

LOCAL GOVERNMENT; POWERS OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS 48
Rejas v. Ombudsman 48

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 49

Republic v. Larrazabal, Sr. 49

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS; POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE

AGENCIES; RULE-MAKING POWER 49
GMA v. NTC 49

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; QUASI JUDICIAL AGENCIES 50

Sumifru v. NMSF 50

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 51

Nacilla v. MTRCB 51

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; GOCCS; PUBLIC CORPORATIONS 51

Land Bank v. Spouses Amagan 51

7
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 52
Ancheta v. Villa 52

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY 52

Lukban v. Carpio-Morales 52

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 53

LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS; CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 53
Marzan v. City Government Of Olongapo 53

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASESC 54

FFIB-MOLEO v. Major Jandayan 54

ELECTION LAW; QUALIFICATIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS OF CANDIDATES 55

Piccio v. HRET 55

ELECTION LAW; POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMELEC 55

PADPAO v. COE 55

LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS; ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS 56

De Castro v. Office Of The Ombudsman 56

ELECTION LAW; ELECTORAL PROTEST; ANNULMENT OF ELECTION 57

Marcos, Jr. v. Robredo 57

QUO WARRANTO, IMPEACHMENT, JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT (JUDICIAL POWER,

APPOINTMENTS TO THE JUDICIARY, THE SUPREME COURT) 58
Republic v. Sereno 58

LOCAL GOVERNMENT; POWERS OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS 58

People v. SANDIGANBAYAN 58

LOCAL GOVERNMENT; JUST SHARE TO NATIONAL TAXES; LGU DECENTRALIZATION 59

Mandanas v. Ochoa 59

8
 BASIC CONCEPTS UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
STATE IMMUNITY

Philippine Textile Research Institute v. Court Of Appeals

JUSTICE, J.
G.R. No. 223319 October 9, 2019
SUMMARY
E.A. Ramirez, a construction company engaged in electrical works, alleged that
sometime in 2012, it entered into a Contract of Works for the Rehabilitation of Electrical
Facilities of PTRI Main Building and Three Pilot Plants (Subject Contract) with PTRI for
the rehabilitation of the latter's electrical facilities in its main building and in three of
its pilot plants.

DOCTRINE
The State cannot be sued without its consent. If the State enters into a contract
that is not related to its governmental function, there is an implied consent of the State
to be sued.
Furthermore, there is implied consent on the part of the State to be subjected
to suit when the State enters into a contract. In this situation, the government is deemed
to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself
of its sovereign immunity. However, not all contracts entered into by the government
operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one
which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign functions and another which is done
in its proprietary capacity.

───※ ·❆· ※───

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM

ANGKLA v. COE
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.
G.R. No. 246816 September 15, 2020
SUMMARY
Ang Partido ng mga Pilipinong Marino, Inc., (ANGKLA) and Serbisyo sa Bayan Party
(SBP) and Petitioner-in-Intervention Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa (AKMA-
PTN) pray that respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) be enjoined from
double-counting the votes in favor of the two-percenters. Instead, the 2% votes counted
in the first round should first be excluded before proceeding to the second round of seat
allocation.

DOCTRINE
Just because a party-list was allocated a guaranteed seat and an additional seat
does not mean that its votes were counted twice. It just means that the party-list

9
 concerned surpassed the proportional thresholds prescribed under the law in both
rounds of seat allocation. Similarly, just because a party-list is not awarded a
guaranteed seat or an additional does not mean that its votes were not counted. Failure
of a party-list to obtain a seat only means one thing — it lost the elections.

───※ ·❆· ※───

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGES

Trillanes v. Honorable Castillo-Marigomen And Tiu

TIJAM, J.
G.R. No. 223451 March 14, 2018
SUMMARY
Antonio F. Trillanes IV (Trillanes) is investigating with aid of legislation, the
alleged P1.601 Billion overpricing of the new 11-storey Makati City Hall II Parking
Building, the reported overpricing of the 22-storey Makati City Hall Building at the
average cost of P240,000.00 per square meter, along with peculiarities perpetrated by
former and local government officials. Trillanes averred that his statements are part of
an ongoing public debate on a matter of public concern and that Mercado who has
apparently thrust himself into the debate gained the status of a public figure or quasi-
public figure. Additionally Trillanes has said that his remarks are protected by his
constitutionally guaranteed rights to free speech and freedom of expression and of the
press.

DOCTRINE
Parliamentary non-accountability cannot be invoked when the lawmaker's speech
or utterance is made outside sessions, hearings or debates in Congress, extraneous to
the "due functioning of the (legislative) process." To participate in or respond to media
interviews is not an official function of any lawmaker; it is not demanded by his sworn
duty nor is it a component of the process of enacting laws. Indeed, a lawmaker may well
be able to discharge his duties and legislate without having to communicate with the
press. A lawmaker's participation in media interviews is not a legislative act, but is
"political in nature, "outside the ambit of the immunity conferred under the Speech or
Debate Clause in the 1987 Constitution.

NOTES
The Speech or Debate Clause in our Constitution did not turn our Senators and
Congressmen into "super-citizens" whose spoken words or actions are rendered
absolutely impervious to prosecution or civil action. The Constitution conferred the
privilege on members of Congress "not for their private indulgence, but for the public
good." It was intended to protect them against government pressure and intimidation
aimed at influencing their decision-making prerogatives.

───※ ·❆· ※───

10
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; PROCESS OF LAW-MAKING;
PRINCIPLE OF NON-DELEGATION OF POWERS -
EXCEPTIONS

COTS-UP v. SEC. OF EDUCATION

CAGUIOA, J.
G.R. No. 216930 October 9, 2018
SUMMARY
Petitions against K to 12 Law and Kindergarten Education Act were filed on the
laws that institutionalized kindergarten education which is one (1) year of preparatory
education for children at least five years old, as part of basic education, and is made
mandatory and compulsory for entrance to Grade 1 with mandated use of the learner's
mother tongue, or the language first learned by a child, as the primary medium of
instruction in the kindergarten level in public schools except for the in cases wherein
the primary medium of instruction would be determined by the DepEd.

Claiming that the K to 12 Basic Education Program violates various constitutional

provisions, the following petitions were filed before the Court praying that the
Kindergarten Education Act, K to 12 Law, K to 12 IRR, DO No. 31, Joint Guidelines, and
CMO No. 20, be declared unconstitutional.

DOCTRINE
The enrolled bill doctrine applies in this case. Under the "enrolled bill doctrine,"
the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the
certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed is
conclusive not only as to its provisions but also as to its due enactment. The rationale
behind the enrolled bill doctrine rests on the consideration that "[t]he respect due to
coequal and independent departments requires the [Judiciary] to act upon that
assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the
manner stated; leaving the court to determine, when the question properly arises, [as
in the instant consolidated cases], whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity
with the Constitution."

───※ ·❆· ※───

COURT LEGAL RESEARCHER FUNCTIONS

Ang Nars v. Executive Secretary

CARPIO, J.
G.R. No. 215746 October 8, 2019
SUMMARY
On 28 July 2008, Congress approved Joint Resolution No. 4, authorizing the
President of the Philippines “Modify the Compensation and Position Classification
System of Civilian Personnel and the Base Pay Schedule of Military and Uniformed
11
 Personnel in the Government, and For Other Purposes.” The said Joint Resolution was
approved by PGMA on 17 June 2009. Joint Resolution No. 4 provides for an amendment
of existing laws including, among others, RA 9173.

DOCTRINE
Only a bill can become a law. Before a bill can become a law, it must pass three
readings on three separate days, unless the President certifies that its enactment is
urgent.
A joint resolution is not a bill, and its passage does not enact the joint resolution
into a law even if it follows the requirements expressly prescribed in the Constitution
for enacting a bill into a law.

NOTES
A joint resolution can be part of the implementation of a law as provided in the
law itself. A joint resolution can also be treated as recommendation to the Executive
on how the law can be implemented. not uncommon to find a proposed piece of
legislation, in identical language, introduced in the Senate as a Senate bill

Justice Caguioa asserts that the Philippine Congress’ concept of joint resolution
is equivalent to the US Senate’s characterization of joint resolution as a piece of
legislation that requires the approval of both chambers and is submitted to the President
for possible signature as a law.

───※ ·❆· ※───

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; APPROPRIATION AND RE-

ALIGNMENT

Dela Cruz v. Ochoa Jr.

BERSAMIN, J.
G.R. No. 219683 January 23, 2018
SUMMARY
Petitioners, Hon. Jonathan A. Dela Cruz and Hon. Gusta Vo S. Tambunting as
members of the House of Representatives and taxpayers, in a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition, assail the implementation of the Motor Vehicle License Plate
Standardization Program (MVPSP) of the Land Transportation Office (LTO) which uses
funds from under Republic Act No. 10633 (General Appropriations Act of 2014), which
will be referred to as GAA 2014. LTO then formulated the Motor Vehicle License Plate
Standardization Program (MVPSP) which aims to supply new license plates for both old
and new vehicle registrants.

Due to delay, the Senate Committee on Public Services instituted an inquiry in

aid of legislation due to the reported delays in the release of motor vehicle license
plates, stickers and tags by the LTO. Subsequently, COA after launching three Audit
Observation Memoranda (AOM) issued a Notice of Disallowance stating that it had
disallowed the advance payment of P477,901,329.00 to JKG Power Plates for the supply
12
 and delivery of motor vehicle plates for apparently dealing with an irregular and illegal
transaction under the Administrative Code and Government Procurement Reform Act.

DOCTRINE
However as explained in Goh v. Bayron the Supreme Court has said that: To be
valid, an appropriation must indicate a specific amount and a specific purpose.
However, the purpose may be specific even if it is broken down into different related
sub-categories of the same nature. For example, the purpose can be to "conduct
elections," which even if not expressly spelled out covers regular, special, or recall
elections. The purpose of the appropriation is still specific - to fund elections, which
naturally and logically include, even if not expressly stated, not only regular but also
special or recall elections.

NOTES
In this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition petitioners assail the
implementation of the Motor Vehicle License Plate Standardization Program (MVPSP) of
the Land Transportation Office (LTO) by using funds appropriated under Republic Act
No. 10633 (General Appropriations Act of 2014).

───※ ·❆· ※───

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES;

POWER OF CONTEMPT

Balag v. Senate
GESMUNDO, J.
G.R. No. 234608 July 3, 2018
SUMMARY
Arvin R. Balag (Balag), a member of Aegis Juris Fraternity (AJ Fraternity) based
in UST, along with several others are being invited in a senate hearing investigating the
death of Horacio Tomas T. Castillo III (Horacio Ill) who died in a hazing ritual allegedly
done by members of AJ Fraternity. Upon questioning by Senator Poe and Lacson inquiring
his status within AJ Fraternity, specifically on whether or not he is the leader of the
aforementioned fraternity, Balag will repeatedly refuse to answer, invoking his right
against self-incrimination

DOCTRINE
The interests of the Senate and the witnesses appearing in its legislative inquiry
are balanced. The Senate can continuously and effectively exercise its power of
contempt during the legislative inquiry against recalcitrant witnesses, even during
recess. Such power can be exercised by the Senate immediately when the witness
performs a contemptuous act, subject to its own rules and the constitutional rights of
the said witness.

13
NOTES
The period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt of the Senate
during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the termination of the
legislative inquiry.
───※ ·❆· ※───

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; POWER OF IMPEACHMENT;

EFFECTS

Re: Letter Of Mrs. Ma. Cristina Roco Corona Requesting The

Grant Of Retirement And Other Benefits To The Late Former
Chief Justice Renato C. Corona
HERNANDO, J.
A.M. No. 20-07-10-SC January 12, 2021
SUMMARY
After a heavily-publicized trial, the Senate declared Chief Justice Corona unfit
to hold such a lofty position and removed him from his office due mainly to his act of
non-declaration of his Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN). The widow
of the Chief Justice, Mrs. Corona, now pleads for judicial benevolence. She prays that
she be allowed to reap the retirement benefits and other gratuities provided under
Sections 1 and 3 of Republic Act No. 9946 (RA 9946), and monthly survivorship pension
under Administrative Circular No. 81-2010 (AC 81-2010).

DOCTRINE
Impeachment is a constitutional process that takes place within the political
departments of our government. The House of Representatives accuses and the Senate,
sitting as an Impeachment Court, decides. Public opinion, as well as the facts
established by the evidence and the grounds and processes prescribed by the basic law,
steer and weigh heavily in the formulation of its outcome. Nevertheless, the pervasive
realm of the courts that is judicial review is retained as to any act within the limits of
discretion provided by the Constitution.

Impeachment is only preparatory to liability. Since a removal by impeachment

does not explicitly provide for forfeiture as a consequence thereof, as opposed to a
criminal conviction carrying the penalty of perpetual or absolute disqualification, an
impeached official, like former Chief Justice Corona, cannot be deprived of his
retirement benefits on the sole ground of his removal. Such forfeiture could have been
imposed upon criminal conviction which, however, was pre-empted by his death.
Viewing it from another angle, a judgment of liability in a separate legal proceeding is
a resolutory condition after a verdict of ouster by impeachment has been rendered, in
that the impeached official retains all the post-employment privileges already earned
unless otherwise declared by the competent tribunals.

───※ ·❆· ※───

14
 EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

De Lima v. Duterte
BERSAMIN, J.
G.R. No. 227635 October 15, 2019
SUMMARY
Petitioner Senator Leila M. de Lima (Sen. De Lima) seeks to enjoin respondent
Rodrigo Roa Duterte, the incumbent Chief Executive of the Philippines, by petition for
the issuance of a writ of habeas data, from committing acts allegedly violative of her
right to life, liberty and security. Sen. De Lima traces this personal presidential
animosity from the existence of the time of the investigation of the so-called "Davao
Death Squad" and thereby concludes that taking all the public statements of the
President including denunciations of her corruption and immorality.

DOCTRINE
Presidential immunity in this jurisdiction attaches during the entire tenure of
the President. The immunity makes no distinction with regard to the subject matter of
the suit; it applies whether or not the acts subject matter of the suit are part of his
duties and functions as President.

NOTES
The rationale for the grant of immunity as stated in Soliven v. Makasiar is “to
assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance of
distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that,
aside from requiring all of the office-holder's time, also demands undivided attention.”
And as expanded in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, it will degrade the dignity of the high
office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations
while serving as such.
Besides, any litigation, whether big or small, naturally serves as a distraction to
a party-litigant. Even while represented by counsel, a litigant is still responsible for
certain facets of the case, like presenting evidence and disputing claims, and cannot
simply leave the course and conduct of the proceedings entirely to the discretion of his
or her chosen counsel.

───※ ·❆· ※───

15
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT; POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT;
ARTICLE VII, SECTION 18 OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION;LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; RIGHT TO
PROMULGATE ITS OWN RULES TO GOVERN ITS
PROCEEDINGS

Lagman v. Senate President Pimentel Et Al.

TIJAM, J.
G.R. No. 235935 February 6, 2018
SUMMARY
President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of martial law
and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao for
a period not exceeding sixty (60) days, to address the rebellion mounted by members of
the Maute Group and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Three separate petitions were filed
before the Supreme Court, challenging the sufficiency of the factual basis of
Proclamation No. 216.

DOCTRINE
The 1987 Constitution grants the Congress the power to shorten or extend the
President's proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. While the number of times that the Congress is allowed to approve an
extension of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
is not specified, Section 18, Article VII is clear that the only limitations to the exercise
of the congressional authority to extend such proclamation or suspension are that the
extension should be upon the President's initiative; that it should be grounded on the
persistence of the invasion or rebellion and the demands of public safety; and that it is
subject to the Court's review of the sufficiency of its factual basis upon the petition of
any citizen. Moreover, Section 18, Article VII did not also fix the period of the extension
of the proclamation and suspension. However, it clearly gave the Congress the authority
to decide on its duration; thus, the provision states that that the extension shall be "for
a period to be determined by the Congress."

No less than the Constitution, under Section 16 of Article VI, grants the Congress
the right to promulgate its own rules to govern its proceedings. This constitutionally-
vested authority is recognized as a grant of full discretionary authority to each House of
Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the
exercise of this power is generally exempt from judicial supervision and interference,
except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will
constitute a denial of due process. In other words, the Court cannot review the rules
promulgated by Congress in the absence of any constitutional violation.

16
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT; POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT

Satur Ocampo v. Admiral Enriquez

PERALTA, J.
G.R. No. 225973 August 8, 2017
SUMMARY
During the 2016 Presidential Election, then candidate Rodrigo Duterte (Duterte)
announced that he would allow the burial of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos
(Marcos) at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LMB). After Duterte assumed the office, public
respondent Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to
the Chief of Staff of AFP regarding the interment of Marcos at the LMB.

DOCTRINE
There is no clear constitutional or legal basis to hold that there was a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction which would justify the Court
to interpose its authority to check and override an act entrusted to the judgment of
another branch. At bar, President Duterte, through the public respondents, acted within
the bounds of the law and jurisprudence. Notwithstanding the call of human rights
advocates, the Court must uphold what is legal and just. And that is not to deny Marcos
of his rightful place at the LNMB. For even the Framers of our Constitution intend that
full respect for human rights is available at any stage of a person's development, from
the time he or she becomes a person to the time he or she leaves this earth.

───※ ·❆· ※───

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT; POWER OF CONTROL OF

THE PRESIDENT

SSS v. COA
JUSTICE, J.
G.R. No. 243278 November 3, 2020
SUMMARY
The Social Security System (SSS) through Board Resolution No. 185 proposed the
amount of Php 5,384,737,000.00 for Personal Services in its 2010 Corporate Operating
Budget (COB). DBM approved the COB however modified it by reducing the amount of
the Personal Services to only Php 4,934,200,000.00, with the caveat that the approval
of the COB should not be construed as authorization for the specific items of expenditure
for the Personal Services, and that the allowances not in accordance with the Salary
Standardization Law (SSL) are SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL of the PRESIDENT upon the
recommendation of the DBM.

17
DOCTRINE
It must always be remembered that under our system of government all
executive departments, bureaus and offices are under the control of the President of
the Philippines specifically provided for under Sec. 17 of Art. VII of the 1987
Constitution.

GOCCs, like the SSS, are always subject to the supervision and control of the
President. That it is granted authority to fix reasonable compensation for its personnel,
as well as an exemption from the SSL, does not excuse it from complying with the
requirement to obtain Presidential approval before granting benefits and allowances.

Under our system of government all executive departments, bureaus, and offices
are under the control of the President. This is embodied in Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution which provides that, “The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

───※ ·❆· ※───

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT; EXTENSION OF THE

PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL LAW AND SUSPENSION OF
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Lagman v. Medialdea
CARANDANG, J.
G.R. No. 243522 February 19, 201c
SUMMARY
In 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring
Martial Law in the whole island of Mindanao and the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus therein. The president asked both the Senate and the House of
Representatives to extend the Proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

DOCTRINE
The test of sufficiency for the extension of martial law is not accuracy nor
preciseness but reasonableness of the factual basis adopted by the Executive in
ascertaining the existence of rebellion and the necessity to quell it.

The Congress has the prerogative to extend the martial law and the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as the Constitution does not limit the period
for which it can extend the same. Subject to the following limitations: (a) The extension
should be upon the President’s initiative; (b) It should be grounded on the persistence
of the invasion or rebellion and the demands of public safety; and (c) It is subject to the
Court’s review of the sufficiency of its factual basis upon the petition of any citizen.

18
 Proclamation No. 216 did not become functus officio with the cessation of the
Marawi siege. Considering that rebellion persists and that the public safety requires it,
there is sufficient factual basis to extend martial law in Mindanao for the third time.

A declaration of martial law does not suspend fundamental civil rights of

individuals as the Bill of Rights enshrined in the Constitution remain effective. Civil
courts and legislative bodies remain open.

NOTES
The Constitutional safeguards found in Section 18, Article VII does not demand
that a city be first taken over or people get killed and billions of properties go up in
smoke before the President may be justified to use his options under Section 18.

───※ ·❆· ※───

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; RULE-MAKING POWER OF

SUPREME COURT

Pimentel v. LEB
REYES, J.
G.R. No. 230642 September 10, 2019
SUMMARY
The Congress passed into law RA no. 7662 to improve the legal education system
of the Philippines on account of the poor performance in the bar examination. For these
purposes, R.A. No. 7662 created the LEB, an executive agency which was made separate
from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), but attached thereto
solely for budgetary purposes and administrative support. LEB issued Memorandum
Order No. 7, Series of 2016 (LEBMO No. 7-2016) pursuant to its power to "prescribe the
minimum standards for law admission" under Section 7 (e) of R.A. No. 766 to improve
the quality of legal education by requiring all those seeking admission to the basic law
course to take and pass a nationwide uniform law school admission test, known as the
PhiLSAT. Petitioners argue that RA no. 7662 and the PhilSAT are offensive to the
Court’s Power to regulate and supervise the legal profession pursuant to Sec. 5 (5),
Article VIII of 1987 Constitution, and that Congress cannot create an administrative
office that exercises the Court’s power over the practice of law.

DOCTRINE
While jurisdiction over legal education belongs primarily and directly to the
political departments, and that the exercise of such police power must be in the context
of reasonable supervision and regulation, and must be consistent with academic
freedom and the right to education, the Court finds certain provisions and clauses of
R.A. No. 7662 which by its plain language and meaning, go beyond legal education and
intrude upon the Court’s exclusive jurisdiction and should therefore be struck down for
being unconstitutional.

19
 ───※ ·❆· ※───

TOPIC

Re: Consultancy Services Of Helen P. Macasaet

CAGUIOA, J.
A.M. No. 17-12-02-SC July 16, 2019
SUMMARY
This case revolves around the eight contracts of services between the Court and
Ms. Macasaet for her rendition of consultancy services for the Enterprise Information
Systems Plan (EISP) for the years 2010-2014 meant to be the blueprint of the Judiciary’s
ICT project. The Bids and Awards Committee for Consultancy Services (BAC-CS)
considered the procurement as highly technical in nature, which led to the same
Committee recommending 3 consultants; one of which was Ms. Macasaet who was found
to be the most qualified after due evaluation. Conflict arose when it was discovered
that the records are bereft as to any explanation how the consultants were chosen by
the Committee. Accordingly, the report of the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCA) states
that there are no documents that would show the needed documents to serve as
credentials. The legality of the contracts are now questioned in this case.

DOCTRINE
Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court "shall
have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof." Thus, the
administrative powers of the Court - which include entering into government contracts
in the exercise of these powers of administration - are vested in the members of the
Supreme Court sitting en banc, as a collegial body. To repeat, any government contract
entered into on and in behalf of the Supreme Court must be authorized by the Supreme
Court En Banc.

The Supreme Court is first and foremost a collegial body, with one vote for each
Justice, including the Chief Justice, in all judicial or administrative matters for decision.
The Supreme Court exercises its functions through the Court En Banc or its Divisions. As
the Court is a collegial body, absent a proper authorization by the Court En Banc, even
the Chief Justice who is primus inter pares cannot act on his or her own.

───※ ·❆· ※───

20
 JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

Knights Of Rizal v. DMCI

JUSTICE, J.
G.R. No. 213948 | April 25, 2017
SUMMARY
DMCI Project Developers, Inc. acquired a 7,716.60-square meter lot in the City
of Manila, located near Taft Avenue, Ermita, beside the former Manila Jai-Alai Building
and Adamson University. The lot was earmarked for the construction of DMCI-PDI’s Torre
de Manila condominium project. KOR claims that the Torre de Manila project violates
the NHCP’s Guidelines on Monuments Honoring National Heroes, Illustrious Filipinos and
Other Personages, which state that historic monuments should assert a visual
“dominance” over its surroundings, as well as the country’s commitment under the
International Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites,
otherwise known as the Venice Charter.

DOCTRINE
In cases where the question of the constitutionality of governmental action is
raised, the judicial power that the courts exercise is likewise identified as the power of
judicial review – the power to review the constitutionality of the actions of other
branches of government. The judicial review that the courts undertake requires 1) there
be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; 2) the person
challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement; 3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity, and 4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very
lismota of the case.
There is, however, no clear legal duty on the City of Manila to consider the
provisions of Ordinance No. 8119 for applications for permits to build outside the
protected areas of Rizal Park. It is the policy of the courts not to interfere with the
discretionary executive acts of the executive branch unless there is a clear showing of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

───※ ·❆· ※───

21
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS; POWER OF THE COA
EN BANC; FILING FEES
BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS; FILING FEES

DFA v. COA
CAGUIOA, J.
G.R. No. 194530 July 7, 2020)
SUMMARY
Between the period of September 24 to October 27, 2008, the COA Resident
Auditor in the Department of Foreign Affairs issued 19 Notices of Disallowances on the
payment of terminal leave benefits for retired DFA employees. On November 27, 2008,
the personnel of the Philippine Embassy in London received NDs from the Supervising
Auditor for 20 personnel representing their overseas and living quarter allowances. In
both cases, the DFA appealed the NDs. DFA to file a motion before the COA to suspend
the implementation of the Resolution on the grounds that: (1) it violates Article IX-A,
Section 6 of the Constitution; (2) it is vague and subject to different interpretations,
and thus, implementing rules are necessary to guard against abuse; and (3) the
requirement of payment of the filing fees before the COA Resident Auditor takes
cognizance of the appeals violates the due process clause and derogates substantive
rights.

DOCTRINE
The power of the respective Commission en banc to promulgate a resolution with
regard to the payment of filing fees for appeals to be taken cognizance of, is sanctioned
by Section 6, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, which expressly grants each
Constitutional Commission en banc to promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings
and practice before it or before any of its offices. The Constitution, however, adds that
such rules shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.

The Court finds no violation of petitioners' Constitutional right to due process in

this regard. For one, settled is the rule that filing fees, when required, are assessed and
become due for each initiatory pleading filed. The payment of filing fees in a judicial
and quasi-judicial set up has always been recognized as essential in our jurisdiction, and
has always been recognized as an allowable limitation to the right to appeal. Secondly,
petitioners were already given a meaningful opportunity to be heard even before their
appeals to the Director were returned for non-payment of docket fee

───※ ·❆· ※───

22
 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION; POWERS OF
COMMISSION ON AUDIT

Collado v. Villar
CAGUOIA, J.
G.R. No. 193143 December 1, 2020
SUMMARY
A contract was entered into by and between the PSHS, Diliman Campus, Quezon
City and N.C. Roxas, Inc., for the construction of the PSHS-Mindanao Campus Building
Complex at Mintal, Davao City. Due to certain circumstances beyond its control, the
contractor requested an extension of the contract time, which the Department of
Science and Technology (DOST)-Wide Infrastructure Committee granted for 50 days from
September 12, 1989, the original completion date, to November 1, 1989 but with a
notification and reminder to the contractor that even considering the grant of extension,
the completion date of the project had elapsed and the same was already subject to
liquidated damages.

For overpaid of liquidated damages, the COA Auditor found the following persons
solidarily liable: (i) N.C. Roxas, Inc., as payee, (ii) Evelyn B. Rabaca (Rabaca),
Accountant III, (iii) Rufina E. Vasquez (Vasquez), Administrative Officer V, for her act of
"certifying the expense as necessary, lawful and incurred under [her] direct supervision,"
and (iv) Collado for her act of "computing the erroneous [liquidated damages] to be
imposed." Collado, together with Vasquez, sought reconsideration of the Notices of
Disallowance with the COA Auditor who affirmed the liability of Collocado.

DOCTRINE
It is a long-standing rule that findings of administrative agencies are accorded
not only respect but also finality absent unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount
to grave abuse of discretion. The [COA] is endowed with enough latitude to determine,
prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable
expenditures of government funds. [t is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in
safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately the people's, property.
The exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that
gives life to the check and balance system inherent in our form of government.

Corollary thereto, it is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of
administrative authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-created, such as the
[COA], not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their
presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce.

───※ ·❆· ※───

23
 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION; POWERS OF THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT

Celeste v. COA
CAGUIOC, J.
G.R. No. 237843 June 15, 2021
SUMMARY
Petitioners Celeste, Buted, Gomez, and Caguioa are employees of NIA Region I
who were assigned to the NIA Office in Urdaneta City, Pangasinan. During the periods of
March to October 2010, February 2011, and May 2011, NIA Region I paid to its managerial
and rank-and-file employees in the amounts of P460,000.00, P72,000.00, and
Pl92,000.00, respectively. Three notices of disallowance (ND) were issued on the basis
of COA Decision No. 2010-075. They appealed arguing that the Joint Resolution of the
HOR is in the nature of a law, and should therefore be given effect to allow the grant
of CNAI to managerial employees. Further, it argues that the NIA CNA serves as sufficient
basis for the grant of CNAI to managerial employees.

DOCTRINE
Generally, excusing payees from return on the basis of good faith has been
previously recognized as an exception to the laws on liability for unlawful expenditures.
However, being civil in nature, the liability of officers and payees for unlawful
expenditures provided in the Administrative Code of 1987 will have to be consistent with
civil law principles such as solutio indebiti and unjust enrichment.

───※ ·❆· ※───

BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND

COMPETENT COUNSEL

In Re: Abellana v. Paredes

CAGUIOA, J.
G.R. No. 232006 July 10, 2019
SUMMARY
Michael Labrador Abellana (Abellana) was charged with violation of Sections 11
and 12, Art. II of R.A. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. By virtue
of a search warrant, the police officers searched the house of Abellana and found shabu
in the pocket of the latter’s hanged pants together with the instruments or equipment
fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, ingesting or introducing any
dangerous drug into the body.

24
DOCTRINE
Broadly speaking, the writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. Thus, the
most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ is that the individual seeking such relief
be illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal
restraint. Concomitantly, if a person's liberty is restrained by some legal process, the
writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. The writ cannot be used to directly assail a judgment
rendered by a competent court or tribunal which, having duly acquired jurisdiction, was
not ousted of this jurisdiction through some irregularity in the course of the proceedings.

However, jurisprudence has recognized that the writ of habeas corpus may also
be availed of as a post-conviction remedy when, as a consequence sentence as to
circumstance of a judicial proceeding, any of the following exceptional circumstances
is attendant: 1) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the
restraint of a person; 2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or 3) the
imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the sentence as such excess.

A client is bound by his counsel's conduct, negligence, and mistake in handling a

case. To allow a client to disown his counsel's conduct would render the proceedings
indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening by the mere subterfuge of replacing
counsel.

Nevertheless, it must be noted that when the detention complained of finds its
origin in what has been judicially ordained, the range of inquiry in a habeas corpus
proceeding is considerably narrowed. Whatever situation the petitioner invokes from
the exceptional circumstances listed above, the threshold remains high. Mere allegation
of a violation of one's constitutional right is not enough. The violation of constitutional
right must be sufficient to void the entire proceedings.

NOTES
Sec. 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

SECTION 6. Promulgation of judgment. — xxxxxxx If the judgment is for

conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he
shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the court shall
order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the
accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies.
He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves
that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies
within fifteen (15) days from notice.

───※ ·❆· ※───

25
 BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS

Maynilad v. Secretary of DENR

HERNANDO, J.
Case Code Case Date
SUMMARY
Regional Office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Environmental Management Bureau-Region III (EMB-RIII) filed a complaint before the
DENR's Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) charging MWSS and its concessionaires,
Maynilad and Manila Water, with failure to provide, install, operate, and maintain
adequate Wastewater Treatment Facilities (WWTFs) for sewerage system resulting in
the degraded quality and beneficial use of the receiving bodies of water leading to
Manila Bay, and which has directly forestalled the DENR's mandate to implement the
operational plan for the rehabilitation and restoration of Manila Bay and its river
tributaries.

DOCTRINE
Due process of law has two aspects: substantive and procedural. Substantive due
process refers to the intrinsic validity of a law that interferes with the rights of a person
to his property. Procedural due process, on the other hand, means compliance with the
procedures or steps, even periods, prescribed by the statute, in conformity with the
standard of fair play and without arbitrariness on the part of those who are called upon
to administer it. In order that a particular act may not be impugned as violative of the
due process clause, there must be compliance with both the substantive and the
procedural requirements thereof.

───※ ·❆· ※───

BILL OF RIGHTS; EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE/DUE

PROCESS; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; DELEGATION OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER

DOTR v. PPTSTA
VELASCO JR., J.
G.R. No. 23010 July 24, 2018
SUMMARY
RA 9483, entitled "An Act Providing For The Implementation of the Provisions of
the 1992 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage and the
1992 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Providing Penalties for Violations thereof, and
for Other Purposes" or simply the "Oil Pollution Compensation Act of 2007," was signed
into law. The provision relevant to this case, Section 22 of RA 9483, provides for the
establishment of an "Oil Pollution Management Fund" Respondents argues that they
argued that the obligation to contribute to the OPMF solely imposed upon the owners
26
 and operators of oil/petroleum tankers and barges violates their right to equal
protection of the law; that the ten-centavo (10 c) impost is confiscatory and, thus,
violates their right to due process; Section 22 (a) is a prohibited rider; and, finally, the
provision provides an undue delegation of legislative power. In an Order dated July 25,
2016, the RTC granted the prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and
enjoined the implementation of the assailed provision and IRR.

DOCTRINE
In Sumulong v. Comelec,the Court held that all that can reasonably be required
is that the title shall not be made to cover legislation incongruous in itself, and which
by no fair intendment can be considered as having necessary or proper connection.
The equal protection guaranty under the Constitution means that "no person or
class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by
other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances." However,
this clause does not preclude classification as long as the classification is reasonable and
not arbitrary. For valid delegation of power, it is essential that the law delegating the
power must be (1) complete in itself, that it must set forth the policy to be executed
by the delegate and (2) it must fix standard - limits of which are sufficiently determinate
or determinable - to which the delegate must conform.
In asserting that the 10-centavo per liter impost is unconstitutional, respondents
have the burden of proof to convince this Court that indeed said imposition is arbitrary,
oppressive, excessive, and confiscatory, thereby violating the constitutional
proscription against deprivation of property without due process of law. The
determination of whether a measure or charge is confiscatory or not, within the purview
of the due process clause, will not solely depend on the amount that will be accumulated
therefrom.

───※ ·❆· ※───

BILL OF RIGHTS; EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

Ongsiako Reyes v. HRET

CARPIO, J.
G.R. No. 22110c October 16, 2018
SUMMARY
Regina Ongsiako Reyes alleges that she has two pending quo warranto cases
before the HRET. They are (1) Case No. 13-036 (Noeme Mayores Tan and Jeasseca L.
Mapacpac v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes) and (2) Case No. 130037 (Eric D. Junio v. Regina
Ongsiako Reyes). Petitioner alleges that Rule 6 of the 2015 HRET Rules is
unconstitutional as it gives the Justices, collectively, denial or veto powers over the
proceedings by simply absenting themselves from any hearing. She also alleges that the
quorum requirement under the 2015 HRET Rules is ambiguous because it requires only
the presence of at least one Justice and four Members of the Tribunal. Petitioner
likewise alleges that Rule 15, in relation to Rules 17 and 18, of the 2015 HRET Rules
unconstitutionally expanded the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).

27
DOCTRINE
A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification
is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in
no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be
based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held
that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.

The presence of the three Justices is meant to tone down the political nature of
the cases involved and do away with the impression that party interests play a part in
the decision-making process.

───※ ·❆· ※───

BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST UNLAWFUL SEARCH

AND SEIZURE

People v. Cristobal
CAGUIOA, J.
G.R. No. 234207 June 10,2019
SUMMARY
PO2 Rexy Ramos (PO2 Ramos) of the PS2, Pulis sa Barangay 28, Brgy. Rosario,
Pasig City, together with other police officers were conducting "Oplan Sita" in a
checkpoint along Ortigas Extension corner GSIS Road. PO2 Ramos flagged down accused-
appellant Marlon Cristobal y Ambrosio who was driving a motorcycle without a helmet.
Whena asked for the original receipt and certificate of registration of the said
motorcycle, Abmorisio ran away and he was searched where 7 plastic sachets containing
white crystalline substance which he suspected as shabu.

DOCTRINE
“Stop and frisk” searches are exceptions to the general rule that warrants are
necessary for the State to conduct a search and, consequently, intrude on a person’s
privacy.

“Stop and frisk” searches should thus be allowed only in the specific and limited
instances contemplated in Terry: (1) it should be allowed only on the basis of the police
officer’s reasonable suspicion, in light of his or her experience, that criminal activity
may be afoot and that the persons with whom he/she is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous; (2) the search must only be a carefully limited search of the outer
clothing; and (3) conducted for the purpose of discovering weapons which might be used
to assault him/her or other persons in the area. In this case, the police officers' act of

28
 proceeding to search Cristobal's body, despite their own admission that they were
unable to find any weapon on him, constitutes an invalid and unconstitutional search.

───※ ·❆· ※───

BILL OF RIGHTS; SEARCH AND SEIZURE

Picardal v. People
JUSTICE, J.
G.R. No. 235749 June 19, 2019
SUMMARY
PO1 Mark Anthony Peniano together with his companion PO1 William Cristobal
and PO1 Rodrigo Co, while they were in a beat patrol back to the station, chanced upon
Ramon Picardal urinating against the wall. They approached Picardal and told him that
it is forbidden to urinate in public. They invited Picardal to go with them to the precinct.
When PO1 Peniano was about to handcuff him, Picardal attempted to run but failed.
Once caught, PO1 Peniano frisked Picqardal and was able to recover a caliber .38
revolver from his waist.

DOCTRINE
SECTION 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution - a search and seizure must be
carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the
existence of probable cause, absent which, such search and seizure becomes
“unreasonable” within the meaning of said constitution. Section 3(2), Article III of the
1987 Constitution - Evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such
unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for
being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.
One of the recognized exceptions to the need for a warrant before a search may
be affected is a search incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires
that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be
reversed. As the firearm was discovered through an illegal search, the same cannot be
used in any prosecution against him as mandated by Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987
Constitution. As there is no longer any evidence against Picardal in this case, he must
perforce be acquitted.

───※ ·❆· ※───

29
 BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

People v. Sapla
CAGUIOA, J.
G.R. No. 244045 June 16, 2020
SUMMARY
Jerry Sapla y Guerrero (Sapla), a.k.a. Eric Salibad y Mallari, the accused-
appellant, was charged with the violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165,
otherwise known as the “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002”. Sapla was
arrested in a joint checkpoint operation after the authorities received an anonymous tip
that a certain male individual would be transporting marijuana.

DOCTRINE
An extensive warrantless search and seizure conducted on the sole basis of a
confidential tip is tainted with illegality. In the great majority of cases upholding the
validity of a warrantless search and seizure on the basis of a confidential tip, the police
did not rely exclusively on information sourced from the informant. There were overt
acts and other circumstances personally observed by the police that engendered great
suspicion and since the police officers failed to rely on their personal knowledge and
depended solely on an unverified and anonymous tip, the warrantless search conducted
on Sapla was an invalid and unlawful search of a moving vehicle.

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BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE AGAINST

UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

Acosta v. Ochoa
JUSTICE, J.
G.R. No. 211559 October 15, 2019
SUMMARY
After the enactment of RA 10591 and the effectivity of the IRR, the Philippine
National Police (PNP) centralized all firearms licensing applications and renewals at its
headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City. The pro forma application form for firearm
registration contained a paragraph on the "Consent of Voluntary Presentation for
Inspection". Licensed firearm owners Eric F. Acosta (Acosta), and Nathaniel G. Dela Paz
(Dela Paz), petitioners, filed a Petition for Prohibition assailing the constitutionality of
certain provisions, including the requirement of signing the Consent of Voluntary
Presentation for Inspection in the pro forma application form for firearm registration,
for violating Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution on the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.

30
DOCTRINE
There is no constitutional right to bear arms. Neither is the ownership or
possession of a firearm a property right. Persons intending to use a firearm can only
either accept or decline the government's terms for its use.

The grant of license, however, is without prejudice to the inviolability of the

home. The right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures remains
paramount, and the government, in the guise of regulation, cannot conduct inspections
of applicants for firearm licenses unless armed with a search warrant.

───※ ·❆· ※───

BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS, FREE

SPEECH AND EXPRESSION, TO BE INFORMED OF THE
NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION, AND NON-
DETENTION SOLELY BY REASON OF POLITICAL BELIEFS

Calleja v. Executive Secretary

CARANDANG, J.
G.R. No. 252578 December 7, 2021
SUMMARY
Petitioners primarily assail the validity of Sections 4 to 12 of the Anti-Terror Act
due to their perceived facial vagueness and overbreadth that purportedly repress
protected speech. It is argued further that the unconstitutionality of the definition of
terrorism and its variants will leave it with "nothing to sustain its existence."

DOCTRINE
Under the vagueness doctrine, a law is constitutionally defective when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of
the Government muscle. Closely related to the vagueness doctrine is the overbreadth
doctrine, under which a law may be struck down as unconstitutional if it achieves a
governmental purpose by means that are unnecessarily broad and thereby invade the
area of protected freedoms. In Philippine jurisprudence, originally, it had special
application only to free-speech cases under non- penal laws.

───※ ·❆· ※───

31
 BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION

Valmores v. Achacosc
CAGUIOA, J.
G.R. No. 217453 July 19, 2017
SUMMARY
Petitioner Denmark S. Valmores (Valmores) is a member of the Seventh-day
Adventist Church. To avoid potential conflict between his academic schedule and his
church's Saturday worship, Valmores wrote a letter to respondent Achacoso, requesting
that he be excused from attending his classes in the event that a regular weekday session
is rescheduled to a Saturday. Some of Valmores' classes and examinations were moved
from weekdays to Saturdays. Despite his request for exemption, no accommodation was
given by either of the respondents. As a result, Valmores received a failing grade of 5
for that particular module and was considered ineligible to retake the exam.

DOCTRINE
The Bill of Rights guarantees citizens the freedom to act on their individual
beliefs and proscribes government intervention unless necessary to protect its citizens
from injury or when public safety, peace, comfort, or convenience requires it. Valmores
is being made by respondents to choose between honoring his religious obligations and
finishing his education is a patent infringement of his religious freedoms. As the final
bulwark of fundamental rights, this Court will not allow such violation to perpetuate
any further.

───※ ·❆· ※───

EMINENT DOMAIN

Republic v. San Miguel Vda. De Ramos

CAGUIOA, J.
G.R. No. 211576 February 19, 2020
SUMMARY
The property subject of this case is a parcel of land in Valenzuela City covered
by TCT No. V-11181 registered under the names of respondents Juliana San Miguel Vda.
de Ramos, et al. Petitioner Republic, represented by the Department of Public Works
and Highways (DPWH), sought to acquire the subject property in relation to the
construction of the North Luzon Expressway Harbor Link Project. The Republic offered
to purchase the subject property for an amount based on the zonal value issued by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), i.e. P457,800, but this offer was rejected by the
respondents. Hence, the Republic filed an action for expropriation before the Regional
Trial Court which ordered DPWH to pay consequential damages and interest.

DOCTRINE
1. Interest in addition to Just Compensation In Evergreen Manufacturing
Corp. v. Republic, citing Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the
32
 Philippines, the Court explained that "the rationale for imposing interest
on just compensation is to compensate the property owners for the
income that they would have made if they had been properly
compensated — meaning if they had been paid the full amount of just
compensation — at the time of taking when they were deprived of their
property."
2. Consequential Damages in Just Compensation - Awarded in case only a
portion of the property owner was expropriated and the taking of said
portion affects the use or value of the remaining portion
3. Just Compensation , should already include the loss of the property owner
because he has to pay transfer taxes and capital gains tax on the said
sale.

───※ ·❆· ※───

EMINENT DOMAIN AND EXPROPRIATION

Republic v. Decena
JUSTICE, J.
Case Code Case Date
SUMMARY
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) sought to acquire the
properties of the, Estrella Decena et. al., all of which are located along Old Balara,
Quezon City, as part of its Circumferential Road 5 (C5 Road) Extension Road Widening
Project. When attempts by Petitioner Decena et. al. to obtain the subject properties
through negotiated sale failed, Petitioner instituted five (5) separate complaints for
expropriation against Respondents between November 2010 and February 2011. These
complaints were later consolidated before the RTC.

DOCTRINE
R.A. 8974 (An Act To Facilitate The Acquisition of Right-Of-Way, Site or Location
for National Government Infrastructure Projects) requires the government to pay at two
stages: first, immediately upon the filing of the complaint, the initial deposit which is
100% of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the
BIR, and the value of the improvements and/or structures sought to be expropriated;
and second, the just compensation as determined by the court, when the decision
becomes final and executory, in which case the implementing agency shall pay the
owner the difference between the just compensation as determined by the court and
the amount already or initially paid.

───※ ·❆· ※───

33
 BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS IN A CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION

People v. Dacanay
CAGUIOA, J.
G.R. No. 216064 November 7, 2016
SUMMARY
Antonio T. Dacanay (Antonio) was charged with the crime of Parricide under
Article 246 of the RPC, for the attack, assault and use of personal violence upon the
person of one NORMA DACANAY y ERO, his wife. Despite having been apprised of his
rights, Antonio confessed to the crime before the media representatives, who separately
interviewed him while he was in his detention cell, without the police.

DOCTRINE
Accused’s verbal confession to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1)
and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with
the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the
relationship between the individual and the State.

───※ ·❆· ※───

BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO PRESUMPTION OF

INNOCENCE

People v. Doria
CAGUIOA, J.
G.R. No. 227854 October 9, 2019
SUMMARY
Perez, was arrested for alleged violation of RA 9165, for illegal sale and
possession of illegal drugs. During the trial, the prosecution did not show proof of
compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165. Perez argued that since
he is the accused he has the presumption of innocence, and furthermore he cannot be
found guilty of violation of RA 9165 specially considering compliance with Section 21 of
RA 9165 has not been proven by the prosecution.

DOCTRINE
Undoubtedly, the spread of illegal drugs must be quelled. Our Constitution
declares that the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and
property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by
all the people of the blessings of democracy. Nevertheless, by sacrificing the sacred and
indelible right to due process for the sheer sake of convenience and expediency, the
very maintenance of peace and order sought after is rendered wholly nugatory. By
thrashing basic constitutional rights as a means to curtail the proliferation of illegal
drugs, instead of protecting the general welfare, oppositely, the general welfare is
34
 viciously assaulted. In other words, when the Constitution is disregarded, the war on
illegal drugs becomes a self-defeating and self-destructive enterprise. A battle waged
against illegal drugs that tramples on the rights of the people, is not a war on drugs; it
is a war against the people.

In an alleged violation of RA 9165, the Prosecution has the burden to prove the
compliance provided for by Section 21, RA 9165 the applicable law at the time of the
commission of the alleged crimes, particularly the prosecution must prove
a. the seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after
seizure or confiscation; and
b. the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence
of:
1. the accused or his/her representative or counsel,
2. an elected public official,
3. a representative from the media, and
4. a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.

If the prosecution failed to prove the compliance with such requirements, and it
also failed to provide a justifiable reason for failure to comply, the accused must be
acquitted as failure to comply with Section 21, of RA 9165, is already proof that the
accused is innocent and not proven guilty.

NOTES
If the buy-bust occurred on or after August 7, 2014, RA 10640 has taken effect
thus in such case, the witness required are only (1) an elected public official, and (2) a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media, who shall sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

───※ ·❆· ※───

BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO PRESUMPTION OF

INNOCENCE

Cuico v. People
CAGUOIA, J.
G.R. No. 232293 December 9, 2020
SUMMARY
Evelyn Cuico allegedly violated Sec 12 of RA 9165 or Dangerous Drugs wherein
she was allegedly have in her possession, 23 disposable syringe and 3 ampoules of Nubain
or Nalbuphine Hydrichloride. PO3 Tiempo along with other police officer were
conducting "foot patrol" in Barang Kamagayan, Cebu City where they saw a group of men
coming out from a small shanty made of light materials. PO3 Teimpo, who was standing

35
 near the open door shanty, saw that Cucio injecting nubain and found in her possession,
the said paraphernalia which they seized.

DOCTRINE
The presumption of innocence of the accused remains until the judgment of
conviction becomes final and executory. Even if a judgment of conviction exists, as long
as the same remains pending appeal, the accused is still presumed to be innocent until
his guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, in People v. Mingming, the Court
outlined what the prosecution must do to hurdle the presumption and secure a
conviction:

First, the accused enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence until final
conviction; conviction requires no less than evidence sufficient to arrive at a moral
certainty of guilt, not only with respect to the existence of a crime, but, more
importantly, of the identity of the accused as the author of the crime.

Second, the prosecution's case must rise and fall on its own merits and cannot
draw its strength from the weakness of the defense.

───※ ·❆· ※───

BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO PRESUMPTION OF

INNOCENCE

Casilag v. People
JUSTICE, J.
G.R. No. 213523 March 18, 2021
SUMMARY
Casilag was arrested after a buy bust for possession of “Shabu”, the buy bust
occurred in 2012. When the inventory was taken, there was no representative of the
media that was present.

DOCTRINE
As the Court explained in Polangcos v. People:

Article III, Section 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that every accused is
presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt. It is a basic
constitutional principle, fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the prosecution
the burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the offense charged by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Corollary thereto, conviction must rest on the strength of the
prosecution's evidence and not on the weakness of the defense." This presumption in
favor of the accused remains until the judgment of conviction becomes final and
executory. Borrowing the words of the Court in Mangubat, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et
al., "[u]ntil a promulgation of final conviction is made, this constitutional mandate
prevails." Hence, even if a judgment of conviction exists, as long as the same remains

36
 pending appeal, the accused is still presumed to be innocent until his guilt is
proved beyond reasonable doubt.

The requirements to be performed after a buy-bust provided in Section 21 of RA

9165 or RA 10640 if the buy-bust occurred on August 7, 2014 or later, must be done by
the arresting officer. The prosecution has the burden of proof to show that the said
requirements have been complied with. In this case, a buy-bust occurred in 2012 and
the prosecution was not able to prove that a public official, and a representative of the
DOJ was present during the buy bust which is required under Section 21 of RA 9165.only
with respect to the existence of a crime, but, more importantly, of the identity of the
accused as the author of the crime.

───※ ·❆· ※───

BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL

People v. Domingo
CAGUIOA, J.
G.R. No. 204895 March 21, 2018
SUMMARY
Three Informations were filed against Joel Domingo, accused-appellant, and Roel
Domingo (Roel) alleging that they shot VIRGILIO DALERE with the use of an unlicensed
firearm causing his instantaneous death; assault, attack and shoot ROQUE BARENG with
the use of an unlicensed firearm but was not able to hit him, thereby commencing by
overt acts the commission of the crime of Murder but did not perform all the acts of
execution. Throughout the proceeding (from pre-trial to MR), several delays ensured
and Joel Domingo was rearrested; his co-accused Roel Domingo was not.

DOCTRINE
To determine whether accused-appellant's right to speedy trial was violated,
"four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c)
the defendant's assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant."

Here, when the prosecution failed to present any evidence during the four trial
dates given to it, accused-appellant moved for the dismissal of the cases, which was
granted by the RTC. Accused-appellant also raised this as an issue on appeal with the
CA. In fact, as early as August 2006, accused-appellant had already raised his right to a
speedy trial when he moved for the cases to be re-raffled because of the delay in the
conduct of the pre-trial conference.

───※ ·❆· ※───

37
 BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND SPEEDY
DISPOSITION OF CASES

DBP v. COA
BERSAMIN, J.
G.R. No. 216954 April 18, 2017
SUMMARY
On February 9, 1990, the Monetary Board, through Board Resolution No. 132,
approved the Rules and Regulations for the Implementation of the Motor Vehicle Lease-
Purchase Plan (RR-MVLPP) for Government Financial Institution (GFI) officers as part of
the package of fringe benefits "to enable them to meet the demands of their work with
more facility and efficiency and provide them with economic means of coping with the
prestige and stature attendant to their respective positions."

DOCTRINE
Right to Due Process is simply the opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, the opportunity to explain one's side or the opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In the application of the
guarantee of due process, indeed, what is sought to be safeguarded is not the lack of
previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. As long as the party was
afforded the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due
process.

Right to Speedy disposition of cases requires that proceedings should be

conducted according to fixed rules, free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays. The right is violated when unjustified postponements of the proceedings are
sought and obtained, or when a long period of time is allowed without justifiable cause
or motive to elapse without the parties having their case tried.

───※ ·❆· ※───

BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY

People v. Sandiganbayan
CAGUIOA, J.
G.R. No. 228221 June 14, 2021
SUMMARY
This case involves the Contract for the Supply of Equipment and Service for the
National Broadband Network Project (NBN Project) between the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC), and Zhing Xing Telecommunications Equipment, Inc. (ZTE), a
Chinese corporation doing business in the People's Republic of China. During the material
period alleged in the Information, Abalos was a public officer, being then the Chairman
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Abalos was charged for violation of Section

38
 3 (h) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Abalos'
alleged brokering between the government and ZTE was the basis of the prosecution's
theory that he had financial interest in the NBN-ZTE contract. In turn, Abalos' alleged
financial interest is the cornerstone of the charge of violation of Section 3 (h) of R.A.
No. 3019. Because of the prosecution's failure to prove such fact, Abalos was acquitted
of the crime charged.

DOCTRINE
Section 7 of Rule 11 of Rules of Criminal Procedure states that:
There is a first jeopardy when there is:
(1) a valid information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction of the crime charged;
(2) a court of competent jurisdiction;
(3) the accused has been arraigned and had pleaded; and
(4) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without
his express consent.

The case at hand meets all the foregoing requirements. Abalos was charged with
violation of Section 3 (h) of R.A. No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan under an
information dated July 15, 2010. He was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty on August
10, 2010. 34 On May 11, 2016, the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division issued the Assailed
Decision acquitting Abalos of the crime charged for failure of the prosecution to
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. This was affirmed by the Sandiganbayan
Special Fourth Division in its Assailed Resolution dated September 29, 2016, which
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The Sandiganbayan noted, evaluated,
and considered each and every piece of evidence, and the Assailed Decision
painstakingly discussed the same before making conclusions which are far from being
offensive to reason or logic. This is not the sham trial sought to be avoided by the limited
exception to the "finality-of-acquittal" rule. Just because petitioner disagrees with how
the Sandiganbayan weighed the prosecution's evidence does not mean that it was
deprived of due process. No party to litigation has a vested right in a favorable decision.
Generally, once there is an acquittal, the accused cannot be tried again as it
would violate his right against double jeopardy. The exception is when the acquittal was
met with grave abuse of discretion or lack of due process on the part of the prosecution.

───※ ·❆· ※───

39
 BILL OF RIGHTS; WRIT OF AMPARO; WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS

In The Matter Of The Petition For Writ Of Amparo And Writ Of

Habeas Corpus In Favor Of Lucena, Et Al.
PERALTA, J.
G.R. No. 252120 September 15, 2020
SUMMARY
Alicia Jasper Lucena or AJ, 19 years old, was enrolled as a Grade 11 student at
the Far Eastern University (FEU). There, AJ was enticed to join the FEU Chapter of
Anakbayan — a youth organization supposedly advocating ideals of national democracy.
AJ informed petitioners that she had joined and was now an official member of
Anakbayan. The next day, AJ left the family home without any explanation. She did not
return until three (3) days later.

DOCTRINE
The remedy of amparo, in its present formulation, is confined merely to
instances of "extralegal killings" or "enforced disappearances" and to threats thereof.
The Rules of Court envisions the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy applicable to cases
of illegal confinement or detention where a person is deprived of his or her liberty, or
where the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.

In this case, however, it did not at all appear that AJ had been deprived of her
liberty or that petitioners had been excluded from their rightful custody over the person
of AJ. The writs of amparo and habeas corpus were never meant to temper the
brashness of youth. The resolution of the conflict besetting petitioners and their
daughter AJ is simply beyond the competence of the writs applied for.

───※ ·❆· ※───

CITIZENSHIP; FOUNDLINGS
ELECTION LAW; CANCELLATION OF CERTIFICATE OF
CANDIDACY

Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission On Elections

JUSTICE, J.
G.R. Nos. 221697 and 221698-700 March 8, 2016
SUMMARY
When Grace Poe-Llamanzares was an infant, her natural parents abandoned her
at the Parish Church of Jara, Ilo-ilo. She was found by Edgardo Militar and was given to
the custody and care of Emiliano Militar and his wife. She was registered as a foundling

40
 with the local civil registry. She was subsequently adopted by Fernando Poe Jr. and
Susan Roces.

DOCTRINE
Under Section 2, Article 4, natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship. In the first place, having to perform an act means that the act
must be done personally by the citizen. In this instance, the determination of foundling
status is done not by the child but by the authorities. Secondly, the object of the process
is the determination of the whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child.
Lastly, the process is certainly not analogous to the naturalization proceedings to
acquire Philippine citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by one born of an alien
father and a Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.

Generally, the Commission on Elections has the ministerial duty to receive and
acknowledge receipt of certificates of candidacy. The Commission on Elections has the
competence to deny acceptance of a certificate of candidacy when a candidate's lack
of qualifications appears patent on the face of the certificate of candidacy and is
indubitable. This is in line with its power to "enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election."

───※ ·❆· ※───

LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

Domingo v. Ochoa, Jr
CAGUIOA, J.
G.R. No. 226648-49 March 27, 2019
SUMMARY
The Career Executive Service Board (CESB) was created by virtue of Presidential
Decree No. dated September 24, 1972, to serve as the governing body of the Career
Executive Service (CES). One of the functions of the CESB is to review, deliberate and
vote upon applications for original appointments or promotion of CESO ranks of
government officials. Twaño admitted signing the pertinent Resolution but denied
acting with improper motive. He claims that he inhibited himself and went outside the
meeting room when his application was discussed by the CESB and was only informed
when he returned to the room that the CESB had resolved to recommend him to the
rank of CESO III. Further, he argued that the CESB acted as a collegial body in issuing
the Resolutions and that he was unaware of the practice of writing "no part" beside his
signature in signing a CESB Resolution.

DOCTRINE
Negligence is the omission of the diligence required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of
the place. In the case of public officials, there is negligence when there is a breach of
41
 duty or failure to perform the obligation.Specifically, an act done in good faith, when
the same constitutes only an error of judgment with no ulterior motives and/or
purposes, constitutes simple negligence.

───※ ·❆· ※───

LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS; CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Cerilles v. CSC
CAGUIOA, J.
G.R. No. 180845 November 22, 2017
SUMMARY
On November 7, 2000, Republic Act No. 8973 entitled "An Act creating the
Province of Zamboanga Sibugay from the Province of Zamboanga del Sur and for other
purposes" was passed. As a consequence thereof, the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA)
of the province of Zamboanga del Sur (province, for brevity) was reduced by thirty-six
percent (36%). Because of such reduction, petitioner [Gov. Cerilles], sought the opinion
of public respondent [CSC] on the possibility of reducing the workforce of the provincial
government.

DOCTRINE
RA 6656 was enacted to implement the State's policy of protecting the security
of tenure of officers and employees in the civil service during the reorganization of
government agencies
IN THIS CASE, There is bad faith when the permanent employees were removed
and the LGU kept the office or department wherein said permanent employees were
previously employed.
There is no encroachment on the discretion of the appointing authority when the
CSC revokes an appointment on the ground that the removal of the employee was done
in bad faith. In such instance, the CSC is not actually directing the appointment of
another, but simply ordering the reinstatement of the illegally removed employee.
To successfully impugn the validity of a reorganization and correspondingly
demand for the reinstatement or reappointment, the aggrieved officer or employee has
the burden to prove the existence of bad faith.

───※ ·❆· ※───

42
 CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION; APPOINTMENT

DDB v. Matibag
CAGUIOA, J.
G.R. No. 2100013 January 22, 2020
SUMMARY
On July 16, 2010, the Office of the President issued the Guidelines Implementing
Memorandum Circular No. 1, 5 which states that "all non-CESOs occupying CES positions
in all agencies of the Executive Branch shall remain in office and continue to perform
their duties and discharge their responsibilities until July 31, 2010 or until their
resignations have been accepted, and/or until their respective replacements have been
appointed or designated, whichever comes first, unless they are reappointed in the
meantime." Matibag, Chief of Policy Studies, Research and Statistics Division was
terminated and filed a case for illegal dismissal. The Dangerous Drug Board, argued that
Matibag was not illegally terminated as Matibag failed to comply with CESB Resolution
No. 811 rendering her appointment as temporary and not permanent, for failure to
comply with the interview requirement to render her appointment as permanent.

DOCTRINE
An appointment is permanent where the appointee meets all the requirements
for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility
prescribed, and it is temporary where the appointee meets all the requirements for the
position except only the appropriate civil service eligibility. On many occasions, the
appointment of non-CES eligibles to CES positions in the government in the absence of
appropriate eligibles and when there is necessity in the interest of public service to fill
vacancies in the government. But in all such cases, the appointment is at best merely
temporary as it is said to be conditioned on the subsequent obtention of the required
CES eligibility.

───※ ·❆· ※───

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ARTICLE XI OF

THE CONSTITUTION;
POWERS OF THE LOCAL CHIEF EXECUTIVE; LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991

Lacap v. Sandiganbayan
CAGUIOA, J.
G.R. No. 198162 June 21, 2017
SUMMARY
Corazon Lacap, the municipal mayor of Masantol, Pampanga, was indicted for
violation of Section 3(f) of RA 3019, for having allegedly neglected or refused, after due
demand, and without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time, on the
43
 application of complainant Fermina Santos for a business permit in Masantol, Pampanga
for the years 1999 and 2000 for the purpose of discriminating against Fermina, who
previously filed a criminal complaint against the accused's husband. Mayor Lacap
claimed that she did not order the closure of the store because when she assumed her
post as a Mayor, Santos' store was already closed by her husband, the former Mayor, way
back June 23, 1997 because it was operating without a Mayor's permit, DTI, SSS and that
she was not issuing official receipt to their customers.

DOCTRINE
The Constitution mandates that: "Public office is a public trust. Public officers
and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and
lead modest lives." Thus, "[they] are called upon to act expeditiously on matters pending
before them. For only in acting thereon either by signifying approval or disapproval may
the [public] continue on to the next step of the bureaucratic process. On the other hand,
official inaction brings to a standstill the administrative process and the [public] is left
in the darkness of uncertainty."

Evidently, the Local Government Code of 1991 is unequivocal that the municipal
mayor has the power to issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for
any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued,
pursuant to law or ordinance.

───※ ·❆· ※───

LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS; POWERS OF THE OFFICE OF

THE OMBUDSMAN

Alaska v. Garcia
CAGUOIA, J.
G.R. No. 228298 June 23, 2021
SUMMARY
Four armed men committed robbery with homicide occurred at the Petron
Gasoline station owned by Leoncio and Josefina Docena. The Police officers conducted
an investigation through interviews with the witnesses and other persons of interest.
They discovered that one Lilia Agda (a cook in the gas station) mistakenly sent a message
to the cellphone Gubie Docena, which was one of the items taken by the robbers. Alaska
and Montesa were charged with Robbery with Homicide before the RTC. They argued
that their warrantless arrest were unlawful and there was no probable cause for the
filing of the information.

DOCTRINE
Jurisprudence has so far settled that dismissal based on the grounds provided
under Section 20 is not mandatory and is discretionary on the part of the evaluating
Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman evaluating the administrative complaint. Clearly, as
the law, its implementing rules, and interpretative jurisprudence stand, the dismissal
44
 by the Ombudsman on grounds provided under Section 20 is applicable only to
administrative complaints. Its invocation in the present criminal case is therefore
misplaced.
Contrariwise, the procedure in criminal cases requires that the Ombudsman
evaluate the complaint and after evaluation, to make its recommendations in
accordance with Section 2, Rule II of the Admin[i]strative Order No. 07, as follows:
Section 2. Evaluation. — Upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer
shall recommend whether it may be:
a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit;
b) referred to respondent for comment;
c) indorsed to the proper government office or agency which has jurisdiction
over the case;
d) forwarded to the appropriate office or official for fact-finding investigation;
e) referred for administrative adjudication; or
f) subjected to a preliminary investigation.
Thus, the only instance when an outright dismissal of a criminal complaint is
warranted is when such complaint is palpably devoid of merit.

───※ ·❆· ※───

LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS; OFFICE OF THE

OMBUDSMAN

Ifurung v. Carpio-Morales
MARTIRES, J.
G.R. No. 232131 April 24 2018
SUMMARY
Petitioner Rey Nathaniel C. Ifurung (petitioner),who claims to be a taxpayer, a
concerned Filipino citizen, and a member of the Bar, invokes the jurisprudence laid
down by the Court in Funa v. Villar, in asserting that he has locus standi to file the
instant petition. He avers that he is seeking the correction of a recurring statutory wrong
and a declaration from the Court that the positions held by the respondents are vacant.
Respondents are the incumbent officials of the Office of the Ombudsman, viz.: Conchita
Carpio Morales, Ombudsman (Ombudsman Morales).

DOCTRINE
Notably, the framers plainly provided for a seven-year term of the Ombudsman
and the deputies. For sure, nowhere in the Constitution can it be gathered that the
appointment to any vacancy for the position of Ombudsman and the deputies shall be
only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. This can only mean that it was the
intent of the framers that the appointment to the positions of the Ombudsman and the
deputies, whether it be for the expired or unexpired term of the predecessor, shall
always be for a full term of seven years. Under Sec. 8 (3) of R.A. No. 6770, we note that
in case of death, resignation, removal, or permanent disability of the Ombudsman, the

45
 new Ombudsman shall be appointed for a full term. Undoubtedly, Sec. 8 (3), R.A. No.
6770 is consistent with Sec. 11, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution in so far as it provides
that the Ombudsman and the deputies shall serve for a term of seven years. Every
statute is presumed valid.

───※ ·❆· ※───

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; REFUND OF ALLOWANCES;

UNLAWFUL EXPENDITURES; SECTION 52, CHAPTER 9,
TITLE I, Book V, ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION; POWERS OF
COMMISSION ON AUDIT

Madera v. Commission On Audit

CAGUIOA, J.
G.R. No. 244128 September 8, 2020
SUMMARY
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, assailing the COA Decision and Resolutions which affirmed the
disallowance of various allowances given in 2013 to the officials and employees of the
Municipality of Mondragon, Northern Samar (the Municipality). The Municipality passed
and approved Sangguniang Bayan Ordinance and Resolution, granting various allowances
to its officials and employees.

DOCTRINE
By way of exception, passive recipients or payees of disallowed salaries,
emoluments, benefits and other allowances need not refund such disallowed amounts if
they received the same in good faith. Stated otherwise, government officials and
employees who unwittingly received disallowed benefits or allowances are not liable for
their reimbursement if there is no finding of bad faith.

While the Court supports the mandate of the COA in ensuring that the funds of
the government are properly utilized and the return to the government of funds unduly
spent, the same must not be at the expense of public officials and employees who are
directly tasked to discharge and render public service - especially when the
presumptions of good faith and regularity in the performance of their duties have not
been rebutted or overturned. Otherwise, the Court would unintentionally sanction the
discouragement of competent and well-meaning individuals from joining the
government. When service in the government is seen as unattractive and unappealing,
it is the public that suffers.

Taking all this into consideration, the Court has laid down the rules that it deems
equitable to the government whose interest is safeguarded by the COA, on the one hand,

46
 and to the government employees who approved, certified, and received the disallowed
benefits, on the other.

NOTES
ADDITIONAL NOTES: The Court recognizes that the jurisprudence regarding the
refund of disallowed amounts by the COA is evolving, at times conflicting, and is
primarily dealt with on a case-to-case basis. If a Notice of Disallowance is set aside by
the Court, no return shall be required from any of the persons held liable therein.

However, if a Notice of Disallowance is upheld, the rules on return are as follows:

a. Approving and certifying officers who acted in good faith, in regular

performance of official functions, and with the diligence of a good father
of the family are not civilly liable to return consistent with Section 38 of
the Administrative Code of 1987.
b. Approving and certifying officers who are clearly shown to have acted in
bad faith, malice, or gross negligence are, pursuant to Section 43 of the
Administrative Code of 1987, solidarily liable to return only the net
disallowed amount which, as discussed herein, excludes amounts excused
under the following sections 2c and 2d.
c. Recipients — whether approving or certifying officers or mere passive
recipients — are liable to return the disallowed amounts respectively
received by them, unless they are able to show that the amounts they
received were genuinely given in consideration of services rendered.
d. The Court may likewise excuse the return of recipients based on undue
prejudice, social justice considerations, and other bona fide exceptions
as it may determine on a case to case basis.

───※ ·❆· ※───

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; DOCTRINE OF CONDONATION

BOTE v. SPCPI
CAGUIOA, J.
G.R. No. 203471 September 14, 2020
SUMMARY
This case stemmed from an administrative complaint filed by Rolando Salonga
on behalf of Respondent SPCPI against Bote, the incumbent mayor for violation of
Section 444 (b) (2) (iv) of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7160, abuse of authority, and culpable
violation of the Constitution.

DOCTRINE
Guided by the foregoing standard on what constitutes misconduct, for the
doctrine of condonation to apply, the malfeasance, misfeasance or non-feasance

47
 committed by the elective official should have a direct relation to his official function
or have adversely affected the performance of his official duties.

───※ ·❆· ※───

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY FOR

GRAVE MISCONDUCT
LOCAL GOVERNMENT; POWERS OF THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNITS

Rejas v. Ombudsman
CAGUIOA, J.
GR Nos. 241576 and 241623 November 3, 2020
SUMMARY
Diosdado Ditona (Ditona) alleged that Rogelio N. Quiño (Rogelio), the former
Municipal Mayor of Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, approved several appointments of his
brother, Antonio N. Quiño, Jr. (Antonio), as Mechanical Shop Foreman. Ditona alleged
that these appointments violated the rule on nepotism.

DOCTRINE
In order to establish administrative liability for misconduct, there must be a
nexus between the public official's acts and the functions of his or her office.

Misconduct has been defined as an intentional wrongdoing or a deliberate

violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior. It is considered grave where the
elements of corruption are present including a clear intent to violate the law, or a
flagrant disregard of established rules. To constitute misconduct, however, it is likewise
imperative that the act or omission complained of must have a direct relation to the
public officer's duties and affect not only his character as a private individual, but also,
and more importantly, the performance of his official duties as a public servant. The
misfeasance or malfeasance must amount to either maladministration or willful,
intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties of the office.

Local government units are endowed with power to fix the compensation of their
officials and employees. Under the LGC, the function of salary determination, which
includes any increase or adjustment, is lodged in the sanggunian concerned. This is clear
from Sections 81 and 447 of the LGC.

───※ ·❆· ※───

48
 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES

Republic v. Larrazabal, Sr.

CAGUIOA, J.
G.R. No. 204530 July 26,2017
SUMMARY
Petitioner filed a Complaint with the RTC for expropriation of portions of three
parcels of land that respondents Potenciano, Victoria, and Betty owned. After the filing
of the Complaint, petitioner was allowed to enter the properties, demolish the
improvements thereon, and to deposit the amounts corresponding to the provisional
payments for the properties.

DOCTRINE
It is a well-entrenched principle that statutes, including administrative rules and
regulations, operate prospectively unless the legislative intent to the contrary is
manifest by express terms or by necessary implication because the retroactive
application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested. This is based
on the Latin maxim: Lex prospicit non respicit (the law looks forward, not backward).

RA 8974 being a substantive law, applies prospectively and not retroactively,

since the law does not provide that it has retroactive effect.

───※ ·❆· ※───

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS;

POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES; RULE-MAKING
POWER

GMA v. NTC
CAGUIOA, J.
G.R. Nos. 192128 and 192135-36 September 13, 2017
SUMMARY
Petitioner GMA, formerly known as Republic Broadcasting System, Inc., is a
Filipino-owned domestic corporation engaged in the business of radio and television
broadcasting as a grantee of a legislative franchise by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7252 enacted on March 20, 1992, to construct, install, operate and maintain radio and
television broadcasting stations in the Philippines for a period of 25 years. Meanwhile,
respondent NTC is the gov’t agency exercising jurisdiction over the supervision,
adjudication and control of all telecommunications and broadcast services in the
country.

49
DOCTRINE
The Court has held that the respondent NTC, being the government agency
entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under its special and technical forte,
and possessing the necessary rule-making power to implement its objectives, is in the
best position to interpret its own rules, regulations and guidelines.

───※ ·❆· ※───

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; QUASI JUDICIAL AGENCIES

Sumifru v. NMSF
CAGUIOA, J.
G.R. No. 202091 June 7, 2017
SUMMARY
Sumifru is a domestic corporation that survived after merging with Fresh banana
Agricultural Corporation which was engaged in buying, marketing, and exportation of
Cavendish bananas. Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Suyapa Farm (NAMASUF A-NAFLU-KMU),
a labor organization, filed a Petition for Certification Election before the Department
of Labor and Employment, Regional Office No. XI in Davao City. NAMASUF A claimed that
there was no existing union in the aforementioned establishment. On the other hand,
FBAC filed an Opposition to the Petition and argued that there exists no employer-
employee relationship between it and the workers involved. Sumifru, filed an a petition
for review to the CA of a judgment by the Med-Arbiter of DOLE, finding it to be the
employer of certain employees who are members of the employee union, Nagkahiusang
Mamumuo sa Suyapa Farm (NAMASUFA-NAFLU-KMU) (NAMASUFA).

DOCTRINE
The factual findings by quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Department of Labor
and Employment, when supported by substantial evidence, are entitled to great respect
in view of their expertise in their respective fields. absent any showing of whimsical or
capricious exercise of judgment, and unless lack of any basis for the conclusions made
by the appellate court be amply demonstrated, we may not disturb such factual findings.
Therefore, absent any showing of whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment, and
unless lack of any basis for the conclusions made by the said quasi-judicial agencies be
amply demonstrated, the courts may not disturb such factual findings. Absent any
showing of a grave-abuse of discretion by the quasi-judicial agency, the court will
respect the findings of the said agency.

───※ ·❆· ※───

50
 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

Nacilla v. MTRCB
CAGUIOA, J.
G.R. No. 223449 November 10,2020
SUMMARY
Petitioners Mina C. Nacilla (Nacilla) and Roberto C. Jacobe (Jacobe) were former
employees of the MTRCB. Nacilla held the position of Administrative Officer V with
Salary Grade (SG) 18 while Jacobe, who passed away on May 21, 2011, was formerly
employed as Secretary I or Administrative Assistant I with SG 7. Jacobe was assigned to
register the 2004 CNA with the CSC and for which he brought copies to the CSC Personnel
Relations Office (CSC-PRO). He was, however, informed that the 2004 CNA could not be
registered because it was not properly ratified by the MTRCBEA and was not submitted
for registration within 30 days from its execution. CSC-PRO advised Jacobe to cause the
signing of the 2004 CNA anew, post a copy in conspicuous places for at least seven days
and ratify it again before re-submitting it to the CSC-PRO for registration. Petitioners
moved for reconsideration and questioned the power and authority of the Adjudication
Committee to impose the penalty of dismissal, but the committee denied this. It ruled
that it acted and decided pursuant to their authority.

DOCTRINE
The MTRCB is empowered to create sub-committees to exercise the power
granted to the Board. There is nothing in its charter that requires that decisions be made
en banc when what is involved is a disciplinary proceeding involving its employees.

───※ ·❆· ※───

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; GOCCS; PUBLIC CORPORATIONS

Land Bank v. Spouses Amagan

CAGUIOA, J.
G.R. No. 209794 June 27, 2016
SUMMARY
The Land Bank of the Philippines through the LBP Legal Services Group,filed a
writ of replevin against Sps Amagan. After LBP filed an Amended Complaint, pursuant
to the April 27, 2011 Order of the RTC, Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss, which
was followed by another Motion to Dismiss both anchored on the fact that the instant
Complaint for Replevin was not filed or initiated by the OGCC, and that the LBP Legal
Services Group is not authorized to initiate the instant complaint against Respondents.
Sps Amagan argued that the writ of replevin cannot be allowed as the LBP - LSG is not
the authorized counsel of the LBP as only the OGCC is authorized to represent LBP.

51
DOCTRINE
It is the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) who is the primary
counsel for cases filed by or against GOCCs. Other counsel such as the LBP Legal Services
Group (LBP - LSG) can be a secondary counsel provided it is authorized by the OGCC.

───※ ·❆· ※───

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

Ancheta v. Villa
CAGUIOA, J.
G.R. No. 229634 January 15, 2020
SUMMARY
Felomino C. Villa (Villa) filed an administrative complaint against Ancheta,
former Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), Talavera, Nueva Ecija for Grave Misconduct and
Dishonesty and for violation of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3019 in connection with Ancheta's
alleged irregular issuance of an Order granting the quashal of a writ of execution in
favor of Villa. The Ombudsman found Ancheta guilty of simple neglect of duty and
imposed on him a fine in lieu of suspension. The Ombudsman found no relevant and
competent evidence linking Ancheta to the alleged inclusion of the subject Order in the
case records because the statements of Villa and his witnesses were all hearsay.

DOCTRINE
While factual findings of administrative and quasi-judicial agencies, such as the
Ombudsman, are generally accorded not only respect but at times finality, this holds
true only when they are supported by substantial evidence.

NOTES

───※ ·❆· ※───

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY

Lukban v. Carpio-Morales
CAGUIOC, J.
G.R. No. 238568 February 12 2020
SUMMARY
This case arose from the so-called "chopper scam" that involved the procurement
of second-hand light police operational helicopters (LPOHs) for use of the Philippine
National Police (PNP). During the time material to this case, petitioner Lukban was the
Chief of the Management Division of the PNP Directorate for Comptrollership. Pursuant
to the modernization program of the PNP, procurement of three (3) LPOHs were included
in its Annual Procurement Plan (APP) for Calendar Year 2008.
52
DOCTRINE
In administrative proceedings, the complainant carries the burden of proving the
allegations with substantial evidence or "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
will accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable
might conceivably opine differently."Jurisprudence instructs that for an act to
constitute such an administrative offense, it need not be related to or connected with
the public officer's official functions. What is essential is that the questioned conduct
tarnishes the image and integrity of his public office. However, after a careful review
of the records of this case, the Court finds that there is no substantial evidence to hold
Lukban administratively liable for gross dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the
service. Consequently, his dismissal was improper.

───※ ·❆· ※───

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF

ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS; CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Marzan v. City Government Of Olongapo

CAGUIOA, J.
G.R. No. 232769 November 3, 2020
SUMMARY
On January 16, 2008, Marzan was named City Government Department Head II
of was made by was made by then-Mayor James Gordon, Jr. and approved by the CSC
on June 7, 2011. Mayor Gordon appointed Marzan as City Budget Officer (City
Government). Department Head II) of the City Budget Office (CBO) on December 1,
2011. Marzan was to perform these duties in addition to her duties as Zoning
Administrator Director, Administrator Directed Officer to facilitate [Marzan's] lateral
transfer to her concurrent position as Budget Officer.

DOCTRINE
Nonetheless, the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies admits
exceptions:

x x x A party may directly resort to judicial remedies if any of the following is

present:
1. When there is a violation of due process
2. When the issue involved is purely a legal question,
3. When the administrative action is patently illegal, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction;
4. When there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency
concerned;

53
 5. When there is irreparable injury;
6. When the respondent is a department secretary who acts as an alter ego
of the President, bear the implied and assumed approval of the latter;
7. When requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable;
8. When it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
9. When the subject matter is a private land inland case proceedings;
10. When the rule does not provide a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy,
11. When there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention.
The Administrative Code of 1987 (Administrative Code) establishes the CSC as
the government's central personnel agency. As a result, the CSC is empowered to
"[p]rescribe, amend, and enforce rules and regulations [to] carry out the provisions of
the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws."

───※ ·❆· ※───

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE IN

ADMINISTRATIVE CASESc

FFIB-MOLEO v. Major Jandayan

CAGUIOA, J.
G.R. No. 218155 September 22, 2020
SUMMARY
In 2000 the Philippine Marine Corps (PMC) released funds amounting to over 36M
intended for combat clothing and individual equipment allowance named CCIE
allowance. The checks were issued by way of cash advances. Various documents were
submitted to support the liquidation of the cash advances. Upon investigations, random
sampling of Marines whose names were part of the CCIE allowance never got the said
CCIE allowance. It was also shown that the signature on the payrolls were not the same
as the marines.

DOCTRINE
In administrative cases, the quantum of proof is merely substantial evidence or
evidence which the reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion

───※ ·❆· ※───

54
 ELECTION LAW; QUALIFICATIONS AND
DISQUALIFICATIONS OF CANDIDATES

Piccio v. HRET
CAGUIOA, J.
G.R. No. 248985 October 5, 2021
SUMMARY
Vergara is a natural-born Filipino citizen, having been born to Filipino parents on
November 5, 1963 in the City of Manila. In 1994, she moved to Cabanatuan City where
she married her husband and established their family home. On May 20, 1998, she moved
to the United States of America (USA), because of job opportunities, and later obtained
a Certificate of Naturalization as an American citizen and was thereby issued an
American passport.

DOCTRINE
In order that a natural-born Filipino citizen, who has lost his/her Filipino
citizenship by reason of naturalization abroad, may qualify to run for elective public
office in the Philippines, must (1) re-acquire Philippine citizenship by taking an Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; and (2) make a personal and sworn
renunciation of his foreign citizenship.

───※ ·❆· ※───

ELECTION LAW; POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMELEC

PADPAO v. COE
CAGUIOC, J.
G.R. No. 223505 October 3, 2017
SUMMARY
The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 10015 which provided for the rules
and regulations on the ban on bearing, carrying or transporting of firearms and other
deadly weapons and the employment, availment or engagement of the services of
security personnel or bodyguards during the election period, or commonly referred to
as the “Gun Ban.” Under the provisions of the Resolution, PSAs may obtain authority to
bear, carry, and transport firearms outside their place of work or business and in public
places during the election period after compliance with the foregoing documentary
requirements and under the conditions set forth.

DOCTRINE
(1) The Constitution and the cited laws specifically empower the COMELEC
to issue rules and regulations implementing the so-called Gun Ban during the election
period. The COMELEC does not encroach upon this authority of the PNP to regulate PSAs
– as it merely regulates the bearing, carrying and transporting of firearms and other
deadly weapons by PSAs and all other persons, during election period.

55
 (2) The equal protection clause does not preclude classification of individuals
who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is
reasonable and not arbitrary. Resolution No. 10015 applies to any and all persons,
whether private individuals or public officers. Rule III contains a comprehensive list of
persons required to obtain written authority from the COMELEC to bear, carry, and
transport firearms outside his place or residence or business. As correctly put by the
COMELEC through the OSG, there is substantial distinction between and among the
persons listed therein.
(3) There is no violation of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.
The PSAs’ contracts with their clients are not affected in any manner by the requirement
of having to obtain from the COMELEC written authority to bear, carry, and transport
firearms outside of their residence or place of work and in public places, during election
period. All that PSAs must do is to secure such authority.

───※ ·❆· ※───

LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS; ACCOUNTABILITY OF

PUBLIC OFFICERS

De Castro v. Office Of The Ombudsman

CAGUIOA, J.
G.R. No. 192723 June 5, 2017
SUMMARY
Leovigildo began working in the Bureau of Customs (BOC) on December 4, 1973
as a storekeeper at the Manila International Airport. Since then, Leovigildo had been
assigned to occupy different positions thereafter: Common Bonded Inspector, Common
Bonded Supervisor, Customs Operations Assistant Chief, Supervising Customs Operations
Officer, & Chief Customs Operations Officer.

DOCTRINE
Public service demands the highest level of honesty and transparency from its
officers and employees. The Constitution requires that all public officers and employees
be, at all times, accountable to the people; serve with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice; and lead modest lives. Public
office is a public trust; it must be treated as a privilege rather than a right, and rest
firmly upon one’s sense of service rather than entitlement.

───※ ·❆· ※───

56
ELECTION LAW; ELECTORAL PROTEST; ANNULMENT OF
ELECTION

Marcos, Jr. v. Robredo

LEONEN, J.
P.E.T. Case No. 005 February 16, 2021
SUMMARY
Ferdinand "Bongbong" R. Marcos, Jr. (Marcos Jr.), the protestant, challenged
before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal) the election of incumbent Vice
President Maria Leonor "Leni Daang Matuwid" G. Robredo (Robredo), the protestee, in
the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections.

DOCTRINE
The difference between the annulment of elections by electoral tribunals and
the declaration of failure of elections by the COMELEC cannot be gainsaid. First, the
former is an incident of the judicial function of electoral tribunals while the latter is in
the exercise of the COMELEC's administrative function. Second, electoral tribunals only
annul the election results connected with the election contest before it whereas the
declaration of failure of elections by the COMELEC relates to the entire election in the
concerned precinct or political unit. As such, in annulling elections, the respective
tribunal does so only to determine who among the candidates garnered a majority of
the legal votes cast. The COMELEC, on the other hand, declares a failure of elections
with the objective of holding or continuing the elections, which were not held or were
suspended, or if there was one, resulted in a failure to elect. When COMELEC declares
a failure of elections, special elections will have to be conducted.

Rule 65 of the Tribunal's Rules mandates an election protest to be dismissed

when the results of the revision and appreciation of the ballots in the pilot provinces do
not support the allegation of fraud or irregularities. The word "may" in Rule 65 refers to
the discretion of the Tribunal to dismiss or not the protest, and if the Tribunal does not
dismiss the protest, to require the protestant to designate "not more than three" pilot
provinces, a mandatory ceiling.

NOTES
In his separate concurring opinion, Justice Caguioa stressed that: 1) following
Rule 65 of the 2010 Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET Rules), the election
protest should be dismissed for Marcos Jr.’s failure to make out a case using his pilot
provinces; 2) a dismissal under Rule 65 applies to the whole protest, including Marcos
Jr.’s third cause of action; 3) the PET Rules, specifically Rule 65, still apply in cases of
annulment of elections contemplated in Abayon v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET); and 4) Abayon's strict requirements, as applied to Marcos Jr.’s
allegations, show that his third cause of action cannot be considered an annulment of
elections but is essentially a petition for declaration of a failure of elections.

───※ ·❆· ※───

57
 QUO WARRANTO, IMPEACHMENT, JUDICIAL
DEPARTMENT (JUDICIAL POWER, APPOINTMENTS TO
THE JUDICIARY, THE SUPREME COURT)

Republic v. Sereno
TIJAM, J.
G.R. No. 237428 May 11, 2018
SUMMARY
A petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of QUO WARRANTO was filed
by the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) against the appointment of CJ Maria Lourdes Sereno (Sereno) as Chief Justice.

DOCTRINE
The title to a PUBLIC OFFICE MAY NOT BE CONTESTED COLLATERLY BUT ONLY
DIRECTLY, by quo warranto proceedings. That the Court has held that title to public
office CAN NOT BE ASSAILED even through mandamus or a motion to annul or set aside
order.

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LOCAL GOVERNMENT; POWERS OF THE LOCAL

GOVERNMENT UNITS

People v. SANDIGANBAYAN
JUSTICE, J.
G.R. Nos. 190728-29 November 18, 202C
SUMMARY
This controversy stems from the 1986 sequestration by the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) of the properties of Bataan Shipyard and
Engineering Company, Inc., and its subsidiaries Philippine Dockyard Corporation and
BASECO Drydock & Construction Co., Inc. (collectively, BASECO). Among the sequestered
properties were nine parcels of land with a total area of 3,005,104 square meters
(subject properties), and registered with the Registry of Deeds of Bataan (RD Bataan).

DOCTRINE
Entering into the Compromise Agreement is within the corporate powers of the
local government unit. Private respondents' act of entering into the Compromise
Agreement with the purpose of ensuring the general welfare of the province by
guaranteeing the province's proprietary interest over the subject properties is most
consistent with the authorities granted to their offices under Sections 18 and 22 of R.A.
7160, on generating and applying resources and their corporate powers.

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 LOCAL GOVERNMENT; JUST SHARE TO NATIONAL
TAXES; LGU DECENTRALIZATION

Mandanas v. Ochoa
BERSAMIN, J.
G.R. No. 199802 July 3, 2018
SUMMARY
Implementing the constitutional mandate for decentralization and local
autonomy, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code (LGC), in order to guarantee the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs. The
share of the LGUs, heretofore known as the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), has been
regularly released to the LGUs. Mandanas, et al. assails the manner the General
Appropriations Act (GAA) for FY 2012 computed the IRA for the LGUs.

DOCTRINE
On the national taxes as just share
1. Although the power of Congress to make laws is plenary in nature,
congressional lawmaking remains subject to the limitations stated in the
1987 Constitution. The phrase national internal revenue taxes engrafted
in Section 284 is undoubtedly more restrictive than the term national
taxes written in Section 6. As such, Congress has actually departed from
the letter of the 1987 Constitution stating that national taxes should be
the base from which the just share of the LGU comes. Such departure is
impermissible. Verba legis non est recedendum (from the words of a
statute there should be no departure). Equally impermissible is that
Congress has also thereby curtailed the guarantee of fiscal autonomy in
favor of the LGUs under the 1987 Constitution.
2. Strictly speaking, customs duties are also taxes because they are
exactions whose proceeds become public funds. According to Garcia v.
Executive Secretary, 53 customs duties is the nomenclature given to taxes
imposed on the importation and exportation of commodities and
merchandise to or from a foreign country. Although customs duties have
either or both the generation of revenue and the regulation of economic
or social activity as their moving purposes, it is often difficult to say which
of the two is the principal objective in a particular instance, for, verily,
customs duties, much like internal revenue taxes, are rarely designed to
achieve only one policy objective.54 We further note that Section 102
(oo) of R.A. No. 10863(Customs Modernization and Tariff Act) expressly
includes all fees and charges imposed under the Act under the blanket
term of taxes.
3. It is clear from the foregoing clarification that the exclusion of other
national taxes like customs duties from the base for determining the just
share of the LGUs contravened the express constitutional edict in Section
6, Article X the 1987 Constitution.
4. The position of the OSG cannot be sustained. Although it has the primary
discretion to determine and x the just share of the LGUs in the national
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 taxes (e.g., Section 284 of the LGC), Congress cannot disobey the express
mandate of Section 6, Article X of the 1987 Constitution for the just share
of the LGUs to be derived from the national taxes. The phrase as
determined by law in Section 6 follows and qualies the phrase just share,
and cannot be construed as qualifying the succeeding phrase in the
national taxes. The intent of the people in respect of Section 6 is really
that the base for reckoning the just share of the LGUs should includes all
national taxes. To read Section 6 differently as requiring that the just
share of LGUs in the national taxes shall be determined by law is
tantamount to the unauthorized revision of the 1987 Constitution.

On fiscal autonomy
1. The foregoing constitutional provisions (Article VII, Section 3, on the
Judiciary; Article IX- A, Section 5, on the Constitutional Commissions;
Article XI, Section 14, on the Office of the Ombudsman; Article XIII,
Section 17(4), on the Commission on Human Rights) share two aspects.
The first relates to the grant of fiscal autonomy, and the second concerns
the automatic release of funds. The common denominator of the
provisions is that the automatic release of the appropriated amounts is
predicated on the approval of the annual appropriations of the offices or
agencies concerned.

Operative fact doctrine:

1. The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or
executive act prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality as an
operative fact that produced consequences that cannot always be erased,
ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or executive act
but sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the general rule that
a void or unconstitutional law produces no effect.
2. But its use must be subjected to great scrutiny and circumspection, and
it cannot be invoked to validate an unconstitutional law or executive act,
but is resorted to only as a matter of equity and fair play. It applies only
to cases where extraordinary circumstances exist, and only when the
extraordinary circumstances have met the stringent conditions that will
permit its application. (SC citing De Agbayani v. PNB)
3. Conformably with the foregoing pronouncements in Araullo v. Aquino III,
the effect of our declaration through this decision of the
unconstitutionality of Section 284 of the LGC and its related laws as far
as they limited the source of the just share of the LGUs to the NIRTs is
prospective. It cannot be otherwise.

Subject to congress
Municipal corporations, being mere creatures of the State, are subject to the
will of Congress, their creator. Their continued existence and the grant of their powers
are dependent on the discretion of Congress.

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