THIRD DIVISION

July 17, 2017

G.R. No. 208441
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPIES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
ZENAIDA FABRO or ZENAIDA MANALASTAS y VIÑEGAS, Accused-Appellant
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated February 19, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04598, affirming in toto the Decision dated July 16, 2010 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC),2 Branch 45 of San Fernando, Pampanga, in Criminal Case No.
1204, which found accused-appellant Zenaida Fabro or Zenaida Viñegas Manalastas guilty of
Serious Illegal Detention.
The Antecedents
In an Information dated March 6, 2006, accused-appellant was charged with Serious Illegal
Detention under Article 2673 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), in relation to Republic Act No.
7610,4 committed as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of March 2006, in the municipality of YYY, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, ZENAIDA FABRO
or ZENAIDA V. MANALASTAS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and
by force take [AAA],5 9 years old, minor, while the latter is in front of the XXX Elementary
School, YYY whom the said accused detained and kept in the house of Brgy. Capt. Fabro,
brother of the accused in Brgy. Villa Viniegas, Llanera, Nueva Ecija from March 2 to March 5,
2006 or a period of four (4) days under restraint and against her will.

Contrary to law.

When arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded "not guilty."

During trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of AAA and SPO1 Elmer Guevarra who
received the report of AAA's abduction. Accused-appellant was the lone witness for the
defense.
The prosecution sought to establish that on March 2, 2006, 9-year old AAA was attending her
Grade IV class at the XXX School in YYY, when accused-appellant suddenly arrived
supposedly to fetch her. Since accused-appellant was AAA's aunt residing just next to AAA's
house, the teacher allowed accused-appellant to take AAA. However, instead of bringing AAA
kept AAA in Nueva Ecija despite the latter's plea to go home. She refused to let AAA go even
after AAA's parents called her via cellular phone begging her to release their daughter.6
AAA's parents had reported the abduction to the police. After receiving information that
accused-appellant might go to her brother's house in Barangay Villa Viniegas, Nueva Ecija, the
police organized a team and monitored said house. On March 5, 2006, police operatives,
accompanied by AAA's parents, rescued AAA and apprehended the accused-appellant at her
brother's house.7
Denying the charge, accused-appellant declared that she could not have committed the crime
because she loved AAA whom she had known since 1999 and who used to frequent her house
to sleep, eat, and watch television with her siblings. She claimed that she brought AAA to
Nueva Ecija on March 2, 2006 with the consent of AAA's mother and teacher. She explained
that she had intended to bring AAA along to the Barangay Captain to prove that her husband
had taken her luggage and some documents, given that AAA used to clean their room. The
Barangay Captain was not around so they proceeded to Nueva Ecija after AAA requested to
join her. After two days in Nueva Ecija, or on March 5, 2006, she brought AAA to her brother's
house where she was arrested.8

The RTC convicted accused-appellant of Serious Illegal Detention, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused ZENAIDA FABRO or
ZENAIDA VIÑEGAS MANALASTAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Serious Illegal
Detention penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences the said
accused to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, together with all the accessory
penalties provided for by law and to pay the private complainant, AAA, thru her father BBB,
the sum of one hundred thousand pesos (₱l00,000.00) as moral damages.

The Jailer is hereby ordered to make the proper reduction of the period during which
the accused was under preventive custody by reason of this case in accordance with
law.

SO ORDERED.

Accused-appellant elevated the case to the CA, arguing that the prosecution failed to prove her
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and faulting the trial court for relying on the prosecution's
version of the events.9 The CA subsequently rendered the assailed Decision affirming the
RTC's Decision in toto. In the present appeal, accused-appellant further asserts that the
prosecution failed to prove her intent to detain the victim.10
Our Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The elements of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains
another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or
kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following
circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; or (b) it
is committed by simulating public authority; or (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted upon
the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or
detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. If the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial.11
There is no dispute that accused-appellant is a private individual and that she took AAA from
her school on March 2, 2006, brought her to Nueva Ecija and kept her there until she was
arrested on March 5, 2006.1avvphi1
That AAA was deprived of her liberty is clear from her testimony that despite her pleas for
accused-appellant to let her go home, the latter refused, thus:
Q: How many days did you stay in that house in Nueva Ecija, AAA?

A: Four, Ma'am.

Q: And, in those four days did you ask Tita Zeny to let you go home?

A: Yes Ma'am.

Q: And what did Tita Zeny tell you?

A: "Huwag muna daw po."

Q: At that time AAA, did you want to go home already in those four days?
A: Yes Ma'am.

Q: And do you know if Tita Zeny called your father or your mother thru cellphone in
those four days?

A: Yes Ma'am.

Q: Whom did Tita Zeny call, your father or your mother?

A: "Tatay ko."

Q: How did you know that Tita Zeny called your father?

A: "Sinabi pong kaklase ko na kinipnap (sic) po ako."

Q: AAA, you said that Tita Zeny called your father. Were you able to talk to your
father on the cellphone?

A: No, Ma'am. "Nakausap ko po ang nanay ko."

Q: Were you able to talk to your mother and that was thru the cellphone that was
being used by Tita Zeny?

A: Yes ma'am.

Q: And, what did you tell your mother?

A: "Sya po ang sumabi."

Q: What did your mother tell you?

A: "Sabi po iuwi na niya ako."

Q: Is that the only conversation that you had with your mother?

A: "Ayaw po ako iuwi ni Tita Zeny."12

x x x xxx

Q: Did you again ask her to go home'!

A: Yes Ma'am.

Q: What did she tell you?

A: "Huwag muna daw po."

Q: During those four days AAA, did you cry?

A: Yes, Ma'am.

Q: Why did you cry?

A: "Ayaw po ako iuwi."13 (Emphasis supplied.)

Accused-appellant, however, contends that AAA had not been deprived of liberty while in her
custody. She argues that the records are bereft of any indication that AAA was physically
restrained, or was under her constant control, or was ever prevented from going home. She
claims that during the period she had custody of AAA, the latter was free to interact with third
persons and communicate with her relatives, and was well taken care of.14
The argument fails. The prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping and illegal detention is that the
curtailment of the victim's liberty need not involve any physical restraint upon the victim's
person.15 For kidnapping to exist, it is not necessary that the offender kept the victim in an
enclosure or treated him harshly.16
In People v. Bisda,17 the Court upheld the conviction of kidnapping for ransom even though
the abducted five-year old child was, during her detention, free to roam around the place of
detention, to practice on her drawing and to watch television, and was regularly fed and bathed.
Citing United States v. McCabe,18 the Court stated that "to accept a child's desire for food,
comfort as the type of will or consent contemplated in the context of kidnapping would render
the concept meaningless." Should the child even want to escape, said the Court, she could not
do so all by herself given her age; she was under the control of her abductors and was merely
waiting and hoping that she would be brought home or that her parents would fetch her.
Nine-year old AAA was brought by accused-appellant to a place unfamiliar to her.19 In fact,
she learned that the name of the place was Nueva Ecija only after she was rescued.20
Leaving a child in a place from which he did not know the way home, even if he had the
freedom to roam around the place of detention, would still amount to deprivation of liberty.
Under such a situation, the child's freedom remains at the mercy and control of the abductor.21
The RTC, thus, correctly held that even in the absence of evidence that AAA was locked up,
she was still deprived of her liberty because considering her minority and the distance between
her home and Nueva Ecija, she could not possibly go back home to YYY without accused-
appellant's assistance.22
The RTC rightly invoked the Court's pronouncement in People v. Acosta:23
The next question to be determined is whether or not element of restraint is present as to
constitute the crime of kidnapping with which the appellants are charged. On this point the trial
court made this observation: "While it is true that the boy was playing while he was in the
house at Murphy on April 6, 1956, the fact remains that he was under the control of the accused
Consolacion Bravo who left him there, as he could not leave that house until she shall have
returned for him. Because of his tender age and the fact that he did not know the way back
home, he was then and there in a way deprived of his liberty. It is like putting him in a prison or
in an asylum where he may have freedom of locomotion but not the freedom to leave it at will.
The same thing can be said of his stay in the house at Tondo, where he was left by her on April
7, 1956." In addition, we may say that because the boy was of tender age and he was warned
not to leave until her return by his godmother, he was practically a captive in the sense that he
could not leave because of his fear to violate such instruction. (Emphasis supplied.)

Accused-appellant also questions AAA's credibility, pointing out that while AAA claimed to
have been taken by force in her Sinumpaang Salaysay,24 she subsequently testified25 in court
that she voluntarily went with accused-appellant.26
The Court is not persuaded.
It is oft-repeated that affidavits are usually abbreviated and inaccurate. Oftentimes, an affidavit
is incomplete, resulting in its seeming contradiction with the declarant's testimony in court.
Generally, the affiant is asked standard questions, coupled with ready suggestions intended to
elicit answers, that later tum out not to be wholly descriptive of the series of events as the
affiant knows them. Worse, the process of affidavit-taking may sometimes amount to putting
words into the affiant's mouth, thus, allowing the whole statement to be taken out of context.27
Discrepancies between the statements of the affiant in his affidavit and those made by him on
the witness stand do not necessarily discredit him since ex parte affidavits are generally
incomplete.28 Reiterating this principle, the Court, in the recently decided case of People v.
Dayaday,29 declared:
xxx [T]his Court had consistently ruled that the alleged inconsistencies between the testimony
of a witness in open court and his sworn statement before the investigators are not fatal defects
to justify a reversal of judgment. Such discrepancies do not necessarily discredit the witness
since ex parte affidavits are almost always incomplete. A sworn statement or an affidavit does
not purport to contain a complete compendium of the details of the event narrated by the
affiant. Sworn statements taken ex parte are generally considered to be inferior to the testimony
given in open court.

xxxx

The discrepancies in [the witness]'s testimony do not damage the essential integrity
of the prosecution's evidence in its material whole. Instead, the discrepancies only
erase suspicion that the testimony was rehearsed or concocted. These honest
inconsistencies serve to strengthen rather than destroy [the witness]'s credibility.

We also note that the force allegedly employed by the accused-appellant, as stated in
AAA's Sinumpaang Salaysay, referred to the moment accused-appellant made AAA board a
tricycle after the latter refused to sign a document from the accused-appellant. This obviously
took place when they were already outside the school premises. On the other hand, when AAA
testified to voluntarily going with accused-appellant, it was in reference to the time accused-
appellant came to her classroom to take her. We are, thus, disinclined to conclude that there
exists a glaring and irreconcilable inconsistency in AAA's declarations that would completely
discredit her testimony.
In any event, the essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim's
liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect the same.30 In this
case, AAA has clearly and consistently declared that accused-appellant kept her in Nueva Ecija
despite her repeated plea for accused-appellant to bring her home.
In People v. Bisda,31 this Court held:

Appellants must come to grips with case law that testimonies of child victims are
given full weight and credit. The testimony of children of sound mind is likewise to
be more correct and truthful than that of older persons. In People vs. Alba, this
Court ruled that children of sound mind are likely to be more observant of incidents
which take place within their view than older persons, and their testimonies are
likely more correct in detail than that of older persons. Angela was barely six years
old when she testified. Considering her tender years, innocent and guileless, it is
incredible that Angela would testify falsely that the appellants took her from the
school through threats and detained her in the "dirty house" for five days. In People
v. Dela Cruz, this Court also ruled that ample margin of error and understanding
should be accorded to young witnesses who, much more than adults, would be
gripped with tension due to the novelty and the experience in testifying before the
trial court.

Furthermore, the basic rule is that the Supreme Court accords great respect and even finality to
the findings of credibility of the trial court, more so if the same were affirmed by the CA, as in
this case.32 We find no reason to depart from this rule.
As consistently adhered to by this Court, the matter of assigning values to declarations on the
witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge, who had the
unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility by the various
indicia available but not reflected on the record.33 The trial court has the singular opportunity
to observe the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as
the angry flush of an insisted assertion, or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie, or the
tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer, or the forthright tone of a ready reply; or the furtive
glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere, or the flippant or sneering
tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full
realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien.34
Thus, when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial court, its
calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight
thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high respect if not
conclusive effect. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court, since
it is settled that when the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said
findings are generally binding upon this Court. Without any clear showing that the trial court
and the appellate court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances
of weight and substance, the rule should not be disturbed.35
It bears stressing, too, that no improper motive has been imputed against AAA or her parents in
filing the case against accused-appellant.1âwphi1 In fact, accused-appellant testified that she
was in good terms with AAA's family before the incident and that AAA's family was, in fact,
"on (her) side because of the maltreatment of (her) other in-laws."36
It is settled that where there is no evidence to show any dubious or improper motive why a
prosecution witness should bear false witness against the accused or falsely implicate him in a
heinous crime, the testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.37
The Court cannot accept accused-appellant's contention that AAA was not deprived of liberty
based on the RTC's supposed observation that she gave in to AAA's request to go home after
AAA cried. First of all, the RTC's observation38 was prefaced by a statement that accused-
appellant "did not want (AAA) to go home," which explains why AAA had been crying. Thus,
the RTC's observation reinforces rather than diminishes accused-appellant's culpability for
detaining the child against her will. Secondly, a. perusal of AAA's testimony, upon which the
RTC ostensibly based its observation, showed that accused-appellant did not accede to AAA's
request to be returned home; she merely brought the child to her brother's house in Villa
Viniegas where she was subsequently arrested by police operatives. 39 Finally, there is nothing
in accused-appellant's testimony that showed her intent to return AAA to her home.
That accused-appellant had no justification whatsoever to detain AAA is undeniable.
AAA's parents had not given their consent for accused-appellant to take and keep their child.
This is evident from the fact that they reported accused-appellant's taking of AAA to the police
on the same day she was removed from her school.40 It is likewise clear from the plea of
AAA's mother, via cellular phone, for accused-appellant to bring AAA home.41 We are, thus,
hard-pressed to believe accused-appellant's claim, uncorroborated as it is, that AAA's mother
had given her consent for accused-appellant to take her child to Nueva Ecija.
Furthermore, as the CA correctly held, neither the permission given by AAA's teacher nor
AAA's supposed agreement to go with accused-appellant, justified AAA's detention.
Besides, AAA was just nine (9) years old at the time of her detention, as evidenced by her
Certificate of Live Birth.42 Thus, accused-appellant's claim that AAA voluntarily went with her
to Nueva Ecija cannot hold water, as AAA was not in a position to give consent.
Where the victim is a minor, lack of consent is presumed. She is incompetent to assent to
seizure and illegal detention. The consent of such child could place accused-appellant in no
better position than if the act had been done against her will.43
The Court also notes AAA's testimony that she had been deceived by accused-appellant to go
with her. Both on direct and cross-examination, AAA testified that accused-appellant told her
that they would be going to the barangay captain as her husband had taken her suitcase, but
they did not proceed to the barangay captain and accused-appellant took her instead to Nueva
Ecija.44
It has been held that the fact that the victim voluntarily went with the accused did not remove
the element of deprivation of liberty, because the victim went with the accused on a false
inducement. What is controlling is the act of the accused in detaining the victim against his or
her will after the offender is able to take the victim in his custody.45
In this case, the inscrutable fact is that accused-appellant detained AAA despite the latter's
repeated plea to be returned home.1âwphi1
Accused-appellant's defense of denial, uncorroborated by testimony or other evidence, cannot
be sustained in the face of AAA's categorical and consistent testimony that accused-appellant
rejected her pleas to be brought home. Denial is a self-serving negative evidence, which cannot
be given greater weight than that of the declaration of a credible witness who testifies on
affirmative matters. Like alibi, denial is inherently a weak defense, which cannot prevail over
the positive and credible testimonies of prosecution witnesses who, as in this case, were not
shown to have any ill-motive to testify against accused-appellant.46
Accused-appellant asserts that while the prosecution attempted to show that she had planned to
poison AAA, and that she had made demands for a PhP2 Million ransom and for AAA's father
to kill her estranged husband (his sibling) as conditions for AAA's release, the RTC found that
such purpose, allegedly heard by AAA from a telephone conversation, had not been sufficiently
substantiated, let alone alleged in the Information. She argues that this negates her intent to
kidnap or illegally detain the victim.
The argument deserves scant consideration.
Suffice it to state that the charge against accused-appellant was for kidnapping of a minor,
committed by taking the victim from her school and detaining her against her will. In
kidnapping, the specific intent is to deprive the victim of his/her liberty.47 If the victim is a
child, it also includes the intention of the accused to deprive the parents with the custody of the
child.48 In this case, the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that accused-
appellant intended to deprive AAA of her liberty, and her parents, with the custody of their
daughter.
The Court notes the RTC's finding that while accused-appellant sought to excuse her actions by
"her desire to be loved" and "to accomplish some family concerns," her detention of AAA was
not justifiable as it already prejudiced a minor.49 Indeed, as the RTC pointed out, despite the
alleged closeness of AAA's family to accused-appellant and their relationship by affinity,
AAA's family still filed and pursued a serious charge against accused-appellant.50
In fine, considering that the elements of Serious Illegal" Detention have been sufficiently
established in this case, there is no cogent reason for the Court to reverse accused-appellant's
conviction for said offense.
Article 267 of the RPC prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for Serious Illegal
Detention. Absent any aggravating or modifying circumstance, the RTC, as affirmed by the
CA, correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 6351 of the
RPC.52
In line with prevailing jurisprudence,53 the Court reduces the award of moral damages from
PhPl00,000 to PhP75,000, and directs accused-appellant to additionally pay AAA a civil
indemnity of PhP75,000 and exemplary damages of PhP75,000. The civil indemnity and
damages are subject to interest at the rate of six percent per annum from the finality of this
Decision until fully paid.
The moral damages awarded by the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, were made payable to AAA
through her father because of her minority. Considering that AAA is no longer a minor, the civil
indemnity and damages shall be paid directly to AAA.
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals' Decision dated February 19, 2013 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 04598 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (a) the award for moral
damages is reduced to PhP75,000; (b) accused-appellant is further ordered to pay a civil
indemnity of PhP75,000 and exemplary damages of PhP75,000; (c) the civil indemnity, moral
damages and exemplary damages so awarded shall be paid by accused-appellant directly to
AAA, all with interest at the rate of six percent per annum from the time of finality of this
Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Chief Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANDRES B. REYES, JR.
Associate Justice
ATT E STAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E RT I FI CAT I O N
Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
* Designated additional Member per Raffle dated February 6, 2017, vice Associate
Justice Francis H. Jardeleza.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, and concurred in by Associate
Justices RebeccaL. De Guia-Salvador and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr.; Rollo, pp. 2-8.
2 Penned by Presiding Judge Adelaida Ala-Medma; CA rollo, pp. 7-12.
3 Article 267 of the RPC as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 reads:
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. -- Any private individua: who
shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty,
shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three
days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

 3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the
person kidnapped or detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been
made.

4. If the person kidnapped 0r detained shall be a minor, except when

the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was

committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any
other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were
present in the commission of the offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or

is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed.

The word "female" in paragraph 1(4) of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
refers to the gender of the victim and not of the offender. (People v. Bisda, G.R.
140895, July 17, 2003.)
4 Known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act."
5 The identity of the victim and any information which could establish or compromise
her identity are withheld in keeping with the policy set forth in Republic Act No. 7610
(An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination, and for Other Purposes), Republic Act No. 9262 (An
Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective
Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes), and
Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, known as the Rule on Violence Against Women
and Their Children, effective November 5, 2004, and in view of this Court's
pronouncement in People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006.
See People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 214502, November 25, 2015.
6 Rollo, pp. 3-4.
7 Id. at 4.
8 Rollo, pp. 4-5.
9 CA rollo, p. 27.
10 Rollo, p. 23.
11 People v. Pepino, G.R. No. 174471, January 12, 2016.
12 Rollo, pp. 6-7; Citing TSN, January 12, 2007. pp. 16-17.
13 Id. at 7; Citing TSN, January 12, 2007, pp. 18-19.
14 Id. at 26-27; Accused-appellant's Supplemental Brief, pp. 4-5.
15 Astorga v. People, G.R. No. 154130, October 1, 2003.
16 People v. Baluya, G.R. No. 181822, April 13, 2011.
17 People v. Bisda, G.R. No. 140895, July 17, 2003.
18 812 F. 2d. 1660 (1987).
19 CA rollo, p. 11.
20 Ibid.
21 People v. Baluya, supra, note 16.
22 Id. at l0-11.
23 People v. Acosta, G.R. No. L-11954. March 24, 1960.
24 AAA's Sinumpaang Salaysay, in part, states:
2. T -AAA, ano ang nanyari sa iyo noong Marso 2, 2006?

S - Habang nasa school po aka dumating si Tita Zeny (Zenaida V.

Manalastas) hinawakan niya aka sa kamay at may pinapipirma sa akin.
Hindi ko po pinirmahan at sapilitan niya akong sinakay sa tricycle. Sinabi
niya sa akin sandali fang at samahan ko daw siya. At sumakay na kami sa
tricycle papuntang ZZZ, YYY. Hindi ko na po naisuot and aking tsinelas dahil
sa paghatak niya sa akin.

25TSN, January 12, 2007, p. 11.

xxxx

Q: Now, AAA, when you were in school and your Tita Zeny came, how did
you leave the school AAA?

A: "Kusa po akong sinama niya. Niloko po niya aka."

xxxx

26 Brief for the Accused-Appellant, pp. 5-6; CA rollo, pp. 31-32.

27 Kummer v. People, G.R. No. 174461, September ll, 2013.
28Ibid.
29 People v. Dayaday, G.R. No. 213224, January 16, 2017,
citing People v. Yanson, G.R. No. 179195, October 3, 2011.
30 People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 214502, November 25, 2015.
31 Supra, note 17, citing People v. Malas, G.R. Nos. 88006-08, March 2, 1998, People
v. Alba, G.R. No. 131858, April 14, 1999, and People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 116726
July 28, 1997.
32 Kummer": People, supra, note 27.
33 People v. Basao, G.R. No. 189820, October 10, 2012.
34 People v. Jacalne, G.R. No. 168552, October 3, 2011
35 People v. Basao, supra, note 33.
36 TSN, August 8, 2008, pp. 6 & 9.
37 Peoplev. Gregorio, G.R. No. 194235, June 8, 2016.
38 CA rollo, p. 8.
39 TSN, January 12, 2007, p. 19.
40 Id. at 4; CA rollo, p. 8.
41 Id. at 10.
42 Rollo, p. 7.
41 People v. Bisda, G.R. No. 140895, July 17, 2003, 406 SCRA 454.
44 TSN, January 12, 2007, pp. 11 & 12; TSN, March 9, 2007, p. 6.
45 People v. Siangco, G.R. No. 186472, July 5, 2010; People v. Deduyo. G.R. No.
138456, October 23, 2003.
46 People v. Jacalne, supra note 34; People v. Marquez, G.R. No. 181440, April 13,
2011; People v. De Guzman supra note 30.
47 People v. Delim, G.R. No. 142773, January 28, 2003.
48 People v. Baluya, supra note 16; People v. Acbangin, G.R. No. 117216, August 9,
2000.
49 CA rollo, p. 11; Citing TSN, August 8, 2008, p. 10.
50 Ibid.
51 Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.
xxxx

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:

xxxx

2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances and there
is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

xxxx

52 People v. Jacalne, supra note 34.

53 People v. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016.
 THIRD DIVISION
December 6, 2017
G.R. No. 222965
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
USTADZ IBRAHIM ALI y KALIM, ABDUL HASSAN AND TWO OTHER
COMPANIONS IDENTIFED ONLY AS "JUL" AND "AMAT," Accused,
USTADZ IBRAHIM ALI y KALIM, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
MARTIRES, J.:
This is an appeal from the 30 April 2015 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 00473-MIN, which affirmed the 30 July 1999 Decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 16, Zamboanga City (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 15599, finding accused
Ustadz Ibrahim Ali y Kalim (Ali) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping
and Serious Illegal Detention, defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC).
THE FACTS
In an Information dated 17 December 1998, Ali, together with Abdul Hassan (Hassan), and
individuals identified as "Jul" and Amat," were charged with the crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the RPC. Only Ali was the subject of the criminal
proceedings because his co-accused Hassan, Jul, and Amat remain at large. The accusatory
portion of the information reads:
That on or about December 14, 1998, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused being then armed with high
powered firearm, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting with one
another, by means of force and intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, KIDNAP the person of CHRISTIA OLIZ y EUCOGCO, a young woman, 19 years
old, particularly on the occasion when she was together with her employer named Antonio Yu
Lim Bo and the latter's wife and daughter, on board a Blue Nissan Vehicle then driven by one
Rene Igno who was ordered by the herein accused to stop said vehicle somewhere at the
vicinity of EAAB at Sta. Maria Road, this City, and thereafter through intimidation,
commandeered and drove said vehicle with all its occupants aboard towards San Roque and
finally to the area of Pitogo beach with the clear intention on the part of the accused to extort
ransom money from said victim or other person; however, when victim Christia Oliz alighted
from the vehicle and was walking towards the direction of Pitogo beach she was able to run
away and with the timely assistance of some residents thereat as well as the arrival of the police
authorities, prompted all the accused to escape except accused Ustadz Ibrahim Ali y Kalim who
was arrested thus briefly depriving the liberty of said victim against her will; furthermore, the
commission of said crime has been attended by the aggravating circumstance of NIGHT TIME
AND USE OF MOTOR VEHICLE.3
During his arraignment, Ali, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded "Not Guilty."4
Evidence for the Prosecution
The prosecution presented six (6) witnesses, namely: Senior Police Officer 2 Salvador F.
Arcillas, Police Inspector Jesus Belarga, private complainant Christia Oliz (Oliz), Police
Inspector Jose Bayani Gucela, Mario C. Agarte, Police Officer 3 Bernardino Bayot. Their
combined testimonies tended to establish the following:
On 14 December 1998, at around 7:30 P.M., Antonio Lim (Antonio), Mary Lim (Mary), and
Cherry Lim (Cherry) left their family-owned grocery and were on their way to their house in
Pasonanca, Zamboanga City, on board a Nissan vehicle. With them were their driver Rene Igno
(Jgno) and Oliz, their helper.5
When they were near Edwin Andrews Airbase (EAAB) along Sta. Maria Road, Igno stopped
the car to avoid bumping into a motorcycle with three persons on board. The three men, later
identified as Ali, Hassan, and Amat, approached the Nissan vehicle and told the passengers that
they were policemen.6 They ordered Antonio and Igno to transfer to the back of the vehicle and
sit with Oliz, Mary, and Cherry. The passengers were told that they would be brought to the
police station on a tip that they were transporting contraband goods. Thereafter, the three armed
men boarded the Nissan vehicle with Amat in the driver's seat, Ali beside him, and Hassan at
the back with the other passengers. Once inside, Ali instructed Hassan to handcuff Igno and
Antonio.7
Amat did not stop when they reached the Sta. Maria police station but kept on driving. Due to
the buildup of traffic at the intersection after the Sta. Maria police station, Mary was able to
escape her captors by jumping out of the vehicle.8
Amat continued to drive towards Pitogo and then veered towards the beach. There, the
occupants were ordered to alight from the vehicle. Oliz was able to escape when she saw a
woman walking nearby because only Antonio, Cherry, and Igno were guarded. She then told
the woman that her employer was being kidnapped.9
Oliz was then accompanied to a nearby house where they contacted the authorities. Before the
police arrived, Oliz heard a commotion outside and saw bystanders mauling Ali. Oliz told the
people around that he was their abductor. When the police arrived, Ali was turned over to the
authorities who brought him to the police station together with Oliz.10
Evidence for the Defense
The defense presented four (4) witnesses, namely: Ali's sister Nauda Ali (Nauda), Ali's wife
Rahima Saulan (Rahima), Ali's cousin Siddik Alfad Abubakar (Siddik), and the accused
himself. Their testimonies sought to prove the following:
On 14 December 1998, Ali, Rahima, and Nauda left Manalipa to proceed to Sinunuc and stay
in Siddik's house before going home to Pagadian City. On their way to Sinunuc, they parted
ways in Zamboanga City because Ali wanted to pray at the Sta. Barbara Mosque; Rahima and
Nauda went ahead to Siddik's place.11
At around 7:00 P.M., while Ali was waiting outside the Mosque for a ride to Sinunuc, he met
Hassan, who was riding a motorcycle with Amat. Hassan told him to ride with them as they
would be going somewhere in Recodo. When they were near the EAAB, Hassan overtook a
motor vehicle and almost collided with it. Amat approached the driver of the motor vehicle
while Hassan went to the other side. Amat and Hassan eventually boarded the vehicle with the
latter forcing Ali to do the same. Hassan pushed Ali inside while he was holding a gun and told
him to follow or he would be in trouble. Meanwhile, Hassan ordered a certain Jun12 to ride the
motorcycle and follow them.13
As Amat was driving, Ali asked what they were doing but was told to stop talking and just
follow. Upon reaching Sinunuc, Ali asked Amat to stop the vehicle so he could get off but he
was ignored. Eventually, they stopped at the seashore of Pitogo.14
There, all the occupants alighted with Hassan and Amat escorting and guarding Antonio,
Cherry, Igno, and Oliz further down the seashore. Ali remained by the vehicle. Later, Jun
arrived on Hassan's motorcycle. After sensing something suspicious with his companions, Ali
decided to walk away and proceed to the main road to catch a ride to Sinunuc. While he was
waiting for transportation, several persons suddenly held him and beat him up, accusing him of
being a thief. Ali was eventually brought to a house where the beatings continued.15
After a few minutes, policemen arrived at the house where Ali was held. He was made to board
the police vehicle where he was blindfolded and beaten again. Ali was detained at the police
station where he was forced to admit to the kidnapping.16
The RTC Ruling
In its 30 July 1999 decision, the RTC found Ali guilty of violating Article 267 of the RPC, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the
accused IBRAHIMALIyKALIMGUILTYBEYONDREASONABLEDOUBT as principal
of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention defined and penalized under Article
267, paragraphs 2 and of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Section 8 of Republic Act No.
7659, and SENTENCES said accused to suffer the penalty of RECLUSIONPERPETUA with
the accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the costs.17
Aggrieved, Ali appealed before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In its assailed 30 April 2015 decision, the CA affirmed the RTC decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision
dated 30 July 1999 of the trial court is AFFIRMED in toto.18
Hence, this appeal, anchored on the following:
ISSUES

WHETHER THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF

SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION; AND

II

WHETHER THE ACCUSED WAS IDENTIFIED WITH MORAL CERTAINTY.

THE COURT'S RULING

The appeal has no merit.
Period of detention immaterial if
victim is a female
Ali argues that he could not be guilty of the crime of Serious Illegal Detention because the
alleged deprivation of liberty did not last for more than three (3) days as the incident only
lasted for about an hour or two. In order for the accused to be guilty of serious illegal detention,
the following elements must concur: (a) the offender is a private individual; (b) he or she
kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of
detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense any of the
following circumstances is present: (1) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three
days; (2) it is committed by simulating public authority; (3) any serious physical injuries are
inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill the victim are made; or (4) the
person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.19
In other words, deprivation of liberty is qualified to serious illegal detention if at least one of
the following circumstances exists: (a) detention lasts for more than three (3) days; (b) accused
simulated public authority; (c) victim suffers serious physical injuries or is threatened to be
killed; or (d) the victim is a minor, female or public officer.
In the case at bar, the elements of serious illegal detention were duly proven by the
prosecution. First, Ali and his cohorts were clearly private individuals. Second, they deprived
Oliz of her liberty. This was manifested by the fact that they forcibly boarded the vehicle and
placed Igno and Antonio in handcuffs evincing their intent to detain the occupants of the motor
vehicle. Third, Oliz was a female victim. The CA was correct in ruling that the period of
detention became immaterial in view of the victim's circumstances. If, during the deprivation of
liberty, any of the circumstances under Article 267(4) of the RPC occurs, i.e, the victim was a
female, the crime of serious illegal detention is consummated.20
Intent to detain or restrain the
victim's movement is tantamount to
illegal detention.
Ali likewise assails that there was insufficient evidence to hold that he forcefully transported,
locked up or restrained Oliz and her companions especially considering that the alleged
handcuffs were never presented in court. The essence of serious illegal detention is the actual
deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with the indubitable proof of intent of the accused to
effect such deprivation-it is enough that the victim is restrained from going home.21 It
contemplates situations where the victim is restricted or impeded in one's liberty to
move.22 Oliz's testimony clearly demonstrates the intent of the accused to deprive her and her
companions of their liberty, to wit:
FISCAL NUVAL:

Q: Aside from asking the license of the driver, what else did they tell you?

A: They told us there was a tip that we were bringing contraband goods.

Q: Did they identify themselves?

A: Yes.

Q: What did they tell you?

A: They said that they are policemen.

Q: Then, what happen (sic) after that?

A: They went inside our vehicle and they asked the driver and this Boa to transfer at
the back seat, together with us.

xxxx

Q: You said three persons approached your vehicle two of them went inside the front
seat, one on the behind the steering wheel (sic) and other one sitting beside him and
the other one went at the back of that vehicle, now, tell us where did this accused sat
(sic)?

A: At the front seat also.

Q: Was he behind the steering wheel?

A: No, he was sitting at the side of the driver.

Q: And after he sat beside the driver's seat, what did this person do?

A: He instructed that Rene will be handcuffed.

 Q: To whom did he instruct to handcuffed (sic) this Rene?

A: His companion, the one sitted (sic) at the back.

Q: What did this person at the back do, after this accused instructed him to
handcuffed (sic) Rene Egno?

A: Then his companion handcuffed Egno.

xxxx

COURT:

Then after Sta. Maria, road, where did you proceed?

A: Then they said we will brought (sic) to the police station.

[FISCAL NUVAL:]

Q: Were you able to go the police station?

A: None, (sic) we just passed by.23

Oliz's testimony clearly shows the intent of Ali and his cohorts to deprive the liberty and
restrain the movement of the occupants of the motor vehicle. They misrepresented themselves
as policemen and claimed they would bring Oliz and her companions to the police station; but
they never got there and were let go only when they arrived at Pitogo. Further, Oliz
categorically stated that Ali ordered his companions to handcuff Antonio and Igno. As pointed
out by the CA, Oliz's testimony demonstrates that her freedom of movement was effectively
restrained by the abductors who exercised complete control and dominion over the person of
the victims.
Otiz identified Ali as the accused in a
categorical and straightforward
manner.
Ali also challenges Oliz's identification of him claiming that her testimony was marred with
inconsistencies and that she was only able to identify him after reading the newspapers two
days after the incident. We have held that inconsistencies on immaterial details do not negate
the probative value of the testimony of a witness regarding the very act of the accused. 24 In
fact, minor inconsistencies tend to strengthen the credibility of the witness because it shows
that the testimony was not rehearsed.25
In the case at bar, the inconsistencies, e.g., the position of the occupants inside the vehicle,
assailed by Ali, pertain to trivial matters. On the contrary, Oliz remained consistent in
identifying Ali as one of those involved in the kidnapping, viz:
FISCAL NUVAL:

xxxx

Q: Now, madam witness, can you recognize those three persons who approached
you and identified themselves as policemen and that person who went inside that
car, can you identify those three persons?

A: Yes.
 Q: Are they inside this courtroom, will you please look around and tell us if they are
inside this courtroom? A: There is one here.

COURT:

Go down and touch him

A: (Witness went down from the witness stand and approached the accused and at
the same time holding his hand, and when the accused was asked, identified himself
as Ibrahim Ali).

xxxx

[Cross-Examination]

ATTY. PAK.AM: xxx

Q: Madam witness, how far were you sitted (sic) to the rear of the car from accused
Ibrahim Ali? From where you were sitted (sic) to the rear of the car, how far were
you to Ibrahim Ali?

A: Ten inches in distance.

Q: You were sitted (sic) ten inches according to you, from Ibrahim Ali, correct?

A: Yes.

Q: Is there a bar that separates you from Ibrahim Ali?

A: Yes.

Q: What is this?

A: Just after the seat from the driver there is a sort of bar, a wall or bar, it is an iron
bar.

xxxx

Q: You said accused Ibrahim Ali instructed that Rene be handcuffed, who did he
give the instruction?

A: He instructed his companion to handcuffed (sic) Rene.26

Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity.27 In order that identification be

deemed with moral certainty enough to overcome the presumption of innocence, it must be
impervious to skepticism on account of its distinctiveness.28 Such distinctiveness is achieved
through identification evidence which encompass unique physical features or characteristics
like the face, voice or any other physical facts that set the individual apart from the rest of
humanity.29 In the case at bar, it is unquestionable that Ali was identified with moral certainty.
Oliz was able to distinguish and identify accused considering their proximity inside the vehicle
and the duration of the captivity. Thus, she was intimately familiar with Ali's facial features and
voice-enough to lend credibility to her identification of the accused.
Ali's contention that Oliz was only able to identify him after reading the newspaper is
erroneous. During cross-examination, she merely stated that she became aware of Ali's name
after reading the dailies. To wit:
ATTY. PAKAM:

Q: Now, specifically you mentioned the name Ali Ibrahim, by the way, do you know
Ali Ibrahim before? A: No.

Q: When did you come to know the name Ali Ibrahim?

A: At the police station and in the newspaper.

Q: You come to know the name Ali Ibrahim thru newspaper and police station,
where?

A: Southcom.

Q: So, not at the police station?

A: At Southcom.

Q: Who told you that his person's name is Ali Ibrahim?

A: When I read the newspaper.

Q: When did you read the newspaper?

A: Last December 16.30

Clearly, the only information Oliz derived from newspapers or third-party sources is the name
of the accused. It was reasonably expected that she would be oblivious of Ali's name because
the latter was a stranger to her prior to the abduction. Nevertheless, Oliz was able to sufficiently
and consistently identify Ali as her abductor even if she did not know his name.
Further, Ali challenging his identification is absurd considering that he himself admits his
presence during the abduction. In his cross-examination, he narrated:
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:

xxxx

Q: Now, you said you overtook a jeep. What kind of a jeep was this, will you please
describe?

A: Well, I do not know what kind of a jeep is this.

Q: Is that the color blue?

A: Yes.

Q: Is it a pick up type?

A: Well, I do not know. I did not examine.

COURT:

Q: Is it not a fact that you were following this jeep while it was travelling in front of
you before you overtook it?
A: Yes, Your Honor, but, I do not know, I was not thinking that it will happen like
that Your Honor.

Q: Since when did you notice that you were following this blue jeep?

A: When we were already near the gate of that Air Base Your Honor.

Q: But, before you overtook this jeep you already noticed that this jeep was
travelling ahead of you?

A: I do not know, Your Honor. I was not thinking about that jeep Your Honor.

xxxx

PROSECUTOR NUVAL:

Q: And this Hassan, when you overtook this jeep almost bumped this jeep?

A: Yes.

Q: And he purposely stopped this motorcycle?

A: Yes.

Q: And, he also make the motorcycle fell on the ground (sic), correct?

A: No. Well, it was not the motorcycle, he was just about to fall down.

Q: Were you able to fall down?

A: No.

Q: So, what did he do with his motorcycle?

A: It was on a stop, standing.

Q: And then, what happened next?

A: All of us alighted.

Q: What about the motorcycle?

A: It was just in front of the jeep.

COURT:

Q: You blocked the jeep?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: So, the jeep had no choice but to stop otherwise, it will run over your
motorcycle?

A: Yes.
Q: Did the driver of the jeep apply the break so as to avoid running over the
motorcycle which stopped in front?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

xxxx

PROSECUTOR NUVAL:

Q: And then, you said the three of you approached the driver?

A: No.

Q: So, when you stopped, was it parked purposely in front of the jeep, this
motorcycle?

A: Yes.

Q: With its stand?

A: Yes.

Q: And, you alighted from the motorcycle?

A: Yes.

Q: Who alighted first from the motorcycle?

A: It was Ahmad, the one driving.

Q: And followed by you?

A: Then we were together with Hassan who alighted from the motorcycle.

Q: And then, when you alighted from that motorcycle, what did you do?

A: I was just there at the side of the motorcycle.

Q: And, what did this Ahmad do?

A: I approached the driver.

Q: What about Abduhassan, what did he do?

A: Abduhassan, went to the right side of the jeep and I was called by him.

Q: How did he call you?

A: You (sic) said, "you come with me".

Q: Did you approach him?

A: Well, I was following him from behind.

 Q: And what happened Mr. Witness?

A: Then, he instructed me to go up immediately in that jeep so that we will not be in

trouble.

Q: You went immediately? Okey (sic). Who was the driver of that jeep at that time?

A: When I boarded already the jeep, I saw Ahmad was already in the place of the
driver.

xxxx

Q: Okey (sic), from the Air Base, you said, this Abduhassan called you. And
voluntarily, you approached him?

A: I was just behind.

Q: And, he asked you to go inside the vehicle?

A: Yes, I was instructed to go up in fact, he was pushing me.

Q: He just pushed you, no more no less?

A: Yes, I was being pushed.

Q: Did he not poke his gun to you and threatened you to go inside?

A: No. I was just pushed.

Q: He did not also utter any words which threatened you if you will not go with
them, Mr. Witness?

A: No, but what he said was just to hurry up in going up that vehicle so that there
will be no trouble.

Q: So you just followed his command, you also hurriedly went up inside that jeep?

A: Well, I did not hurry but, I just went up the jeep. And according to him, to avoid
trouble.31

Instead of refuting the version of Oliz, Ali's testimony in fact corroborates its material points.
He admitted that he was with Hassan and Amat when their motorcycle stopped in front of the
Nissan vehicle; and that the three decided to board the vehicle and take control. Ali merely
denied his participation feigning that Hassan coerced him.
This, however, is refuted by the categorical and straightforward testimony of Oliz that it was
Ali who was giving commands to his companions. Thus, he could not have been an unwilling
participant as he was in fact the one calling the shots. Further, even if Ali were to be believed,
nothing in his testimony shows that Hassan exerted such force or coercion or uttered threats
that would have deprived Ali with the free exercise of his will. Absent any showing that Oliz
was motivated by ill will to falsely testify against Ali, her testimony should be granted
credence32 especially since it was candid, straightforward, and devoid of any material
inconsistencies.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The 30 April 2015 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00473-MIN is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
(On Official Leave)
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
(On Leave)
ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO
Associate Justice
ATT E STAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R TI FI CAT I O N
Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
* On Official Leave.
** On Leave.
1 Rollo, pp. 5-27; penned by Associate Justice Rafael Antonio M. Santos, and concurred
in by Associate Justices Edgardo T. Lloren and Edward B. Contreras.
2 Records, pp. 56-86; penned by Judge Jesus C. Carbon, Jr.
3 Id. at 1.
4 Id. at 16.
5 TSN, 6 May 1999, pp. 6-7; testimony of Oliz.
6 Id. at 9-10 and 33.
7 Id. at 8-15.
8 Id. at 16-17; TSN, 17 May 1999, pp. 18-19; testimony of Mario C. Agarte.
9 TSN, 6 May 1999, pp. 18-20; testimony of Oliz.
10 Id. at 20-22.
11 TSN, 13 May 1999, pp. 7-8; cross-examination of Ali; TSN, 12 May 1999, pp. 14-16;
direct examination of Ali
12 Identified as "Jul" in the Information.
13 TSN, 12 May 1999, pp. 20-22, 25-28 and 31-32.
14 Id. at 35-37.
15 Id. at 39-43.
16 Id. at 46-51.
17 Records, p. 86.
18 Rollo, p. 27.
19 People v. Niegas, 722 Phil. 30 I, 310 (2013).
20 People v. De Guzman, 773 Phil. 662, 671 (2015).
21 People v. Pepino, G.R. No. 174471, 12 January 2016, 779 SCRA 170, 671.
22 People v. Baluya, 664 Phil. 141, 150 (2011).
23 TSN, 6 May 1999, pp. 10-16.
24 Avelino v. People, 714 Phil. 323, 334 (2013).
25 People v. Alipio, 618 Phil. 38, 48 (2009).
26 TSN, 6 May 1999, pp. 11-12 and 44-45.
27 People v. Gallarde, 382 Phil. 718, 736 (2000).
28 People v. Caliso, 675 Phil. 742, 756 (2011).
29 Id.
30 TSN, 6 May 1999, pp. 46-47.
31 TSN, 13 May 1999, pp. 15-22.
32 People v. Jalbonian, 713 Phil. 93, 104 (2013).
 EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 131926 & 138991. June 18, 2003.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. MICHAEL U. PAGALASAN alias "Mike,"

RONNIE CABALO alias "Romy", ALADIN CABALO, FERDINAND CORTEZ, a JOHN
DOE identified only as FERNANDO, and a PETER DOE identified only as "Bong," accused,

MICHAEL U. PAGALASAN alias "Mike," Appellant.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is an automatic review of the Decisions 1 of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos
City, Branch 35, convicting appellant Michael U. Pagalasan of two counts of kidnapping for
ransom of George Lim and his 10-year-old son Christopher Neal Lim and sentencing him to
double death.

The Antecedents

The Spouses George and Desiree Lim and their three young children, one of whom was 10-
year-old Christopher Neal Lim, resided at Villa Consuelo Subdivision, General Santos City.
The spouses hired a security guard, Ferdinand Cortez, from the Valiant Security Agency to
provide security services to the family. On September 4, 1994, at 11:00 p.m., the spouses and
their children were in the master’s bedroom watching television. The couple’s housemaid,
Julita Sarno, was in the kitchen. She heard knocks on the kitchen door. Thinking that it was
Ferdinand, she opened the door. Four men, about 5’5" to 5’6" tall, each armed with handguns,
two of whom were holding hand grenades, barged into the kitchen. The four intruders wore
bonnets over their faces. With them was Ferdinand, whose hands were tied behind his back.
When asked by the masked men where her employers were, Julita responded that they were in
their bedroom. On orders of the intruders, she knocked on the bedroom door. When George’s
daughter opened the door, three of the masked men barged into the room, while the fourth
masked man remained in the sala of the house. 2 The three masked men shouted to George and
Desiree: "Walang mangyayari sa inyo basta ibigay ninyo ang kailangan namin." (Nothing will
happen to you provided you give us what we want.) 3 They ransacked the house, getting cash
and valuables. The masked men gave Desiree a handwritten note, 4 and dragged George and
Christopher Neal Lim out of the bedroom through the sala to the garage, where George’s
Nissan car was parked for the night. George saw Ferdinand in the sala with his hands tied
behind his back. One of the masked men ordered George to hand over the key to his vehicle, to
board the car and occupy the back seat along with Christopher. Father and son did as they were
told. Two of the masked men positioned themselves on either side of George and Christopher.
The third man drove the car, while the fourth sat on the passenger’s seat beside the driver. The
car cruised along the national highway. When the car was nearing the Gambalan Kitchenette,
George and Christopher were blindfolded. The masked men told them that they would be
brought to Polomolok. After about fifteen minutes, the car stopped at Sitio Tupi. The two men
who were seated at the back and the masked man seated beside the driver alighted from the car,
bringing Christopher with them. George was transferred to the front seat beside the driver.
George was told that he would be transported to Maasim.

In the meantime, SPO2 Federico Paño, the duty officer of Police Precinct No. 2, received a
radio report that George Lim and his son Christopher had been kidnapped. Police investigators
were dispatched to the Lim residence to conduct an on-the-spot investigation. They brought
Ferdinand and Julita to the police station for investigation. SPO2 Renato Daga-as, SPO2 Datur
Villanueva and SPO1 Alimuddin Timbao were directed to establish a mobile checkpoint at the
intersection of the national highway and a dirt road (Espina Road). The three policemen
boarded a Tamaraw mobile car and parked it at the said intersection. At about thirty meters
from the checkpoint, the masked driver of the Nissan vehicle saw the police car. Instead of
running the car through the checkpoint, the driver stopped and switched off its headlights. He
removed his bonnet and George’s blindfold, warning the latter not to make any false move.
George looked at the driver, who turned out to be the appellant Michael Pagalasan.

The three police officers approached the car. Daga-as went to the right side of the car beside the
passenger seat, while Villanueva went to the left side, near the driver’s seat. For his part,
Timbao proceeded to the car’s rear end. Daga-as and Villanueva identified themselves to
George and Michael as police officers on the lookout for a certain George Lim and his son who
had been kidnapped in General Santos City. Daga-as inquired from George what his name was,
and George replied that he was Albert Lim. The driver identified himself as Michael Pagalasan.
George gave a false first name because he was afraid Michael might shoot him. Daga-as
noticed that George’s fingers were trembling. Villanueva knocked at the door on the driver’s
side, and tried to open the same, but it was locked. When Michael himself opened the door,
Villanueva pulled him out of the vehicle and brought him to the mobile car. Michael was
suddenly in the custody of the policemen. George then identified himself as one of the
kidnapped victims. He also told the policemen that his son was still with the other kidnappers.
The policemen thereafter searched the Nissan car and found a .38 caliber 5 handgun with six
live bullets in its chamber 6 and a grenade under the driver’s seat. 7 The policemen brought
Michael and George to the police station where Ferdinand was being interrogated by police
investigators. Ferdinand told George that he had nothing to do with the kidnapping, but before
he could explain further, he was whisked into the investigation room. After giving a sworn
statement to the police investigator, George was allowed to go home. Desiree gave George the
handwritten letter earlier given to her by the kidnappers before they left the house that evening.
In the letter, the spouses were warned not to coordinate with the military, nor to take any action
in connection with the kidnapping without their knowledge or consent. They were also
informed that the malefactors would communicate with the couple, whether by letter or through
the telephone only through "MUBARAK II or 2." 8 Julita executed an affidavit in connection
with the kidnapping. 9

Police Inspector Antonio Evangelista ordered SPO4 Recio Aniversario to conduct a custodial
investigation on Michael. Recio asked Michael if he wanted to execute an affidavit, and
Michael replied that he was going to execute one. The police investigator inquired if he knew
of any lawyer, to which Michael replied in the negative. The police investigator then suggested
Atty. Tomas C. Falgui, a private practitioner, as his counsel. When Michael agreed, the police
investigator phoned the lawyer, requesting the latter to assist Michael while undergoing
custodial investigation. The lawyer agreed and forthwith proceeded to the police station.
Michael gave his confession under custodial investigation with the assistance of Atty. Falgui.
10

In his confession, Michael admitted that upon orders of Ronnie Cabalo, he and three other men,
Aladin (Ronnie’s brother), a Muslim known as Ferdinand, and Bong (a resident of Purok
Islam), had kidnapped George and his son Christopher. Ronnie Cabalo instructed Michael to
use George’s vehicle to transport father and son to the banana plantation where Aladin,
Ferdinand and Boy would alight with Christopher, and to thereafter return George to his house.
Aladin had given him a handgun for his use. Ferdinand Cortez was in cahoots with them. He
was at first reluctant to obey Ronnie, but relented when he was told not to be afraid and to use
the grenade in case of trouble. George told him that he had already given money to Aladin, and
that Michael’s companions had taken some pieces of jewelry from him and his wife before they
left the Lim residence.

In the light of Michael’s confession, farmer Hadji Aladin Malang Cabalo, Ronie Puntuan and
Fernando Quizon were arrested and detained at Camp Fermin Lira Barracks, General Santos
City. In the meantime, on September 6, 1994, George received another handwritten letter,
ordering the release of Michael and Ronie Puntuan because they were innocent, and demanding
P3,000,000 for Christopher’s release. 11

On September 9, 1994, George received another handwritten letter dated September 9, 1994,
this time from "MUBARAK II or 2" informing him and his wife that the kidnappers did not
want the military to be involved nor innocent people to be prejudiced. The spouses were also
warned that their son would not be released alive unless Ronie Puntuan was freed in three days.
12 On the same day at 3:25 p.m., Ronie Puntuan, through counsel, filed a motion with the MTC
praying that he be transferred from the Camp Fermin Lira Barracks to the General Santos City
Jail. 13

In the morning of the following day, September 10, 1994, Christopher was rescued by
policemen without any ransom being paid. On September 13, 1994, George executed a sworn
statement relating to the incidents that happened from September 4, 1994 to September 10,
1994. 14

Michael was charged with kidnapping for ransom and violation of PD 1866 before the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of General Santos City. 15

During the initial stage of the preliminary investigation by the MTC on September 6, 1994,
Atty. Falgui appeared as Michael’s counsel and testified on what transpired immediately
before, during and after the custodial investigation, including Michael’s execution of his
extrajudicial confession. 16 Michael was also placed on the witness stand and, with the
assistance of counsel, testified on his extrajudicial confession. He affirmed the veracity of the
contents of the said confession. 17 Subsequently, Michael, through his mother, secured the
services of Atty. Emmanuel V. Fontanilla. On September 12, 1994, Michael executed an
affidavit withdrawing his September 5, 1994 extrajudicial confession, in which he stated that:
(a) he was not assisted by counsel of his own choice when he executed the extrajudicial
confession; and (b) Ronie Puntuan, who was arrested and detained, was not Ronnie Cabalo. 18
Michael also executed a counter-affidavit where he denied the accusations against him, and
clarified that he was forced and intimidated into making his September 5, 1994 confession, and
he was not provided with counsel of his own choice during custodial investigation. His
constitutional rights under custodial investigation were allegedly not sufficiently explained to
him. 19 He filed the said affidavits with the MTC during the preliminary investigation.

On September 23, 1994, the MTC issued a resolution finding probable cause for charging the
accused with kidnapping for ransom. The Office of the City Prosecutor conducted a
reinvestigation of the case. On October 4, 1994, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a
resolution ordering the release of Hadji Aladin Malang Cabalo on the ground that he was not
the Aladin Cabalo referred to by Michael in his confession. 20

An Information for violation of PD 1866 was filed against Michael on October 17, 1994 with
the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch 22, docketed as Criminal Case No.
11062. On November 3, 1994, Michael, Ronnie Cabalo, Aladin Cabalo, Ferdinand Cortez, a
certain John Doe identified as Fernando, and Peter Doe were charged with kidnapping for
ransom in an Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 11098, which reads:chanrob1es
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That on or about September 4, 1994, in General Santos City, Philippines, within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring, and confederating together and mutually
helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap George Lim,
and his ten-year-old son, Christopher Neal Lim, for the purpose of extorting ransom from the
said victims. 21

The cases were raffled to Branch 22 of the Regional Trial Court. When arraigned in Criminal
Case No. 11062 for Violation of PD 1866, Michael pleaded not guilty. On February 6, 1995,
Michael, Ferdinand and Fernando Quizon were arraigned in Criminal Case No. 11098 and
pleaded not guilty. 22 Ronnie Cabalo and Aladin Cabalo remained at-large. On August 24,
1995, the judge hearing the cases inhibited himself. Both cases were re-raffled, assigned to, and
were tried jointly by Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court.

During the trial, Michael, through counsel, admitted the truth of the contents of the affidavit
executed by Julita Sarno. 23 Michael also executed an affidavit on December 5, 1995 alleging
inter alia that he was forced at gunpoint by Boy and Aladin to barge into the Lim residence and
drive the latter’s car, and that he did not know Fernando Quizon. 24 After the prosecution had
presented all its witnesses, it filed a formal offer of its documentary evidence including
Michael’s December 15, 1995 Sworn Statement and his confession. 25 Michael did not file any
comment or opposition to the said offer. On May 3, 1996, the trial court issued an order
admitting the prosecution’s documentary evidence, including Michael’s confession. 26 After
the prosecution had rested its case, Fernando Quizon filed a demurrer to evidence in Criminal
Case No. 11098. On July 2, 1996, the court issued an order granting the demurrer to evidence
of the said accused and acquitted him of the charge. 27

The Defense and Evidence of the Accused

Ferdinand Cortez denied kidnapping George and Christopher. He testified that he had been
employed as a security guard by the Valiant Security Agency. He was assigned by the agency to
protect George Lim and his family. On the evening of September 4, 1994, Ferdinand was
washing George’s car in the garage. The house was surrounded by a 10-foot wall, and the gate
was locked. Ferdinand was shocked when masked men, armed with handguns, suddenly
arrived. They poked their guns at him, maltreated him, and tied his hands behind his back. The
masked men knocked at the door of the house and when the housemaid Julita Sarno opened it,
the men dragged Ferdinand towards the entrance, to make it appear that he was the one
knocking. The masked men then barged into the sala and tied Julita’s hands. Ferdinand claimed
he never met any of the kidnappers before September 4, 1994. He was puzzled why he was
being implicated in the case.

For his part, Michael testified that he was a Muslim, 19 years of age, and an elementary school
graduate. He made a living as a conductor of his uncle’s jeepney. At night, the jeepney was
parked in Tambler, and it was where he usually slept. On the evening of September 4, 1994, at
about 9:00 p.m., he was in their house at Purok Islam public market, General Santos City. His
friend Bong arrived, and invited him for a stroll and to accompany the latter to get a
motorcycle. Michael agreed. They took a tricycle and arrived at the Villa Consuelo
Subdivision. Michael was surprised when the tricycle stopped near the gate of the Lim
residence and masked men suddenly appeared, poking their guns at him. Bong fled, leaving
Michael alone to fend for himself. The masked men ordered Michael to drive a car, and warned
him that if he refused, he would be killed. Momentarily, one of the men emerged from the
house, with George Lim in tow. George gave the key to his Nissan car to one of the kidnappers,
who in turn handed it over to Michael. The men forced George and his son Christopher to
board the car. Father and son were seated between two masked men. Afraid for his life, Michael
was forced to drive the car with one of the kidnappers pointing a gun at him, seated to his right
at the passenger’s side. The kidnappers ordered Michael to drive the car towards the direction
of Barangay Ligaya.

When the car reached a dark portion of the road in Barangay Ligaya, three of the men alighted,
bringing Christopher with them. Michael then pleaded to George to bring him first to Tambler,
where the jeepney of his uncle was parked. Michael wanted to sleep there instead of going
home. George agreed, and drove the car himself through Barangay Makar. George told Michael
that they had to travel along Espina road, a dirt road, instead of the regular road because they
might encounter policemen, and Christopher might be killed by his kidnappers. However, the
car had to stop at the intersection of the national highway and Espina Road when George saw
policemen and the mobile police car parked at the intersection.

Michael was arrested by the police, blindfolded, and brought to the mobile car where he was
also mauled. His head was banged against the sides of the mobile car. At the precinct, Michael
was mauled anew by the policemen. It was only after he had given his statement to a police
investigator that Atty. Falgui arrived and told Michael, "I am your lawyer." 28 Atty. Falgui
instructed Michael to tell the whole truth. 29 When his mother Camaria Opong visited him, he
told her that he had been blindfolded and mauled at the station, and that because of this, his
body ached. She saw a big hump in his head. On September 8, 1994, she secured the services
of Atty. Fontanilla as counsel of her son. The lawyer went to the City Jail and talked to
Michael. Michael showed the lawyer the contusions and bruises on his body, and the scratches
on his neck. Michael told the lawyer that he had been maltreated by an inmate at the detention
cell. He also narrated that he knew nothing about the kidnapping and that he was only hired by
somebody to drive a car. Michael assured the lawyer that he was not aware of the purpose of
the culprits in kidnapping George and Christopher. On September 9, 1994, Atty. Fontanilla
executed an affidavit reiterating the information Michael conveyed to him. 30 On September
16, 1994, Michael filed an urgent motion for medical check-up, which the court granted. 31

Dra. Virginia Ramirez, Officer-In-Charge of the City Integrated Health Services, examined
Michael on September 22, 1994 and found him suffering from myalgia residual or muscle pains
due to mauling, which she surmised took place about one week to ten days before the
examination. She issued a medical certificate of the said examination. 32

On September 24, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment acquitting Ferdinand Cortez and
convicting Michael of kidnapping for ransom, the decretal portion of which reads:chanrob1es
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JUDGMENT

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused is hereby sentenced as follows:chanrob1es

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In Criminal Case No. 11062 for failure of the prosecution to prove the accusation against the
accused Michael Pagalasan beyond reasonable doubt, he is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime
charged.

In Criminal Case No. 11098, the accused Michael Pagalasan is hereby found guilty of the crime
of kidnapping for ransom as defined and penalized under Article 267 as amended by Section 8
of Republic Act 7659, and there being no modifying circumstance to consider, he is sentenced
to suffer the EXTREME PENALTY OF DEATH insofar as the case of George Lim is
concerned.
The same penalty of death shall also be imposed against Michael Pagalasan in the case of
Christopher Neal Lim who was kidnapped on the same occasion and was released only on the
sixth day after his captivity.

The case of Ferdinand Cortez, for lack of sufficient evidence to convict him, he is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

SO ORDERED. 33

The trial court ruled in Criminal Case No. 11098 that with or without the confession of
Michael, the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that he, in conspiracy with
three others, kidnapped George and Christopher. It found the testimony of George
straightforward and positive, credible and entitled to full probative weight. The trial court
sentenced Michael to double death on its finding that he and his cohorts kidnapped George and
Christopher for the purpose of extorting ransom. It disbelieved Michael’s confession
implicating Ferdinand Cortez, and acquitted the latter for failure of the prosecution to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court likewise acquitted Michael in Criminal Case No.
11062.

Michael, now the appellant, asserts that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE

CRIME OF KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM OF CHRISTOPHER NEAL LIM DESPITE THE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE

CRIME OF KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM OF ONE GEORGE LIM WITHOUT ANY BASIS
IN FACT AND IN LAW.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE DEFENSE INTERPOSED BY

THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE INCONSISTENT
TESTIMONY OF GEORGE LIM. 34

The appellant is guilty of kidnapping Christopher under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.

On the first assignment of error, the appellant avers that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt
beyond cavil of doubt for the crime of kidnapping Christopher. George’s testimony that the gun
and hand grenade 35 were found in the car, under the seat beside the driver is inconsistent with
his own statement before the police investigator that the said gun and grenade were found in
the appellant’s possession; hence, the testimony of George is incredible and barren of probative
weight. The case for the prosecution was enfeebled by its failure to present Christopher to
testify on his kidnapping and to corroborate the testimony of his father. The failure of the
prosecution to present Christopher as a witness raised the presumption that if he had been so
presented, he would have testified on matters adverse to the prosecution. For its part, the Office
of the Solicitor General contends that the testimony of George, its principal witness, as well as
those of its other witnesses, is sufficient to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the appellant
conspired with three others in kidnapping Christopher for ransom. There was no need for the
prosecution to present Christopher to testify on his kidnapping, as his testimony would be
merely corroborative of his father’s account of events.

The contention of the appellant is barren of merit.

Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 reads:chanrob1es
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ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. — Any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been made.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the
parents, female, or a public officer.

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-
mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected
to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. (As amended by RA
No. 7659).

For the accused to be convicted of kidnapping, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond
reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime, namely: (a) the offender is a private individual;
(b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act
of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense any of the
following circumstances is present: (1) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three
days; (2) it is committed by simulating public authority; (3) any serious physical injuries are
inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (4) the
person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. 36 If the victim of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial.
Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom,
the duration of his detention is immaterial.

The essential elements for this crime is the deprivation of liberty of the victim under any of the
above-mentioned circumstances coupled with indubitable proof of intent of the accused to
effect the same. 37 There must be a purposeful or knowing action by the accused to forcibly
restrain the victim coupled with intent. 38

Judge Learned Hand once called conspiracy "the darling of the modern prosecutor’s nursery."
39 There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to
commit it. 40 Conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal liability must be proven separately
from and with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself. Conspiracy need not be proven by
direct evidence. After all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful
conspiracy. Conspiracies are clandestine in nature. It may be inferred from the conduct of the
accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with
a common purpose and design. 41 Paraphrasing the decision of the English Court in Regina v.
Murphy, 42 conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their
acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their
combined acts, though apparently independent of each other, were, in fact, connected and
cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. 43
To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have
performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. 44 There must be
intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design
and purpose. 45

The United States Supreme Court in Braverman v. United States, 46 held that the precise nature
and extent of the conspiracy must be determined by reference to the agreement which embraces
and defines its objects. For one thing, the temporal dimension of the conspiracy is of particular
importance. Settled as a rule of law is that the conspiracy continues until the object is attained,
unless in the meantime the conspirator abandons the conspiracy or is arrested. There is
authority to the effect that the conspiracy ends at the moment of any conspirator’s arrest, on the
presumption, albeit rebuttable, that at the moment the conspiracy has been thwarted, no other
overt act contributing to the conspiracy can possibly take place, at least as far as the arrested
conspirator is concerned. 47 The longer a conspiracy is deemed to continue, the greater the
chances that additional persons will be found to have joined it. There is also the possibility that
as the conspiracy continues, there may occur new overt acts. If the conspiracy has not yet
ended, then the hearsay acts and declarations of one conspirator will be admissible against the
other conspirators and one conspirator may be held liable for substantive crimes committed by
the others. 48

Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates which follows
incidentally in the execution of a common design as one of its probable and natural
consequences even though it was not intended as part of the original design. 49 Responsibility
of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but
extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended. 50
Conspirators are held to have intended the consequences of their acts and by purposely
engaging in conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces a prohibited result that they are
in contemplation of law, charged with intending the result. 51 Conspirators are necessarily
liable for the acts of another conspirator even though such act differs radically and
substantively from that which they intended to commit. 52 The Court agrees with the ruling of
the Circuit Court of Appeals (Second District) per Judge Learned Hand in United States v.
Peoni 53 "that nobody is liable in conspiracy except for the fair import of the concerted purpose
or agreement as he understood it; if later comers change that, he is not liable for the change; his
liability is limited to the common purpose while he remains in it." Earlier, the Appellate Court
of Kentucky in Gabbard v. Commonwealth 54 held that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The act must be the ordinary and probable effect of the wrongful acts specifically agreed on, so
that the connection between them may be reasonably apparent, and not a fresh and independent
project of the mind of one of the confederates, outside of or foreign to the common design, and
growing out of the individual malice of the perpetrator.

Equally persuasive is the pronouncement of the Circuit Court of Appeals (Second District) in
United States v. Crimms, 55 that it is never permissible to enlarge the scope of the conspiracy
itself by proving that some of the conspirators, unknown to the rest, have done what was
beyond the reasonable intendment of the common understanding. This is equally true when the
crime which the conspirators agreed upon is one of which they severally might be guilty though
they were ignorant of the existence of some of its constitutive facts. Also, while conspirators
are responsible for consequent acts growing out of the common design they are not for
independent acts growing out of the particular acts of individuals. 56

In this case, the evidence on record inscrutably shows that the appellant and his three cohorts
were armed with handguns; two of them had hand grenades, and all of them had masks over
their faces. They gained entry into the Lim residence after overpowering the security guard
Ferdinand and the housemaid Julita, and tying their hands behind their backs. One of the
masked men remained in the sala, while the three others barged into the bedroom of George
and Desiree, and kidnapped George and his ten-year-old son Christopher. The appellant and his
cohorts forced father and son to board George’s car. The appellant drove the car, dropped off
Christopher and his cohorts at Sitio Tupi, and drove on with George in the car towards the
direction of Maasim.

The collective, concerted and synchronized acts of the appellant and his cohorts before, during
and after the kidnapping constitute indubitable proof that the appellant and his three
companions conspired with each other to attain a common objective: to kidnap George and
Christopher and detain them illegally. The appellant was a principal by direct participation in
the kidnapping of the two victims.

The trial court found the testimony of George straightforward and positive, and entitled to
credit and full probative weight. 57 The legal aphorism is that the findings of facts of the trial
court, its calibration of the testimonies of witnesses and of their probative weight, its
conclusions anchored on its findings are accorded high respect by, the appellate court, if not
conclusive effect, because of the unique advantage of the trial court of observing at close range
the demeanor, conduct and deportment of witnesses as they regale the trial court with their
testimonies. 58 It is true that the appellate court is not bound by the findings and conclusions of
the trial court if the latter ignored, misunderstood, misapplied or misinterpreted cogent facts
and circumstances, which, if considered, would change the outcome of the case. 59 This ruling,
however, is inapplicable in the case at bar, since the appellant failed to establish that the trial
court erred in this wise.

George testified that when the policemen found the gun and grenade 60 inside his car, the
appellant was already at the police station. 61 However, in his September 13, 1994 Affidavit,
62 George stated that the policemen found the gun when the appellant was frisked, while the
grenade was spotted under the passenger’s seat, beside the driver. This seeming inconsistency
between the two statements does not discredit his testimony nor his credibility for the following
reasons: (a) it is of judicial knowledge that affidavits being taken ex parte are almost always
incomplete and often inaccurate and are generally inferior to the testimony of a witness in open
court; 63 (b) the credibility of George’s testimony cannot be impeached by the inconsistent
statements contained in his sworn statement because the said statement was not admitted in
evidence; and Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides that the Court
shall not consider evidence which has not been formally offered; besides, George was not
confronted with his sworn statement and accorded an opportunity to explain the inconsistency;
64 (c) the inconsistency refers to trivial, minor and collateral matters and not to the substance
of his testimony. Such minor inconsistency even enhances its veracity as the variances erase
any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. 65 A truth-telling witness is not always expected to
give an error-free testimony, considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory.
66

Neither is the case for the prosecution impaired by the failure of the prosecution to present
Christopher as its witness. It bears stressing that George’s testimony is corroborated by Julita
and the three arresting officers. Besides, case law has it that the testimony of a single witness, if
positive and credible, is sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction. 67 The law does not
require the testimonies of at least two witnesses for the conviction of an accused for kidnapping
and serious illegal detention. The prosecution has the discretion to decide on who to call as
witness during the trial, and its failure to present a particular witness does not give rise to the
presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if withheld, where the
evidence is at the disposal of the appellant and is merely cumulative or corroborative. 68 In this
case, the testimony of George is, by itself, independently of Christopher’s testimony, sufficient
proof of the guilt of the appellant. George had personal knowledge of the facts and
circumstances of the kidnapping, as he himself had been kidnapped along with his young son.
His failure to testify on where Christopher was detained after the three cohorts of the appellant
had alighted from the car with Christopher, and the circumstances surrounding the rescue do
not weaken the case of the prosecution, as the said facts and circumstances had occurred after
the crime of kidnapping had already been a fait accompli.

The prosecution failed to prove that in kidnapping George and Christopher, the appellant and
his cohorts intended to extort ransom.

The trial court convicted the appellant of kidnapping George and Christopher for ransom and
sentenced him to double death on its finding that the appellant and his co-accused conspired to
extort ransom for the release of the victims. For his part, the appellant contends that the
prosecution failed to prove the element of extorting ransom. The appellant argues that he
cannot be held liable for kidnapping for ransom, even if after his arrest on September 4, 1994
his co-conspirators actually demanded ransom for Christopher’s release. The prosecution failed
to prove that he had knowledge of and concurred with the said demand.

The Court agrees with the appellant. The second paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-
mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.

The provision is pursuant to Rep. Act No. 1084 approved on June 15, 1984 derived from the
so-called "Lindbergh Law" in the United States, approved on June 22, 1932, as amended on
May 13, 1934.

To warrant the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention for ransom, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt the following: (a)
intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of
the victim of his liberty; (c) motive of the accused, which is extortion of ransom from the
victim or any other person. In kidnapping or serious illegal detention for ransom, the purpose of
extorting ransom is a qualifying circumstance which must be alleged in the Information and
proved by the prosecution as the crime itself by words and overt acts of the accused before,
during and after the kidnapping and detention of the victim. Neither actual demand for nor
actual payment of ransom is necessary for the crime to be committed. 69 Although kidnapping
for a certain purpose is a qualifying circumstance, the law does not require that the purpose be
accomplished. 70 Ransom employed in the law is so used in its common or ordinary sense: a
sum of money or other thing of value, price, or consideration paid or demanded for redemption
of a kidnapped or detained person, a payment that releases from captivity. 71 It may include
benefits not necessarily pecuniary which may accrue to the kidnapper or a third person as a
condition for the release of the victim. 72

In this case, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant
conspired with three others to kidnap the victims. However, it failed to prove that they intended
to extort ransom from the victims themselves or from some other person, with a view to
obtaining the latter’s release. The kidnapping by itself does not give rise to the presumption that
the appellant and his co-conspirators’ purpose is to extort ransom from the victims or any other
person.
The only evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove the element of extorting ransom are the
three handwritten letters: the first was received by Desiree on September 4, 1994, while the
second and third letters were received by George on September 6 and 9, 1994, respectively.

The handwritten letter received by Desiree on September 4, 1994, "first letter" for brevity,
reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Para Sa Inyo Mr. & Mrs. Lim,

Una wag na wag kayong gumawa ng hakbang na hindi namin alam o gusto, lalong-lalo na sa
pakikipag-usap sa militar o magkoordinate sa militar ay hindi namin gustong mangyari ang
ganon mga sistem. Ang pangalawa, wag na wag kayong tumanggap ng negotiator na walang
palatandaan na galing sa amin, pakiusap lang yon na dapat ninyong sundin, madidisgrasya ang
aming dala kung kayo’y magkakamali ng hakbang.

Maliwanag sana sa inyo ang aming mga salaysay.

Note . . .

Palatandaan na galing sa aming hakbang ay ito —

MR. MUBARAK II or 2

Sulat man o telephone 73

The letter received by George on September 6, 1994, "second letter" for brevity,
reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Ronie Puntuan

Michael Pagalasan

Mr. G. Lim palayain ninyo ang suspek ninyo. Wala silang kasalanan bago natin tapusin ang
usapan tatlong milyong piso (3,000,000) katumbas ng kalayaan ng mahal ninyong anak.
Paalisin ang mga sundalo. Kailangan ang Black Out News. Huwag kang magkakamali Mr.
Lim. Kunting sipyot mo patay ang anak mo. Isang araw lamang ang tagal namin sa inyo.

(Sgd.) 74

The handwritten letter received by George on September 9, 1994, "third letter" for brevity,
reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Para sayo Mr. & Mrs. Lim,

Mr. Lim, gusto ko lang ipaabot sayo ang maikli kong kataga. Unang-una, ayaw namin na mga
asong militar na makialam. Pangalawa, ayaw namin sa grupo na idamay ang tao na walang-
alam. Alalahanin mo mabuti lahat ng mga kataga na iniwan ko sayo, Mr. Lim. Ang taong
dinampot ng militar sa purok islam na si Ronie, ang taong yan walang conection (sic) sa grupo,
sa madaling usapan, Mr. Lim, alalahanin mo ang anak mo sa oras na tatlong araw na taong yan
hindi makalabas. Ang isipin mo ang anak mo hindi rin makalabas hanggat sa mabulok sa lupa
(maliwanag).

(Sign)

Palatandaan
MUBARAK II—2 75

As gleaned from the three letters, there was no demand for ransom in exchange for George and
Christopher’s liberty. While there is a demand for ransom of P3,000,000 in the second letter,
and a demand for the release of Ronie Puntuan within three days in the third letter, the said
demands are in consideration of Christopher’s release from custody, and not that of George.

Even then, the prosecution failed to adduce evidence that the second letter demanding ransom
in the amount of P3,000,000 for the release of Christopher actually came from the appellant
and his co-conspirators. It bears stressing that in the first letter, the kidnappers made it clear to
the couple that only those communications, whether by letter or by telephone, bearing the name
"MR. MUBARAK II or 2" came from them:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Note . . .

Palatandaan na galing sa aming hakbang ay ito —

MR. MUBARAK II or 2

Sulat man o telephone 76

The second letter received by George was signed by an unidentified person. It was not stated
that the letter came from "MUBARAK II-2." That the second letter could not have come from
the appellant and his cohorts is buttressed by the fact that the third letter, which came from
"MUBARAK II-2," does not even mention any demand for ransom in the amount of
P3,000,000 for Christopher’s release.

The Court can only surmise, but it is possible that the signatory and sender of the second letter
could have been acting independently of the appellant and his co-conspirators in order to profit
from the kidnapping. It bears stressing that the kidnapping of Christopher and George was
already known when the appellant was arrested on September 4, 1994, and the crime had
already been reported to the police authorities. Persons other than the co-conspirators of the
appellant could have written the letter.

Since there is no evidence that the signatory and sender of the second letter is a co-conspirator
of the appellant, the latter is not bound by the said letter, conformably to Section 28, Rule 130
of the Revised Rules of Evidence which reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Sec. 28. Admission by third party. — The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided.

Even if it is assumed for the nonce that the second letter came from a co-conspirator, the same
is not binding on the appellant, absent evidence aliunde that he knew of and concurred with the
said ransom demand. It bears stressing that when George received the second letter on
September 6, 1994, the appellant had already been arrested and detained. The conspiracy
forged by the appellant and his cohorts on or before September 4, 1994 had already ceased,
when on the said date, the appellant was arrested by the policemen and detained. 77

Neither is the third letter admissible in evidence against the appellant to prove that he conspired
with others to demand the release of Ronie Puntuan in consideration for Christopher’s freedom.
The appellant and his cohorts could not have planned to demand ransom for the release of
Ronie Puntuan as early as September 4, 1994, the date of the kidnapping: Ronie had not yet
been arrested on this date. The appellant was arrested first, and Ronie’s detention was only to
follow. Furthermore, the third letter was sent to George on September 9, 1994. At that point, the
appellant had already been arrested by the policemen, and was already in jail. There is no
evidence that while in jail, the appellant had knowledge of and concurred with the said ransom
demand. It may be reasonably inferred that the appellant’s co-conspirators could have decided
to demand Ronie Puntuan’s release as a consideration for Christopher’s liberty, while the
appellant was already languishing in jail. The said demand for ransom was a new and
independent project of the appellant’s co-conspirators, growing out of their own malice,
without any a priori knowledge on the part of the appellant or his post facto concurrence
therewith. Indeed, the records show that on September 9, 1994, the very day the co-
conspirators sent the third letter to George, Ronie Puntuan through counsel Atty. Jose Jerry L.
Fulgar, also the counsel for the appellant, filed a motion with the MTC, praying that he be
detained at the General Santos City Jail:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that an order be please

issued directing that accused Ronie Puntuan be please detained at General Santos City Jail with
the instruction that the said accused be separated from his co-accused as desired by the Police
Officers. 78

That the appellant plotted with his co-conspirators to demand the release of Ronie Puntuan as a
condition for Christopher’s liberty is too far-fetched, considering that Ronie and the appellant
had the same lawyer. Ronie Puntuan himself, through his and the appellant’s counsel, prayed to
the court that he be transferred from Camp Fermin Lira Barracks to the General Santos City
Jail.

The appellant is also guilty of slight illegal detention of George under Article 268 of the
Revised Penal Code.

Aside from convicting the appellant of kidnapping Christopher, the trial court also convicted
him of kidnapping George under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. But the Office of the
Solicitor General contends that the appellant is guilty of another felony: slight illegal detention
under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code, because none of the circumstances enumerated in
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is present in the kidnapping and detention of George.
The prosecution may have failed to prove that the appellant and his co-conspirators intended to
extort ransom for George’s release; however, as a matter of substantive law, the appellant may
be held guilty of two separate crimes, although he and his co-conspirators kidnapped George
and Christopher on the same occasion and from the same situs. As a matter of procedural law,
the appellant may be convicted of slight illegal detention under the Information for kidnapping
for ransom as the former is necessarily included in the latter crime.

The Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General. The appellant is guilty of slight
illegal detention under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code which reads:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library

Art. 268. Slight illegal detention. — The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be imposed upon
any private individual who shall commit the crimes described in the next preceding article
without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated therein.

The same penalty shall be incurred by anyone who shall furnish the place for the perpetration
of the crime.

If the offender shall voluntarily release the person so kidnapped or detained within three days
from the commencement of the detention, without having attained the purpose intended, and
before the institution of criminal proceedings against him, the penalty shall be prision mayor in
its minimum and medium periods and a fine not exceeding seven hundred pesos. (As amended
by Republic Act No. 18).
While the epigraph or title of the article mentions only slight illegal detention, kidnapping
committed in connection with the lower offense of slight illegal detention is also covered by the
article. 79

The felony has the following essential elements:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. That the offender is a private individual.

2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives him of his liberty.

3. That the act of kidnapping or detention is illegal.

4. That the crime is committed without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated
in Art. 267. 80

The crime of slight illegal detention is consummated upon the occurrence of all the elements
thereof. "A day," in the last paragraph of Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code, should be
understood as twenty-four hours, to be counted from the deprivation of the liberty of the victim
until the cessation thereof. As Cuello Calon put it: "El plazo de los tres dias de veinte cuatro
horas y desde el momento de la privacion de libertad si en que esta cesare." 81 The rescue or
escape of the victim within three days from his kidnapping and detention is not an exempting
circumstance. The voluntary release by the offender of the victim within three days from his
detention, without the offender having attained his purpose and before the institution of
criminal proceedings against him for slight illegal detention, is not an exempting circumstance;
it merely serves to reduce the penalty to prision mayor in its maximum and medium periods
and a fine not exceeding P700.

In this case, the appellant is a private individual. George had been kidnapped and detained
illegally by the appellant and his cohorts, but only for less than a day. George regained his
freedom after the appellant had been arrested at the intersection of the national highway and
Espina Road. There is no evidence that the appellant and his cohorts kidnapped George for the
purpose of extorting ransom for his release. There is likewise no evidence that they inflicted
any serious physical injuries on George, or simulated public authority, or threatened to kill him.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that the appellant and his cohorts intended to detain the
victim for more than three days.

Although the appellant and his co-conspirators kidnapped George and Christopher on the same
occasion and from the same situs, the appellant is guilty of two separate crimes: kidnapping
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, and slight illegal detention under Article 268 of
the Revised Penal Code. The appellant and his co-conspirators were animated by two sets of
separate criminal intents and criminal resolutions in kidnapping and illegally detaining the two
victims. The criminal intent in kidnapping Christopher was separate from and independent of
the criminal intent and resolution in kidnapping and detaining George for less than three days.
In the mind and conscience of the appellant, he had committed two separate felonies; hence,
should be meted two separate penalties for the said crimes: one for kidnapping under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code and another for slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the
same code. 82 The felony of slight illegal detention is necessarily included in the crime of
kidnapping for ransom; thus, the appellant may be convicted of the former crime under an
Information for kidnapping for ransom. 83

PENALTIES FOR THE CRIMES COMMITTED BY THE APPELLANT

The crimes committed by the appellant were aggravated by dwelling, 84 the victims having
been kidnapped in their house; by the use of motor vehicle, 85 the victims having been
transported by the appellant from their house with the use of George’s car; and by a band, the
crime having been committed by the appellant and three co-conspirators. 86 However, the
Court cannot consider these aggravating circumstances in determining the proper penalties for
the said crimes, because the same were not alleged in the Information as mandated by Sections
8 and 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. 87 Although the said rules took
effect after the commission of the crimes by the appellant, the same is favorable to the
appellant; hence, should be applied retroactively. 88

The appellant is not entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance under the second
paragraph of Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code 89 because he did not voluntarily release
George within three days from the kidnapping. George was recovered by the policemen at the
intersection of the national highway and Espina Road.

The prescribed penalty for kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no aggravating
circumstance or modifying circumstance in the commission of the crime, the proper penalty for
the said crime is reclusion perpetua, conformably to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. The
prescribed penalty for slight illegal detention is reclusion temporal in its full period, with a
range of twelve years and one day to twenty years. To determine the minimum of the
indeterminate penalty, the penalty shall be reduced by one degree, prision mayor, which has a
range of six years and one day to twelve years. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall
be taken from the full range of the penalty at the discretion of the Court. The maximum of the
indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal,
conformably to Article 64, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, the appellant shall
suffer an indeterminate penalty of nine years and four months of prision mayor in its medium
period as minimum, to sixteen years and five months of reclusion temporal in its medium
period as maximum.

CIVIL LIABILITIES OF THE APPELLANT

Although the prosecution adduced testimonial evidence that the appellant and his co-
conspirators ransacked the bedroom of the victims and took cash and valuables, the prosecution
nevertheless failed to adduce any documentary evidence to prove the amount of the said cash
and the value of the jewelry. Hence, Spouses George and Desiree Lim are not entitled to actual
damages.

Under Article 2219, paragraph 5 of the New Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered. In
this case, the prosecution adduced testimonial evidence that for the crimes committed by the
appellant and his co-conspirators, Spouses George and Desiree suffered mental anguish, fright
and serious anxiety caused by the kidnapping of George and their son Christopher. Considering
the factual milieu in this case, the Court believes that the said spouses are entitled to moral
damages in the amount of P100,000 for the kidnapping of Christopher, and the amount of
P50,000 for the illegal detention of George. The appellant is also liable to the spouses for
exemplary damages in the total amount of P50,000 for the two crimes conformably with
current jurisprudence. 90

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision dated September 27, 1997 of the
Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch 35, is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS. Appellant Michael Pagalasan alias "Mike" is found guilty of kidnapping
under Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code and there being no modifying
circumstances in the commission of the crime is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. Appellant Michael Pagalasan alias "Mike" is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the Revised Penal
Code and there being no modifying circumstances in the commission of the crime is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from nine years and four months of prision
mayor in its medium period as minimum to sixteen years and five months of reclusion temporal
in its medium period as maximum. The said appellant is ordered to pay to Spouses George and
Desiree Lim the total amount of P150,000 as moral damages; and P50,000 as exemplary
damages in the two cases.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-

Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1. Penned by Judge Antonio S. Alano.

2. Exhibit "H."cralaw virtua1aw library

3. Records, p. 24.

4. Exhibit "C."cralaw virtua1aw library

5. Exhibits "A" and "A–1."cralaw virtua1aw library

6. Exhibits "F" and "F-5."cralaw virtua1aw library

7. Exhibit "B."cralaw virtua1aw library

8. See note 3.

9. Exhibit "F."cralaw virtua1aw library

10. Exhibits "G" to "G-2-C."cralaw virtua1aw library

11. Exhibit "D." (The signature is illegible.)

12. Exhibit "E."cralaw virtua1aw library

13. Records, pp. 21–22.

14. Id. at 5–6.

15. Id. at 11.

16. Id. at 110–112.

17. Id. at 113–125.

18. Exhibit "K."cralaw virtua1aw library

19. Exhibit "4."cralaw virtua1aw library

20. Records, p. 78.

21. Id. at 1.

22. Ronie Puntuan was not arraigned.

23. Exhibit "H."cralaw virtua1aw library

24. Exhibit "J."cralaw virtua1aw library

25. Records, pp. 194–202; 265–268.

26. Id. at 210.

27. Id. at 220.

28. TSN, 9 January 1997, p. 19.

29. Ibid.

30. Exhibits "K" and "J."cralaw virtua1aw library

31. Exhibit "I."cralaw virtua1aw library

32. Exhibit "1."cralaw virtua1aw library

33. Records, p. 289.

34. Rollo, pp. 79–80. The appellant also assails in his brief the admissibility of his
confession alleging that Atty. Tomas Falgui was not the competent and independent
counsel envisaged in Section 12, paragraph 1 of the 1987 Constitution. He avers that
the said counsel was not of his own choice and was merely foisted on him by police
investigator SPO4 Recy Aniversario. He was forced by policemen to execute his
confession. The trial court erred in using his extrajudicial confession as species of
proof in convicting him of kidnapping for ransom. The Office of the Solicitor
General, for its part, contends that there is no need for the Court to resolve the issue,
as the appellant’s extrajudicial confession is merely corroborative of George’s
testimony, the absence of which cannot in any way affect the prosecution’s case. The
trial court, in fact, stated in its decision that even without the extrajudicial
confession of the appellant, the other evidence of the prosecution by themselves
constituted proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the appellant of the crime
charged.

The Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General that in convicting the
appellant of kidnapping for ransom of George and Christopher, it relied on the
collective testimonies of George and the other witnesses of the prosecution and on
the statement of Julita Sarno, the truth of the contents of which was stipulated on by
the prosecution and the appellant. The other issues raised by the appellant in his
brief may be resolved by the Court independently of appellant’s confession. Hence,
there is no need for the Court to still delve into and resolve the issue of the
admissibility of the appellant’s confession.

35. Exhibits "A" and "B."cralaw virtua1aw library

36. People v. Salimbago, 314 SCRA 282 (1999).

37. People v. Borromeo, 323 SCRA 547 (2000).

38. People v. Soverano, 281 SCRA 438 (1997).

39. Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d. 259 (1925).

40. Article 8, Revised Penal Code.

41. People v. Quilaton, 324 SCRA 670 (2000).

42. 172 Eng. Rep. 502 (1837).

43. People v. Del Rosario, 305 SCRA 740 (1999).

44. People v. Elijorde, 306 SCRA 188 (1999).

45. People v. Del Rosario, supra.

46. 87 L.ed. 23 (1942).

47. 22A Corpus Juris Secundum, Conspiracy, p. 1150; US v. Eng, 241 F.2d. 157
(1957).

48. Section 30, Rule 130, Revised Rule of Evidence.

49. 15A Corpus Juris Secundum, Conspiracy, p. 828.

50. Id.

51. Ingram v. United States, 259 F.2d. 886 (1958).

52. Pring v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 185 (1985).

53. 100 F.2d. 401 (1938).

54. 236 SW 942 (1922).

55. 123 F.2d. 271 (1941).

56. Martin v. State, 8 So. 23 (1890).

57. Records, p. 287.

58. People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 142577, December 27, 2002.

59. People v. Realin, 301 SCRA 495 (1999).

60. Exhibits "A" and "B."cralaw virtua1aw library

61. TSN, 7 February 1996, p. 37 (George Lim).

62. Records, p. 5.

63. People v. Silvestre, 307 SCRA 68 (1999).

64. People v. De Guzman, 288 SCRA 346 (1998).

65. People v. Khor, 307 SCRA 295 (1999).

66. People v. Ebrada, 296 SCRA 353 (1998).

67. People v. Barellano, 319 SCRA 567 (1999).

68. People v. Barellano, supra.

69. See note 36.

70. 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abduction and Kidnapping, p. 199.

71. People v. Akiran, 18 SCRA 239 (1966).

72. United States v. Cleveland, 56 F. Supp. 890 (1944).

73. Exhibit "C," p. 199 (Emphasis supplied).

74. Id. at 200.

75. Exhibit "E," p. 202 (Emphasis supplied).

76. See note 66.

77. 22A C.J.S. 1150; US v. Eng, 241 F.2d 157 (1957).

78. Records, p. 22.

79. Regalado, Criminal Law Conspectus, 2000 ed., p. 493 (Emphasis supplied).

80. Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Vol. II, 2001 ed., p. 543.

81. Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, Book II, 1961 ed., p. 649.

82. The appellant is not guilty of a continuous crime for his overt acts of kidnapping
Christopher and George. For a continuous crime to be committed, there should be
separate acts performed during a period of time; unity of penal provisions infringed
upon or violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose; which means that two or
more violations of the same penal provision are united in one and the same intent
leading to the preparation of the same criminal purpose or aim. (Cuello Calon,
Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p. 521, cited in People v. Zapata, 88 Phil. 688 (1951).

83. SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. — When
there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and
that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the
offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is
included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the
offense proved.

SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. — An offense charged

necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the
latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when
the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting
the latter. (Rule 120, Sections 4 and 5, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.)

84. Article 14, paragraph 3, Revised Penal Code.

85. Article 14, paragraph 20, Revised Penal Code.

86. Article 14, paragraph 6, Revised Penal Code.

87. Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. — The complaint or information shall state
the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions
constituting the offense and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If
there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or
subsection of the statute punishing it.

Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. — The acts or omissions complained of as

constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be
stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in
the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.

88. People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 145505, March 14, 2003.

89. If the offender shall voluntarily release the person so kidnapped or detained
within three days from the commencement of the detention, without having attained
the purpose intended, and before the institution of criminal proceedings against him,
the penalty shall be prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods and a fine
not exceeding 700 pesos. (As amended by Rep. Act No. 18, approved Sept. 5, 1946.)

90. People v. Catubig, 363 SCRA 621 (2001).

 829 Phil. 275
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 214886, April 04, 2018 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BERNIE CONCEPCION, ACCUSED-
APPELLANT.

DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
This resolves the appeal[1] from the Court of Appeals March 28, 2014 Decision,[2] affirming with modification the November
29, 2011 Decision[3] of Branch 34, Regional Trial Court, La Union. The Regional Trial Court found the accused, Bernie
Concepcion (Concepcion), guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. The
Regional Trial Court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered Concepcion to pay the victim P50,000.00 as
moral damages.[4] On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the crime of rape absorbed the crime of forcible abduction;
thus, it found Concepcion guilty only of the crime of rape and imposed the same penalty of reclusion perpetua. It ordered
Concepcion to pay the victim the amounts of P50,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P30,000.00
as exemplary damages.[5]

Informations were filed with the Regional Trial Court, La Union against accused-appellant Concepcion, charging him with
serious illegal detention and two (2) counts of rape. The information for serious illegal detention was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 2899. The relevant portion stated:
That on or about the 17th day of February 2001, in the Municipality of Province of La Union, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being a private individual did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, detain and deprive the liberty of complainant AAA and
while detaining the latter inside a house, said accused forcibly and with intimidation and lewd design, have
sexual intercourse with complainant twice against her will and consent, all to the damage and prejudice of said
complainant and her personal liberty and security.[6]
The informations for rape were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 2900 and 2901, and read, in part:
Crim. Case No. 2900

That on or about the 17th day of February 2001, at 8:00 o'clock in the evening at Brgy. Municipality of Province
of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by
means of force and intimidation and with lewd design did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously
have sexual intercourse with AAA without her consent, to the damage and prejudice of said victim.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Crim. Case No. 2901

That on or about the 17th day of February 2001, at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon at Brgy. Municipality of
Province of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by means of force and intimidation and with lewd design did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with AAA without her consent, to the damage and prejudice of said victim.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
On June 4, 2002, upon arraignment in the consolidated criminal cases, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty,[8] and trial
ensued.

The prosecution's version of the events was as follows:

AAA and her common-law husband lived rent-free in a house owned by Concepcion. In return, they helped maintain the
house and contributed to utility bills.[9]

On February 17, 2001, at around 5:00 p.m., AAA arrived home in a tricycle, bringing with her a sack of rice. Concepcion was
at the gate of the house, drunk, when AAA arrived. She went inside the house to place her lunchbox and to find someone to
help her carry the sack of rice. Concepcion intercepted her at the garage area. He held a knife to her back and dragged her
to his room. Then he locked his room and blocked its door using his bed. Concepcion then pulled AAA to the bed and told her
to undress. She begged Concepcion not to rape her. He undressed her, pulled down his pants, cut her underwear using his
knife, and then inserted his hand in her vagina. AAA felt pain and struggled. Then, Concepcion inserted his penis into her
vagina.[10]

Shortly after, a vehicle arrived and a person who introduced himself as Chief of Police Pedro Obaldo, Jr.[11] called on
Concepcion to release AAA. In response, Concepcion demanded that the police first produce the men who raped his
girlfriend, Malou Peralta (Peralta). The police then brought the three (3) men demanded by Concepcion. Then, Concepcion
told the police to bring Peralta and her father, which they did. When Peralta arrived, Concepcion refused to release AAA
unless Peralta admitted that she had been raped. At first, Peralta refused to admit this, but later did just so Concepcion would
release AAA. Then, Concepcion asked that Board Member Alfred Concepcion be produced. When he arrived, however,
Concepcion asked him to leave.[12]

Concepcion then inserted his penis in AAA's vagina again, holding a knife to her neck. Mayor Joaquin Ostrea's arrival
interrupted the rape. He tried, but failed, to convince Concepcion to release AAA. Concepcion instructed AAA to dress up.
She could not find her shirt, however, and wore Concepcion's shirt instead.[13]

Then, to electrocute those who might enter the room, Concepcion installed electric wires on the door. The police officers
used their vehicle to create noise outside, starting its engine and honking its horn. They forcibly entered Concepcion's room,
breaking the window and the door. PO3 Bartolome Oriña, Jr. (PO3 Oriña)[14] pulled AAA and exited through the window. AAA
then passed out.[15]

Thereafter, Concepcion was arrested and brought to the police station. AAA was brought to the hospital where Dr. Maribeth
Baladad (Dr. Baladad) examined her. Dr. Baladad testified that there were abrasions and lacerations in her genital area,
caused by the forceful entry of an object or organ.[16]

Concepcion did not present evidence before the Regional Trial Court.[17]

In its November 29, 2011 Decision,[18] the Regional Trial Court found Concepcion guilty of the complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape, considering that she was forcibly abducted and then sexually assaulted. It dismissed one (1) charge of
rape for failure of the prosecution to establish the same with moral certainty. The dispositive portion of this Decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, a judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Bernie Concepcion
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape and is hereby
sentenced to serve the penalty of imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua.

Further, accused is hereby ordered to pay FIFTY THOUSAND (PHP 50,000.00) PESOS as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.[19]
Concepcion appealed the Regional Trial Court Decision to the Court of Appeals. In his appellant's brief, he admitted detaining
AAA and holding her against her will. However, he claimed that "his intention was not to detain" but "to extract an admission
from his girlfriend of the fact of her being raped and ... to bring the alleged perpetrators out in the open."[20] He stressed that
even AAA testified that he assured her release provided that those who raped his girlfriend were presented. This was also
corroborated by PO3 Oriña.[21] He insisted that no evidence was presented to show any other intention than to attract
attention to the alleged rape of his girlfriend.[22] Absent proof that Concepcion's intent was to deprive AAA of her liberty, he
should not be convicted .under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. Similarly, absent. proof that he abducted AAA with
lewd designs, Concepcion could not be convicted of forcible abduction under Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code.
[23] Further, Concepcion insisted that the testimonies presented by the prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable
doubt that he raped AAA. It was established that at the time of the alleged rape, AAA was on her fourth day of menstruation,
yet no evidence was presented showing traces of menstrual discharge on the bed sheets or on Concepcion's clothing.
Moreover, while it may have been established that the coitus had occurred, Dr. Baladad could not determine the date of such
occurrence[24] or recall whether the lacerations she found on AAA were fresh or old.[25] Finally, it was not shown that the
spermatozoa found inside AAA belonged to Concepcion.[26]

The Court of Appeals denied Concepcion's appeal in its March 28, 2014 Decision.[27] It found that the elements of rape had
been proven beyond reasonable doubt. It ruled that carnal knowledge was established by AAA's testimony, which was
corroborated by the Physical and Medical Examination and testimony of Dr. Baladad, who examined AAA on February 18,
2001. Dr. Baladad found abrasions on her flank area, left posterior shoulder, and right knee, as well as a laceration on her
fourchette. The Exfoliative Cytology Report established the presence of spermatozoa and of a moderate inflammation. That
the carnal knowledge was accomplished through force or intimidation was established by AAA, who testified that Concepcion
held a knife to her neck and that her pushes were ineffective against Concepcion, who was stronger than her.[28]

The Court of Appeals also found that the prosecution established the elements of abduction. However, the Court of Appeals
ruled that the crime of rape absorbed the forcible abduction, considering that it was established that the forcible abduction of
AAA was for the purpose of raping her.[29] The Court of Appeals also increased the amount of damages awarded by the trial
court. The dispositive portion of its Decision read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated 29 November 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Branch 34, La Union in Crim. Case Nos. 2899, 2900 & 2901 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, in that accused-appellant is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua; and he is ORDERED to pay the victim
AAA not only the amount of Php 50,000.00 as a moral damages already awarded by the trial court, but also the
amounts of Php 50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and Php 30,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus interest on all
damages at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.[30]
Thus, Concepcion filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals.[31]

In compliance with its May 14, 2014 Resolution,[32] which gave due course to accused-appellant's notice of appeal, the
Court of Appeals elevated the records of the case to this Court.[33] In its January 14, 2015 Resolution,[34] this Court required
the parties to submit their respective supplemental briefs. The parties filed their respective manifestations in lieu of
supplemental briefs on March 19, 2015[35] and March 31, 2015.[36]

After considering the parties' arguments and the records of this case, this Court resolves to DISMISS accused-appellant's
appeal for failing to show reversible error in the assailed decision, warranting this Court's appellate jurisdiction, and
to MODIFY the assailed decision.

Accused-appellant has failed to present any cogent reason to reverse the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and of the
Regional Trial Court, with regard to his conviction. The trial court's factual findings, its assessment of the credibility of
witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies, and its conclusions based on these factual findings are to be given
the highest respect, and when these are affirmed by the Court of Appeals, this Court will generally not re-examine them.
[37] However, this Court modifies the assailed decision.

To recall, three (3) informations were filed against accused-appellant for two (2) counts of rape and one (1) count of serious
illegal detention. Accused-appellant was uniformly acquitted of the second count of rape due to the failure of the prosecution
to establish beyond reasonable doubt that it actually happened. As for the remaining two (2) charges, the Regional Trial
Court and the Court of Appeals both considered the first count of rape and the charge of serious illegal detention as
necessarily linked.

Upon studying the records of this case, this Court finds AAA's testimony as sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt
that there was a second incident of rape.

The Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court found AAA's testimony to be credible. Thus, in affirming accused-
appellant's conviction for the first count of rape, the Court of Appeals March 28, 2014 Decision properly explained:
(Indeed) (i)n resolving rape cases, primordial consideration is given to the credibility of the victim's testimony.
Further, it bears stressing that (i)n a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of
the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal
course of things, as in (the present) case. No law or rule requires the corroboration of the testimony of a single
witness in a rape case. Due to its intimate nature, rape is usually a crime bereft of witnesses, and, more often
than not, the victim is left to testify for herself.

In this case, accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA by inserting his penis into AAA's genitalia, and
the same was accomplished through force, threat or intimidation. AAA testified that she was not able to fight
back because accused-appellant's knife was pointed at her neck and that while she tried to push him, he was
stronger than her. AAA described the weapon used by accused-appellant as a stainless bread knife which is
about 9 inches long. AAA also testified and narrated in detail the manner on how accused-appellant had carnal
knowledge of her, despite her efforts of fighting back.

We also find that AAA's claim for rape was corroborated by Dr. Baladad, a Medical Officer III in the OB-Gyne
Department of the Ilocos Training and Regional Medical Center, the doctor who examined her, upon the
request for Physical and Medical Examination dated 18 February 2001 of Police Chief Inspector Pedro Obaldo,
Jr. of the Police Station...

....

It has been repeatedly held that no woman would want to go through the process, the trouble and the
humiliation of trial for such a debasing offense unless she actually has been a victim of abuse and her motive
is but a response to the compelling need to seek and obtain justice. It is settled jurisprudence that when a
woman says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed
committed.[38] (Citations omitted)
As appreciated by the Court of Appeals, AAA testified and narrated in detail how accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of
her. Upon examining the records, it became clear that AAA testified and narrated two (2) separate incidents of rape. As to the
first incident, AAA testified:
Q And when the accused took off your underwears, what happened next?
A After he removed the panty and bra he inserted his hand (Witness demonstrating her fingers).

Q Where did the accused inserted (sic) his finger?

A In my vagina, sir.

Q What particular part of the room [were you in] when the accused inserted his finger [into] your
vagina?
A On the bed, sir.

....

Q When you struggled so that the finger was removed, what happened next?
A That is the time he inserted his penis in ... my vagina, sir.

Q Can you recall how many minutes or second[s] when he inserted his penis to ... your vagina?
A It is a short time bee[ause] he notice[d] that there [was] a vehicle ... stop[ped] outside their house,
sir.[39]
As for the second incident of rape, AAA narrated:
Q And what happened after the accused ask[ed Board Member Alfred Concepcion] to leave the
place?
A That [was] the time that he want[ed] again to rape me, sir.[40]

....

Q And what happened after that?

 A He went on top of me, sir.

Q And what happened [when he was] on top of you?

A He inserted his penis to my vagina, sir.

Q Was he able to penetrate your vagina?

A Yes, sir.

Q What did you feel when he did that?

A None because I am still afraid at that time because the knife was still pointed at my neck, sir.

....

Q On the 2nd time that the accused ... inserted his penis to your vagina, what then [were] you doing?
A Still I was lying down, sir.

Q You did not push him?

A I did it but of course he [was] a male, he [was] stronger than me, Your Honor.

Q You did not cry while he was raping you?

A I cried, Your Honor.[41]
As properly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, in rape cases, primordial consideration is given to the credibility of a victim's
testimony. Here, AAA's testimonies on both incidents of rape are equally credible. Considering that the judge who examined
AAA found her a believable witness[42] and considering further that there was nothing wanting in AAA's testimony on the
second rape incident, for the same reasons outlined by the Court of Appeals in its decision, this Court finds that the evidence
was sufficient to establish accused-appellant's guilt of the second rape charge.

As for the charge of serious illegal detention, the Court of Appeals held that the forcible abduction was absorbed in the crime
of rape because it was established that the forcible abduction of AAA was for the purpose of raping her:[43]
In this case, it is clear that accused-appellant forcibly abducted AAA for the purpose of raping her. It bears to
stress that accused-appellant already raped AAA, and it was only after his commission of the said crime that
he made demands from the police authorities for AAA's release. In fact, AAA testified that accused-appellant
even placed electrical wires for the purpose of electrocuting anybody who would enter the door or the window.
Hence, if it were true that accused-appellant only detained the victim to extract an admission from his girlfriend
Malou [Peralta] and to bring the alleged perpetrators of the latter out in the open, he should have released AAA
the moment his demands were acceded to by the police officers. It bears emphasis that accused-appellant
failed to present any evidence, and the defense he is belatedly putting up now is but a last-ditched effort on his
part to evade criminal liability.[44] (Citation omitted)
This Court disagrees.

The facts as found by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals show that after raping AAA, accused-appellant
continued to detain her and refused to release her even after raping her. Thus, although the initial abduction of AAA may
have been absorbed by the crime of rape, the continued detention of AAA after the rape cannot be deemed absorbed in it.
Likewise, since the detention continued after the rape had been completed, it cannot be deemed a necessary means for the
crime of rape.

Articles 267 and 268 of the Revised Penal Code provide:

Article 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain
another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the
parents, female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death penalty where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances abovementioned were
present in the commission of the offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.

Article 268. Slight illegal detention. - The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be imposed upon any private
individual who shall commit the crimes described in the next preceding article without the attendance of any of
the circumstances enumerated therein.

The same penalty shall be incurred by anyone who shall furnish the place for the perpetration of the crime.
 If the offender shall voluntarily release the person so kidnapped or detained within three days from the
commencement of the detention, without having attained the purpose intended, and before the institution of
criminal proceedings against him, the penalty shall be prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods and a
fine not exceeding seven hundred pesos.
Thus, the felony of slight illegal detention has four (4) elements:
1. That the offender is a private individual.
2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or m any other manner deprives him of his liberty.
3. That the act of kidnapping or detention is illegal.
4. That the crime is committed without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in Art. 267.
[45] (Emphasis in the original)
The elements of slight illegal detention are all present here. Accused-appellant is a private individual. The Court of Appeals
found that after raping AAA, accused-appellant continued to detain her and to deprive her of her liberty. It also appreciated
AAA's testimony that accused-appellant placed electrical wires around the room to electrocute anyone who might attempt to
enter it. He refused to release AAA even after his supposed demands were met. The detention was illegal and not attended
by the circumstances that would render it serious illegal detention. Thus, this Court finds accused-appellant guilty of the
crime of slight illegal detention.

Further, in line with current jurisprudence,[46] P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00
as exemplary damages shall be awarded to the victim for each count of rape.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Regional Trial Court November 29, 2011 Decision in Criminal Case
Nos. 2899, 2900, and 2901, and the Court of Appeals March 28, 2014 Decision in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05721 are
hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

Accused-appellant Bernie Concepcion is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of the crime of rape under
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua for each count. Accused-appellant Bernie Concepcion is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code, and is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision mayor in its medium period as
minimum to sixteen (16) years and five (5) months of reclusion temporal in its medium period as maximum.

The victim is entitled to the following amounts, for each count of rape: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral
damages; and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. The award of damages shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%)
per annum from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid.

The accused shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Martires, and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.

July 9, 2018

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs / Mesdames:

Please take notice that on April 4, 2018 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-
entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on July 9, 2018 at 4:02 p.m.
Very truly yours,

(SGD)
WILFREDO V.
LAPITAN
  Division Clerk of Court

[1] The appeal was filed under Rule 124, Section 13(c) of the Rules of Court.

[2] Rollo, pp. 2-22. The Decision, docketed as CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05721, was penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-
Leagogo and concurred in by Associate Justices Franchito N. Diamante and Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles of the Fourteenth
Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

[3] CA rollo, pp. 52-57. The Decision, docketed as Crim. Case Nos. 2899, and 2900 and 2901, was penned by Judge Manuel
R. Aquino.

[4] Id. at 57.

[5] Rollo, pp. 18-19.

[6] Id. at 3.

[7] Id. at 3-4.

[8] Id. at 4.
[9] CA rollo, p. 74.

[10] Id. at 74-75.

[11] Id. at 111.

[12] Id. at 75.

[13] Id.

[14] Id. at 99.

[15] Id. at 75-76.

[16] Id. at 76.

[17] Id. at 53.

[18] Id. at 52-57.

[19] Id. at 57.

[20] Id. at 42.

[21] Id. at 42-43.

[22] Id. at 44.

[23] Id. at 43.

[24] Id. at 46.

[25] Id. at 47.

[26] Id. at 48.

[27] Rollo, pp. 2-22.

[28] Id. at 16-17.

[29] Id. at 18.

[30] Id. at 19.

[31] CA rollo, pp. 147-149.

[32] Id. at 152.

[33] Rollo, p. 1.

[34] Id. at 28.

[35] Id. at 30-32. People of the Philippines filed a Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Supplemental Brief.

[36] Id. at 33-36. Acused-appellant filed a Manifestation (in Lieu of Supplemental Brief).

[37] See People v. Castel, 593 Phil. 288 (2008) (Per J. Reyes, En Banc].

[38] Rollo, pp. 16-17.

[39] CA rollo, p. 106.

[40] Id. at 108.

[41] TSN, September 30, 2003, pp. 8-9.

[42] RTC Records, p. 220.

[43] Rollo, p. 18.

[44] Id.

[45] See People v. Pagalasan, 452 Phil. 341 (2003) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., En Banc].

[46] See People v. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016

<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2016/april2016/202124.pdf> [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].