DRAFT 1.

2.1.1. Chernobyl accident

2.1.1.1. General information

Origin of the accident
The Chernobyl NPP consisted of four power blocks. Commissioning of the first power
unit of the Chernobyl NPP took place in 1977 and of the fourth one in March 1984. Units V and
VI were under construction at the time of the accident. (See Figure 5.1 -Map of the industrial
site)

Figure 5.1. Map of the industrial site

Anthropogenic accident occurred on 26 April 1986 in the night from Friday to Saturday
at 1 hr 23 min 40 sec during a low-power engineering test of the Unit IV. Improper, unstable
operation of the reactor, which had design flaws, allowed an uncontrollable power surge to
occur, resulting in successive steam explosions, which severely damaged the reactor building
and completely destroyed the reactor (Figure5.2- Destroyed Unit IV)
Figure 5.2. Destroyed Unit IV

Source
Uncontrollable radioactive release
The accident released a mixture of radionuclides into the air over a period of about 10
days
The following stages of release may be identified
 I – 26 April. Release due to explosions both as fine-dispersed fuel and violent
radionuclides released from fuel at Tfuel = 1600-1800 K
 II – 26 April - 2 May. Release due to graphite burning at Tfuel < 1600 K
 III – 2 -5 May. Release due to fuel overheating up to 2500-2800 K as a result of
radioactive decay
 IV – Later 5 May. Release reduction and sporadic volley emissions of
radioactivity
Dynamics of radioactive release is shown in Figure 5.3
 50
45
40
35
30
25 Ряд1
20
15
10
5
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Figure 5.3. Dynamics of radioactive release

Spatial balance of nuclear fuel

Total spatial distribution of nuclear fuel was as follows:
>96% - inside Unit IV, <0.3%, - industrial site<1.5% - 80-km zone (excluding industrial
site), < 1.5% - rest of the USSR, <0.1% - outside of the USSR
Another words, spatial balance of released nuclear fuel was follows: 9% - NPP site, 44%
- 80-km zone, 44% - rest of the USSR, 3% - outside of the USSR
Total radioactive release was amounted more than 12,000 PBq, including 6,500 PBq – inert
gases, 1,800 PBq – 131I, 85 PBq – 137Cs.
NPP site area (around 1 km2) mainly was contaminated by dispersed nuclear fuel following
explosions on the night of accident.
So contamination of industrial area occurred immediately following explosions on the night of
accident. This is the first discrepancy compared Fukushima - 1. Just that area is very interesting
from point of view on radiation protection of emergency workers.

General questions of emergency response

 What and how should be immediately done to take emergency process under
control?
 What and how should be done to mitigate consequences of the accident?
 What is crucial issues of radiological protection of emergency workers at the early
stages following an accident?

2.1.1.2. Emergency and preparedness regulation in the USSR to the

Chernobyl accident
It was held 10 thousand days in September 11, 2013 from the day (more exactly, the
night) of the Chernobyl accident. Past system of occupational radiological protection in the
USSR should be considered and compared with the present system of EPR
Evolution of dose limitation for planned exposure situations before Chernobyl accident is
given in Table 5.1
Table 5.1.
The USSR dose limits for occupational exposure
Year No Standard Annual dose limit, mSv Permissible daily dose,
mSv
1948 Т- 1031 300 1
1950 2413 300 1
1953 129-53 150 0.5
1957 233-57 150 0.5
1960 333-60 50 -
1969 BSS-69 50 -
1976 BSS-76 50 -

This table demonstrates that for planned exposure situation (according to the current
IAEA terminology) old-timer workers remembered their routine experience to operate in a heavy
radiation conditions with annual and dose limitation. However, the main part of personnel had no
such experience and proper trainning in time of the Chernobyl accident.
Basic regulation requirements of the USSR Radiation Safety Standards NRB-76 for
emergency situation were as follows:
 Emergency plan shall be prepared in any legal person
 All practicable measures shall be intended for minimize external exposure and
radionuclide intake for emergency workers (EWs)
 Overexposure of EWs above dose limits may be justified:
- for the purpose of saving life,
- averting a large-scale public overexposure, and
- preventing the development of catastrophic conditions
 Elevated planned exposure (EPE) shall be below twice dose limit for single
undertaken action and five times over dose limit for all emergency period of time (i.e. 100 and
250 mSv)
 Written permission of administration and personal consent of EW to EPE is
required
 Work Order shall include detailed list of actions, their time limitation and safety
tips
 EPE not be allowed if:
- EPE+E(received before accident)>Dose Limit x T(radiation experience),
- worker already received elevated exposure over 250 mSv,
- worker is woman younger 40
These national requirements were in accordance with IAEA documents, for instance, No
50-SG-D9, IAEA, Vienna, 1985
Management system of EPR to 1986 at the Chernobyl NPP includes:
 Plan of emergency management at the Chernobyl NPP
 Plans of radiation protection of the NPP personnel and public
 Procedure of emergency notification
 Emergency system of the national operator “Souzatomenergy”
 Special medical provision
 General procedure for official inquiry and liquidation of major accidents in
industry
For clear understanding actual emergency response after the accident it is necessary to remind
features of state power. The USSR was a totalitarian state. So existed national EPR system had a
command-and-control management style:
 Strict vertical of power
 Secrecy order in nuclear energy and atomic industry
As a consequence:
  Guaranteed financial and resource provisions of any countermeasures
 Inability of serious decision making at a local level
 Restriction on exchange emergency experience between NPPs and informing of nuclear
workers

Special judgment No 1
Formally, general approach to a problem of radiation protection
regulation for rescuers and emergency workers by the time of the
Chernobyl accident and currently not undergoes a change.
From practical application point of view, existed national EPR
system had a features agreeable to that command-and-control
management style and national mentality
2.1.1.3. Categories of emergency workers
According to the USSR, Belarus, Russia, Ukraine Laws specific cohort of emergency
workers and recovery workers are defined as participants of emergency response (so called
“liquidators”):
“Citizens taken part in termination of the accident and in mitigation of its consequences
on the affected areas in 1986-1990”
The total number of emergency and recovery operation workers (from 1986 to 1990) was
530,000 including 150,000 liquidators worked at the NPP site area
Within this period of time the duration of emergency exposure situation assumed to be 7
months (26 April - 30 November 1986 - completion of the SHELTER construction around Unit
IV).
Attributes for categorization of emergency workers
 Management of emergency works, including radiation protection (national
governmental and functional EPR system) - Figure 5.4
 Time after accident (first responders on scene, attracted units for urgent response,
emergency workers for restoration) - Table 5.2.
 Type of emergency work (saving life, preventing of catastrophic conditions,
source localization, evacuation, decontamination etc) Tables 5.3, 5.4.
 5
LIQUIDATOR S

CIVIL MILITARY

PERSONNEL VOLUNTEER REGULAR RESERVE

MINISTRY MINISTRY MINISTRY OF

OTHER MINISTRY INTERNAL CGB
OF OF ATOMIC MINISTRIES OF DEFENCE
ENERGY INDUSTRY COMPEX DISPATH OF KI AFFAIRS

INGENEERING TROOPS
CHEMICAL TROOPS

FRONTIER GUARDS
CIVIL DEFENCE

FIRE-BRIGADES
ENTERPRISES
INSTITUTES

AIR FORCE
COMBINAT

SECURITY
SERVICE

POLICE

GUARD
ChNPP

US-605

Figure 5.4. Governmental categories of liquidators

Table 5.2.
Cohorts of liquidators (EWs) in 1986

No Cohort Number Dates

1 Witnesses and first responders 1,000 April, 26
2 Urgent response teams 35,000 27.04 –20.05
2.1 Military 13,000
2.2 Civil 22,000
3 Emergency & Recovery workers 89,000 21.05 – 30.11
3.1 Military 49,000
3.2 Civil 40,000
Total 125,000 26.04 – 30.11

Table 5.3.
Operating schedule in 1986

Category Type Duration

ChNPP personnel Shift work 15working days + 15days of
rest
Early liquidators Single mission Till 15 days
Attached to ChNPP Shift work or single/repeated Till 30 days
missions
US-605 personnel Single shift work 2 months
Military liquidators Single frame 3 min or E < 200mSv
Single/repeated missions E < 250 mSv
Shift work 3/6 months
Attached into 30-km zone Shift work or single/repeated 3 months or
missions E < 250 mSv

Table 5.4
General activities

Measure Object Dates

Preventing of release Ruined Unit IV 26.04 -10.05.1986
Evacuation Pripyat town 27.04.1986
Chernobyl town, rural settlements 3.05-7.05.1986
Decontamination Units I-III, industrial area, 1986-1990
settlements, roads 1987
“Red” forest
Construction “Shelter” 21.05-30.11.1986
Waste depository 1986-1988
Damps 11.07-25.09.1986
Filter screen 1987
Building Shift industrial community 15.05-31.10.1986
Slavutich town 25.05.1986-1988
Guarding Scala-1M (10-km), 30-km zone Permanently
Radiation monitoring Contaminated territories Permanently

Dose restrictions after the accident

Evolution of occupational dose limitation was as follows:
- 26 April 1986: without emergency dose constraints for personnel of the Chernobyl NPP;
- 27 April: 20 May 1986 – 500 mSv for military liquidators and 250 mSv for civil
liquidators;
- 21 May – 31 December 1986: 250 mSv for all categories of liquidators;
- 1 January – 31 December 1987: 250 mSv the permission of the USSR Ministry of
Public Health for special works, 100 mSv – works at the Unit III and the NPP site, 50 mSv –
everywhere except for the above-mentioned places.

Special judgment No 2

Liquidators were not homogeneous cohorts of professional

rescuers and nuclear workers
Cohort of liquidators were composed of independent groups met
certain tasks within own management and dose control
Activities of liquidators took place in emergency exposure
situation, existing exposure situation and planned exposure situation
 Air kerma rate, mGy/h.
mGy/h. 26 April 1986

Pripyat town Pri

p ya
t ri
ve r

10 Chernobyl N PP area
Cooling pond
100 3000
1000
1000

Figure 5.6A. Air kerma rate, mGy/h. 26 April 1986

One can see that levels of exposure rates (or air kerma rates) were very high in the NPP
site Gy –tens Gy/h, i.e. typical levels of exposure rate exceeded the natural background in 10 6 -
108 times (Fig. 5.6A). Unfortunately this fact timely has not been confirmed by measurements.
Dangerous situation was outside NPP. Dose of 1 Gy which corresponded to threshold of
deterministic effects was formed in the 4-km locality during 2 days (Fig. 5.6B). Annual doses of
100 and 30 mSv which required intervention for public were predicted for settlements in the 30
km territory and far from here (Fig 5.6C). Refractory radionuclides gave the big contribution to
total activity in the first year after the accident (Fig 5.6D). This is the second discrepancy
compared Fukushima-1.

Special judgment No 3
Unfortunately emergency dose monitoring was absent during
reflex phase:
 The first radiation data were reported after 1 -3.5 hours later explosion
 Individual dose monitoring has not been carried out on April, 26. Only film
badges (the upper level of registration of 20 mGy) were present. Routine individual dose
monitoring has been carried out for 4,750 ChNPP workers and attracted personnel before the
accident (data on 1 January 1986)
 Actual doses for witnesses were in the range of 40- 15,000 mGy
 Dose of 40 mGy was received only during one trip from Pripyat town to the NPP

Number of emergency workers and witnesses is given in Table 5.7 and urgent actions - in
Table 5.8.
As a result of a heavy radiation conditions, lack of occupational exposure monitoring
from one hand, and professional courage of workers and firemen, from other hand,
overexposures were occurred (Table 5.9)
Table 5.7.
First responders & witnesses of accident
Contingent Number of witnesses
At the accident moment 8 hours later
Personnel of Units I-IV 176 374
Builders of Units V, VI 268 -
Firemen 24 69
Guards 23 113
Medical staff - 10
Subtotal 491 566

Table 5.8.
Actions of the first responders
No Action
1 Fire control
2 Saving life
3 Cut-off ventilation/ electricity, switching of cooling system , lube swap
4 Examination of equipment
5 Radiation reconnaissance#
6 Water supply
# Radiation data were reported after 1 -3.5 – 8.5 -17.5 hours later explosion

Table 5.9
Individual and collective doses of the first responders

Category Number Dose, mGy Collective dose,

Mean Median person Gy
Witnesses 1,057 550 450 581
Clinics patients 134 3400 2400 455

Internal exposures took a lower values compared with external doses .Average committed
equivalent dose (lung) for alive 125 witnesses of accident, treated in clinics was about 400 mSv.
Distribution of thyroid doses is shown in Figure 5.7
 Internal thyroid doses: first responders
HT
Outside
mSv Industrial area Inside Unit IV Inside Unit IV industrial area
few hrs later
1000

75%
100

25%
max
10

A B C D min
1
Group of Chernobyl workers, 26 April 1986

Figure 5.7. Internal thyroid doses: first responders

Management at the reflex phase

In general, chaos and uncertainty are essential feature a of major nuclear accident which
characterized the following attributes:
- prevalence chance over the order;
- violation of information channels;
- total uncertainty concerning radiation situation, exact personnel location and severity of
technology violations.
These uncertainties create risks of decision making
1. Decision maker under a great stress
2. The more uncertainty the greater risk of decision
3. Range of alternative decision options: to do any available actions or to do nothing
excepting actions directed on reducing uncertainties
4. Breach of management hierarchy: informal leaders with a great professional
experience come to the first plan
5. Simple and robust decisions are optimal in a case of great total uncertainty
Management structure at the Chernobyl NPP is demonstrates in the table 5.10.

Table 5.10.
Management during the first 18 hours
No Manager
1 Director NPP
2 Main engineer NPP
3 Shift man NPP: Formal
head of reflex response
4 Deputy Main engineer on
operation Unit III+Unit IV
Arrival Operator guide
+45 min Emergency headquarters actions
+3 hr Water supply, s/m measurements
0 Collect witnesses, notification. Actually
transmit his duty to No 4, 7
0 Actual head: call the fire, switch on
diesel generator, ventilation, switch off
power supply cables, saving life, stop
Unit III
 5 Shift man Unit III 0 Complete and strict compliance with
emergency plan & instructions
6 Shift man Unit IV 0 Translation of No 4 guides
7 Deputy head of safety +1 hr Radiation monitoring, zoning 30
department mGy/h#, switch off ventilation
# Radiation zoning has not be applied on April, 26
There are two alternative retrospective estimates of reflex management
View I– Decision making was chain of mistakes or
View II – Decision making would have been logical timely resolute actions (water supply,
preventing panics, challenging data of radiation reconnaissance, switch off long-distance
telephony etc) if reactor of Unit IV had not been destroyed.

Special judgment No 4
Along with positive action and results, delay of reflex administrative
response concerning occupational radiation protection is obvious:
 “Dose Order form” did not apply during the first day for
organization of any work
 Forbidden and restricted working radiation zones have not be
applied
 Procedure of “Elevated Planned Dose Permission” did not apply
during the first day
 Ignoring danger of overexposure by administration and personnel
excepting dosimetrists and the turbine shop workers
 Urgent evacuation of unnecessary personnel

Lessons learnt from the reflex response are as follows:

 Transition from routine planned exposure situation to emergency
management is a crucial point of reflex response
 Urgent actions of the first responders corresponded with
emergency situation, purposes, plan and instructions
 However delay of adequate decisions was 11 -15 hours due to
great uncertainties
 Absence of appropriate radiometric and dose monitoring led to
serious radiological consequences among emergency workers and
witnesses
 Under a great stress dominant behaviour of nuclear workers to
carry out their duties prevailed over personal safety, including
radiation safety
 2.1.1.4. Reflex Phase – 26 April 1986
Key issues in reflex phase were as follows:
(1) To clarify situation and arising threats → Collection and comprehensive analysis of
witness evidence
(2) To introduce emergency plan into action → Emergency management and urgent
actions directed on maintenance of the viability of the object
(3) To limit the number of involved EWs → Evacuation of unnecessary witnesses,
functionality of security check-points
(4) To measure exposure rate and surface radioactivity contamination → Emergency
zoning
(5) To prevent radionuclide carrying over → Functionality of sanitary check-points

All of above-mentioned actions carried out in extremely heavy radiation conditions

(figures 5.5, 5.6, 5.6A and table 5.5). It is nesessary to note that mostly retrospective estimation
of radiological situation are presented below.

Spatial distribution of exposure rate, mGy/hr

mGy/hr

50 83 19

87
89A
57A 27A
48A 30A 91 38
35
42A
28A
83A 24A 80 85 40

300 42A
12
24
15A
1000 1000 4 82
15 13

42A 56
2000 93A 95

2A
100 23A 9A
10
3000 21A
23
9 8

300
4000 30 10 42 30
1000

7A 7A 34 7 7
16

6A 5A 6
3000

17 5

Coordinates in meters

Figure 5.5. Spatial distribution of exposure rate, mGy/hr at the NPP site

Table 5.5.
Total beta-activity. 26 April 1986
Sample Place of sampling Concentration, Bq m-3
Air Premises of Unit III 109 – 10 10
Pumped water# Flooded basement Up to 10 13
# 57, 700 m3 of water was pumped out of the basement to cooling pond
 A 1000 C 30 mGy

100

100mGy
10

1
1mGy/h

B D
Re
lati
ve
co
1Gy
nte
nt,
%
R

A - Kerma rate, mGy/h on April, 26 – 4 km zone C – Annual kerma – 30 km zone

B – Kerma within first 2 days – 4 km zone D – Fuel radionuclide composition with time

Fig 5.6. Gamma radiation near the Chernobyl NPP and radionuclide composition of fuel and fallout
2.1.1.5 Early Phase: 27 April -20 May 1986

Harmful working conditions at the early phase included chemical, physical, radiological and
psychological factors.

Table 5.11.
Chemical factor at working places

Origin Initial materials Pollutants

Fire at the Unit IV
Sublimation of materials
dumped on the reactor
Dust catching for building,
roof, industrial site and roads
of 30-km zone
Graphite, building & organic
containing materials, bitumen
Sand, clay, lead, dolomite,
boron compounds
Sulphite-alcohol barda, oxalic
& hydrochloric acids,
formalin; resinas, oil-slime
CO, NO2, hydrocianide,
phosgene, smoke, superfine
aerosols
Depositions of lead
Superfine acid aerosols,
sulfer/organic–containing
vapour

Physical factor was ionizing of air. Ionization levels exceeded permissible level many
times (103- 105 greater near Unit IV). This factor led to oropharyngeal syndrome estimated to be
58% among liquidators in 1986 (3000 questionnaires)

Structure of radiological factor is shown in Figure 5.8.

 Radiological factor

Total exposure

External Internal
External External
beta-particles Alpha-
photons neutrons
- beta-rays

Directed to
“forward-back”, Directed to
Distant & Inhalated
Isotropic, “forward-back”
contact radionuclides
Rotary

Figure 5.8. Structure of radiological factor

Neutron exposure
 The first wrong measurements of neutron flux were evidence of nuclear chain
reaction. This suggestion became start point in the set of early countermeasures directed to
nuclear safety
 Neutron exposure gave minor impact to the total dose (up to 1-2% of gamma
exposure nearby Unit IV, June-July 1986)

Distant beta exposure

Ratio of beta to gamma-exposure for different types of work is given in the Figure 5.8.

Distant beta exposure

Ratio of beta- to gamma-exposure rate

Types
of work

Gamma exposure, mGy

Figure 5.8. Ratio of beta to gamma-exposure

Gamma exposure
Energy dependence of different dosimeters was in a range of 0.8 – 1.7 compared with the
known good device. This uncertainty should be taken into account when analyzing dosimetric
data (Table 5.12)

Table 5.12.
Sources and average energy of photons at the typical working places

Eγ, MeV Source distribution/

working place
~ 0.5 Local sources, surface contamination/
Roof, contaminated premises
~ 0.2 Volumetric distribution activity in soil/
Contaminated territory
~ 0.1 Behind light shield materials (concrete, crushed stone)

Comparison of measured external and internal exposures show that external exposure was
dominant component of total dose (Figure 5.9)

Comparison of measured
external and internal exposures

1 1111
Internal dose/ ALI

0.01

0.0001
1
External dose/ Dose limit
0.0001 0.01 1 100

Figure 5.9. Ratios of measured external and internal exposures for early liquidators

Key issues in early phase

1. To identify list of urgent actions, available means and man power according to
radiation situation and predictable threats
2. To use graded approach for operational planning
3. To estimate resources for urgent measures
4. To apply system of emergency management in proper manner
 Management system change at that time. Governmental Commission began to manage
emergency response instead of internal facility administration. Probably, excessive activity of
governmental body is inevitable attribute of early response on a major accident. Twenty five
years later similar process of excessive management activity was repeated in Fukushima-1
Actions of early liquidators are presented in the Table 5.13.
Table 5.13
Actions of early civil and military liquidators

Industrial site 4-km zone 30-km, 70-km zones

Civil liquidators
Decontamination Construction “wall in ground” Public evacuation
Drilling of wells Works in river port “Pripyat Evacuation of cattle
town”
Digging of foundation Dyking of riverside Sanitary measures
pit near Unit III
Building of tunnel Evacuation of equipment from Art concert activity
under Units III, IV “Jupiter” factory
Freezing of soil under Loading sand and lead to Domestic service
Unit IV helicopters
Transportation Transportation Transportation
Military liquidators
Fire control near Decontamination of vehicles Public evacuation
reactor coolant pump
on 23 May
Laying in reactor with Decontamination of Pripyat Evacuation of cattle
the help of helicopters town
Air reconnaissance Transport examination Radiological survey
Decontamination of Fire control around Pripyat Fire control
site, machinery hall, town
roof
Building of concrete Guarding of Pripyat town, 10- Decontamination shower
wall between Unit IV km, 30-km zones facilities
and depository of SNF
Transportation Adjustment of road traffic Decontamination of
settlements

Reasonability of complete urgent actions

Useful actions
 Maintenance of operated ChNPP technologies
 Evacuation of public
 Water pumping out bubbler-basin
 Removal of valuable imported equipment from the building base
 Investigation of the accident reasons
 Fire control on May, 23
Useless actions
 Covering the reactor with materials by helicopters
 Dust catching and decontamination on the industrial area and settlements
 Building of concrete slab (30mx30mx2.5m) with cooling system under reactor
 Liquid nitrogen supply into under-reactor premises
Reasonability of incomplete urgent actions
Useful actions
 Nuclear fuel diagnostics of under-reactor premises
 Radiation, fire, thermal reconnaissance
 Personal dose monitoring
 Optimized emergency management
 Sanitary and hygienic measures
Useless actions
 Construction of horizontal holes for soil freezing under reactor IV
 Building of underground wall around NPP

Doses and dose distribution for early civil liquidators are presented in Table 5.14..

Table 5.14.
Individual and collective doses

Category Number Dose, mGy Collective dose,

Mean Median person Gy
Civil liquidators 21,600 115 56 2,487

Individual dose distribution for early civil liquidators

Dose range, mSv <10 10-30 30-100 100-300 300-1000 >1000
Percent 21.5 13.2 27.7 30.8 6.2 0.6

It is important to estimate part of collective dose related to useful actions. Figure 5.10
demonstrates distributions of man-power and collective dose among general actions had been
carried out within first days following the accident.

Fig.5.10. Distributions of man-hours and collective doses during first 5 days after vthe accident

One can see that movement and loss of time account for ¾ of total collective dose.
Special judgment No 4
Optimization of traffic on contaminated area is important issue from
occupational radiological protection point of view.

Evolution of dose monitoring

Dose monitoring of Chernobyl NPP workers
 27 April - Regional Civil Defense unit handed condenser dosimeters DKP-50 to
the ChNPP safety engineering department
 28April – Two TLD devices were deployed at the dosimeter point of industrial
camp “Skazochniy”
 28April – WBC was deployed at the dosimetry point. Then WBCs were placed in
the after-work sanatorium
 Occupational dose monitoring of the Chernobyl personnel was satisfactory
established by 10 May 1986
 Results of dose monitoring were daily reported to Governmental commission in
May-June 1986
Dose monitoring of military liquidators
 Both instrumental and calculated techniques
 Application of different types of dosimeters
 Fabricated dose records
 Value of elevated planned exposure was considered 500 mSv till 20 May

Negative lessons: early phase

1. Absence of adequate personal dose monitoring means and dosimeters for measurements
of high levels of air kerma rate
2. Working assumption that reactor was not destroyed for water supply operation
3. Working assumption that active core was placed inside reactor
4. Political decision on Unit III restoration without economic justification
Link between gaps or wrong assumptions or unfounded decisions and non-justified exposure is
given in Figure 5.11.
Figure 5.11. Negative lessons 1 - 4: Logical chain

Positive lessons: early phase

1. Reliable system of security check-points and sanitary check points
2. The ranking of the harmful factors: external gamma → external beta→ internal
exposure
3. Development of retrospective dosimetry techniques
4. Timely triage of victims and system of three-stage medical treatment
5. Stable iodine prophylaxis

Special judgment No 5
Involvement a great number of people in emergency response and
recovery operations without proper selection and training is professional
and social phenomenon of the Chernobyl event

2.1.1.6. Intermediate phase: 21 May – 30 November

 Strategy of emergency and recovery works has been elaborated on May 1986, less than
one month after the accident. This strategy was adopted on the highest state level by Decree of
Central Committee of CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers (29 May 1986, No 634-188).
Planned vs actual dates and results of works is shown in Table 5.12
Table 5.12
Strategy of works: goals and schedule

Work Completion date

Planned Actual
Public returning into 30-km Sept -Dec 1986 Not reevaluated
zone
Construction of the Shelter September 1986 November 1986
Decontamination on-site NPP September 1986 December 1987
Unit I startup July 1986 October 1986
Unit II startup July 1986 October 1986
Unit III startup August 1986 December 1986
Recovery of Units V and VI October 1986 Never
projects

Involvement of large number of common people was needed to fulfill this strategy.
Above-mentioned Decree resolved:
“To accelerate decontamination operations in the Chernobyl NPP zone, which operations
are of social and political importance and the first priority
to call up reservists for 6 month-term above limits provided to Ministry of Defense by
the USSR Council Ministers of 20 August 1985”.
However, targets has have been achieved with delay or other results have not been
achieved at all.
 Special sanitary regulation
Special sanitary regulation covered all objects and aspects of emergency works.
Firstly, radiation zones has been established as follows;
Zone I – (so called, zone of strict control) – area between isolines 3.0 -5.0 mR/hr (30-50
µGy/h) decay-corrected on May, 10. Projected annual external dose below 50 mSv;
Zone II – (including 30-km zone and excluding or prohibited 10-km zone) - area
between isolines 5.0 -20 mR/hr (50-200 µGy/h) decay-corrected on May, 10
Zone III – area of prohibited 10-km zone above isoline 20 mR/hr (>200µGy/h), excluding
industrial site of NPP, Pripyat town
Zone IIIA – industrial site of NPP, Pripyat town
Secondly, different regulatory and administrative documents were adopted, applied and renewed.
Types of adopted documents in May and June 1986 are given in Tables 5.13, 5.14
Temporal permissible levels for surfaces were used at the sanitary check-points and applied as
criteria of decontamination. Primarily, values of flux density of beta-particles were identified.
However gamma-exposure rate was more convenient value for large scale radiometric
examination of surface contamination: 10,000 β/(cm2 min) →1 mR/hr or 1,000 β/(cm2 min) →
1 µGy/h (Table 5.15) . Change of temporal permissible levels is illustrated in Table 5.16.

Table 5.13
Sanitary regulation: May 1986

Document type Brief title Approved by Issued

Temporary Surface radioactive Regulatory body 7 May
permissible levels contamination
Interim methodic Management of Regulatory & 27 May
recommendation occupational Government bodies
protection
Recommendation Using of cleaning Regulatory body 29 May
agent “Z” for skin
decontamination
Recommendation Using of Regulatory body 29 May
pharmaceutics for
nuclides washout
Statement Monitoring and Chair of 30 May
records of individual Governmental
doses in 30-km zone Commission
Interim guidance Sanitary supervision Regulatory body 31 May
of dose monitoring

Table 5.14
Sanitary regulation: June 1986

Document type Brief title Approved by Issued

Instruction Decontamination of Regulatory body 11 June
protective clothes etc
in laundries of other
NPPs
Temporary Contamination of Regulatory body 12 June
permissible levels skin, linen, clothes,
protective means,
vehicles
Temporary Residual exposure Regulatory body 12 June
permissible levels rates after
decontamination
General requirements Interaction between Regulatory & 22 June
Recommendation the USSR State Government bodies
Sanitary Inspectors
and radiation safety
services: dose
monitoring

Table 5.15
Temporary permissible levels (TPLs) of surface radioactive contamination. Adopted on May, 7,
1986

Surface Flux density, β/(cm2 min) Exposure rate, µGy/h

Skin, underwear, towel, bed 1000 1
linen, footwear, protective
device & clothes
Dwelling, internal surface of 2000 2
transport facility
External surface of transport 3000 3
facility

Table 5.16
Temporary permissible levels (TPLs) for surface contamination (mR/hr) Adopted on
02.06.1986 /on 14.10.1986

Zone
Contaminated object I II III III-A Outside

Skin, underwear 5/ 3 10/ 7 20/ 15 20/ 15 0,1/-

Bed linen, outerwear 5/ 3 10/ 7 - - 0,1/-
Personal footwear 10/ 7 - - - 0,1/-
Protective device & working clothes -/ 10 30/ 20 50/ 40 100/ 70 -
Internal face of transport facility 10/ 10 30/ 30 50/ 50 100/ 0,2/-
100
External face of transport facility 15/ 10 50/ 40 200/ 150 400/ 0,3/-
300

Individual dose monitoring

Formally, Chernobyl NPP administration had to provide appropriate dose monitoring of
attached liquidators both civil staff and military reservists. However it was not able because of
lack of resources, equipment and operators. Management of dose monitoring of civil and military
staff was carried out independently.
Quality of dose monitoring during the first year after the accident is estimated in Table
5.17.
Table 5.17
Quality levels of dose monitoring during the first year after the accident

Level Description Percent Staff

High Only instrumental data. 13 ChNPP
Less than 10% of gaps and mistaken US-605
records
 Satisfied Mixture of high and low quality 4 Attached to NPP
levels
Low Both instrumental and calculated 58 Attached to 30-km
techniques. Incomplete or/and zone,
doubtful records Military men
Zero Absence of personal dose monitoring 25 Victims &Witnesses
procedure and data Early liquidators &
Belarus liquidators

Positive experience of dose monitoring management connected with construction of

“Shelter” around Unit 4 from June to November 1986 (special enterprises of US-605).
Heavy radiation conditions at working places were existed in that time (maximum values
are given in Table 5.18).
Table 5.18.
Source parameters during construction of “Shelter” around Unit IV
Influencing factors Maximum levels
Gamma-radiation of fuel fragments, surfaces, 100Gy/h – reactor
soil 4 Gy/h –working places
Alpha-, beta-aerosols 300 permissible concentration – dusty work
Alpha-, beta-contamination of surfaces 102-105 α/(cm2 min)
104-108 β/(cm2 min)
Neutron radiation 4-400 µSv/h – machinery hall

Total number of involved workers was 21,500. Maximal shift of workers was 11,000,
including 6,000 of military staff and 5,000 of civil workers. Monitoring procedure was the same
both civil and military staff. Numerical structure of dose monitoring department was 150 - 270.
System of dose monitoring management included radiation technical survey, dose monitoring,
radiation protection and research function. It was delineated 12 working zones of industrial area
during the US-605 activity according to radiation situation and operation technologies.
Administrative daily dose of 10 mSv was established for permanent control of received dose.
Also set temporary permissible levels of surface radioactive contamination were adopted and
timely revised by both regulatory body and emergency operator. A noticeable dose decreasing
gave using separate shuttle mobile means in different zone.
Figure 5.12. Dose distributions for civil and military liquidators of US-605 enterprises

Special study shown influence of behavior factor (both professional and psychological
origins) on individual dose value. Dose distribution for group of liquidators carried out a certain
operation at the same working place may be approximated by lognormal dependence with GSD
= 1.75±0.20 (see Figure 5.13)

Figure 5.13. Individual doses for the same working places

In general, results of individual dose monitoring are presented in Table 5.19

Table 5.19.
\Individual and collective doses: 26 April – 31 December 1986): official data

Category Number Dose, mGy Collective dose,

Mean Median person Gy
Clinics patients 134 3400 2400 455
Witnesses 1,057 550 450 581
Early civil liquidators 21,600 115 56 2,484
ChNPP personnel 2,358 87 48 205
US-605 personnel 21,500 82 50 1,763
Military liquidators 61,762 204 220 12,600
Attached into 30-km zone 31,021 20 6.3 620
Total 139,432 134 18,708

Efficiency of protective equipment, radiation protected mechanisms and managing

Large scale application of protective means is one of important lesson of Chernobyl, Briefly,
results of this experience in heavy radiation conditions are illustrated in Tables 5.20-5.22

Table 5.20
Personal protective equipment
PPE Organ /tissue Reduction factor
Filter mask & respirator Lung 40 – 200 (without violation of
obturation)
Lead screen 3mm Red bone marrow 1.9
Lead band 3mm Gonads 1.83 ± 0.15
Dust proof spectacles 2mm Eyes 36 - 200
Plexiglass helmet visor 2-5mm Skin, lens of the eye
Lead inner soles 1.5mm Feet 1.4
Lead rubber apron Body 1.6
Lead rubber gloves Hands 1.4

Table 5.21.
Radiation protected mechanisms

Class Reducing factor Exposure Mechanisms

rate, mGy/h
I >1000 >1000 Bathyscaphe, heavy crane
II 100-200 n 100 Heavy bulldozer, obstacle clearing
engineering machine
III 3-20 <100 Excavator, ditcher, concrete pump, motor
transport

Table 5.22.
Decontamination planning and carrying out
Principle Procedure
Choice of main source 1. To estimate exposure rate and collective dose due to
local areas
2. To select area raised maximal dose on other areas
Step-by step recapture of territory 1. To start from the most contaminated part removing

Application of unmanned techniques
The reduction of operational duration
sources from a back space
2. To use local shield against radiation from front space
1. To use building technology, robots, remote control
guidance
2. To equip point of control with monitors and
speakerphone
2. To work out operations in normal radiation condition
2.To analyze detailed operational time study

Positive lessons
 Dose management on the base of Dose Order Form
 Change of routine managers to the emergency managers in the field of radiation
protection
 Dual personal dose monitoring of external exposure: daily and cumulative
 Application of “Choice of main source”, “Step-by step recapture of territory” approaches,
“Optimal impact on radiation situation” concept
 Application of unmanned techniques the reduction of operational duration
 Dose distribution analysis in ALARA procedure
 Lead protective equipment was not optimum in the limited time conditions for intensive
manual operations
 Suitable and adequate personal protective equipment (including protective clothing,
respiratory equipment, protective aprons and gloves) is required from radiation protection
of EWs

Specific judgment No 6
 Involvement a great number of people in emergency response and recovery operations
without proper selection and training is professional and social phenomenon of
Chernobyl event
 Large-scaled application of Elevated Planned Exposure in excess of 50 mSv conflicts
with IBSS-2011 (4.15). However justification of such decision was outside of the SRP

Conclusions to 2.1.1
1. Both positive and negative lessons of the Chernobyl accident
concerning radiation protection of emergency workers are still valid for
international community.
2. Two issues are considered extremely important, i.e. (1) management
and dose control for the first responders and (2) involvement of a great number of
common people to recovery operation.
3. Chernobyl experience has demonstrated change of priorities and key
issues in different phases of mitigation consequences:
Reflex phase:
- To clarify situation and arising threats by forces of collection and
comprehensive analysis of witness evidence;
- To introduce emergency plan into action. Emergency management and
urgent actions should be directed on maintenance of the viability of the object;
- To limit the number of involved emergency workers by means of
evacuation of unnecessary witnesses, functionality of security check-points;
- To measure exposure rate and surface radioactivity contamination for
delineation of emergency zones;
 - To prevent radionuclide carrying over by managing and functionality of
sanitary check-points.
Early phase:
- To identify list of urgent actions, available means and man power
according to radiation situation and predictable threats;
- To use graded approach for operational planning;
- estimate resources for urgent measures;
- To apply system of emergency management in proper manner.
Recovery phase:
- Strategy planning based on holistic approach;
- Stakeholder involvement;
- Transition from emergency management to management for existing
exposure situation;
- Implementation of analytic ALARA procedure;
- Design and application of optimized technologies and protective means
4. Brief list of negative lessons are as follows:
(1) Absence of adequate personal dose monitoring means and dosimeters for
measurements of high levels of air kerma rate;
(2) Working assumption that reactor was not destroyed for water supply
operation;
(3) Working assumption that active core was placed inside reactor;
(4) Political decision on Unit III restoration without economic justification
5. Positive lessons are as follows:
(1) Reliable system of security check-points and sanitary check points;
(2) The ranking of the harmful factors: external gamma → external beta→
internal exposure;
(3) Development of retrospective dosimetry techniques;
(4) Timely triage of victims and system of three-stage medical treatment;
(5) Managing stable iodine prophylaxis;
(6) Dose management on the base of Dose Order Form;
(7) Change of routine managers to the emergency managers in the field of
radiation protection;
(8) Dual personal dose monitoring of external exposure: daily and
cumulative;
(9) Application of “Choice of main source”, “Step-by step recapture of
territory” approaches, “Optimal impact on radiation situation” concept;
(10) Application of unmanned techniques the reduction of operational
duration;
(11) Dose distribution analysis in ALARA procedure;
(12) Application of suitable and adequate personal protective equipment
(including protective clothing, respiratory equipment, protective aprons and
gloves). It was proved that lead protective equipment was not optimum in the
limited time conditions for intensive manual operations
References
1 Chernobyl’ 88. Proceedings of the Union scientific-technical Conference. Ten volumes.
Edited by Ye. I. Ignatenko. Ministry of Atomic Energy. Chernobyl, 1989
2. R.M. Alexakhin et al. Large Radiation Accidents: Consequences and Protective
Countermeasures. Edited by L.A. Ilyin, V.A. Gubanov. Moscow, IzdAT, 2004.
Book was printed in Russian - 2001, in English - 2004 and in Japanese
3. V.P. Kruchkov et.al. Mitigation of accident consequences at Chernobyl NPP: Radiation and
dosimetry issues. Edited by V.G. Asmolov, O.A. Kochetkov. Moscow, IzdAT, 2013 Book was
printed in Russian - 2011, in English - 2013