HCL TECHNOLOGIES PHILIPPINES, INC. v. FRANCISCO GUARIN, JR.

G.R. No. 246793, March 18, 2021

FACTS: HCL, a business process outsourcing company, hired respondent Guarin, Jr. as
its Senior Technical Support Officer assigned to provide technical support to
administrators and users of account Salesforce. Upon the latter’s decision to end the
contract, HCL informed Guarin, Jr. that his services are no longer necessary and that he
is given an option to file an application with Accenture; to find a suitable position in
client Google; or to resign. However, respondent sent his resume for the Google
account positions after the deadline of submission has lapsed. Subsequently,
respondent was directed not to return to work for his position has become redundant.
After signing a release, waiver and quitclaim acknowledging his receipt of P182,340.65,
he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against HCL. The Labor Arbiter held that HCL
was not able to satisfy all the requisites of termination due to redundancy which the
NLRC and CA concurred with, declaring that respondent was illegally dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Guarin, Jr. was illegally dismissed by HCL.

RULING: No. Article 298 of the Labor Code allows the employer to terminate the
employee on the ground of redundancy which exists when the service of an employee
is in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual requirement of the business.
The Court held that all requisites for a valid redundancy program are present in the
case. First, HCL complied with the notice requirement. Second, Guarin, Jr. received his
separation pay. Third, HCL exercised good faith and employed fair and reasonable
criteria in abolishing Guarin, Jr.’s position. HCL hired him specifically for its Salesforce
account but his position was rendered redundant and ceased to exist upon the
termination of the said account. There is no proof that Guarin, Jr. was forced to sign
the quitclaim. Hence, he executed a valid release, waiver and quitclaim. Considering
that HCL complied with all the requisites for terminating respondent’s employment on
the ground of redundancy, his dismissal was valid.
 SUSAN BANCE, et al. v. UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANTHONY
G.R. No. 202724, February 3, 2021

FACTS: Petitioners were regular employees of the University. An audit report revealed
a cash shortage of P 1, 239, 856.25 supposed to be kept inside the cash vault under
the custody of Credit and Collection Officer Lobetania. Upon the latter’s admission of
failure to deposit the amount in the University’s bank account, she paid it in
installments out of her personal funds. On the approval of her resignation, the
University filed criminal cases for Estafa against her and Qualified Theft charged by the
prosecutor. At around the same period, Bance, Dimaiwat and Aguirre were found to
have taken advantage of their positions in the Accounting Office by enrolling their
children and relatives, including Velasco’s, under the University’s group enrollment
incentive program despite knowing that they were unqualified. Through an office memo
not preceded by any written notice, petitioner-employees were informed that their
employment will be terminated on grounds of dishonesty amounting to malversation of
funds. Petitioners filed complaints for illegal dismissal against the University contending
that it was lacking of just or authorized causes and non-observance of the requirements
of procedural due process. On the other hand, respondents contended that petitioner’s
(except Bance) resignation rendered the complaints for illegal dismissal without basis.
The Labor Arbiter found the petitioners to have been illegally dismissed, which was
reversed by NLRC on the ground that the complaints for illegal dismissal have no basis
as petitioners have opted for voluntary exit instead of being fired.    The CA affirmed the
ruling of NLRC, holding that there was a just cause for Velasco, Aguirre, and Dimaiwat’s
dismissal when they participated in the anomalous scheme in the University’s
Accounting department; Lobetania failed to remit collections to the University’s bank
account while Bance enrolled unqualified candidates into the University’s enrollment
incentive program.

ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioner’s (except Bance) voluntary resignation render their
complaints for illegal dismissal without basis.
2. Whether Bance was illegally dismissed.

RULING:
1. Yes. The Court held that respondents showed that Lobetania, Dimaiwat,
Velasco, and Aguirre voluntarily resigned prior to the effectivity date of the
termination of their employment. Thus, because of the voluntary resignation,
their complaints for illegal dismissal have no basis. The Court agrees with CA
that they were dismissed for just causes. Lobetania’s failure to remit and
deposit the University’s funds to its bank account amounted to a willful
breach of trust. As to Dimawait, Velasco and Aguirre, their collective act of
taking undue advantage of the University’s group enrollment incentive
program despite knowledge that their children and relatives were unqualified
amounted to fraud and dishonesty.

2. No. The Court held that Bance’s dismissal was for a just cause when she
willfully breached the trust that the University has reposed on her. To
constitute a willful breach of trust, the employee concerned must be holding
a position of trust and confidence, and there must be a willful act that would
justify the loss of trust and confidence. Hence, Bance’s position as Senior
Accounts Officer can be considered as a position of trust, participating in the
scheme in the incentive program by enrolling unqualified beneficiaries. By her
 admission that her children or relatives benefited from the unauthorized
discounts, Bance’s act was willful. Such constitutes willful breach of the trust
that the University has reposed on her.

PEDRO D. DUSOL AND MARICEL M. DUSOL, v. EMMARCK A. LAZO

 G.R. No. 200555, January 20, 2021

FACTS: Petitioners Pedro and Maricel Dusol were employees of Ralco Beach, a beach
resort then operated by the parents of respondent Emmarck. Pedro as caretaker,
worked from 5 a.m. to 9 p.m. every day, including weekends and holidays, and was
given an allowance of P100.00 per week. Maricel working from 5 a.m. to 9 p.m. every
day, was employed to manage the store in the resort to which she was paid P1,000 a
month and entitled to 15% commission on the rentals collected from the cottages and
rest house. When the business was no longer profitable, the resort was leased out.
Respondent notified the petitioners that their services were no longer needed which
prompt the latter to file for an illegal dismissal. Respondent denied the employment
relationship with the petitioners and asserted that they were his industrial partners. On
January 2009, the Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction
since petitioners failed to prove that they were Emmarck's employees. Petitioners
appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which ruled in favor of the
petitioners and ruled they were employed "as overseers and caretakers of the business.
Emmarck filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which reversed the NLRC's
Resolutions. Hence, this petition for review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Pedro and Maricel were employees of Emmarck.
2. Whether or not Pedro and Maricel were validly dismissed.

RULING:
1. Yes. an employee is any person in the service of another under a contract for
hire, express, or implied, oral or written.38 To determine whether an employment
relationship exists, the following elements are considered: (1) the selection and
engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal;
and (4) the employer's power to control the employee's conduct. The most important
element is the employer's control of the employee's conduct, not only as to the result of
the work to be done, but also as to the means and methods to accomplish it. Here, it is
undisputed that Pedro and Maricel rendered their services in Ralco Beach and received
compensation sourced from rentals and sales of the resort. Thus, their relationship can
only be characterized as employment.
2. Yes. The employer failed to observe procedural due process in closure of
business as an authorized cause.
Article 29853 of the Labor Code considers closure of business as an authorized cause
for the dismissal of employees, whether or not the closure is due to serious business
losses. However, if the closure is not due to serious business losses, the employer is
required to pay its employees separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay or at
least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In this
case, the closure of the business is not disputed by Pedro and Maricel. While closure of
the business is an authorized cause, there no proof that it was due to serious business
losses. In effect, Pedro and Maricel are entitled to separation pay.

OSM MARITIME SERVICES, INC. v.  NELSON A. GO

 G.R. No. 238128, February 17, 2021

FACTS: Petitioner Nelson Go has been working as oiler/motorman for respondent OSM
Maritime Services, Inc. since 2009. Petitioner’s employment contract is nine months and
was under a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). While on board the vessel,
petitioner suddenly experienced dizziness accompanied by vomiting, chest pain and
shortness of breath. He was then brought to a hospital in Singapore where he was
diagnosed with sub-acute myocardial infarction with new onset hypertension. He was
repatriated and was seen by the company-designated physician. In a medical
certificate, Go was certified fit to resume sea duties as it was declared that his illness is
not work related. Petitioner was referred to the Maritime Clinic for International
Seafarers (MCIS) for his Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME) where he was
found unfit for sea duty due to his Meniere's Disease. Petitioner consulted his own
doctor who issued a certificate finding his disease as work-related and work-
aggravated. Petitioner filed the instant complaint for permanent and total disability
benefits, moral and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees. The Labor Arbiter (LA)
ruled in favor of Go with amendments on the compensation to be awarded. Respondent
made a partial appeal on the LA's Decision with the NLRC insisting that he is entitled to
the full disability compensation. NLRC denied respondent's appeal for lack of merit
declaring that respondent's Meniere's Disease is not work-related. Respondent filed a
Petition for Certiorari in the CA which reversed the decision of NLRC. Hence, this
Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is entitled to a total and permanent disability
benefits even though his condition does not merit a grade 1 disability and there is no
showing that he is permanently unfit for sea duties.

RULING: Yes. According to respondent's Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with

OSM Maritime Services, Inc., a seafarer who is declared permanently disabled as a
result of an occupational injury or an occupational disease, and who is assessed at less
than 50% permanent disability, but permanently unfit for further service at sea in any
capacity, shall also be entitled to a 100% compensation. It is important to note that it is
a fundamental doctrine in labor law that the CBA is the law between the parties and
they are obliged to comply with its provisions. Thus, in the case of Honda Phils., Inc. v.
Samahan ng Malayang Manggagawa sa Honda, it was ruled that:
A collective bargaining agreement or CBA refers to the negotiated contract between a
legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning wages, hours of work and all
other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit. As in all contracts, the
parties in a CBA may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they
may deem convenient provided these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy. Thus, where the CBA is clear and unambiguous, it
becomes the law between the parties and compliance therewith is mandated by the
express policy of the law.

TORM SHIPPING PHILIPPINES, INC., TORM S/A VS. PAMFILO A. ALACRE

 G.R. No. 229228, January 26, 2021

FACTS: Respondent was hired as a Fitter on board the vessel Torm Kristina for a
period of six months with a basic monthly salary of US$648.00. Sometime in July 2012,
while working on board the vessel, respondent felt pain on his right shoulder. He
sought medical help and was diagnosed by the doctor to be suffering from "Right
shoulder sprain, right hand joint sprain." Respondent was repatriated to the Philippines
on July 8, 2012 and was referred to the company-designated physician for post-
employment medical examination. Respondent underwent a series of treatments,
consulted another doctor, who concluded that it would be impossible for the respondent
to work as a seaman and recommended a Grade 3 disability grading. Respondent
underwent surgery on his right shoulder and was advised to continue his physical
therapy after being discharged. As his condition failed to improve, respondent filed a
Complaint before the LA against the petitioners for recovery of permanent total
disability benefits with claims for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

The Labor Arbiter held that the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) no longer
applies since it covers only the period of February 1, 2008 to January 31, 2010.

ISSUE: Whether or not the parties' CBA remains effective and applicable in resolving
this controversy and the disability grading of respondent's illness.

RULING: The petition is meritorious.

The Court agrees with the NLRC. The CBA should be applied in determining the rights
of the parties in this case as it remained effective even after its expressed duration.

Significantly, not only the respondent but as well petitioners' do not dispute the
effectivity of the CBA. In fact, one of the errors assigned in this petition for review is
that the complaint is premature pending ruling under the Danish Industrial Injuries Act
as mandated by the parties' CBA. This assertion is an implied recognition that the CBA
remained effective at the time respondent lodged his complaint.37
Having thus concluded that the CBA remained effective, its provisions on the award of
disability should be followed, particularly as it is not contrary to law, the POEA-SEC, and
public policy. In fact, it is more favorable to respondent and does not preclude the
latter from recovery under the provisions of the POEA-SEC.

RONNIE L. SINGSON VS. ARKTIS MARITIME CORP./FILPRIDE SHIPPING,

CO., INC./PROSPER MARINE PRIVATE LTD.
G.R. No. 214542, January 13, 2021
FACTS: Respondent hired Ronnie as "third engineer officer" on board the vessel "MIT
Atlanta 2" for a period of 10 months, boarding the vessel on January 20, 2010 and
commenced his employment. Concurrently, Fil-Pride was replaced by Arktis Maritime
Corp. (Arktis) as the new manning agent of Prosper.
On October 13, 2010, petitioner complained of severe stomach pains and was confined
at the Citymed Hospital in Singapore. The next day, petitioner was declared fit to rejoin
the vessel. When his condition did not improve, he was recommended for repatriation.
Petitioner arrived in Manila and was diagnosed the petitioner as suffering from
"cholecystolithiasis and r/o pancreatic pseudocyst," the next day by the company
physician with a recommendation for surgery. Exactly 134 days from petitioner's arrival
in Manila, he was declared by Dr. de Leon as "fit to work" in the Medical Report dated
February 28, 2011.
Petitioner filed a complaint against respondents for the payment of his disability
benefits, sickness allowance, refund of medical expenses, as well as damages and
attorney's fees. He alleged that after he was diagnosed with the disease and
recommended for surgery, Arktis took no action, forcing him to undertake medication at
his own expense without receiving any assistance from the respondents. He further
alleged that Arlctis denied him his sickness and medical benefits and failed to give him
an assessment of his disability.17 Considering that he contracted the illness during the
term of his employment contract, he maintained that his illness was work-related.
The Arbiter granted petitioner's claim for disability benefits. NLRC denied respondent’s
motion for reconsideration and dismissed the latter’s appeal, but was later reversed by
the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed serious errors of law in ruling that petitioner
is not entitled to the award of total and permanent disability benefits.

RULING: The Petition is denied.

The mere lapse of the 120-day period under Article 198(c)(l) of the Labor Code does
not automatically give rise to a cause of action for a claim of permanent total disability
benefits.
To be clear, when a certain sickness or injury causes a temporary and total disability
which lasts continuously for more than 120 days, then such total disability is considered
to be permanent. However, as an exception to this rule, if the said sickness or injury
that caused the temporary total disability requires medical treatment beyond the 120-
day period but not to exceed 240 days, then the employee is only entitled to temporary
total disability benefits until he is declared as either: 1) "fit to work," which stops his
entitlement to disability benefits; or 2) "permanently and totally disabled," which then
entitles him to permanent total disability benefits. In any event, if the 240 days had
lapsed without any certification issued by the company designated doctor, then the
employee may pursue an action for permanent total disability benefits.

PHILIPPINE LONG-DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY VS. CECILIO DOMINGO

G.R. No. 197402, January 30, 2021
FACTS: Respondent Cecilio Z. Domingo (Domingo) has been employed by PLDT as an
Installer/Repairman and was assigned as a temporary Storekeeper in one of PLDT's
Data Services Installation Maintenance Divisions (DSIM).    Due to involvement in the
anomalous and fraudulent transactions concerning the forged PLD forms, and that the
same constitutes serious misconduct, his employment was terminated.
Domingo filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal before the Labor Arbiter (LA), with
prayer for reinstatement and the payment of full backwages and rendered the dismissal
Domingo's Complaint for lack of merit. Unsatisfied with the LA's Decision, Domingo
appealed the same before the National Labor Relations Commission, however, the NLRC
denied Domingo's appeal. A petition for review on certiorari was filed in the Court of
Appeals which granted the petition. Therefore, this instant appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent’s dismissal was validly constituted.

HELD: Yes, the respondent’s dismissal was validly constituted. The quantum of proof
required in illegal dismissal cases is merely substantial evidence. Thus, in illegal
dismissal cases, the employer need only present evidence which is adequate to support
a conclusion, and not evidence which will establish moral certainty of guilt on the part
of the employee. This means that in justifying Domingo's dismissal, PLDT had the
burden to prove, with substantial evidence, that the acts of Domingo: (1) were of a
serious nature; (2) related to his duties as a Storekeeper of the DSIM Tambo
Warehouse; and (3) has made him unfit to continue working for PLDT. In this regard,
both the LA and the NLRC found that PLDT was able to overcome the burden of
proving, with substantial evidence, that Domingo committed serious misconduct, and as
such, the dismissal of Domingo was justified.
Therefore, the dismissal of the Respondent is valid.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANTONIO M. TALAUE

G.R. No. 248652, 12 January 2021
FACTS: Information was filed by the GSIS against Antonio M. Talaue (Talaue) a
municipal mayor and his co-accused for the violation of Section 52 (g) in relation to
Section 6 (b) of Republic Act No. 8291 (R.A. No. 8291). Santos’s petitioner found that
the municipal government failed to remit the total amount of P22,436,546.10, inclusive
of interests to GSIS.

ISSUE: Whether or not Talaue is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Sec. 52(g) in
relation to Sec. 6(b) of R.A. No. 8291.

RULING: YES. Section 52 (g) of the GSIS Act of 1997 penalizes the heads of the
offices of the national government, its political subdivisions, branches, agencies and
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations and
government financial institutions, and the personnel of such offices who are involved in
the collection of premium contributions, loan amortization and other accounts due the
GSIS, who fail, refuse, or delay the payment, turnover, remittance or delivery of such
accounts to the GSIS within thirty (30) days from the time the same have become due
and demandable.

THIRD DIVISION PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS EMPLOYEES

ASSOCIATION Present: (PBCEA), Petitioner V. PHILIPPINE BANK OF
COMMUNICATIONS
G.R. No. 250839, September 14, 2022
Facts: Sometime in the 1980s, PBCom adopted a policy on its loan program which
allowed their qualified employees to avail themselves of simultaneous loans. The aim of
the loan program was to help qualified employees meet certain difficulties and
emergencies and improve their quality of life. Under the policy, employees could use
their mid-year and year-end bonuses to pay for their loan amortizations.    Meanwhile
new group of investors took over the management of PBCom and redefined the loan
program Under the latest policy, employees whose net take home pay can
accommodate the value of their loan amortization are not allowed to use their mid-year
and year-end bonuses to pay for their loans PBCEA opposed the change in the loan
program. However, despite its opposition, PBCom unilaterally enforced the latest policy.

Issue: Whether or not the latest policy of PBCom on its loan program violates PBCEA's
right to collective bargaining.

Ruling: YES. No less than the 1987 Constitution guarantees the rights of the workers
to collective bargaining and negotiations and to participate in policy and decision-
making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
Notably, a CBA is a product of a constitutionally-guaranteed right to participate and is
therefore the law between the parties. Hence, the parties are obliged to comply with its
provisions. To stress, if the terms of the CBA are clear and there is no doubt as to the
intention of the contracting parties, then the literal meaning of the CBA's stipulations
shall prevail. Otherwise, the CBA must be construed liberally and the courts are
mandated to use a practical and realistic construction upon it, so that doubts in the
interpretation of its stipulations affecting labor should be resolved in the latter's favor.

NANCY CLAIRE PIT CELIS v. BANK OF MAKATI (A SAVINGS BANK), INC.

G.R. No. 250776, June 15, 2022

FACTS: Respondent hired petitioner Celis as an Account Officer for its Pasay City
Branch in 2013. In 2017, a report was received by HR Department that Celis was
involved in a case concerning embezzlement of funds in the Rural Bank of Placer. Upon
discovering that she did not disclose such employment in her job application,
respondent issued a Notice of Explanation and placed her under preventive suspension
for 30 days. Subsequent to the hearing/conference conducted, respondent dismissed
petitioner for (1) violation of the Bank’s Code of Conduct and Discipline; and (2) serious
misconduct, fraud or Willful Breach of Trust and Loss of Confidence under the Labor
Code. Celis filed a complaint for illegal dismissal contending that her failure to disclose
her past employment with the Bank was done in good faith and that her involvement in
the embezzlement case was not proven. The Labor Arbiter and NLRC held that
respondent illegally dismissed petitioner from employment. However, the CA reversed
the decision holding that respondent validly dismissed petitioner and finding grave
abuse of discretion on the part of NLRC.

ISSUE: Whether respondent validly dismissed petitioner from employment.

RULING: No. The Court held that petitioner’s infractions not being related or similar in
nature to the present charge, the CA erred in applying the Principle to Totality of
Infractions against her. Indubitably, respondent failed to substantially prove that
petitioner’s dismissal from employment was for a just cause. There is substantial
evidence to support the finding of the NLRC that respondent illegally dismissed
petitioner from employment.    The Court agrees with the labor tribunals that petitioner
was indeed illegally terminated from her job on the ground that it is merely a case of an
omission to disclose former employment in a job application, a fault which does not
justify petitioner’s suspension and eventual termination from employment. To dismiss
petitioner on account of her omission to disclose former employment is just too harsh a
penalty.

EDNA LUISA SIMON v. THE RESULTS COMPANIES AND JOSELITO SUMCAD

G.R. Nos. 249351-52, March 29, 2022

FACTS: Petitioner Simon filed a complaint against Results and Sumcad for illegal
dismissal alleging that she was hired as Customer Service Representative on October
2012 until forced to resign on December 2012. To prove her employment, she
submitted copies of her identification card and pay slips. Respondents explained that it
could not have terminated petitioner from employment because a two-month
probationary employment was insufficient for the company to assess her fitness for
regularization. The Labor Arbiter and NLRC held that Results illegally dismissed
petitioner from employment and that she was a probationary employee of Results.
However, the CA reversed the decision, holding that petitioner was actually a regular
employee of Results with an order to reinstate petitioner to her previous position.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner was a regular employee of Results and that she was illegally
dismissed from employment.

RULING: Yes. Since the ruling of the NLRC that petitioner was a mere probationary
employee was not supported by substantial evidence, the Court therefore agreed with
the CA that petitioner was deemed a regular employee of Results by operation of law.
Moreover, as Results did not present a copy of petitioner’s resignation letter or any
evidence that petitioner went an AWOL, the Court cannot consider its allegations that
petitioner voluntarily resigned or abandoned her work. There is substantial evidence to
support the finding of the NLRC that petitioner was forced to resign and simply left her
job without benefit of a written letter because she was dismissed in a casual manner.
Thus, the Court agreed with the labor tribunals that petitioner was illegally terminated
from her job.

GEROME B. GINTA-ASON VS. J.T.A. PACKAGING CORPORATION and JON TAN

ARQUILLA
G.R. No. 244206, MARCH 16 2022

FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of salary/wages,

service incentive leave, 13th month pay, separation pay and ECOLA, with claims for
moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees against respondents. Petitioner
alleged that he was hired by JTA on December 26, 2014 as an all-around driver until his
constructive dismissal on September 5, 2016. In his payday, petitioner asked Chancie,
his live-in partner, to follow him into respondent's office. After receiving his salary,
without any reason, Arquilla hit petitioner with a gun and kicked him several times.
Arquilla then turned his ire on Chancie and hurled invectives at her. He commanded
Chancie to kneel, and threatened to kill her and petitioner. Arquilla then illegally
detained Chancie and petitioner in the office and were released only the next day.
Petitioner claimed that he was constructively dismissed because Arquilla made his
continued employment impossible, unbearable, and unlikely.

ISSUE: Whether or not an employer-employee relationship existed between petitioner

and JTA at the time of petitioner's dismissal.

RULING: We rule in the negative.

Applying the "four-fold test" in determining the existence of an employer-employee
relationship, to wit: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the
payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the power to control the
employee's conduct, 32 the NLRC, as affirmed by the CA, found that petitioner failed to
prove, by competent and relevant evidence that he is an employee of JTA.

To begin with, We, stress that from the lowest tribunal up to this Court, JTA has
consistently denied having employed petitioner. It maintained that petitioner is a
stranger and was never an employee of JT A. Considering such denial, it was incumbent
upon petitioner to prove the fact of his employment with JTA. However, nothing to this
effect has been proven by petitioner. He presented no document setting forth the terms
of his employment. In particular, no contract of employment or written agreement was
introduced by petitioner to establish the true nature of his relationship with JT A.
Evident also is the lack of a company identification card to prove petitioner's
employment with JTA. The Court has held that in a business establishment, an
identification card is usually provided not only as a security measure but mainly to
identify the holder thereof as a bona fide employee of the firm that issues it.

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. Nos 210965 & 217623, March 22, 2022

FACTS: On 23 April 2007, DBP received from COA, through its Supervising Auditor,
Hilconeda P. Abril (Auditor Abril), four Audit Observation Memoranda (AOM) relative to
the grant of additional allowances and fringe benefits to DBP officers acting as officers
of DBP Subsidiaries in 2006. The AOM stated that the allowances and benefits
constitute double compensation to DBP officers, since they receive the same type of
benefits from DBP where they hold permanent plantilla positions. Auditor Abril directed
DBP to cause the immediate refund of all additional allowances granted to the officers
in compliance with laws on double compensation. In reply to the AOM, DBP requested
for the reversal of the AOM recommendations, arguing that DBM Circular Letter No.
2003-10 and PD 1597 do not apply to DBP, since under its Charter, it is exempt from
existing laws, rules, and regulations on compensation, position, and qualification
standards. DBP insists that the amounts received as allowances, per diems, and/or
honoraria by DBP officers from its subsidiaries where they perform services connected
with or directly related to their functions as officers/employees of DBP should not be
considered as double compensation. COA disallowed the grant of merit increases and
other additional compensation or allowances because these were not specifically
authorized by existing laws

ISSUE: Whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of COA in affirming the disallowance of the grant of merit
increase to DBP officers and employees.

HELD: No. In this case, the COA disallowed the grant of merit increases and other
additional compensation or allowances because these were not specifically authorized
by existing laws. While the DBP BOD is authorized by the Revised DBP Charter to adopt
and fix additional compensation, the COA stressed that the grant of the disallowed
benefits did not have the requisite approval of the president as required by PD 1597
and MO No. 20.72 Petitioner argues that the presidential approval obtained by DBP on
22 April 2010 validates the grant of merit increase to DBP officers and employees,
integration of officers' allowance to basic pay, and grant of economic assistance to DBP
employees, which COA previously disallowed. The Court disagrees.    Here, the
disallowed benefits clearly lacked legal cover as it violated not only PD 1597 and MO 20
but also the Constitution. That alone disqualifies the subject benefits and allowances
from being considered as genuinely given ·in consideration of services rendered.
Hence, there is no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of COA in affirming the disallowance of the grant of merit increase to DBP
officers and employees.

VIBAL COMPANY, VIRTUALIDAD INC., ET. AL VS. APRIL GRACE MORQUIN

G.R. No. 247879, April 19, 2022

FACTS: Vibal Company employed respondent as a Staff Writer for the S & T Digest
Magazine under the SD Publication Department which she became a probationary
employee and need to undergo a written examination for regularization, however, she
failed the two examinations said by the HR Manager. Then, she received a Notice of
Retrenchment informing the respondent that her employment had become redundant
and that he shall be terminated. She filed for illegal dismissal, however, the petitioners
insisted that she was validly dismissed.
Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioners. Respondent filed an appeal to the
National Labor Regulatory Commission which declared that there was an illegal
dismissal. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied it.
Hence, this instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent was illegally dismissed on the ground of
redundancy.

HELD: No. Redundancy exists where the services of an employee are more than what
is reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the enterprise.46 As a rule, a
declaration of redundancy is ultimately a management prerogative, and the employer is
not obligated to keep in its payroll more employees than are needed for its day-to-day
operations. Nonetheless, it is well settled that management, in the exercise of its
prerogative, must not violate the law or declare redundancy without sufficient basis.47
The following are the requirements for a valid redundancy program: (a) written notice
served on both the employees and the DOLE at least one ( 1) month prior to the
intended date of termination of employment; (b) payment of separation pay equivalent
to at least one ( 1) month pay for every year of service; ( c) good faith in abolishing the
redundant positions; and ( d) fair and reasonable criteria in asce1iaining what positions
are to be declared redundant and accordingly abolished,48 taking into consideration
such factors as (i) preferred status; (ii) efficiency; and (iii) seniority, among others.
Which petitioners failed to comply with all of the foregoing requisites, therefore, the
petition is denied for lack of merit.

NOEL G. GUINTO V STO. NINO CONSIGNEE, SALANGSANG, SALANGSANG,

LONG-ZENY ANGELO and ZENAIDA
G.R. No. 250987 MARCH 29,2022

FACTS: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision. The CA sustained in
all aspects the Decision and the Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) which set aside the Decision of the Labor Arbiter (LA) and entered a new
judgment that dismissed the claim for illegal dismissal of Noel G. Guinto (petitioner),
directed his reinstatement without back wages, deleted the award of separation pay
and 13th month pay, and ordered the payment of service incentive leave pay and l 0%
attorney's fees in his favor.

ISSUES: Whether the CA erred in not finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the NLRC when it held that: (1) petitioner was not illegally dismissed; and (2) he was
neither entitled to 13th month pay nor separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.

RULING: The Court holds that the CA erred in not finding grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the NLRC when it reversed the LA's Decision and dismissed the Complaint
for illegal dismissal for lack of merit.
The rule is that "in illegal dismissal cases, the burden of proof is on the employer in
proving the validity of dismissal. However, the fact of dismissal, if disputed, must be
duly proven by the complainant. Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, in turn,
provides that "material averment[s] in the complaint, other than those as to the
number of unliquidated damages, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically
denied. In the case; respondents did not specifically deny and rebut petitioner's
allegations as to the fact of his dismissal from employment.
As to the other monetary claims of petitioner, there is no issue that petitioner is entitled
to service incentive leave pay in the amount of P4,500.00 as ruled by the LA and
affirmed by the NLRC. It bears emphasis that the NLRC ruling on this matter has
already attained finality considering respondents' failure to assail it before the CA by
way of their own petition for certiorari. With respect to petitioner's prayer for the award
of 13th month pay, the CA is correct that the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion
when it ruled against his entitlement thereto. Under Section 3(e) of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing PD 851, 70 employers of those who are paid on purely
commission, boundary, or task basis, among others, are exempted from the payment of
13th month pay to its employees.