HCL TECHNOLOGIES PHILIPPINES, INC. v. FRANCISCO GUARIN, JR.

G.R. No. 246793, March 18, 2021

FACTS: HCL, a business process outsourcing company, hired respondent Guarin, Jr. as its
Senior Technical Support Officer assigned to provide technical support to administrators
and users of account Salesforce. Upon the latter’s decision to end the contract, HCL
informed Guarin, Jr. that his services are no longer necessary and that he is given an
option to file an application with Accenture; to find a suitable position in client Google;
or to resign. However, respondent sent his resume for the Google account positions after
the deadline of submission has lapsed. Subsequently, respondent was directed not to
return to work for his position has become redundant. After signing a release, waiver and
quitclaim acknowledging his receipt of P182,340.65, he filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against HCL. The Labor Arbiter held that HCL was not able to satisfy all the
requisites of termination due to redundancy which the NLRC and CA concurred with,
declaring that respondent was illegally dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Guarin, Jr. was illegally dismissed by HCL.

RULING: No. Article 298 of the Labor Code allows the employer to terminate the
employee on the ground of redundancy which exists when the service of an employee is
in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual requirement of the business. The
Court held that all requisites for a valid redundancy program are present in the case.
First, HCL complied with the notice requirement. Second, Guarin, Jr. received his
separation pay. Third, HCL exercised good faith and employed fair and reasonable criteria
in abolishing Guarin, Jr.’s position. HCL hired him specifically for its Salesforce account
but his position was rendered redundant and ceased to exist upon the termination of the
said account. There is no proof that Guarin, Jr. was forced to sign the quitclaim. Hence,
he executed a valid release, waiver and quitclaim. Considering that HCL complied with all
the requisites for terminating respondent’s employment on the ground of redundancy, his
dismissal was valid.

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 SUSAN BANCE, et al. v. UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANTHONY
G.R. No. 202724, February 3, 2021

FACTS: Petitioners were regular employees of the University. An audit report revealed a
cash shortage of P 1, 239, 856.25 supposed to be kept inside the cash vault under the
custody of Credit and Collection Officer Lobetania. Upon the latter’s admission of failure
to deposit the amount in the University’s bank account, she paid it in installments out of
her personal funds. On the approval of her resignation, the University filed criminal cases
for Estafa against her and Qualified Theft charged by the prosecutor. At around the same
period, Bance, Dimaiwat and Aguirre were found to have taken advantage of their
positions in the Accounting Office by enrolling their children and relatives, including
Velasco’s, under the University’s group enrollment incentive program despite knowing
that they were unqualified. Through an office memo not preceded by any written notice,
petitioner-employees were informed that their employment will be terminated on
grounds of dishonesty amounting to malversation of funds. Petitioners filed complaints
for illegal dismissal against the University contending that it was lacking of just or
authorized causes and non-observance of the requirements of procedural due process. On
the other hand, respondents contended that petitioner’s (except Bance) resignation
rendered the complaints for illegal dismissal without basis. The Labor Arbiter found the
petitioners to have been illegally dismissed, which was reversed by NLRC on the ground
that the complaints for illegal dismissal have no basis as petitioners have opted for
voluntary exit instead of being fired. The CA affirmed the ruling of NLRC, holding that
there was a just cause for Velasco, Aguirre, and Dimaiwat’s dismissal when they
participated in the anomalous scheme in the University’s Accounting department;
Lobetania failed to remit collections to the University’s bank account while Bance
enrolled unqualified candidates into the University’s enrollment incentive program.

ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioner’s (except Bance) voluntary resignation render their
complaints for illegal dismissal without basis.
2. Whether Bance was illegally dismissed.

RULING:
1. Yes. The Court held that respondents showed that Lobetania, Dimaiwat,
Velasco, and Aguirre voluntarily resigned prior to the effectivity date of the
termination of their employment. Thus, because of the voluntary resignation,
their complaints for illegal dismissal have no basis. The Court agrees with CA
that they were dismissed for just causes. Lobetania’s failure to remit and
deposit the University’s funds to its bank account amounted to a willful breach
of trust. As to Dimawait, Velasco and Aguirre, their collective act of taking
undue advantage of the University’s group enrollment incentive program
despite knowledge that their children and relatives were unqualified amounted
to fraud and dishonesty.

2. No. The Court held that Bance’s dismissal was for a just cause when she
willfully breached the trust that the University has reposed on her. To
constitute a willful breach of trust, the employee concerned must be holding a
position of trust and confidence, and there must be a willful act that would
justify the loss of trust and confidence. Hence, Bance’s position as Senior
Accounts Officer can be considered as a position of trust, participating in the

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scheme in the incentive program by enrolling unqualified beneficiaries. By her
admission that her children or relatives benefited from the unauthorized
discounts, Bance’s act was willful. Such constitutes willful breach of the trust
that the University has reposed on her.

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 PEDRO D. DUSOL AND MARICEL M. DUSOL, v. EMMARCK A. LAZO
G.R. No. 200555, January 20, 2021

FACTS: Petitioners Pedro and Maricel Dusol were employees of Ralco Beach, a beach
resort then operated by the parents of respondent Emmarck. Pedro as caretaker, worked
from 5 a.m. to 9 p.m. every day, including weekends and holidays, and was given an
allowance of P100.00 per week. Maricel working from 5 a.m. to 9 p.m. every day, was
employed to manage the store in the resort to which she was paid P1,000 a month and
entitled to 15% commission on the rentals collected from the cottages and rest
house. When the business was no longer profitable, the resort was leased out.
Respondent notified the petitioners that their services were no longer needed which
prompt the latter to file for an illegal dismissal. Respondent denied the employment
relationship with the petitioners and asserted that they were his industrial partners. On
January 2009, the Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction
since petitioners failed to prove that they were Emmarck's employees. Petitioners
appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which ruled in favor of the
petitioners and ruled they were employed "as overseers and caretakers of the business.
Emmarck filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which reversed the NLRC's
Resolutions. Hence, this petition for review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Pedro and Maricel were employees of Emmarck.
2. Whether or not Pedro and Maricel were validly dismissed.

RULING:
1. Yes. an employee is any person in the service of another under a contract for
hire, express, or implied, oral or written.38 To determine whether an employment
relationship exists, the following elements are considered: (1) the selection and
engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and
(4) the employer's power to control the employee's conduct. The most important element
is the employer's control of the employee's conduct, not only as to the result of the work
to be done, but also as to the means and methods to accomplish it. Here, it is undisputed
that Pedro and Maricel rendered their services in Ralco Beach and received compensation
sourced from rentals and sales of the resort. Thus, their relationship can only be
characterized as employment.

2. Yes. The employer failed to observe procedural due process in closure of

business as an authorized cause.

Article 29853 of the Labor Code considers closure of business as an authorized cause for
the dismissal of employees, whether or not the closure is due to serious business losses.
However, if the closure is not due to serious business losses, the employer is required to
pay its employees separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2)
month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In this case, the closure of the
business is not disputed by Pedro and Maricel. While closure of the business is an
authorized cause, there no proof that it was due to serious business losses. In effect,
Pedro and Maricel are entitled to separation pay.

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 OSM MARITIME SERVICES, INC. v.  NELSON A. GO
G.R. No. 238128, February 17, 2021

FACTS: Petitioner Nelson Go has been working as oiler/motorman for respondent OSM
Maritime Services, Inc. since 2009. Petitioner’s employment contract is nine months and
was under a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). While on board the vessel,
petitioner suddenly experienced dizziness accompanied by vomiting, chest pain and
shortness of breath. He was then brought to a hospital in Singapore where he was
diagnosed with sub-acute myocardial infarction with new onset hypertension. He was
repatriated and was seen by the company-designated physician. In a medical certificate,
Go was certified fit to resume sea duties as it was declared that his illness is not work
related. Petitioner was referred to the Maritime Clinic for International Seafarers (MCIS)
for his Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME) where he was found unfit for sea
duty due to his Meniere's Disease. Petitioner consulted his own doctor who issued a
certificate finding his disease as work-related and work-aggravated. Petitioner filed the
instant complaint for permanent and total disability benefits, moral and exemplary
damages plus attorney's fees. The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of Go with
amendments on the compensation to be awarded. Respondent made a partial appeal on
the LA's Decision with the NLRC insisting that he is entitled to the full disability
compensation. NLRC denied respondent's appeal for lack of merit declaring that
respondent's Meniere's Disease is not work-related. Respondent filed a Petition
for Certiorari in the CA which reversed the decision of NLRC. Hence, this Petition for
Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is entitled to a total and permanent disability
benefits even though his condition does not merit a grade 1 disability and there is no
showing that he is permanently unfit for sea duties.

RULING: Yes. According to respondent's Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with

OSM Maritime Services, Inc., a seafarer who is declared permanently disabled as a result
of an occupational injury or an occupational disease, and who is assessed at less than 50%
permanent disability, but permanently unfit for further service at sea in any capacity,
shall also be entitled to a 100% compensation. It is important to note that it is a
fundamental doctrine in labor law that the CBA is the law between the parties and they
are obliged to comply with its provisions. Thus, in the case of Honda Phils., Inc. v.
Samahan ng Malayang Manggagawa sa Honda, it was ruled that:

A collective bargaining agreement or CBA refers to the negotiated contract between a

legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning wages, hours of work and all
other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit. As in all contracts, the
parties in a CBA may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they
may deem convenient provided these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy. Thus, where the CBA is clear and unambiguous, it becomes
the law between the parties and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy
of the law.

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 TORM SHIPPING PHILIPPINES, INC., TORM S/A VS. PAMFILO A. ALACRE
G.R. No. 229228, January 26, 2021

FACTS: Respondent was hired as a Fitter on board the vessel Torm Kristina for a period of
six months with a basic monthly salary of US$648.00. Sometime in July 2012, while
working on board the vessel, respondent felt pain on his right shoulder. He sought
medical help and was diagnosed by the doctor to be suffering from "Right shoulder
sprain, right hand joint sprain." Respondent was repatriated to the Philippines on July 8,
2012 and was referred to the company-designated physician for post-employment medical
examination. Respondent underwent a series of treatments, consulted another doctor,
who concluded that it would be impossible for the respondent to work as a seaman and
recommended a Grade 3 disability grading. Respondent underwent surgery on his right
shoulder and was advised to continue his physical therapy after being discharged. As his
condition failed to improve, respondent filed a Complaint before the LA against the
petitioners for recovery of permanent total disability benefits with claims for moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

The Labor Arbiter held that the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) no longer applies
since it covers only the period of February 1, 2008 to January 31, 2010.

ISSUE: Whether or not the parties' CBA remains effective and applicable in resolving this
controversy and the disability grading of respondent's illness.

RULING: The petition is meritorious.

The Court agrees with the NLRC. The CBA should be applied in determining the rights of
the parties in this case as it remained effective even after its expressed duration.

Significantly, not only the respondent but as well petitioners' do not dispute the
effectivity of the CBA. In fact, one of the errors assigned in this petition for review is that
the complaint is premature pending ruling under the Danish Industrial Injuries Act as
mandated by the parties' CBA. This assertion is an implied recognition that the CBA
remained effective at the time respondent lodged his complaint.37
Having thus concluded that the CBA remained effective, its provisions on the award of
disability should be followed, particularly as it is not contrary to law, the POEA-SEC, and
public policy. In fact, it is more favorable to respondent and does not preclude the latter
from recovery under the provisions of the POEA-SEC.

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 RONNIE L. SINGSON VS. ARKTIS MARITIME CORP./FILPRIDE SHIPPING, CO.,
INC./PROSPER MARINE PRIVATE LTD.
G.R. No. 214542, January 13, 2021

FACTS: Respondent hired Ronnie as "third engineer officer" on board the vessel "MIT
Atlanta 2" for a period of 10 months, boarding the vessel on January 20, 2010 and
commenced his employment. Concurrently, Fil-Pride was replaced by Arktis Maritime
Corp. (Arktis) as the new manning agent of Prosper.
On October 13, 2010, petitioner complained of severe stomach pains and was confined at
the Citymed Hospital in Singapore. The next day, petitioner was declared fit to rejoin the
vessel. When his condition did not improve, he was recommended for repatriation.
Petitioner arrived in Manila and was diagnosed the petitioner as suffering from
"cholecystolithiasis and r/o pancreatic pseudocyst," the next day by the company
physician with a recommendation for surgery. Exactly 134 days from petitioner's arrival in
Manila, he was declared by Dr. de Leon as "fit to work" in the Medical Report dated
February 28, 2011.
Petitioner filed a complaint against respondents for the payment of his disability benefits,
sickness allowance, refund of medical expenses, as well as damages and attorney's fees.
He alleged that after he was diagnosed with the disease and recommended for surgery,
Arktis took no action, forcing him to undertake medication at his own expense without
receiving any assistance from the respondents. He further alleged that Arlctis denied him
his sickness and medical benefits and failed to give him an assessment of his disability.17
Considering that he contracted the illness during the term of his employment contract,
he maintained that his illness was work-related.
The Arbiter granted petitioner's claim for disability benefits. NLRC denied respondent’s
motion for reconsideration and dismissed the latter’s appeal, but was later reversed by the
Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed serious errors of law in ruling that petitioner is
not entitled to the award of total and permanent disability benefits.

RULING: The Petition is denied.

The mere lapse of the 120-day period under Article 198(c)(l) of the Labor Code does not
automatically give rise to a cause of action for a claim of permanent total disability
benefits.
To be clear, when a certain sickness or injury causes a temporary and total disability
which lasts continuously for more than 120 days, then such total disability is considered
to be permanent. However, as an exception to this rule, if the said sickness or injury that
caused the temporary total disability requires medical treatment beyond the 120-day
period but not to exceed 240 days, then the employee is only entitled to temporary total
disability benefits until he is declared as either: 1) "fit to work," which stops his
entitlement to disability benefits; or 2) "permanently and totally disabled," which then
entitles him to permanent total disability benefits. In any event, if the 240 days had
lapsed without any certification issued by the company designated doctor, then the
employee may pursue an action for permanent total disability benefits.

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 PHILIPPINE LONG-DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY VS. CECILIO DOMINGO
G.R. No. 197402, January 30, 2021

FACTS: Respondent Cecilio Z. Domingo (Domingo) has been employed by PLDT as an

Installer/Repairman and was assigned as a temporary Storekeeper in one of PLDT's Data
Services Installation Maintenance Divisions (DSIM). Due to involvement in the
anomalous and fraudulent transactions concerning the forged PLD forms, and that the
same constitutes serious misconduct, his employment was terminated.
Domingo filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal before the Labor Arbiter (LA), with
prayer for reinstatement and the payment of full backwages and rendered the dismissal
Domingo's Complaint for lack of merit. Unsatisfied with the LA's Decision, Domingo
appealed the same before the National Labor Relations Commission, however, the NLRC
denied Domingo's appeal. A petition for review on certiorari was filed in the Court of
Appeals which granted the petition. Therefore, this instant appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent’s dismissal was validly constituted.

HELD: Yes, the respondent’s dismissal was validly constituted. The quantum of proof
required in illegal dismissal cases is merely substantial evidence. Thus, in illegal dismissal
cases, the employer need only present evidence which is adequate to support a
conclusion, and not evidence which will establish moral certainty of guilt on the part of
the employee. This means that in justifying Domingo's dismissal, PLDT had the burden to
prove, with substantial evidence, that the acts of Domingo: (1) were of a serious nature;
(2) related to his duties as a Storekeeper of the DSIM Tambo Warehouse; and (3) has
made him unfit to continue working for PLDT. In this regard, both the LA and the NLRC
found that PLDT was able to overcome the burden of proving, with substantial evidence,
that Domingo committed serious misconduct, and as such, the dismissal of Domingo was
justified.
Therefore, the dismissal of the Respondent is valid.

8
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANTONIO M. TALAUE
G.R. No. 248652, 12 January 2021

FACTS: Information was filed by the GSIS against Antonio M. Talaue (Talaue) a
municipal mayor and his co-accused for the violation of Section 52 (g) in relation to
Section 6 (b) of Republic Act No. 8291 (R.A. No. 8291). Santos’s petitioner found that the
municipal government failed to remit the total amount of P22,436,546.10, inclusive of
interests to GSIS.

ISSUE: Whether or not Talaue is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Sec. 52(g) in relation
to Sec. 6(b) of R.A. No. 8291.

RULING: YES. Section 52 (g) of the GSIS Act of 1997 penalizes the heads of the offices of
the national government, its political subdivisions, branches, agencies and
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations and
government financial institutions, and the personnel of such offices who are involved in
the collection of premium contributions, loan amortization and other accounts due the
GSIS, who fail, refuse, or delay the payment, turnover, remittance or delivery of such
accounts to the GSIS within thirty (30) days from the time the same have become due and
demandable.

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 THIRD DIVISION PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION Present: (PBCEA), Petitioner V. PHILIPPINE BANK OF
COMMUNICATIONS
G.R. No. 250839, September 14, 2022

Facts: Sometime in the 1980s, PBCom adopted a policy on its loan program which
allowed their qualified employees to avail themselves of simultaneous loans. The aim of
the loan program was to help qualified employees meet certain difficulties and
emergencies and improve their quality of life. Under the policy, employees could use their
mid-year and year-end bonuses to pay for their loan amortizations. Meanwhile new
group of investors took over the management of PBCom and redefined the loan program
Under the latest policy, employees whose net take home pay can accommodate the value
of their loan amortization are not allowed to use their mid-year and year-end bonuses to
pay for their loans PBCEA opposed the change in the loan program. However, despite its
opposition, PBCom unilaterally enforced the latest policy.

Issue: Whether or not the latest policy of PBCom on its loan program violates PBCEA's
right to collective bargaining.

Ruling: YES. No less than the 1987 Constitution guarantees the rights of the workers to
collective bargaining and negotiations and to participate in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
Notably, a CBA is a product of a constitutionally-guaranteed right to participate and is
therefore the law between the parties. Hence, the parties are obliged to comply with its
provisions. To stress, if the terms of the CBA are clear and there is no doubt as to the
intention of the contracting parties, then the literal meaning of the CBA's stipulations
shall prevail. Otherwise, the CBA must be construed liberally and the courts are
mandated to use a practical and realistic construction upon it, so that doubts in the
interpretation of its stipulations affecting labor should be resolved in the latter's favor.

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 NANCY CLAIRE PIT CELIS v. BANK OF MAKATI (A SAVINGS BANK), INC.
G.R. No. 250776, June 15, 2022

FACTS: Respondent hired petitioner Celis as an Account Officer for its Pasay City Branch
in 2013. In 2017, a report was received by HR Department that Celis was involved in a case
concerning embezzlement of funds in the Rural Bank of Placer. Upon discovering that
she did not disclose such employment in her job application, respondent issued a Notice
of Explanation and placed her under preventive suspension for 30 days. Subsequent to the
hearing/conference conducted, respondent dismissed petitioner for (1) violation of the
Bank’s Code of Conduct and Discipline; and (2) serious misconduct, fraud or Willful
Breach of Trust and Loss of Confidence under the Labor Code. Celis filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal contending that her failure to disclose her past employment with the
Bank was done in good faith and that her involvement in the embezzlement case was not
proven. The Labor Arbiter and NLRC held that respondent illegally dismissed petitioner
from employment. However, the CA reversed the decision holding that respondent
validly dismissed petitioner and finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of NLRC.

ISSUE: Whether respondent validly dismissed petitioner from employment.

RULING: No. The Court held that petitioner’s infractions not being related or similar in
nature to the present charge, the CA erred in applying the Principle to Totality of
Infractions against her. Indubitably, respondent failed to substantially prove that
petitioner’s dismissal from employment was for a just cause. There is substantial evidence
to support the finding of the NLRC that respondent illegally dismissed petitioner from
employment. The Court agrees with the labor tribunals that petitioner was indeed
illegally terminated from her job on the ground that it is merely a case of an omission to
disclose former employment in a job application, a fault which does not justify
petitioner’s suspension and eventual termination from employment. To dismiss petitioner
on account of her omission to disclose former employment is just too harsh a penalty.

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 EDNA LUISA SIMON v. THE RESULTS COMPANIES AND JOSELITO SUMCAD
G.R. Nos. 249351-52, March 29, 2022

FACTS: Petitioner Simon filed a complaint against Results and Sumcad for illegal
dismissal alleging that she was hired as Customer Service Representative on October 2012
until forced to resign on December 2012. To prove her employment, she submitted copies
of her identification card and pay slips. Respondents explained that it could not have
terminated petitioner from employment because a two-month probationary employment
was insufficient for the company to assess her fitness for regularization. The Labor Arbiter
and NLRC held that Results illegally dismissed petitioner from employment and that she
was a probationary employee of Results. However, the CA reversed the decision, holding
that petitioner was actually a regular employee of Results with an order to reinstate
petitioner to her previous position.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner was a regular employee of Results and that she was illegally
dismissed from employment.

RULING: Yes. Since the ruling of the NLRC that petitioner was a mere probationary
employee was not supported by substantial evidence, the Court therefore agreed with the
CA that petitioner was deemed a regular employee of Results by operation of law.
Moreover, as Results did not present a copy of petitioner’s resignation letter or any
evidence that petitioner went an AWOL, the Court cannot consider its allegations that
petitioner voluntarily resigned or abandoned her work. There is substantial evidence to
support the finding of the NLRC that petitioner was forced to resign and simply left her
job without benefit of a written letter because she was dismissed in a casual manner.
Thus, the Court agreed with the labor tribunals that petitioner was illegally terminated
from her job.

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 GEROME B. GINTA-ASON VS. J.T.A. PACKAGING CORPORATION and JON TAN
ARQUILLA
G.R. No. 244206, MARCH 16 2022

FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of salary/wages,

service incentive leave, 13th month pay, separation pay and ECOLA, with claims for moral
and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees against respondents. Petitioner alleged that
he was hired by JTA on December 26, 2014 as an all-around driver until his constructive
dismissal on September 5, 2016. In his payday, petitioner asked Chancie, his live-in
partner, to follow him into respondent's office. After receiving his salary, without any
reason, Arquilla hit petitioner with a gun and kicked him several times. Arquilla then
turned his ire on Chancie and hurled invectives at her. He commanded Chancie to kneel,
and threatened to kill her and petitioner. Arquilla then illegally detained Chancie and
petitioner in the office and were released only the next day. Petitioner claimed that he
was constructively dismissed because Arquilla made his continued employment
impossible, unbearable, and unlikely.

ISSUE: Whether or not an employer-employee relationship existed between petitioner

and JTA at the time of petitioner's dismissal.

RULING: We rule in the negative.

Applying the "four-fold test" in determining the existence of an employer-employee
relationship, to wit: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of
wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the power to control the employee's conduct, 32
the NLRC, as affirmed by the CA, found that petitioner failed to prove, by competent and
relevant evidence that he is an employee of JTA.

To begin with, We, stress that from the lowest tribunal up to this Court, JTA has
consistently denied having employed petitioner. It maintained that petitioner is a
stranger and was never an employee of JT A. Considering such denial, it was incumbent
upon petitioner to prove the fact of his employment with JTA. However, nothing to this
effect has been proven by petitioner. He presented no document setting forth the terms
of his employment. In particular, no contract of employment or written agreement was
introduced by petitioner to establish the true nature of his relationship with JT A. Evident
also is the lack of a company identification card to prove petitioner's employment with
JTA. The Court has held that in a business establishment, an identification card is usually
provided not only as a security measure but mainly to identify the holder thereof as a
bona fide employee of the firm that issues it.

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 DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. Nos 210965 & 217623, March 22, 2022

FACTS: On 23 April 2007, DBP received from COA, through its Supervising Auditor,
Hilconeda P. Abril (Auditor Abril), four Audit Observation Memoranda (AOM) relative to
the grant of additional allowances and fringe benefits to DBP officers acting as officers of
DBP Subsidiaries in 2006. The AOM stated that the allowances and benefits constitute
double compensation to DBP officers, since they receive the same type of benefits from
DBP where they hold permanent plantilla positions. Auditor Abril directed DBP to cause
the immediate refund of all additional allowances granted to the officers in compliance
with laws on double compensation. In reply to the AOM, DBP requested for the reversal
of the AOM recommendations, arguing that DBM Circular Letter No. 2003-10 and PD
1597 do not apply to DBP, since under its Charter, it is exempt from existing laws, rules,
and regulations on compensation, position, and qualification standards. DBP insists that
the amounts received as allowances, per diems, and/or honoraria by DBP officers from its
subsidiaries where they perform services connected with or directly related to their
functions as officers/employees of DBP should not be considered as double
compensation. COA disallowed the grant of merit increases and other additional
compensation or allowances because these were not specifically authorized by existing
laws

ISSUE: Whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of COA in affirming the disallowance of the grant of merit
increase to DBP officers and employees.

HELD: No. In this case, the COA disallowed the grant of merit increases and other
additional compensation or allowances because these were not specifically authorized by
existing laws. While the DBP BOD is authorized by the Revised DBP Charter to adopt and
fix additional compensation, the COA stressed that the grant of the disallowed benefits
did not have the requisite approval of the president as required by PD 1597 and MO No.
20.72 Petitioner argues that the presidential approval obtained by DBP on 22 April 2010
validates the grant of merit increase to DBP officers and employees, integration of
officers' allowance to basic pay, and grant of economic assistance to DBP employees,
which COA previously disallowed. The Court disagrees. Here, the disallowed benefits
clearly lacked legal cover as it violated not only PD 1597 and MO 20 but also the
Constitution. That alone disqualifies the subject benefits and allowances from being
considered as genuinely given ·in consideration of services rendered.
Hence, there is no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of COA in affirming the disallowance of the grant of merit increase to DBP
officers and employees.

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 VIBAL COMPANY, VIRTUALIDAD INC., ET. AL VS. APRIL GRACE MORQUIN
G.R. No. 247879, April 19, 2022

FACTS: Vibal Company employed respondent as a Staff Writer for the S & T Digest
Magazine under the SD Publication Department which she became a probationary
employee and need to undergo a written examination for regularization, however, she
failed the two examinations said by the HR Manager. Then, she received a Notice of
Retrenchment informing the respondent that her employment had become redundant
and that he shall be terminated. She filed for illegal dismissal, however, the petitioners
insisted that she was validly dismissed.
Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioners. Respondent filed an appeal to the National
Labor Regulatory Commission which declared that there was an illegal dismissal.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied it. Hence, this
instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent was illegally dismissed on the ground of
redundancy.

HELD: No. Redundancy exists where the services of an employee are more than what is
reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the enterprise.46 As a rule, a
declaration of redundancy is ultimately a management prerogative, and the employer is
not obligated to keep in its payroll more employees than are needed for its day-to-day
operations. Nonetheless, it is well settled that management, in the exercise of its
prerogative, must not violate the law or declare redundancy without sufficient basis.47
The following are the requirements for a valid redundancy program: (a) written notice
served on both the employees and the DOLE at least one ( 1) month prior to the intended
date of termination of employment; (b) payment of separation pay equivalent to at least
one ( 1) month pay for every year of service; ( c) good faith in abolishing the redundant
positions; and ( d) fair and reasonable criteria in asce1iaining what positions are to be
declared redundant and accordingly abolished,48 taking into consideration such factors
as (i) preferred status; (ii) efficiency; and (iii) seniority, among others.
Which petitioners failed to comply with all of the foregoing requisites, therefore, the
petition is denied for lack of merit.

15
NOEL G. GUINTO V STO. NINO CONSIGNEE, SALANGSANG, SALANGSANG, LONG-
ZENY ANGELO and ZENAIDA
G.R. No. 250987 MARCH 29,2022

FACTS: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision. The CA sustained in all
aspects the Decision and the Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) which set aside the Decision of the Labor Arbiter (LA) and entered a new
judgment that dismissed the claim for illegal dismissal of Noel G. Guinto (petitioner),
directed his reinstatement without back wages, deleted the award of separation pay and
13th month pay, and ordered the payment of service incentive leave pay and l 0%
attorney's fees in his favor.

ISSUES: Whether the CA erred in not finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
NLRC when it held that: (1) petitioner was not illegally dismissed; and (2) he was neither
entitled to 13th month pay nor separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.

RULING: The Court holds that the CA erred in not finding grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the NLRC when it reversed the LA's Decision and dismissed the Complaint for
illegal dismissal for lack of merit.
The rule is that "in illegal dismissal cases, the burden of proof is on the employer in
proving the validity of dismissal. However, the fact of dismissal, if disputed, must be duly
proven by the complainant. Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, in turn, provides that
"material averment[s] in the complaint, other than those as to the number of
unliquidated damages, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. In the
case; respondents did not specifically deny and rebut petitioner's allegations as to the fact
of his dismissal from employment.
As to the other monetary claims of petitioner, there is no issue that petitioner is entitled
to service incentive leave pay in the amount of P4,500.00 as ruled by the LA and affirmed
by the NLRC. It bears emphasis that the NLRC ruling on this matter has already attained
finality considering respondents' failure to assail it before the CA by way of their own
petition for certiorari. With respect to petitioner's prayer for the award of 13th month pay,
the CA is correct that the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it ruled against
his entitlement thereto. Under Section 3(e) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
PD 851, 70 employers of those who are paid on purely commission, boundary, or task
basis, among others, are exempted from the payment of 13th month pay to its employees.

16
 JOHN N. CELESTE, EDGAR M. BUTED, DANILO V. GOMEZ, LUZVIMINDO
CAGUIOA, LELITO VALDEZ, RENATO P. MILLAN, CATALINA DE LEON, ROBERTO
Q. ABULE, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent.
G.R. No. 237843, June 15, 2021

FACTS: Celeste et. al. were employees of National Irrigation Administration (NIA) Region
I. During the periods of March to October 2010, February 2011, and May 2011, NIA Region I
paid Collective Negotiation Agreement Incentive (CNAI) to its managerial and rank-and-
file employees in the amounts of P460,000.00, P72,000.00, and P192,000.00, respectively.
Subsequently, three notices of disallowance (ND) were issued based on COA Decision No.
2010-075 dated August 20,2010. On December 2, 2010, an Audit Observation
Memorandum was issued by the Audit Team Leader for NIA Region I concerning the
grant and payment of CNAI. It issued Notice of Disallowance (ND) as well. The ND was
affirmed by the Director or the COA Regional Office No. 1 on the premise that the grant
of CNAI is pursuant to Public Sector Labor-Management Council (PSLMC) Resolution
No. 04, s. 200214 and PSLMC Resolution No. 02, s. 2003, all limiting the grant of CNAI to
rank-and-file employees. Celeste et. al. argued that Joint Resolution (JR) No. 4 is in the
nature of a law, and that its Item 4(h)(ii) (aa) should be given effect to allow the grant of
CNAI to managerial employees. It further argues that the NIA Collective Negotiation
Agreement (CNA) also serves as sufficient basis for the grant of CNAI to managerial
employees, as it is a recognition of the joint efforts of both labor and management to
attain more efficient operations. Finally, Celeste et. al. argued that the grant of CNAI was
done in good faith. COA argued that JR 4, Item 4(h)(ii) (aa) is not an automatic grant of
CNAI to both rank-and-file and managerial employees, as it is dependent on the
guidelines to be issued jointly by the CSC and the DBM. It further pointed out that the
CNA cited by NIA cannot supplant the relevant executive issuances on the matter, and
that the CNAI was not granted in good faith because it contravened the clear language of
AO 135 and BC 2006-1.

ISSUE: Whether or not CNAI may be granted only to rank-and-file employees.

HELD: Yes. COA's disallowance of the CNAI granted to managerial employees of NIA is
based on AO 135 and BC 2006-1. Section 2 of AO 135 provides: Sec. 2. Limitation – The
CNA incentive shall be granted only to rank-and-file employees. Celeste et. al. argues that
JR 4 amended AO 135 and BC 2006-1, insofar as these two issuances limited the grant of
CNAI only to rank-and-file employees. These arguments are misplaced. Celeste et. al.
failed to consider that JR 4, Item 4(h)(ii) (aa) is not an automatic grant of CNAI to
managerial employees. As correctly pointed out by COA in its Assailed Decision and in its
Comment on the Petition for Certiorari dated 07 March 2018,20 JR 4 itself subjects the
grant of CNAI to the necessary rules and guidelines to be issued by the CSC and the DBM.
Furthermore, when the CNAI subject of this case was granted to employees of NIA during
the periods of March to October 2010, February 2011, and May 2011, the necessary rules
mandated by Item 17(b) of JR 4 had not yet been issued. It was only on September 29, 2011
that the DBM issued Circular Letter No. 2011-9,21 acknowledging that JR 4, Item 4(h)(ii)
(aa) had extended the authority to grant CNAI to managerial employees of government
agencies. Prior to that, the provisions of AO 135 and BC 2006-1 allowing the grant only to
rank-and-file employees were still in effect, and NIA did not yet have any legal basis to
grant CNAI to its managerial employees. Hence, the COA was correct in disallowing the
same.

17
 GREGORIO F. ABELLA, Petitioner, vs. ABOSTA SHIPMANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, PANSTAR SHIPPING CO., LTD., AND ALEX S. ESTABILLO,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 249358, April 28, 2021

FACTS: Abella worked as an oiler for Abosta Shipmanagement Corporation (Abosta), on

board M/V Sino Trader under a 10-month employment contract. While carrying a sack of
rice, Abella allegedly felt a sudden snap on his left lower back with a sharp pain radiating
down to his thigh/leg. Due to persistent pain, he was admitted to hospital and was
repatriated for further medical treatment. When Abella arrived in the Philippines, he
immediately reported to the company-designated physician. The company informed
Abella that he is suffering from Grade 8 disability and offered him the corresponding
disability benefits. However, Abella allegedly requested for further treatment or an
improved monetary offer, but his requests were denied. Abella consulted an orthopedic
surgeon, who diagnosed and declared him permanently unfit for sea duty in any capacity.
Thus, Abella instituted a complaint for payment of total and permanent disability
benefits, medical expenses, damages, and attorney's fees. The Labor Arbiter held that the
absence of a third doctor opinion does not preclude it from deciding the case based on
the pieces of evidence on record. The LA gave more weight and credence to the medical
reports issued by the company-designated physician. The NLRC and CA denied the
appeals.

ISSUE: Whether Abella is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits under the
POEA-SEC.

HELD: Yes. The Court held that claims for disability benefits for injuries suffered by
seafarers on board or during the term of their employment contract are governed by the
provisions of the POEA-SEC, particularly Section 20(A) thereof. According to the rules,
the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a
company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when
he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency
within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with
the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the
above benefits. The Court explained that if a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees
with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the
seafarer. The third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties. It is,
however, not enough for the company-designated physician to issue a medical
assessment within 120 or 240 days from the seafarer's repatriation. In order to be binding,
the medical assessment must be final, definite, and conclusive, otherwise, the law will
step in and consider the seafarer totally and permanently disabled. In this regard, the
company-designated physician is mandated to issue a medical certificate, which should
be personally received by the seafarer, or, if not practicable, sent to him/her by any other
means sanctioned by present rules. For indeed, proper notice is one of the cornerstones of
due process, and the seafarer must be accorded the same especially so in cases where
his/her well-being is at stake Here, the company designated physician failed to furnish
Abella with a copy of the Medical Assessment within the periods mandated by law.
Instead, respondents merely informed Abella of his Grade 8 disability rating during the
conference. A verbal notice of the seafarer's disability rating is not enough. The seafarer
must be furnished a copy of the final medical assessment issued by the company-
designated physician in order to afford the seafarer the opportunity to evaluate the same
and decide whether he agrees with it or not.

18
UNITED PHILIPPINE LINES INC, Petitioner, vs. LEOBERT S. RAMOS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 225171, March 18, 2021

FACTS: United Philippine Lines, Inc. (UPL) hired Ramos as Assistant Cook for its foreign
principal, Holland America Line Westours, Inc. (Holland America). His contract was for a
period of 10 months with a basic monthly salary of US$300.00. In his position paper,
Ramos claimed that while performing his tasks as Assistant Cook, he felt severe pain on
his left shoulder, prompting him to report this to his superior. He was advised to visit the
infirmary where the ship doctor gave him pain relievers and advised him to take a few
days' rest. Ramos then requested for off-shore consultation but Holland America opted
for his medical repatriation. Ramos claimed that he was compelled to seek the medical
assistance of independent doctors because Shiphealth, Inc. and UPL did not furnish him
with his medical records and that it was through his own initiative that he sought medical
help from other doctors. Ramos claimed that he is entitled to permanent and total
disability benefits because he has not returned to his seafaring job after. Although he was
eventually cleared for duty, he rested for more than a year and embarked on his second
contract. However, he again experienced pain on his left shoulder, which led to his
medical repatriation. The Labor Arbiter (LA) found that Ramos is entitled to total and
permanent disability benefits considering that it was the second time for Ramos to be
medically repatriated for the same physical infirmity. The NRLC affirmed the LA. The CA
then affirmed the NLRC’s Decision.

ISSUE: Whether Ramos is entitled to permanent disability benefits.

HELD: Yes. Although the Court ruled that should the seafarer fail to initiate the process
to have the conflicting assessments of the company-designated physician and his own
doctor referred to a third doctor, the assessment of the company-designated physician
will prevail, the seafarer's failure to refer the conflicting findings of the company-
designated physician and that of his own doctor is only taken against him if it is first
shown that the seafarer had been notified of the assessment of the company_designated
physician. It is only when the seafarer is duly and properly informed of the medical
assessment can he determine whether or not he agrees with the assessment. If he does
not agree, he can commence the process of referring the assessment to his personal
physician, and thereafter the conflicting assessments are referred to a third doctor. The
Court held in Gere v. Anglo-Eastern Crew Management Phils., Inc. (Gere) that the
company_designated physician is mandated to issue a medical certificate, which should
be personally received by the seafarer, or, if not practicable, sent to him/her by any other
means sanctioned by present rules. For indeed, proper notice is one of the cornerstones of
due process, and the seafarer must be accorded the same especially so in cases where
his/her well-being is at stake. Moreover, if the seafarer is not notified of the evaluation of
the company-designated physician after the lapse of the 120 or 240-day period for the
company-designated physician to issue the final and valid assessment of the seafarer's
condition, then, by operation of law, the seafarer is deemed entitled to total permanent
disability benefits. Here, Ramos is entitled to permanent disability benefits as it was
found that Ramos was only shown the assessment of his impediment only when and after
UPL had filed their position paper, which the latter did not deny.

19
PACIFIC OCEAN MANNING, INC., BARKER HILL ENTERPRISES, S.A., AND ELMER
PULUMBARIT, * Petitioners, vs. FELICIANO M. CASTILLO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 230527, June 14, 2021

FACTS: Castillo was hired as a fitter by Pacific Ocean Manning for its foreign principal,
Barker Hill. His employment was covered by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) and ITF IBF TCC AMOSUP
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Castillo boarded the vessel MT Tequila and
thereafter consulted the on-board doctor due to pain in his right knee. The on-board
doctor diagnosed Castillo with "Damage of the Meniscus of the Right Knee." He was
referred to a doctor in Poland, who made the same diagnosis and he was subsequently
repatriated to the Philippines. Upon arrival in Manila, Castillo reported to Pacific Ocean
Manning's office and was referred to company-designated physicians. Castillo consulted
with Dr. Lim and was diagnosed with chondromalacia patella, right or patellofemoral
syndrome. He was prescribed medications and advised to undergo physical rehabilitation.
Later on, Castillo consulted a personally-appointed physician, Dr. Manuel Magtira, who
issued a medical report which stated that Castillo was unfit for sea duties as he was
suffering from partial permanent disability with a disability rating of Grade 10. On April 11,
2013, Castillo had a check-up with the company-designated physician Dr. Chua, who
issued an interim disability assessment also of Grade 10, and advised Castillo to continue
physiotherapy. During the last consultation on August 2, 2013, Dr. Chua advised that
Castillo's physiotherapy be stopped and for Castillo to continue on a home exercise
program. On October 2, 2013, Castillo consulted a different personally-appointed
physician, Dr. Venancio Garduce, who gave a disability rating of Grade 6. Thereafter,
Castillo filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter (LA) for total and permanent disability
compensation. During the preliminary conference, the parties agreed to refer Castillo to a
third and independent physician, Dr. Arandia, who diagnosed Castillo with valgus knee 2
to moderate-severe degenerative osteoarthritis and declared him “unfit to work as
seafarer”. Pacific Ocean Manning and Barker Hill refuted Castillo's claim that he was
suffering from total and permanent disability and countered that Castillo's condition of
patellafemoral syndrome is a degenerative disease. The LA rendered a Decision granting
total and permanent disability compensation to Castillo under the CBA. On appeal,
however, the NLRC reversed the LA Decision and held that Castillo was entitled only to
Grade 7 disability compensation and that the medical report of the third doctor is final
and binding. The CA, however, agreed with the LA that Castillo's disability is total and
permanent.

ISSUE: Whether Castillo is entitled to the full amount of total and permanent disability
compensation under the CBA.

HELD: No. Castillo was only entitled to partial permanent disability. The last paragraph
of Section 20(A)(3) of the POEA-SEC provides the mandatory conflict resolution
procedure when the findings of the company-designated physicians and the seafarer's
appointed physician are different: if a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the
assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer.
The third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties. Here, the company-
designated physician and seafarer's appointed physician were consistent in their
diagnoses that Castillo was suffering from partial permanent disability. They differed only
as to the disability rating. In any event, the parties agreed to refer Castillo's condition to a
third independent doctor in compliance with the mandatory conflict resolution

20
procedure under the POEA-SEC. Only disabilities classified as Grade 1 are considered
total permanent disability. Thus, disabilities with a rating from Grade 2 to Grade 14 are
classified as partial permanent disability. The CA committed reversible error in its
interpretation of Dr. Arandia's medical report. As correctly held by the NLRC, Dr.
Arandia's medical report must be viewed and upheld in its entirety. Dr. Arandia's medical
report does not indicate that Castillo was suffering from total and permanent disability. If
so, Dr. Arandia would have rated his disability as Grade 1. The phrase "unfit to work as a
seaman" should be understood in the context of Dr. Arandia having also given a Grade 7
rating. Thus, the rational understanding of this phrase is that it merely indicates that
Castillo is suffering from a disability which renders him physically incapable for sea
duties. The report clearly did not declare that Castillo was suffering from total and
permanent disability but rather, that he was suffering only from Grade 7 partial
permanent disability.

21
SATURNINO A. ELEVERA, Petitioner vs. ORIENT MARITIME SERVICES, INC./OSM
CREW MANAGEMENT, INC./MS. VENUS RICO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 240054, March 18, 2021

FACTS: Elevera worked as a 3rd Engineer on board the vessel Normand Baltic for OSM
Maritime Services, Inc. (OSM Maritime), on behalf of its foreign principal, OSM Crew
Management, Inc. (OSM Crew), under a three-month employment contract. Sometime in
March 2013, Elevera complained of ringing sensation on his left ear and dizziness
characterized as swirling of the surrounding. On March 18, 2013, he was brought to
Changi General Hospital due to loss of hearing, where he was diagnosed with Ear-Vertigo
and other Vestibular Disorder-Stress Related. On March 21, 2013, Elevera was repatriated
to the Philippines for medical treatment. The company-designated physician, Dr. Hao-
Quan, diagnosed him with Mild Sensorineural Hearing Loss, Right Ear; Moderate
Sensorineural Hearing Loss, Left Ear; Vestibular Neuronitis, Hypertensive Cardiovascular
Disease, and Blepharitis of both eyes. On July 1, 2013, another company-designated
physician, Dr. Rosales, issued a medical report diagnosing Elevera with Vestibular
Neuronitis and recommending a Grade 10 disability rating. Elevera then filed a complaint
for permanent total disability benefits, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and
reimbursement of medical expenses after OSM Maritime refused to pay him full disability
benefits. The Labor Arbiter held that Elevera failed to prove that his illness is work related
or work aggravated. The NLRC however, awarded Elevera of total permanent disability
benefits and held that Elevera’s illness is work related. In a Resolution, the NLRC
modified its Decision in reducing the amount of partial disability benefits to Elevera. The
CA reduced the amount of partial disability benefits.

ISSUE: Whether Elevera’s disability is total or partial.

HELD: The Court held that Elevera is deemed suffering from permanent total disability.
It must be stressed that in disability compensation, what is compensated is not the injury
or illness, but the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one’s earning
capacity. Moreover, the determination of the fitness of a seafarer for work is the duty of
the company-designated physician, the seafarer’s personal doctor, or the third doctor, as
the case may be. In Carcedo v. Maine Marine Philippines, Inc., the Court emphasized that
such determination is “the province of the company-designated physician, subject to the
periods prescribed by law.” This prerogative is required under Section 20 (A), paragraph 2
of the POEA-SEC, which provides that if after repatriation, the seafarer still requires
medical attention arising from said injury or illness, he shall be so provided at cost to the
employer until such time he is declared fit or the degree of his disability has been
established by the company-designated physician. In addition, paragraph 2 of the same
Section provides that the seafarer shall also receive sickness allowance from his employer
in an amount equivalent to his basic wage computed from the time he signed off until he
is declared fit to work or the degree of disability has been assessed by the company-
designated physician. Here, although the Medical Report of the company-designated
physician states that Elevera is “permanently unfit for sea duties,” it failed to indicate the
appropriate rating corresponding to Elevera’s disability. It cannot therefore, be
determined with certainty whether he is suffering from total or mere partial permanent
disability. Accordingly, this results in a failure of the company-designated physician to
issue a final and definitive medical assessment within the 120-day period set by law.

22
 JAYRALDINE F. EBUS, Petitioner vs. THE RESULTS COMPANY INC., MICHAEL
KALAW, SHERRA DE GUZMAN, et. al., Respondents.
G.R. No. 244388, March 3, 2021

FACTS: Ebus has been an employee of the Results Company, Inc. (TRCI). Ebus received an
email from David, a consultant of TRCI, informing him of two company infractions allegedly
committed by one of Ebus’s agents – De Leon. Allegedly, based on a quality call monitoring,
De Leon incorrectly processed a customer’s order and failed to fully apprise the customer of
the products that TRCI offers. David recommended that coaching be provided to De Leon.
On the same day, Dombrowski replied to the group email that a final written warning must
be given to De Leon, stating that De Leon’s employment should be terminated if it would be
later found out that the same process has become a trend in past transactions. However, the
other program managers disagreed with Dombrowski and recommended only coaching as
there seemed to have been no fraud committed. Ebus issued a Notice to Explain to De Leon,
pursuant to Dombrowski’s instructions, but without mentioning any sanctions as Ebus was
still awaiting the recommendation of Aguilar who was his immediate supervisor. Ebus stated
that all the support staff concurred that coaching was the sanction to be imposed on De Leon
and that he was not grossly negligent as he fulfilled his duty to issue the Notice to Explain to
De Leon. Administrative proceedings ensued. Subsequently, TRCI issued a Notice of
Decision, wherein Ebus was admonished with a warning that another similar violation of
TRCI's Code of Discipline might lead to his dismissal. He was found to have committed
insubordination for failing to issue a Notice to Explain to De Leon and to inform her that it
should be deemed a final warning for the infractions she committed. Hence, along with the
Notice of Decision, the HR Department issued a Redeployment Notice, placing Ebus on
temporary lay-off (TLO) until he was re-assigned to another account after being processed
and after having qualified therefor. During the lay-off, which should not exceed six months,
Ebus would not receive any compensation. Ebus thus filed a Complaint for constructive
dismissal and other monetary claims and damages before the Labor Arbiter (LA). The LA
found Ebus to have been constructively dismissed and ordered payment of full separation pay
and back wages. The NLRC reversed the LA’s Decision and ruled that actions taken by TRCI
were valid management prerogatives. The CA affirmed the NLRC’s ruling.

ISSUE: Whether Ebus was constructively dismissed.

HELD: Yes. The Court held that TRCI failed to prove the propriety of putting Ebus on TLO.
The Court discussed in Morales v. Harbor Centre Port Terminal, Inc. (Morales), that in cases
of transfer of an employee, the employer has the burden to prove that its conduct is valid and
legitimate and that it would not be prejudicial to the employee; otherwise, it will be deemed
as constructive dismissal. Here, Ebus's infraction that led to his re-profiling was his failure to
inform his subordinate of the penalty imposable on her because of her error during a call. But
there is nothing on record to show that Ebus's infraction was detrimental to the account he
was handling such that TRCI had no choice but to re_profile him. Using TRCI's term, he was
temporarily laid-off, and was treated like a new applicant where he would be assessed for
other accounts to see if he was qualified. In the interim, Ebus's salaries and benefits, save for
accrued vacation leave, were all stopped for a period not to exceed six months as he awaited
being accepted into a new account. Measured against the standard for a valid transfer as
stated in Morales, the Court is convinced that TRCI failed to prove any valid and legitimate
ground to re-profile Ebus as its drastic action was not commensurate to Ebus's transgressions.
This is clearly a dismissal in disguise and is tantamount to constructive dismissal. TRCI
cannot hide behind the argument that its conduct was an exercise of management
prerogative as its actions prejudiced Ebus and it failed to provide a legitimate ground to put
him on TLO. Although the exercise of management prerogative will ordinarily not be

23
interfered with, it is not absolute and it is limited by law, collective bargaining agreement,
and general principles of fair play and justice.

FERNANDO C. GOSOSO, PETITIONER, VS. LEYTE LUMBER YARD AND

HARDWARE, INC., AND RUBEN L. YU, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 205257, January 13, 2021

FACTS: Leyte Lumber, a construction supply and hardware store, hired Gososo as a sales
representative. Yu was Leyte Lumber's general manager. Gososo worked from Mondays to
Saturdays from 7:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M., and received a daily salary of P220.00.

As a company policy, Leyte Lumber's sales representatives were prohibited from getting
items or stocks from the storage area by themselves. They were to course the orders
through authorized checkers before the items are released. They were also prohibited
from leaving their designated work areas without their superior's consent. Moreover, they
were required to submit their applications for leave days before the intended dates to
allow the management ample time to approve the application and to adjust the workforce
and their workload.

Gososo allegedly overstepped the boundaries of Leyte Lumber's company policies. On

October 6, 2008, he was on his way to the stock room to follow up on a customer's urgent
order when Yu stopped him. The next day, Yu saw Gososo step out of the store to check
the availability of a ball caster having a customer's specifications in the storage area.

Yu required Gososo to produce a letter of apology for the two incidents under pain of
dismissal. Admitting fault, Gososo submitted a letter of apology to Yu on October 8,
2008.6 He reasoned that he was just doing his job for the company's clients and that he
never intended to neglect his duties or disobey the company policy. Yu allegedly refused
to accept the letter of apology and instructed Gososo to write further in his letter the
words "I am not supposed to approach the checker" and "I promise again to ask
permission from manager before I can go out."7 On October 9, 2008, Gososo submitted
the revised letter of apology to Yu,8 who told him to come back the next day.

When he returned to work on October 11, 2008, Yu allegedly told Gososo to sign a
prepared document. Gososo declined since the document contained admissions of
offenses that he did not commit. Irked by Gososo's refusal, Yu informed him of his
termination from work. Yu allegedly even threw a pair of scissors at Gososo but missed.

Aggrieved, Gososo filed on October 13, 2008 a Complaint for illegal constructive dismissal
against respondents,9 non-payment of salary, overtime pay, premium pay for holiday and
rest day allowance, vacation and sick leave pays, separation pay, moral damages, and
attorney's fees.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the CA correctly determined that petitioner Gososo abandoned his work and
was legally dismissed by respondents Leyte Lumber and Yu; and

2. Whether petitioner is entitled to separation pay and his other money claims.

HELD: The Court grants the Petition in part.

24
The burden of proving a claim fall on the party alleging its affirmative.25 In labor cases,
substantial evidence is the basic minimum of required proof – or that amount of evidence
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

In illegal dismissal cases, the employee must first establish by substantial evidence the
fact of dismissal before the employer is charged with the burden of proving its legality.

Petitioner never proved that he was dismissed in the first place. He simply alleged that on
October 11, 2008, upon his refusal to sign a document prepared by respondent Yu, the
latter "flared up with his usual hot temper and told [the former] that he is terminated
from work on that very day," and "even threw sharp scissors towards [him, which], almost
hit by a narrow margin."28 This barely measured up to the minimum evidential
requirement from petitioner. Mere acts of hostility, however grave, committed by the
employer towards the employee cannot on their lonesome be construed as an overt
directive of dismissal from work.

In fine, the Court finds no working basis to declare that petitioner had been dismissed,
whether legally, illegally, or constructively.

At the same time, we find petitioner not guilty of abandonment.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED in PART. The assailed
February 29, 2012 Decision and December 19, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 05183 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The dismissal of
petitioner Fernando C. Gososo's complaint for illegal dismissal STANDS.

Upon a correlative finding of lack of abandonment of work, petitioner is entitled to

reinstatement to his former position without payment of back wages. As reinstatement is
already rendered impossible under the present circumstances, respondents are
ORDERED to pay petitioner separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement, computed at one (1)-
month salary for every year of service until petitioner stopped working for respondents, in
the amount of P63,360.00. This amount shall bear interest at the rate of six percent (6%)
per annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO, ORDERED.

25
 BLUE MANILA, INC. AND/OR OCEANWIDE CREW MANILA, INC., PETITIONERS,
VS. ANTONIO R. JAMIAS, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 230919, January 20, 2021

FACTS: Petitioners Blue Manila, Inc. (Blue Manila), and/or Oceanwide Crew Manila, Inc.
(G.R. No. 230919), are the former and present manning agents of Wagenborg Crew
management BV (Wagenborg)/The Netherlands, owner of the vessel M/V Kwintebank.
Seafarer Antonio R. Jamias (Jamias) worked for petitioners since 1998. In February 2011, he
was rehired as Cook AB by Blue Manila under a 6-month contract,4 which is covered by
the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between Associated Marine Officers' and
Seamen's Union of the Philippines and Wagenborg.5 After passing the mandatory Pre-
Employment Medical Examination (PEME), Jamias boarded M/V Kwintebank. Jamias
alleged that as a cook, he was tasked to: (1) prepare and cook food for the officers and
crew, including desserts and pies; (2) maintain cleanliness in work areas, equipment,
kitchen tools, and cold rooms; (3) clean, wash and paint the gallery, kitchen, and store
rooms as scheduled, as well as sweep garbage disposed from the freezers daily; (4) receive
food stores or provisions delivery and bring it inside to be arranged in the walk-in
freezers; (5) paint and chip rust on deck and superstructure of the ship; (6) deckhand on
various repairs and maintenance works on deck; and (7) perform other work required by
his superiors. His duties involve constant strenuous manual work like pushing, lifting,
and carrying heavy provisions on board the vessel. In August 2011, while doing his usual
work on board the vessel, 1amias claimed that he had a bout of coughing which triggered
pain in his umbilical area. Then, as he was lifting 2 sacks of potatoes, he felt excruciating
pain as if something snapped at his waist area. He rested and waited for the pain to
subside before finishing his task of carrying food provisions for the ship.

A few days later, Jamias complained of abdominal pain in the umbilical area, with the
pain extending to his left side.7 The ship captain ordered that he be brought to Telemark
Hospital in Norway, where he was diagnosed with constipation and umbilical hernia.
Upon recommendation of the offshore doctor, Jamias was signed off the vessel. He was
subsequently repatriated to Manila on August 24, 2011,8 and was admitted at the Manila
Doctor's Hospital. On August 25, 2011, the company-designated doctor ordered him to
undergo Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) of the lumbosacral spine, the result of
which was reflected in the Radiographic Report, as follows:

IMPRESSION:

Disc desiccation and diffuse disc bulge with focal broad-based central disc protrusion
causing mild central canal and mild left foraminal stenoses, L5-S1.

ISSUE: Whether or not the seafarer's ailment must be a necessary consequence or

directly connected to the cause of medical repatriation to be compensable.

HELD: In our jurisdiction, a seafarer may claim disability benefits arising from (1) an
injury or illness that manifests, or is discovered during the term of the seafarer's contract,
which is usually while the seafarer is still on board the vessel; or (2) an illness that
manifests, or is discovered after the contract, which is when the seafarer has disembarked
from the vessel. If the illness or injury falls under the first scenario, the procedure as to

26
how the seafarer can legally demand and claim disability benefits from the
employer/manning agency under Section 20 (A) of the 2010 POEA-SEC applies.

The disability shall be based solely on the disability gradings provided under Section 32 of
this Contract, and shall not be measured or determined by the number of days a seafarer
is under treatment or the number of days in which sickness allowance is paid.

At any rate, as already discussed, the unceremonious issuance of the fit-to-work

certification to Jamias, is a complete abdication of the company-designated physician's
statutory obligation to give a complete and definite medical assessment of the seafarer's
medical condition. The law now steps in and considers these lapses as equivalent to a
declaration of permanent and total disability in favor of the seafarer. The PVA, is thus,
correct in ruling that Jamias is rightfully entitled to total and permanent disability
benefits amounting to US$80,000.00 in accordance with the parties' CBA.

FOR THESE REASONS, the petition, G.R. No. 230919, filed by Blue Manila, Inc. and/or
Oceanwide Crew Manila, Inc., is DENIED. The petition, G.R. No. 230932, filed by Antonio
R. Jamias is GRANTED. As discussed, the Court of Appeals' Decision and Resolution in
CA-G.R. SP No. 133729, which ordered the referral of the seafarer's back condition to the
third doctor for purposes of issuance of disability rating are REVERSED. The judgment of
the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, National Conciliation and Mediation Board,
Department of Labor and Employment, awarding total and permanent disability benefits
in favor of seafarer Antonio R. Jamias is REINSTATED.

SO, ORDERED.

27
 OSCAR S. ORTIZ, Petitioner, v. FOREVER RICHSONS TRADING CORPORATION,
CHARVERSON WOOD INDUSTRY CORPORATION, and ADAN CO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 238289, January 20, 2021
FACTS: On June 28, 2013, Oscar S. Ortiz (Oscar), filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
and monetary claims against Forever Richsons Trading Corporation (Forever Richsons),
now Charverson Wood Industry Corporation, and Adan Co (respondents).4 In his
Position Paper,5 Oscar narrated that he was hired by Forever Richsons in June 2011, and
signed a 5-month employment contract with Workpool Manpower Services (Workpool
Manpower). Despite the expiration of the contract, Oscar continued to work for
respondents. Sometime in April 2013, news spread among the personnel of respondents
that five of its previous employees won their case in the CA. Thereafter, respondents'
paymaster, Paulino Tinoy, required the workers to sign a 5-month employment contracts,
blank papers, and vouchers. For fear of having their employment terminated, most of the
employees acquiesced; a handful, including Oscar and one William Longakit, however,
refused to sign.

To support his claims, Oscar alleged that he was a regular employee of the respondents
since he served them for two years after the expiration of his 5-month contract, and that
he performed tasks which were necessary and desirable to respondents' usual business of
plywood manufacturing and marketing. He was illegally dismissed after he refused to sign
a new 5-month employment contract, blank vouchers, and papers. Moreover, Oscar
submitted some of his pay slips to prove that he was paid a daily wage of P155.00, far from
the mandated minimum daily wage.7 Neither was Oscar paid holiday pay, 13th month
pay, service incentive leave pays, and overtime pay. Finally, Oscar prayed to be reinstated
and be granted back wages, as well as moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not there is an employer-employee relationship between Oscar and the

respondents.

2. Whether or not Oscar was illegally dismissed.

HELD: Yes. The petition is meritorious.

The general rule is that only questions of law may be raised and resolved by this Court in
petitions under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, because the Court, not being a trier of facts,
is not duty-bound to reexamine and calibrate the evidence on record. Findings of fact of
quasi-judicial bodies, especially when affirmed by the CA, are generally accorded finality
and respect. In exceptional cases, however, such as the instant case, when the findings of
fact are conflicting, this Court may review and re-evaluate the evidence on record. Here,
on the one hand, the LA concluded that Oscar is a regular employee of Workpool
Manpower, and that the latter is a legitimate labor-only contractor. On the other hand,
the NLRC and the CA refrained from determining the contracting relationship of the
parties. Instead, the NLRC and the CA's rulings centered on the failure of Oscar to
implead Workpool Manpower as an indispensable party. In view of the foregoing differing
conclusions of the labor tribunals and the CA, we undertake to decide the contracting
relationship of the respondents and Workpool Manpower.

28
Pursuant to Article 279 of the Labor Code, Oscar is entitled to reinstatement without loss
of seniority rights; payment of back wages inclusive of allowances and other benefits, or
their monetary equivalent from the time his compensation was withheld up to the time of
actual reinstatement; or if reinstatement is no longer possible, Oscar may be entitled to
separation pay equivalent to one month pay for every year of service up to the finality of
this judgment.

FOR THE STATED REASONS, the petition is GRANTED. The September 22, 2017
Decision and February 21,2018 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
06555-MIN are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Oscar S. Ortiz is declared illegally
dismissed, and respondents are ORDERED to reinstate petitioner to his former position
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, and to pay petitioner's back wages
and other benefits computed from the time of his dismissal to the time of actual
reinstatement.

SO, ORDERED.

29
 MARCELO M. CORPUZ, JR., PETITIONER, VS. GERWIL CREWING PHILS., INC.,
RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 205725, January 18, 2021

FACTS: Gerwil Crewing Phils., Inc. (respondent) recruited Marcelo M. Corpuz, Jr.
(petitioner) to work as an Able Seaman for a period of twelve (12) months with Echo
Cargo & Shipping LLC on board the vessel MT Azarakhsh,6 with a monthly salary of Four
Hundred Sixty-One Dollars ($461.00).7 Respondent deployed petitioner on August 5,
2008.

On May 17, 2009, petitioner was brought to the Sheik Khalifa Medical City in the United
Arab Emirates due to severe headache and vomiting after he allegedly sustained a fall
while lifting heavy motor parts on board the vessel. He experienced an episodic low back
pain radiating to his left posterior thigh accompanied by severe pain of the foot. This
caused him to slip, hitting his chest first, followed by his head. The diagnosis revealed
that he suffered from Left Cerebellar Hemorrhage with Intraventricular Hematoma. Aside
from the medications given, he underwent an external ventricular drain (EVD) to relieve
his hydrocephalus. Petitioner was eventually recommended for repatriation to undergo
further evaluation and treatment.

On September 9, 2009, petitioner arrived in Manila on a wheelchair. Petitioner claims to

have reported to the office of respondent the next day. However, respondent's Chief
Executive Officer (CEO), Rommel S. Valdez (Valdez), denied his request for medical
assistance on the ground that his illness was not work-related. Valdez also allegedly
humiliated him in front of the people present in the agency.

Consequently, petitioner sought medical consultation with Dr. Nune Babao-Balgomera

(Dr. Balgomera), a neurologist at Sta. Rosa Medical Center. On October 28, 2009, Dr.
Balgomera issued a medical certificate declaring petitioner as permanently unfit for sea
duty in any capacity and suffering from Severe Complex Cerebral Function Disturbance or
Post Traumatic Psychoneurosis. Dr. Balgomera classified petitioner's illness as a Grade I
disability.

Petitioner also consulted Dr. Donald S. Camero (Dr. Camero), an internist, who also gave
an assessment of POEA Disability Grade I. Armed with both medical assessments,
petitioner demanded payment of disability benefits from respondent to no avail.

On April 20, 2010, petitioner instituted a complaint against respondent and Valdez for
payment of disability benefits, among others.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE NLRC (FIRST DIVISION) AND THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS (FOURTEENTH DIVISION) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN RENDERING
THE ASSAILED DECISIONS AND DENIED RESOLUTIONS.

HELD: The petition is partially meritorious.

Respondent's appeal before the NLRC is not procedurally infirm

30
Petitioner insists that respondent's appeal before the NLRC was defective because it was
filed beyond the reglementary period and was not accompanied by a cash or surety bond.

We find the above claim to have no basis both in fact and in law.

Section 1, Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the applicable rule
at the time that respondent filed its appeal, reads:

Section 1. Periods of Appeal. - Decisions, resolutions or orders of the Labor Arbiter shall
be final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within
ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof; and in case of decisions, resolutions or orders
of the Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment pursuant to Article
129 of the Labor Code, within five (5) calendar days from receipt thereof. If the 10th or 5th
day, as the case may be, falls on a Saturday, Sunday or holiday, the last day to perfect the
appeal shall be the first working day following such Saturday, Sunday or holiday.

In view of the foregoing, the Court holds that respondent should be liable to pay the
following: moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00; exemplary damages in the
amount of P100,000.00, due to its wanton behavior and by way of example for the public
good; and attorney's fees equal to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award. Finally,
the total monetary awards shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from finality of this judgment until fully satisfied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The September 28, 2012 Decision
and January 30, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 120720 are
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.

Gerwil Crewing Phils., Inc. is hereby ORDERED to indemnify Marcelo M. Corpuz, Jr. the
following amounts:

1. Moral damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00);

2. Exemplary damages m the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00);

3. Attorney's fees equal to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award; and

4. Costs of suit.

All monetary awards shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
from finality of this Decision until fully satisfied.

SO, ORDERED.

31
 SQUARE METER TRADING CONSTRUCTION AND LITO C. PASCUAL,
PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, RICARDO GALLANO, FELIMON
FRANCISCO, OSCAR BORJA, ET AL, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 225914, January 26, 2021

FACTS: The primary issue in this petition arises from the fact that in an earlier case (CA-
G.R. SP No. 124979)4 involving pure money claims for underpayment of wages, overtime
pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave and the 13th month pay, the 12th Division of the
CA had made a factual finding that that private respondents are project employees. Said
decision attained finality.5 Subsequently, the 10th Division of the CA, in a case for illegal
dismissal involving the same parties, ruled that they are regular employees.6 It is this
ruling now being challenged by herein petitioners, who argue that the earlier ruling of the
CA 12th Division is binding upon the 10th Division under the doctrine of res judicata in
the concept of "conclusiveness of judgment".

Petitioner Lito C. Pascual is the sole proprietor of petitioner Square Meter Trading
Construction, a company engaged in the construction industry. Petitioners hired private
respondents on various years between 2002 to 20088 are now separated from
employment.9 On February 14, 2011, private respondents lodged with the Labor Arbiter
(LA) a complaint against petitioners for underpayment of wages, overtime pay, holiday
pay, service incentive leave, and the 13th month pay for the years 2007-2010. This first
complaint was docketed as NCR-02-02511-11 (first case) and assigned to Labor Arbiter (LA)
Adela S. Damasco.

On April 29, 2011, private respondents filed a second complaint docketed as NCR-04-
06754-11, (second case) alleging illegal dismissal and unfair labor practices and praying for
an award of actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees. This
complaint was assigned to LA Jenneth B. Napiza and was consolidated with a separate
complaint filed on June 1, 2011 by the Philippine Association of Free Labor Union
(PAFLU), Regilan Andres, and Ronald Ebuenga, and docketed as NCR-06-08563-11, which
also alleged illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the private respondents were regular employees of petitioners.

2) Whether or not petitioners dismissed private respondents with just or authorized

cause and with due process.

HELD: Yes. Private respondents, except Oscar Borja, are regular employees who are
entitled to security of tenure

Petitioners do not contest they had an employer-employee relationship with the private
respondents, except for Borja. The disagreement is whether the employment was regular
or project-based. With the exception of Borja, we find that the CA correctly affirmed the
LA's ruling that private respondents are regular employees.

Generally, for an employee to be considered project-based, the employer must show that:
(a) the employee was assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking; and (b) the

32
duration and scope of such project.74 Failure to do so will accord the dismissed employee
with the presumption of regularity of employment.75 Aside from this, the court has also
made use of parameters specific to workers in the construction industry. In Samson vs.
NLRC,76 the court had relied on the indicators of enumerated in Section 2.2 of
Department Order No. 19, Series of 1993 to determine whether the complainant was a
project employee in the construction industry. The employer's failure to prove any of
these indicators is evidence that the employment was regular.

Judged against the foregoing criteria, the court finds it proper to accord private
respondents, except Oscar Borja, the presumption of regularity of employment.
Petitioners have absolutely failed to present any evidence that each of the private
respondent were assigned to a particular project with a defined scope or duration. They
failed to offer contrary evidence to any of the enumerated indicators of project
employment under Section 2.2 Department Order No. 19, Series of 1993. Likewise, there is
no proof that termination reports were filed with the DOLE after each project
completion. Thus, private respondents must be accorded the presumption of regularity of
employment under Article 295 of the Labor Code.

Petitioners dismissed private respondents without due process and just or authorized
cause.

Under Article 294 of the Labor Code,81 private respondents, as regular employees, are
entitled to security tenure and may be dismissed only upon a just or authorized cause.
Since the beginning, petitioners have erroneously insisted that private respondents are
project employees and consequently, failed to cite any just or authorized cause for
dismissal. Naturally, they have also failed to comply with the two-notice requirement to
accord the employees with due process, i.e.: (1) a notice which apprises the employee of
the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the subsequent
notice after due hearing which informs the employee of the employer's decision to
dismiss him.

As a general rule, illegal dismissal entitles the employee to reinstatement. However, in

their Motion for Early Resolution dated February 5, 2018,83 and their Urgent Motion to
Resolve dated January 23, 2019,84 private respondents, through their counsel, manifested
that in their almost decade-long wait for a final resolution of this case, most of them are
now old and sickly. For many of them, it appears that reinstatement may no longer be
feasible and would no longer be in the interest of the parties. In such instances we have
ruled that as an alternative to reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one-month
salary for every year of service should be awarded. The payment of separation pay is in
addition to payment of back wages.

Finally, consistent with the guidelines set in Nacar v. Gallery Frames93 for the proper
application of legal interest in light of BSP-MB Circular No. 799, We find petitioners liable
to pay the legal interest of twelve percent (12%) on the monetary awards counted from
the respective dates of dismissal as found by the LA Napiza until June 30, 2013 and six
percent (6%) from July 1, 2013 until the said awards are fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated February 24,
2016 and the Resolution dated June 8, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
130349 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE with respect to private respondent Oscar
Borja. The same are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION with respect to the other private
respondents.

33
Petitioners are ordered to pay to each of respondents, except Oscar Borja:

1. full back wages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent
to be computed from the dates of dismissal up to the time of the finality of this judgment;

2. separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement, equivalent to one month salary for every year
of their respective service up to the time of the finality of this judgment;

3. interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum of the total monetary awards computed
from the dates of dismissal, as found by the Labor Arbiter, until June 30, 2013 and six
percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until said monetary awards are fully paid; and

4. moral damages and exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00.

Petitioners are likewise ORDERED to pay attorney's fees, which shall be ten percent (10%)
of the total monetary award.

The case is hereby REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for purposes of computing the
monetary awards in accordance with this decision.

SO, ORDERED.

34
 ANTONIO R. JAMIAS, PETITIONER, VS. BLUE MANILA, INC. AND/OR
OCEANWIDE CREW MANILA, INC., RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 230932, January 20, 2021

FACTS: On September 24, 2011, Jamias had surgery for his umbilical hernia which cleared
up his abdominal pain. Despite of this, Jamias claimed that his lower back pain persisted.
The company-designated physician dismissed this as something attributable to aging and
declared him fit-to-work as of November 12, 2011.10 Still, Jamias went to the local manning
office to request that his back pain be medically evaluated. Instead, the manning agent
allegedly told him to submit himself to a PEME on November 15, 2011.11 Came January
2012, Jamias wrote two letters12 to petitioners asking that his back condition be evaluated.
He did not receive any reply from petitioners leading him to consult Dr. Renato P. Runas
(Dr. Runas), an orthopedic specialist. Dr. Runas declared that Jamias' lower back pain was
due to the presence of a "central broad-based disc herniation,"13 a Grade 8 disability
under the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Contract. He
described the impediment as moderate rigidity or 2/3 loss of motion or lifting power of
the trunk. Since Jamias' job as cook involves carrying heavy provisions and food supplies,
Dr. Runas declared that his impediment renders him unfit to resume his occupation on
board the vessel.14 Jamias resorted to Voluntary Arbitration and demanded payment of
disability benefit from petitioners.

On the other hand, petitioners refused to acknowledge any liability for Jamias' back
ailment. Petitioners contended that prior to his repatriation in August 2011, Jamias' only
complaint was abdominal pain, but not back pain. He was diagnosed with constipation
and umbilical hernia in an offshore hospital, and these conditions were medically
resolved after his September 2011 surgery in Manila. As for the back pains, petitioners
alleged that Jamias never complained about this during the time that he was under the
care of the company-designated physician. Also, the back ailment was not disclosed by
Jamias in his subsequent PEME conducted in November 2011. These circumstances,
according to petitioners, freed them from any liability for Jamias' subsequently acquired
back illness.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to disability claim.

HELD: Yes. SEC. 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS.

A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS

The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness
during the term of his contract are as follows:

1. The employer shall continue to pay the seafarer these wages during the time he is on
board the ship;

2. If the injury or illness requires medical and/or dental treatment in a foreign port, the
employer shall be liable for the full cost of such medical, serious dental, surgical and
hospital treatment as well as board and lodging until the seafarer is declared fit to work or
to be repatriated. However, if after repatriation, the seafarer still requires medical
attention arising from said injury or illness, he shall be so provided at cost to the

35
employer until such time he is declared fit or the degree of his disability has been
established by the company-designated physician.

3. In addition to the above obligation of the employer to provide medical attention, the
seafarer shall also receive sickness allowance from his employer in an amount equivalent
to his basic wage computed from the time he signed off until he is declared fit to work or
the degree of disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician. The
period within which the seafarer shall be entitled to his sickness allowance shall not
exceed 120 days. Payment of the sickness allowance shall be made on a regular basis, but
not less than once a month.

The seafarer shall be entitled to reimbursement of the cost of medicines prescribed by the
company-designated physician. In case treatment of the seafarer is on an out-patient
basis as determined by the company-designated physician, the company shall approve the
appropriate mode of transportation and accommodation. The reasonable cost of actual
traveling expenses and/or accommodation shall be paid subject to liquidation and
submission of official receipts and/or proof of expenses.

For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical
examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his
return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice
to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. In the course of the
treatment, the seafarer shall also report regularly to the company-designated physician
specifically on the dates as prescribed by the company-designated physician and agreed
to by the seafarer. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting
requirement shall result m his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.

If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be
agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor's decision shall be
final and binding on both parties.

4. Those illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as
work-related.

5. In case a seafarer is disembarked from the ship for medical reasons, the employer shall
bear the full cost of repatriation in the event the seafarer is declared (1) fit for
repatriation, or (2) fit to work but the employer is unable to find employment for the
seafarer on board his former ship or another ship of the employer.

6. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer caused by either injury or
illness the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits
enumerated in Section 32 of [this] Contract. Computation of his benefits arising from an
illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation applicable
at the time the illness or disease was contracted.

The disability shall be based solely on the disability gradings provided under Section 32 of
this Contract, and shall not be measured or determined by the number of days a seafarer
is under treatment or the number of days in which sickness allowance is paid. (Emphases
supplied.)

In this case, Jamias was seen by the company-designated physician on August 25, 2011, or
one day after his arrival in Manila. On the same date, the company-designated doctor

36
ordered a test "for MRI of lumbosacral spine."30 To argue that the conduct of an MRI on
that area of the spine is merely a routine test is cheap shot at evading an employer's
obligations under the law. As correctly ruled by the CA, the only logical conclusion why
the company designated doctor would specifically request for a lumbosacral MRI is that
Jamias was already suffering from low back pains and he brought this to the attention of
the attending physician.

Clearly, any illness complained of, and/or diagnosed during the mandatory PEME under
Section 20 (A) is deemed existing during the term of the seafarer's employment, and the
employer is liable therefor. This is true, regardless of whether the existing illness was the
immediate cause of a medical repatriation. Likewise, it matters not that there was no
statement about Jamias' lower back pain in the ship captain's report, or in the records of
the offshore hospital. Precisely, the law requires the conduct of a PEME within 3 days
upon repatriation because offshore hospitals are mostly concerned with emergency
medical situations, and rarely provide a comprehensive assessment of the seafarer's actual
condition, or existing illnesses. It is also inconceivable why the employer, in this case,
referred the seafarer to undergo a PEME if he still complains of, and is suffering from his
back ailment.

At any rate, as already discussed, the unceremonious issuance of the fit-to-work

certification to Jamias, is a complete abdication of the company-designated physician's
statutory obligation to give a complete and definite medical assessment of the seafarer's
medical condition. The law now steps in and considers these lapses as equivalent to a
declaration of permanent and total disability in favor of the seafarer. The PVA, is thus,
correct in ruling that Jamias is rightfully entitled to total and permanent disability
benefits amounting to US$80,000.00 in accordance with the parties' CBA.

FOR THESE REASONS, the petition, G.R. No. 230919, filed by Blue Manila, Inc. and/or
Oceanwide Crew Manila, Inc., is DENIED. The petition, G.R. No. 230932, filed by Antonio
R. Jamias is GRANTED. As discussed, the Court of Appeals' Decision and Resolution in
CA-G.R. SP No. 133729, which ordered the referral of the seafarer's back condition to the
third doctor for purposes of issuance of disability rating are REVERSED. The judgment of
the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, National Conciliation and Mediation Board,
Department of Labor and Employment, awarding total and permanent disability benefits
in favor of seafarer Antonio R. Jamias is REINSTATED.

SO, ORDERED.

37
JEROME I. MARIVELES, PETITIONER, VS. WILHELMSEN-SMITHBELL* MANNING,
INC. AND WILHELMSEN SHIP MANAGEMENT, LTD., RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 238612, January 13, 2021

FACTS: Mariveles was engaged by Wilhelmsen-Smithbell Manning, Inc., and the

Wilhelmsen Ship Management, Ltd. (respondents) on April 8, 2013 as Able-Bodied
Seaman on board the ship MV "Perseverance" with a basic monthly salary of US$ 689.00
for nine months, as indicated in the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) Contract of Employment. Prior to his deployment on March 19, 2013, Mariveles
underwent preemployment medical examination, and the physician's referral slip dated
March 19, 2013 indicated that Mariveles had Cardiac Arrythmia (TET Impression).
Respondents then referred Mariveles for 2D Echo with Doppler Study. However, despite
such findings, on March 25, 2013, respondents declared Mariveles fit to work, but the
physician prescribed maintenance medicines for Mariveles' condition.

In November 2013, while on board the vessel, Mariveles experienced chest pain, dizziness,
difficulty in sleeping and breathing. Mariveles immediately informed his officers of his
condition. On November 18, 2013, the ship captain referred Mariveles to a physician at the
Canadian Specialist Hospital in Dubai for medical examination and treatment, and the
physician diagnosed Mariveles to be suffering from "coronary artery disease;
Hyperlipidemia; Leukocytosis and Thrombocythemia; Hyperuricemia; and Hyper
parathyroid Gland." Thereafter, Mariveles was confined in the hospital from November 19,
2013 to November 28, 2013, as indicated in the Medical Report. After discharge from the
hospital, Mariveles was immediately repatriated to the Philippines.9 Upon arrival in the
Philippines, Mariveles reported to respondents, and he was immediately referred to
Marine Medical Services, where Dr. Esther G. Go (Dr. Go) examined and diagnosed
Mariveles as suffering from "coronary artery disease; SIP Percutaneous Coronary
Intervention of the Right Coronary Artery - Right Posterolateral Branch; Essential
Thrombocytosis; Dyslipidemia; and Hyperuricemia."10 On February 17, 2014, Dr. Go
issued the Medical Certificate11 and assessed Mariveles' disability as Grade 7 - moderate
residual or disorder. Subsequently, Mariveles consulted Dr. Leonardo Raymundo (Dr.
Raymundo), an independent physician, and as indicated in the Medical Certificate dated
April 29, 2014 executed by Dr. Raymundo, Mariveles was "unfit to withstand the [rigors]
of sea duty."

Mariveles instituted grievance proceedings at the Associated Marine Officers and

Seamen's Union of the Philippines. Thereafter, he requested the referral of the case to the
NCMB for mediation conferences. Since the parties failed to settle, the case was elevated
to Arbitration Panel, and the Arbitration Panel eventually ordered the submission of the
parties' respective pleadings.

In his Position Paper, Mariveles enumerated some of his material and substantial duties
being an Able-Bodied Seaman which includes "performing navigational [watchkeeping]
and gangway [watchkeeping], performing duties of a [lookout] and helmsman; keeping
the bridge and the gangway clean, and obey the orders of the deck [officer-in-charge]
when carrying out maintenance or using navigation equipment, accessories in rescue
boats, lifesaving appliances, pilot ladder, steering gear and other bridge accessories;
perform duties assigned and guide ordinary seamen." Moreover, in his Rejoinder,
Mariveles also asseverated that he had no choice of what to eat on board except those
provided on the vessel which consisted mainly of high-fat, high-cholesterol, and low fiber
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food and that the work of a seafarer is generally strenuous and demanding. Such working
conditions and the food provided to them on board surely caused his illness.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mariveles is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits.

HELD: Yes. For disability to be compensable under Section 20(A) of the Amended
Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Overseas Employment of Filipino
Seafarers on-Board Ocean-Going Ships issued on October 26, 2010 (2010 POEA-SEC), two
elements must concur: (1) the injury or illness must be work-related; and (2) the work-
related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer's employment
contract.44 A work-related illness is defined as "any sickness as a result of an
occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this Contract with the conditions set
therein satisfied."45 Section 32-A of the 2010 POEA-SEC reads:

SEC. 32-A. OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES

For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, all of
the following conditions must be satisfied:

1. The seafarer's work must involve the risks described herein;

2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks;

3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors
necessary to contract it; and

4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.

Section 32-A(11) of the 2010 POEA-SEC lists cardiovascular disease as a compensable

work-related condition. For cardiovascular disease to be considered as an occupational
disease, sub-item number 11, Section 32-A of the 2010 POEA-SEC requires any of the
following conditions to be met:

1. If the heart disease was known to have been present during employment, there must be
proof that an acute exacerbation was clearly precipitated by an unusual strain by reasons
of the nature of his work;

2. The strain of work that brings about an acute attack must be sufficient severity and
must be followed within 24 hours by the clinical signs of a cardiac insult to constitute
causal relationship;

3. If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before being subjected to strain at work
showed signs and symptoms of cardiac injury during the performance of his work and
such symptoms and signs persisted, it is reasonable to claim a causal relationship;

4. If a person is a known hypertensive or diabetic, he should show compliance with

prescribed maintenance medications and doctor recommended lifestyle changes. The
employer shall provide a workplace conducive for such compliance in accordance with
Section l(A) paragraph 5; [and]

5. In a patient not known to have hypertension or diabetes, as indicated on his last Pre-
Employment Medical Examination (PEME).

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Thus, to be truly considered as an occupational disease, other than its inclusion under
Section 32-A, the claimant must likewise prove that the conditions laid down by said
provision are met. Otherwise, the claimed illness cannot be regarded as work-related.

Moreover, Section 20(A)(3) of the POEA-SEC commands that the employee seeking
disability benefits submit himself to post-employment medical examination by a
company-designated physician within three working days from his repatriation.

Therefore, to summarize, when a seafarer seeks to claim the compensation and benefits
that Section 20(A) of the POEA-SEC grants to him, the law requires the seafarer to prove
that:

1) He suffered an illness;

2) He suffered this illness during the term of his employment contract;

3) He complied with the procedures prescribed under Section 20(A)(3) of the POEA-SEC;

4) His illness is one of the enumerated occupational disease or that his illness or injury is
otherwise work-related; and

5) He complied with the four conditions enumerated under Section 32(A) for an
occupational disease or a disputably-presumed work-related disease to be compensable.

Applying the foregoing guidelines, the Court disagrees with the ruling of the CA and
grants Mariveles' Petition.

Mariveles' illness is work-related.

In this case, Mariveles was found to be suffering from coronary artery disease which is
considered as an occupational disease pertaining to cardiovascular diseases. In several
cases, cardiovascular disease, coronary artery disease, as well as other heart ailments were
held to be compensable.

In view of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court, therefore, affirms the compensability of
Mariveles' permanent disability. The amount of US$ 93,154.00 is justified under Section 32
of the POEA-SEC as Mariveles suffered from permanent and total disability. The grant of
attorney's fees is likewise affirmed for being justified in accordance with Article 2208(2) of
the New Civil Code since Mariveles was compelled to litigate to satisfy his claim for
disability benefits.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
of petitioner Jerome I. Mariveles is GRANTED. Consequently, the Decision dated
November 27, 2017 and the Resolution dated April 11, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 138754 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision dated September 23,
2014 of the Office of the Voluntary Arbitrators of the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board granting Mariveles disability benefits in the amount of US$ 93,154.00 and 10%
thereof as and for attorney's fees, is REINSTATED.

SO, ORDERED.

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