Synthetic summary of everything:

Moral philosophy is the branch of philosophy that explores questions about morality
and ethical behavior. It seeks to understand what is right or wrong, good or bad, and
how individuals ought to behave. There are many different approaches to moral
philosophy, but they can be broadly divided into three categories: consequentialism,
deontology, and virtue ethics.
Consequentialism is the view that the morality of an action should be judged based on
its consequences. The most well-known form of consequentialism is utilitarianism,
which holds that an action is morally right if it maximizes overall happiness or pleasure
and minimizes overall pain or suffering. Utilitarianism can be further divided into two
subcategories: act-utilitarianism, which evaluates each individual action based
on its consequences, and rule-utilitarianism, which evaluates actions based on
whether they follow general rules that would produce the greatest good for the
greatest number.
Deontology, on the other hand, is the view that the morality of an action should be
judged based on its adherence to moral rules or duties. Deontologists believe that
there are certain actions that are inherently right or wrong, regardless of their
consequences. One of the most well-known deontological theories is Immanuel Kant's
categorical imperative, which holds that actions should be chosen based on whether
they could be willed to become universal laws.
Virtue ethics focuses on the character of the individual rather than on rules or
consequences. It holds that a virtuous person will naturally act in accordance with
moral principles, and that the development of virtues such as honesty, courage,
and compassion is key to ethical behavior. Virtue ethics also emphasizes the
importance of practical wisdom or phronesis, the ability to make good decisions in
specific situations.
In summary, the taxonomy of moral philosophy includes consequentialism (with
utilitarianism as a subcategory), deontology (with the categorical imperative as a
subcategory), and virtue ethics (with practical wisdom as a subcategory). Each of these
categories provides a different approach to understanding morality and ethical behavior,
and each has its own strengths and weaknesses.

***
Summary of the readings:
Section 1
Section 1: The definition of morality
• The idea of morality: moral norms vs. legal norms, aesthetic rules, and the
norms of convention or etiquette
• Moral judgment and the moral point of view
• The relationship between religion and morality
• Moral responsibility and free will

The idea of morality: Morality refers to a system of norms and values that guide
human behavior and promote human well-being. Moral norms are distinct from legal
norms, aesthetic rules, and the norms of convention or etiquette, and are based on
principles of right and wrong conduct.
Moral judgment and the moral point of view: Moral judgment involves evaluating
actions, motives, and character traits as morally right or wrong. The moral point of view
involves adopting a stance of impartiality and considering the interests and well-being of
all individuals affected by an action.
The relationship between religion and morality: The relationship between religion
and morality is complex and contested. Some argue that morality is dependent on
religious beliefs and teachings, while others claim that moral principles can be derived
from reason and experience independent of religion.
Moral responsibility and free will: Moral responsibility involves holding individuals
accountable for their actions and decisions, and assumes that individuals have free will
and the ability to make moral choices. The debate over free will concerns the question
of whether human actions are determined by prior causes or are the result of free
choice, and has implications for moral responsibility.

- Frankena, Ethics, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs NJ 1973, chap. 1

Ethics in Philosophy
There is a descriptive empirical study of human nature and sociality from which one
suggests implications to ethics.
There is a normative dimension in which one is interested in developing concepts,
judgments, and norms that are universally valid.
Meta-ethics: critical analytical field: studying what humans perceive as morals, and
values; when one critically assesses cultural traditions, its justifications, and efficiency,
etc. Why and what is understood as moral principles.
Morality is something predecessor to the individual that is embedded in the common
morality in which one is born, and morality works as a social norm, a rule to guide the
collective, group, and individual behavior. Morality is different from governmental
laws.

- Strawson, Freedom and resentment, Proceedings of the British Academy, 48,

1962, pp. 187-211.
In "Freedom and Resentment," philosopher P.F. Strawson explores the concept
of moral responsibility by analyzing the relationship between our attitudes of resentment
and forgiveness and our ability to hold individuals accountable for their actions.
Strawson argues that moral responsibility is not based solely on a person's capacity to
act freely but also on the social practices of blame and praise that constitute our moral
attitudes. He suggests that our attitudes of resentment and forgiveness are not
based on an individual's free will but rather on our emotional responses to their actions.
Thus, Strawson challenges traditional philosophical views of moral responsibility, which
emphasize the role of free will and rationality in our moral judgments. Instead, he
argues that our moral attitudes are fundamentally shaped by our social practices and
interactions.
Strawson also argues that our moral practices are based on our reactive
attitudes, such as resentment, gratitude, and forgiveness. These attitudes are not just
emotions, but they are essential to our moral lives. Strawson argues that reactive
attitudes are not based on judgments or beliefs but are natural responses to how we are
treated by others. These attitudes express our sense of worth and value, as well as our
expectations of how we should be treated.
 Furthermore, Strawson critiques the traditional philosophical approach to free
will, which he believes is too focused on metaphysical questions about determinism and
causation. Instead, he proposes a compatibilist view of free will, which he believes is
more in line with our everyday practices and attitudes. According to Strawson, free will
is not a metaphysical or theoretical concept, but it is the capacity to act on our desires
and intentions without external interference. This capacity is necessary for us to be held
morally responsible for our actions, which is an essential feature of our moral practices.
On the debate of determinism of behavior or free will:
The author holds a moderate position between those so-called pessimists that
defend that there is no free will and then humans cannot be properly judged and those
that entail that although determinism is true, it does not mean that humans cannot be
morally judged.
“So my answer has two parts. The first is that we cannot, as we are, seriously
envisage ourselves adopting thoroughgoing objectivity of attitude to others as a result of
theoretical conviction of the truth of determinism; and the second is that when we do in
fact adopt such an attitude in a particular case, our doing so is not the consequence of a
theoretical conviction which might be expressed as ‘Determinism in this case’, but is a
consequence of our abandoning, for different reasons in different cases, the ordinary
interpersonal attitudes” (Strawson).
‘Strawson’s purpose here is to dissolve the so-called problem of determinism and
responsibility. He does this by drawing a contrast between two different perspectives we
can take on the world: the ‘participant’ and ‘objective’ standpoints. These
perspectives involve different explanations of other people’s actions. From the objective
point of view, we see people as elements of the natural world, causally manipulated and
manipulable in various ways. From the participant point of view, we see others as
appropriate objects of ‘reactive attitudes’, attitudes such as gratitude, anger,
sympathy and resentment, which presuppose the responsibility of other people. These
two perspectives are opposed to one another, but both are legitimate. In particular,
Strawson argues that our reactive attitudes towards others and ourselves are natural
and irrevocable. They are a central part of what it is to be human. The truth of
determinism cannot, then, force us to give up the participant standpoint, because the
reactive attitudes are too deeply embedded in our humanity. Between determinism and
responsibility there can be no conflict.
In resume:
‘Freedom and Resentment’ introduced the notion of reactive attitudes to debates
about free will and responsibility” (Stanford Plato Philosophy).
‘In “Freedom and Resentment” (1962), the British philosopher P.F. Strawson
(1919–2006) introduced an influential version of compatibilism grounded in human
psychology. Strawson observed that people display emotions such as resentment,
anger, gratitude, and so on in response to the actions of others. He argued that holding
agents morally responsible for their actions is nothing more than having such feelings,
or “reactive attitudes,” toward them. The question of whether the agents act freely
matters only insofar as it affects the feelings toward them that others may have; apart
from this, freedom is beside the point. Moreover, because people cannot help but feel
reactive attitudes, no matter how much they may try not to, they are justified in having
them, whatever the truth or falsity of determinism. (This is not to say that the specific
reactive attitude a person may have on a given occasion—of blind rage as opposed to
mere annoyance, for example—is always justified.)

- Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1997, pp. 155-184
In the chapter "Justice and Morality" in his book "The Concept of Law," H.L.A. Hart
explores the relationship between law, justice, and morality. He argues that while law
and morality are related, they are not the same thing. Morality provides a basis for
criticizing laws, but it does not necessarily determine what the law should be.
Hart acknowledges that there is often overlap between law and morality, and that the
law is often influenced by moral principles. However, he argues that this overlap does
not mean that the law and morality are the same thing. Rather, the relationship
between law and morality is complex and multifaceted.

According to Hart, law is a system of rules that are enforced by the state, while
morality is a system of values that are internalized by individuals. He believes that the
law does not necessarily have to be moral, and that there can be instances where the
law is unjust or immoral.
Hart also introduces the idea of the "minimum content of natural law." This is the
idea that there are certain moral principles that are so fundamental that they must be
reflected in the law. For example, the prohibition of murder and theft are principles that
are so essential to society that they must be reflected in the law. However, Hart argues
that this minimum content of natural law is limited, and that the law should not attempt
to enforce all moral principles. Laws are part of a realm that people often discuss as just
or unjust - because there are moral principles that make people judge whether a legal
system and its legal norms are just or unjust - however, our society also posits a law as
morally just if it followed institutional procedures and fairness, which means that there
will not be partiality in the use of the law (he is a liberal in this sense). There is a
distributive sense regarding legal norms. There are conflicts between legal norms for
the common good and legal norms regarding individuals. “Justice constitutes one
segment of morality primarily concerned not with individual conduct but with the ways
classes in which individuals are treated”.
Four features distinguishing moral rules
Importance: they are maintained against the strong passions they restrict; there is
strong social pressure for conformity and for their teaching; the consequences of their
violation are believed to be serious (not necessarily true for legal ones).
Immunity from deliberate change: it is senseless to say ‘On 1 Jan. last year it became
immoral to do so-and-so’; moral rules cannot be changed or repealed by deliberate
enactment.
Voluntary character of moral offenses: lack of intention and use of due precaution
exclude from moral responsibility and blame; in morals (not always in law), ‘ought
implies can’.
Form of moral pressure: moral arguments cannot involve threats of physical
punishment, but only consist in reviewing the reasons for accepting the moral rules, and
making appeal to conscience.

Berg, How could ethics depend on religion?, in Singer (ed.), A Companion to

Ethics, Blackwell, Oxford, 1991, pp. 525-533
In the article "How Could Ethics Depend on Religion?" by E. M. Berg, the author
explores the relationship between ethics and religion. Berg examines different
arguments that suggest ethics and religion are interdependent. One argument is that
without religion, there would be no objective basis for morality, and morality would
become subjective and arbitrary. Berg criticizes this argument, pointing out that morality
can be based on human reason and experience rather than relying on religion.
Another argument is that religion provides motivation and inspiration for people to act
ethically. Berg acknowledges that religion can be a source of motivation for ethical
behavior, but argues that it is not the only source. Secular values, such as empathy and
compassion, can also motivate ethical behavior.
Berg also considers the view that religion is necessary for moral education and
formation. While she acknowledges that religion can play a role in moral education, she
argues that it is not the only means of moral education.
Overall, Berg suggests that while religion can contribute to ethics, it is not necessary for
morality or ethical behavior. Morality can be based on human reason and experience,
and secular values can provide motivation and guidance for ethical behavior.
Berg is trying to set a philosophical explanation of ethics/morality from the perspective
of theological arguments from the judeo-christian civilization - although he does not
imply god's existence. He is just using the religious logic of god to derive moral norms
and assess their validity and coherence.
According to him, religion is very related to morality and ethics and influenced part of
western moral philosophy as it began with absolute commandments given by a shared
belief in an absolute instance of universal law, which is the realm of god.
Devine command theory.
Some thinkers explain morality through the ideal of an omnipotent, omniscient, and
omnipresent almighty god. This god would represent the good in itself and does not
need to justify it; what it will is necessarily good as it is incapable of doing bad or it
would not choose to do bad. However, there are contradictions in this line as there
seems to be intrinsically good or bad outside god’s domain.
Is something good because god says so, or is it god’s will because it is good?
How can atheists and agnostics be good persons if they do not believe in the absolute
measure of good coming from god?
Some believe that ethics and morality depend on the religion and the existence of god
to validate themselves in several ways.
- Taylor, Determinism and the Theory of Agency, in R. Shafer-Landau (ed.), Ethical
Theory: An Anthology, Wiley Blackwell, Malden 2013, pp. 308-311
In "Determinism and the Theory of Agency," Taylor discusses the concept of
determinism and its implications for the theory of agency. He argues that determinism
poses a challenge to the idea of free will and responsibility, which are crucial
components of agency. Taylor acknowledges that determinism seems to conflict with the
idea of free will because it suggests that all events are causally determined by prior
events and natural laws.
However, Taylor argues that determinism does not necessarily undermine free
will and responsibility. He suggests that we can still have agency and responsibility even
if determinism is true. Taylor proposes that the key to reconciling determinism and
agency is to distinguish between two different senses of "can" - "can" in the sense of
physical ability and "can" in the sense of practical possibility. He argues that
determinism only affects the former sense of "can," and that we can still be morally
responsible for our actions in the latter sense of "can." Taylor's argument is intended to
show that determinism is not a threat to the theory of agency and that it is possible to
maintain a sense of moral responsibility even in a deterministic universe.
Taylor argues that agency is closely tied to the concept of free will, which he sees as the
ability of individuals to make choices that are not predetermined by prior causes. He
suggests that agency requires both the capacity to act freely and the ability to
understand the consequences of one's actions. Furthermore, Taylor emphasizes that
agency is an essential part of our moral and ethical understanding of human behavior,
as it allows us to hold individuals responsible for their actions and to praise or blame
them accordingly. He contends that without agency, moral and ethical judgments lose
their significance.
In short: in his article "Determinism and the Theory of Agency," philosopher Richard
Taylor addresses the question of whether determinism, the idea that all events are
predetermined and inevitable, is compatible with the concept of free will and moral
responsibility. Taylor begins by defining determinism and outlining its implications,
arguing that if determinism is true, then human beings do not have free will and cannot
be held morally responsible for their actions.
However, Taylor then presents several arguments against determinism, beginning
with the idea that determinism is self-refuting because it implies that the
determinist's own belief in determinism was predetermined and therefore not
based on reason or evidence. He also argues that determinism is incompatible with
the reality of deliberation and choice, as these imply that there are genuine alternatives
to the actions we take.
Taylor then proposes an alternative view of human agency that he calls "causal
indeterminism." This view holds that while many events are determined by prior
causes, some events are indeterminate and the result of chance or randomness.
According to Taylor, this allows for the possibility of genuine free will and moral
responsibility, as our actions are not entirely predetermined but also influenced
by chance and our own choices.
Finally, Taylor addresses objections to his view, such as the argument that
indeterminism would mean that our choices are random and therefore not under our
control. He responds by arguing that while indeterminism does introduce an element of
chance, it does not mean that our choices are completely random, as they are still
influenced by our values, beliefs, and desires.
Overall, Taylor's article presents a defense of the idea that human agency and moral
responsibility are compatible with indeterminism, and that determinism is a flawed and
self-refuting view.
Taylor also distinguishes between two different forms of determinism: hard determinism
and soft determinism. Hard determinism argues that determinism is incompatible with
free will, and therefore that we are not morally responsible for our actions. Soft
determinism, on the other hand, argues that determinism is compatible with free will
and moral responsibility, but that our choices are still determined by prior causes. Taylor
argues that while soft determinism is more plausible than hard determinism, it still fails
to account for the sense of responsibility we feel for our actions. He suggests that a
more satisfactory account of free will and moral responsibility must involve some
degree of indeterminacy or chance, which allows for genuine choice and agency.

Section 2
Section 2: Normative theories
• Forms of consequentialism: ethical egoism and utilitarianism
• Act-consequentialism and rule-consequentialism
• Theories of the good life: hedonism, preferentialism or desire-theory,
perfectionism or the ‘objective list’ theory
• Deontological views in ethics: duty-based and rights-based theories
• Theories of unconditional duties and theories of prima facie duties
• Rights as side-constraints and the rationality of agent-relative restrictions
• The critique of ‘modern morality’ and Aristotelian views on virtue ethics
• Agent-based vs. agent-focus virtue ethics

Forms of consequentialism: Ethical egoism and utilitarianism are both forms of

consequentialism that hold that the morality of an action should be judged by its
outcomes or consequences. Ethical egoism states that individuals should act in their
own self-interest, while utilitarianism argues that actions should be chosen to produce
the greatest amount of overall happiness or pleasure.
Act-consequentialism and rule-consequentialism: Act-consequentialism is the
view that the rightness or wrongness of an action depends solely on the consequences
of that particular action, while rule-consequentialism holds that the rightness or
wrongness of an action depends on the consequences of following a particular rule or
set of rules.
Theories of the good life: Hedonism, preferentialism, and perfectionism are
theories of what constitutes the good life. Hedonism holds that pleasure or happiness is
the ultimate good, while preferentialism or desire-theory argues that the good life is
defined by satisfying one's own desires. Perfectionism or the 'objective list' theory states
that the good life is achieved by fulfilling a list of objective goods or values.
Deontological views in ethics: Duty-based and rights-based theories focus on
duties or obligations that individuals have, independent of the consequences of their
actions. Duty-based theories argue that certain actions are inherently right or wrong,
while rights-based theories hold that individuals have certain rights that must be
respected.
Theories of unconditional duties and theories of prima facie duties: Unconditional
duties are duties that must always be fulfilled, regardless of the situation, while prima
facie duties are duties that are binding unless they conflict with other, stronger duties.
Rights as side-constraints and the rationality of agent-relative restrictions: The
view that rights function as side-constraints means that they restrict what others may do
to individuals, rather than prescribing what individuals ought to do. Agent-relative
restrictions hold that individuals may have different moral obligations depending on their
personal relationships and circumstances.
The critique of 'modern morality' and Aristotelian views on virtue ethics: Critics of
modern morality argue that moral theories tend to focus too much on rules and
principles, neglecting the importance of character and virtues. Aristotelian virtue ethics
holds that moral virtues are habits or dispositions that enable individuals to act in the
right way, and that the ultimate aim of human life is to cultivate these virtues.
 Agent-based vs. agent-focus virtue ethics: Agent-based virtue ethics emphasizes
the development of virtuous character traits, while agent-focused virtue ethics
emphasizes the actions and decisions of virtuous individuals.

- Smart, Extreme and restricted utilitarianism, in Shafer-Landau (ed.), Ethical

Theory, pp. 423-427
J.J.C. Smart's essay "Extreme and restricted utilitarianism" discusses the difference
between two forms of utilitarianism: extreme and restricted. Extreme utilitarianism
holds that one should always act to bring about the greatest possible happiness for the
greatest number of people, without considering any other moral values. According to
this view, all other moral values, such as justice or individual rights, are ultimately
reducible to the promotion of happiness or pleasure.

Restricted utilitarianism, on the other hand, sees moral rules as rules of thumb
that are to be applied in practice mostly for the sake of expediency, and not because
they are sacrosanct in themselves. According to this view, moral rules are generally
reliable guides for promoting happiness, but there may be exceptions where following
the rules would actually lead to less overall happiness.
Smart argues that extreme utilitarianism is problematic because it fails to take
into account the importance of individual rights and the possibility of injustice. Restricted
utilitarianism, on the other hand, acknowledges that there are limits to what actions can
be justified on the basis of promoting happiness. Smart suggests that the ideal
approach would be to combine utilitarianism with other moral theories that take
into account individual rights and justice.

- Hooker, Rule-Consequentialism, in Shafer-Landau (ed.), Ethical Theory, pp.

428-440
In "Rule-Consequentialism," Brad Hooker presents and defends the view that the
rightness of an action is determined by the moral rules that, if generally followed, would
produce the best consequences overall. This view combines consequentialist concerns
with the importance of moral rules, and Hooker argues that it avoids the problems of
both deontological and act-consequentialist theories. - Kant.
Hooker distinguishes his view from other forms of consequentialism, such as
act-consequentialism, by emphasizing the role of moral rules in guiding action.
According to rule-consequentialism, the moral rules that we should follow are those that
would lead to the best overall consequences if they were generally followed. This
means that sometimes it is permissible to break a moral rule if doing so would lead to
better overall consequences.
Hooker also addresses objections to rule-consequentialism, such as the worry that it
cannot account for our intuitions about individual rights and the value of justice. He
argues that a rule-consequentialist approach can still recognize the importance of these
values, but that they must be understood in a way that is consistent with producing the
best overall consequences.
Overall, Hooker defends rule-consequentialism as a promising approach to ethical
theory that avoids the shortcomings of both deontological and act-consequentialist
views.
Act-consequentialism is a type of ethical theory that evaluates the morality of individual
actions based on their consequences. According to act-consequentialism, an action is
morally right if it produces the best overall consequences compared to all other possible
actions. This means that the morality of an action is determined solely by the goodness
or badness of its consequences, and not by any inherent qualities of the action itself.
Examples of act-consequentialist theories include classical utilitarianism, which holds
that the morally right action is the one that produces the greatest overall happiness, and
negative utilitarianism, which holds that the morally right action is the one that minimizes
the overall amount of suffering.
- Nagel, The View from Nowhere, Oxford University Press, New York 1986, chap.
IX, pp. 164-185; repr. in S. Darwall (ed.), Deontology, Blackwell, Malden MA 2003,
pp. 90-111.
In chapter IX of "The View from Nowhere," Nagel discusses deontological ethics and
argues that it is possible to combine deontological and consequentialist ethical
theories. He believes that deontological theories, which focus on the intrinsic value of
actions, are necessary because they capture the moral significance of actions that have
a certain kind of meaning, such as those that express respect for persons or promote
justice. However, he also thinks that consequentialist theories, which focus on the
overall good or bad consequences of actions, are necessary because they capture the
moral significance of actions that have a certain kind of impact, such as those that
prevent harm or increase happiness.
Nagel introduces the idea of the "agent-relative/agent-neutral" distinction, which
distinguishes between ethical theories that are focused on the perspective of individual
agents and those that are focused on the perspective of everyone involved. He argues
that both agent-relative and agent-neutral perspectives are necessary to capture the full
moral significance of actions.
Agent-relative reasons are reasons that are dependent on the interests, aims, or desires
of a particular agent. For example, a mother may have an agent-relative reason to care
for her child because of her personal relationship with the child. Agent-neutral reasons,
on the other hand, are reasons that do not depend on the particular interests or desires
of any individual agent. They apply equally to everyone. For example, the reason not to
kill innocent people is an agent-neutral reason because it applies to all individuals
regardless of their personal interests or desires. Nagel argues that both agent-relative
and agent-neutral reasons are necessary for a complete ethical theory.
Nagel also discusses the concept of "moral luck," which refers to the idea that the
morality of an action can depend on factors outside of an agent's control, such as the
outcome of their actions. He argues that deontological theories are better equipped to
deal with the problem of moral luck because they focus on the intrinsic value of actions,
rather than just their outcomes.
Overall, Nagel's main point is that deontological and consequentialist ethical theories
should be seen as complementary rather than mutually exclusive, and that a
combination of both perspectives is necessary to fully capture the moral significance of
actions.
- Ross, What makes right acts right?, in Shafer-Landau (ed.), Ethical Theory, pp.
756-762
In his article "What makes right acts right?", W.D. Ross presents his theory of
prima facie duties, which he claims are the foundational principles of ethics. Ross
argues that there are several different prima facie duties, including duties of fidelity,
reparation, gratitude, justice, beneficence, self-improvement, and non-maleficence.
These duties are considered prima facie because they can conflict with each other, and
there is no set hierarchy that determines which duty takes precedence in a given
situation. - pluralism
According to Ross, right acts are those that fulfill our prima facie duties. He notes
that there may be cases where two or more prima facie duties conflict, and in these
situations, we must use our moral judgment to determine which duty takes precedence.
Ross argues that this process of moral judgment is not based on any objective
principles, but rath1er on our intuition and experience.
Ross also addresses the question of whether moral rules are absolute or relative.
He argues that moral rules are not absolute, as there may be situations where the
fulfillment of a prima facie duty requires breaking a moral rule. However, he also argues
that moral rules are not completely relative, as there are some moral rules that are
nearly always valid, such as the prohibition against killing innocent people.
Overall, Ross's theory of prima facie duties emphasizes the complexity and
nuance of ethical decision-making, and emphasizes the importance of balancing
multiple duties in order to determine what makes right acts right.

- Nozick, The Rationality of Side Constraints, in Shafer-Landau (ed.), Ethical

Theory, pp. 521-523
In his article "The Rationality of Side Constraints," Robert Nozick argues that moral
theories should not be based solely on the consequences of actions but must also take
into account individual rights and constraints on actions. Nozick introduces the concept
of "side constraints" which are moral principles that prohibit certain actions regardless of
their consequences. He argues that side constraints are necessary for the protection of
individual rights and that they should not be violated even if doing so would bring about
a greater good. Nozick asserts that side constraints are necessary for moral reasoning
because they provide limits to what can be done to others in pursuit of a goal. He also
claims that moral theories that rely solely on consequentialist reasoning are insufficient
because they do not take into account the value of individual rights and the constraints
on actions. Nozick concludes that moral theories should incorporate both
consequentialist reasoning and side constraints in order to provide a comprehensive
and balanced approach to moral reasoning.

- Hursthouse, Normative virtue ethics, in Shafer-Landau (ed.), Ethical Theory, pp.

645-652
"Normative Virtue Ethics," Hursthouse argues for a version of virtue ethics that is both
objective and action-guiding. She begins by criticizing consequentialist and
deontological moral theories for focusing on the rightness or wrongness of actions
rather than the character of agents. Hursthouse argues that these theories fail to
capture the complex, context-dependent nature of moral life.
She then turns to Aristotle's conception of virtue, which she argues provides a better
approach. Virtues are habits or dispositions to act in certain ways, and they are
acquired through practice and education. Virtuous action is not determined solely by
following a set of rules or maximizing happiness, but by cultivating virtuous character
traits such as courage, generosity, and honesty.
Hursthouse goes on to address objections to virtue ethics, including the charge that it is
overly subjective and that it cannot provide action-guidance. She argues that virtue
ethics is objective insofar as it appeals to a shared human nature and the virtues that
are necessary for human flourishing. Furthermore, virtue ethics does provide
action-guidance by emphasizing the importance of cultivating virtuous character traits
and making practical judgments about how to act in specific situations.
Overall, Hursthouse argues that normative virtue ethics is a more comprehensive and
satisfying moral theory than consequentialism or deontology, as it provides a richer
account of moral life and human flourishing.

- Slote, Agent-Based Virtue Ethics, in Shafer-Landau (ed.), Ethical Theory, pp.

653-663
In his essay "Agent-Based Virtue Ethics," Michael Slote presents a version of virtue
ethics that focuses on the individual's character rather than the act itself. Slote argues
that an agent-based approach to ethics can better capture the complexity of moral
decision-making than traditional consequentialist or deontological approaches.
According to Slote, an agent-based approach focuses on the agent's moral
character, which is developed over time through habituation and repetition of
virtuous actions. In contrast to consequentialism, which evaluates actions solely
based on their outcomes, and deontology, which evaluates actions based on
moral rules, agent-based virtue ethics emphasizes the importance of the agent's
motives, intentions, and dispositions.
Slote claims that this approach allows for a more nuanced understanding of ethical
decision-making, as the context and circumstances of a particular situation can
influence the moral status of an action. For example, an action that is normally
considered morally wrong, such as lying, may be justified in certain circumstances if the
agent's intentions are virtuous, such as lying to protect someone from harm.
Overall, Slote argues that agent-based virtue ethics offers a more realistic and
comprehensive account of morality, as it acknowledges the complexity of human
motivation and the importance of the agent's character in determining the morality of an
action.

Section 3: The Status of Morality

• The critique of value objectivism: non-cognitivism and error theory
• The defense of value objectivism: naturalistic and non-naturalistic forms of
moral realism.
The Status of Morality refers to the debate over the nature and status of moral
values and the foundations of morality.
The critique of value objectivism: Non-cognitivists and error theorists argue that
moral statements do not express objective facts, but rather express the speaker's
attitudes or emotions towards a particular situation or action. They deny the existence of
objective moral values that are independent of human beliefs and attitudes.
The defense of value objectivism: Moral realists defend the existence of objective
moral values and argue that they are independent of human beliefs and attitudes.
Naturalistic moral realism claims that moral facts are grounded in natural facts about the
world, such as human biology or evolutionary history. Non-naturalistic moral realism, on
the other hand, posits the existence of non-natural moral facts that are not reducible to
natural facts.
Second-order moral propositions: Second-order moral propositions are
statements about the truth or falsity of moral claims. They express beliefs about the
nature and status of moral judgments, and may concern questions such as whether
moral claims can be objectively true or false.
Moral cognitivism: Moral cognitivism is the view that moral statements are
capable of being true or false, and that they express beliefs about the moral properties
of actions, motives, or character traits. Cognitivists believe that moral claims can be
verified or falsified through empirical evidence or logical analysis.
Moral subjectivism: Moral subjectivism is the view that moral judgments are
based on personal preferences or feelings, and that there are no objective moral
standards that apply universally. According to subjectivists, moral claims express
subjective attitudes or opinions rather than objective facts.
 Moral relativism: Moral relativism is the view that moral truths are relative to the
culture, society, or individual who holds them, and that there are no objective moral
standards that apply universally. Relativists believe that what is morally right or wrong
depends on the context and cannot be evaluated from a standpoint outside of that
context.
Emotivism: Emotivism is a non-cognitivist theory that moral statements do not
express beliefs or propositions, but rather express emotions or attitudes of approval or
disapproval. According to emotivists, moral claims do not have objective truth values
and cannot be verified or falsified.
Error theory: Error theory is a meta-ethical theory that denies the existence of
objective moral values and claims that all moral claims are false. According to error
theorists, moral language is systematically mistaken because it presupposes the
existence of objective moral properties that do not exist.

- Ayer, A Critique of Ethics, in Shafer-Landau (ed.), Ethical Theory, pp. 16-21

"A Critique of Ethics," Ayer argues that moral statements, such as "murder is wrong,"
are not factual statements but rather express the speaker's emotions or attitudes. He
contends that ethical propositions do not have any objective truth value and are instead
expressions of subjective preferences. Ayer rejects the idea that moral propositions are
grounded in any objective moral facts, such as God's will or a natural law, and argues
that moral discourse is more like poetry or metaphor than a scientific or factual
endeavor. Ayer's argument is based on a version of the verification principle, which
holds that only statements that can be empirically verified or logically deduced from
empirical statements are meaningful. Therefore, Ayer concludes that ethical
propositions are not meaningful and that ethics should be replaced with a form of
emotivism, where ethical statements are treated as expressions of personal attitudes
rather than objective facts.

- Mackie, The Subjectivity of Values, in Shafer-Landau (ed.), Ethical Theory, pp.

22-30
In "The Subjectivity of Values," J.L. Mackie argues that the existence of objective values
is doubtful because they would require a metaphysical justification that is not available.
He suggests that moral judgments are based on personal and cultural preferences and
that ethical claims cannot be objectively true or false. Mackie asserts that there is an
apparent disagreement among people about moral issues that cannot be resolved by
any argument or fact. Moreover, Mackie argues that if there were objective values, they
would be necessarily prescriptive, which implies the existence of a divine or
supernatural authority that imposes them. However, he claims that no evidence
supports the existence of such an authority. Therefore, Mackie concludes that values
are subjective and that ethical theories should not seek to justify moral claims but rather
aim to understand the nature and function of moral language and discourse.
- Shafer-Landau, Ethics as Philosophy, in Shafer-Landau (ed.), Ethical Theory, pp.
54-62
In "Ethics as Philosophy," Russ Shafer-Landau argues for the importance of treating
ethics as a philosophical enterprise. He begins by noting that while many people seem
to have a basic understanding of what morality is and how it works, this understanding
is often inconsistent, incomplete, and contradictory. Philosophical inquiry,
Shafer-Landau argues, is necessary to clarify our thinking about ethical questions.
Shafer-Landau argues that ethical theory must be grounded in a set of moral principles
that are universal, objective, and impartial. These principles must be able to account for
our moral intuitions and be capable of providing guidance for moral decision-making. He
contends that there are certain moral truths that are self-evident and require no further
justification.
Shafer-Landau also critiques the view that moral relativism is a plausible alternative to
moral objectivism. He argues that relativism fails to provide a coherent account of moral
truth and that it is ultimately self-defeating. He also rejects the idea that moral nihilism,
the view that moral truths do not exist at all, is a viable option.
Overall, Shafer-Landau's essay is a defense of the importance of ethics as a
philosophical enterprise, and a call to take seriously the task of engaging in rigorous
ethical inquiry.
- Brink, Moral Realism and the skeptical arguments from disagreement and
queerness, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64, 1984, pp. 111-125.
In this article, David Brink addresses two skeptical arguments against moral realism: the
argument from disagreement and the argument from queerness. The argument from
disagreement claims that widespread and intractable moral disagreement is
incompatible with the existence of objective moral truths. The argument from queerness
claims that the ontological commitments of moral realism are too bizarre and
ungrounded to be credible.
Brink first argues that moral disagreement is not as widespread or intractable as many
skeptics claim. He notes that there is much agreement on moral issues within particular
communities and cultures, and that disagreements are often due to differences in
factual beliefs or conceptual frameworks rather than fundamental differences in moral
values.
Brink then turns to the argument from queerness, which he believes is more challenging
for moral realism. He argues that moral realism does indeed have ontological
commitments that are strange and ungrounded, but that this is not sufficient reason to
reject the position. Instead, he argues that these commitments are no stranger than
those of other ontological positions, such as scientific realism or mathematical
platonism.
Overall, Brink concludes that moral realism is a viable position that can withstand the
skeptical arguments from disagreement and queerness, although it does require careful
and nuanced defense.
****************
Brief concepts:
● Forms of consequentialism: Ethical egoism and utilitarianism are both forms of
consequentialism that hold that the morality of an action should be judged by its
outcomes or consequences. Ethical egoism states that individuals should act in
their own self-interest, while utilitarianism argues that actions should be chosen
to produce the greatest amount of overall happiness or pleasure.
○ Act-consequentialism and rule-consequentialism:
Act-consequentialism is the view that the rightness or wrongness of an
action depends solely on the consequences of that particular action, while
rule-consequentialism holds that the rightness or wrongness of an action
depends on the consequences of following a particular rule or set of rules.
● Theories of the good life: Hedonism, preferentialism, and perfectionism are
theories of what constitutes the good life. Hedonism holds that pleasure or
happiness is the ultimate good, while preferentialism or desire-theory argues that
the good life is defined by satisfying one's own desires. Perfectionism or the
'objective list' theory states that the good life is achieved by fulfilling a list of
objective goods or values.
● Deontological views in ethics: Duty-based and rights-based theories focus on
duties or obligations that individuals have, independent of the consequences of
their actions. Duty-based theories argue that certain actions are inherently right
or wrong, while rights-based theories hold that individuals have certain rights that
must be respected.
● Theories of unconditional duties and theories of prima facie duties: Unconditional
duties are duties that must always be fulfilled, regardless of the situation, while
prima facie duties are duties that are binding unless they conflict with other,
stronger duties.
● Rights as side-constraints and the rationality of agent-relative restrictions: The
view that rights function as side-constraints means that they restrict what others
may do to individuals, rather than prescribing what individuals ought to do.
Agent-relative restrictions hold that individuals may have different moral
obligations depending on their personal relationships and circumstances.
● The critique of 'modern morality' and Aristotelian views on virtue ethics: Critics of
modern morality argue that moral theories tend to focus too much on rules and
principles, neglecting the importance of character and virtues. Aristotelian virtue
ethics holds that moral virtues are habits or dispositions that enable individuals to
 act in the right way, and that the ultimate aim of human life is to cultivate these
virtues.
● Agent-based vs. agent-focus virtue ethics: Agent-based virtue ethics emphasizes
the development of virtuous character traits, while agent-focused virtue ethics
emphasizes the actions and decisions of virtuous individuals.
● Moral realism is the view that moral facts and values are objective and exist
independently of human beliefs, attitudes, or opinions. According to this view,
moral statements can be true or false, and moral facts are discoverable through
rational inquiry.
● Moral cognitivism is the view that moral judgments are capable of being true or
false, and that they express beliefs about the moral properties or characteristics
of actions, people, or things.
● Moral subjectivism is the view that moral judgments are expressions of
personal feelings, attitudes, or preferences, and that they are not capable of
being true or false. According to this view, moral statements reflect individual
opinions or cultural norms, and there are no objective moral facts that exist
independently of human beliefs or attitudes.
● Free will? In the western philosophical tradition, there is the notion of individual
free will and its implications for several fields of studies and political action. It
implies implications in the field of moral philosophy and moral behavior. “there
were three claims that were widely, although not universally, agreed upon. The
first was that free will has two aspects: the freedom to do otherwise and the
power of self-determination. The second is that an adequate account of free will
must entail that free agents are morally responsible agents and/or fit subjects for
punishment. Ideas about moral responsibility were often a yardstick by which
analyses of free will were measured, with critics objecting to an analysis of free
will by arguing that agents who satisfied the analysis would not, intuitively, be
morally responsible for their actions. The third is that compatibilism—the thesis
that free will is compatible with determinism—is true. It is worth observing that in
many of these disputes about the nature of free will there is an underlying dispute
about the nature of moral responsibility. This is seen clearly in Hobbes (1654
[1999]) and early twentieth century philosophers’ defenses of compatibilism.
Underlying the belief that free will is incompatible with determinism is the thought
that no one would be morally responsible for any actions in a deterministic world
in the sense that no one would deserve blame or punishment.” Consequence
argument: In short, determinism is the understanding that everything that has
happened has already been pre-determined by historical and natural universal
laws, in the sense that it could not have happened differently. If this is true,
incompatibilists would claim that an agent’s free will does not exist. For
incompatibilists, there is only free will if and only if determinism is false.
● Either one is libertarian or determinist.
● As for compatibilists, even though determinism is true, there can be free will as
the agent is capable of acting otherwise and changing the set of circumstances.
In other words, “causal determinism is compatible with the possession of a
certain kind of control guidance control – and moral responsibility… an agent
exercise guidance control of his behavior insofar as it issues from his own,
appropriately reason-responsive mechanism. These entries have important
implications for moral philosophy regarding responsibility and legal matters.
Libertarians incompatibilists would argue that humans are morally responsible for
their actions as they could have chosen differently.
● Blame? But how can morally and legally someone be blamed if determinism is
true? Some argue no one should be morally judged if determinism is true.
○ Solution: to drop the notion of responsibility altogether, and accept that
wrongdoers should be cured, instead of being blamed or punished.
○ To shift from a retributive conception of responsibility (and of punishment)
to a consequentialist one.
○ To deny that judgments of moral responsibility require free will
● In moral philosophy, rules of thumb refer to general guidelines or principles
that are not absolute but are commonly accepted as a practical guide for ethical
decision-making. These rules can be seen as heuristics that help individuals
make decisions based on their experience and common sense, without
necessarily having to engage in complex moral reasoning every time they face a
new ethical dilemma. For example, some common moral rules of thumb might
include "do not lie," "treat others with respect," and "do not steal." These rules
are not considered absolute moral principles, but they are widely accepted as
good guides for moral behavior in most situations. The concept of rules of thumb
is often contrasted with the idea of moral absolutism, which holds that there are
certain moral principles that are universally applicable and do not admit of
exceptions or qualifications. Rules of thumb are also contrasted with
consequentialist approaches to ethics, which focus on the outcome or
consequences of actions rather than on the principles or rules that guide those
actions.
● Anscombe invented consequentialism to define all the moral philosophies that
existed before. According to her, it is consequentialism when the moral
philosopher accepts to break its rules to exceptions. Consequentialism is defined
as the denial of absolutism.
○ One needs to think about concepts such as justice.
● Jonathan Dancy criticized Ross by saying that general rules such as promise
keeping is right - Ross showed that everything depends on circumstances, so
that we should accept a particularist account - moral particularism - Ross is moral
 generalistic , because there is general principals since certain characteristics
counts in all circumstances.
● The Status of Morality refers to the debate over the nature and status of moral
values and the foundations of morality.
● The critique of value objectivism: Non-cognitivists and error theorists argue that
moral statements do not express objective facts, but rather express the speaker's
attitudes or emotions towards a particular situation or action. They deny the
existence of objective moral values that are independent of human beliefs and
attitudes.
● The defense of value objectivism: Moral realists defend the existence of objective
moral values and argue that they are independent of human beliefs and attitudes.
Naturalistic moral realism claims that moral facts are grounded in natural facts
about the world, such as human biology or evolutionary history. Non-naturalistic
moral realism, on the other hand, posits the existence of non-natural moral facts
that are not reducible to natural facts.
● Five principles of utilitarianism:
● welfarism (pleasure and pain are the only things that make a state of affairs
better or worse)

● b) consequentialism (only consequences count)

● c) universality: the consequences for the welfare of every individual count equally
(Bentham: “each to count for one, nobody for more than one”)

● d) maximisation: not simply producing good consequences, but producing the

highest total net amount of good consequences that can be produced in each
situation

● e) aggregation or sum-ranking: individual utilities must be added in order to

compare different total sums of possible welfare.