Mind Association

Rule-Consequentialism
Author(s): Brad Hooker
Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 99, No. 393 (Jan., 1990), pp. 67-77
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
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 Rule-Consequentialism'
BRAD HOOKER

Suppose thatacceptingrulesis a matterof havingcertaindesiresand

dispositions.Now considerthetheorythatan act is morallyrightifand
onlyifit is calledforby theset ofdesiresand dispositionsthehavingof
whichby everyone wouldresultin at leastas goodconsequencesjudged
impartially as anyother.2For lack of a bettername,we mightcall this
or just rule-consequentialism
theorydisposition/rule-consequentialism, for
short.Two crucialfeatures ofthistheoryshouldbe noted.One is thatit
assessestherightness and wrongness ofanyparticular act,notdirectlyin
termsof its consequences,but indirectly in termsof a set of desires,
dispositions, and rules,whichis thenassessedin termsof the conse-
quencesof everyone's havingthatset.3The otheris thatit assessesthe
rightness of anygivenact,notin termsof thedesires,dispositions, and
ruleswhichare suchthattheagent'shavingthemwouldbringaboutthe
bestoverallconsequences, butratherin termsofthedesires,dispositions,
andruleswhicharesuchthateveryone's havingthem wouldbringaboutthe
bestoverallconsequences.4 Let mereferto thesetofdesires,dispositions,
and ruleswhichare suchthateveryone's havingthemwouldbringabout
thebestoverallconsequencesas theoptimific set.
To thosewhoareattracted toconsequentialism butwanta moraltheory
thataccordswithat leastmostof our intuitions, rule-consequentialism

1 This paperis muchbetterthanit wouldotherwise havebeenbecauseof written comments on

earlierdraftsfromPenelopeMackie,MarkOvervold,PeterVallentyne, Anthony Ellis,MarkNelson,
andRichardBrandt.I am extremely to thesepeople,andtoAlanFuchs,JamesGriffin,
grateful R. M.
Hare, RogerCrisp,David Dyzenhaus,CherylMisak,Eldon Soifer,HowardRobinson,Madison
Powers,and GregTrianosky forhelpfuldiscussions abouttheideasin thepaper.Remaining defects,
however, are myresponsibility.
2 I do notwantto makeanycontroversial assumptions aboutwhatdesiresand dispositions human
beingsarecapableofhaving.I do notwanttoenterhereintodebatesabouthow'plastic'humannature
has beenup to now;nordo we needto takeup questionsaboutwhether trying to 'improve'human
naturevia geneticengineering wouldbe advisable.
3 So rule-consequentialism is a kindof indirect consequentialism.It is a mistaketo thinkthat
indirectconsequentialism assessesnotactsbutonlytherightness and wrongness ofotherthingssuch
as motives,standing rules,andsocialpractices.
dispositions, Indirectconsequentialism doesassessacts
as well (see B. Williams,'A Critiqueof Utilitarianism', in J. J. C. Smart and B. Williams,
Utilitarianism:For and Against,Cambridge, CambridgeUniversity Press,I973, p. I2I).
4 See R. M. Adam'sdistinction between'Individualistic motiveutilitarianism'and 'Universalistic
motiveutilitarianism' ('MotiveUtilitarianism', journal ofPhilosophy,I976, p. 480) and D. Parfit's
distinction between'IndividualConsequentialism' and 'CollectiveConsequentialism', Reasonsand
Persons, Oxford,Clarendon Press,I984, pp. 30-I. Theremightseemto be something fishy aboutthe
claimthattherightactis whatever onewouldbe calledforbythedesires,dispositions, andruleswhich
aresuchthat,ifeverylastpersonhad them,thebestconsequences wouldresult.I shallreturnto this.

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68 Brad Hooker

should have considerableinitialappeal. In sectionI of this paper I tryto

bringout the attractionsof rule-consequentialism by showinghow it can
be formulatedso as to be safe from the main objections to other
consequentialisttheories.Yet, even ifthe best versionof rule-consequenti-
alism is immune to the objections that plague other consequentialist
theories,rule-consequentialism has difficulties
of its own one of themost
seriousof whichis the so-called partialcomplianceobjection.5In section
II I consider how rule-consequentialistsmight reply to the partial
compliance objection. Then, in section III I explore the question of
whetherrule-consequentialists can avoid the partialcomplianceobjection
withoutopeningup theirtheoryto the objectionthatit makes unreason-
ably severe demands on individuals.

One of the most popular objectionsto utilitarianism is thatinterpersonal

comparisonsof utilityare impossible. I assume any plausible versionof
rule-consequentialismwillhave a utilitariancomponent,and will therefore
need an answerto the objectionabout interpersonalcomparisons.But for
the purposesof thispaper I shall simplyassume thatsome acceptableway
of makinginterpersonalcomparisonsis possible.6
Anotherprominentobjection to act-utilitarianism is that it does not
allow thatfairnessor equalityin the distributionof benefitsand burdens
can be morally required even when a less fair or less egalitarian
distributionwould provide greaternet welfare.7But it is possible to
accommodatethis objectionwithoutabandoningeven act-consequential-
ism. For it mightbe held that,whilethe rightact is stilljust whateverone
will bringabout the best outcome,outcomesare to be rankedin termsof
not onlyhow much well-beingtheycontainbut also how equally or fairly
it is distributed.8
A prominentobjectionto standardkindsof act-consequentialism is that
5 Indeed, R. Brandt-long one of the pre-eminent that this
rule-consequentialists-admits
problemis themostimportant
oftheproblemspeculiarto theindirect
formofconsequentialism.
See
his 'Fairness to Indirect OptimificTheories in Ethics', Ethics, I988, pp. 341-60.
6 As consequentialists
havelongpointedout,ithad betterbe, ifwe areto be able toconformeven
witha common-sense
dutyofbeneficence,suchas W. D. Ross's(on whichsee Ross, TheRightandthe
Good,Oxford,ClarendonPress,I930, ch.2). For a recentdefenceof interpersonal of
comparisons
seeJ.Griffin,
utility, Its Meaning,
Well-being: Measurement andMoralImportance, Oxford,Clarendon
Press, I986, Part Two.
7 For an account of the main intuitiveobjectionsto act-utilitarianism, see S. Scheffler's
'Introduction'tohiscollection Consequentialism
anditsCritics,
Oxford, OxfordUniversity Press,I988,
pp. I-I3, esp. pp. 2-4.
8 See, forexample, T. M. Scanlon,'Rights,Goals,and Fairness',in PublicandPrivateMorality,
ed. S. Hampshire, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press,I978, pp. 93-I I I, especially
sect.2. This
paperis reprinted in Scheffler's
collectionConsequentzalism
and its Critics.See also Scheffler, The
Rejection of Consequentialism,Oxford,ClarendonPress,I982, pp. 26-34, 70-9; and Parfit,Reasons
andPetsons,p. 26.

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 Rule-Consequentialism
69
theygive no directweightto deontological,agent-relativeconsiderations:
standard kinds of act-consequentialismhold that it is morallyrightto
harmpeople, or to ignoreone's special obligationsto thosewithwhomone
has some special connection,when such acts would bring about even
slightlymore good overall.9 Many people confidentlybelieve that it is
morallywrongto commitmurder,to torturesomeone forinformation, to
framethe innocent,to steal,to breakone's promises,to failto give special
weight to the interests of those with whom one has some special
connection,and so on, even whendoingone of thesethingswouldproduce
somewhat betterconsequences
judged impartially.But here,too, much can be
said in defenceof act-consequentialism.'0Defendersof the theoryusually
startby pointingout thatthe kindsof act in questionveryrarelyproduce
the best available outcome. They add that human limitationsand biases
are such thatwe are not accuratecalculatorsof the expectedconsequences
foreveryone-of our alternatives.That is, we frequentlydo not have
theneeded information, time,or thecapacityto weightbenefitsand harms
impartially(forexample,mostof us are biased in such a way thatwe tend
to underestimatethe harm to othersof acts that would benefitus). For
these reasons, a sophisticatedact-consequentialismwould prescribethat
we inculcateand maintainin ourselvesand othersbothfirmdispositions
not to commitsome kindsof acts and dispositionsto disapproveof others
who do committhem. Indeed, given our psychologicallimitations,act-
consequentialismmay favourour moraldispositions'runningso deep that
we could not bringourselvesto do the kindsof act in questioneven in the
rare cases in which they would bring about the best consequences
impartiallycalculated. Such mightbe the dispositions-of those sets that
are psychologicallypossible-which are such that one's having them
would produce the most good. But all this notwithstanding, act-conse-
quentialistsinsistthatrightacts are those whichwould resultin the most
overallgood (even if morallygood people could not bringthemselvesto
performsome of theseacts). And in makingthis claim act-consequential-
ism conflictssharplywiththe deontologicalconvictionsI mentioned."
Rule-consequentialism, however,does not makethatproblematicclaim.
Rule-consequentialiamclaims instead that individual acts of murder,
torture,promise-breaking, and so on, can be wrong even when those
particularacts bringabout betterconsequences than any alternativeacts
9 Of course, Schefflerhimselfadvances a powerfulattackon the idea that deontological
considerations should figurein the most basic, or first,principlesof morality(Rejectionof
Consequentialism,ch.4).
" Prominent amongthoseassociatedwiththedefenceI am aboutto summarize areH. Sidgwick,
TheMethods ofEthics,7thed,London,Macmillan,I907, bk.IV, ch. III; R. M. Hare,MoralThinking,
Oxford,ClarendonPress,i98i, pp. 35-52, I30-59; Parfit,Reasonsand Persons,pp. 27-8; and P.
Railton, 'Alienation,Consequentialism, and Morality',Philosophyand Public Affairs,I984,
pp. I34-7I, esp. pp. I53-4, I57-9 (Railton'spaperis also reprinted
in Scheffler's
collection).
" See ConradJohnson, 'The Authority oftheMoralAgent',in Consequentialhsm
nand itsCritics,ed.
Scheffler,p. 264.

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7o Brad Hooker

would have. For rule-consequentialism makestherightnessand wrongness

ofparticularacts,nota matteroftheconsequencesofthoseindividualacts,
but rathera matterof conformity withthatset of fairlygeneralruleswhose
acceptance by (more or less) everyone would have the best conse-
quences.12 And, thisacceptanceof fairlygeneralrulesforbiddingmurder,
torture,promise-breaking, and so on, would clearlyhave betterconse-
quences than everyone'saccepting fairlygeneral rules permittingsuch
acts. (This pointcould just as easilybe put in termsof dispositionsrather
than rules.)
Consider now one more objection to act-utilitarianism-thatit is
unreasonably demanding, construingas duties what one would have
thoughtwere supererogatoryself-sacrifices. 13 To fully appreciate this
objectionwe need to keep in mind the followingthreethings:(i) money
and other materialgoods usually have diminishingmarginalutility;(2)
each dollar can buy vastlymore food in, forexample,Ethiopia thanit can
in a 'First-World'country;and (3) otherrelativelywell-offpeople will not
give much. We mustthus accept thatit would be utility-maximizing, and
thusoptimificaccordingto mostversionsofact-consequentialism, ifI gave
away most of my materialgoods to the appropriatecharities.I must, of
course, take into account the effectsof my presentactions on my future

12
The rulesin questionmustofcoursebe 'fairly general'becauserule-consequentialism collapses
intoextensionalequivalencewithact-consequentialism iftherulesareallowedto be infinitely specific.
Brandtmentionsthis problem('IndirectOptimific Theories',p. 347). The questionof just how
universaltheacceptanceof themodecode mustbe is one I returnto below.
13 This objection is discussedin manyplaces.Sidgwickacknowledges thatutilitarianism 'seemsto
requirea morecomprehensive and unceasing subordination of self-interest
to thecommongood' than
common-sense morality does (MethodsofEthics,p. 87, italicsadded). See also ibid.,pp. 492, 499.
Otherdiscussionsof thisobjectioninclude:K. Baier, The Moral Pointof View,Ithaca,Cornell
University Press, I958, pp. 203-4; Scheffler, 'Introduction'to Consequentialism and its Critics,
pp. 3-4; G. Harman,TheNatureofMorality, New York,OxfordUniversity Press,I977, p. I57-62;
F. Feldman,Introductory Ethics,EnglewoodCliffs, Prentice-Hall,I978,ch.4; R. Brandt,A Theory of
theGoodandtheRight,Oxford,ClarendonPress,I979, p. 276; J.Hospers,HumanConduct: Problems
ofEthics,2ndedn,New York,HarcourtBraceJovanovich, i982, pp. i62-5; D. Brock,'Utilitarianism
and AidingOthers',in The Limitsof Utlihtarianism, ed. H. Millerand W. Williams,Minneapolis,
University ofMinnesotaPress,i982; ThomasCarson,'Utilitarianism and WorldPoverty', in Miller
and Williams;Parfit,Reasonsand Persons,pp. 30-I; and B. Williams,Ethicsand the Limitsof
Philosophy, Cambridge,Mass., HarvardUniversity Press,i985, p. 77. And considerthe following
passagefromRailton,a defender of act-consequentialism: [J]usthowdemanding or disruptive it [act-
consequentialism]wouldbe foran individual is a function-asitarguably shouldbe-of howbad the
stateoftheworldis,howotherstypically act,whatinstitutions exist,andhowmuchthatindividual is
capableofdoing.If wealthweremoreequitablydistributed, ifpoliticalsystemswereless repressive
and moreresponsive to theneedsof theircitizens,and if peopleweremoregenerally preparedto
acceptcertainresponsibilities, thenindividuals'everydaylives would not have to be constantly
disrupted forthesakeofthegood'(p. i6i). So act-consequentialism holdsthatintherealworld,where
wealthis not equitablydistributed, wherepoliticalsystemsare repressive and unresponsive to the
needsof theircitizens,and wheremostothersare not moregenerally preparedto acceptcertain
responsibilities,
mostof youracts willnot be morallyrightunlessyoureveryday lifeis constantly
disruptedforthe sake of the good?And one of the mainwaysin whichact-consequentialism can
becomenotconstantly disruptiveis fora muchwidergroupofpeopletomakesacrifices forthesakeof
thosein need?

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 Rule-Consequentialism
71

capacityto give. In thelightof thatconsideration,I should keep whatever

proportionof my income and possessionsis necessaryforme to continue
earningso thatI can maximizethe amount I can give over the course of
mywhole life. 4 But, presumably,whatI am allowed to keep formyselfis
still verylittle.And many of us may on reflectionthinkthatit would be
morallyunreasonableto demand this level of self-sacrifice forthe sake of
others.15 This thought is not inconsistentwith the realization that
moralitycan fromtimeto timerequiresignificant forthe sake
self-sacrifice
of others;nor does it oppose the claim thatgivingmostof whatone has to
the needyis both permissibleand extremelypraiseworthy. But most of us
are quite confidentthatsuch self-sacrifice is supererogatory-thatis, not
somethingmoralityrequiresof us.
I admit that thereis somethingunsavouryabout objectingto a moral
theorybecause of the severityof its requirements.One mightbe tempted
to thinkthat the demandingnessobjection will appeal to people whose
self-interestis clouding their moral judgement, that it will appeal to
people who have a lot to lose froma strongrequirementto aid others.16
But it would be unfairto dismiss the objection on such grounds to do
so would be to findthe objection 'guilty by association'. Furthermore,
even afterwe acknowledgethatthe demandingnessobjectionmay appeal
to some disreputable characters, the objection retains considerable
force.
I have been discussingthe act-utilitarian requirementto keep making
sacrificesfor others until furthersacrificeswould result in less overall
welfarein the long run. Consider now an alternativeand less demanding
principleofaid. This principleis thatwe are requiredto come to theaid of
othersas long as the benefitto them is verygreatin comparisonto the
sacrificeto us.'7 Even thisless demandingprinciplemakesheavydemands
on thoseofus withsparemoney:mostofus would have to sacrificemostof
our welfarein helping othersbeforewe reached the point at which the
sacrificeto us would no longer be verymuch smaller than the benefits

14 See P. Singer,PracticalEthics,Cambridge, CambridgeUniversity Press,I979, p. I63.

15 SchefflerandT. Nagelusefully setouta number ofdifferent waysmoraltheorists might respondto
a verydemandingmoralconception(Scheffler, 'Morality'sDemandsand theirLimits',Journalof
Philosophy, I986, pp. 53I-7; Nagel, The ViewfromNowhere, New York,OxfordUniversity Press,
I986, ch.X; but cf. Griffin, Well-Being, pp. I27-62, I95-206, 246-5I, 302-7; Railton,pp. I69-70
n. 42; andD. Brink,'Utilitarian Morality andthePersonalPointofView',Journal ofPhilosophy, I986,
pp. 432-8). Particularly important is the following contrast.Whenconfronted withan accountof
morality whichpicturesit as extremely demanding, some of us wouldrespondby rejectingthat
accountofmorality's content. Another responseis to acceptthataccountofitscontentbutthenlimit
morality's rational
authority. Thoughthereareotherpossibleresponses as well,theideaI amdrawing
on in this paper is thatany accountof the contentof morality whichmakesit constantly and
relentlesslydemandingis ultimately mistaken.The purposeof the secondhalfof thisnote is to
acknowledge thatnoteveryone willfindthatidea seductive.
16 See Carson,'Utilitarianism and WorldPoverty', p. 243.
17 A principleSidgwickthinksis partof 'common-sense and even,'broadlyspeaking,
morality'
unquestionable' (Methods, p. 348-9; see also pp. 253, 26I).

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72 Brad Hooker
produced forthem.'8 And it mightwell be thoughtthat a requirement
thatone sacrificemostof one's own welfareforthe sake of strangerswhose
suffering is not one's faultis unreasonablydemanding,particularlywhen
most othersin a positionto help are not doing so.
Indeed, one of the notableinitialattractionsof rule-consequentialism is
thatit-unlike both act-consequentialismand the more modest principle
of aid just mentioned-calls for an amount of self-sacrifice that is not
unreasonable.'9 If each relativelywell-offperson contributed some
relativelysmall percentageof his or her income to faminerelief,there
would be enoughto feedthe world.Perhaps ten per cent fromeach of the
well-offwould be enough. Though givingthat much may seem difficult
enough for most of us, the demand that we do so does not seem
unreasonab'le.Rule-consequentialismthereforeseems to escape the de-
mandingnessobjection. If so, it is acquitted of all of the main charges
againstact-utilitarianism.
I do not mean to suggestthatthereare not otherpowerfulreasons for
findingrule-consequentialism the most appealing formof consequential-
ism. One might well think that reflectionon the nature of morality
suggeststhatit mustserveas a publicsystemof principlesto whichwe can
appeal to justifyour behaviourto one another,and thatrule-consequenti-
alism does, but not act-consequentialismdoes not, do justice to this
insight.20Or one mightwell thinkthatrule-consequentialism does justice
to theimportanceof thecommonquestion'whatifeveryonedid that?'in a
way thatact-consequentialism cannot. I also do not mean to suggestthat
the onlyway of reactingto the excessivedemandsof act-consequentialism
is to join up withthe rule-consequentialists.2'But those are mattersI do
not want to explorehere.
18 This claim is similarto one of the centralpointsof J. Fishkin'stightlyarguedLimitsof
New Haven,Yale University
Obligation, Press,I982, a book withprofoundimplications. See also
Nagel's observationthat,givenexistingworldcircumstances, not just act-utilitarianism
but any
moralitywitha substantial
impersonalcomponent willmakevoraciousdemands( ViewfromNowhere,
p. I 92).
1' See Parfit,
Reasonsand Persons,p. 3I. Cf. Singer,PracticalEthics,ch. 8, esp. pp. i8o-i; and
Fishkin, Limits of Obligation,pp. I62-3.
20 The literature on the 'publicitycondition'is voluminous.For a sampling,see Sidgwick,
Methods,pp. 489-go: K. Baier,MoralPointofView,p. I98; A. Donagan,'Is Therea CredibleForm
ofUtilitarianism?'
in Contemporary ed. M. Bayles,GardenCity,NY, Doubleday& Co.,
Utilitarianism,
I968, pp. I87-202, p. I94; J. Rawls, A TheoryofJustice,Cambridge,Mass., Harvard UniversityPress,
I97I, pp. n. 5, I33, i8i, 582; J.Hospers, Human Conduct,ProblemsofEthics,New York, Harcourt
I30
BraceJovanovich, Inc., I972, pp. 3I4-I5; Brandt,Theory oftheGoodand theRight,pp. I73-4, and
'IndirectOptimific Theories',p. 348; Parfit,Reasonsand Persons,sect. I7; Williams,Ethicsand the
Limits of Philosophy,pp. IOI-2, I08-9.
21 A different
responseis Scheffler's advocacyof an agent-relative prerogative
to giveone's own
proiectsand commitments somewhatgreaterweightthan those of others.See his Rejectionof
Consequentialism.
Scheffler's
theory is notyetfullyworkedout,butthedifficulties withit(on whichsee
S. Kagan,'Does Consequentialism DemandToo Much?RecentWorkon theLimitsofObligation',
Philosophy and PublicAffairs,I984, pp. 239-54, esp. p. 25I) are seriousenoughto keep us from
droppingworkon rule-consequentialism. Another interesting idea is thatact-consequentialism
turns
outnottobe unreasonably demanding oncewe takeintoconsideration thepointthateverycriterionof

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 73
Rule-Consequentialism
II
What is the partial compliance objection to rule-consequentialism? It is
thatfollowingthe moral code thatwould be optimalin a world in which
everyoneaccepted it can be (in Brandt's words) 'counterproductiveor
useless' in the real world where there is actually only partial social
acceptanceof that code.22 To use an example Brandt cites,suppose that
whatwould produceoptimalresultswould be foreveryoneto act in a race-
blind way. But suppose also thatyou are surroundedby people withfierce
racialprejudices.It is easy to imaginethatyouractingin a race-blindway
in frontof these rabid racistswould have verybad consequences.
On the simplestrule-consequentialist view,the best set of rules,desires,
and dispositions is whatever set is such that, if absolutely everyone
accepted those rules and had those desires and dispositions,the results
would be better than if absolutely everyone accepted otherrules and had
otherdesires and dispositions.But then how can it make sense to object
thatsome dispositionswhichwould producethe mostgood ifeveryone had
them would be counter-productiveor useless in situations where not
everyonehad them? It is clearlyillogical to imagine both that everyone
acceptsa certaincode ofrulesor has a certainset ofdispositionsand thatat
the same time some do not accept that code and do not have those
dispositions.Brandt provides a neat solutionto this problem: he defines
the optimalmoralcode as the one thatwould resultin the most good if it
were accepted by 'all except those whose agreementis precluded by a
descriptionof some moral-problemsituations'.23
But thereremainproblemswithhow to interpretthe partialcompliance
objectionto rule-consequentialism. Consider threepossibilities:
(i) The objectionmightbe thatyou mightsometimesbe requiredby
the rules whose currencywould produce the most good to do
somethingthat,because othersare not complying,would produce
slightlyworse consequences viewed impartially.

rightandwrongmustbe sensitive to a requirement ofpsychological realism,i.e.,act-consequentialism

cannotdemandmoreself-sacrifice thanhumannaturecan deliver.I am grateful toJamesGriffin for
thissuggestion, but I do nothaveroomhereto exploreit here.
22 Brandt, 'Fairnessto Indirect Optimific TheoriesinEthics',p. 357.See alsohis Theory oftheGood
and theRight,pp. 297-9, and his 'Problemsof Contemporary Utilitarianism:Real and Alleged',in
EthicalTheory in theLast QuarteroftheTwentieth Century, ed. N. E. Bowie,Indianapolis,Hackett
Publishing Co., I983, pp. 99-I02. I shouldmentionthatI willusuallyfollowcommonpracticein
contrasting fulland partialcompliance. But,sincethebestversions ofrule-consequentialism(including
Brandt's)are concerned withacceptance-utilityratherthancompliance-utility, thisterminologywillbe
less than perfectly accurate.The distinction betweenacceptance-utility and compliance-utility is
important because the consequencesof everyone'sacceptingsome code (and being motivated
accordingly) mayinvolvemorethantheconsequences oftheiractsofcompliance withthatcode. (On
this,seeWilliams, 'CritiqueofUtilitarianism',pp. I I9-30; Adams,'MotiveUtilitarianism', pp.467-8I,
p. 470; S. Blackburn, 'ErrorsandthePhenomenology ofValue',inMorality andObjectivity,A Tributeto
f.L. Mackie,ed. T. Honderich,London,Routledgeand KeganPaul, I985, p. 2I n. I2.)
23 'Fairnessto Indirect Optimific Theoriesin Ethics',p. 342; see also p. 358.

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74 Brad Hooker
(ii) Or the objectionmightbe that you mightsometimesbe required
by the rules to do something that, because others are not
complying,would be harmfulor inconvenienttoyou and beneficial
to
theverypeople whoare notcomplying.
(iii) Or theobjectionmightbe thatyou mightsometimesbe requiredby
theserulesto do somethingthat,because othersare not complying,
would produce verymuchworse consequencesviewed impartially.
The firstof these interpretationscan, I think,be dismissed.The claim
that one should follow certain rules even when breakingthem would
produce slightlymore good does not seem counter-intuitive (except to
hard-lineact-consequentialists).24
So consider now the second interpretationof the objection that,
sometimes,because othersare not complying,my followingsimple rules
would be bothharmfulto me and beneficialto the verypeople who are not
complying.The idea thatthe simplerulesprovidethe criterionof rightness
and wrongnessfor such cases does offendagainst our sentimentsabout
fairness.25But it is prettyobvious how rule-consequentialists can defuse
thisobjection:theycan agreeit is notwrongto refuseto followcertainrules
in one's dealingswiththose who do not reciprocate.The moralrules that
would producethe most good in our partialcomplianceworldwould have
provisionswritteninto themdesignedto give incentivesto those who are
possiblebeneficiariesof our rule-followingto do theirpartin followingthe
rules.Such provisionswould permitus to ignorethe ordinarily appropriate
rules when we are dealingwiththose who refuseto followthoserules.
The third interpretationof the objection seems the most powerful.
Rule-consequentialismis less than credible if it claims one is required
alwaysto followcertainrules,even when not followingthese rules would
preventverymuchworse consequences forothers.(Since fromnow on I
shall ignore the firsttwo ways of construingthe partial compliance
objection,I shall henceforthreferto the objectionconstruedin the third
way as simply the partial compliance objection.) Now, can rule-conNe-
quentialistsprovidea convincingreplyto the objection?
Brandtarticulateswhatwould seem to be the naturalreplyforthe rule-
consequentialistto make. He suggeststhat rule-consequentialismwould
prescribeour havinga set of moral motivationsconsistingof
24 See thefamous discussionin Ross,Rightand theGood,pp. 34-5. The claimmadein mytext
mustnotbe misconstrued as a replytothefollowing commonobjectionagainstrule-consequentialism:
giventhatrule-consequentialism saysthepointof following moralrulesis to optimize,itsrefusalto
permitus to breaktheruleswhendoingso wouldbe optimific makesthetheory internally
incoherent.
I do nothaveroomheretogo intodetailaboutthiswell-worn objection,
whichBrandtdoestakeup in
'Fairnessto IndirectOptimificTheories' on pp. 353-7, and to whichI believethat thereare
persuasive indirect
consequentialistreplies.But I am grateful
to Anthony Ellisforpointing outthatI
needto distinguish theidea I discussin thetextfromthisobjection.
25 For a recentattemptto dealwithfairness bysomeonesympathetic to utilitarianism,see Griffin,
Well-being,ch.X.

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 Rule-Consequentialism75

(i) the standingmotivationscorrespondingto the usual simple moral

rules (that is, a standing desire to treat others fairly,another
standingdesirenot to hurtothers,anothernot to steal,anothernot
to break one's promises,anothernot to lie, and so on),
(2) a standingdesire to preventgreat harm,and
(3) a standingdesire to promotethe wideracceptanceof the optimific
rules.26

Rule-consequentialists would presumablysay thatan act is morallywrong

if it is one that this set motivationswould oppose. We mightsummarize
this replyto the partialcompliance objectionas follows:by includingin
their favouredcode a particularlystrongrequirementthat one prevent
greatharm,rule-consequentialists can escape havingto maintainthatit is
morallyrightto stickto the (normallyoptimific)rulesin thosesituationsin
which our doing so would resultin verymuch worse consequences. (For
thepurposesof the restof thispaper,however,we can focuson (i) and (2)
above and ignore (3). This is so because in at least many situationsthe
desire to preventgreat harm would not need the help of the desire to
promotewider acceptance of the optimificrules in order to prevail in a
battlewith the motivationscorrespondingto the simple rules. And those
are the cases I shall be focusingon.)

III
Unfortunately, relyingon a strongprincipleofpreventingharmin orderto
deal with the partial compliance problem threatensto make rule-conse-
quentialismexcessivelydemanding.Suppose that,of the various possible
rules about comingto others'aid, the rule whose acceptanceby absolutely
everyonerelativelywell offwould produce the most good requiresone to
donatea tenthof one's incometo faminerelief.Suppose thatthisis whatI
have just done. Knowing thatmost othersin a positionto donate are not
complyingwith that requirement,I am now tryingto decide whetherI
must donate more. There are still people dyingwho would be saved if I
gave more.My doing so would thuspreventseriousharmto others.Given
26 Actually thisis notexactlywhatBrandtpresents.He saysthathis proposalwouldlead us to
thinkthatin theexamplefromSouthAfricain whichtheagentis beingwatchedbyrabidracists'the
requirement to treatpeopleequallynowmaybe weakerthantheprohibition on causinggreatharm,
buttherequirement todo whatonecantoimprove matterswillbe stronger
thansimplecapitulation to
the rulessubscribedto by the majority'('IndirectOptimific Theories',p. 359). This is confusing
becauseit suggeststhattheoptimalmoralcode wouldincludean intrinsic motivation to capitulateto
therulessubscribed tobythemajority-which mustbe a mistake.To be sure,wemight accepttheidea
thatattempts at moralreform maybe mostsuccessful iftheytryto buildon, ratherthancompletely
overturn,existingrules.(On thisidea, see Sidgwick,MethodsofEthics,pp. 467-7I, 473-6, 480-4;
Griffin,Well-being,pp. 206, 302; Brandt,Theoryof theGoodand theRight,p. 290, and 'Indirect
Optimific Theories',pp. 350, 356-7.) But to acceptthatattemptsat moralreformmay be most
successfuliftheytrytobuildon existingrulesis nottoaccepttheideathatpeopleshouldbe motivated
to capitulateto whatevermoralrulesthemajority accepts.

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76 Brad Hooker
these conditions,Brandt's proposal would requireme to give more of my
income. And even if I give anothertenth,there would be other people
whom I would save by givingmore. So yet again serious harm would be
avoided if I keptgiving.In fact,I would have to make myselfquite badly
offbeforeI myselfwould be so poor that the furthersacrificesI could
make would be too littleto save othersin desperateneed fromgreatharm.
And so the code in question seems to require self-sacrifices up to that
point. But to require self-sacrifices all the way up to this point seems
unreasonablydemanding,especiallywhen othersin a positionto help are
not doing theirshare.27
So myargumentmightbe put likethis.The partialcomplianceobjection
to rule-utilitarianism is extremelyimportant-afterall, we live in a partial
complianceworld.Rule-consequentialism can be rescued fromthe partial
complianceobjectionby bringingin a strongrequirementthatone prevent
greatharm.But this move seems to pull rule-consequentialism out of the
mouthof one objectiononlyto throwit into the mouthof another.
What mightrule-consequentialists say in reply?They mighttryto claim
thatthe optimificset of rules and dispositionswouldpermitme to depart
froma givenrule in orderto preventgreatharm,but wouldnotrequireme
to do so. This replymightsound good when we thinkabout the famine
reliefcases, but we can see it cannot be rightwhen we thinkabout the
otherpartialcompliancecases, the cases in whichthe agent's own welfare
is not in play. To give an intuitivelyacceptable answer for the cases in
which the agent's own welfareis not in play, rule-consequentialists must
say thatthe optimificcode requiresthe agentnot to do what would result
in great harm. And it would seem that the most natural way for rule-
consequentialiststo accomplishthisis to maintainthatwe should obey the
code of rules thatwould be optimificif everyonecomplied withit, except
whenour followingthatcode would resultin greatharmbecause of others'
non-compliance,and thatin thosecases we should do whatwould prevent
that harm. But, as I have explained, this answer will make rule-
consequentialismterriblydemandingin the faminereliefcases.
Here is a more promisingreplythat rule-consequentialists mighttry.
Rule-consequentialistsfavour the code of rules whose currencywould
produce the most good. One of the factorscounted in the cost-benefit
assessmentof any proposed code is what we mightcall its maintenance
costs, that is, the costs of sustainingpeople's commitmentto it and of
teaching it to the young. Furthermore,many rule-consequentialists
(Brandt among them) hold that wrongacts are those forbiddenby that
moralcode whose generalcurrencyamonghumanbeingswiththeirnatural
biasesand limitations would produce the best consequences.28And, given
27 For the suggestionthatrule-utilitarianism
will,undernot far-fetchedconditions,
describeas
dutiesacts whichsurelyare merelysuipererogatory,see Donagan, 'Is There a CredibleForm of
Utilitarianism?'
pp. I94-6.
28 See 'IndirectOptimificTheories', pp. 346-7, 349-50; and 'Problemsof Contemporary

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 Rule-Consequentialism77

natural human selfishness,etc., it mightwell be true that an extremely

demandingmoralitycould be successfullytaught to, and sustained in,
people onlyat great cost.29Therefore,the currencyof a somewhatless
demanding moralitymight have better consequences, all things con-
sidered. That is, the moral code whose currencywould result in the
greatest good overall might be less demanding than we would have
thoughtif we had forgottenabout maintenancecosts.
The questionnow is: even afterwe takemaintenancecostsintoaccount,
would the optimificset of rules neverthelessbe unreasonablydemanding?
It is hard to be sure. Part of the reason forthis is thatour sense of what
counts as being unreasonablydemanding is somewhat vague (though
determinateenough to license the charges of excessive demandingness
made earlierin thispaper). But equally importantis thatwe are uncertain
which rule of the alternativepossible ones about coming to the aid of
others is such that its acceptance by everyone (except those whose
acceptance is precluded by the descriptionof the problem situationin
question) would produce the most good. In otherwords,we do not know
how demandingthe optimificrule about comingto theaid of otherswould
be.30 Just where the line is between reasonable and unreasonable
demandingnessand just how demandingthe optimificrule would be are
questionsthat require furtherwork.But at least we can throwdown the
gauntlet,challengingrule-consequentialists to show that the rule about
comingto the aid of otherswhichis such thatits generalacceptancewould
produce betterconsequences on the whole than the generalacceptanceof
any alternativewould not be in conflictwith our fairlyconfident convic-
tions about what is above and beyond the call of duty.3'

DepartmentofPhilosophy,9I5 W. FranklinStreet BRAD HOOKER

VirginiaCommonwealth University
Richmond,VA 23284- 2025 USA

p. 98. See alsoJ.L. Mackie'sremark

Utilitarianism', thatin devising
a moralcode'we aretotakemen
as theyare and morallawsas theymightbe' (Ethics:Inventing Rightand Wrong, Harmondsworth,
Penguin Books, I977, p. I33).
29 If at all! As Brandt observesin hisbook,'Whattheserules[ofobligation] mayrequireis limited
bythestrainofself-interest in everyone,
and [by]thespecific desiresand aversions boundto develop
in nearlyeveryone . . .' (p. 287).
30 As Brandtconcedes, 'theoptimificindirect theorydoes runintocomplications whenwe tryto
workout thedetailsin anyrealisticway'('IndirectOptimific Theories',p. 36o).
31 Cf.J.Arthur, 'Equality,Entitlements, andtheDistribution ofIncome',inApplying Ethics, ed.J.
Olen and V. Barry,Belmont,CA, Wadsworth Inc., i989, pp. 362-72.
Brandt'sTheory oftheGoodandtheRightcontainsa powerful andcelebrated attackon theideathat
we shouldjudgemoraltheories byhowmuchtheyagreewithourintuitions (see op. cit.,ch. I sect.3).
But see also N. Daniels,'Can Cognitive Psychotherapy ReconcileReasonand Desire?',Ethics,i983,
pp. 772-85,esp. pp. 778-8i. My ownopinionis that,whilewe mustheedSidgwick'swarning that'it
cannotbe deniedthatanystrongsentiment, howeverpurelysubjective, is aptto transform itselfinto
the semblanceof an intuition' (Methods,p. 339) consideredjudgements mightnevertheless playa
legitimate rolein thetestingof moraltheories.

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