V. Establishing Union Majority Status 4.

That this CONTRACT  is good and valid for a period of one (1) month from August 12, 1952, but
same may be renewed by agreement of the parties; however Compañia MARITIMA reserves the
A. Pre-Condition: Employer-Employee Relationship right to revoke this CONTRACT even before the expiration of the term, if and when the Allied Free
Workers' Unionfails to render good service.
G.R. Nos. L-22951 and L-22952           January 31, 1967
ALLIED FREE WORKERS' UNION (PLUM), petitioner, vs. COMPAÑIA MARITIMA, Manager JOSE C.
TEVES, and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we hereunto sign this presents in the City of Iligan, Philippines, this
----------------------------- 11th day of August, 1952.
G.R. No. L-22971           January 31, 1967
COMPAÑIA MARITIMA and Manager JOSE C. TEVES, petitioners, vs. ALLIED FREEWORKERS' (PLUM)
and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents. (SGD) SALVADOR T. LLUCH (SGD) JOSE C. TEVES
President Branch Manager
Allied Free Workers' Union Compañia Maritima
BENGZON, J.P., J.: Iligan City Iligan City
SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:
The three cases before this Court are the respective appeals separately taken by the parties hereto from an order1 of the 1. (SGD) JOSE CUETO
Court of Industrial Relations en banc affirming its trial judge's decision, rendered on November 4, 1963, in CIR Case
175-MC and CIR Case 426-ULP. Thus L-22971 is the appeal of MARITIMA2 in CIR Case 175-MC; L-22952
is AFWU's appeal in the same case; and L-22951 refers to AFWU's3 appeal in CIR Case 426-ULP. Since these cases 2. (SGD) SERGIO OBACH.
were jointly tried and decided in the court a quo and they involve the same fundamental issue — the presence or absence
of employer-employee relationship — they are jointly considered herein. During the first month of the existence of the CONTRACT  , AFWU rendered satisfactory service. So, MARITIMA,
through Teves, verbally renewed the same. This harmonious relations between MARITIMA and AFWU lasted up to the
MARITIMA is a local corporation engaged in the shipping business. Teves is its branch manager in the port of Iligan latter part of 1953 when the former complained to the latter of unsatisfactory and inefficient service by the laborers doing
City. And AFWU  is duly registered legitimate labor organization with 225 members. the arrastre and stevedoring work. This deteriorating situation was admitted as a fact by AFWU's president. To remedy
the situation since MARITIMA's  business was being adversely affected — Teves was forced to hire extra laborers from
among "stand-by" workers not affiliated to any union to help in the stevedoring and arrastre work. The wages of these
On August 11, 1952, MARITIMA, through Teves, entered into a CONTRACT  4 with AFWU the terms of which We extra laborers were paid by MARITIMA  through separate vouchers and not by AFWU. Moreover, said wages were not
reproduce:
charged to the consignees or owners of the cargoes.

— ARRASTRE AND STEVEDORING CONTRACT — On July 23, 1954, AFWU presented to MARITIMA  a written proposal5 for a collective bargaining agreement.

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

This CONTRACT made and executed this 11th day of August, 1952, in the City of Iligan,
Philippines, by and between the COMPAÑIA MARITIMA Iligan Branch, represented by its Branch
Manager in Iligan City, and the ALLIED FREE WORKERS' UNION, a duly authorized labor
union, represented by its President:
WITNESSETH.
1. That the Compañia MARITIMA hereby engage the services of the Allied Free Workers' Union to
do and perform all the work of stevedoring and arrastre services of all its vessels or boats calling in
the port of Iligan City, beginning August 12, 1952.
2. That the Compañia MARITIMA shall not be liable for the payment of the services rendered by the
Allied Free Workers' Union, for the loading, unloading and deliveries of cargoes as same is payable
by the owners and consignees of cargoes, as it has been the practice in the port of Iligan City.
3. That the Allied Free Workers' Union shall be responsible for the damages that may be caused to
the cargoes in the course of their handling.
This demand embodied certain terms and conditions of employment different from the provisions of the CONTRACT .
No reply was made by MARITIMA.
On August 6, 1954, AFWU instituted proceedings in the Industrial Court6 praying that it be certified as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent in the bargaining unit composed of all the laborers doing the arrastre and stevedoring work in
connection with MARITIMA's vessels in Iligan City. MARITIMA answered, alleging lack of employer-employee
relationship between the parties.
On August 24, 1954, MARITIMA  informed AFWU of the termination of the CONTRACT because of the inefficient
service rendered by the latter which had adversely affected its business. The termination was to take effect as of
September 1, 1954. MARITIMA then contracted with the Iligan Stevedoring Union for the arrastre and stevedoring work.
The latter agreed to perform the work subject to the same terms and conditions of the CONTRACT . The new agreement
was to be carried out on September 1, 1954.
On August 26, 1954, upon the instance of AFWU, MARITIMA  found itself charged before the Industrial Court 7 of unfair
labor practices under Sec. 4(a), (1), (3), (4) and (6) of Rep. Act No. 875. MARITIMA answered, again denying the
employer-employee relationship between the parties.
On September 1, 1954, members of AFWU, together with those of the Mindanao Workers Alliance — a sister union —
formed a picket line at the wharf of Iligan City, thus preventing the Iligan Stevedoring Union from carrying out the
arrastre and stevedoring work it contracted for.8 This picket lasted for nine days.
On September 9, 1954, MARITIMA filed an action9 to rescind the CONTRACT , enjoin AFWU  members from doing
arrastre and stevedoring work in connection with its, vessels, and for recovery of damages against AFWU  and its officers.
Incidentally, this civil case has been the subject of three proceedings already which have reached this Court. The
first 10 involved a preliminary injunction issued therein on September 9, 1954, by the trial court prohibiting AFWU  from
interfering in any manner with the loading and unloading of cargoes from MARITIMA's  vessels. This injunction was
lifted that very evening upon the filing of a counter bond by AFWU. Subsequently, a motion to dissolve said counterbond
was filed by MARITIMA but the hearing on this incident was enjoined by Us on March 15, 1955, upon the institution of
the petition for prohibition and injunction in said L-8876. 11 Meanwhile, AFWU members-laborers were able to continue
the arrastre and stevedoring work in connection with MARITIMA's vessels.
On December 5, 1960, the CFI decision in the civil case was promulgated. It ordered the rescission of
the CONTRACT and permanently enjoined AFWU members from performing work in connection
with MARITIMA's  vessels. AFWU  then filed its notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal. 12 The subsequent
incidents thereto gave rise to the two other proceedings which have previously reached Us here.
On January 6, 1961, upon motion of MARITIMA ,an order of execution pending appeal and a writ of injunction
against AFWU was issued by the trial court in the civil case. This enabled MARITIMA  to engage the services of the
Mindanao Arrastre Service to do the arrastre and stevedoring work on January 8, 1961. However, AFWU  filed a petition
for certiorari, injunction and prohibition 13 here and on January 18, 1961, was able to secure a writ of preliminary
injunction ordering the maintenance of the status quo  prior to January 6, 1961. Thus, after January 18,
1961, AFWU  laborers were again back doing the same work as before.
The third incident that reached US 14 involved an order of the same trial court in the same civil case, dated January 11,
1961, which amended some clerical errors in the original decision of December 5, 1960. Upon motion of MARITIMA, the
trial court, on March 24, 1962, issued an order for the execution of the decision of January 11, 1961, since AFWU  did not
appeal therefrom, and on March 31, 1962, a writ of execution ousting the 225 AFWU  members-laborers from their work
in connection with the loading and unloading of cargoes was issued and a levy on execution upon the properties
of AFWU was effected. Accordingly, on April 1, 1962, MARITIMA  was again able to engage the services of the
Mindanao Arrastre Service.
On April 16, 1962, upon the institution of the petition for certiorari, injunction, prohibition and mandamus, a preliminary
injunction was issued by Us against the orders of March 24 and 31, 1962. But then, on May 16, 1962, upon motion
of MARITIMA this preliminary injunction was lifted by Us insofar as it related to the execution of the order ousting
the AFWU laborers from the stevedoring and arrastre work in connection with the MARITIMA vessels. 15 Such then was
the status of things.
On November 4, 1963, after almost 10 years of hearing the two cases jointly, the Industrial Court finally rendered its
decision. The dispositive part provided:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CIRCUMSTANCES, the complaint of the union for unfair labor
practices against the Compañia MARITIMA and/or its agent Jose C. Teves and the Iligan Stevedoring Union
and/or Sergio Obach is hereby dismissed for lack of substantial evidence and merit.
In pursuance of the provisions of Section 12 of Republic Act 875 and the Rules of this court on certification
election, the Honorable, the Secretary of Labor or any of his authorized representative is hereby requested to
conduct certification election among all the workers and/or stevedores working in the wharf of Iligan City who
are performing stevedoring and arrastre service aboard Compañia MARITIMA vessels docking at Iligan City
port in order to determine their representative for collective bargaining with the employer, whether their desire
to be represented by the petitioner Allied Free Workers Union or neither [sic]; and upon termination of the said
election, the result thereof shall forthwith be submitted to this court for further consideration. The union
present payroll may be utilized in determining the qualified voters, with the exclusion of all supervisors.SO
ORDERED.
As already indicated, the fundamental issue involved in these cases before Us consists in whether there is an employer-
employee relationship between MARITIMA, on the one hand, and AFWU and/or its members-laborers who do the actual
stevedoring and arrastre work on the other hand.
THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CASE
(L-22951 * [CIR Case 426-ULP])
Petitioner AFWU's proposition is that the court a quo erred (1) in concluding that MARITIMA had not refused to bargain
collectively with it, as the majority union; (2) in not finding that MARITIMA had committed acts of discrimination,
interferences and coercions upon its members-laborers, and (3) in concluding that the CONTRACT  may not be interferred
with even if contrary to law or public policy.
It is true that MARITIMA admits that it did not answer AFWU's proposal for a collective bargaining agreement. From this
it does not necessarily follow that it is guilty of unfair labor practice. Under the law 16 the duty to bargain collectively
arises only between the "employer" and its "employees". Where neither party is an "employer" nor an "employee" of the
other, no such duty would exist. Needless to add, where there is no duty to bargain collectively the refusal to bargain
violates no right. So, the question is: Under the CONTRACT , was MARITIMA the "employer" and AFWU  and/or its
members the "employees" with respect to one another?
The court  a quo held that under the CONTRACT , AFWU  was an independent contractor of MARITIMA. This conclusion
was based on the following findings of fact, which We can no longer disturb, stated in the CIR decision:
7. ... The petitioner union operated as a labor contractor under the so-called "cabo" system ; and as such it has
a complete set of officers and office personnel (Exhs. "F" and "F-1") and its organizational structure includes
the following: General President, with the following under him — one vice-president, legal counsel, general
treasurer, general manager and the board of directors. Under the general manager is the secretary, the auditor,
and the office staff composing of the general foreman, general checker, general timekeeper, and the respective
subordinates like assistant foreman, capataz, assistant general checker, field checker, office timekeeper, and
field timekeeper all appointed by the general manager of the union and are paid in accordance with the union
payroll exclusively prepared by the union in the office. (See t.s.n. pp. 32-36, June 9, 1960; pp. 78-80, February
16, 1961; pp. 26-28, August 9, 1960). The payrolls where laborers are listed and paid were prepared by the
union itself without the intervention or control of the respondent company and/or its agent at Iligan City. The
respondent never had any knowledge of the individual names of laborers and/or workers listed in the union
payroll or in their roster of membership.
8. The union engaged the services of their members in undertaking the work of arrastre and stevedoring either
to haul shippers' goods from their warehouses in Iligan City to the MARITIMA boat or from the boat to the
different consignees. The charges for such service were known by the union and collected by them through
their bill collector. This is shown by the preparation of the union forms known as "conduci" or delivery
receipts. These "conduci" or receipts contain informations as to the number and/or volume of cargoes handled
by the union, the invoice number, the name of the vessel and the number of bills of lading covering the cargoes
to be delivered. Those delivery receipts are different and separate from the bills of lading and delivery receipts
issued by the company to the consignees or shippers. Cargoes carried from the warehouses to the boat or from
the boat to the consignees were always accompanied by the union checker who hand-carry the
"conduci". Once goods are delivered to their destination the union through its bill collectors prepare the bills
of collection and the charges thereon are collected by the union bill collectors who are employees of the union
and not of the respondent. The respondent had no intervention whatsoever in the collection of those charges as
the same are clearly indicated and described in the labor CONTRACT , Exhibit "A". There were, however,
instances when the respondents were requested to help the union in the collection of charges for services
rendered by members of the union when fertilizers and gasoline drums were loaded aboard the
Compañia MARITIMA boats. This was necessary in order to facilitate the collection of freight and handling
charges from the government for auditing purposes. When cargoes are to be loaded, the shipper usually
 notifies the petitioner union when to load their cargoes aboard Compañia MARITIMA boats calling in the port
of Iligan City; and when a boat docks in said port, the union undertakes to haul the said shipper's goods to the
boat. In doing this work, the union employs their own trucks or other vehicles or conveyance from shipper's
warehouse to the boat or vice-versa. The respondent has no truck of any kind for the service of hauling
cargoes because such service is included in the CONTRACT executed between the parties. (See Exh. "A").
9. The union members who were hired by the union to perform arrastre and stevedoring work on respondents'
vessels at Iligan port were being supervised and controlled by the general foreman of the petitioner union or
by any union assistant or capataz responsible for the execution of the labor CONTRACT  when performing
arrastre and/or stevedoring work aboard vessels of the Compañia MARITIMA docking at Iligan City. The
foreman assigned their laborers to perform the required work aboard vessels of the respondent. For instance,
when a boat arrives, the general foreman requests the cargo report from the chief mate of the vessel in order to
determine where the cargoes are located in the hold of the boat and to know the destination of these
cargoes. All the laborers and/or workers hired for said work are union members and are only responsible to
their immediate chief who are officers and/or employees of the union. The respondent firm have their own
separate representatives like checkers who extend aid to the union officers and members in checking the
different cargoes unloaded or loaded aboard vessels of the Compañia MARITIMA. There were no instances
where offices and employees of the respondent Compañia MARITIMA and/or its agent had interferred in the
giving of instructions to the laborers performing the arrastre and/or stevedoring work either aboard vessels or
at the wharf of Iligan City. As contractor, the union does not receive instructions as to what to do, how to do,
and works without specific instructions. They have no fixed hours of work required by the MARITIMA.
10. While cargoes were in transit either from the warehouse to the boat or from the boat to the different
consignees, any losses or damages caused with the said cargoes were charged to the account of the union; and
the union likewise imposed the penalty or fine to any employee who caused or committed the damages to
cargoes in transit. Other disciplinary measures imposed on laborers performing the said work were exercised
by the general foreman of the union who has blanket authority from the union general manager to exercise
disciplinary control over their members who were assigned to perform the work in a group of laborers
assigned by the union to perform loading or unloading cargoes when a Compañia MARITIMA boat docked at
Iligan City. The respondents have not at any time interferred in the imposition of disciplinary action upon the
laborers who are members of the union. In one instance, under this situation, the president of the union
himself dismissed one inefficient laborer found to have been performing inefficient service at the time (t.s.n.
pp. 17-18, February 15, 1961).
13. Erring laborers and/or workers who are affiliates of the union were directly responsible to the union and
never to the respondent. Respondent cannot, therefore, discipline and/or dismiss these erring workers of the
union. (Emphasis supplied)
And in absolving MARITIMA of the unfair labor charge on this point, the court a quo concluded:
From the foregoing circumstances and findings, the Court is of the opinion that no substantial evidence has
been presented to sustain the charge of unfair labor practice acts as alleged to have been committed by herein
respondent. The Court finds no interference in the union activities, if any, of the members of the Allied Free
Workers Union as these persons engaged in the stevedoring and arrastre service were employed by the Allied
Free Workers Union as independent contractor subject to the terms and conditions of their then existing labor
CONTRACT Exhibit "A". To construe the CONTRACT otherwise would tend to disregard the rights and
privileges of the parties intended by them in their CONTRACT . (Exhibit "A"). This Court believes that it may
not interfere in the implementation of the said labor CONTRACT  in the absence of abuse by one party to the
prejudice of the other. ...
Further, the Court finds that the petitioner, aside from its labor CONTRACT (See Exhibit "A") with the
respondent Compañia MARITIMA also has other labor contracts with other shipping firms on the stevedoring
and arrastre work; and that this CONTRACT obligated the petitioner as an independent labor contractor to
undertake the arrastre and stevedoring service on Compañia MARITIMA boats docking at Iligan City Port.
The petitioner is an independent contractor as defined in the CONTRACT  Exhibit "A" and in the evidence
submitted by the parties. "An independent contractor is one who, in rendering services, exercises an
independent employment or occupation and represents the will of his employer only as to the results of his
work and not as to the means whereby it is accomplished; one who exercising an independent employment,
contracts to do a piece of work according to his own methods, without being subject to the control of his
employer except as to the result of his work; and who engaged to perform a certain service for another,
according to his own manner and methods, free from the control and direction of his employer in all matters
connected with the performance of the service except as to the result of the work." (see 56 C.J.S. pp. 41-43;
Cruz, et al. vs. Manila Hotel et al., G.R. No. L-9110, April 30, 1957). These factors were present in the
relation of the parties as described in their CONTRACT Exhibit "A".
In Viaña vs. Al Lagadan et al., G.R. No. L-8967, May 31, 1956, the Supreme Court states the rule as follows.
'In determining the existence of employer-employee relationship, the following elements are
generally considered, namely: (1) the selection and engagement of the employees; (2) the payment
of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employee's conduct —
although the latter is the most important element (35 Am. Jur. 445). Assuming that the share
received by the deceased could partake of the nature of wages — on which we need not and do not
express our view — and that the second element, therefore, exists in the case at bar, the record does
not contain any specific data regarding the third and fourth elements.'
The clear implication of the decision of the Supreme Court is that if the defendant has no power of control —
which, according to the Supreme Court, is the "most important element" — there is no employer-employee
relationship. (Emphasis supplied)
The conclusion thus reached by the court a quo is in full accord with the facts and the applicable jurisprudence. We
totally agree with the court a quo  that AFWU was an independent contractor. And an independent contractor is not an
"employee".17
Neither is there any direct employment relationship between MARITIMA and the laborers. The latter have no separate
individual contracts with MARITIMA. In fact, the court a quo found that it was AFWU that hired them. Their only
possible connection with MARITIMA is through AFWU which contracted with the latter. Hence, they could not possibly
be in a better class than AFWU which dealt with MARITIMA.18
In this connection, it is interesting to note that the facts as found by the court a quo  strongly indicate that it
is AFWU  itself who is the "employer" of those laborers. The facts very succinctly show that it was AFWU, through its
officers, which (1) selected and hired the laborers, (2) paid their wages, (3) exercised control and supervision over them,
and (4) had the power to discipline and dismiss them. These are the very elements constituting an employer-employee
relationship.19
Of course there is no legal impediment for a union to be an "employer". 20 Under the particular facts of this case,
however, AFWU appears to be more of a distinct and completely autonomous business group or association. Its
organizational structure and operational system is no different from other commercial entities on the same line. It even
has its own bill collectors and trucking facilities. And that it really is engaged in business is shown by the fact that it had
arrastre and stevedoring contracts  with other shipping firms in Iligan City.
Now, in its all-out endeavor to make an "employer" out of MARITIMA, AFWU citing an impressive array of
jurisprudence, even goes to the extent of insisting that it be considered a mere "agent" of MARITIMA. Suffice it to say on
this point that an agent can not represent two conflicting interests that are diametrically opposed. And that the cases
sought to be relied upon did not involve representatives of opposing interests.
Anent the second point raised: AFWU claims that the court a quo found that acts of interferences and discriminations
were committed by MARITIMA against the former's members simply for their union affiliation. 21 However, nowhere in
the 32-page decision of the court a quo can any such finding be found. On the contrary, said court made the following
finding:
18. There is no showing that this new union, the Iligan Stevedoring Union, was organized with the help of the
branch manager Jose C. Teves. The organizer of the union like Messrs. Sergio Obach, Labayos and Atty.
Obach and their colleagues have never sought the intervention, help or aid of the respondent
Compañia MARITIMA or its branch manager Teves in the formation and/or organization of the said Iligan
Stevedoring Union. It appears that these people have had previous knowledge and experience in handling
stevedoring and in the arrastre service prior to the employment of the Allied Free Workers Union in the Iligan
port. The charge of union interference and domination finds no support from the evidence. (Emphasis
supplied)
More worthy of consideration is the suggestion that the termination of the CONTRACT was in bad faith. First of all,
contrary to AFWU's sweeping statement, the court a quo did not find that the termination of the CONTRACT was "in
retaliation to AFWU's demand for collective bargaining. On the contrary, the court a quo held
that MARITIMA's authority to terminate the CONTRACT  was rightfully exercised:
21. The evidence does not show substantially any act of interference in the union membership or activities of
the petitioner union. The rescission of their CONTRACT is not a union interference contemplated in the law.
x x x Further, the Court is satisfied that there is no act or acts of discrimination as claimed by herein
petitioner to have been committed by the respondent firm or its branch manager Teves . Evidence is clear that
Teves, in representation of the principal, the respondent Compañia MARITIMA, has also acted, in good faith in
implementing the provisions of their existent CONTRACT (Exhibit "A"), and when he advised the union of the
rescission of the said CONTRACT effective August 31, 1954, he did so in the concept that the employer firm
may so terminate their contract pursuant to paragraph 4 of Exhibit "A" which at the time was the law
controlling between them. ... (Emphasis supplied)
We are equally satisfied that the real reason for the termination of the CONTRACT was AFWU's inefficient service. The
court a quo drew its conclusion from the following findings:
11. During the first month of the existence of the labor CONTRACT Exhibit 'A', the petitioner union rendered
satisfactory service. Under this situation, the Compañia MARITIMA's representative at Iligan City was
authorized to renew verbally with the extension of the CONTRACT Exhibit "A" from month to month basis
after the first month of its expiration. This situation of harmony lasted up to the latter part of 1953 when the
Compañia MARITIMA and its branch manager agent complained to the union of the unsatisfactory service of
the union laborers hired to load and unload cargoes aboard Compañia MARITIMA boats. This deteriorating
situation was admitted as a fact by the union president (See Exhs. "3", "3-A" and "3-B"; See also t.s.n. pp. 65-
66, August 9, 1960).
12. There was a showing that the laborers employed by the union were inefficient in performing their jobs,
and the business of the respondent company in Iligan City suffered adversely during the year 1954; and this
was due to the fact that respondents' vessels were forced to leave cargoes behind in order not to disrupt the
schedule of departures. The Union laborers were slow in loading and/or unloading freight from which the
respondent Compañia MARITIMA secured its income and/or profits. At times, cargoes were left behind
because of the union's failure to load them before vessel's departure. In order to solve this inefficiency of the
complaining union, the branch manager of the Compañia MARITIMA was forced to hire extra laborers from
among 'stand-by' workers not affiliated to any union for the purpose of helping in the stevedoring and arrastre
work on their vessels because, at that time, the union was not performing and/or rendering efficient service in
the loading and unloading of cargoes. ...
14. Because of the deterioration of the Service rendered to the respondent, the branch manager of the
respondent Compañia MARITIMA informed the union of its intention to rescind the CONTRACT Exhibit "A"
because the company had been suffering losses for such inefficient service. (See Exhibit "N").
Respondent Teves reported to the MARITIMA's head office on the financial losses of the company in its
operations. (See Exhibits 'Y', 'Y-1' to 'X-5').
15. On August 24, 1954, branch manager Jose C. Teves of the Iligan City MARITIMA Branch, wrote the
petitioner union informing them of the termination of their CONTRACT , Exhibit "A". (See Exhibit "N"). This
step was taken after the company found the union lagging behind their work under the CONTRACT , so much
so that MARITIMA boats have to leave on schedule without loading cargoes already contacted to be
transported. (Emphasis supplied)
Perhaps, AFWU might say that this right to terminate appearing in paragraph 4 of the CONTRACT is contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. 22 However, it has not adduced any argument to demonstrate such
point. Moreover, there is authority to the effect that the insertion in a CONTRACT for personal services of a resolutory
condition permitting the cancellation of the CONTRACT  by one of the contracting parties is valid. 23 Neither would the
termination constitute "union-busting". Oceanic Air Products vs. CIR, 24 cited by AFWU is not in point. That case
presupposes an employer-employee relationship between the parties disputants — a basis absolutely wanting in this case.
AFWU's third point is again that MARITIMA's act of terminating the CONTRACT  constituted union interference. As
stated, the court a quo found as a fact that there is no sufficient evidence of union interference. And no reason or
argument has been advanced to show that the fact of said termination alone constituted union interference.
THE CERTIFICATION ELECTION CASE
(L-22952 ** & L-22971 [CIR Case No. 175-MC]).
In the certification ejection case, the court a quo directed the holding of a certification election among the laborers then
doing arrastre and stevedoring work. Both MARITIMA and AFWU  have appealed from that ruling. The latter maintains
that the lower court should have directly certified it as the majority union, entitled to represent all the workers in the
arrastre and stevedoring work unit, whereas MARITIMA contends that said court could not even have correctly ordered a
certification election considering that there was an absence of employer-employee relationship between it and said
laborers.
There is no question that certification election could not have been proper during the existence of the CONTRACT in
view of the court a quo's finding that there was no employment relationship thereunder between the parties. But after the
termination of the CONTRACT  on August 31, 1954, what was the nature of the relationship between MARITIMA and the
laborers-members of AFWU?
From the finding that after the rescission of the CONTRACT , MARITIMA continued to avail of the services of AFWU the
court a quo concluded that there came about an implied employer-employee relationship between the parties. This
conclusion cannot be sustained.
First of all, it is contradicted by the established facts. In its findings of fact, the court a quo observed that after the
rescission, the AFWU laborers continued working in accordance with the "cabo" system, which was the prevailing
custom in the place. Said the court:
 20. After the rescission of the CONTRACT Exhibit "A" on August 31, 1954, the Allied Free Workers Union
and its members were working or performing the work of arrastre and stevedoring service aboard 'vessels of
the Compañia MARITIMA docking at Iligan City port under the 'cabo system' then prevailing in that teritory ;
and the customs and conditions then prevailing were observed by the parties without resorting to the
conditions of the former labor contract  Exhibit "A". (Emphasis supplied)
Under the "Cabo" system, the union was an independent contractor. This is shown by the court a quo's own finding that
prior to the CONTRACT  between MARITIMA and AFWU, the former had an oral arrastre and stevedoring agreement
with another union. This agreement was also based on the "cabo" system. As found by the court a quo:
4. That prior to the execution of Exhibit "A", the arrastre and stevedoring work was performed by the Iligan
Wharf Laborers Union headed by one Raymundo Labayos under a verbal agreement similar to the nature and
contents of Exhibit "A"; and this work continued from 1949 to 1952.
5. Under the oral CONTRACT , the Iligan Laborers Union acting as an independent labor contractor engaged
[in] the services of its members as laborers to perform the contract work of arrastre and stevedoring service
aboard vessels of the Compañia MARITIMA calling and docking at Iligan City; and for the services therein
rendered the union charged shippers and/or consignees in accordance with the consignment or place, and the
proceeds thereof shall be shared by the union members in accordance with the union's internal rules and
regulations. This system of work is locally known as the 'cabo system'. The laborers who are members of the
union and hired for the arrastre and stevedoring work were paid on union payrolls and the Compañia
MARITIMA has had nothing to do with the preparation of the same.
6. Because of unsatisfactory service rendered by the Iligan Wharf Labor Union headed by Labayos, the
Compañia MARITIMA through its agent in Iligan City cancelled their oral contractor and entered into a new
contractor, Exhibit "A" with the Allied Free Workers Union (PLUM) now petitioner in this case. The terms
and conditions of the same continued and was similar to the oral contractor entered into with the union headed
by Labayos. ...
7. The cancellation of the oral contract with the Iligan Wharf Labor Union headed by Labayos was due to the
inefficient service rendered by the said union. The labor contract entered into by the petitioner herein (Exh.
"A") was negotiated through the intervention of Messrs. Salvador Lluch, Mariano Ll Badelles, Laurentino Ll.
Badelles, Nicanor T. Halivas and Raymundo Labayos. The contract was prepared by their legal panel and
after several negotiations, respondent Teves reluctantly signed the said written contract with the union with
the assurance however that the same arrange previously had with the former union regarding the performance
and execution of the arrastre and stevedoring contract be followed in accordance with the custom of such kind
of work at Iligan City.  The petitioner union, operated as a labor contractor under the so-called "cabor"
system; ... (Emphasis supplied)
From the above findings, it is evident that, insofar as the working arrangement was concerned, there was no real
difference between the CONTRACT and the prior oral agreement. Both were based on the "cabo" system. Under both, (1)
the union was an independent contractor which engaged the services of its members as laborers; (2) the charges against
the consignees and owners of cargoes were made directly by the union; and (3) the laborers were paid on union payrolls
and MARITIMA had nothing to do with the preparation of the same. These are the principal characteristics of the "cabo"
system on which the parties based their relationship after the termination of the CONTRACT.
Hence, since the parties observed the "cabo" system after the rescission of the CONTRACT, and since the characteristics
of said system show that the contracting union was an independent contractor, it is reasonable to assume
that AFWU  continued being an independent contractor of MARITIMA. And, being an independent contractor, it could not
qualify as an "employee". With more reason would be true with respect to the laborers.
Moreover, there is no evidence at all regarding the characteristics of the working arrangement
between AFWU and MARITIMA after the termination of the CONTRACT. All we have to go on is the court a quo's
finding that the "cabo" system was observed — a system that negatives employment relationship. The four elements
generally regarded as indicating the employer-employee relationship — or at the very least, the element of "control" —
must be shown to sustain the conclusion that there came about such relationship. The lack of such a showing in the case
at bar is fatal to AFWU's contention.
Lastly, to uphold the court a quo's conclusion would be tantamount to the imposition of an employer-employee
relationship against the will of MARITIMA. This cannot be done, since it would violate MARITIMA's exclusive
prerogative to determine whether it should enter into an employment CONTRACT  or not, i.e, whether it should hire
others or not. 25 In Pampanga Bus Co. vs. Pambusco Employees' Union, 26 We said:
x x x The general right to make a contract in relation to one's business is an essential part of the liberty of the
citizens protected by the due process clause of the constitution. The right of a laborer to sell his labor to such
person as he may choose is, in its essence, the same as the right of an employer to purchase labor from any
person whom it chooses. The employer and the employee have thus an equality of right guaranteed by the
constitution. 'If the employer can compel the employee to work against the latter's will, this is servitude. If the
employee can compel the employer to give him work against the employer's will, this is oppression (Emphasis
supplied) .
Therefore, even if the AFWU laborers continued to perform arrastre and stevedoring work after August 31, 1954, it
cannot be correctly concluded — as did the court a quo — that an employer-employee relationship — even impliedly at
that — arose when before there never had been any. Indeed, it would appeal unreasonable and unjust to force such a
relationship upon MARITIMA when it had clearly and continuously manifested its intention not to have any more
business relationship whatsoever with AFWU because of its inefficient service. It was only to comply with injunctions
and other judicial mandates that MARITIMA continued to abide by the status quo, extending in fact and in effect the
operation of the MARITIMA contract.
The only remaining question now is whether, in the particular context of what We have said, the lower court's ruling
ordering a certification election can be sustained. As already stated, the duty to bargain collectively exists only between
the "employer" and its "employees". However, the actual negotiations — which may possibly culminate in a concrete
collective bargaining contract — are carried on between the "employer" itself and the official representative  of the
"employees" 27 — in most cases, the majority labor union. Since the only function of a certification election is to
determine, with judicial sanction, who this official representative or spokesman of the "employees" will be, 28 the order
for certification election in question cannot be sustained. There being no employer-employee relationship between the
parties disputants, there is neither a "duty to bargain collectively" to speak of. And there being no such duty, to hold
certification elections would be pointless. There is no reason to select a representative to negotiate when there can be no
negotiations in the first place. We therefore hold that where — as in this case — there is no duty to bargain collectively,
it is not proper to hold certification elections in connection therewith.
The court a quo's objective in imposing the employer-employee relationship may have been to do away with the "cabo"
system which, although not illegal, is in its operation regarded as disadvantageous to the laborers and stevedores. The
rule however remains that the end cannot justify the means. For an action to be sanctioned by the courts, the purpose
must not only be good but the means undertaken must also be lawful.
A true and sincere concern for the welfare of AFWU members-laborers would call for reforms within AFWU itself, if the
evil of the so-called "cabo" system is to be eliminated. As We suggested in Bermiso vs. Hijos de Escaño, 29 the remedy
against the "cabo" system need not be sought in the courts but in the laborers themselves who should organize into a
closely-knit union "which would secure the privileges that the members desire thru the election of officers among
themselves who would not exploit them."
Wherefore, the appealed decision of the Court of Industrial Relations is hereby affirmed insofar as it dismissed the charge
of unfair labor practice in CIR Case 426-ULP, but reversed and set aside insofar as it ordered the holding of a
certification election in CIR Case No. 175-MC, and the petition for certification in said case should be, as it is hereby,
dismissed. No costs. So ordered.

B. Methods of Establishing Majority Status

Major Policies

a. Union Voluntary Recognition

b.Law

c. No Direct Certification

d. One Company - One Union Policy

e. Policy Consideration

f. Effect of Receipt of Benefits

g. Religion / Past Non-Participation

h. Rationale

i. Forum Issue

j. Venue of Petition

C. Consent Elections

D. Certification Election
G.R. No. 97020 June 8, 1992
CALIFORNIA MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, ABD FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS
(FFW), CALIFORNIA MFG. CORP. SUPERVISORS UNION CHAPTER (CALMASUCO), respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order
seeking to annul and set aside the (a) resolution * of the Department of Labor and Employment dated October 16, 1990
in OS-A-10-283-90 (NCR-OD-M-90-05-095) entitled "In Re: Petition for Certification Election Among the Supervisors
of California Manufacturing Corporation, Federation of Free Workers (FFW) California Mfg. Corp. Supervisors Union
Chapter (CALMASUCO), petitioner-appellee, California Manufacturing Corporation, employer-appellant" which denied
herein petitioner's appeal and affirmed the order of Med-Arbiter Arsenia Q. Ocampo dated August 22, 1990 directing the
conduct of a certification election among the supervisory employees of California Manufacturing Corporation, and (b)
the Order ** of the same Department denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
As culled from the records, the following facts appear undisputed:
On May 24, 1990, a petition for certification election among the supervisors of California Manufacturing Corporation
(CMC for brevity) was filed by the Federation of Free Workers (FFW) — California Manufacturing Corporation
Supervisors Union Chapter (CALMASUCO), alleging inter alia, that it is a duly registered federation with registry
certificate no. 1952-TTT-IP, while FFW-CALMASUCO Chapter is a duly registered chapter with registry certificate no.
1-AFBI-038 issued on May 21, 1990 (Annex "A", Rollo, p. 63); that the employer CMC employs one hundred fifty (150)
supervisors; that there is no recognized supervisors union existing in the company; that the petition is filed in accordance
with Article 257 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6715; and that the petition is nevertheless
supported by a substantial member of signatures of the employees concerned (Annexes "E" and "F", Ibid., pp. 28-29).
In its answer, CMC, now petitioner herein, alleged among others, that the petition for the holding of a certification
election should be denied as it is not supported by the required twenty-five percent (25%) of all its supervisors and that a
big number of the supposed signatories to the petition are not actually supervisors as they have no subordinates to
supervise, nor do they have the powers and functions which under the law would classify them as supervisors (Annex
"D", Ibid., P. 25).
On July 24. 1990, FFW—CALMASUCO filed its reply maintaining that under the law, when there is no existing unit yet
in a particular bargaining unit at the time a petition for certification election is filed, the 25% rule on the signatories
does not apply; that the "organized establishment" contemplated by law does not refer to a "company"  per se but rather
refers to a "bargaining unit" which may be of different classifications in a single company; that CMC has at least two (2)
different bargaining units, namely, the supervisory (unorganized) and the rank-and-file (organized); that the signatories to
the petition have been performing supervisory functions; that since it is CMC which promoted them to the positions, of
supervisors. it is already estopped from claiming that they are not supervisors; that the said supervisors were excluded
from the coverage of the collective bargaining agreement of its rank-and-file employees; and that the contested
signatories are indeed supervisors as shown in the "CMC Master List of Employees" of January 2, 1990 and the CMS
Publication (Annex "G", Ibid., p 30).
On August 12, 1990, the Med-Arbiter issued an order, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby ordered that a certification election be conducted
among the supervisory employees of California Manufacturing Corporation within twenty (20) days
from receipt hereof with the usual pre-election conference of the parties to thresh out the mechanics
of the election The payroll of the company three (3) months prior to the filing of the petition shall be
used as the basis in determining the list of eligible voters.
The choices are:
1. Federation of Free Workers (FFW) California Manufacturing Corporation
Supervisors Union Chapter (CALMASUCO); and
2. No union.
SO ORDERED. (Annex "H" Ibid., p. 33).
CMC thereafter appealed to the Department of Labor and Employment which, however, affirmed the above order in its
assailed resolution dated October 16, 1990 (Annex, "B", Ibid, a 18) CMC's subsequent motion for reconsideration was
also denied in its order dated November 17, 1990 (Annex "A", Ibid., p. 15), hence, his petition.
a) whether or not the term "unorganized establishment' in Article 257 of the tabor Code refers to a
bargaining unit or a business establishment;
b) whether or not non-supervisors can participate in a supervisor's certification election; and
c) whether or not the two (2) different and separate plants of herein petitioner in Parañaque and Las
Piñas can be treated as a single bargaining unit.
The petition must be denied.
The Court has already categorically ruled that Article 257 of the Labor code is applicable to unorganized labor
organizations and not to establishments where there exists a certified bargaining agent which had previously entered
into a collective bargaining agreement with the management (Associated Labor Unions [ALU] v. Calleja, G.R. No.
85085, November 6, 1989, 179 SCRA 127) (Emphasis supplied). Otherwise stated, the establishment concerned must
have no certified bargaining agent (Associated Labor Unions [ALU] v. Calleja G.R. No. 82260, July 19, 1989, 175
SCRA 490). In the instant case, it is beyond cavil that the supervisors of CMC which constitute a bargaining unit separate
and distinct from that of the rank-and-file, have no such agent. thus they correctly filed a petition for certification election
thru union FFW-CALMASUCO, likewise indubitably a legitimate labor organization. CMC's insistence on the 25%
subscription requirement, is clearly immaterial. The same has been expressly deleted by Section 24 of Republic Act No.
6715 and is presently prescribed only in organized establishments, that is, those with existing bargaining agents.
Compliance with the said requirement need not even be established with absolute certainty. The Court has consistently
ruled that "even conceding that the statutory requirement of 30% (now 25%) of the labor force asking for a certification
election had not been strictly compiled with, the Director (now the Med-Arbiter) is still empowered to order that it be
held precisely for the purpose of ascertaining which of the contending labor organizations shall be the exclusive
collective bargaining agent (Atlas Free Workers Union (AFWU)-PSSLU Local v. Noriel, G.R. No. L-51905, May 26,
1981, 104 SCRA 565). The requirement then is relevant only when it becomes mandatory to conduct a certification
election. In all other instances, the discretion, according to the rulings of this Tribunal, ought to be ordinarily exercised in
favor of a petition for certification (National Mines and Allied Workers Union (NAMAWU-UIF) v. Luna, et al., G.R.
No. L-46722, June 15, 1978, 83 SCRA 607).
In any event, CMC as employer has no standing to question a certification election (Asian Design and Manufacturing
Corporation v. Calleja, et al., G.R. No. 77415, June 29, 1989, 174 SCRA 477). Such is the sole concern of the workers.
The only exception is where the employer has to file the petition for certification election pursuant to Article 259 (now
258) of the Labor Code because it was requested to bargain collectively. Thereafter, the role of the employer in the
certification process ceases. The employer becomes merely a bystander. Oft-quoted is the pronouncement of the Court on
management interference in certification elections, thus:
 On matters that should be the exclusive concern of labor, the choice of a collective bargaining
representative, the employer is definitely an intruder, His participation, to say the least, deserves no
encouragement. This Court should be the last agency to lend support to such an attempt at
interference with purely internal affair of labor. (Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied
Services (TUPAS) v. Trajano. G.R. No. L-61153 January 17, 1983, 120 SCRA
64 citing Consolidated Farms, Inc. v. Noriel, G.R No. L-47752 July 31, 1978, 84 SCRA 469, 473).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 101730 June 17, 1993
PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. BIENVENIDO E.
LAGUESMA and PT & T SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES UNION-APSOTEU, respondents.
Leonard U. Sawal for private respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Can a petition for certification election filed by supervisory employees of an unorganized establishment — one without a
certified bargaining agent — be dismissed on the ground that these employees are actually performing managerial
functions?
This is the issue for reconsideration in this petition for certiorari and mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order, of
the Resolution of 11 June 19911 of then Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment Nieves D. Confesor dismissing the
appeal from the Order of 11 December 19902 of the Med-Arbiter which granted the petition for certification election, and
of the Order of 15 August 19913 denying reconsideration.
On 22 October 1990, private respondent PT&T Supervisory Employees Union-APSOTEU (UNION, for brevity) filed a
petition before the Industrial Relations Decision of the Department of Labor and Employment praying for the holding of
a certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation
(PT&T, for brevity). On 29 October 1990, UNION amended its petition to include the allegation that PT&T was an
unorganized establishment employing roughly 100 supervisory employees from whose ranks will constitute the
bargaining unit sought to be established.
On 22 November 1990, PT&T moved to dismiss the petition for certification election on the ground that UNION
members were performing managerial functions and thus were not merely supervisory employees. Moreover, PT&T
alleged that a certified bargaining unit already existed among its rank-and-file employees which barred the filing of the
petition.
On 27 November 1990, respondent UNION opposed the motion to dismiss, contending that under the Labor Code
supervisory employees are not eligible to join the Labor organization of the rank-and-file employees although they may
form their own.
On 4 December 1990, PT&T filed its reply to the opposition and manifested that it is the function of an employee which
is determinative of whether said employee is a managerial or supervisory employee.
On 11 December 1990, the Med-Arbiter granted the petition and ordered that "a certification election . . . (be) conducted
among the supervisory personnel of the Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation (PT&T)."4 Petitioner PT&T
appealed to the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
On 24 May 1991, PT&T filed its supplemental appeal and attached copies of the job descriptions and employment
service records of these supervisory employees, including samples of memoranda and notices they made which
purportedly illustrate their excercise of management prerogatives. On 31 May 1991, petitioner submitted more job
descriptions to further bolster its contention.
On 11 June 1991, the Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment Nieves R. Confesor denied petitioner's appeal for lack
of merit. However, she did not rule on the additional evidence presented by PT&T. Instead, she directed that the evidence
"should be scrutinized and . . . considered during the exclusion-inclusion proceedings where the employees who should
be part of the bargaining unit . . . will be determined."5
On 15 August 1991, respondent Undersecretary of Labor and Employment Bienvenido E. Laguesma denied
reconsideration of the resolution dismissing the appeal. Hence, the instant petition anchored on the ground that public
respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to rule on the additional evidence submitted by petitioner
which would have buttressed its contention that there were no supervisory employees in its employ and which, as a
consequence, would have barred the holding of a certification election.
The petition is devoid of merit.
The applicable provision of law in the case at bar is Art. 257 of the Labor Code. It reads —
Art. 257. Petitions in unorganized establishments. — In any establishment where there is no
certified bargaining agent, a certification election shall automatically be conducted by the Med-
Arbiter upon the filing of a petition by a legitimate labor organization (emphasis supplied).
The supervisory employees of PT&T did not yet have a certified bargaining agent to represent them at the time the
UNION, which is legitimate labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment, 6 filed the
petition for certification election. Since no certified bargaining agent represented the supervisory employees, PT&T may
be deemed an unorganized establishment within the purview of Art. 257 of the Labor Code.
The fact that petitioner's rank-and-file employees were already represented by a certified bargaining agent doe not make
PT&T an organized establishment vis-a-vis the supervisory employees. After all, supervisory employees are "not . . .
eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees."7
Consequently, the Med-Arbiter, as sustained by public respondent, committed no grave abuse of discretion in granting
the petition for certification election among the supervisory employee of petitioner PT&T because Art. 257 of the Labor
Code provides that said election should be automatically conducted upon filing of the petition. In fact, Sec. 6 of Rule V,
Book V, of the Implementing Rules and Regulations makes it mandatory for the Med-Arbiter to order the holding of a
certification election. It reads —
Sec. 6. Procedure. — Upon receipt of a petition, the Regional Director shall assign the case to a
Med-Arbiter for appropriate action. The Med-Arbiter, upon receipt of the assigned petition, shall
have twenty (20) working days from submission of the case for resolution within which to dismiss
or grant the petition.
In a petition filed by a legitimate organization involving an unorganized establishment, the Med-
Arbiter shall immediately order the conduct of a certification election  . . . (emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, PT&T did not possess the legal personality to file a motion to dismiss the petition for certification election
even if based on the ground that its supervisory employees are in reality managerial employees. It is well-settled that an
employer has no standing to question a certification election 8 since this is the sole concern of the workers. 9 The only
exception to this rule is where the employer has to file the petition for certification election itself pursuant to Art.
258 10 of the Labor Code because it was requested to bargain collectively. But, other that this instance, the choice of a
collective bargaining agent is purely the internal affair of labor. 11

What PT&T should have done was to question the inclusion of any disqualified employee in the certification election
during the exclusion-inclusion proceedings before the representation officer. Indeed, this is precisely the purpose of the
exclusion-inclusion proceedings, i.e., to determine who among the employees are entitled to vote and be part of the
bargaining unit sought to be certified.

Then Acting Secretary Nieves D. Confesor therefore did not abuse her discretion when she opted not to act upon the
additional evidence by petitioner PT&T. For, the holding of a certification election in an unorganized establishment is
mandatory and must immediately be ordered upon petition by a legitimate labor organization, which is the case here.

At any rate, the additional evidence presented by petitioner failed to sufficiently show that the supervisory employees
who sought to be included in the bargaining unit were in fact performing managerial functions. On the contrary, while
these supervisory employees did excercise independent judgment which is not routinary or clerical in nature, their
authority was merely recommendatory in character. In all instances, they were still accountable for their actions to a
superior officer, i.e., their respective superintendents. The Solicitor General succinctly puts it thus —

A perusal of petitioner's annexes . . . would readily show that the power of said supervisors in
matters relating to the excercise of prerogatives for or against rank-and-file employees is not
absolute but merely recommendatory in character. Note that their reports recommending or
imposing disciplinary action against rank-and-file employees always bore the concurrence of one or
two superiors . . . and the job descriptions . . . clearly stated that these supervisors directly reported
to a superior and were accountable to the latter 12 (emphasis supplied).

As the Med-Arbiter himself noted, "It is incredible that only rank-and-file and managerial employees are the personnel of
respondent firm, considering the line of service it offers to the public" 13 and the fact that it employed 2,500 employees,
more or less, all over the country.

A word more. PT&T alleges that respondent UNION is affiliated with the same national federation representing its rank-
and-file employees. Invoking Atlas Lithographic Services, Inc. v. Laguesma, 14 PT&T seeks the disqualification of
respondent UNION. Respondent, however, denied it was affiliated with the same national federation of the rank-and-file
employees union, the Associated Labor Union or ALU. It clarified that the PT&T Supervisory Employees Union is
affiliated with Associated Professional, Supervisory Office, Technical Employees Union or APSOTEU, which is a
separate and distinct national federation from ALU.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Petition for Certiorari  and Mandamus  with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order is DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 97568 February 4, 1992
CELINE MARKETING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and
CONFEDERATION OF FILIPINO WORKERS (CFW), respondents.
Jesus C. Gentiles for petitioner.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
Celine Marketing Corporation filed a petition for certiorari to review the resolution dated March 5, 1991, of the
Undersecretary of Labor and Employment, Bienvenido Laguesma, ordering the holding of a certification election among
its rank-and-file employees, as prayed for in a petition filed on August 26, 1990, by the Confederation of Filipino
Workers (or CFW), praying that it be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank-and-file employees of the
petitioner.
On September 10, 1990, the petition was amended to include all the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner in its
outlets at Landmark-Makati; Shoppesville-Greenhills; SM-North: Ginza-Esperanza-Shoe Mart; SM Car Park-Celine
Marketing; Gold Crest-Makati; Greenbelt-Celine: Makati Ginza-Esperanza-Tesoro Building; Mabini-Celine, Mabini;
Escolta-Celine, Escolta; and Escolta Ginza-Esperanza Escolta, comprising more or less 100 employees.
The petitioner moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds that the CFW had not been authorized by a majority of the
rank-and file employees, and that it failed to submit a copy of the charter certificate issued to the local union.
At the hearing before the Labor Arbiter on October 16, 1991, CFW submitted a xerox copy of the charter certificate
issued to its local union, "Celine Marketing Corp. Workers Chapter-CFW."
The petitioner moved to strike it from the records for non-production of the original and for lack of proof that the
organizational documents of the union had been filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations.
On October 19, 1990, the Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition on those grounds.
The union appealed the order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment, who, on March 5, 1991, through
Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma, granted the appeal. The dispositive portion of the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby granted and the order appealed from set aside. A new order is
hereby entered directing the conduct of a certification election among the rank-and-file employees
of Celine Marketing Corporation/Ginza Esperanza, and all its outlets at Landmark-Makati;
Shoppesville-Greenhills: SM-North. Ginza Esperanza Shoe Mart, SM-Car Park-Celine Marketing;
Gold Crest-Makati-Celine Makati; Greenbelt-Celine; Makati Ginza Esperanza-Tesoro Building;
Mabini-Celine Mabini; Escolta-Celine Escolta; Escolta Ginza Esperanza Escolta with the following
choices:
1. CFW-Celine Marketing Corp. Workers Chapter: and
2. No Union.
The payroll three (3) months prior to the filing of the petition shall be the basis for determining the
list of eligible voters.
Let therefore, the pertinent records of the case be forwarded to the Office of origin for the conduct
of certification election."(pp. 12-13, Rollo.)
Hence, this petition for certiorari in which petitioner assails the resolution of respondent Undersecretary Laguesma on
the grounds that:
1. The Undersecretary of Labor and Employment acted in excess of jurisdiction in setting aside the
Med-Arbiter's order to conduct a certification election because the appeal of CFW was addressed to
the Secretary of Labor & Employment himself who could not delegate the power of review to the
Undersecretary.
2. The Undersecretary of Labor & Employment erred in setting aside the Med-Arbiter's order
despite the failure of the private respondent to comply with the mandatory requirements in Section
3. Rule II. Book V of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code as amended.
The petition has no merit.
The issuance of the questioned resolution by Undersecretary of Labor Laguesma was not irregular for he did so authority
of the Secretary of Labor & Employment. Not having been repudiated or reversed by the head of office, that resolution
has the force and effect of a resolution of the Secretary himself. (Hannibal Bridge Co. vs. U.S., 221 U.S. 194, 55 L. ed.
699, 31 CT. 603; Alvord vs. U.S., 95 U.S. 356, 24 L. ed. 414; pp. 53-54, 2 Am. Jur. 2d.)
While it may be true that the petition for certification election did not carry the authorization of a majority of the rank-
and file employees of the petitioner, their consent is not necessary when the bargaining unit that the union seeks to
represent, is still unorganized. The petition for certification election may be filed by any union, not by the employees.
Thus, Article 257 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. 6715, provides:
 Art. 257. Petitions in unorganized establishments. — In any establishment where there is no
certified bargaining agent, a certification election shall automatically be conducted by the Med-
Arbiter upon the filing of a petition by a legitimate labor organization.
The law assumes that the union is the real party in interest in a petition for certification election. Anyway, the
certification election itself is the appropriate forum for the employees to express their choice of a bargaining
representative or none at all.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion in the Undersecretary's resolution ordering the holding of a
certification election among the petitioner's employees, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-48007 December 15, 1982
PLUM FEDERATION OF INDUSTRIAL AND AGRARIAN WORKERS, petitioner,
vs.
DIRECTOR CARMELO C. NORIEL, of the Bureau of Labor Relations; MANILA JOCKEY CLUB RACE DAY
OPERATION EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION-PTGWO and MANILA JOCKEY CLUB, INC., respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Pedro A. Lopez for respondent MJCRDOELU-PTGWO.
Armando V. Ampil for respondent Manila Jockey Club.
DE CASTRO, J.:
Petitioner seeks to set aside the Order and Resolutions dated May 6, 1977, September 17, 1977 and March 14, 1978 of
the Bureau of Labor Relations for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. It,
likewise, prays for an order directing respondent director to hold a certification election so that the employees in the
company can elect a union representative to negotiate an improved connective bargaining agreement to replace the
agreement which has expired on February 1, 1976.
On May 5, 1976, Plum Federation of Industrial and Agrarian Workers filed a petition, praying that it be certified as the
sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file workers of Manila Jockey Club, Inc.
On June 18, 1976, the Manila Jockey Club Race Day Operation Employees Labor Union-PTGWO filed a motion to
intervene and opposition to said petition and alleged among other things, that it is the recognized collective bargaining
representative of all the employees of the company and that it is in the process of negotiating a modification of the
collective bargaining agreement.
On August 30, 1976, another supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by intervenor PTGWO, this time invoking the
"No Union Raiding Clause" of the "Code of Ethics" adopted by the members of the Trade Union Congress of the
Philippines (T.U.C.P.) wherein both petitioner and intervenor are members, and claiming that the petition failed to satisfy
the 30% requirement of the law. The entire record of the case was forwarded to the Office of the President of the
T.U.C.P. for the purpose of submitting the matter to the Congress for decision.
On March 16, 1977, the entire record of the case was returned by the T.U.C.P. President to the Office of then Secretary
of Labor which in turn transmitted the same to the Bureau of Labor Relations Office with a forwarding letter signed by
the late Roberto S. Oca in his capacity as President of the Congress, stating, among other things, the following: 1
In a National Executive Board meeting of the Katipunang Manggagawang Pilipino (TUCP) held last
March 7, 1977 at the Army & Navy Club, it was duly approved that the above-captioned case be
referred back to the BLR and that MJCR-OELU-PTGWO be declared as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent, thus dismissing the petition of PLUM.
On March 22, 1977, the BLR endorsed the case to Officer-in-Charge Vicente Leodegardo, Jr., of Region IV for
appropriate action.
On May 5, 1977, Atty. Luna C. Piezas, Chief, Med-Arbiter Section of Region IV, Department of Labor, promulgated an
order 2 dismissing the case pursuant to the letter of the President of the T.U.C.P.
Petitioner PLUM filed an appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations predicated on the ground that TUCP has no authority
in law to grant or deny election under the Labor Code which mandated the secret ballot to elect the true union
representative.
On September 17, 1977, the Bureau Director issued a resolution' dismissing the appeal. Pertinent portions 3 of said
resolution read thus:
While it may be true that the facts of the case may warrant the holding of a certification election in
the bargaining unit concerned, to sustain first the decision arrived at by the National Executive
Board of TUCP appears of indispensable importance. Contenders in the case at bar are both
members of TUCP. Undeniably, there are internal rules including their Code of Ethics to keep them
intact, to govern their actions and finally to preserve the Congress. It is therefore, a matter of utmost
necessity that a decision arrived at by the National Executive Board be respected and enforced not
only by the members of the Congress themselves but also by this Bureau and the Department if
necessity arises,
The appealed order has the letter of Roberto Oca as its basis. It is worthy to note that the letter sent
said communication in his capacity as President of the TUCP and nothing else. Whether or not he
happens also to be the president of intervenor union is of no legal significance since the decision of
the TUCP was handed down by its National Executive Board and not by him alone.
Other recourse could have been taken by appellant. Very much aware of the Decision of the
National Executive Board on March 7, 1977, it could have asked for a reconsideration of the same.
As shown by the records, the first decision of the National Board was for the holding of a
certification election. But intervenor asked for a reconsideration hence the March 7, decision.
Appellant's failure however could unequivocably be interpreted as satisfaction of the Decision. For
this Office now, to sustain appellant's stand and re-open the case again by giving due course to the
 instant appeal is not only an open manifestation of non-recognition of the existence of TUCP but a Accordingly, the questioned order and resolutions dated May 5, 1977, September 17, 1977 and March 14, 1978 are
further obstruction to the goal of the Department to establish one-union in one industry; thus at the nullified and set aside. Respondent Director is hereby ordered to hold a certification election forthwith. This decision is
end, to attain industrial peace. immediately executory. No costs.

xxx xxx xxx SO ORDERED.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied by public respondent for being pro-forma, hence the present
recourse by way of a petition for certiorari and mandamus.

It was asserted by petition that nowhere in the Labor Code or in the new Constitution has TUCP been granted any
authority to supersede or impair the holding of a certification election or deny the majority employees of their right to
elect their own union; that public respondent and the PTGWO acted without jurisdiction in defiance of the rule of law
and popular democracy, that it, is not within the Code of Ethics to suppress the employees' freedom to choose their own
union; and that the TUCP, while asserting itself to be a Labor Center did not call the parties involved for conference, to
submit evidence or to make a fair judicious and rational evaluation of the dispute.

The Solicitor General in his manifestation and motion prayed that he be relieved from filing the required answer to the
instant petition for the reason that he was unable to sustain respondent bureau director's questioned orders and resolution.
The records of the case were returned to said public respondent and he was granted an extension of time within which to
submit his own answer to the petition.

Respondent Noriel in his comment (answer) made it clear that he is not opposed to the conduct of a certification election,
and in fact he is ready to hold such election if the case is returned to the jurisdiction of his office. However, he stressed
that the TUCP Code of Ethics and General Council Resolution No. 76-2 are clear expressions of consent by the signatory
members, including their locals or affiliates, to settle their disputes among themselves in accordance with the decision of
the National Executive Board and the decision he made was made pursuant to such an agreement.

On the other hand, private respondent union maintained its stand that no certification election should be held because the
petition was not supported by the written consent of at least 30% of all the employees in the bargaining unit, and that this
requirement is mandatory.

A letter from the president of respondent union reveals the present state of affairs of the employees wherein they are
deprived of the benefits of a collective bargaining agreement, for management refused to bargain with the union. If this
situation continues, the employees would stand to lose a long-line of cases that the workers' welfare can be promoted
through the bargaining process. Certification election is the fairest and most effective way of determining which labor
organization can truly represent the working force. It is a fundamental postulate that the win of the majrity if given
expression in an honest election with freedom on the part of the voters to make their choice, is controlling. 4 Protection to
labor and freedom of peaceful assembly and association are guaranteed by the Constitution.

As to the issue of whether or not the 30% minimum subscription requirement was met, it was held that the Director is
still empowered to call for a certification election provided there was no abuse of discretion. However, in the case at bar,
instead of ordering an election, respondent Director dismissed the appeal of PLUM based on the decision of the TUCP,
which the Court considers an impairment of the freedom of the workers to voice out their choice of the union to represent
them. If there is any doubt as to the required number having met, there would be no better way than the holding of a
certification election to ascertain which union really commands the allegiance of the rank-and-file employees. 5 If the
desired goal is for the execution of a collective bargaining contract to protect the workers, then certification election is
the most appropriate means to attain said end.

Since there has been no certification election for the past three (3) years as well as a certified collective bargaining
agreement which should govern the economic and working conditions of the workers, a certification election should
immediately be ordered. This Court had repeatedly made it clear that in labor controversies, time is of the essence. 6

G.R. No. 79025. December 29, 1989.
BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, and BENECO EMPLOYEES
LABOR UNION, respondents.
E.L. Gayo & Associates for petitioner.
CORTES, J.:
On June 21, 1985 Beneco Worker's Labor Union-Association of Democratic Labor Organizations (hereinafter referred to
as BWLU- ADLO) filed a petition for direct certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the
rank and file employees of Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as BENECO) at Alapang, La
Trinidad, Benguet alleging, inter alia, that BENECO has in its employ two hundred and fourteen (214) rank and file
employees; that one hundred and ninety-eight (198) or 92.5% of these employees have supported the filing of the
petition; that no certification election has been conducted for the last 12 months; that there is no existing collective
bargaining representative of the rank and file employees sought to represented by BWLU- ADLO; and, that there is no
collective bargaining agreement in the cooperative.
An opposition to the petition was filed by the Beneco Employees Labor Union (hereinafter referred to as BELU)
contending that it was certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the subject workers pursuant to an
order issued by the med-arbiter on October 20,1980; that pending resolution by the National Labor Relations
Commission are two cases it filed against BENECO involving bargaining deadlock and unfair labor practice; and, that
the pendency of these cases bars any representation question.
BENECO, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss the petition claiming that it is a non-profit electric cooperative
engaged in providing electric services to its members and patron-consumers in the City of Baguio and Benguet Province;
and, that the employees sought to be represented by BWLU-ADLO are not eligible to form, join or assist labor
organizations of their own choosing because they are members and joint owners of the cooperative.
On September 2, 1985 the med-arbiter issued an order giving due course to the petition for certification election.
However, the med-arbiter limited the election among the rank and file employees of petitioner who are non-members
thereof and without any involvement in the actual ownership of the cooperative. Based on the evidence during the
hearing the med-arbiter found that there are thirty-seven (37) employees who are not members and without any
involvement in the actual ownership of the cooperative. The dispositive portion of the med-arbiter's order is as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a certification election should be as it is hereby ordered to be
conducted at the premises of Benguet, Electric Cooperative, Inc., at Alapang, La Trinidad, Benguet
within twenty (20) days from receipt hereof among all the rank and file employees
(non-members/consumers and without any involvement in the actual ownership of the cooperative)
with the following choices:
1. BENECO WORKERS LABOR UNION-ADLO
2. BENECO EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION
3. NO UNION
The payroll for the month of June 1985 shall be the basis in determining the qualified voters who
may participate in the certification election to be conducted.
SO ORDERED. [Rollo, pp. 22-23.]
BELU and BENECO appealed from this order but the same was dismissed for lack of merit on March 25,1986.
Whereupon BENECO filed with this Court a petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and /or
restraining order, docketed as G.R. No. 74209, which the Supreme Court dismissed for lack of merit in a minute
resolution dated April 28, 1986.
The ordered certification election was held on October 1, 1986. Prior to the conduct thereof BENECO's counsel verbally
manifested that "the cooperative is protesting that employees who are members-consumers are being allowed to vote
when . . . they are not eligible to be members of any labor union for purposes of collective bargaining; much less, to vote
in this certification election." [Rollo, p. 28]. Petitioner submitted a certification showing that only four (4) employees are
not members of BENECO and insisted that only these employees are eligible to vote in the certification election. Canvass
of the votes showed that BELU garnered forty-nine (49) of the eighty-three (83) "valid" votes cast.
Thereafter BENECO formalized its verbal manifestation by filing a Protest. Finding, among others, that the issue as to
whether or not member-consumers who are employees of BENECO could form, assist or join a labor union has been
answered in the affirmative by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 74209, the med-arbiter dismissed the protest on February
17, 1987. On June 23, 1987, Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) director Pura Ferrer-Calleja affirmed the med-arbiter's
order and certified BELU as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank and file employees of BENECO.
Alleging that the BLR director committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction BENECO
filed the instant petition for certiorari. In his Comment the Solicitor General agreed with BENECO's stance and prayed
that the petition be given due course. In view of this respondent director herself was required by the Court to file a
Comment. On April 19, 1989 the Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.
The main issue in this case is whether or not respondent director committed grave abuse of discretion in certifying
respondent BELU as the sole and exclusive bargaining representtative of the rank and file employees of BENECO.
Under Article 256 of the Labor Code [Pres. Decree 442] to have a valid certification election, "at least a majority of all
eligible voters in the unit must have cast their votes. The labor union receiving the majority of the valid votes cast shall
be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of all workers in the unit." Petitioner BENECO asserts that the certification
election held on October 1, 1986 was null and void since members-employees of petitioner cooperative who are not
eligible to form and join a labor union for purposes of collective bargaining were allowed to vote therein.
Respondent director and private respondent BELU on the other hand submit that members of a cooperative who are also
rank and file employees are eligible to form, assist or join a labor union [Comment of Respondent Director, p. 4; Rollo,
p. 125; Comment of BELU, pp. 9-10; Rollo pp. 99-100].
The Court finds the present petition meritorious.
The issue of whether or not employees of a cooperative are qualified to form or join a labor organization for purposes of
collective bargaining has already been resolved and clarified in the case of Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc.
vs. Ferrer Calleja, et al. [G.R. No. 7795, September 26,1988] and reiterated in the cases of Batangas-Electric
Cooperative Labor Union v. Young, et al. [G.R. Nos. 62386, 70880 and 74560 November 9, 1988] and San Jose City
Electric Service Cooperative, Inc. v. Ministry of Labor and Employment, et al.  [G.R. No. 77231, May 31, 1989] wherein
the Court had stated that the right to collective bargaining is not available to an employee of a cooperative who at the
same time is a member and co-owner thereof. With respect, however, to employees who are neither members nor co-
owners of the cooperative they are entitled to exercise the rights to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiation as mandated by the 1987 Constitution and applicable statutes.
Respondent director argues that to deny the members of petitioner cooperative the right to form, assist or join a labor
union of their own choice for purposes of collective bargaining would amount to a patent violation of their right to self-
organization. She points out that:
Albeit a person assumes a dual capacity as rank and file employee and as member of a certain
cooperative does not militate, as in the instant case, against his/her exercise of the right to self-
organization and to collective bargaining guaranteed by the Constitution and Labor Code because,
while so doing, he/she is acting in his/her capacity as rank and file employee thereof. It may be
added that while the employees concerned became members of petitioner cooperative, their status
employment as rank and filers who are hired for fixed compensation had not changed. They still do
not actually participate in the management of the cooperative as said function is entrusted to the
Board of Directors and to the elected or appointed officers thereof. They are not vested with the
powers and prerogatives to lay down and execute managerial policies; to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-
off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees; and/or to effectively recommend such
managerial functions [Comment of Respondent Director, p. 4; Rollo, p. 125.]
Private respondent BELU concurs with the above contention of respondent director and, additionally, claims that since
membership in petitioner cooperative is only nominal, the rank and file employees who are members thereof should not
be deprived of their right to self-organization.
The above contentions are untenable. Contrary to respondents' claim, the fact that the members-employees of petitioner
do not participate in the actual management of the cooperative does not make them eligible to form, assist or join a labor
organization for the purpose of collective bargaining with petitioner. The Court's ruling in the Davao City case that
members of cooperative cannot join a labor union for purposes of collective bargaining was based on the fact that as
members of the cooperative they are co-owners thereof. As such, they cannot invoke the right to collective bargaining for
"certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself or his co-owners." [Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. v.
Ferrer-Calleja, et al., supra]. It is the fact of ownership of the cooperative, and not involvement in the management
thereof, which disqualifies a member from joining any labor organization within the cooperative. Thus, irrespective of
the degree of their participation in the actual management of the cooperative, all members thereof cannot form, assist or
join a labor organization for the purpose of collective bargaining.
Respondent union further claims that if nominal ownership in a cooperative is "enough to take away the constitutional
protections afforded to labor, then there would be no hindrance for employers to grant, on a scheme of generous profit
sharing, stock bonuses to their employees and thereafter claim that since their employees are not stockholders [of the
corporation], albeit in a minimal and involuntary manner, they are now also co-owners and thus disqualified to form
unions." To allow this, BELU argues, would be "to allow the floodgates of destruction to be opened upon the rights of
labor which the Constitution endeavors to protect and which welfare it promises to promote." [Comment of BELU, p. 10;
Rollo, p. 100].
The above contention of respondent union is based on the erroneous presumption that membership in a cooperative is the
same as ownership of stocks in ordinary corporations. While cooperatives may exercise some of the rights and privileges
given to ordinary corporations provided under existing laws, such cooperatives enjoy other privileges not granted to the
latter [See Sections 4, 5, 6, and 8, Pres. Decree No. 175; Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City v. Ferrer-Calleja, supra].
Similarly, members of cooperatives have rights and obligations different from those of stockholders of ordinary
corporations. It was precisely because of the special nature of cooperatives, that the Court held in the Davao City case
that members-employees thereof cannot form or join a labor union for purposes of collective bargaining. The Court held
that:
A cooperative ... is by its nature different from an ordinary business concern being run either by
persons, partnerships, or corporations. Its owners and/or members are the ones who run and operate
the business while the others are its employees. As above stated, irrespective of the number of
shares owned by each member they are entitled to cast one vote each in deciding upon the affairs of
the cooperative. Their share capital earn limited interest. They enjoy special privileges as-exemption
from income tax and sales taxes, preferential right to supply their products to State agencies and
even exemption from the minimum wage laws.
An employee therefore of such a cooperative who is a member and co-owner thereof cannot invoke
the right to collective bargaining for certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself or his co-
owners.
It is important to note that, in her order dated September 2, 1985, med-arbiter Elnora V. Balleras made a specific finding
that there are only thirty-seven (37) employees of petitioner who are not members of the cooperative and who are,
therefore, the only employees of petitioner cooperative eligible to form or join a labor union for purposes of collective
bargaining [Annex "A" of the Petition, p. 12; Rollo, p. 22]. However, the minutes of the certification election [Annex "C"
of the Petition: Rollo, p. 28] show that a total of eighty-three (83) employees were allowed to vote and of these, forty-
nine (49) voted for respondent union. Thus, even if We agree with respondent union's contention that the thirty seven
(37) employees who were originally non-members of the cooperative can still vote in the certification election since they
were only "forced and compelled to join the cooperative on pain of disciplinary action," the certification election held on
October 1, 1986 is still null and void since even those who were already members of the cooperative at the time of the
issuance of the med-arbiter's order, and therefore cannot claim that they were forced to join the union were allowed to
vote in the election.
Article 256 of the Labor Code provides, among others, that:
 To have a valid, election, at least a majority of all eligible voters in the unit must have cast their
votes. The labor union receiving the majority of the valid votes cast shall be certified as the
exclusive bargaining agent of all workers in the unit . . . [Italics supplied.]
In this case it cannot be determined whether or not respondent union was duly elected by the eligible voters of the
bargaining unit since even employees who are ineligible to join a labor union within the cooperative because of their
membership therein were allowed to vote in the certification election. Considering the foregoing, the Court finds that
respondent director committed grave abuse of discretion in certifying respondent union as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of the rank and file employees of petitioner cooperative.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed resolution of respondent director is ANNULLED. The
certification election conducted on October 1, 1986, is SET ASIDE. The Regional Office No. 1 of San Fernando, La
Union is hereby directed to immediately conduct new certification election proceedings among the rank and file
employees of the petitioner who are not members of the cooperative.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 113448 July 14, 1995
•Militante v. NLRC, G.R. No. 113448, July 14, 1995  Industrial Workers Union — Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (PACIWU-TUCP), to the award of financial
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to reverse the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC
NCR CA No. 004908-93, affirming the order of the Labor Arbiter which dismissed, for having been barred by prior
judgment, NLRC-NCR Cases Nos. 00-01-00618-93, 00-03-01784-93, and 00-03-02073-93.
I previous judgment rendered in NLRC NCR CA No. 003194-92 (NLRC NCR Case No. 00-05-02875-90).
The Golden Taxi Employees and Workers Union — ANGLO (GTEWU-ANGLO), represented by Ernesto Serrano, as
union president, filed a case against respondent Golden Taxi Cab Co. (Company) and/or Lorenzo Zamora and Jose
Zamora (NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-05-02875-90) for illegal lock-out, violation of B.P. Blg. 130, as amended by R.A. No.
6715, unfair labor practice, and payment of actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. In his decision,
Labor Arbiter Patricio P. Libo-on found that the closure of respondent company was illegal, and ordered private
respondents to pay the members of GTEWU-ANGLO P22,947,200.00 as separation pay and the equivalent of 10% of the
award as attorney's fees (Rollo, p.·48). Upon appeal, NLRC in NLRC NCR CA No. 003194-92, reversed the decision of
the Labor Arbiter and in lieu thereof directed private respondents to pay, as financial assistance, the workers named in the
list attached to its decision the amount of P5,646,699.50 plus P564,669.95 as attorney's fees (Rollo, p. 69).
On January 25, 1993, a complaint was filed by Danilo Q. Militante against Lorenzo Zamora, Doña Nena Zamora and
Doña Pacing Zamora for illegal lockout, illegal dismissal, non-remittance of SSS deduction, deduction for burial benefits,
non-payment of premium pay for rest day, thirteenth-month pay and separation pay with a prayer for reinstatement,
upgrading of SSS payments, payment of separation pay, thirteenth-month pay and premium pay for rest day (NLRC NCR
Case No. 00-01-00618-93).
On March 9, 1993, another complaint was filed by Miguel C. Salonga against respondent Company, Lorenzo Zamora,
Doña Nena Zamora and Doña Pacing Zamora, for illegal dismissal and non-payment of retirement benefits with a prayer
for payment of retirement benefits and other benefits (NLRC NCR Case No. 00-03-01784-93).
On March 15, 1993, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaints on the grounds of  res judicata  and
prescription, arguing that the NLRC decision in NLRC NCR CA No. 003194-92 barred these subsequent complaints.
On March 19, 1993, another complaint was filed against respondent company, Lorenzo Zamora, Doña Nena Zamora and
Doña Pacing Zamora by Bernardino O. Tejada again for illegal lockout, illegal deductions of SSS and burial benefits,
illegal dismissal, non-payment of separation pay, holiday pay and thirteenth-month pay, and payment of moral damages
and attorney's fees with a prayer for upgrading of SSS payments, payment of separation pay, thirteenth-month pay,
premium pay for rest day, attorney's fees, moral damages, holiday pay and reimbursement of illegal deductions (NLRC
NCR CA No. 00-03-02073-93).
On April 28, 1993, Labor Arbiter Ramon V. C. Reyes issued an order dismissing the three consolidated cases on the
ground of bar by prior judgment. Upon appeal (NLRC NCR CA No. 004908-93), NLRC rendered a decision dismissing
the appeal for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
II
Petitioners argue that NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction: (1) in
holding that petitioner's causes of action are barred by the prior final judgment in NLRC NCR CA No. 003194-92 despite
the lack of jurisdiction of NLRC over the complaint therein and the lack of identity of parties, subject matter, and cause
of action between the two cases; (2) in not holding that the decision in the previous case did not prejudice but even
entitled petitioners, who are members of the exclusive bargaining representative Philippine Agricultural Commercial and
assistance; and (3) in failing to comply with its duty to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain speedily and
without regard to technicalities of law or procedure the facts in each case.
III
We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by NLRC in applying the principle of res judicata in NLRC NCR CA
No. 004908-93 (NCR No. 00-01-00618-93; 00-03-01784-93; 00-03-02073-93), subject of this petition by reason of the
Res Judicata  has the following elements: (1) that the previous judgment has become final; (2) that the prior judgment
was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) that the first judgment was
rendered on the merits; and (4) that there was substantial identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action, as
between the prior and subsequent actions (Diwa v. Donato, 234 SCRA 608 [1994]).
It is undisputed that the NLRC decision in NLRC NCR CA No. 003194-92 was decided on the merits and has already
become final.
Petitioners insist, however, that they, being members of the rival union PACIWU-TUCP, were not parties in the first case The legal conclusion of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC on the binding effect of the judgment in the NLRC NCR CA No.
filed by GTEWU-ANGLO (Rollo, p. 12). Such claim is not supported by the records of the case. The Labor Arbiter' s 003194-92 on petitioners finds support in Article 255 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended. Said article
decision in the subsequent consolidated cases, which was affirmed by NLRC, states: provides:

It is not disputed that on May 27, 1990, the date the company filed its notice of closure with the
Department of Labor and Employment, copy furnished the complainant Union, the said Union was
already "certified" (in fact more than a year earlier after winning the March 17, 1989 Consent
election) as "the exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank and file employees" of respondent
company. The effect of such a certification brought about the legal mandate that henceforth,
complainant Union "shall be the exclusive representative" (Art. 255, Labor Code) of all the "rank
and file employees (take note, not just the union members) of respondent company not only for the
purpose of entering into a collective bargaining agreement" on "terms and conditions of
employment" (Arts. 251, 252, ibid), but also in the matter of "rights, benefits and welfare" (Art.
255, ibid) of the said represented workers. . . . (Rollo, p. 41).
Exclusive bargaining representation and workers participation in policy and decision making. —
The labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate
collective bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the
purpose of collective bargaining. . . . .
Inasmuch as GTEWU-ANGLO was certified as the exclusive bargaining agent in the consent election conducted on
March 17, 1989, petitioners cannot now claim that they were not parties in the first case filed by GTEWU-ANGLO,
which represented not only PACIWU-TUCP but also GTEWU-ANGLO. Hence, all the requisites of res judicata being
present, said principle should be made to apply, thus barring any subsequent action such as the consolidated cases subject
of this petition.

In their opposition to respondents' motion to dismiss filed in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-01-00618-93, petitioners apprised
the Labor Arbiter thus:
For the information of the Honorable Labor Arbiter, the herein mentioned case was initiated by
Ernesto Serrano who was the union president of GTEWU-ANGLO for and in behalf of all the
workers and employees of the Golden Taxi Co. numbering about 1649, whether or not the worker is
a member of the union as the law on this point is clear that as the winner of the certification/consent
Election on March 17, 1989, GTEWU-ANGLO, became the exclusive bargaining agent of all the
rank and file employees of the respondent company. . . . (Rollo, p. 103).
The Solicitor General, in his comment filed for NLRC, observes that with the exception of the complaint docketed as
NLRC NCR No. 00-03-01784-93, charging private respondents with illegal dismissal and non-payment of retirement
benefits, the other two complaints contained monetary claims such as non-remittance of SSS deduction and deductions
for burial benefits, non-payment of holiday pay and thirteenth-month pay. However, inasmuch as these claims were
neither raised nor determined in the first case, even indirectly, petitioners cannot be said to be precluded from filing and
pursuing these claims. We agree with the Solicitor General.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, without prejudice to petitioners' right to submit before the Labor Arbiter all
the unresolved money claims.

Petitioners further explained in said opposition:

SO ORDERED.

What happened in this case was that, while the herein mentioned case was first filed before the
Arbitration Branch of this Honorable Commission and assigned to the Honorable Labor Arbiter
PATRICIO LIBO-ON, all the workers of respondent company were complainants until the case
was decided in complainants' favor, but when the herein mentioned case was elevated on appeal by
respondent company to the First Division of the Honorable Commission and was decided on 20
November 1992, the complainants in this instant case were no longer included, hence, this instant
complaint (Rollo, p. 104).

In the first case (NLRC NCR CA No. 003194-92), NLRC resolved two issues insofar as the award is concerned: (1) the
determination of the employees who are to receive financial assistance; and (2) the amount they are entitled to receive. In
conclusion, NLRC took out those who no longer worked with respondent company before its closure, and favored only
those who actively pursued the case. It limited the award of financial assistance only to those mentioned in the list
attached to its decision resulting in the exclusion from the benefits of petitioners.

We cannot simply disregard these factual findings made by the Labor Arbiter, as well as the conclusion arrived at by
NLRC, inasmuch as the same are supported by the records of the case and in accord with law and jurisprudence. In  Five
J Taxi v. National Labor Relations Commission, 235 SCRA 556 (1994), we ruled:

This Court has repeatedly declared that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the
NLRC, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are
generally accorded not only respect but, at times, finality if such findings are supported by
substantial evidence. Where, however, such conclusions are not supported by the evidence, they
must be struck down for being whimsical and capricious and, therefore, arrived at with abuse of
discretion (at p. 560).
 QUIASON, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which seeks to set aside the Resolutions of the
Undersecretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) dated July 22, 1992, affirming the order of the
Med-Arbiter calling for the conduct of the certification election, and August 25, 1992, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

On January 4, 1991, respondent Christian Labor Organization of the Philippines (CLOP), filed with the Med-Arbitration
Unit of the DOLE a petition for certification election among the rank and file employees of the petitioner (NCR-OD-M-
91-01-002).

On April 8, 1991, Med-Arbiter A. Dizon dismissed the petition on the ground that the bargaining unit sought to be
represented by respondent did not include all the eligible employees of petitioner but only the drivers, conductors and
conductresses to the exclusion of the inspectors, inspectresses, dispatchers, mechanics and washerboys.

On May 10, 1991, respondent. CLOP rectified its mistake and filed a second petition for certification election,which
included all the rank and file employees of the company, who hold non-managerial. and non-supervisorial positions.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the second petition and contended that the dismissal of the first petition
constituted res judicata. Petitioner argued that respondent CLOP should have interposed an appeal to the dismissal of the
first petition and its failure to do so barred it from filing another petition for certification election.

On July 3, 1991, Med-Arbiter R. Parungo rendered a decision, which ordered that a certification election among the
regular rank and file workers of petitioner company be conducted (Rollo, pp. 87-91).

Bars to Certification Election On October 16, 1991, the Associated Labor Unions (ALU-TUCP) filed a motion for intervention (NCR OD-M-91-01-
002) and alleged that it has members in the proposed bargaining unit. Subsequently, the National Federation of Labor
a. One Year Bar Rule Unions (NAFLU) filed a separate petition for certification election (NCR-OD-M-91-10-058) and a motion to consolidate
related cases to avoid confusion.

G.R. No. 106830 November 16, 1993

Dissatisfied with the Decision dated July 3, 1991 rendered by Med-Arbiter R. Parungo, petitioner appealed to the DOLE
Secretary, who, through Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma, affirmed the Med-Arbiter in its Resolution dated July
R. TRANSPORT CORPORATION, petitioner, 22, 1992 calling for the conduct of the certification election (Rollo, pp. 25-28). The Resolution, in pertinent part, reads as
vs. follows:
HON. BIENVIENIDO E. LAGUESMA. in his capacity as Undersecretary of the Department of Labor and
Employment, CHRISTIAN LABOR ORGANIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (CLOP), NATIONAL
FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS (NAFLU), and ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU- xxx xxx xxx
TUCP), respondents.
The defense of res judicata is not obtaining in the present petition for certification election. It is
Gaspar V. Tagalo for petitioner. settled that for res judicata to apply there must be a final judgment on the merits on matters put in
issue. In the instant case, it could not be said that there is a final judgment on the merits of the
petition simply because the composition of the present proposed bargaining unit is different from
Jose Torregoza for Christian Labor Organization of the Philippines. that in the first petition. Moreover, there are now other parties involved, and therefore, it would not
be correct to say that the parties in the said two cases are identical.
Joji Barrios for intervenor ALU-TUCP.
xxx xxx xxx
Villy Cadiz for National Federation of Labor Unions.
With regard however, to the question on propriety of consolidation, there is merit in the argument of
respondent-appellant on the need to consolidate the separate petitions for certification election
because they involve the same bargaining unit. Case No. NCR-OD-M-91-10-058 should be
consolidated with that of Case No. NCR- OD-M-91-05-062, where the petition of NAFLU should
 be treated as an intervention and resolved by the Med-Arbiter together with the intervention of
ALU-TUCP.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Order of the Med-Arbiter calling for the conduct of the
certification election is hereby affirmed subject to the resolution of the Med-Arbiter of the motions
for intervention aforementioned (Rollo, pp. 27-28; emphasis supplied).
On July 31, 1992, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, again stressing the principle of res judicata. Petitioner
further argued that the second petition for a certification election by respondent CLOP, NAFLU and ALU-TUCP were
barred at least for a period of one year from the time the first petition of CLOP was dismissed pursuant to Section Rule
V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code as amended.
On August 25, 1991, Undersecretary Laguesma denied the motion for reconsideration (Rollo, pp. 32-34).
On September 3, 1992, petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on Prejudicial Questions as an Addendum
to the Motion for Reconsideration filed on July 31, 1992. Petitioner argued that the present case must be indefinitely
suspended until the following cases are resolved by the NLRC and the Supreme Court: a) NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-08-
04708-91 entitled "R". Transport Corporation v. Jose S. Torregaza, et. al.,  wherein Labor Arbiter de Castro declared the
strike staged by respondent CLOP illegal and ordered the strikers to pay petitioner the amount of P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages; b) NLRC-NCR Case No. 06-03415092 filed by respondent CLOP and its members for illegal
dismissal; and NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-08-04389-92 filed by respondent CLOP in behalf of its affected members for
illegal dismissal (Rollo, pp. 139-145).
On September 29, 1992, Undersecretary Laguesma in a resolution denied the motion to suspend the conduct of the
certification election. The pertinent portion of said resolution reads as follows:
The pendency of NLRC-NCR Cases Nos. 00-08- 04708-91, 06-03415092 and 00-08-04389-92
before the NLRC is not a valid ground for the suspension of the already stalled petition for
certification election which must be resolved with dispatch.
This must be so, because the employees subject of the pending cases before the NLRC legally
remain as employees of respondent until the motion to declare them as having lost their
employment status by reason of the illegal strike or their complaint for illegal dismissal is finally
resolved. (Rollo, pp. 181-182; emphasis supplied)
On October 14, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated September 29, 1992 which
was subsequently denied by Undersecretary Laguesma on October 29, 1992 (Rollo, pp. 29-31).
Petitioner filed a Comment and Objection to the Order dated October 29, 1992 with Urgent Motion to Dismiss the
Petition for Certification Election. Without waiting for the resolution of the motion to dismiss, petitioner resorted to this
Court by way of the instant special civil action.
This petition is without merit.
Before the principle of res judicata can be operative, the following requisites must be present: a) the former judgment or
order must be final; b) it must be a judgment ororder on the merits; c) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the parties; and d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of
parties (Nabus v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]).
In the case at bench, it cannot be said that the parties in the first and second actions were identical. The first action was
dismissed by the Med-Arbiter because it excluded parties essential to the bargaining unit such as inspectors,
inspectresses, dispatchers and washer boys. The second petition included all the employees who were excluded in the
first petition. Therefore, the Med-Arbiter was correct when he gave due course to the second petition for certification
election after respondent CLOP corrected its mistake.
Likewise untenable is petitioner's contention that the second petition for certification election should have been filed after
one year from the dismissal of the first petition certification election under Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code as amended. Said section provides as follows:
When to file — In the absence of collective bargaining agreement duly registered in accordance
with Article 231 of the Code, a petition for certification election may be filed any time.
However, no certification election may be held within one year from the date of the issuance of a
final certification election result (Emphasis supplied).
Apparently, petitioner misread the above-mentioned provision of law. The phrase "final certification election result"
means that there was an actual conduct of election i.e. ballots were cast and there was a counting of votes. In this case,
there was no certification election conducted precisely because the first petition was dismissed, on the ground of a
defective petition which did not include all the employees who should be properly included in the collective bargaining
unit.
Devoid of merit is petitioner's contention that the employment status of the members of respondent CLOP who joined the
strike must first be resolved before a certification election can be conducted.
As held in the case of Philippine Fruits and Vegetables Industries, Inc. v. Torres, 211 SCRA 95 (1992):
At any rate, it is now well-settled that employees who have been improperly laid-off but who have a
present, unabandoned right to or expectation of re-employment, are eligible to vote in certification
elections (Rothenberg on Labor Relations, p. 548). Thus, and to repeat, if the dismissal is under
question, as in the case now at bar whereby a case of illegal dismissal and/or unfair labor practices
was filed, the employees concerned could still qualify to vote in the elections.
Therefore, the employees of petitioner who participated in the strike, legally remain as such, until either the motion to
declare their employment status legally terminated or their complaint for illegal dismissal is resolved by the NLRC.
It should be noted that it is the petitioner, the employer, which has offered the most tenacious resistance to the holding of
a certification election. This must not be so for the choice of a collective bargaining agent is the sole concern of the
employees. The employer has no right to interfere in the election and is merely regarded as a bystander (Divine Word
University of Tacloban v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 213 SCRA 759 [1992]).
Finally, petitioner's Comment and Objection to the Order dated October 29, 1992 with Urgent Motion to Dismiss the
Petition for Certification Election is still pending with the Undersecretary of Labor. The resort to judicial action by
petitioner is premature. Hence, it is also guilty of forum-shopping in pursuing the same cause of action involving the
same issue, parties and subject matter before two different fora.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition.

G.R. No. 75810 September 9, 1991
KAISAHAN NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO (KAMPIL-KATIPUNAN), petitioner,
vs.
HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Labor Relations, and VIRON
GARMENTS MFG., CO., INC., respondents.
Esteban M. Mendoza for petitioner.
R E S O LU T I O N
NARVASA, J.:
The propriety of holding a certification election is the issue in the special civil action of certiorari at bar.
By virtue of a Resolution of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated February 27, 1981, the National Federation of Labor
Unions (NAFLU) was declared the exclusive bargaining representative of all rank-and-file employees of Viron Garments
Manufacturing Co., Inc. (VIRON).
More than four years thereafter, or on April 11, 1985, another union, the Kaisahan ng Manggagawang Pilipino KAMPIL
Katipunan filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a petition for certification election among the employees of VIRON.
The petition allegedly counted with the support of more than thirty percent (30%) of the workers at VIRON.
NAFLU opposed the petition, as might be expected. The Med-Arbiter however ordered, on June 14, 1985, that a
certification election be held at VIRON as prayed for, after ascertaining that KAMPIL had complied with all the
requirements of law and that since the certification of NAFLU as sole bargaining representative in 1981, no collective
bargaining agreement had been executed between it and VIRON.
NAFLU appealed. It contended that at the time the petition for certification election was filed on April 11, 1985, it was in
process of collective bargaining with VIRON; that there was in fact a deadlock in the negotiations which had prompted it
to file a notice of strike; and that these circumstances constituted a bar to the petition for election in accordance with
Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code,1 reading as follows:
SEC. 3. When to file. — In the absence of a collective bargaining agreement submitted in accordance with
Article 231 of the Code, a petition for certification election may be filed at any time. However, no certification
election may be held within one year from the date of issuance of declaration of a final certification election
result. Neither may a representation question be entertained if, before the filing of a petition for certification
election, a bargaining deadlock to which an incumbent or certified bargaining agent is a party had been
submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout.
If a collective bargaining agreement has been duly registered in accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a
petition for certification election or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within sixty (60) days
prior to the expiry date of such agreement.
Finding merit in a NAFLU's appeal, the Director of Labor Relations rendered a Resolution on April 30, 1986 setting
aside the Med-Arbiter's Order of June 14, 1985 and dismissing KAMPIL's petition for certification election. This
disposition is justified in the Resolution as follows:
... While it may be true that the one-year period (mentioned in Section 3 above quoted) has long run its course
since intervenor NAFLU was certified on February 27, 1981, it could not be said, however, that NAFLU slept
on its right to bargain collectively with the employer. If a closer look was made on the history of labor
management relations in the company, it could be readily seen that the delay in the negotiations for and
conclusion of a collective agreement — the object of the one-year period — could be attributed first, on the
exhaustion of all legal remedies in the representation question twice initiated in the company before the filing
of the present petition and second, to management who had been resisting the representations of NAFLU in
collective bargaining.
The one-year period therefore, should not be applied literally to the present dispute, especially considering that
intervenor had to undergo a strike to bring management to the negotiation table. ...
KAMPIL moved for reconsideration, and when this was denied, instituted in this Court the present certiorari action.
It is evident that the prohibition imposed by law on the holding of a certification election "within one year from the date
of issuance of declaration of a final certification election result' — in this case, from February 27, 1981, the date of the
Resolution declaring NAFLU the exclusive bargaining representative of rank-and-file workers of VIRON — can have no
application to the case at bar. That one-year period-known as the "certification year" during which the certified union is
required to negotiate with the employer, and certification election is prohibited2 — has long since expired.
Thus the question for resolution is whether or not KAMPIL's petition for certification election is barred because, before
its filing, a bargaining deadlock between VIRON and NAFLU as the incumbent bargaining agent, had been submitted to
conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout, in accordance with Section 3,
Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules above quoted.
Again it seems fairly certain that prior to the filing of the petition for election in this case, there was no such "bargaining
deadlock ... (which) had been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike
or lockout." To be sure, there are in the record assertions by NAFLU that its attempts to bring VIRON to the negotiation
table had been unsuccessful because of the latter's recalcitrance and unfulfilled promises to bargain collectively; 3 but
there is no proof that it had taken any action to legally coerce VIRON to comply with its statutory duty to bargain
collectively. It could have charged VIRON with unfair labor practice; but it did not. It could have gone on a legitimate
strike in protest against VIRON's refusal to bargain collectively and compel it to do so; but it did not. There are assertions
by NAFLU, too, that its attempts to bargain collectively had been delayed by continuing challenges to the resolution
pronouncing it the sole bargaining representative in VIRON; but there is no adequate substantiation thereof, or of how it
did in fact prevent initiation of the bargaining process between it and VIRON.
The stark, incontrovertible fact is that from February 27, 1981 — when NAFLU was proclaimed the exclusive bargaining
representative of all VIRON employees — to April 11, 1985 — when KAMPIL filed its petition for certification election
or a period of more than four (4) years, no collective bargaining agreement was ever executed, and no deadlock ever
arose from negotiations between NAFLU and VIRON resulting in conciliation proceedings or the filing of a valid strike
notice.
The respondents advert to a strike declared by NAFLU on October 26, 1986 for refusal of VIRON to bargain and for
violation of terms and conditions of employment, which was settled by the parties' agreement, and to another strike
staged on December 6, 1986 in connection with a claim of violation of said agreement, a dispute which has since been
certified for compulsory arbitration by the Secretary of Labor & Employment.4 Obviously, however, these activities took
place after the initiation of the certification election case by KAMPIL, and it was grave abuse of discretion to have
regarded them as precluding the holding of the certification election thus prayed for.
WHEREFORE, it being apparent that none of the proscriptions to certification election set out in the law exists in the
case at bar, and it was in the premises grave abuse of discretion to have ruled otherwise, the contested Resolution of the
respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated April 30, 1986 in BLR Case No. A-7-139-85 (BZEO-CE-04-
004-85) is NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
b. Deadlock Bar Rule
G.R. No. L-67485 April 10, 1992
NATIONAL CONGRESS OF UNIONS IN THE SUGAR INDUSTRY OF THE PHILIPPINES (NACUSIP)-
TUCP, petitioner,
vs.
DIR. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, Bureau of Labor Relations, Ministry of Labor and Employment, Manila,
FEDERATION OF UNIONS OF RIZAL (FUR)-TUCP, and CALINOG REFINERY CORPORATION
(NASUREFCO), respondents.
 
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition for certiorari  seeks to annul and set aside the decision rendered by the respondent Director Cresenciano B.
Trajano of the Bureau of Labor Relations, Ministry of Labor and Employment, dated November 18, 1983 affirming the
order of Med-Arbiter Demetrio Correa dated May 2, 1983 giving due course to the petition for certification election filed
by private respondent Federation of Unions of Rizal (FUR)-TUCP; and the order dated March 21, 1984 denying the
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the Philippines (NACUSIP)-TUCP is the certified
exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file workers of Calinog Refinery Corporation. Private respondent
Federation of Unions of Rizal (FUR)-TUCP is a labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment while private respondent Calinog Refineries Employees Union (CREU)-NACUSIP is the certified exclusive
bargaining representative of the rank and file workers of the private respondent Calinog Refinery Corporation by virtue
of the certification election held on March 30, 1981.
On June 21, 1982, petitioner union filed a petition for deadlock in collective bargaining with the Ministry of Labor and
Employment (now Department of Labor and Employment). In order to obviate friction and tension, the parties agreed to
submit the petition for deadlock to compulsory arbitration on July 14, 1982 and was docketed as RAB Case No. VI-
0220-82.
On July 21, 1982, private respondent FUR-TUCP filed with the Regional Office No. VI, MOLE (now DOLE), Iloilo City
a petition for certification election among the rank and file employees of private respondent company, alleging that: (1)
about forty-five percent (45%) of private respondent company's employees had disaffiliated from petitioner union and
joined private respondent union; (2) no election had been held for the past twelve (12) months; and (3) while petitioner
union had been certified as the sole collective bargaining agent, for over a year it failed to conclude a collective
bargaining agreement with private respondent company. Petitioner union filed a motion to intervene in the petition for
certification election filed by private respondent union.
By order dated July 23, 1982, the Acting Med-Arbiter Pacifico V. Militante dismissed the petition for certification
election for lack of merit since the petition is barred by a pending bargaining deadlock.
On August 25, 1982, private respondent union filed an appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations, Manila.
The Bureau of Labor Relations through respondent Director Cresenciano B. Trajano rendered a decision on September
30, 1982 setting aside the order of the Acting Med-Arbiter and remanding the case to Regional Office VI, Iloilo City for
hearing and reception of evidence.
On May 2, 1983, Honorable Med-Arbiter Demetrio Correa issued an order in LRD Case No. 4293 giving due course to
the petition of private respondent FUR-TUCP and ordering that an election be held within 20 days from receipt of the
order.
From the order of Med-Arbiter Correa, petitioner interposed an appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations.
During the pendency of the appeal or on September 10, 1983, a collective bargaining agreement was entered and
executed by the management of the National Sugar Refineries Co., Inc. and petitioner union and was subsequently
ratified by a majority of the rank and file employees. On the basis of the concluded CBA, the Honorable Executive Labor
Arbiter Celerino Grecia II issued an award dated September 12, 1983 adopting the submitted agreement as the CBA
between the parties.
On November 18, 1983, respondent Director Trajano rendered a decision affirming with qualification the order of Med-
Arbiter Correa dated May 2, 1983, the pertinent portions of which provide as follows:
It appears that the Calinog Refinery Employees, Union-NACUSIP-TUCP no longer commands the
support of the majority of the employees. This observation is buttressed by the fact that more than
seventy five percent (75%) of the workers have disaffiliated from the intervenor and joined the
ranks of the petitioner. Thus, intervenor's status as sole and exclusive bargaining representative is
now of doubtful validity.
 For the above-mentioned reason, we stand obliged to resort to the most expeditious, practical and
democratic option open to us, that is, the conduct of a certification election. Through this forum, the
true sentiments of the workers as to which labor organization deserves their loyalty can be fairly
ascertained. In any event, it is our view that the 10 September 1983 collective agreement should be
respected by the union that shall prevail in the election not only because it is an arbitration award
but also because substantial benefits are provided thereunder. Otherwise stated, the winning union
shall administer said agreement. In passing, it may be pointed out that CAREFCO has been included
as one of the contending parties in the election. We feel that it is error for the acting Med-Arbiter to
do so considering that the company is a mere bystander in this representation dispute.
WHEREFORE, as above qualified, the Order dated 2 May 1983 is affirmed.
SO DECIDED. (Rollo, pp. 40-41)
From the decision of respondent Director Trajano, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration dated December 6, 1983.
The respondent Director in his order dated March 21, 1984 denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit and
affirmed the Bureau's decision of November 18, 1983.
Hence, this petition.
This Court in a resolution dated December 10, 1984 resolved to grant the urgent motion of petitioner for the issuance of a
restraining order and issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from conducting and holding the
certification election on December 17, 1984 among the rank and file employees of respondent company (see Rollo, p.
99).
Petitioner maintains that respondent Director Trajano committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it rendered a decision affirming the order of Med-Arbiter Correa finding that the deadlock is "nothing
but a mere subterfuge to obstruct the exercise of the workers of their legitimate right to self-organization, a last minute
maneuver to deny the workers the exercise of their constitutional rights" (Rollo, p. 28) and ordering a certification
election among the rank and file workers of respondent company.
Furthermore, petitioner stresses that the finding that the contract (deadlock) bar rule has no room for application in the
instant case, runs counter to the provision of Section 3 of the Rules Implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 which
prohibits the filing of a petition for certification election during the pendency of a bargaining deadlock.
In conformity with the petitioner's contentions, the Solicitor General insists that the respondent Director has acted
arbitrarily in issuing the assailed decision and order. In addition, it argues that the CBA concluded on September 10,
1983 has a life span of three (3) years and constitutes a bar to the petition for certification election pursuant to Section 3
of the Rules Implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 130.
The pivotal issue therefore, is whether or not a petition for certification election may be filed during the pendency of a
bargaining deadlock submitted to arbitration or conciliation.
After a careful review of the records of this case, the Court finds the petition meritorious and holds that the respondent
Director gravely abused his discretion when he affirmed the order of Med-Arbiter Correa calling for a certification
election among the rank and file workers of private respondent company.
The law on the matter is Section 3, Book V, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, to wit:
Sec. 3. When to file. — In the absence of a collective bargaining agreement duly registered in
accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a petition for certification election may be filed at any
time. However, no certification election may be held within one year from the date of issuance of a
final certification election result. Neither may a representation question be entertained if, before the
filing of a petition for certification election, a bargaining deadlock to which an incumbent or
certified bargaining agent is a party had been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become
the subject of valid notice or strike or lockout.
If a collective bargaining agreement has been duly registered in accordance with Article 231 of the
Code, a petition for certification election or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within
sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of such agreement.
The clear mandate of the aforequoted section is that a petition for certification election may be filed at any time, in the
absence of a collective bargaining agreement. Otherwise put, the rule prohibits the filing of a petition for certification
election in the following cases:
(1) during the existence of a collective bargaining agreement except within the freedom period;
(2) within one (1) year from the date of issuance of declaration of a final certification election result; or
(3) during the existence of a bargaining deadlock to which an incumbent or certified bargaining agent is a party and
which had been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout.
The Deadlock Bar Rule simply provides that a petition for certification election can only be entertained if there is no
pending bargaining deadlock submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike
or lockout. The principal purpose is to ensure stability in the relationship of the workers and the management.
In the case at bar, a bargaining deadlock was already submitted to arbitration when private respondent FUR-TUCP filed a
petition for certification election. The same petition was dismissed for lack of merit by the Acting Med-Arbiter in an
order dated July 23, 1982 on the sole ground that the petition is barred by a pending bargaining deadlock. However,
respondent Director set aside the same order and subsequently affirmed an order giving due course to the petition for
certification election and ordering that an election be held.
The law demands that the petition for certification election should fail in the presence of a then pending bargaining
deadlock.
A director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, by the nature of his functions, acts in a quasi-judicial capacity. We find no
reason why his decision should be beyond this Court's review. Administrative officials, like the director of the Bureau of
Labor Relations are presumed to act in accordance with law but this Court will not hesitate to pass upon their work where
there is a showing of abuse of authority or discretion in their official acts or when their decisions or orders are tainted
with unfairness or arbitrariness.
Noteworthy is the fact that a certification was issued by Executive Labor Arbiter Celerino Grecia II on October 21, 1982
certifying that the petition for deadlock in RAB Case No. VI-0220-82 was forwarded to the Executive Labor Arbiter for
compulsory arbitration (see Rollo, p. 19). The respondent Director erred in finding that the order issued by the Med-
Arbiter dismissing the petition for certification election was irregular and was merely based on information.
All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the assailed decision and order of the respondent Director is tainted
with arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED; the decision dated November 18, 1983 and order dated March 21, 1984 of
the respondent Director Cresenciano B. Trajano are hereby nullified and the order of Med-Arbiter Militante dated July
23, 1982 dismissing the petition for certification election is hereby reinstated.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 91915. September 11, 1992.]
DIVINE WORD UNIVERSITY OF TACLOBAN, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT and DIVINE WORD UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES UNION-ALU, Respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari for being violative of the "constitutional right of employees to self-
organization which includes the right to form, join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes of
collective bargaining," are the Orders of May 23, 1989 and January 17, 1990 issued by then Secretary of Labor and
Employment Franklin H. Drilon and Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment Dionisio D. de la Serna, respectively.
Culled from the records are the following facts which led to the filing of the instant petition:
On September 6, 1984, Med-Arbiter Bienvenido C. Elorcha certified the Divine Word University Employees
Union (DWUEU) as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the Divine Word University (University for brevity). On
March 7, 1985, DWUEU submitted its collective bargaining proposals. On March 26, 1985, the University replied and
requested a preliminary conference to be held on May 28, 1985. However, two days before the scheduled conference or
on May 26, 1985, DWUEU’s resigned vice-president Mr. Brigido Urminita (or Urmeneta) wrote a letter addressed to the
University unilaterally withdrawing the CBA proposals. Consequently, the preliminary conference was cancelled.
After almost three years, or on March 11, 1988, DWUEU, which had by then affiliated with the Associated
Labor Union, requested a conference with the University for the purpose of continuing the collective bargaining
negotiations. Not having heard from the University, DWUEU-ALU sent a follow-up letter on March 23, 1988 reiterating
its request for a conference and warning the University against committing acts of interference through its various
meetings with both the academic and non-academic employees regarding their union affiliation and activities. Despite the
letter, the University persisted in maintaining silence.
On April 25, 1988, DWUEU-ALU filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of the
Department of Labor and Employment a notice of strike on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and unfair labor practice
acts, specifically, refusal to bargain, discrimination and coercion on (sic) employees. 5 The conferences which were held
after the filing of the notice of strike led to the conclusion of an agreement between the University and DWUEU-ALU on
May 10, 1888 with the following terms:
"1. Union will submit their (sic) CBA proposals on Friday, May 13, 1988 for whatever action management
will take.
2. Union and management agrees (sic) to sit down and determine (sic) the number of employees that will
represent their bargaining unit.
3. Conciliation proceedings is (sic) temporarily suspended until the parties inform this office of further
development.
4. The issues of discrimination: re Ms. Colinayo and Ms. Cinco Flores is settled.
5. Issue (sic) on coercion and refusal to bargain shall be subject of continuing dialogue.
6. Atty. Jacinto shall be given 10 days notice in the next conciliation meeting."
However, it turned out that an hour before the May 10, 1988 agreement was concluded, the University had
filed a petition for certification election with the Region VIII office of the Department of Labor and Employment.
On the other hand, on May 19, 1988, DWUEU-ALU, consonant with the agreement, submitted its collective
bargaining proposals. These were ignored by the University. Thereafter, through the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board (NCMB) of Region VIII, marathon conciliation conferences were conducted but to no avail. Hence, on August 25,
1988, then Secretary of Labor Franklin M. Drilon, exercising his powers under Art. 263(g) of the Labor Code, issued an
Order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute and directing all striking workers to report back to work within
twenty-four (24) hours and the management to accept them back under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to
the work stoppage. The Secretary also designated the NCMB to hear the case and to submit its report thereon.
On the same day, Med-Arbiter Rodolfo S. Milado, acting on the University’s petition for certification election,
issued an Order directing the conduct of a certification election to be participated in by DWUEU-ALU and "no union,"
after he found the petition to be "well-supported in fact and in law."
Said Order prompted the DWUEU-ALU to file with the Secretary of Labor an urgent motion seeking to enjoin
Milado from further acting on the matter of the certification election. On September 20, 1988, the Labor Secretary
granted said motion and directed Milado to hold in abeyance any and all certification election proceedings at the
University pending the resolution of the labor dispute. The Labor Secretary’s Order, predicated on his extraordinary
powers under Art. 263 (g) of the Labor Code, conformed with this Court s Resolution of October 29, 1987 in the Bulletin
Today cases (G.R. Nos. 79276 and 79883) where the issue of strong disagreement among the parties on the question of
representation was deemed subsumed in the labor dispute certified for compulsory arbitration. The Secretary added:
"Underscoring the necessity to conform with this settled doctrine is the fact that the dispute over which this
Office assumed jurisdiction arose from the alleged continued refusal by the University to negotiate a CBA with the
Union despite the latter’s certification as exclusive bargaining agent in 1984. Necessarily related thereto is the
representativity issue raised by the University in its certification election petition. The resolution of these issues in one
proceeding is, in the words of the Supreme Court, ‘meet and proper in view of the very special circumstances obtaining
in this case, and will prevent split jurisdiction and that multiplicity of proceedings which the law abhors’ (24 December
1987 [should be December 17, 1987] resolution of the Supreme Court in the Bulletin Today cases, supra).
Moreover, to allow a certification election to proceed at this point in time might further rupture the already
strained labor-management relations pervading at the University. The assumption order issued by this Office merely
served as a temporary bond to hold together such a fragile relationship. More importantly, the projected election hastily
decreed would preempt the proper resolution of the issues raised and pursued so zealously by the employees that
prompted them to stage their strike."
The NCMB of Region VIII conducted hearings on the case from October 17-18, 1988. On October 26, 1988,
the Divine Word University Independent Faculty and Employees Union (DWUIFEU), which was registered earlier that
day, filed a motion for intervention alleging that it had "at least 20% of the rank and file employees" of the University.
Exercising once again his extraordinary powers under Art. 263(g) of the Labor Code, the Secretary
consolidated "the entire labor dispute including all incidents arising therefrom, or necessarily related thereto" in his Order
of May 23, 1989 13 and the following cases were "subsumed or consolidated to the labor dispute" : the petition for
certification election docketed as MED-ARB-Case No. 5-04-88, the DWUEU’s complaint docketed as NLRC Case No.
8-0321-88, and the University’s complaint docketed as NLRC Case No. 8-0323-88. Thus, in said Order of May 23, 1989,
the Secretary of Labor resolved these issues:" (1) whether there was refusal to bargain and an impasse in bargaining; (2)
whether the complaints for unfair labor practices against each other filed by both parties, including the legality of the
strike with the NLRC, which later on was subsumed by the assumption Order, are with merits; and, (3) whether or not the
certification election can be passed upon by this Office."
On the first issue, the Secretary of Labor said:
"It is a matter of record that when the Union filed its Notice of Strike (Exh. A) two of the issues it raised were
bargaining deadlock and refusal to bargain. It is also worth mentioning that the CBA proposals by the Union were
submitted on March 7, 1985 (Exh. 9) after Med-Arbiter Bienvenido Elorcha issued a certification election Order dated
September 6, 1984 (Exh. 4). An examination of the CBA proposals submitted by the Union of the University showed
there was (sic) some negotiations that has (sic) taken place as indicated on the handwritten notations made in the CBA
proposal (Exh. F). The said proposals include among others, union scope, union recognition, union security, union rights,
job security, practices and privileges, terms and conditions of work, leave of absence, hours of work, compensation
salary and wages, workers’ rights and safety, workers’ education, retirement longevity pay, strike and lockouts and
grievance machinery.
The said CBA proposals were indorsed by DWU President to Atty. Generosa R. Jacinto, Divine Word
University legal counsel together with a copy of the Union CBA proposals. The submission of the CBA proposals and
the reply letter of the DWU counsel, dated March 26, 1985 to the Union indicated that the CBA negotiations process was
set into motion. DWU’s counsel even suggested that the preliminary conference between the union and the university be
scheduled on 28 May 1985 at 2:30 P.M. which unfortunately did not take place due to the alleged withdrawal of the CBA
proposals.
Undeniably, the Union and the DWU have not been able to conclude a CBA since its certification on 6
September 1984 by then Med-Arbiter Bienvenido Elorcha. But the non-conclusion of a CBA within one year, as in this
case, does not automatically authorize the holding of a certification election when it appears that a bargaining deadlock
issue has been submitted to conciliation by the certified bargaining agent. The records show that the Notice of Strike was
filed by the Union on 25 April 1988, citing bargaining deadlock as one of the grounds (Annex ‘1’), while the Petition for
Certification Election was filed by the DWU on 10 May 1988. The filing of the notice of strike was precipitated by the
University’s act of not replying to the Union’s letters of March 11 and March 23, 1988.
This being the case, Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code applies and we
quote:
‘Sec. 3. When to file. In the absence of a collective bargaining agreement submitted in accordance with Article
231 of the Code, a petition for certification election may be filed at any time. However, no certification election may be
held within one year from the date of issuance of declaration of a final certification election result. Neither may a
representation question be entertained it (sic) before the filing of a petition for certification election, a bargaining
deadlock to which an incumbent or certified bargaining agent is a party has been submitted to conciliation or arbitration
or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout.’
Clearly, a bargaining deadlock exists and as a matter of fact this is being conciliated by the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board at the time the University filed its Petition for Certification Election on 10 May 1988.
In fact the deadlock remained unresolved and was in fact mutually agreed upon to be conciliated further by the NCMB as
per items 1 and 5 of the ‘Agreement’ (Exhibit ‘L’).
The aforequoted rule clearly barred the Med-Arbiter from further entertaining the petition for certification
election. Furthermore, the various communications sent to the University by the Union prior to the filing of the notice of
strike was enough opportunity for the former to raise the issue of representation if it really casts doubt to the majority
status of the Union. More importantly, if DWU indeed doubted the status of the union, how come it entered into an
agreement with the latter on May 10, 1988. Apparently, the move to file the petition on the same day was an afterthought
on the part of the University which this Office considers as fatal."
The same Order dismissed not only the case filed by DWUEU-ALU for unfair labor practice on the ground of
the union’s failure to prove the commission of the unfair labor practice acts specifically complained of (NLRC Case No.
8-0321-88) but also the complaint filed by the University for unfair labor practices and illegal strike for "obvious lack of
merit brought about by its utter failure to submit evidence" (NLRC Case No. 8-0323-88).
Citing the Bulletin Today cases, the said Order pronounced as untenable the University s claim that the
assumption Order earlier issued by the Office of the Secretary of Labor merely held in abeyance the holding of a
certification election and that the representation issue was not deemed consolidated by virtue of the said assumption
Order. Accordingly, the Order has this dispositive portion:
"WHEREFORE, ALL THE FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Divine Word University of
Tacloban and the Divine Word University Employees Union are hereby directed to enter into a collective bargaining
agreement by adopting the Union’s CBA proposals sent to the DWU President on 19 May 1988 (Exhibit ‘6’). DWU is
hereby warned that any unwarranted delay in the execution of the collective bargaining agreement will be construed as an
unfair labor practice act. Moreover, the petition for certification election filed by the University is hereby dismissed for
lack of merit and the Order of Med-Arbiter Rodolfo Milado set aside. Likewise, NLRC CASES Nos. 8-0321-88 and 8-
0323 filed by the Union and the DWU, respectively, are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED."
The University filed a motion for the reconsideration of said Order. It was opposed by the DWUEU-ALU.
However, since on May 5, 1989 the DWUEU-ALU had filed a second notice of strike charging the University with
violation of the return-to-work order of the Secretary of Labor and unfair labor practices such as dismissal of union
officers, coercion of employees and illegal suspension, 16 the Office of the Secretary called for a series of conciliation
and mediation conferences between the parties. At the July 5, 1989 conference, the University agreed to submit its
proposals on how to settle amicably the labor dispute on or before July 17, 1989.
On said date, however, the University failed to appear. Instead, its representative phoned in a request for the
resetting of the conference purportedly because its Board of Directors had failed to muster a quorum. Hence, after so
informing ALU’s Eastern Visayas Vice-President, the conference was rescheduled for July 19, 1989. The University
once again failed to appear.
In view of the University’s intransigence, the DWUEU-ALU pursued its second notice of strike on November
24, 1989. Four days later, the University filed with the Office of the Secretary of Labor a motion praying that said Office
assume jurisdiction over the dispute or certify the same to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration on the ground that the
strike affected not only the University but also its other academic and non-academic employees, the students and their
parents. On December 4, 1989, the Office of the Secretary of Labor received a Resolution passed by the students of the
University urging said Office’s assumption of jurisdiction over the labor dispute and the earliest resolution of the case
Consequently, on December 29, 1989, Secretary Drilon issued an Order reiterating the August 28, 1988 Order
which assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute. He ordered all striking workers to return to work within 24 hours and
the University to accept them back under the same terms and conditions of employment; deemed the issues raised in the
May 5, 1989 notice of strike as "subsumed in this case" ; ordered the Director of Regional Office No. VIII to hear the
issues raised in said notice of strike and to submit his findings and recommendations within ten days from submission of
the case by the parties, and enjoined the parties to cease and desist from any act that may "aggravate the employer-
employee relationship."
On January 17, 1990, Acting Secretary of Labor Dionisio L. de la Serna, "dismissed" for lack of merit the
University’s motion for reconsideration and affirmed the Order of May 23, 1989. He noted the fact that the March 7,
1985 collective bargaining proposals of the DWUEU had not been validly withdrawn as the union’s Vice-President had
resigned and the withdrawal was signed only by three of the eight members of the Executive Board of said union.
Granting that the withdrawal was valid, the Acting Secretary believed that it did not "exculpate the University from the
duty to bargain with the Union" because the collective bargaining processes had been "set in motion from the time the
CBA proposals was (sic) received by the University until the impasse took place on account of its failure to reply to the
Union’s letters pursuing its CBA Proposals dated March 11 and 23, 1988."
On the University’s assertion that no negotiations took place insofar as the March 7, 1985 collective
bargaining proposals are concerned, the Acting Secretary found that
". . . The records indicate otherwise Conciliation meetings were conducted precisely to discuss the CBA
proposals the Union submitted to the University on March 7, 1985. As a matter of fact, the University admitted the
existence of the deadlock when a provision was incorporated in the agreement it signed on May 10, 1988 with the Union
which reads:
‘a. That on the matter of Bargaining Deadlock —
1. Union will submit their (renewed) CBA proposals on Friday May 13, 1988 for whatever action management
will take.
2. Union and Management agree to sit down and determine the number of employees that will represent
(constitute) their bargaining unit;
On account of the deadlock regarding the March 7, 1985 CBA proposals, it was agreed that the Union submit a
renewed CBA proposal which it did on May 19, 1988. The records indicate that no response was made by the University.
The uncooperative posture of the University to respond and continue with the negotiations could very well be explained
when one (1) hour prior to the start of the conciliation on May 10, 1988, the University filed a Petition for Certification
with (sic) Regional Office. The surreptitious filing of the petition and at the same time cunningly entering into an
agreement which required the Union to submit a renewed CBA proposal, is patently negotiating in bad faith. The
University should have candidly and timely raised the issue of representation, if it believed that such issue was valid, not
by entering into an agreement. The May 10, 1988 Agreement only served to falsely heighten the expectations of the
Union and this Office that a mutually acceptable settlement of the dispute was in the offing. This Office cannot tolerate
such actuations by the University."
The Acting Secretary then concluded that for reneging on the agreement of May 10, 1988 and for its
"reluctance and subscription to legal delay," the University should be "declared in default." He also maintained that since
under the circumstances the University cannot claim deprivation of due process, the Office of the Secretary of Labor may
rightfully impose the Union’s May 19, 1988 collective bargaining agreement proposals motu proprio. On the University’s
contention that the motion for intervention of the DWU-IFEU was not resolved, the Acting Secretary ruled that said
motion was in effect denied when the petition for certification election filed by the University was dismissed in the Order
of May 23, 1989.
Hence, the University had recourse to instant petition.
In its petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed on February 9, 1990, the
University raises as grounds therefor the following:
"A. Respondent Secretary committed grave and patent abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
issuing his order dated 17 January 1990 finally denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in the face of the order
dated 29 December 1989 and subsequent acts of DOLE official subsuming the second notice of strike with the first notice
of strike.
B. In the absence of a certified CBA and there having been no certification election held in petitioner unit for
more than five (5) years, a certification election is mandatory.
C. Respondent Secretary committed grave and patent abuse of discretion in issuing his orders dated 23 May
1989 and 17 January 1990 disregarding evidence on record, provisions of law and established jurisprudence.
D. Petitioner was denied due process."
Citing the dispositive portion of the December 29, 1989 Order of the Secretary of Labor which states that the
issues raised in the May 5, 1989 notice of strike "are ordered subsumed in this case" and elaborating on the meaning of
the word "subsume," i.e., "to include within a larger class, group, order, etc.," 19 the petitioner University argues that the
Secretary of Labor "cannot resolve petitioner’s and (intervenor) DWU-IFEU’s motions for reconsideration (in the NS. 1)
of the Order dated 23 May 1989 until the proceedings in the subsumed NS. 2 are terminated." It opines that since the
Regional Director is an extension of the Secretary of Labor, the latter should have waited for the recommendation of the
former on the issues in notices of strike nos. 1 and 2 before the he issued the Order of January 17, 1990.
We agree with the Acting Secretary of Labor’s observation that the action for intervention had in effect been
denied by the dismissal of the petition for certification election in the May 23, 1989 Order. The sub silencio treatment of
the motion for intervention in said Order does not mean that the motion was overlooked. It only means, as shown by the
findings of facts in the same Order, that there was no necessity for the holding of a certification election wherein the
DWU-IFEU could participate. In this regard, petitioner’s undue interest in the resolution of the DWU-IFEU’s motion for
intervention becomes significant since a certification election is the sole concern of employees except where the
employer itself has to file a petition for certification election. But once an employer has filed said petition, as the
petitioner did in this case, its active role ceases and it becomes a mere bystander. Any uncalled-for concern on the part of
the employer may give rise to the suspicion that it is batting for a company union.
Petitioner’s contention that the Acting Secretary of Labor should have deferred the issuance of the Order of
January 17, 1990 until after his receipt of the Regional Director’s recommendation on the notices of strike is, under the
circumstances, untenable. Ideally, a single decision or order should settle all controversies resulting from a labor dispute.
This is in consonance with the principle of avoiding multiplicity of suits. However, the exigencies of a case may also
demand that some matters be threshed out and resolved ahead of the others. Any contrary interpretation of the Secretary
of Labor’s powers under Art. 263(g) of the Labor Code on this matter would only result in confusion and delay in the
resolution of the manageable aspects of the labor dispute
In this case, resolution of the motion for reconsideration at the earliest possible time was urgently needed to set
at rest the issues regarding the first notice of strike, the certification election and the unfair labor practice cases filed by
the University and the DWUEU-ALU. The nature of the business of the University demanded immediate and effective
action on the part of the respondent public officials. Otherwise, not only the contending parties in the dispute would be
adversely affected but more importantly, the studentry and their parents. It should be emphasized that on January 17,
1990, the second notice of strike could not have been resolved as yet considering that at that time, Regional Director
Teddy S. Cabeltes was still conducting the conference between the parties in pursuance of the directive in the Order of
December 19, 1989. The Secretary, or for that matter, the Acting Secretary, could not have intended the efforts of the
Regional Director to be inutile or fruitless. Thus, when he set aside the issues raised in the second notice of strike, the
Acting Secretary was acting in accordance with the exigencies of the circumstances of the case. Hardly can it be said to
be an abuse of his discretion
On the issue of whether or not a certification election should have been ordered by the Secretary of Labor,
pertinent are the following respective provisions of the Labor Code and Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the same
"ART. 258. When an employer may file petition. — When requested to bargain collectively, an employer may
petition the Bureau for an election. If there is no existing certified collective bargaining agreement in the unit, the Bureau
shall, after hearing, order a certification election.
All certification cases shall be decided within twenty (20) working days.
The Bureau shall conduct a certification election within twenty (20) days in accordance with the rules and
regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Labor.
Sec. 3. When to file. — In the absence of a collective bargaining agreement duly registered in accordance with
Article 231 of the Code, a petition for certification election may be filed at any time. However, no certification election
may be held within one year from the date of issuance of a final certification election result. Neither may a representation
question be entertained if, before the filing of a petition for certification election, a bargaining deadlock to which an
incumbent or certified bargaining agent is a party had been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the
subject of valid notice of strike or lockout. (Emphasis supplied)
If a collective bargaining agreement has been duly registered in accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a
petition for certification election or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the
expiry date of such agreement."
These provisions make it plain that in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement, an employer who is
requested to bargain collectively may file a petition for certification election any time except upon a clear showing that
one of these two instances exists: (a) the petition is filed within one year from the date of issuance of a final certification
election result or (b) when a bargaining deadlock had been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the
subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout.
While there is no question that the petition for certification election was filed by the herein petitioner after
almost four years from the time of the certification election and, therefore, there is no question as to the timeliness of the
petition, the problem appears to lie in the fact that the Secretary of Labor had found that a bargaining deadlock exists
A "deadlock" is defined as the "counteraction of things producing entire stoppage: a state of inaction or of
neutralization caused by the opposition of persons or of factions (as in government or a voting body): standstill." There is
a deadlock when there is a "complete blocking or stoppage resulting from the action of equal and opposed forces; as, the
deadlock of a jury or legislature." The word is synonymous with the word impasse which, within the meaning of the
American federal labor laws, "presupposes reasonable effort at good faith bargaining which, despite noble intentions,
does not conclude in agreement between the parties."
A thorough study of the records reveals that there was no "reasonable effort at good faith bargaining" specially
on the part of the University. Its indifferent attitude towards collective bargaining inevitably resulted in the failure of the
parties to arrive at an agreement. As it was evident that unilateral moves were being undertaken only by the DWUEU-
ALU, there was no "counteraction" of forces or an impasse to speak of. While collective bargaining should be initiated
by the union, there is a corresponding responsibility on the part of the employer to respond in some manner to such acts.
This is clear from the provisions of the Labor Code Art. 250(a) of which state
"ART. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. — The following procedures shall be observed in collective
bargaining:
(a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a written notice upon the other party with a
statement of its proposals. The other party shall make a reply thereto not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt of
such notice.
(b) Should differences arise on the basis of such notice and reply, either party may request for a conference
which shall begin not later than ten (10) calendar days from the date of request.
(c) If the dispute is not settled, the Board shall intervene upon request of either or both parties or at its own
initiative and immediately call the parties to conciliation meetings. The Board shall have the power to issue subpoenas
requiring the attendance of the parties to such meetings. It shall be the duty of the parties to participate fully and
promptly in the conciliation meetings the Board may call;
(d) During the conciliation proceedings in the Board, the parties are prohibited from doing any act which may
disrupt or impede the early settlement of the disputes; and
(e) The Board shall exert all efforts to settle disputes amicably and encourage the parties to submit their case to
a voluntary arbitrator."
Considering the procedure outlined above, the Court cannot help but notice that the DWUEU was not entirely
blameless in the matter of the delay in the bargaining process. While it is true that as early as March 7, 1985, said union
had submitted its collective bargaining proposals and that, its subsequent withdrawal by the DWUEU Vice-President
being unauthorized and therefore ineffective, the same proposals could be considered as subsisting, the fact remains that
said union remained passive for three years. The records do not show that during this three-year period, it exerted any
effort to pursue collective bargaining as a means of attaining better terms of employment.
It was only after its affiliation with the ALU that the same union, through the ALU Director for Operations,
requested an "initial conference" for the purpose of collective bargaining. 25 That the DWUEU abandoned its collective
bargaining proposals prior to its affiliation with ALU is further confirmed by the fact that in the aforequoted May 10,
1988 agreement with the University, said Union bound itself to submit a new set of proposals on May 13, 1988. Under
the circumstances, the agreement of May 10, 1988 may as well be considered the written notice to bargain referred to in
the aforequoted Art. 250(a) of the Labor Code, which thereby set into motion the machinery for collective bargaining, as
in fact, on May 19, 1988, DWUEU-ALU submitted its collective bargaining proposals.
Be that as it may, the Court is not inclined to rule that there has been a deadlock or an impasse in the collective
bargaining process. As the Court earlier observed, there has not been a "reasonable effort at good faith bargaining" on the
part of the University. While DWUEU-ALU was opening all possible avenues for the conclusion of an agreement, the
record is replete with evidence on the University’s reluctance and thinly disguised refusal to bargain with the duly
certified bargaining agent, such that the inescapable conclusion is that the University evidently had no intention of
bargaining with it. Thus, while the Court recognizes that technically, the University has the right to file the petition for
certification election as there was no bargaining deadlock to speak of, to grant its prayer that the herein assailed Orders
be annulled would put an unjustified premium on bad faith bargaining.
Bad faith on the part of the University is further exemplified by the fact that an hour before the start of the
May 10, 1988 conference, it surreptitiously filed the petition for certification election. And yet during said conference, it
committed itself to "sit down" with the Union. Obviously, the University tried to preempt the conference which would
have legally foreclosed its right to file the petition for certification election. In so doing, the University failed to act in
accordance with Art. 252 of the Labor Code which defines the meaning of the duty to bargain collectively as "the
performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith." Moreover, by filing
the petition for certification election while agreeing to confer with the DWUEU-ALU, the University violated the
mandate of Art. 19 of the Civil Code that" (e)very person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."
Moreover, the University’s unscrupulous attitude towards the DWUEU-ALU is also betrayed by its belated
questioning of the status of the said union. The communications between them afforded the University ample opportunity
to raise the issue of representation if indeed it was doubtful of the DWUEU-ALU’s status as a majority union, but it
failed to do so. On the other hand, in the agreement of May 10, 1988, the University even agreed "to sit down and
determine the number of employees that will represent their bargaining unit." This clearly indicates that the University
recognized the DWUEU-ALU as the bargaining representative of the employees and is, therefore, estopped from
questioning the majority status of the said union.
Hence, petitioner’s contention that the DWUEU-ALU’s proposals may not be unilaterally imposed on it on the
ground that a collective bargaining agreement is a contract wherein the consent of both parties is indispensable is devoid
of merit. A similar argument had already been disregarded in the case of Kiok Loy v. NLRC, where we upheld the order
of the NLRC declaring the union’s draft CBA proposal as the collective agreement which should govern the relationship
between the parties. Kiok Loy v. NLRC is applicable in the instant case considering that the facts therein have also been
indubitably established in this case. These factors are: (a) the union is the duly certified bargaining agent; (b) it made a
definite request to bargain and submitted its collective bargaining proposals, and (c) the University made no counter
proposal whatsoever. As we said in Kiok Loy," [a] company’s refusal to make counter proposal if considered in relation
to the entire bargaining process, may indicate bad faith and this is especially true where the Union’s request for a counter
proposal is left unanswered." Moreover, the Court added in the same case that "it is not obligatory upon either side of a
labor controversy to precipitately accept or agree to the proposals of the other. But an erring party should not be tolerated
and allowed with impunity to resort to schemes feigning negotiations by going through empty gestures."
That being the case, the petitioner may not validly assert that its consent should be a primordial consideration
in the bargaining process. By its acts, no less than its inaction which bespeak its insincerity, it has forfeited whatever
rights it could have asserted as an employer. We, therefore, find it superfluous to discuss the two other contentions in its
petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. This decision is immediately executory.
Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.
c. Contract Bar Rule
G.R. Nos. L-38955-56 October 31, 1974
CONFEDERATION OF CITIZENS LABOR UNIONS (CCLU), CONTINENTAL EMPLOYEES AND
LABORERS ASSOCIATION (CELA) AND REDSON EMPLOYEES AND LABORERS ASSOCIATION
(RELA), petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, THE SECRETARY OF LABOR, FEDERATION OF FREE
WORKERS, CONTINENTAL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION AND REDSON TEXTILE
MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, respondents.
O. B. Gesmundo and R. E. Maderazo for petitioners.
Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo for respondent Redson Textile Manufacturing Corporation.
F. F Bonifacio, Jr. for respondent Federation of Free Workers.
A. K. Tan for respondent Continental Manufacturing Corporation.
Sol. Gen. E. P. Mendoza and Sol. Romeo C. de la Cruz for respondents Secretary of Labor and The Commission.
FERNANDEZ, J.:p
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition to have the respondents National Labor Relations Commission declared
without jurisdiction over its cases Nos. LR-2751 and 2883 with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin
said Respondent from proceeding with the scheduled certification election on July 23, 1974.
G. R. No. L-38895. On February 15, 1974 the Continental Manufacturing Corporation, (hereinafter referred to as CMC)
renewed for another three years or until February 15, 1977 its collective bargaining agreement with Continental
Employees and Laborers Association (hereinafter referred to as CELA) an affiliate of petitioner Confederation of
Citizens Labor Unions, (hereinafter referred to as CCLU) which is a legitimate labor organization. Copy of this collective
bargaining agreement was attached to the petition as Annex A, and appears to have been acknowledged on February 21,
1974. Three days before February 15, 1974 however, that is, on February 12, 1974, respondent Federation of Free
Workers (hereinafter referred to as FFW), another legitimate labor organization, filed with the National Labor Relations
Commission (hereinafter referred to as NLRC), a "Petition for Certification Election at the Continental Manufacturing
Corporation",1 and docketed as NLRC Case No. LR-2751. A copy of this petition was furnished CMC on February 22,
1974. Subsequently, on February 25, 1974 a copy of the CMC-CELA collective bargaining agreement was filed with the
Bureau of Labor Relations for certification. The collective bargaining agreement was certified on March 4, 1974. 2 On
February 28, 1974, CMC filed its answer to the petition praying for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of the
contract-bar rule.
G.R. No L-38956. A three-year collective bargaining agreement 3 was signed on March 4, 1974 4 but to be effective as of
February 16, 1974 by Redson Textile Manufacturing Company (hereinafter referred to as REDSON) and Redson
Employees and laborers Association (hereinafter referred to as RELA). Said agreement was filed with the NLRC on
March 7, 1974, and certified on March 15, 1974. The FFW, however, had already filed on February 25, 1974 it, "Petition
for Certification Election at Redson and Company, Inc." with the NLRC, and docketed as NLRC Case No. LR-
2883.5 REDSON was furnished a copy of the petition on March 7, 1974. On March 18, 1974 REDSON filed its answer
praying for the dismissal of the petition principally on the ground that the petition was barred by the collective bargaining
agreement which it had signed with RELA.
The CELA-CCLU and RELA-CCLU filed on April 23, 1974 a motion to dismiss6 the petitions for certification election,
and on May 8, 1974 a supplemental motion to dismiss.7
Respondent NLRC rendered its decision dated April 26, 1974, which consolidated the two petitions for certification
election inasmuch as they raised identical issues, granted the petitions, and directed the Bureau of Labor Relations to
conduct the certification elections within ten days from receipt thereof. 8 Copy thereof was received by petitioners on May
11, 1974.
Petitioners filed on May 15, 1974 their "Motion for Reconsideration and/or Appeal from the NLRC Decision of 26th of
April 1974,"9 and their Appeal to the Secretary of Labor on May 16, 1974. 10
On July 6, 1974, petitioners, through counsel, received a telegram dated July 5, 1974 from the Bureau of Labor Relations,
requesting them to attend the pre-election conference in LR-2751 and LR-2883 on July 15, 1974. 11 On July 12, 1974,
petitioners filed a motion to cancel the pre-election conference. 12
Claiming that notwithstanding the fact that the NLRC's decision had not yet become final or they had not received a copy
of the decision of the Secretary of Labor and that their motion to cancel the pre-election conference had not yet been
acted upon, Respondent NLRC already scheduled the election on July 23, 1974, which unless enjoined, it intended to
hold, petitioners filed on July 18, 1974 the instant petition, praying, on the basis of the irregularities allegedly committed
by the NLRC, for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the NLRC from taking any action on the
cases in question.
On July 22, 1974, the Second Division of this Court, resolved to require the respondents to comment on the petition, to
set the date for the hearing of the matter of issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, and to allow the holding of the
certification election on July 23, 1974. At the same time this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondents from opening the ballot boxes, canvassing the votes, and announcing the results thereof.
In their comments, respondents CMC and REDSON, thru counsel, asserted that the scheduled certification elections on
July 23, 1974 were cancelled until further orders from the NLRC at the pre-election conference called on July 18, 1974
by the Bureau of Labor Relations; that CMC signed with petitioner CELA a collective bargaining agreement on February
15, 1974; that REDSON and petitioner RELA also signed a collective bargaining agreement on February 15, 1974; that
in both NLRC Cases Nos. LR-2751 and LR-2883, counsel submitted memoranda to sustain the proposition that both
petitioners for certification election should be dismissed for the collective bargaining agreements of CMC and REDSON
were in effect certified as of February 15, 1974, and no certification election could be entertained during the life of said
bargaining contracts; that CMC and REDSON received copy of the NLRC decision on May 11, 1974 ordering an
election within ten (10) days from receipt thereof to select an exclusive collective bargaining agent; that the Secretary of
Labor denied in a resolution dated May 29, 1974 the appeal of CMC and REDSON; that CMC and REDSON filed with
the Secretary of Labor on July 10, 1974 a manifestation to the effect that as long as their collective bargaining
agreements were honored, an election might not jeopardize the rights of their employees who were already enjoying the
benefits of the collective bargaining agreements; that CMC and REDSON would obey whatever may be the resolution of
this Court regarding the holding of the certification elections during the life of the certified collective bargaining
agreements. 13
Respondent FFW, in its comments, alleged that petitioners cannot legally avail themselves of the remedy of certiorari
and/or prohibition as they did not raise the issue of jurisdiction in their motions to dismiss NLRC cases Nos. 2751 and
2883 and that petitioners did not move that respondent FFW be required to present evidence of its claimed 60% or 10%
membership of the employees and workers; that neither the NLRC nor the Secretary of Labor had acted with grave abuse
of discretion for their orders were issued pursuant to the rules of the Commission; that neither the NLRC nor the
Secretary of Labor acted in excess of jurisdiction as the certification election order was issued pursuant to the
Implementing Rules of the Commission issued under Presidential Decree No. 21; and that the certification election
scheduled set for July 23, 1974 were cancelled. 14
The Solicitor General's Office, as counsel for respondents NLRC and the Secretary of Labor, refuted in its comments
petitioners' contentions that said respondents did not have jurisdiction over the NLRC cases or that said respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion, or that they committed the irregularities imputed to them. 15
ISSUES RAISED AND OUR RULINGS
1. Petitioners contend, first, that respondent NLRC had no authority to modify the "contract-bar rule" by requiring that a
collective bargaining agreement had to be certified before it could constitute a bar to a petition for certification
election. 16 The contract-bar rule is a principle in labor law that a collective bargaining agreement of reasonable duration
is, in the interest of the stability of industrial relations, a bar to certification elections.
We think otherwise for the following reasons.
The NLRC issued on October 18, 1972, Rules and Regulations Re Its Organization and Definition of Functions, which
among other things, provided thus:
Section 30. All collective bargaining agreements and other agreements settling or adjusting labor
disputes must be filed with the Commission by the parties therein for certification. The widest
publicity shall be given by the management and the union to such collective bargaining agreements
for the information and guidance of the workers concerned.
Section 31. During the life of a certified collective bargaining agreement, the Commission shall not
entertain any representation issues which may in any manner affect the administration of the
agreement.
Labor Relations Implementing Instruction No. 2, dated December 21, 1972, establishing rules and regulations concerning
certification elections provides thus:
Section 3. When Petition May Be Filed. — Where the collective bargaining agreement is certified, a
petition may be filed within sixty (60) days before its expiration date. In the absence of a certified
collective bargaining agreement, a petition may be filed any time. If a petition is filed during the life
of a collective bargaining agreement, the same shall be dismissed without prejudice to its refiling
within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration date of the certified collective bargaining agreement.
It shall be the duty of the petitioner to serve a copy of the petition to each of the interested parties
either personally or by registered mail. Proof of such service must be shown in the petition.
But where from does the NLRC's authority to promulgate its rules emanate? From Presidential Decree No. 21, dated
October 14, 1972, section 2 whereof gave the NLRC, which the Decree created, original and exclusive jurisdiction over
all matters involving all disputes and grievances which may otherwise lead to strikes and lockouts under Republic Act
No. 875. Section 9 thereof also enjoined the NLRC to promulgate rules and regulations governing collective bargaining.
Petitioners, however, contend that respondent NLRC had no authority to promulgate Section 3 of Implementing
Instructions No. 2 because it violates not only General Order No. 3 but also the existing jurisprudence on the matter. 17
We do not agree. The President in General Order No. 3, dated September 22, 1972, ordered "all executive departments,
bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the National Government ... to function ... in accordance with existing
laws, until otherwise ordered by me or by my duly designated representative," and the Judiciary to continue trying and
deciding cases in accordance with existing laws. Assuming, gratia argumenti, that the existing law on collective
bargaining at the time of the promulgation of Implementing Instructions No. 2 was that a collective bargaining agreement
need not be certified in order to be a bar to a certification election, it does not mean that it could not be changed by virtue
of General Order No. 3. This Order did not render unchangeable the existing law, for it is expressly provided therein that
the executive departments and their agencies may function not in accordance with the then existing law if so ordered by
the President or by his duly authorized representative, and as stated above, the President granted the NLRC original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving employee-employer relationship, and the authority to issue rules and
regulations concerning collective bargaining.
Assuming arguendo, furthermore, that a non-certified collective bargaining agreement may serve as a bar to a
certification election as petitioners would want us to hold, petitioners would still be bereft of cause to complain. The
petition for certification election filed by FFW at the Continental Manufacturing Corporation (NLRC CASE No. LRO
2751) was filed, as shown by Annex C to the petition, on February 12, 1974. The collective bargaining agreement
between the CMC and the CELA (Annex A) which, as claimed, should bar said petition, had not yet been filed as of that
date for certification, for it was acknowledged before the Notary Public only on February 21, 1974.
The petition for certification election at Redson and Company (NLRC Case No. LR-2883) was filed on February 25,
1974. As of said date, no collective bargaining agreement had been entered into between REDSON and RELA which
could serve as a bar to the petition, for their collective bargaining agreement was signed only on March 4, 1974, as
admitted by REDSON in its answer, 18 and acknowledged only on March 7, 1974. 19
We do not see, moreover, any violation of the existing law which NLRC allegedly committed when it gave due course to
the petitions for certification election. Section 12 (b) of Republic Act No. 875 makes it plain that after a certification
election has been made "the court shall not order certification in the same unit more often than once in 12 months," and
under Section 12 (d) of the same law, "an employer may petition the court for an election if there has been no
certification election held during the 12 months prior to the date of the request of the employees," which provision tends
to show that after the lapse of such period of 12 months a certification election may be requested either by the employer
or by the requisite number of employees of a particular union. 20 The petitions for certification election in both NLRC
Cases Nos. 2751 and 2883 alleged "that there has been no certification election in the company for the last 12
months," 21 which allegation was not denied by CMC and REDSON in their answers. 22
Section 12 (c) of the same law furthermore provides that it shall be mandatory on the Court to order an election for the
purpose of determining the representative of the employees for the appropriate bargaining unit, where a petition is filed
by at least ten per cent of the employees in the appropriate unit requesting an election. In LR No. 2751, FFW claimed that
it represented 60% of the employees and workers in CMC, and in LR No. 2883, it claimed that it represented more than
10% of the employees in REDSON.
II. Secondly, petitioners contend that inasmuch as the collective bargaining agreements (Annexes A and B to the Petition)
contain standard and substantial benefits and their duration is reasonable, there was no reason why said agreements
should still be certified before they could be considered bars to the petitions for certifications election. 23 In the light of
what has been said above regarding NLRC's authority to promulgate Labor Relations Implementing Instruction No. 2 and
the clear provisions of section 12 of Republic Act No. 875, it is obvious that petitioner's complaint on this point is not
meritorious. Even if a certification of the collective bargaining agreements were not necessary, the certification elections
could still be ordered by virtue of Republic Act No. 875.
III. Petitioners complain, thirdly, that respondent NLRC favored FFW and allowed it to raid CCLU locals when it
granted the petitions for certification elections. 24 It has been shown that FFW had legal right to petition for certification
elections. If in exercising said right, FFW would reap benefits and petitioners would suffer damage, such damage would
be no more than a damnum absque injuria, damage without legal injury.
IV. Fourthly, petitioners also complain that the respondent NLRC committed an irregularity when it took cognizance of
the petitions' for certification elections despite the fact that there was no schism and the grievance procedure provided in
the collective bargaining agreements 25 have not been resorted to. Assuming arguendo, that petitioners were correct on
this point, NLRC's error would still be only an error in judgment and not of jurisdiction, hence, this petition for
certification would still fail.
For it is elementary that a petition for certiorari in order to succeed, must be based on jurisdictional grounds because as
long as the respondent official acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him in the exercise thereof will amount to
nothing more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal. 26 It is true that an
application for the issuance of the writ of certiorari may likewise be based on grave abuse of discretion. But it is equally
true that there is grave abuse of discretion which justifies the issuance of the writ of certiorari only if and when there is a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, amounting to an evasion of positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law. 27 In other words, the writ
of certiorari will lie when an inferior Court, board or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. 28
In the case at bar, the alleged error of the respondent Commission is one of judgment. And as already pointed out, even
assuming that such judgment is indeed erroneous, the same does not constitute a grave abuse of discretion within the
meaning of the Rules and established jurisprudence, there being no showing that said Commission exercised its power on
the matter "in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, amounting to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law." 29
The "grievance procedure" provided in the collective bargaining agreements Annexes A and B need not be resorted to in
the instant cases for said procedure was not applicable. The collective bargaining agreements defines a grievance as a
"controversy between the COMPANY and the UNION or any employee or employees covered by this Agreement." The
instant cases do not involve a controversy between the company and the union, but between two unions.
V. Fifth, petitioners contend that the decision (Annex H) dated April 26, 1974 was void for not having been personally
and directly prepared by the members of the Commission, 30 alleging as reason therefor that the NLRC Chairman and
Commissioners, being saddled with administrative duties, have no time to personally prepare decisions such that their
decisions are prepared by other employees. 31
There was no evidence introduced that that particular decision complained of was not personally prepared by the NLRC
Chairman and Commissioners. Because an official has much administrative work to do, and which he does, it does not
follow that he does not have time to prepare decisions, for the preparation of the decisions is one of those duties he must
do. Such bare allegation of petitioners cannot furthermore prevail over the presumption that "official duty has been
regularly performed." 32
This presumption is particularly strong as regards respondent Commission a government agency vested with quasi-
judicial powers, in connection with the enforcement of labor laws and social legislations affecting particular fields of
activity involving labor and capital. Thus, it was held that a legal presumption is particularly strong as regards
administrative agencies vested with powers considered to be quasi-judicial in nature, in connection with the enforcement
of laws affecting particular fields of activity, the proper regulations and/or promotion of which requires a technical or
special training, aside from a good knowledge and grasp of the overall conditions, relevant to said field, obtaining in the
nation. 33
VI. The sixth alleged irregularity complained of by petitioners is that they were deprived of their day in court for the
parties seeking certification elections were not required to prove the allegations in their petitions, particularly their
claimed membership consisting of "more than 60% of the employees and workers" of CMC and "10% of the employees
of Redson and Company." 34 We note that this question was not raised in the proceedings before the NLRC. It was not
raised in the Answer in NLRC Case No. LR-2751 35 or in the Answer in NLRC Case No. LR-2883. 36 Too repeatedly
enunciated as not to require citation of authorities is the rule that no issue may be raised on appeal which was not raised
in the lower court. Moreover, before an act of an official may be questioned in certiorari proceedings, said official must
first be given the opportunity to correct the error by moving that he reconsider the same. 37 The NLRC was not given this
opportunity.
VII. Petitioners' last complaint was that the NLRC attempted to implement its decision even before they received copy of
the alleged resolution or decision on their "Motion for Reconsideration and/or Appeal." 38
Assuming that there was an irregularity on this point, it was corrected when the certification elections scheduled on July
23, 1974 as well as the pre-election conference set for July 18, 1974 were cancelled. 39
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the temporary restraining order issued on July 22, 1974 is
LIFTED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED. The facts of the case are as follows. On January 15, 1991, a certification election was conducted among employees of
respondent Permex Producer and Exporter Corporation (hereafter referred to as Permex Producer). The results of the
elections were as follows:

National Federation of Labor (NFL) 235

No Union 466

Spoiled Ballots 18

Marked Ballots 9

Challenged Ballots 7

However, some employees of Permex Producer formed a labor organization known as the Samahang Manggagawa sa
Permex (SMP) which they registered with the Department of Labor and Employment on March 11, 1991. The union later
affiliated with the Philippine Integrated Industries Labor Union (PIILU).

On August 16, 1991, Samahang Manggagawa sa Permex-Philippine Integrated Industries Labor Union (SMP-PIILU),
wrote the respondent company requesting recognition as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of employees at
the Permex Producer. On October 19, 1991 Permex Producer recognized SMP-PIILU and, on December 1, entered into a
collective bargaining agreement with it. The CBA was ratified between December 9 and 10, 1991 by the majority of the
rank and file employees of Permex Producer. On December 13, 1991, it was certified by the DOLE.

On February 25, 1992, respondent NFL filed a petition for certification election, but it was dismissed by Med-Arbiter
Edgar B. Gongalos in an order dated August 20, 1992. Respondent NFL then appealed the order to the Secretary of Labor
and Employment. On October 8, 1992, the Secretary of Labor, through Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma, set aside
the order of the Med-Arbiter and ordered a certification election to be conducted among the rank and file employees at
the Permex Producer, with the following choices:

1. National Federation of Labor

2. Samahang Manggagawa sa Permex

3. No union

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but its motion was denied in an order dated November 12, 1992. Hence, this
petition.
G.R. No. 107792 March 2, 1998
SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA PERMEX (SMP-PIILU-TUCP), petitioners, vs. THE SECRETARY OF
LABOR, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR, PERMEX PRODUCER AND EXPORTER Two arguments are put forth in support of the petition. First, it is contended that petitioner has been recognized by the
CORPORATION, respondents. majority of the employees at Permex Producer as their sole collective bargaining agent. Petitioner argues that when a
group of employees constituting themselves into an organization and claiming to represent a majority of the work force
requests the employer to bargain collectively, the employer may do one of two things. First, if the employer is satisfied
MENDOZA, J.: with the employees' claim the employer may voluntarily recognize the union by merely bargaining collectively with it.
The formal written confirmation is ordinarily stated in the collective bargaining agreement. Second, if on the other hand,
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated October 8, 1992 and order dated November 12, 1992, of the employer refuses to recognize the union voluntarily, it may petition the Bureau of Labor Relations to conduct a
Undersecretary of Labor and Employment Bienvenido Laguesma, ordering a certification election to be conducted certification election. If the employer does not submit a petition for certification election, the union claiming to represent
among the employees of respondent company. the employees may submit the petition so that it may be directly certified as the employees' representative or a
certification election may be held.
The case of Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa v. Ferrer-Calleja, 1 cited by the Solicitor General in his comment filed in
behalf of the NLRC, is particularly apropos. There, the union also requested voluntary recognition by the company.
Instead of granting the request, the company petitioned for a certification election. The union moved to dismiss on the
ground that it did not ask the company to bargain collectively with it. As its motion was denied, the union brought the
matter to this Court. In sustaining the company's stand, this Court ruled:
. . . Ordinarily, in an unorganized establishment like the Calasiao Beer Region, it is the union that
files a petition for a certification election if there is no certified bargaining agent for the workers in
the establishment. If a union asks the employer to voluntarily recognize it as the bargaining agent of
the employees, as the petitioner did, it in effect asks the employer to certify it as the bargaining
representative of the employees — A CERTIFICATION WHICH THE EMPLOYER HAS NO
AUTHORITY TO GIVE, for it is the employees' prerogative (not the employer's) to determine
whether they want a union to represent them, and, if so, which one it should be. (emphasis supplied)
intervention may be entertained only within 60 days prior to the date of expiration of an existing collective bargaining
agreement. The purpose of the rule is to ensure stability in the relationships of the workers and the management by
preventing frequent modifications of any collective bargaining agreement earlier entered into by them in good faith and
for the stipulated original period. Excepted from the contract-bar rule are certain types of contracts which do not foster
industrial stability, such as contracts where the identity of the representative is in doubt. Any stability derived from such
contracts must be subordinated to the employees' freedom of choice because it does not establish the kind of industrial
peace contemplated by the law. 6 Such situation obtains in this case. The petitioner entered into a CBA with Permex
Producer when its status as exclusive bargaining agent of the employees had not been established yet.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision and order of the respondent Secretary of Labor are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

In accordance with this ruling, Permex Producer should not have given its voluntary recognition to SMP-PIILU-TUCP
when the latter asked for recognition as exclusive collective bargaining agent of the employees of the company. The
company did not have the power to declare the union the exclusive representative of the workers for the purpose of
collective bargaining,

Indeed, petitioner's contention runs counter to the trend towards the holding of certification election. By virtue of
Executive Order No. 111, which became effective on March 4, 1987, the direct certification previously allowed under the
Labor Code had been discontinued as a method of selecting the exclusive bargaining agents of the
workers. 2 Certification election is the most effective and the most democratic way of determining which labor
organization can truly represent the working force in the appropriate bargaining unit of a company. 3

Petitioner argues that of the 763 qualified employees of Permex Producer, 479 supported its application for registration
with the DOLE and that when petitioner signed the CBA with the company, the CBA was ratified by 542 employees.
Petitioner contends that such support by the majority of the employees justifies its finding that the CBA made by it is
valid and binding.

But it is not enough that a union has the support of the majority of the employees. It is equally important that everyone in
the bargaining unit be given the opportunity to express himself. 4

This is especially so because, in this case, the recognition given to the union came barely ten (10) months after the
employees had voted "no union" in the certification election conducted in the company. As pointed out by respondent
Secretary of Labor in his decision, there can be no determination of a bargaining representative within a year of the
proclamation of the results of the certification election. 5 Here the results, which showed that 61% of the employees
voted for "no union," were certified only on February 25, 1991 but on December 1, 1991 Permex Producer already
recognized the union and entered into a CBA with it.

There is something dubious about the fact that just ten (10) months after the employees had voted that they did not want
any union to represent them, they would be expressing support for petitioner. The doubt is compounded by the fact that
in sworn affidavits some employees claimed that they had either been coerced or misled into signing a document which
turned out to be in support of petitioner as its collective bargaining agent. Although there were retractions, we agree with
the Solicitor General that retractions of statements by employees adverse to a company (or its favored union) are
oftentimes tainted with coercion and intimidation. For how could one explain the seeming flip-flopping of position taken
by the employees? The figures claimed by petitioner to have been given to it in support cannot readily be accepted as
true.

Second. Petitioner invokes the contract-bar rule. They contend that under Arts. 253, 253-A and 256 of the Labor Code
and Book V, Rule 5, §3 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations, a petition for certification election or motion for
 KAPUNAN, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside and annul the
decision and orders of the public respondent dated 11 February 1993, 4 March 1993, 16 June 1993 and 25 November
1993, respectively.

The facts which gave rise to the present petition are as follows:

On 27 June 1988, petitioner (formerly the Philippine Lingerie Corporation) filed a petition for certification election
among its rank-and-file employees (docketed as NCR-OD-M-6-349-88). As a consequence thereof, two (2) unions
sought recognition, namely: PHILIPPINE LINGERIE WORKERS UNION-ALAB and BUKLOD NG
MANGGAGAWA NG PHILIPPINE LINGERIE CORPORATION.

In one of the pre-election conferences, PHILIPPINE LINGERIE WORKERS UNION-ALAB moved for the exclusion of
a number of employees who were allegedly holding supervisory positions.

Only 28 July 1988, Med-Arbiter Rasidali C. Abdullah issued an order denying the motion of PHILIPPINE LINGERIE
CORPORATION WORKERS UNION-ALAB for lack of merit. Said order was appealed to the Bureau of Labor
Relations (BLR) which issued an Order on 16 November 1988, the dispositive portion of which declares:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated 28 July 1988 is hereby affirmed. Accordingly,
to ensure fairness to all the parties and in order to hasten the proceedings, let the election be
conducted under the supervision of the Labor Organization Division, this Office, which is hereby
directed to immediately set this case for pre-election conference.

SO ORDERED.1

PHILIPPINE LINGERIE WORKERS UNION-ALAB filed two (2) separate motions for reconsideration of the above
order which were consolidated and treated in an Order dated 22 December 1988, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the twin motions for reconsideration are hereby deemed
denied for lack of merit. Accordingly, let the pre-election conference preparatory to the certification
election proceed without further delay.

No further motion of similar nature shall be hereafter entertained.

SO ORDERED.2

No further appeal of the above-quoted order was interposed, thus it became final and executory.

On 3 May 1989, a certification election was conducted with the votes of "supervisors and confidential" employees being
G.R. Nos. 113204-05 September 16, 1996 challenged. Thus, the certification election showed the following results:
BARBIZON PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NAGKAKAISANG SUPERVISOR NG BARBIZON PHILIPPINES, INC. — NAFLU AND THE HON. 1. Philippine Lingerie Workers Union-ALAB 318 votes
UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, respondents. 2. Buklod Ng Manggagawa Ng Philippine
Lingerie Corporation 412 votes
3 No Union 17 votes
  4. Challenged Supervisors/Confidential
 Employees 99 votes WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied and the Buklod Ng Manggagawa
———— Ng Philippine Lingerie Corporation (now, Barbizon Philippines, Inc.) is hereby certified as the sole
and exclusive bargaining representative of all the regular rank-and-file employees of Barbizon
Philippines, Inc. (formerly Philippine Lingerie Corporation).
TOTAL VALID VOTES CAST 855 votes
SPOILED BALLOTS 12 votes
The management of Barbizon Philippines, Inc. is hereby directed to immediately start negotiating
for a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the said union.
PHILIPPINE LINGERIE WORKERS UNION-ALAB filed an election protest which was later formalized on 25 May
1989. In the meantime, on 9 May 1989, BUKLOD moved for the opening of the challenged ballots.
No further motion of any nature shall hereinafter be entertained by this Office.
On 20 July 1989, the BLR, through its director Pura Ferrer-Calleja, issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which
reads: SO ORDERED.4

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the protest and challenged (sic) of the Alyansang Likha Ng Not satisfied with the aforequoted order, PHILIPPINE LINGERIE WORKERS UNION-ALAB appealed to the Secretary
Mga Anak Ng Bayan (ALAB) are hereby denied for lack of merit. of Labor but on 26 September 1989, the same was withdrawn and a motion to dismiss appeal with prejudice was filed by
the same union. There being no more obstacle to collective bargaining, petitioner negotiated with BUKLOD as the sole
and exclusive bargaining representative.
Accordingly, let the challenged votes of the supervisors and confidential employees be opened in
the presence of the parties under the supervision of the Labor Organization Division (LOD) on 26
July 1989 at 9:00 A.M., Bureau of Labor Relations. A Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) was signed by petitioner and BUKLOD which was effective for five (5)
years or until 18 November 1994.5
SO ORDERED.3
While the CBA was still in force, several employees organized themselves into the Nagkakaisang Supervisors Ng
Barbizon Philippines, Inc. (NSBPI) and the 0Nagkakaisang Excluded Monthly Paid Employees Ng Barbizon,
With the above-quoted order, the challenged votes were opened on 3 August 1989 and the results were as follows:
Philippines, Inc. (NEMPEBPI) allegedly because they were excluded from the coverage of the existing CBA between
petitioner and BUKLOD.
Philippine Lingerie Workers Union-ALAB 4 votes
Buklod Ng Manggagawa Ng Phil. Lingerie
Corp. 84 votes Two (2) separate petitions for certification election were filed by NSBPI and NEMPEBPI. The petition of the former was
raffled to Med-Arbiter Renato D. Parungo and the latter to Med-Arbiter Paterno D. Adap. Both cases were dismissed6
No Union 6 votes
Spoiled 5 votes
NSBPI appealed to the Office of the Secretary of Labor. On 29 December 1992, public respondent Undersecretary
Bienvenido Laguesma denied the same for lack of merit. NSBPI moved for reconsideration on 15 January 1993.
TOTAL VOTES CAST 99 votes

PHILIPPINE LINGERIE WORKERS UNION-ALAB filed a motion for reconsideration of the BLR's Order of 20 July On 11 February 1993, the Office of the Secretary of Labor, through public respondent rendered the questioned Decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
1989 which, however, was denied in an Order dated 22 August 1989, the pertinent portion of which states:

xxx xxx xxx WHEREFORE the Motion for Reconsideration of Nagkakaisang Superbisor ng Barbizon
Philippines, Inc. (NSBPI) and the appeal of Nagkakaisang Excluded Monthly Paid Employees ng
Barbizon Philippines, Inc. (NEMPEBPI) are hereby granted and the Orders of this Office and the
This time movant should now be convinced that the alleged supervisory and confidential employees Med-Arbiter dated 29 December 1992 and 01 September 1992, respectively, are hereby SET
are more rank-and-file employees. ASIDE.

As early as Resolution dated 16 November 1988, the Bureau had already ruled that the alleged
supervisors are not managerial employees (rec. p. 154, First Folder). On motion for reconsideration
the Bureau affirmed the aforementioned Resolution in its Order dated 22 December 1988 (rec. p.
302. First Folder). And on 20 July 1989, when R.A. 6715 was already in full force and effect, the
Bureau in resolving the protest of ALAB declared that the job descriptions of the alleged
supervisors and confidential employees do not in any way suggest that they are indeed supervisors
or managerial employees (rec. p. 39, Second Folder).
Accordingly, a new Order is hereby entered in the above-captioned cases directing the conduct of
certification election among the subject employees excluded from the coverage of the bargaining
unit of the existing CBA of rank and file employees aforestated, not otherwise excluded/disqualified
by law. The choices are as follows:
1. Nagkakaisang Superbisor ng Barbizon Philippines, Inc. (NSBPI)

xxx xxx xxx 2. Nagkakaisang Excluded Monthly Paid Employees ng Barbizon Philippines, Inc. (NEMPEBPI);
and,
 3. No Union.
Let, therefore, the entire records of these consolidated cases be forwarded to the Regional Office of
origin for the immediate conduct of certification election, subject to the usual pre-election
conference.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied8 A second motion for reconsideration was filed by
petitioner but it was likewise denied, this time, with finality. 9 Undaunted, petitioner filed a third motion for
reconsideration which was also denied for lack of merit. 10
Hence, this petition wherein the following issues were raised:
A finality that said employees are merely rank and file and this fact has been accepted by the petitioning union
THE RESPONDENT "SUPERVISORS" LOCAL UNION CANNOT FORM A SUPERVISORS
UNION, WHEN THEIR MEMBERS ARE INCOMPATIBLY "RANK-AND-FILE
EMPLOYEES"; MUCH LESS, CAN IT SEEK REPRESENTATION STATUS FOR
SUPERVISORS, WHEN THE EMPLOYEES THEY WANT TO REPRESENT FOR
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PURPOSES BELONG IN THE "APPROPRIATE BARGAINING
UNIT" OF RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES ON THE "EMPLOYER WIDE UNIT", WHICH
ALREADY HAS A CERTIFIED BARGAINING AGENT: BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA NG
PHILIPPINE LINGERIE CORPORATION.
B
WORSE, SINCE THE MEMBERS OF THE RESPONDENT LOCAL UNION BELONG TO THE
APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT OF RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES, THE EXISTING
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT WHICH COVERS THEM, IS (A) "BAR" TO ITS
CERTIFICATION ELECTION PETITION 11
Barbizon Philippines, Inc. alleges that this petition only assails the resolution of the public respondent regarding NSBPI
and does not include the NEMPEBPI, the union of the excluded monthly paid employees because the separate motion for
reconsideration it filed in connection with the latter has not yet been resolved by the NLRC.
On 8 February 1994, this Court issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining the Bureau of Labor Relations from
setting the pre-election conference in Case No. OS-MA-A-215-92-93 entitled "In Re: Petition for Certification Election
among the Supervisory Employees of Barbizon Philippines, Inc., Nagkakaisang Supervisor Ng Barbizon Philippines, Inc.
— OBRERO" and from conducting further proceedings in the aforesaid cases. 12
During the pendency of the petition, the CBA expired. However, no other agreement between the parties was made
known to this Court, thus, in accordance with Article XX of the CBA, it continues to be in force and shall govern the
relations between the parties thereto. 13
We find no merit in the petition.
Petitioner maintains its stance that the petition for certification election filed by the Nagkakaisang Supervisor ng
Barbizon Philippines, Inc. — NAFLU (NSBPI) must necessarily fail because the employees designated as "supervisors"
cannot legally form a supervisors' union by virtue of the BLR's final decision dated 22 August 1989 declaring the
abovementioned employees mere rank and file workers. Being part of the rank and file, petitioner avers that said
employees belong to the "employer wide unit," which is the appropriate bargaining unit of all its rank and file employees
and which is represented by the Buklod ng Manggagawa ng Philippine Lingerie Corporation (BUKLOD) as the sole
certified bargaining agent.
Petitioner further asserts that the Undersecretary of Labor committed grave abuse of discretion in granting NSBPI's
petition for certification election as this was tantamount to an unjustifiable reversal of the BLR's final ruling that the
subject employees are not supervisory employees, but merely rank and file, due to the nature of their duties and
functions.
Petitioner's reasoning is flawed, proceeding as it does from the wrong premise. Petitioner obstinately believes that
NSBPI's petition for certification election was granted because the employees carrying the appellation "supervisor" were
deemed supervisory employees. The status of the subject employees, however, is not the issue in the case at bar. Their
status as "supervisors" is not in dispute. The aforestated decision of the BLR dated 22 August 1989 has settled with
NSBPI. 14 NSBPI's petition for certification election was granted because the subject employees, including petitioner's
monthly paid employees, were expressly excluded from the bargaining unit and from the coverage of the CBA executed
between petitioner and BUKLOD, as clearly stated therein. 15 This is the real reason behind the certification election in
question. Unfortunately, this was not successfully debunked by petitioner, which chose to focus, albeit erroneously, on
the status of the subject employees.
The exclusion of petitioner's "supervisors" from the bargaining unit of the rank-and-file employees indiscriminately
curtailed the right to these employees to self-organization and representation for purposes of collective bargaining, a right
explicitly mandated by our labor laws 16 and "accorded the highest consideration." 17 In the recent case of Golden Farms,
Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 18 we aptly declared:
In the case at bench, the evidence established that the monthly paid rank-and-file employees of
petitioner primarily perform administrative or clerical work. In contradistinction, the petitioner's
daily paid rank-and-file employees mainly work in the cultivation of bananas in the fields. It is
crystal clear the monthly paid rank-and-file employees of petitioner have very little in common with
its daily paid rank-and file employees in terms of duties and obligations, working conditions, salary
rates, and skills. To be sure, the said monthly paid rank-and-file employees have even been excluded
from the bargaining unit of the daily paid rank-and-file employees. This dissimilarity of interests
warrants the formation of a separate and distinct bargaining unit for the monthly paid rank-and-file
employees of the petitioner. To rule otherwise would deny this distinct class of employees the right
to self-organization for purposes of collective bargaining. Without the shield of an organization, it
will also expose them to the exploitations of management. . . . (Emphasis ours)
In the case at bar, BUKLOD cannot successfully act as the bargaining agent of and duly represent petitioner's
"supervisor" employees since the latter were expressly excluded from the appropriate bargaining unit.
Petitioner's reliance on the case of Pagkakaisa ng mga Manggagawa sa Triumph Int'l.-United Lumber and General
Workers of the Phils.  v. Ferrer-Calleja 19 is misplaced. The aforecited case upholds the "one union-one company" policy,
thus:
Once again, we enunciate that the proliferation of unions in an employer unit is discouraged as a
matter of policy unless compelling reasons exist which deny a certain and distinct class of
employees the right to self-organization for purpose of collective bargaining. (See General Rubber
& Footwear Corporation v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 155 SCRA 283 [1987].) 20 (Emphasis ours.)
As clearly indicated in the aforequoted decision, the "one union — one company" rule is not without exception. The
exclusion of the subject employees from the rank-and-file bargaining unit and the CBA is indefinitely a "compelling
reason" for it completely deprived them of the chance to bargain collectively with petitioner and are thus left with no
recourse but to group themselves into a separate and distinct bargaining unit and form their own organization. The
rationale behind the exception to the aforementioned policy is further elucidated in Knitjoy Manufacturing,
Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja: 21
1. The suggested bias of the Labor Code in favor of the one company-one union policy, anchored on
the greater mutual benefits which the parties could derive, especially in the case of employees
whose bargaining strength could undeniably be enhanced by their unity and solidarity but
diminished by their disunity, division and dissension, is not without exceptions.
xxx xxx xxx
The usual exception, of course, is where the employer unit has to give way to the other units like the
craft unit, plant unit, or a subdivision thereof; the recognition of these exceptions takes into
accountant the policy to assure employees of the fullest freedom in exercising their
rights. Otherwise stated, the one company-one union policy must yield to the right of the employees
to form unions or associations for purposes not contrary to law, to self-organization and to enter
into collective bargaining negotiations, among others, which the Constitution guarantees .
(Emphasis ours.)
The receipt by petitioner's "supervisor" employees of certain benefits under the CBA between BUKLOD and petitioner is
not sufficient to deny the petition for certification election filed by the labor organization formed by the excluded
employees. It is not equivalent to and does not compensate for the denial of the right of the excluded employees to self-
organization and collective bargaining. We concur with the findings of the Undersecretary of Labor, thus:
It is not disputed that the members of both petitioning unions NSBPI and NEMPEBPI are excluded
from the coverage of the existing CBA entered into between the respondent BPI and Buklod ng mga
Manggagawa ng Barbizons Philippines, Inc. (BUKLOD) (pp. 84-85, folder II, records). Thus,
respondent BPI being privy to the said exclusion has to accept the inescapable consequences of its
act of depriving the excluded employees of their right to self-organization for the purpose of
collective bargaining. We find immaterial and irrelevant the allegation of hereby respondent BPI to
the effect that the benefit being enjoyed by the rank and file employees covered by the existing
CBA are extended/accorded to the excluded employees. Indeed, what is crucial and of paramount
consideration is the fact that the excluded rank and file employees are afforded the right to bargain
collectively.
The Supreme Court in the cases of General Rubber and Footwear Corporation vs. Bureau of Labor
Relations, et al., G.R. No. 74262, October 29, 1987; and Manila Bay Spinning Mills, J and P Coats,
Manila Bay, Inc. vs. Hon. Pura Ferrer-Calleja, G.R. No. 80910, August 1, 1988, ruled that the
employees excluded from the coverage of the CBA, who not being excluded by law, have the right
to bargain collectively. Further, the Supreme Court aptly stated that:
The allegation that some benefits under the existing CBA were extended to the
monthly paid employees, even if true will not preclude them from entering into
a CBA of their own. Neither is the inconvenience that may befall petitioner for
having to administer two CBAs an excuse for depriving the monthly paid
employees of their constitutionally guaranteed right to collective bargaining.
(Emphasis supplied.) 22
The petition for certification election cannot likewise be deterred by the "contract-bar rule," 23 which finds no application
in the present case. The petitioning union NSBPI is not questioning the majority status of Buklod as the incumbent
bargaining agent of petitioner's rank and file employees. The petition for certification election is addressed to a separate
bargaining unit — the excluded employees of petitioner. We agree with the ruling of the Undersecretary of Labor, thus:
Certainly, one who has been instrumental in the denial of a right otherwise enjoyable by a rank and
file, as in membership in its appropriate bargaining unit, cannot now say that he ought to be
included in the existing bargaining unit of the rank and file just because that "rank and file"
employee is now seeking representation for himself as well as those who like him were specifically
excluded from the coverage of the CBA. A rank and file employee, irrespective of his job
designation and in whatever form his wages are paid has the unbridled right to the exercise of self-
organization. This right cannot, like a chattel, be compromised in the bargaining table so as to
deprive him of the same in violation of the constitutional mandate. In this wise, the claim as to the
applicability of the contract bar doctrine could have not gained ground. A contract bar applies in a
situation where the petition is directed towards one and the same bargaining unit. This does not
appear to be so in the case considering the built-in-limitation in the CBA excluding the workers
sought to be represented by herein petitioner from its coverage, albeit, their being admittedly rank
and file employees. On the same line of reasoning, neither would the substantial mutual interest test
hold. So too, is the claim against union turncoatism. In the latter case, the emergence thereof is
farfetched considering the defined boundaries of the bargaining units concerned. Let it be stressed,
that the certification election as ordered would only affect those rank and file employees who are
excluded from the coverage of the existing CBA. Those who are already represented in the existing
collective bargaining agreement may rest secured in the bargaining unit that considers them as
members of its family. 24 (Emphasis ours.)
The right to self organization and collective bargaining is an integral part of the protection to labor provision embodied in
our Constitution, the essence of which is aptly expressed in Tropical Hut Employees' Union-CGW v. Tropical Hut Food
Market, Inc.: 25
All employees enjoy the right to self-organization and to form and join labor organizations of their
own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining and to engage in concerted activities for their
mutual aid or protection. This is a fundamental right of labor that derives its existence from the
Constitution. In interpreting the protection to labor and social justice provisions of the Constitution
and the labor laws or rules or regulations, we have always adopted the liberal approach which favors
the exercise of labor rights.
Finally, we take this opportunity to reiterate the standing rule that a certification election is the sole concern of the
workers, hence, an employer lacks the personality to dispute the same. In Golden Farms, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 26 we
held:
Finally, we note that it was petitioner company that filed the motion to dismiss the petition for
election. The general rule is that an employer has no standing to question a certification election
since this is the sole concern of the workers. Law and policy demand that employers take a strict,
hands-off stance in certification elections. The bargaining representative of employees should be
chosen free from any extraneous influence of management. A labor bargaining representative, to be
effective, must owe its loyalty to the employees alone and to no other.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the Temporary Restraining Order
issued on 8 February 1994 is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-8049.  May 9, 1956.]
BUKLOD ÑG SAULOG TRANSIT, Petitioner, vs. MARCIANO CASALLA, ET ALS., Respondents.
DECISION
PADILLA, J.:
On 7 December 1953 the Respondents, 65 in number, employees of the Saulog Transit, Inc., filed in the Court
of Industrial Relations a petition for a certification election, alleging that the total number of employees in the Saulog
Transit, Inc. was 583 that there were two labor organizations which represented the employees in the Saulog Transit, Inc.,
to the Buklod ñg Saulog Transit and the Saulog Transit Employees Union (PFL);  and that the certification election
prayed for was for the purpose of determining the sole bargaining representative of the employees in the Saulog Transit,
Inc. On 23 December 1953 the president of the Buklod ñg Saulog Transit filed its answer stating that on 1 (15) July 1953
a collective bargaining agreement had been entered into by and between the Buklod ñg Saulog Transit, a duly registered
union with the Department of Labor, on the one hand, and the Saulog Transit, Inc., on the other;  on 5 December an
election was held peacefully and orderly, the result thereof having been forwarded to the Department of Labor, against
which election and the result thereof no protest as regards the legality thereof was lodged;  that having acquired a
juridical personality from the time of its registration, on 15 July 1953 the Buklod ñg Saulog Transit entered into a
collective bargaining contract already referred to covering the well-being of the members of which the Respondents were
still members. On 16 February 1954 the Saulog Transit, Inc. filed a pleading entitled “Appearance and Manifestation”
averring that the allegation that the Respondents constituted 10 per cent of the total number of employees of the Saulog
Transit, Inc. was for the Court to determine yand that it had dealt and had been dealing with the Buklod ñg Saulog
Transit in accordance with a collective bargaining agreement entered into by and between them, the Buklod ñg Saulog
Transit representing the employees of the Saulog Transit, Inc. as an industrial unit.
After hearing, on 17 May 1954 the Court rendered judgment directing —
that a certification election be held among the employees and/or laborers of the Saulog Transit, Inc. at Pasay City, in
accordance with section 12 of Republic Act No. 875, and in conformity with the Rules promulgated by this Court on
September 4, 1953.
All the employees and/or laborers whose names appear in the list submitted by the company and marked as Exhibits “E”
to “7”, attached to the records of this case, minus the supervisory personnel composed of the General Manager, Assistant
General Manager, the two guards, one shift foreman, and one accountant, shall be eligible to vote.
Let a copy of this order be furnished the Department of Labor for its information and guidance.
A motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court in banc on 12 July 1954, the Buklod ñg Saulog Transit
prays for a review of the order of the Court of Industrial Relations dated 17 May 1954 and the resolution of the Court in
banc dated 12 July 1954 denying its motion for reconsideration.
The logical inference that may be drawn from the order appealed from is that the Court of Industrial Relations could not
determine or at least was in doubt as to which of the two labor unions named in the petition was the true choice of the
laborers or employees of the Saulog Transit, Inc. to represent them in all their dealings or for the purpose of collective
bargaining with their employer as regards the “rates of pay, wages, hours of employment and other conditions of
employment,” and for that reason the trial court ordered a certification election pursuant to section 12(b), Republic Act
No. 875.
The Court of Industrial Relations made the following findings:
From the evidence, the following are explicit in the pleadings and documents as well as the testimonies submitted by the
parties. It appears that the Saulog Transit, Inc. is engaged in the transportation business in Manila and surrounding cities
and employs 583 workers including supervisory personnel that there exists in the company two unions, namely, the
Buklod Ñg Saulog Transit, the intervenor in this case, and the Saulog Employees Union (PFL);   that
the Petitioners numbering 65 are all employees of the company that there exists a collective bargaining contract (Exhibit
10) dated July 15, 1953, between the Saulog Transit, Inc. and the Buklod Ñg Saulog Transit with a supplementary
agreement (Exhibit “10-1”) entered into on January 10, 1954, a month after the petition for certification election was
filed and already being investigated by this Court.
The fundamental issue to be resolved in the present case is whether or not an order of certification election shall issue on
the basis of the evidence established.
By stipulation of the parties it was agreed in open Court that instead of a petition for certification election confined to
drivers and conductors as the appropriate bargaining unit in the Saulog Transit, Inc., the parties have agreed on the
employer’s unit.
At the hearing on January 16, 1954, counsel for Petitioner manifested in open Court that out of the 65 signatories to the
petition, 3 are inspectors and inasmuch as the inspectors are supervisors he moved that they be stricken out of the
petition, thereby leaving a total of 62 signatories to the petition.
x x x                    x x x                    x x x
The evidence show that a total of 583 are employed in the Saulog Transit, Inc. Out of said number, the Court holds that
the following should be excluded as they come within the disqualifying category of “supervisors”, namely, one (1)
assistant General Manager;  two (2) guards;  one (1) shift foreman;  and one (1) accountant. With regards to the 28
inspectors, which counsel for Petitioners contends to be supervisors without presenting evidence on the matter, the Court
is of the opinion that inspectors in transportation business by the nature of their work do not fall within the category of
supervisors under Section 2 (k) of Republic Act No. 875.
On the basis of those retractions, intervenor maintains that the Petitioner can only lay claim to forty-two (42) on their
side and, therefore, this number no longer constitute ten (10%) per cent of all the employees in the company minus the
supervisory personnel. On the subject of these retractions during the hearings of this case by the signatories to the
petition, the Court cannot help but entertain doubts that it was their free and untrammeled will without pressure from
without (within). It is to be noted that during one of the hearings of this case, counsel for intervenor presented a letter
(Exhibit “A”) dated December 23, 1953, purportedly signed by 53 signatories to the petition addressed to Marciano
Casalla, president of the Saulog Employees Union (PFL) and one of the Petitioners in this case, wherein it was stated that
what they signed before Marciano Casalla was not what they really signed for. During the next hearing on January 19,
1954, counsel for Petitioners presented a document (Exhibit “B”) dated January 9, 1954, addressed to the Court and
purportedly signed by 21 out of the 53 signatories of the letter marked as Exhibit “A”, wherein it was stated that when the
company knew of their signatures to the petition for certification election, they were told to sign the letter (Exhibit “A”)
or else they will lose their jobs.
Marciano Casalla testified at the hearings on January 19, 1954, when confronted with the aforementioned documents,
that the signatories of Exhibit “A” told him that they were forced to sign said letter. Asked by counsel for intervenor how
the signatories were forced to sign, he testified that some of the signatories told him that they did not like to sign;  that
some told him they have to be rendered drunk first before they could sign and that some could not ask for “vale” in the
company unless they signed. (Recross examination of Marciano Cassalla, t.s.n., p. 27, hearing of January 19, 1954.).
Again at the hearing on February 4, 1954, 16 signatories to the petition for certification election present signified in open
court their desire for a certification election. Counsel for intervenor in an effort to refute what they have previously
testified regarding their desire for a certification election presented affidavit previously signed by some of them.
Feliciano Ignacio when shown the affidavit (Exhibit “D-1”) he previously signed stated that he signed said affidavit in
his desire to work; . de Luna testified that he signed the affidavit (Exhibit “3”) believing that it was for the return of the
fund deposits and there was nothing mentioned about certification election Gallardo testified that he signed the affidavit
(Exhibits “D-3” and “D-4”) in his desire to be employed;  A. Alde testified that he signed the affidavit because he wanted
to be assigned to a trip;  N. Alcantara testified that he signed the affidavit because he was afraid to be rejected in his
work.
From the demeanor of the witnesses in the witness stand and the testimonies of the above-mentioned witnesses, the Court
believes that those retractions could not destroy the desire of all signatories constituting, at least, ten (10%) per cent of
the employees in the appropriate unit desiring a certification election. The manner in which the retractions were obtained
more than convinces the Court of the need for a certification election so that the doubt as to the true bargaining
representative will be finally resolved. Republic Act No. 875 states the remedy - a certification election. Besides, it
should be noted that section 12 of Republic Act No. 875 speaks of the ten (10%) per cent at the time of the filing of the
petition. Retractions and withdrawals, therefore, after the petition is filed cannot affect the number of the Petitioners at
the time the petition is filed.
Intervenor also offered in evidence a collective bargaining agreement it had with the Saulog Transit, Inc., marked as
Exhibit “10” and contends that it is a bar to the petition for certification election. A careful scrutiny of such contract
reveals that it does not touch in substantial terms the rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of
employment of all the employees in the company but seeks to establish merely a grievance procedure for drivers,
conductors and inspectors who are members of the Buklod ñg Saulog.
x x x                    x x x                    x x x
From the evidence on record, it appears that a supplementary contract (Exhibit “10-1”) providing for increase in pay,
fixing of guarantee deposits nor conductors and drivers, granting of loans to immediate members of the family of the
union employees in case of death, and granting daily bonus to drivers and conductors who have reached their daily quota
of collection, have been executed between the Saulog Transit, Inc., and the Buklod Ñg Saulog Transit  cralaw
In its brief the Petitioner contends that (1) the Court of Industrial Relations erred in holding that it did not lose
jurisdiction over the case notwithstanding the fact that the Respondents (Petitioners in the court below) were reduced to
less than 10 per cent of the appropriate unit;  (2) the Court of Industrial Relations erred in its interpretation of section 13,
Republic Act No. 875, relative to the kind of collective bargaining agreement which would constitute a bar to a
certification election, and in declaring that Exhibit 10 (whether by itself or as supplemented by Exhibit 10-1) did not
constitute a sufficient bar to a certification election. In support of its petition filed in the Court of Industrial Relations
the Petitioner Buklod ñg Saulog Transit raised the following questions:
1.  Does the collective bargaining agreement between the Buklod and the Saulog Transit, Inc. (consisting of Exhibits 10
[and] 10-1) conform as to contents to the bargaining contract contemplated in Section 13 of Republic Act 875? If so, is it
a bar to certification election? (Exhibits 10 and 10-1 are Annexes D and E, respectively.)
2.  What is the effect of the holding of certification election on the collective bargaining agreement previously entered
into by the parties mentioned in Question 1?
The first error the Petitioner claims the Court of Industrial Relations committed is not well taken, not only because of the
rule laid down in cases decided under section 4, Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended by section 2 of
Commonwealth Act No. 559, consistently followed and maintained in this jurisdiction, 1 to the effect that the Court of
Industrial Relations acquires jurisdiction of an industrial dispute upon the filing of a petition by 31 employees or laborers
bringing such dispute to the Court for determination, and that a diminution in number by retraction or withdrawal of any
of them does not divest it of its jurisdiction already acquired, but also because as found by the Court of Industrial
Relations, the retraction by some members who originally had signed the petition was not of their own free will. The
petition filed by 65 laborers or employees of the Saulog Transit, Inc., was sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the Court
of Industrial Relations, for their number was more than 10 percent of the laborers and employees of the Saulog Transit,
Inc. 2
It is argued that under and pursuant to section 13, paragraph 1, of Republic Act No. 875, which provides that —
In the absence of an agreement or other voluntary arrangement providing for a more expeditious manner of collective
bargaining, it shall be the duty of an employer and the representative of his employees to bargain collectively in
accordance with the provisions of this Act. Such duty to bargain collectively means the performance of the mutual
obligation to meet and confer promptly and expeditiously and in good faith, for the purpose of negotiating an agreement
with respect to wages, hours, and/or other terms and conditions of employment, and of executing a written contract
incorporating such agreement if requested by either party, or for the purpose of adjusting any grievances or question
arising under such agreement, but such duty does not compel any party to agree to a proposal or to make concession.
there was no need or reason for ordering a certification election, because on 15 July 1953 the Petitioner Buklod ñg
Saulog Transit and the Saulog Transit, Inc. had already entered into a collective bargaining agreement, as shown by
Exhibit 10.
The provisions of section 13, paragraph 1, of Republic Act No. 875, contemplate a situation not only where there had
been no agreement entered into by and between employees or laborers and employer or management as to terms and
conditions of employment, but also where there had been an agreement that leaves out many or some matters on which
the parties should have stipulated, if the collective bargaining agreement is to achieve its purpose and aim — industrial
peace. 1
The trial court found that the collective bargaining agreement entered into by and between the Saulog Transit, Inc. and
the Buklod ñg Saulog Transit on 15 July 1953 (Exhibit 10Annex D) “does not touch in substantial terms the rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment of all the employees in the company but seeks to
establish merely a grievance procedure for drivers, conductors and inspectors who are members of the Buklod ñg
Saulog.” And even in the supplementary agreement (Exhibit 10-1;  Annex E), there is no clear-cut stipulation as to “rates
of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions or employment.” 2 In their reply the Respondents claim that
such an agreement (Exhibit 10Annex D) and the supplementary agreement (Exhibit 11Annex E) have not been identified
and offered in evidence and should not be taken into consideration. The trial court took, however, into consideration both
agreements and found that the first agreement being incomplete does not bar a certification election;  and as to the
supplementary agreement the Court held that it having been entered into after the filing of the petition for a certification
election the same cannot and does not bar a certification election. The affidavit filed by the President of the Buklod ñg
Saulog Transit (Annex F) is not mentioned in the order and resolution appealed from. It is clearly an effort on the part of
the Petitioner to supply what was lacking in the two agreements already mentioned. The contention that as section 13,
Republic Act No. 875, does not require that the agreement be in writing unless either party request that it be reduced to
writing, thereby insinuating that there had been a verbal understanding before the written agreement was entered into, has
no bearing and effect in a case where there is a written agreement which the Court of Industrial Relations found
incomplete. In these circumstances we are of the opinion that the collective bargaining agreement entered into on 15 July
1953 is no bar to a certification election at the instance of at least 10 per cent of the employees in an appropriate
collective bargaining unit, pursuant to section 12, paragraphs (a), (b) and (c), Republic Act No. 875.
The second question raised by the Petitioner in support of its petition filed in the court below need not be passed upon. It
has not arisen. Any pronouncement thereon would be obiter and not binding.
The order and resolution appealed from are affirmed, with costs against the Petitioner.
d. Premature Contract
e. Not Registered CBA
f. Expired CBA
G.R. No. 141471               September 18, 2000
COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN, petitioner,
vs.
ASSOCIATION OF EMPLOYEES AND FACULTY OF LETRAN and ELEONOR AMBAS, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 9
August 1999, dismissing the petition filed by Colegio de San Juan de Letran (hereinafter, "petitioner") and affirming the
Order of the Secretary of Labor, dated December 2, 1996, finding the petitioner guilty of unfair labor practice on two (2)
counts.
The facts, as found by the Secretary of Labor and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
"On December 1992, Salvador Abtria, then President of respondent union, Association of Employees and Faculty of
Letran, initiated the renegotiation of its Collective Bargaining Agreement with petitioner Colegio de San Juan de Letran
for the last two (2) years of the CBA's five (5) year lifetime from 1989-1994. On the same year, the union elected a new
set of officers wherein private respondent Eleanor Ambas emerged as the newly elected President (Secretary of Labor
and Employment's Order dated December 2, 1996, p. 12).
Ambas wanted to continue the renegotiation of the CBA but petitioner, through Fr. Edwin Lao, claimed that the CBA
was already prepared for signing by the parties. The parties submitted the disputed CBA to a referendum by the union
members, who eventually rejected the said CBA (Ibid, p. 2).
Petitioner accused the union officers of bargaining in bad faith before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC). Labor Arbiter Edgardo M. Madriaga decided in favor of petitioner. However, the Labor Arbiter's decision was
reversed on appeal before the NLRC (Ibid, p. 2).
On January 1996, the union notified the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of its intention to strike on
the grounds (sic) of petitioner's: non-compliance with the NLRC (1) order to delete the name of Atty. Federico Leynes as
the union's legal counsel; and (2) refusal to bargain (Ibid, p. 1).
On January 18, 1996, the parties agreed to disregard the unsigned CBA and to start negotiation on a new five-year CBA
starting 1994-1999. On February 7, 1996, the union submitted its proposals to petitioner, which notified the union six
days later or on February 13, 1996 that the same had been submitted to its Board of Trustees. In the meantime, Ambas
was informed through a letter dated February 15, 1996 from her superior that her work schedule was being changed from
Monday to Friday to Tuesday to Saturday. Ambas protested and requested management to submit the issue to a grievance
machinery under the old CBA (Ibid, p. 2-3).
Due to petitioner's inaction, the union filed a notice of strike on March 13, 1996. The parties met on March 27, 1996
before the NCMB to discuss the ground rules for the negotiation. On March 29, 1996, the union received petitioner's
letter dismissing Ambas for alleged insubordination. Hence, the union amended its notice of strike to include Ambas'
dismissal. (Ibid, p. 2-3).
On April 20, 1996, both parties again discussed the ground rules for the CBA renegotiation. However, petitioner stopped
the negotiations after it purportedly received information that a new group of employees had filed a petition for
certification election (Ibid, p. 3).
On June 18, 1996, the union finally struck. On July 2, 1996, public respondent the Secretary of Labor and Employment
assumed jurisdiction and ordered all striking employees including the union president to return to work and for petitioner
to accept them back under the same terms and conditions before the actual strike. Petitioner readmitted the striking
members except Ambas. The parties then submitted their pleadings including their position papers which were filed on
July 17, 1996 ( Ibid, pp. 2-3).
On December 2, 1996, public respondent issued an order declaring petitioner guilty of unfair labor practice on two counts
and directing the reinstatement of private respondent Ambas with backwages. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated May 29, 1997 (Petition, pp. 8-9)."1
Having been denied its motion for reconsideration, petitioner sought a review of the order of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the petition and affirmed the findings of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment. The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals sets forth:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, this Petition is DISMISSED, for being without merit in fact and in law.
With cost to petitioner.
SO ORDERED.2
Hence, petitioner comes to this Court for redress.
Petitioner ascribes the following errors to the Court of Appeals:
I Petitioner's utter lack of interest in bargaining with the union is obvious in its failure to make a timely reply to the
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
WHICH DECLARES PETITIONER LETRAN GUILTY OF REFUSAL TO BARGAIN (UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICE) FOR SUSPENDING THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS WITH
RESPONDENT AEFL, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SUSPENSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WAS
BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE FILING OF A PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION ELECTION BY A RIVAL
UNION WHO CLAIMED TO COMMAND THE MAJORITY OF THE EMPLOYEES WITHIN THE
BARGAINING UNIT.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
WHICH DECLARES PETITIONER LETRAN GUILTY OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE FOR
DISMISSING RESPONDENT AMBAS, DESPITE THE FACT THAT HER DISMISSAL WAS CAUSED
BY HER INSUBORDINATE ATTITUDE, SPECIFICALLY, HER REFUSAL TO FOLLOW THE
PRESCRIBED WORK SCHEDULE.3
The twin questions of law before this Court are the following: (1) whether petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by
refusing to bargain with the union when it unilaterally suspended the ongoing negotiations for a new Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) upon mere information that a petition for certification has been filed by another legitimate
labor organization? (2) whether the termination of the union president amounts to an interference of the employees' right
to self-organization?
The petition is without merit.
After a thorough review of the records of the case, this Court finds that petitioner has not shown any compelling reason
sufficient to overturn the ruling of the Court of Appeals affirming the findings of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment. It is axiomatic that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Supreme
Court and will not be reviewed or disturbed on appeal. In this case, the petitioner failed to show any extraordinary
circumstance justifying a departure from this established doctrine.
As regards the first issue, Article 252 of the Labor Code defines the meaning of the phrase "duty to bargain collectively,"
as follows:
Art. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. - The duty to bargain collectively means the performance of a mutual
obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement
with respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting
any grievances or questions arising under such agreement and executing a contract incorporating such agreements if
requested by either party but such duty does not compel any party to agree to a proposal or to make any concession.
Noteworthy in the above definition is the requirement on both parties of the performance of the mutual obligation to meet
and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement. Undoubtedly,
respondent Association of Employees and Faculty of Letran (AEFL) (hereinafter, "union") lived up to this requisite when
it presented its proposals for the CBA to petitioner on February 7, 1996. On the other hand, petitioner devised ways and
means in order to prevent the negotiation.
proposals presented by the latter. More than a month after the proposals were submitted by the union, petitioner still had
not made any counter-proposals. This inaction on the part of petitioner prompted the union to file its second notice of
strike on March 13, 1996. Petitioner could only offer a feeble explanation that the Board of Trustees had not yet
convened to discuss the matter as its excuse for failing to file its reply. This is a clear violation of Article 250 of the
Labor Code governing the procedure in collective bargaining, to wit:
Art. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. - The following procedures shall be observed in collective bargaining:
(a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a written notice upon the other party with a statement of
its proposals. The other party shall make a reply thereto not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such notice.4
xxx
As we have held in the case of Kiok Loy vs. NLRC,5 the company's refusal to make counter-proposal to the union's
proposed CBA is an indication of its bad faith. Where the employer did not even bother to submit an answer to the
bargaining proposals of the union, there is a clear evasion of the duty to bargain collectively. 6 In the case at bar,
petitioner's actuation show a lack of sincere desire to negotiate rendering it guilty of unfair labor practice.
Moreover, the series of events that transpired after the filing of the first notice of strike in January 1996 show petitioner's
resort to delaying tactics to ensure that negotiation would not push through. Thus, on February 15, 1996, or barely a few
days after the union proposals for the new CBA were submitted, the union president was informed by her superior that
her work schedule was being changed from Mondays to Fridays to Tuesdays to Saturdays. A request from the union
president that the issue be submitted to a grievance machinery was subsequently denied. Thereafter, the petitioner and the
union met on March 27, 1996 to discuss the ground rules for negotiation. However, just two days later, or on March 29,
1996, petitioner dismissed the union president for alleged insubordination. In its final attempt to thwart the bargaining
process, petitioner suspended the negotiation on the ground that it allegedly received information that a new group of
employees called the Association of Concerned Employees of Colegio (ACEC) had filed a petition for certification
election. Clearly, petitioner tried to evade its duty to bargain collectively.
Petitioner, however, argues that since it has already submitted the union's proposals to the Board of Trustees and that a
series of conferences had already been undertaken to discuss the ground rules for negotiation such should already be
considered as acts indicative of its intention to bargain. As pointed out earlier, the evidence on record belie the assertions
of petitioner.
Petitioner, likewise, claims that the suspension of negotiation was proper since by the filing of the petition for
certification election the issue on majority representation of the employees has arose. According to petitioner, the
authority of the union to negotiate on behalf of the employees was challenged when a rival union filed a petition for
certification election. Citing the case of Lakas Ng Manggagawang Makabayan v. Marcelo Enterprises,7 petitioner asserts
that in view of the pendency of the petition for certification election, it had no duty to bargain collectively with the union.
We disagree. In order to allow the employer to validly suspend the bargaining process there must be a valid petition for
certification election raising a legitimate representation issue. Hence, the mere filing of a petition for certification
election does not ipso facto justify the suspension of negotiation by the employer. The petition must first comply with the
provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules. Foremost is that a petition for certification election must be
filed during the sixty-day freedom period. The "Contract Bar Rule" under Section 3, Rule XI, Book V, of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code, provides that: " .… If a collective bargaining agreement has been duly registered in
accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a petition for certification election or a motion for intervention can only be
entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of such agreement." The rule is based on Article 232, 8 in
relation to Articles 253, 253-A and 256 of the Labor Code. No petition for certification election for any representation
issue may be filed after the lapse of the sixty-day freedom period. The old CBA is extended until a new one is signed.
The rule is that despite the lapse of the formal effectivity of the CBA the law still considers the same as continuing in
force and effect until a new CBA shall have been validly executed.9 Hence, the contract bar rule still applies.10 The
purpose is to ensure stability in the relationship of the workers and the company by preventing frequent modifications of
any CBA earlier entered into by them in good faith and for the stipulated original period.11
In the case at bar, the lifetime of the previous CBA was from 1989-1994.1âwphi1 The petition for certification election
by ACEC, allegedly a legitimate labor organization, was filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
only on May 26, 1996. Clearly, the petition was filed outside the sixty-day freedom period. Hence, the filing thereof was
barred by the existence of a valid and existing collective bargaining agreement. Consequently, there is no legitimate
representation issue and, as such, the filing of the petition for certification election did not constitute a bar to the ongoing
negotiation. Reliance, therefore, by petitioner of the ruling in Lakas Ng Manggagawang Makabayan v. Marcelo
Enterprises12 is misplaced since that case involved a legitimate representation issue which is not present in the case at bar.
Significantly, the same petition for certification election was dismissed by the Secretary of Labor on October 25,
1996.1âwphi1 The dismissal was upheld by this Court in a Resolution, dated April 21, 1997.13
In view of the above, there is no doubt that petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by its stern refusal to bargain in
good faith with respondent union.
Concerning the issue on the validity of the termination of the union president, we hold that the dismissal was effected in
violation of the employees' right to self-organization.
To justify the dismissal, petitioner asserts that the union president was terminated for cause, allegedly for insubordination
for her failure to comply with the new working schedule assigned to her, and pursuant to its managerial prerogative to
discipline and/or dismiss its employees. While we recognize the right of the employer to terminate the services of an
employee for a just or authorized cause, nevertheless, the dismissal of employees must be made within the parameters of
law and pursuant to the tenets of equity and fair play.14 The employer's right to terminate the services of an employee for
just or authorized cause must be exercised in good faith.15 More importantly, it must not amount to interfering with,
restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization because it would amount to, as in this
case, unlawful labor practice under Article 248 of the Labor Code.
The factual backdrop of the termination of Ms. Ambas leads us to no other conclusion that she was dismissed in order to
strip the union of a leader who would fight for the right of her co-workers at the bargaining table. Ms. Ambas, at the time
of her dismissal, had been working for the petitioner for ten (10) years already. In fact, she was a recipient of a loyalty
award. Moreover, for the past ten (10) years her working schedule was from Monday to Friday. However, things began
to change when she was elected as union president and when she started negotiating for a new CBA. Thus, it was when
she was the union president and during the period of tense and difficult negotiations when her work schedule was altered
from Mondays to Fridays to Tuesdays to Saturdays. When she did not budge, although her schedule was changed, she
was outrightly dismissed for alleged insubordination.16 We quote with approval the following findings of the Secretary of
Labor on this matter, to wit:
"Assuming arguendo that Ms. Ambas was guilty, such disobedience was not, however, a valid ground to teminate her
employment. The disputed management action was directly connected with Ms. Ambas' determination to change the
complexion of the CBA. As a matter of fact, Ms. Ambas' unflinching position in faithfully and truthfully carrying out her
duties and responsibilities to her Union and its members in getting a fair share of the fruits of their collective endeavors
was the proximate cause for her dismissal, the charge of insubordination being merely a ploy to give a color of legality to
the contemplated management action to dismiss her. Thus, the dismissal of Ms. Ambas was heavily tainted with and
evidently done in bad faith. Manifestly, it was designed to interfere with the members' right to self-organization.
Admittedly, management has the prerogative to discipline its employees for insubordination. But when the exercise of
such management right tends to interfere with the employees' right to self-organization, it amounts to union-busting and
is therefore a prohibited act. The dismissal of Ms. Ambas was clearly designed to frustrate the Union in its desire to
forge a new CBA with the College that is reflective of the true wishes and aspirations of the Union members. Her
dismissal was merely a subterfuge to get rid of her, which smacks of a pre-conceived plan to oust her from the premises
of the College. It has the effect of busting the Union, stripping it of its strong-willed leadership. When management
refused to treat the charge of insubordination as a grievance within the scope of the Grievance Machinery, the action of
the College in finally dismissing her from the service became arbitrary, capricious and whimsical, and therefore violated
Ms. Ambas' right to due process."17
In this regard, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the Court of Appeals affirming the findings of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment. The right to self-organization of employees must not be interfered with by the
employer on the pretext of exercising management prerogative of disciplining its employees. In this case, the totality of
conduct of the employer shows an evident attempt to restrain the employees from fully exercising their rights under the
law. This cannot be done under the Labor Code.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Suspension of Certification Election
a. Prejudicial Question Rule
[G.R. No. 51337. March 22, 1984.]
UNITED CMC TEXTILE WORKERS UNION, Petitioner, v. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, HON.
CARMELO NORIEL, PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS, (JULY
CONVENTION), Respondents.
Jose L. Simon for Petitioner.
Wilfredo Y. Guevarra and Edward P. David for Private Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR LAWS; BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS;
PENDENCY OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CASE, A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION TO
CERTIFICATION ELECTION; CASE AT BAR. — Under settled jurisprudence, the pendency of a formal
charge of company domination is a prejudicial question that, until decided, bars proceedings for a certification
election, the reason being that the votes of the members of the dominated union would not be free. The ULP
Case herein was filed on August 31, 1978, or anterior to the Certification Case, which was presented on
September 5, 1978. The pendency of the charge was known to respondent public official by virtue of the
Motion to Dismiss filed by petitioner as intervenor in the Certification Case. No allegation has been made that
said ULP Case was instituted in bad faith to forestall the Certification Case.
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
The question to resolve is whether or not public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion in affirming the Order of
the Med-Arbiter calling for a certification election despite: (a) the pendency of an unfair labor practice case filed by
petitioner charging respondent PAFLU as being company-dominated; (b) the existence of a deadlock in negotiations for
renewal of the collective bargaining agreement between petitioner and the Central Textile Mills, Inc. (CENTEX, for
short); and (c) a reasonable doubt as to whether the 30% requirement for holding a certification election has been met.
Petitioner is a legitimate labor organization, the incumbent collective bargaining representative of all rank and file
workers of CENTEX since 1956. Respondent PAFLU is also a legitimate labor organization seeking representation as the
bargaining agent of the rank and file workers of CENTEX.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
On August 31, 1978, petitioner filed a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice (R4-LRD-C-8-1493-78) (the ULP Case, for
brevity) against CENTEX and PAFLU alleging that CENTEX had "helped and cooperated in the organization of the
Central Textile Mills, Inc. Local PAFLU by allowing the organizing members of the PAFLU to solicit signatures of
employees of the company who are members of the complainant union to disaffiliate from complainant union and join
the respondent PAFLU, during company time and inside the company premises on August 21, 1978 and the following
days thereafter." 1
While the ULP Case was pending, PAFLU, on September 5, 1978, filed a Petition for Certification Election (R4-LRD-
M-9432-78) (the Certification Case, for short) among the rank and file workers of CENTEX, alleging that: 1) there has
been no certification election during the 12 months period prior to the filing of the petition; 2) the petition is supported by
signatures of 603 workers, or more than 30% of the rank and file workers of CENTEX; 3) the collective bargaining
agreement between CENTEX and petitioner will expire on October 31, 1978; 4) the petition is filed within the 60-day-
freedom-period immediately preceding the expiration of the CBA, and 6) there is no legal impediment to the filing of the point:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
petition. 2
"There is no assertion that such complaint was flimsy, or made in bad faith or filed purposely to forestall the certification
Petitioner intervened in the Certification Case and filed a Motion to Dismiss on September 27, 1978 on the grounds that: election. So, no reason existed for the Industrial Court to depart from its established practice of suspending the election
1) the ULP Case charging that PAFLU is a company-dominated union is a prejudicial question and bars the holding of proceeding. And this seems to be accepted rule in the law of labor relations, the reason being, in the words of Mr. Justice
the certification election; and 2) PAFLU failed to comply with the 30% requirement for mandatory certification election Montemayor, `if there is a union dominated by the company, to which some of the workers belong, an election among
since only 440 of the 603 are valid signatures and that 719 signatories are required as constitutive of 30% of the rank and workers and employees of the company would not reflect the true sentiment and wishes of the said workers and
file workers totalling 2,397 and not 1,900 as alleged by PAFLU. 3 employees because the votes of the members of the dominated union would not be free.’ (Manila Paper Mills Employees
v. Court of Industrial Relations, 104 Phil. 10)
On October 16, 1978, petitioner filed a Notice of Strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations for deadlock in the CBA
negotiations with CENTEX. The parties having failed to effect a conciliation, the Labor Minister assumed jurisdiction on "And we have held, through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, that such charge of company domination is a prejudicial question
November 9, 1978 in Case No. AJML-033-78 4 (referred to hereafter as the Deadlock Case)cralawnad that until decided, shall suspend or bar proceedings for certification election. (Standard Cigarette Workers’ Union v.
Court of Industrial Relations, 101 Phil. 126)
A Supplemental Motion to Dismiss in the Certification Case was filed by petitioner on December 7, 1978 alleging that
the Labor Minister had already taken cognizance of the deadlock in the CBA negotiations and constituted an impediment "Indeed, if as a result of the Pelta’s complaint in Case No. 255-ULP, the Workers Union should be ordered dissolved as a
to the holding of a certification election. 5 company dominated union, any election held in the meantime would be a waste of energy and money to all parties
concerned." 12
On December 18, 1978, in the Deadlock Case, the Deputy Minister of Labor released a Decision directing petitioner and
CENTEX to execute and sign a CBA to take effect on November 1, 1978 up to October 30, 1981 based on the guidelines The rationale for the suspension of the election proceedings has been further amplified as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
enumerated therein, and to furnish the Office of the Minister of Labor with a signed copy of the renewed agreement not
later than January 31, 1979. 6 "What is settled law, dating from the case of Standard Cigarette Workers’ Union v. Court of Industrial Relations (101
Phil. 126), decided in 1957, is that if it were a labor organization objecting to the participation in a certification election
On January 23, 1979, in the Certification Case, the Med-Arbiter issued an Order for the holding of a certification election of a company-dominated union, as a result of which a complaint for an unfair labor practice case against the employer
among CENTEX rank and file workers, whereby qualified voters could choose either PAFLU or petitioner as the was filed, the status of the latter union must be first cleared in such a proceeding before such voting could take place. In
collective bargaining representative or No Union at all. 7 This was affirmed by respondent Director of the Bureau of the language of Justice J.B.L. Reyes as ponente: `As correctly pointed out by Judge Lanting in his dissenting opinion on
Labor Relations on appeal, in the challenged Resolution, dated May 25, 1979, stating that: 1) the Bureau has discretion to the denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, a complaint for unfair labor practice may be considered a prejudicial
order certification election where several unions are contending for representation and when there is doubt as to whether question in a proceeding for certification election when it is charged therein that one or more labor unions participating in
the 30% requirement has been met; and 2) to preclude the filing of a petition for certification election the notice of strike the election are being aided, or are controlled, by the company or employer. The reason is that the certification election
for deadlock in CBA negotiations must occur prior to the petition. 8 may lead to the selection of an employer-dominated or company union as the employees’ bargaining representative, and
when the court finds that said union is employer-dominated in the unfair labor practice case, the union selected would be
A Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied for lack of merit in the Resolution of August 20, 1979 9 , decertified and the whole election proceedings would be rendered useless and nugatory.’ (Ibid., 128). The next year, the
also assailed herein. same jurist had occasion to reiterate such doctrine in Manila Paper Mills Employees and Workers Association v. Court of
Industrial Relations (104 Phil. 10 [1958]), thus: `We agree with the CIR on the reasons given in its order that only a
Hence, this petition, on the general proposition that public respondent has committed serious error of law and acted with formal charge of company domination may serve as a bar to and stop a certification election, the reason being that if
grave abuse of discretion, and that petitioner has no plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. there is a union dominated by the Company, to which some of the workers belong, an election among the workers and
employees of the company would not reflect the true sentiment and wishes of the said workers and employees from the
We issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the conduct of the certification election, and eventually gave the standpoint of their welfare and interest, because as to the members of the company dominated union, the vote of the said
Petition due course. members in the election would not be free. It is equally true, however, that the opposition to the holding of a certification
election due to a charge of company domination can only be filed and maintained by the labor organization which made
The issues raised are: (1) is the pendency of the ULP Case charging a participating union in the certification election the charge of company domination, because it is the entity that stands to lose and suffer prejudice by the certification
proceedings as company-dominated a prejudicial question to the conduct of the election? (2) Does the decision in the election, the reason being that its members might be overwhelmed in the voting by the other members controlled and
Deadlock Case directing the parties to execute a CBA have the effect of barring the certification election? (3) Does dominated by the Company,’ (Ibid., 15). It is easily understandable why it should be thus. There would be an impairment
respondent Director have the discretion to call for a certification election even if the 30% consent requirement is lacking? of the integrity of the collective bargaining process if a company-dominated union were allowed to participate in a
certification election. The timid, the timorous, and the faint-hearted in the ranks of labor could easily be tempted to cast
The case can be resolved on the basis of the first issue alone, which must be answered in the affirmative. Under settled their votes in favor of the choice of management. Should it emerge victorious, and it becomes the exclusive
jurisprudence, the pendency of a formal charge of company domination is a prejudicial question that, until decided, bars representative of labor at the conference table, there is a frustration of the statutory scheme. It takes two to bargain. There
proceedings for a certification election 10 , the reason being that the votes of the members of the dominated union would would be instead a unilateral imposition by the employer. There is need therefore to inquire as to whether a labor
not be free. 11 The ULP Case herein was filed on August 31, 1978, or anterior to the Certification Case, which was organization that aspires to be the exclusive bargaining representative is company-dominated before the certification
presented on September 5, 1978. The pendency of the charge was known to respondent public official by virtue of the election." 13
Motion to Dismiss filed by petitioner as intervenor in the Certification Case. No allegation has been made that said ULP
Case was instituted in bad faith to forestall the Certification Case. The following ruling is thus squarely in With the suspension of the certification proceedings clearly called for by reason of a prejudicial question, the necessity of
passing upon the remaining issues is obviated.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library G.R. No. L-32853 September 25, 1981
JUAN S. BARRERA, (doing business under the firm and trade name, MACHINERY AND STEEL PRODUCTS
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of August 20, 1979 issued by public respondent affirming the Order of the Med-Arbiter, ENGINEERING MASPE petitioner,
dated January 23, 1979, calling for a certification election is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Temporary vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Philippine Associated Workers Union
Restraining Order heretofore issued by this Court shall continue to be in force and effect until the status is cleared of (PAWO) and MASPE WORKERS' UNION, respondents.
respondent Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (July Convention) in Case No. R4-LRD-M-9-432-78 entitled
"In the Matter of Certification Election Among Rank and File Workers of Central Textile Mills, Inc., Philippine
Association of Free Labor Unions, Petitioner, United CMC Textile Workers Union, Intervenor."cralaw virtua1aw library FERNANDO C.J.:

No costs. It was the absence of any definite ruling at the time this petition was filed on the question of whether or not a
pending certification election proceeding may be dismissed or held in abeyance, there being such a motion on the part of
the employer Juan S. Barrera, doing business under the firm and trade name of Machinery and Steel Products
Engineering MASPE alleging an unfair labor practice against one of the contending parties, private respondent MASPE
Workers Union, the other being private respondent Philippine Associated Workers Union, that led this Court to give it
due course. The unfair labor practice imputed to such labor union consisted of failure to bargain collectively, aggravated
SO ORDERED. by an illegal strike. Respondent Court of Industrial Relations denied such a motion to dismiss, stating that the grounds
therein alleged "appear not to be indubitable A motion for reconsideration having proved futile, this petition was filed.

Subsequently, to be precise, in 1973, in the case of B. F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc. vs. Goodrich (Marikina Factory)
Confidential and Salaried Employees Union-NATU. 1 such a question was given an answer by this Court, one adverse to
the claim of petitioner. This petition, therefore, must be dismissed.

The case for petitioner was put most vigorously in the exhaustive and scholarly brief of its counsel, Manuel M. Crudo To
quote from its pertinent portion: "On September 22, 1970 the petitioner Barrera filed a motion to dismiss or hold case in
abeyance, in CIR Case No. 2759-MC. In said motion, we called attention to the admission of MASPE Workers Union as
intervenor in the case. We stated that the intervenor union, its officers and members had committed various acts of unfair
labor practice and were on illegal strike punctuated by force, violence and intimidation. We called attention to
our formal charge of unfair labor practice against the intervenor union. We called attention to the fact that in the charge
of unfair labor practice among the reliefs prayed for were to declare respondents therein collectively and individually
guilty of unfair labor practice; to declare the strike, and other concerted actions resorted to in pursuance of said unfair
labor practice illegal to declare the MASPE Workers Union as consequently having lost all rights and privileges
accorded by law to a legitimate labor union; and to declare all individual respondents therein and others as having lost
their employment status by virtue of the illegality of the strike staged by them. We then pointed out that unless the case
for unfair labor practice against MASPE Workers Union, its officers and members is decided the status of that union and
its members who are respondents would be uncertain (i.e., in relation to the requested certification election and the
outcome thereof). * * * Unfortunately, the respondent Honorable Court of Industrial Relations denied our motion to
dismiss or hold case in abeyance. * * * ." 2 It remains only to be added that subsequently the Court of Industrial
Relations en banc denied a motion for reconsideration, failing "to find sufficient justification to alter or to modify the
aforesaid Order." 3

To repeat, the petition cannot prosper.

1. As set forth in the B. F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc. decision: "There is novelty in the specific question raised, as to
whether or not a certification election may be stayed at the instance of the employer, pending the determination of an
unfair labor practice case filed by it against certain employees affiliated with respondent-unions. That is a matter of
which this Court has not had an opportunity to speak on previously. What is settled law, dating from the case of Standard
Cigarette Workers' Union v. Court of Industrial Relations, decided in 1957, is that if it were a labor organization
objecting to the participation in a certification election of a company dominated union, as a result of which a complaint
for an unfair labor practice case against the employer was filed, the status of the latter union must be first cleared in such
a proceeding before such voting could take place." 4

b. Party and Issue

2. This is the more relevant excerpt: "The unique situation before us, however, is exactly the reverse. It is management
that would have an unfair labor practice case filed by it for illegal strike engaged in by some of its employees concluded,
before it would agree to the holding of a certification election. That is the stand of petitioner. It does not carry conviction.
The reason that justifies the postponement of a certification election pending an inquiry, as to the bona fides of a labor
union, precisely calls for a different conclusion. If under the circumstances disclosed, management is allowed to have its
way, the result might be to dilute or fritter away the strength of an organization bent on a more zealous defense of labor's
prerogatives. The difficulties and obstacles that must be then hurdled would not be lost on the rest of the personnel who
had not as yet made up their minds one way or the other. This is not to say that management is to be precluded from
filing an unfair labor practice case. It is merely to stress that such a suit should not be allowed to lend itself as a means,
whether intended or not, to prevent a truly free expression of the will of the labor group as to the organization that will
represent it. It is not only the loss of time involved, in itself not likely to enhance the prospect of respondent-unions, but
also the fear engendered in the mind of an ordinary employee that management has many weapons in its arsenal to bring
the full force of its undeniable power against those of its employees dissatisfied with things as they are. There is no valid
reason then for the postponement sought. This is one instance that calls for the application of the maxim, lex dilationes
semper exhorret. Moreover, is there not in the posture taken by petitioner a contravention of what is expressly set forth in
the Industrial Peace Act, which speaks of the labor organizations 'designated or selected for the purpose of collective
bargaining by the majority of the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit [be the exclusive] representative
of all the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining.' The law clearly contemplates all the
employees, not only some of them. As much as possible then, there is to be no unwarranted reduction in the number of
those taking part in a certification election, even under the guise that in the meanwhile, which may take some time, some
of those who are employees could possibly lose such status, by virtue of a pending unfair labor practice case." 5

3. Even on the assumption that the vigorous condenmation of the strike and the picketing were attended by violence, it
does not automatically follow that thereby the strikers in question are no longer entitled to participate in the certification
election for having automatically lost their jobs. So it was made clear in another B.F. Goodrich decision: 6 What was set
forth in the facts as found by respondent Judge Salvador would indicate that it was during the picketing, certainly not
peaceful, that the imputed acts of violence did occur. It cannot be ignored, however, that there were injuries on both sides
because management did not, understandably, play a passive role confronted as it was with the unruly disruptive tactics
of labor. This is not, by any means, to condone activities of such character, irrespective of the parties responsible. It is
merely to explain what cannot be justified. Nonetheless, did the acts in question call for an automatic finding of
illegality? Again, the order issued on February 4, 1972 appeared to be oblivious of a 1971 decision of this Court, Shell
Oil Workers' Union v. Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd. There it was clearly held: 'A strike otherwise valid, if
violent in character, may be placed beyond the pale. Care is to be taken, however, especially where an unfair labor
practice is involved, to avoid stamping it with illegality just because it is tainted by such acts. To avoid rendering illusory
the recognition of the right to strike, responsibility in such a case should be individual and not collective. A different
conclusion would be called for, of course, if the existence of force while the strike lasts is pervasive and widespread,
consistently and deliberately resorted to as a matter of policy. It could be reasonably concluded then that even if justified
as to ends, it becomes illegal because of the means employed.' It must be pointed out likewise that the facts as there
found would seem to indicate a greater degree of violence. Thus: 'Respondent Court must have been unduly impressed by
the evidence submitted by the Shell Company to the effect that the strike was marred by acts of force, intimidation and
violence on the evening of June 14 and twice in the mornings of June 15 and 16, 1967 in Manila. Attention was likewise
called to the fact that even on the following day, with police officials stationed at the strike bound area, molotov bombs
did explode and the streets were obstructed witlh wooden planks containing protruding nails. Moreover, in the branches
of the Shell Company in Iloilo City as well as in Bacolod, on dates unspecified, physical injuries appeared to have been
inflicted on management personnel. Respondent Court in the appealed decision did penalize with loss of employment the
ten individuals responsible for such acts. Nor is it to be lost sight of that before the certification on June 27, 1967, one
month had elapsed during which the Union was on strike. Except on those few days specified then, the Shell Company
could not allege that the strike was conducted in a manner other than peaceful Under the circumstances, it would be
going too far to consider that it thereby became illegal.' Then, mention was made of a decision in Insular Life Assurance
Co., Ltd. Employees' Association vs. Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. [where] there is the recognition by this Court,
speaking through Justice Castro, of picketing as such being "inherently explosive." It is thus clear that not every form of
violence suffices to affix the seal of illegality on a strike or to cause the loss of employment by the guilty party. " 7

WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed and the appealed order affirmed. No costs.