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LOGIC, REASONING, INFORMATION

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LOGIC, REASONING, INFORMATION

Dmitry Zaitsev

What is logic? The answer to this question is not as obvious as it may

appear. More than a century ago, at the dawn of modern symbolic logic,
Bertrand Russel noted that an adequate definition of logic had yet to be
found [26]. A hundred years on Jaakko Hintikka and Gabriel Sandu still
admit in their programmatic article “What is Logic” [11, p.13] that “it is
still far from clear what is meant by logic.”
Today the most common definitions and their variations are as
follows:
1. Logic is the study of the methods and principles used to
distinguish correct reasoning from incorrect.
2. Logic is the study of argument.
In Russian the difference between these definitions disappears and
they practically merge into one. However, in the English-language
literature a distinction is made between reasoning and argument. In any
case it is impossible to clarify the meaning of the term “logic” without
clarifying the Russian term rassuzhdeniye which may mean both
“reasoning” and “argument.” Thus the first part of this article will be
devoted to terminology while the second part will argue that modern
logic is not a science either of reasoning or argument.

TERMIONOLOGY
Let us first look at the differences in the use of the terms “reasoning”
and “argument,” especially since the use of these terms in the logical
context is not obvious even in English-language studies. Thus D.Walton
in an article devoted to this problem notes that logic as a study discipline
is living through hard times [37, p.399]: “it has become questionable
whether there are any longer clear and appropriate definitions of the key
terms 'reasoning' and 'argument' with which we can work.”
Typically, both terms are related to inferring. This is the interpretation
one finds in the logic textbooks by I.Copy which have become classics
1
in the Western logical-philosophical tradition of logical textbooks. All
reasoning is thinking but not all thinking is reasoning – special kind of
thinking in which inference takes place [2, p.6 ]. G.Hardegree makes
this point still more forcefully: Reasoning is a special mental activity
called inferring, what can also be called making (or performing)
inferences [9]. In the above-mentioned article Hintikka and Sandu also
propose to interpret logic as the study of inference and the
corresponding relations.
The term “inference” is defined predictably:”Reasoning is the process of
inference; it is the process of passing from certain propositions already
known or assumed to be true, to another truth distinct from them but
following from them” [25]. With minor modifications, the definition of
reasoning as inference, ie passage from premises to conclusions, is
shared by many authors (see, for example [1], [3], [10], [37]).
The situation seems to be clear enough. Reasoning implies arriving at a
conclusion. But the clarity is only an illusion which is instantly dispelled
if we turn to the definition of “argument.” For example, according to
Peter Suber, author of Basic Terms of Logic, “an argument is not a
quarrel or dispute, but an example of reasoning in which one or more
statements are offered as support, justification, grounds, reasons, or
evidence for another statement. The statement being supported is the
conclusion of the argument, and the statements that support it are the
premises of the argument” [35]. This brief passage lumps together
inference and the varieties of reasoning and argument.
G.Hardegree effectively identifies argument or at least the result with a
conclusion. “An argument is a collection of statements, one of which is
designated as the conclusion, and the remainder of which are designated
as the premises.” [9] “Argument” is defined in a similar way by I.Copy
and P.Angeles (author of Dictionary of Philosophy) and even by
T.Govier, a specialist in the field of informal logic who believes that
“Reasoning is distinguished from arguing along these lines: reasoning is
what you may do before you argue, and your argument expresses some
of your (best) reasoning.” [8]
Without going into further terminological differences the following
conclusions suggest themselves:
1. There is no consensus in the English-language literature on logic
concerning the use of the terms “reasoning,” “argument” и “inference.”

2
 2. Below I will proceed from the assumption that reasoning is a
cognitive process of inference, and argument is the result of this
process expressed in language and representing a system of sentences
consisting of premises and a conclusion.
This interpretation accords well with the widely accepted
interpretation in modern philosophical logic in Russia. According to
Bocharov and Markin, reasoning is an intellectual procedure of
supporting a certain proposition by deriving it step-by-step from other
propositions” [43]. Inference is the simplest type of reasoning, “direct
transition from one or several propositions А1, А2,..., Аn to proposition
В” [43]. The examples cited by the authors indirectly confirm the
distinction introduced above: the definition refers to “reasoning” while
the example refer to “argument.”

REASONING AND LOGIC

Is logic indeed a science of reasoning and/or argument? In this
paragraph I will attempt to build a case for a negative answer to this
question. This interpretation of logic is unorthodox though it is not
entirely new. The myth of logic as the science or reasoning is challenged
in the works of D.Perkins [19] and G.Harman, with the latter bearing a
tell-tale title “Internal critique: a logic is not a theory of reasoning and a
theory of reasoning is not a logic’[10]. To prove that it is wrong to
consider logic to be a science of reasoning I will use the system of
arguments proposed by D.Perkins which I have expanded and modified
for the purposes of this study.
So, D.Perkins asks three key questions:
Do people reason according to standard logic?
Can people reason according to standard logic?
Should people reason according to standard logic?
Cognitive psychology studies show that people often fail to draw
proper conclusions from given premises. First, they arrive at wrong
conclusions (the conclusion does not follow from the premises) and
second, they fail to draw the conclusions that do follow from the given
3
premises. A classical example of such illogical reasoning is incorrect use
of conditional-categorical schemes of inference. Thus, studies have
revealed [6] that about 75% of respondents assess incorrect moduses
with a negative antecedent and a positive consequent as correct. On the
other hand, the majority of respondents consider the standard modus
tollens to be incorrect.
Naturally, it is possible to attribute these and similar phenomena to
a different treatment of logical connectives. For example, the natural
language conjunction “if…then” is often interpreted not in the meaning
that we put in material implication but rather in the meaning that is
similar to the interpretation of equivalence in formal logic. Such
explanations, in our view, confuse cause and effect. The natural
language use of conjunctions in discourse is the solely correct non-trivial
thinking that errs against logic, while logic is at odds with natural
reasoning.
Thus, in many cases natural human reasoning does not correspond
to logical norms.
Can people reason according to standard logic? That, too, is
unlikely owing to natural limitations of intellect, the capacity to
calculate and understand. One example will suffice to illustrate
misunderstanding of logical links. Most people not specializing in logic
consider the following sequence of equivalent logical forms to be
correct:
Wrong (A and B)  Wrong (A or B)  Wrong and Wrong B
Should people reason according to standard logic? How useful is it
to do so? Perkins believes that logic is too cerebral and general to be of
practical use. This is borne out by the above analysis of the (non)use of
modus tollens in natural reasoning and the numerous cases of reasoning
yielding information that is “superfluous” in logical terms but useful and
highly plausible, and finally by the historical-logical analysis of the
theory of reasoning in the original Aristotelian interpretation. According
to [39], the reasoning models, from Aristotle’s point of view, differ in
some important ways from modern logical reasoning: the conclusion
may not coincide with one of the premises, there should be no redundant
4
(unused) premises (which leads to non-monotony), there can be no
multiple conclusions, and the conclusion must not be a law of logic and
must be relevant to the premises. Thus, following logical requirements
in modeling natural reasoning sidetracks the scientist. The task set in
recent years is totally different: to change standard logic to bring it more
in line with the practice of natural reasoning.
If one looks at the treatment of reasoning as an object language
correlate of cognitive activity of making inferences from premises, in
that interpretation too reasoning is not the subject matter of logic.
First, being fixed in language as the result of reasoning, argument is
exposed to all the critical remarks cited above. Second, another
important feature of argument, ie language verbalization, gives rise to
serious doubts. Is language the only reality of thought, in particular, the
form of being of the argument?
Modern cognitive psychology and linguistics increasingly refer to
non-language and pre-language thinking. L.Orbely in his time [48],
elaborating Pavlov’s interpretation of language as the second signal
system, suggested the existence of intermediate stages in the evolution
of signal systems, notably pre-verbal (proto-verbal) concepts. As early
as 1934 L.Vygotsky in the fourth chapter of his seminal book Thought
and Speech pointed to different genetic roots of thought and speech.
“1. Thought and speech have different generic roots.
“2. Thought and speech develop along different paths independently
from each other…
“6. In the philogenesis of thought and speech we can safely posit the
pre-speech phase in the development of intellect and the pre-intellectual
phase in the development of speech.” [45].
Anna Wierzbicka, developing Vygotsky’s ideas, proposed a
program of looking for the ”alphabet of human thoughts” or “semantic
primitives”, ie a set of innate concepts common to all humans that
ensures the initial conceptualization of the world and thus makes
communication possible. Obviously, such a set of semantic primitives
must be essentially pre-verbal.

5
 According to Wierzbicka, if we want to find truly universal human
concepts we should look for them not in the surrounding reality, but in
our heads.
Therefore establishing a definitive set of universal atoms of
meaning (“the alphabet of human thoughts”) is a highly relevant and
urgent task of linguistic semantics whose solution will have far-reaching
implications not only for linguistics, but also for the theory of cognition
and cultural anthropology[38].
A further potent argument in favor of the existence of non-verbal
reasoning has been provided by cognitive studies carried out in recent
years into the thinking of higher primates, dolphins and birds belonging
to the Corvidae family. The project of studying the behavior of primates
launched in the late 1960s has yielded many startling and mind-changing
results. ([7], [23], [24], [28]).
To sum up the results of these studies:
1. higher animals have the capacity to reason and make inferences
(one instance is the so-called “transitive transfer” possessed not only by
chimpanzees and gorillas, but also by crows);
2. the capacity to reason is based on the deeper capacity for non-
verbal thinking.
Thus, interpreting logic as the science of reasoning fixed in
language is too narrow to say the least.

I would hate the reader to get the impression that I adhere to an

eccentric and unorthodox view of logic. No one and nothing can prevent
logic from being considered the science of reasoning in all the above-
mentioned meanings. The question is whether this concept of logic
corresponds to the modern trends in its development. In other words, are
logic as the science of reasoning and modern symbolic logic one and the
same science of fundamentally different sciences? In the preceding
paragraph I tried to show that logic in its modern interpretation is
emphatically not a science of reasoning. Posing this question and the
proposed answer to it give rise to another question, which is the key
question this article seeks to answer: what is logic?

THREE SOURCES

6
 Before I venture to offer my interpretation of logic I would like to
consider two more traditions in its interpretation that are essential for
our purpose.
The interpretation of logic as the theory of entailment goes back to
Bertrand Russel’s The Theory of Implication [27]. Another interesting
and little-known milestone in the development of the “implications”
approach to logic is arguably the works of Karl Popper in the late 1940s
([20], [21], [22]) which propose an original view of logic as a meta-
linguistic theory of implicative relations. According to [29], in these
works Popper laid the foundations of the structuralist approach to logic.
A.Koslow took the structuralist approach to logic a step further ([13],
[14], [15]). He sees logic as a set of systems arrived at through varying
the axiomatization of the implication relations. “The kind of Structuralist
Logic that I have in mind begins with implication structures, those
ordered pairs consisting of a nonempty set, together with an implication
relation on it…”[13]
The entities connected by the implication relation are not so
important. In Russel’s case these are propositions, in other theories it
may be judgments (meanings of sentences) or sentences, and it makes
sense to speak of entailment as the relation between true meanings. The
key to this concept of logic is the study of a special kind of implication
relations between “meaning entities.”
The second concept that is essential for what follows is the
interpretation of logic as the science of the being of the truth (or truth-
values, in more modern parlance). It goes back to the works of Frege. In
his 1918 article “The Thought” he proclaims that the task of logic is to
identify the laws of truth, and truth is its object of study. Similar views
were expressed by Lukasiewicz who considered logic to be a science of
a special kind of objects, namely, a science of logical values [16]. In
modern logic this ontological approach is being developed by
Y.Shramko ([30], [49] (and by the works included in this publication).
Summing up the distinctive features of this concept of logic it has to be
noted that logic is concerned with special abstract entities akin to
numbers, or truth-values (logical values).
It is interesting that the two concepts of logic described above
represent, as it were, two sides of the same coin. We can look at logic
through the prism of implication relations ignoring the nature of the
entities they link and merely positing their existence, or we can, on the
contrary, focus on the objects regarding the relations between them as
7
being derived from the nature of the objects. In terms of concrete logical
theories, both approaches are mutually expressible in modern logic.
Thus, defining entailment through the preservation of the truth but
generalizing truth-values, like in relevant logic [5], [4], and in the logics
of generalized truth-values ([31], [32], [40], [42]) we get different
systems of entailment. And conversely, the article [33] shows how a
logic can be built in which various types of entailment relations are
chosen as possible values. Interestingly, Lukasiewicz himself hesitates
in choosing the interpretation of logic. In his early works “On the
Principle of the Excluded Third” and “Logic and Psychology” he
interprets propositions as Meinong’s objectives noting that logic studies
objective correlates of propositions, that is, objectives.
The third and final source of my vision of logic is the ”act/product”
concept as the foundation of he theory of meaning. These ideas were
developed by Stumpf [34], Тwardowski[36] and Ossowski[18].
Incidentally, Twardowski was so impressed by Lukasiewicz’ work
Logic and Psychology that he was led to develop a new theory of
meaning. Under that theory there is a two-way relation between the
semantic meaning and the sign. The sign expresses the meaning and the
meaning generates the sign. Thus it turns out that the concept or
reference has some pre-existence with regard to the lexical expression
and determines it in a certain sense.

LOGIC AROUND US
As I see it, the first thing to be done in order to take an unbiased look at
modern logic is to shed some misguided views on logical common
sense. The main delusion, at least within the Russian logical community,
consists in misunderstanding the role of language. We all have an innate
idea that language is the (sole) form in which meaning exists.
Paraphrasing Quain one might exclaim: “no meaning without
expression” or ”no signified without the signifier.” The very term
“meaning” semantically presupposes “the meaning of something.” It is
odd to speak about meaning in itself. Perhaps it has to do with the term
that produces a certain mental blockage. What will be discussed below
might be more appropriately called “an information complex” or “an
information entity.”

So, let us try to get rid of the tenacious idea that meaning exists only
though language and imagine that information entities we used to call
8
meanings are abstract entities that pre-exist their linguistic expression
(which transforms them into meanings). This would not seem so strange
if one remembers, on the one hand, the ideas of non-verbal and pre-
verbal reasoning, and on the other hand the theory of meaning based on
the act/product principle.
This line of reasoning leads us to positing the existence of an area of
information entities similar to Frege’s “third world” of thoughts. It
would be natural to assume that this area is ordered by certain relations.
The relations may be between individual information entities, between
entities and more complex information entities or between different
information complexes. The resulting picture is highly reminiscent of
the ideas of Husserl set forth in the second volume of Logical
Investigations where he speaks about a tree of semantic meanings with
vertical inclusion-type relations and lateral relations between points on
various branches of the tree. As he put it, ”if all the masses gravitating
toward each other disappeared the law of gravitation would thereby be
destroyed, it would remain without the possibility of being actually
applied. Indeed, it does not say anything about the existence of
gravitating masses, but only about what characterizes the gravitating
masses as such” [46]. At this stage there are grounds for interpreting
logic as a science of (implication) relations between information entities.
This kind of ontological interpretation of logic involves some
difficulties that need to be resolved. So, the area of information entities
is objective (inter-subjective) and exists independently of human
consciousness. Moreover, the constituent objects are not sensually
perceived, but are given to the subject in real perception. Consequently,
we have no direct access to these objects. The question then suggests
itself, how do these objects and – perhaps even more importantly in the
logical context – these relations manifest themselves? To answer this
question we should once again turn to the analysis of language and the
definition of logic as the science of true meanings.
What is language and how did it come into being? There is still no
precise answer to the question. However, all the diverse theories of the
origin of the natural language, including the exotic “ding-dong,” “pooh-
pooh,” “bow-wow,” “ta-ta,” “yo-he-ho,” theories etc., link its genesis to
communication. Language is needed to exchange information, to convey
it to someone. In turn, communication presupposes that in conveying a
message to The Other we expect it to be understood, ie that the meaning
the sender invests it with will be adequately interpreted by the recipient.
9
It is for this purpose that we use signs as the carriers of meaning, of
information in the process of communication.
Obviously, we are talking not about personal meaning, but about an
inter-subjective semantic nucleus of the message. The sign expresses
information. In order to be expressed something must, first, precede the
(linguistic) means of expression and second, be objective (expressible in
an inter-subjective way). Thus, language signs are vehicles of objective
semantic information being the only sensually perceived intermediaries
between the area of information entities and the subject.
This objective fact is expressed in the grammar of language. To fall
back on Husserl’s example from Logical Investigations. “It swam if the
apple never knocked” is an impossible linguistic structure due to
objective, ideal causes rooted in the pure essence of meaning.
Thus, we understand information expressed through language,
which makes communication possible. Going back to the nature of logic
we move to a different level of abstraction, from the level of objects to
the level of relations between them. In other words, in the process of
communication we exchange information because there exists an
objective area of information entities. But what is the connection
between this area and the relation of entailment studied by logic? I
believe that the spectrum of entailment relations is a variety of more
general relations between information entities. This interpretation throws
a new sidelight on the argument. An argument is a set of sentences
describing the relation of entailment, which is a particular case of
relations of a higher order between information entities. It is at this point
that true meanings come to the fore.
In fact the true value of a sentence plays a dual role. On the one
hand, in the classical interpretation the true value of a sentence means
that the situation it describes corresponds to reality. The evaluation,
though, is practically useless and only leads to semantic pseudo-
paradoxes. Indeed, as Frege noted, to say “today is Tuesday” is the same
as saying “it is true that today is Tuesday.” In the latter case the truth-
value does not add anything to the meaning of the sentence and carries
no new information. I would even hazard to suggest that truth as a
characteristic of a sentence is relevant and is introduced into the
philosophical domain only in connection with logical problems, to make
the narrative more coherent. On the other hand interpreted as an
assumption is needed to evaluate arguments. We say that reasoning is
correct if truth is preserved in the transition from premises to
10
conclusions. The second role of true-value from the logical point of view
turns out to be the more important one.
Preservation of truth-value is one possible criterion of verification
of reasoning. The development of logic over the past fifty years has
shown that it often makes sense to speak about reasoning in terms of
transition from true premises to a non-false conclusion and from non-
false premises to a true conclusion, etc. What is the underlying motive,
to try to formalize ever new types of practical arguments or to select
reasoning interpretations for new varieties of entailment relations in
order to rescue the traditional logical paradigm?
From approximately the 1970s the project of generalized truth-
values and the corresponding logics initiated in the early studies of
J.M.Dunn and N.Benlap in the field of relevant logic has been actively
pursued. Over time the range of studies broadened intertwining with
related areas in philosophical logic. Thus, Malinowski’s attempts to
disprove the famous Suchko thesis led to the building of the logic of
quasi-entailment in which the entailment relation can be interpreted as a
variety of generalization of the entailment relations as part of the project
of the logics of generalized truth-values. In our resent papers with
Y.Shramko [41] and with O.Grigoriev [47], we proposed a
generalization of the classical propositional logic that paves the way for
expressing new, non-standard connective that have no analogues in the
natural language as well as further generalization of entailment-type
relations. These and similar results of recent years highlight one of the
vectors in the development of philosophical logic whose link with the
reasoning paradigm is tenuous and indirect to say the least.
Moreover, logic at the current stage of its development can indeed
be interpreted ontologically as the science of the being and relations of
(generalized) truth-values. Truth-values, then, are substitutes or markers
of information entities. We ascribe truth to sentences in order to
somehow capture the meaning of sentences. In the case of reasoning, the
truth-values of the premises and the conclusion make it possible to
identify various types of transitions from (often more complicated)
information complexes to others.

CONCLUSION
It is generally assumed that the main difference of modern symbolic
logic from traditional logic lies in the method. The descriptive method of
classical science is being replaced by formalization. The difference of
11
method corresponds to the transition from traditional to symbolic logic
and adequately describes the symbolic logic at its inception more than a
hundred years ago. At the same time the emphasis on formalization
considered outside the historical context and interpreted as bringing out
the logical form of language context diverts attention away from the
genuine trends in the development of logic by fastening logic to
language and through it, to the cloying subject of reasoning.
Consistent adherence to the idea of the language reality of the
logical, first, keeps one in thrall to the reasoning paradigm, second,
underscores the normative aspect of logic (because the only acceptable
method of studying reasoning is not generalizing the empirical types of
arguments but revealing the model of correct reasoning), third, links
logic to a certain stage of rational cognition thus leading to its epistemic
interpretation and rationalization. Examples of the elaboration of this
approach to logic can be found in the standard textbook by V.Bocharov
and V. Markin and in the works of Ye.Voishvillo in collaboration with
M.Degtyarev under the notable title Logic as Part of the Theory of
Cognition and Scientific Methodology [44]. Unfortunately, this approach
is all but useless in interpreting the modern trends in the development of
logic. Logic feels constrained in the framework of the natural language.
Hence the interpretations of logic as the study of certain mathematical
aspects of artificial formal languages (see Hofweber’s article “Logic and
Ontology” in the Stanford Philosophical Encyclopedia [12]) that
essentially seek to save the old paradigm by replacing the natural
language with an artificial one and replacing the reasoning paradigm
with an inference-based one.
The most radical, revolutionary way to overcome the problems
facing modern logic, as I have tried to show in this article, is to renounce
the premise that meaning can only exist in the language mode.
Traditional post-Aristotle logic (my knowledge of logical history is not
sufficient to discuss Aristotle’s logical views) has indeed developed
within the reasoning paradigm. The use of formalization methods
marked the start of its collapse. The next stage in the development of
symbolic logic, especially in the last fifty years, has seen an ontological
pivot. Logic gradually morphed into a science of the being of truth-
values and the relations between them. This interpretation of the nature
of logic corresponds to a certain level of the definition of the object of
logic. Epistemic interpretation and description is being replaced with
ontological interpretations. Logic is shedding its normative character as
12
it is turning from a science of what should be into a science of what is.
Ontologized truth-values and the relations between them are not the
limit, but merely a stage in the cognition of the world, a method of
presenting and capturing more fundamental meaning and information
structures. The next step must be deeper penetration into the nature of
the logicality and the search for an answer to the question of what lies
behind truth-values. Acceptance of the area of information entities as
genuine reality and a source of the logicality expands the boundaries of
logic to include the surrounding world. Logic is becoming a science of
being.

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