Civic Associations and Authoritarian Regimes in Interwar Europe: Italy and Spain in

Comparative Perspective
Author(s): Dylan Riley
Source: American Sociological Review, Vol. 70, No. 2 (Apr., 2005), pp. 288-310
Published by: American Sociological Association
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CivicAssociationsand AuthoritarianRegimes
in InterwarEurope:
Italyand Spainin ComparativePerspective
Dylan Riley
University of California, Berkeley

Whatis the relationship between civic associations and authoritarian regimes? While
Tocquevillian theories have concentrated mostly on the connection between civic
associationism and democracy, this article develops a Gramscian approach, suggesting
that a strong associational sphere can facilitate the development of authoritarian parties
and hegemonic authoritarian regimes. Twocountries are used for comparison, Italy from
1870 to 1926 and Spain from 1876 to 1926. The argument here is that the strength of the
associational sphere in north-central Italy provided organizational resources to the
fascist movement and then party. In turn, theformation of the party was a key reason
why the Italian regime developed as a hegemonic authoritarian regime. The absence of a
strong associational sphere in Spain explains why that regime developed as an economic
corporate dictatorship, despite many similarities between the two cases.

workon civic associationism regime and the Spanishdictatorshipof Miguel

Contemporary
focusesmostly on democracy(Arato1981;
Paxton 2002; Putnam 1993; Wuthnow 1991).
This analysis investigatesinsteadthe relation-
ship betweenassociationismandauthoritarian-
ism. I explore how the strength of the
associational sphere influenced the degree of
regime hegemony in two cases of interwar
Europeanauthoritarianism:the Italian fascist
Direct all correspondence to Dylan Riley,
Department of Sociology,Universityof California
Berkeley,410 BarrowsHall #1980, Berkeley,CA
94720-1980(riley@berkeley.edu). Thisresearchwas
fundedby an IIEFulbrightgrant.Manythanksto
PerryAnderson, VictoriaBonnell,MichaelBurawoy,
RebeccaEmigh,CarloGinzburg,ChaseLangford
(whohelpedwiththemap),MichaelMann,Emanuela
Tallo,andthestudentsattheCenterforComparative
SocialAnalysisat UCLAfortheirhelpon thisarti-
cle. In addition,the authorthanksaudiencesat UC
andcolleaguesin
Davis,JohnsHopkinsUniversity,
both the Departmentof Sociology and Social
Anthropologyand the Departmentof Political
ScienceattheCentral EuropeanUniversity,
Budapest.
Theauthor alsothankstheASReditorandanonymous
reviewersforbeingbothextraordinarily helpfuland
patient.
Primode Rivera(1870-1930). By hegemony I
meanthe extentto whicha regimepoliticizesthe
associationalspherein accordancewith its offi-
cial ideology.A hegemonicauthoritarian regime
exists to the extent that official regime unions,
employers'organizations,andprofessionalasso-
ciations exist. In contrast,economic-corporate
dictatorshipsleave the preexistingassociation-
al terrainintact. I treat Italian fascism and de
Rivera's Spain as instances, respectively, of
hegemonic authoritarianismand an economic
corporate dictatorship, and I ask how the
strengthof the associationalsphereshapedthese
divergentoutcomes.
Classic scholarshipin the Tocquevilliantra-
dition suggests that a developed associational
sphereshouldpreserve a realm of privatenon-
regime-dominated social relations (Arendt
1958:323; Friedrichand Brzezinksi 1966:279;
Kornhauser1959:30,76-90; Lerderer1940:72).
Therefore,it should be difficult to establish a
hegemonic authoritarianregime in the context
of a strong associational sphere. I suggest, in
contrast, that relatively strong associational
spheresin the preseizureof powerperiod have
sometimesrenderedauthoritarian regimesmore
hegemonic than they would be had associa-
tionismbeen weaker.To establishmy argument,

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL
REVIEW, 2005, VOL. 70 (April:288-31o)

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 ANDAUTHORITARIAN
CIVICASSOCIATIONS
REGIMES
I develop a historicaland comparativeanalysis
of Italian fascism and Spanish authoritarian-
ism in the early1920s.My mainargumentis that
the Italianfascistpartycouldemergeonly in the
context of a relatively strong associational
sphere,andthe Italianfascisthegemonicauthor-
itarianregime could emergeonly becausethere
was a strong fascist party.Radical right-wing
forces were unableto constitutethemselves as
a fascist party in the Spanishcase, where civic
associationismwas relativelyweak. Thus, sig-
nificant pockets of nonpoliticized social exis-
tence remained in Spain. The result was an
economic-corporatedictatorship.
THEORIZING CAPITALIST
AUTHORITARIANISM, CIVIC
ASSOCIATIONISM, HEGEMONY
AND
Drawingon Gramsci(1971:259),I usetheterm
hegemony to referto the political organization
of consent. Some regimes devote considerable
effort to the political constitutionof their sup-
porting social interests, while others adopt a
morepragmaticbargainingorientationto these.
Hegemonic authoritarianregimes, as a conse-
quence of their concertedorganizationof con-
sent, tend to eliminatethe distinctionbetween
public and private existence penetrating the
associationalsphereand reducingthe realm of
nonpolitically relevant activities. In contrast,
economic corporatedictatorshipstolerate and
encouragenonpoliticalorganizations,general-
ly basing themselves on alliances with preex-
istinggroupsthatthey neithercreatenor greatly
alter.Thus, the main theoreticalpuzzle here is
"Why do authoritarianregimes with similar
bases of social supportdiffer in theirdegree of
hegemony?"I seek to relatethese differentout-
comes to differencesin the strengthof the asso-
ciationalspherepriorto the seizureof powerin
the cases of Spainand Italy in the earlytwenti-
eth century(Gramsci1971:216,259).1The asso-
ciationalsphererefersto a thirdsectorbetween
states and marketscomprisedmostly of volun-
tary associations, such as mutualaid societies
1Although generally notstatedinGramscianterms
thisdistinctionis quitecommonin theliteratureon
authoritarianism (De Felice [1981] 1996:10-11;
Gentile2000:240-41;Linz 1970:262;2003:29-40,
68; Pavone 1998:75).
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IN EUROPE 289
and cooperatives, employers' organizations,
unions, chambersof labor,and democratically
orientedpoliticalparties(Paxton2002; Schofer
and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001; Putnam
2000:15-28; Skocpol and Fiorina 1999:2;
Wuthnow1991:7).
I consider two theories of the relationship
between associationism and authoritarianism:
the Tocquevillianview andthe Gramscianalter-
native for which I will argue. Tocquevillians
argue that civic associationism protects the
sphereof privateexistence makinghegemonic
authoritarianregime formation difficult. The
Tocquevillianapproachidentifies two specific
mechanisms:insulationandorganizationalbal-
ancing. The insulation argumentsuggests that
the more developedthe sphereof associations,
the more difficult it will be to establishauthor-
itarianpartyorganizationsbecause such organ-
izations appeal primarilyto persons who are
socially atomized and, therefore, lack well-
structured interests (Arendt 1958:311;
Kornhauser1959:46,64; Tocqueville1988:523).
The organizationalbalancing argument sug-
gests thatassociationsprovidepeople the means
to act withoutinvokingthe stateand such asso-
ciationsalso balancestateauthorityby creating
alternativepower centers (Putnam 2000:345;
Tocqueville1988:516).TheTocquevilliananaly-
sis of authoritarianism and civic associationism
follows logically from this view. Strong asso-
ciational spheres should presentan obstacle to
the formationof authoritarian partiesand hege-
monic authoritarian regimes(Arendt1958:323;
Gannett 2003:11-12; Goldberg 2001;
Kornhauser 1959:76-90; Lerderer 1940:72;
Tocqueville 1988:516).
The Gramscianview rejectstheTocquevillian
claim of a zero sum relationshipbetween social
self-organizationandpolitical power (Bellamy
and Schechter 1993:123; Gramsci 1971:160;
Laclau and Mouffe [1985] 2001:xvii). For
Gramsci,the sphereof associationsis important
because it produces technologies of political
rule thatpotentiallycan extendthe reach of the
state (Bellamy and Schecther 1993:122;
Gramsci1971:259).Morespecifically,Gramsci
rejects the two basic arguments of the
Tocquevillianposition.First,for Gramsci,asso-
ciations are not necessarilyopposed to author-
itarianparties.Such partiesarebased precisely
on an integration of local and sectoral inter-
ests, not on a socially atomizedmass (Anderson
29o SOCIOLOGICAL
AMERICAN REVIEW
1965:242;Gramsci1971:181).Second,although
associationsmay startas opposed to the state,
they can be reabsorbed by it. Indeed, in
Gramsci's view, strong associational spheres
can enablehegemonic authoritarianregimes to
the extent that associations provide a congen-
ial environmentfor the constructionof author-
itarianparties,which are both a key agent and
central institutional feature of hegemonic
authoritarian regimes (Gramsci1971:221).The
associationalsphere,in this scheme, is a poten-
tial transmissionbelt ratherthana bulwarkpro-
tectingprivateexistence.It is worthemphasizing
thatthe Italianfasciststhemselveslargelyshared
this Gramscianview of the associationalsphere
(Bottai 1934:29; Panunzio 1987:272). Adrian
Lyttelton(1987:205) neatly catches the point
when he contrasts de Tocqueville with the
nationalist and then fascist theorist Alfredo
Rocco (1875-1925):
The'intermediateassociation',forDeTocqueville
a necessarycheckonthepowerof theState,which
wouldotherwiseoverwhelm theisolatedindivid-
ual, for Rocco was insteadto be a cog in the
machinery whichwouldensurehis [sic]subordi-
nation.
This leads to a relativelyclear prediction.In
historical contexts, where an authoritarian
seizure of power is likely, one may expect the
associationalsphere to facilitate the construc-
tion of a hegemonic authoritarianregime. The
absenceof a strongassociationalsphereshould
place limits on authoritarianparty formation,
andthis shouldhave consequencesfor the kind
of authoritarianism thatemerges.Thus, in con-
trast to the Tocquevillian suggestion that the
associationalspherealwaysconstitutesa barri-
er to hegemonic authoritarianregime forma-
tion, the Gramscianview suggests thatit can be
an enabling structurefor this type of authori-
tarianrule.
AND METHOD
CASESELECTION
This articledevelops a comparativeand histor-
ical approachto civic associationismandauthor-
itarianism. The relative strength of civic
associationismin Italyandits relativeweakness
in Spainbecame causally relevantthroughthe
activityof social agents,who attemptedto build
radical right-wing political movements and
authoritarianregimes in the specific historical
circumstancesof early twentiethcentury Italy
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and Spain.Thus, in this study,the cases should
be understoodas members of the conceptual
class of sequences of "transitionsto authoritar-
ian rule" (for this use of case language see
Abbott 1983:137; Abbott 1992:53). My
approach is unusual because I synthesize a
Milliancomparativestrategy(for examples,see
Brenner 1985:252; Emigh 1997:651; Ertman
1997; Gorski 1993; Skocpol 1979:37) with an
analysisof suppressedalternativesembeddedin
historical sequences (Moore 1978:385-91;
Weber 1949:172). I use Mill's comparative
method to justify my focus on Italy and Spain.
Specifically, I use the method of difference,
which comparescases that are similar in theo-
reticallyrelevantrespectsbut thatdiffer in out-
come (Mill 1971:211-19; Skocpol and Somers
1980:184).
I do not, however,adopt a Millian approach
to developingmy own explanation.The Millian
approachis particularlyinadequatefor socio-
historical explanations, because it does not
demanda specification of mechanisms, and it
leads to misleading generalizationsparticular-
ly because the method obscuresthe possibility
of divergent causal pathways to similar out-
comes (Burawoy1989:769-72;Lieberson1991,
1994; Steinmetz 1998:173). I push beyond a
conventionalMillian approach,because I show
how the associationalsphere in Italy was con-
nectedto the formationof a fascist party,which
then became a centralactorin the construction
of a hegemonic authoritarianregime in the
Italian case. The existence of the fascist party
in Italy blocked the possibility of the more
relaxed dictatorship that Benito Mussolini
(1883-1945) tried to institute.Conversely,the
absence of a strong party actor in the Spanish
case explains why, despite the existence of
fascisticcurrentsin Spain,the regimedeveloped
as an economiccorporatedictatorship.Thus,my
methodemphasizeshow associationismshould
be understoodin terms of the specific histori-
cal trajectories through which authoritarian
regimes consolidatedin Spain and Italy in the
early 1920s. This methodologicalstrategyuses
possibilitiesintrinsicto the historicalsequences
themselves to establish the importanceof the
conditions identified in the comparativesec-
tion of the essay (Desai 2002; Elster
1978:175-232; Moore 1966:108-10; Moore
1978:385-91; Weber 1949:172; Zeitlin
1984:18-20). This analysisproducesa different
 CIVICASSOCIATIONS
ANDAUTHORITARIAN
type of generalizationthan a standardMillian
theory of explanationwould demand.I do not
aim to discovera coveringlaw,i.e., a statement
of the type, "Inall instanceswhere a relatively
strong associational sphere combines with a
political crisishegemonicauthoritarianism will
be the outcome"(for critiquesof covering law
models, see Bashkar 1998:41; Steinmetz
1998:176-7). Rather,I seek to show thatin the
contextof post-WorldWarI Italy,a strongasso-
ciational sphere was a crucial mechanism in
the constructionof the fascist party,which was
equallya crucialmechanismleadingto a hege-
monic authoritarianregime.
The structureof my analysis is in terms of
backgroundconditionsandsequencesof events.
The trajectoriesthatI select areItalyfrom 1870
to 1926, and Spain from 1876 to 1926. I estab-
lish the roughcomparabilityof Spainand Italy
in termsof theirclass structuresandstatesat the
beginning of the twentiethcentury.I then dis-
cuss regionaland cross-nationaldifferencesin
associationalstrengthin the two cases. Finally,
I show how these differences mattered for
authoritarianmovements and regimes in the
two countries. Specifically, I trace the diver-
gent forms of political organizationthat simi-
larly placed radicalright-wingforces hit upon
in differentregionsof SpainandItalyandin the
two nationalcases.
TWO PERIPHERALCAPITALISMS
An agro-industrialbloc closely connected to
the state, supportinghigh tariffs and political
authoritarianism, beganto consolidatein Spain
and Italy by the late nineteenthcentury.Many
scholarssuggest thatthis was majorreason for
authoritarianismin both cases. Big holdings
and a politically dependent labor force were
commonin preunificationsouthernItaly,andthe
problemwas exacerbatedin the late 1860swhen
the Italianstate sold off public lands mostly in
the south (2.5 million hectaresout of a total of
3 million hectares privatized) (Castronovo
1975:58; Zamagni 1993:21-2, 56, 175).
Southernagrariansgenerallypushed for tariff
protections,ratherthan cost-cuttingto support
their economic position. Key sectors of Italian
industry(railroads,steel, shipbuilding,cotton
cloth manufacturing,and sugar refining) also
demandedandreceivedsubstantialstatesupport
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REGIMES
IN EUROPE 291
(Federico 1996:771-2; Zamagni 1993:89, 95,
162).
Labor repressive large landlords in Spain
concentratedin the southand west of the coun-
try (Simpson1992:108-9), anda huge latenine-
teenthcenturylandsell-off (10 millionhectares)
enlargedthis group(Simpson 1995:44;Tortella
2000:56; Trebilcock 1981:327-8). As in Italy,
an allianceof industryandlaborrepressiveagri-
culturepushedtariffprotectionin the late nine-
teenth century. Catalan textile producers and
Castilianwheatgrowerspushed for a total pro-
tective tariff,which the governmentenacted in
December of 1891 (Tortella2000:199).
Thus, both Italy and Spainpossessed one of
the classic preconditionsof authoritarianism: a
nascentstate-dependentgroupof industrialists,
and a significant sector of large landholders
socially dependenton the political subordina-
tion of the agrarianmasses. These key interests
coalescedaroundtariffprotectionin both cases.
In Italy,landedinterestsin the southandthe val-
ley of the Po allied with the nascentsteel indus-
try to supporta state-ledindustrialdevelopment
underthe leadershipof PrimeMinisterAgostino
Depretis (1813-1887) (Carocci 1975:74-5). A
similarindustrialandagrarianbloc, basedon an
allianceamongCatalantextiles,Basquemining
and southernagriculturedeveloped in Spain in
the latenineteenthcentury(Tusell1990:14-20).
The political institutionsof the two regimes
also made the developmentof democracydif-
ficult. Neither the Italiannor the Spanishpar-
liament was based on an alternationbetween
partiesthatwon competitiveelections. Rather,
governmentsemerged on the basis of gentle-
men's agreements among deputies. In liberal
Italy, governmentswere based on big parlia-
mentarymajoritiesof the centerrallyingbehind
leaders of various political hues. Depretis ini-
tiatedthis systemof politicalco-optation,called
trasformismo(transformism),in the aftermath
of the elections of 1882 when he invited mem-
bers of the oppositionto transformthemselves
into members of the majority (Chabod
1961:41-3; Salvemini [1945] 1960:xviii).
Spanishliberalismwas based insteadon a sys-
tem of partyalternationbetween the conserva-
tive liberalsandthe liberalscalled el turno(the
turn) (Lyttelton 1973:98; G6mez-Navarro
1991:60). When a turn was exhausted, the
monarch(1875-1885, Alfonso XII; 1886-1902,
Maria Cristina the Queen regent; and
292 AMERICAN REVIEW
SOCIOLOGICAL
1902-1923, Alfonso XII's posthumous son
Alfonso XIII)wouldappointa new government
from the loyal opposition. This government
would then fix the elections, with the complic-
ity of the outgoing party, giving retroactive
legitimacyto the alternation(Boyd 1979:4;Carr
1982:356-7). In both cases, however,therewas
little relationshipbetween elections and gov-
ernments.
Both liberalismsalso had imperfectsuffrage.
In Italy,suffragewas limited to abouttwo per-
centof the populationuntil 1882,whenDepretis
expanded it to seven percent. Prime Minister
GiovanniGiolitti (1842-1928) introduceduni-
versalsuffragein 1912, anda proportionalelec-
toralsystem was establishedin 1919. Electoral
corruption,confinedmostlyto the south,played
a key role in maintainingliberaldominance.In
Spain, the liberal parliamentarianPrixedes
Mateo Sagasta (1825-1903) introduced uni-
versal suffrage in 1890 (Carr 1982:359; Linz
1967:202). Laws in the late 1880s and 1890s
also guaranteedfreedomof associationandthe
rightto strike(Payne1973:475;Tusell1990:26).
But these precocious laws were largely violat-
ed in practice by local political bosses who
coerced and manipulatedthe population into
voting for official candidates.
The two countries,then, startedthe twentieth
centuryin a similarposition as peripheralcap-
italist societies with large regional disparities
and powerfulagrarianel1ites.In both cases the
landedaristocracyand industrialinterestsfused
intoa statedependentagro-industrial bloc in the
late nineteenth century. Both countries were
also ruledby oligarchicliberalstates.It should
come as no surprise then that scholars have
oftenstressedthe similaritiesbetweenthe Italian
and Spanish cases in terms of their political
institutions and class structures (Stephens
1989:1060-61). Since these two factors were
quite similarin the Italianand Spanishcases, it
is unlikely that they can explain the divergent
regimes that emergedin the 1920s.
CIVICASSOCIATIONISM
IN ITALYAND SPAIN
On the basis of these relatively similar class
and state structures,Italy and Spaindeveloped
differentlystructuredassociationalspheres.In
bothcases associationismincreasedin a region-
ally uneven patternin the late nineteenthcen-
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tury, driven by early industrializationand the
development of capitalist agriculture. This
regional variation shaped radical right-wing
movements in the post-World WarI period in
bothcountries.HoweverSpainandItalydiffered
at the national level. Associationism in Spain
was generally weaker, and specifically more
regionally fragmented,than in Italy.
Fromthe 1890s, two kinds of associationsin
Italywere particularlyimportantat the popular
level: cooperatives and mutual aid societies
(Bonfante 1981:203-5; Carocci 1971:13-4,
18-9). By encouraging their development,
Italianliberal 61itesaimed to give the working
class andpeasantrya stakein the liberalsystem
while stimulatingownersto fend forthemselves
(Degl'Innocenti 1981:36; Fornasari and
Zamagni 1997:79). Most cooperatives were
either consumer cooperatives providing low
cost goods, or producers'cooperativesdistrib-
uting jobs among their members
(Degl'Innocenti 1981:28-9; Fornasari and
Zamagni1997:83).Using cooperatives,Giolitti
wanted to relieve unemployment especially
among the agriculturalproletariatandto weak-
en the socialists (Bonfante 1981:205).The pol-
icy encouragedthe developmentof associations.
According to the Lega nazionale delle cooper-
ative italiane (National League of Italian
Cooperative Societies), the number of Italian
cooperativesincreased from 2,199 in 1902 to
7,429 in 1914 while the number of members
expandedfromabout0.5 million to 1.5 million
(FornasariandZamagni1997:81).Cooperatives
were regionally concentratedin the north and
center of Italy in the three provinces of the
Emilia Romagna, Tuscany, and Lombardy
(Fornasariand Zamagni 1997:83).
The early part of the twentiethcentury was
a period of associationaldevelopmentin Spain
as well. As in Italy,this developmentwas region-
ally uneven.In north-centralSpain,wheresmall
propertyholders predominated,agrariansyn-
dicates presided over by clergy and providing
credit for seeds, machinery, and equipment,
established a strong base of operations. For
example, the CatholicAgro-Social of Navarre
includeda vast networkof cooperatives,leisure
centers, small rural mutual aid and insurance
funds, and youth organizations (Mufioz
1992:77).Therewerealso Catholicmixedowner
andworkersyndicatesandnumerousruralbanks
and farmers'circles (Perez-Diaz 1991:7).
 ANDAUTHORITARIAN
CIVICASSOCIATIONS
REGIMES
In Spain, lay popularassociationismtook a
variety of forms, from cooperatives,to mutual
aid societies, to Casas del Pueblo (people's
houses) (Carr 1982:454-55; Vives 1959:
211-32). Alejandro Lerroux (1864-1949), a
Republicanpolitician,broughtthe model of the
Casas del Puebloto SpainfromBelgium,where
the socialists lattercopied it. These were part-
ly political and partlyculturalinstitutionswith
committeerooms andlendinglibraries(Brenan
2000:219). An associationalcensus conducted
by the Institutode reformassociales (Institute
of Social Reforms)demonstratesthe explosion
of popular associationism at the turn of the
nineteenthcentury.The survey included asso-
ciations that were founded between 1884 and
1904, and it showedthat78 percentof all work-
ers' associations were founded in the years
between 1899 and 1904 (Institutode reformas
sociales 1907:286). Associationism in Spain
was regionally uneven as in Italy. Most evi-
dence suggeststhatpopularassociationismwas
most developed in Old Castile, Navarre, the
Basquecountry,andCatalonia.In the firstthree
provincesin north-centralSpain,Catholicasso-
ciations of very small proprietorsdominated.
Associationismwas restrictedto workersand
smallpropertyholdersin neithercase.As indus-
try developed in northernItaly,the industrial-
ists formed a syndicate called the Lega
industrialedi Torino(TurinIndustrialLeague)
in 1906 (Adler 1995:75).Associationspursuing
various industrial and professional interests
appearedalso duringthe tariff struggles of the
1880s (Banti 1996:162).Agrarianassociations
were quite important.Many of these grew out
of older agrarianacademiesestablishedfor the
purpose of protecting the economic interests
of their members and spreading technical
knowledge(Ridolfi 1999:130).By the latenine-
teenth century,they had developedinto agrari-
an committees (Ridolfi 1999:131-2). In the
earlytwentiethcentury,these becamemoremil-
itant. After a series of bitter strikes led by the
revolutionary syndicalists, a form of radical
precommunist socialism, in 1907 and 1908,
landowners began to organize self-defense
leagues. In 1910, these mergedinto the agrari-
an confederation,which controlled 10 subas-
sociations, had over 6,000 members, and
controlled the Bolognese newspaperII Resto
del Carlino (Banti 1996:294-5). White-collar
professionals produced a version of associa-
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IN EUROPE 293
tionism that followed the same municipalpat-
tern.In 1903, a federationof white-collarwork-
ers was established.Theseprocessesintensified
in the immediatepostwarperiod as the organi-
zationalmodel of the tradeunionextendedinto
the ranks of white-collarworkers.In the peri-
od immediately before the rise of fascism, a
new roundof associationaldevelopmentamong
white-collarworkerstook place. In 1919, new
associationsof lawyersandprosecutors,doctors
and engineers formed (Turi 1994:20). From
1906 to 1910 northernindustrialistsestablished
the Confederazione italiana dell'industria
(Italian Confederation of Industry) (Banti
1996:300).
Upperclass associationismin Spainwas driv-
en partlyby protectionistsentimentin Catalonia
and partlyby disgust over the consequencesof
the loss of Cuba in 1898 (Balfour 1997:80-3;
Tusell 1990:47; Vilar 1987:71). As was also
true of Italy,one of the most active periods of
upperclass associationismwas duringthe tar-
iff struggles of the 1880s (Vilar 1987:77-8).
Upper class associationism in Spain tended,
however,to be fragmentedby regionalnation-
alist sentiment. This was particularlytrue in
Catalonia and the Basque countries where it
developed in close relationshipwith regional
separatism(Payne1971:35-6; Payne1973:579;
Vilar 1987:76-7). Employers' organizations
were also qualitativelyweakerin Spainthanin
Italy.As Payne(1970:38) says in the following:
Spanishentrepreneurs were not accustomedto
spendingtimeandmoneyon cooperative profes-
sionalendeavorsunlessfacedby direnecessity.
Employers' thustendedtobelocaland
associations
limited,for thesegroupslackedthe moneyand
influenceof theirAmerican,German,or even
FrenchandItaliancounterparts.
The role of the CatholicChurchin the asso-
ciationalspherealso differedin SpainandItaly.
The church in Spain was a highly privileged
official institutionandtendedthusto be less pro-
ductive of associationismthan in Italy (Payne
1973:603). Duringthe late nineteenthcentury,
Catholicreligiousordersproliferated(Callahan
2000:52; Carr2000:232). However,these, espe-
cially the Jesuits,werewealthyandclosely con-
nected to political power (Brenan 2000:47).
GrassrootsCatholicorganizationsin Spainwere
confined mostly to the north and the east, and
they were associatedwith Basque nationalism
andCarlism.Attemptsto breakout of the north-
294 AMERICAN REVIEW
SOCIOLOGICAL

eastern strongholdwere largely unsuccessful, quence, Catholicismin Italytendedto be much

partlybecause of the powerof the churchhier-
archy (Carr 2000:232; Tusell 1974:88-7).
Catholic workers'circles, originallypromoted
by the CatalanindustrialistClaudioL6pez Bru,
marques de Comillas (1853-1925), and the
JesuitfatherAntonioVincent(1837-1912) were
generallyunsuccessful(Tussell1974:40,87-8).
The church in Spain thus tended to be much
morean organizationof the statethanan organ-
ization of society. The following are Brenan's
(2000:52) scathingwords:
Insteadof meetingtheSocialistsandtheAnarchists
on theirown groundwith labororganizations,
friendlysocietiesandprojectsfor socialreform,
[the church]... concentratedits efforts upon the
searchfor a government thatwouldsuppressits
enemiesby force.
The position of the churchin Italy differed.
Relations between church and state were
strainedfromthe unificationof Italyto at least
1909. Indeed, the papal injunction known as
the non expedit(meaning"it is not expedient")
formally banned Catholicsfrom participation in variation in the strengthof civic associationism
nationallevel Italianpolitical life. As a conse-
less of a state-centered61itephenomenonthan
in Spain, and it tendedto have a strongergrass
roots organization. The Catholic reformers
Romolo Murri(1870-1944) and Luigi Sturzo
(1871-1959) imitated the methods of the
reformist socialists and established coopera-
tives, unions, mutualaid societies, andpopular
libraries especially in north-central Italy
(Webster1960:9).Ragionieri(1972:294) writes
the following:
The 'white'[Catholic]workersleaguesflanked
mutualisticand cooperativeinstitutionsin the
urbancentersand in the countryside,diffusing
mostlyinnorthern Italy,butalsoin somezonesof
centralItalyand in Sicily.
because of its difficult rela-
Thus, precisely
tionship with the Italian state, the churchtend-
ed to producemore associationsin Italythanin
Spain.The similaritiesandcontrastsbetweenthe
two cases can be brieflysummarizedwith quan-
titativeevidence.
Table 1 shows five indicators of regional
in prefascistItaly,and it suggests a fairly clear

Table1. RegionalVariationin CivicAssociationismin Italy

Membersof LiteratePersons
Cooperatives Leagues Leagues (%) Periodicals
Region 1915 1912 1912 1911 1905
Basilicata 36 0 0 35 2
AbruzzoandMolise 68 0 0 42 5
Sardinia 64 1 321 42 3
Calabria 117 1 102 30 4
Campania 231 4 613 46 10
Sicily 374 6 1,087 42 5
Marche 225 5 496 49 8
Apulia 263 5 2,104 41 5
Umbria 104 5 646 51 11
Veneto 669 5 664 75 6
Piedmont 620 8 930 89 12
Lazio 447 9 1,002 67 26
Tuscany 770 12 1,116 63 13
Lombardy 1477 15 1,316 87 12
Emilia-Romagna 1575 100 7,886 67 8
Liguria 389 16 1,873 83 12
Note: Datashownas numberper 100,000inhabitants,exceptwhereindicated.
Sources:Capecchi,VittorioandMarinoLivolsi. 1971.La stampaquotidianain Italia. Milan,Italy;Bompiani;
Degl'Innocenti,Maurizio.1977.Storiadella cooperazionein Italia: 1886-1925.Rome,Italy:Riuniti;Forgacs,
David. 1990.ItalianCulturein theIndustrialEra: 1880-1980. ManchesterandNew York:St. Martin'sPress;
Ministerodi agricoltura,industriae commercio.1913.Statisticadelle organizzazionidi lavoratori.Rome,Italy:
Officinapoligrafica.

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 CIVICASSOCIATIONS
ANDAUTHORITARIAN IN EUROPE 295
REGIMES

Table2. RegionalVariationin CivicAssociationismin Spain

Workers' Workers' Bosses' Mixed Nonprofessional

Associations Associations Associations Associations Associations Associations
Region 1928 1904 1913 1913 1913 1913
Galicia 8 4 34 17 1 5
Leon 9 6 18 25 1 21
Aragon 10 4 15 46 2 18
Andalusia 10 8 26 13 1 5
Asturias 10 7 41 34 2 3
Murcia 11 4 29 21 1 11
Estremadura 12 8 11 19 1 10
New Castile 16 11 28 22 2 13
Catalonia 25 23 49 45 3 96
Valencia 26 13 44 40 5 21
BasqueCountry 28 20 82 47 4 33
OldCastile 29 10 30 52 4 13
Navarre 44 7 16 64 4 9
Note:Datashownas numberof associationsper 100,000inhabitants.Numbersin italic representthe top five
regionswithineachof theseassociationalindicators.
Sources:Institutode ReformasSociales. 1915.Avanceal censo de asociaciones.Madrid:Imprentade la
Sucesorade M. Minuesa.Institutode ReformasSociales. 1907.Estadisticade la asociaci6nobrera.Madrid:
Imprentade la SucesoraM. Minuesa.Ministeriode Trabajoy Previsi6n.1930. Censocorporativoelectoral.
Madrid:Imprentade los hijosde M. G. Hernindez.

north-south split. Veneto, Piedmont, Lazio,
Tuscany, Lombardy, Emilia-Romagna, and
Liguriahad amongthe highestnumberof coop-
erativesper 100,000 inhabitantsin 1915, high-
est densitiesof leagues,andhighestdensitiesof
membersof leaguesperpopulation.All of these
provincesalso had literacyratesof well over50
percent(rangingfrom 51 percentin Umbriato
89 percent in Piedmont) and relatively high
densities of periodicals when controlled for
population.
Three associational censuses redacted in
1904, 1913, and 1928 give a similarpicturefor
Spain.The Institutode reformassociales gath-
eredthe informationfor the first two censuses.
The informationfor the thirdcensus was gath-
ered in preparationfor elections to de Rivera's
nationalassembly (Table2).
This evidence, like the Italian evidence,
shows sharpregionalimbalancesin the Spanish
associational sphere. The de Rivera survey
includes information on three main kinds of
association:associationsof riches and produc-
tion, workers'associations, and culturalasso-
ciations.The othersurveysincludeinformation
on workers',employers',nonprofessionalasso-
ciations(like choralgroups), and mixed work-
ers and employers' associations. The bolded
figures in each column representthe top five
regions on each one of these associationalindi-
cators. Cataloniaand the Basque countries in
everysurvey,for everyindicatorwereamongthe
top five regions in associationaldensity.This is
particularlyimportantbecause these were pre-
cisely the areas with the strongest regional
nationalistmovements.Valenciafollowedthese
regions.It was in the top five on five of the indi-
cators,andscoredsixthin the densityof employ-
ers' associations. Old Castile was in the top
five on fourindicators;Navarrethreeindicators;
Aragon two indicators;and Galicia, Leon, and
Asturias one each. Andalusia, Murcia, and
Extramadurawere not in the top five on any of
these indices. Even in its areas of greatest
strengththe Spanish associational sphere was
probablyweakerthan its Italiancounterpart.
Table 3 compares the two associational
spheres in terms of five indicators.In Italy by
1915, there were about 21 cooperatives per
100,000inhabitants.In Spain,the corresponding
figure was about 3. In Italy,the socialist party
had entered parliament already by 1900 and
playedan importantrole in the strugglesaround
the turn of the century.In Spain, the socialist
party did not enter parliamentuntil 1910, and
it did not play an importantpolitical role until
1931 with the rise of the secondrepublic.By the
post-WorldWarI period,approximately5 per-

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296 AMERICAN
SOCIOLOGICAL
REVIEW

Table3. CivicAssociationismin ItalyandSpainCompared

Indicators Italy Spain

Cooperativesper 100,000inhabitantsin 1915 21 3
Dateof the entranceof the SocialistPartyinto Parliament 1900 1910
Percentageof the PopulationEnrolledin SocialistUnionsin the post WWIperiod 5% 1%
Percentageof the Populationenrolledin a politicalpartyin the postWWIperiod 1.0% 0.2%
Numberof LiteratePersonspercopy of the majordailyaround1914 60 143
Percentof the Populationwho couldsign theirnamesin 1910 62 50
Sources:Forgacs,David. 1990. Italian culturein the industrialera 1880-1980: Cultureindustries,politics
and thepublic. Manchesterand London:St. Martin'sPress;Desvois, JeanMichel. 1978. "Lastrasforma-
ciones de la prensade la oligarquiaa principiosdel siglo."La crisis del estado espahiol:1898-1936, edited
by M. Tufionde Lara.Madrid:EditorialCuadernosparael DiAlogo;Degl'Innocenti,Maurizio. 1977. Storia
della cooperazionein Italia 1886-1925. Rome, Italy:Riuniti;Istitutode reformassociales. 1915. Avanceal
censo de asociaciones. Madrid:Imprentade la sucesorade M. Minuesade los Rios; Linz, Juan. 1967. "Five:
The PartySystem of Spain:Past and Future."PartySystemsand VoterAligments:CrossNational
Perspectives,edited by SeymourM. Lipset and Stein Rokkan.New York:Free Press; Seton-Watson,Hugh.
1967. Italy FromLiberalismto Fascism: 1870-1925. London,England:Methuen;Tortella,Gabriel.2000.
TheDevelopmentof ModernSpain. Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityPress.

centof thepopulationwas enrolledin the social-
ist unions in Italy,and only about 1 percent in
Spain. In postwarItaly,about 1 percent of the
populationwas enrolledin one of the two mass
parties(the socialists or the popolari),while in
Spainthe correspondingfigure was .2 percent.
In Italy,1 copy of the majordaily newspaperIl
corrieredella sera circulateda day for every 60
Italians who could read, whereas in Spain 1
copy of El debate circulated for every 143
Spaniards.Finally,literacywas about12 percent
higher in Italy than in Spain in 1910.
The evidencethen suggeststwo conclusions.
Associationism was regionallyuneven in both
countries.In Italy,associationsconcentratedin
Lombardy, Veneto, Emilia Romagna, and
Tuscany.In Spain,associationsconcentratedin
Cataloniaand the Basque countries.However,
in Spain,the associationalspherewas general-
ly weaker and split by regional nationalism,
while this was not the case in Italy.
THEPOSTWARPOLITICAL
CRISES
ANDAUTHORITARIANISM
IN SPAINAND ITALY
Spain and Italy entered into similar political
crises in the postwarperiod.The biennio rosso
(red two years) in Italy, from 1918 to 1920,
resemble the trienio bolchevista (Bolshevik
three years) in Spain. Both were periods of
social unrestfollowing a failed attemptto sig-
nificantly extend political and civil rights. In
both cases, conflicts pitting an alliance of rad-
icalizedurbanandruralworkersagainsta coali-
tion of powerful industrialand agrarianruling
classes and small landowners undermined a
postwardemocratictrend.A countermovement,
which emerged after the defeat of the revolu-
tionarythreatbut presenteditself as a defense
against revolution, formed the basis for an
authoritarianseizure of power in each country.
But differences in the strengthof the associa-
tionalsphereaffectedthe organizationof author-
itarianismwithinandbetweenthe two countries.
In Italy,where associationismwas well devel-
oped, fascists developed a mass party organi-
zation. In Spain, associationism had similar
effects, but since the associational sphere was
less developed, only regionally bound proto-
fascist movementswere possible.
ItalyemergedfromWorldWarI with a deeply
shakenconservativegovernmentfacing a broad
democratic coalition based on demobilized
recruits (Tasca 1950:20). Most historical evi-
dence indicatesthatthe majorityof the warvet-
eranswere interestedin an expansionof Italian
democracy, and the establishment of a con-
stituentassembly.This political mood grew out
of democraticinterventionism,the movement
thathad pushedItalyto join the war on the side
of the allies againstthe reactionarycentralpow-
ers. De Felice ([1965] 1995:469) writes, "the
idea [of a Constituentassembly]circulateda lit-

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 ANDAUTHORITARIAN
CIVICASSOCIATIONS
tie in all quarters of democratic and revolu-
tionary interventionism,and was not lacking
supporters even among the non-maximalist
socialists." For example, the main veterans'
organization, the Associazione nazionale di
combattenti (The National Association of
Combatants)made this a central plank of its
program(Tasca 1950:20).
The immediatepostwarperiodin Spain,and
particularlyin Catalonia,bears many similari-
ties to the Italian case. Here the conservative
Lliga Catalanspearheadedan assemblymove-
ment that linked socialists, Catalan regional-
ists and army reformers in a coalition that
pushed for a constitutional convention. The
Lliga Catalandominatedthe movement,which
also included political representatives of
Asturianand Basque heavy industry(Harrison
1976:912). As Boyd (1979:78) remarks, this
was an "attemptat bourgeois revolution."In
both cases, however,an in partreal and in part
perceivedred threatscuttled the possibility of
a gradualextension of democraticrights. Men
of propertyin both cases perceivedthis mobi-
lization as especially threatening because it
includedboth agrarianand industrialworkers,
andbecause it came on the heels of the Russian
revolution.
Italyseemed on the brinkof social revolution
between 1918 and 1920. A mass socialistparty,
which had rejectedcollaborationin WorldWar
I andwas explicitly committedto socialist rev-
olution, seemed poised to win parliamentary
power. Strike activity increased dramatically
from 1918 to 1920 in both industryand agri-
culture(Elazar1993:189).The old liberal61ites
were withoutpolitical instrumentsto deal with
these pressures. Trasformismohad basically
ceased to operate by 1913, but a truly bour-
geois party had not yet developed (Chabod
1961:41-2).
The situation in Spain was similar. Since
1917, strikes shook both Barcelona and the
Andalusiancountryside.The high point of this
strikewave in Barcelonawas the strikeagainst
an electrical firm called La Canadiense (The
Canadian),which shut down 70 percent of the
power to the city for over a month (Tusell
1990:167).Duringthe so-calledBolshevikthree
years from 1918 to 1920, massive strikesbroke
out acrossAndalusia;andin Catalonia,the anar-
chists, socialists, and right-wingorganizations
fought one another in the street (Tusell
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REGIMES
IN EUROPE 297
1990:169). The agrarianunrestwas as threat-
ening as the anarchistagitationin Barcelona.
Esdaile (2000:241) writes, "Andalusiaexperi-
enced a wave of strikesthatbroughtan increase
in wages, a reduction in working hours, the
recognitionof anarchistunionsas defacto labor
exchanges,andthe abolitionof piece works."In
some places, the strikeswere so successful that
even the servants and the wet nurses of the
landownersjoined forces with the day laborers,
and men of property fled their estates to the
cities (Esdaile 2000:245). The monarchycame
to terms with the armyorganizedas the Juntas
de defesa, an organizationformed in 1916 to
protect the interests of junior officers whose
salarieshad been underminedby postwarinfla-
tion and who resented"specialpromotionsfor
africanista officers" (Payne 1967:184; Boyd
1979:76). The Spanishking Alfonso XIII met
the demands of the military reformers and
immediatelyused the armyto crushthe social-
ist-anarchistalliance(Boyd 1979:82-5; Brenan
2000:65-9; Tusell 1990:159-60).
THECRISES
COMPARED
Thus, in Spain and Italy,the basic social con-
ditions for right-wing mass mobilization were
present (Ben-Ami 1983:33-48). Preston
(1990:13)writes,"Inmanyrespects,the Spanish
crisis of 1917-23 is analogous to the Italian
crisis of 1917-22." The combined effects of
WorldWarI and the Bolshevik revolutionrad-
icalized the industrialand agrarianproletariat
in bothcases (Carr1982:509).In differentways,
the political systems of both cases faced what
were apparentlyinsurmountablecrises (Carr
1982:489-97; Tusell 1990:94-8).
There was, however, a crucial difference
between the biennio rosso and the tri'enio
bolchevista. In Italy, the crisis was intimately
linked to the country'sparticipationin World
WarI. Spain, as a neutralcountry,did not face
this problem.Given that fascism initially arose
precisely as a war veterans' organization,this
difference is crucial. One of the main conse-
quences of Italy'sparticipationin WorldWarI
was precisely to exaggerate the differences
between Italian and Spanish associational
spheres already present in the prewarperiod.
Especiallyafterthe defeatat Caporetto,in which
the Austrianspushedthe Italianarmydeep into
its own territory,the war set offa wave ofasso-
298 AMERICANSOCIOLOGICALREVIEW
ciationismthatcontinuedinto the postwarperi-
od (De Felice [1965] 1995:388-9; Gentile
1989:70-1). Italy'spostwarexperiencewas thus
an instance of the broader phenomenon that
participationin mass mobilizing warfaretends
to be civic association building (Skocpol
1999:54-60).
In part,as a resultof this developmentin the
associational sphere, the Italian state faced a
challenge of a different magnitude from its
Spanishcounterpart.In Italy,the strikewave of
1918-1920 combined with a serious electoral
challenge by the socialist party,and to a lesser
extent the Catholics. In Spain, no such direct
political challenge to the Restorationsystem
emerged.At no point in postwarSpaindid any
political force challenge the monopoly of the
two dynasticparties (Linz 1967:212).The two
crises were thus socially similar,but political-
ly different.
CIVICASSOCIATIONISMAND
RADICAL PARTIES
RIGHTPOLITICAL
IN SPAINAND ITALY
How,then,did differencesin the strengthof
the associationalsphereat both the regional
and cross-nationallevels relateto differencesin
the development of fascist movements and
regimes in the two cases? A relatively strong
associationalsphereprovidedthe indispensable
organizational environment for the develop-
ment of radicalright-wingmovementsin both
Italyand Spain.But the relativeweakness,and
especially regional fragmentation, of the
Spanish associational sphere meant that only
regionallyboundprotofascismscouldemergein
this case.
ITALY
Figure 1 is an overlay of fascist cell organiza-
tions per 100,000 people in 1921 on a map
adapted from Robert Putnam's indicators of
civic associationism from 1861-1920.2 Since
Putnam's approach is explicitly neo-
Tocquevillian, the striking correspondence
2 An earlierdraftof this in addi-
paperpresented,
tionto thePutnammap,a mapusingtheindicators
inTable1.Pleasecontacttheauthorforfurther infor-
mation.
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
between fascist cell organizations and the
strengthof civic associationismprovidesstrong
evidence for my argument(for a similar argu-
ment, see Kwon 2004). Whatexplainsthis sur-
prising relationship between the strength of
civic associationismand fascism?This section
identifies two mechanisms. First, a relatively
strong associational sphere facilitated recruit-
ment. In this context, fascists could expandby
forminga federationof allied organizationsand
penetratingenemy organizations.Second a rel-
atively strong associational sphere provided
organizationaltechniquesthatthe fascist move-
ment and partyadopted.
Thestrategyforfascistexpan-
RECRUITMENT.
sion, establishedby Umberto Pasella, the first
general secretary of the fascist party, was to
multiplythe numberof cell organizations(fasci)
as rapidlyas possible. Pasella would contact a
local sympathizerwho would then organize a
foundingmeeting.The movementat the begin-
ning was internally highly democratic. Each
organizationwas autonomous in its policies,
and there was little formal doctrineconstrain-
ing the members (Gentile 1989:40-1). Emilio
Gentile (1984:253) writes the following:
movement,theFasci
As a self-styled'libertarian'
di combattimento hadno statuteordetailedregu-
lations:organizationsand methodsof struggle
were dictatedby circumstances. Therewere no
ties of leadershipand memberscould also join
otherpartiesso longastheywerepatriotic andanti-
Bolshevik.Duringthis period[1919-1920],the
ideologyandorganization of fascismwereformed
spontaneously orby imitation,thanksto localini-
tiatives,oftenonthepartof individualsandwhich
frequently provedephemeral.
Fascism in Italy thus became a mass move-
ment precisely by providingan alliance frame-
work for variouspreexistingassociations.Two
of these were especially important:patriotic
associationsandagrarianassociations.Patriotic
associationshada prominentplace in the north-
centralItalyfromthe 1860s (Ridolfi 1999:156).
They undertookvariouskindsof activities,such
as dedicatingmonumentsandconductingfuner-
al services. Wartime mobilization, basically
from 1915, gave a massive push to this form of
associationism. These organizations were
already in place well before the emergence of
the fascist party in 1921.
 CIVICASSOCIATIONS
ANDAUTHORITARIAN
REGIMES
IN EUROPE 299

Most Civic

I..O V

I ~IE-R

T A
Least Civic

~LLA
..........
................
I..........

Most
Fascist
Cellsjijiiiiijii

SI
O

O
LeastFascist
Cells
Figure 1. Fascismandthe Strengthof CivicAssociationism
Note: Regionnameshavebeen abbreviatedas follows:AB = Abruzzi;AP = Apulia;B = Basilicata;CA =
Campania; CL = Calabria; E-R = Emilia-Romagna; LA = Lazio; LI = Liguria; LO = Lombardia; MA = Marche;
MO = Molise; P = Piemonte; SA = Sardinia; SI = Sicily; T = Tuscany; V = Veneto. Sources: Adapted from the
following:Putnam,RobertD. 1993.MakingDemocracyWork.Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress.
Reprintedby permissionof PrincetonUniversityPress.The informationon fascistcell organizationsis fromthe
following:Gentile,Emilio.2000. Fascismoe antifascismo.Ipartiti italianifrale dueguerre.Florence,Italy:Le
Monnier.

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3oo AMERICAN REVIEW
SOCIOLOGICAL
Archival documentsprovide some sense of
the Italian world of patriotic associationism,
among which the fascists first expanded.
Consider a political meeting that Mussolini
attendedin Januaryof 1919 two monthsbefore
he decidedto foundhis own organization.This
was a meeting of various Milanese patriotic
associationsto constitutea Milaneseassociation
for the League of Nations.The ItalianNational
League and the Wilsonian Propagandagroup
called the meeting, to which they invited the
heads of 24 patrioticorganizations(ACS; MI;
DGPS; 1919; Milano; Document 564). The
meetingresolvedto founda new associationand
entrusteda committeeto drawup a statuteand
provide for financing. In April 1919, the
Committee for the Defense of the Rights of
Italy met to decide what kind of relationshipit
should have to Mussolini's newly formedfas-
cio di combattimento.Approximately200 peo-
ple were at the meeting, and there was lively
debatein whichthe committeedecidedto coop-
erate with Mussolini's organization to form
propagandasquads (ACS; MI; DGPS; 1919;
Milano; Document 2523). In May 1919,
Mussolini'sorganizationwas cooperatingwith
a larger umbrella group called the fascio of
patrioticassociations(ACS; MI; DGPS; 1919;
Document 15933). Across northern Italy,
numeroussuch associationsformedin the peri-
od from 1915 to 1919. At Cremona,Venice,
Milan,Turin,and Modena, groupswith names
like the League for Civil Defense, the Patriotic
League, Social Renovation,the New Contract,
and The Italian League for the Protection of
National Interests formed the core of subse-
quent fascist cell organizations (Gentile
1989:70-4).
Thefascistmovement by
precisely
expanded
providing a loose umbrella organizationthat
welded these groups together. Indeed
Mussolini's initial aim in founding what he
calledthefascio di combattimentowas "tounite
in a singlefascio with a single will all the inter-
ventionistsand the combatants,to direct them
towarda precise aim, and to valorizethe victo-
ry"(Chiurco1929:98-9). In line with this strat-
egy, the fascist movement first burst onto the
nationalpoliticalscene as an electoralbloc, and
then as a federationof local militia organiza-
tions. Fascism formed as a political party only
in November1921 (Gentile1989:316-84;Milza
and Berstein 1980:113).
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But fascism did not arisejust as an alliance
of patrioticassociations.The decisiveexpansion
of the movementoccurredin the firstsix months
of 1921 as a result of its alliance with agrarian
organizations.These organizations,as I indi-
cated previously, emerged in response to day
laborerand sharecroppingorganizationsin the
earlytwentiethcentury.They organizedstrike-
breaking funds, financed local newspapers,
establishedbanksthatfunneledmoney to small
holders(in an attemptto alterthe agrarianclass
structure),and financedcooperativesand insur-
ance for "freelaborers"who agreednot to join
the socialist leagues (Ministerodi Agricoltura
Industriae Commercio 1912:13). The fascist
movementgrafteditself on to this association-
al terrain.This gave it an anarchicand decen-
tralized character.Despite the efforts of the
urbanleadershipto control the financial basis
of the movement, agrarianfascism was self-
financing.The fascists set up informaltaxation
at the local level, and did not transferfunds to
centralcommitteein Milan.The agrarifinanced
local fascist organizationsandnewspapers,not
the Milanese leadership (De Felice [1966]
1995:45; Gentile 1989:166-8). In that sense,
agrarianfascism was simply a re-editionof the
agrarianorganizationsof the prefascistperiod
(Gentile1989:166).Fascismin the firstinstance
was a broadalliance of two mainkinds of asso-
ciations: veterans' associations and agrarian
associations.
In addition to providing an alliance frame-
work for the agrariansand the patrioticassoci-
ations, fascism penetrated the preexisting
structureof working class associationism.For
example, RobertoFarinacci(1892-1945), sec-
ond only in importance to Mussolini among
fascist leaders,used his contactsin the railroad
unions, which he had establishedas a socialist,
to build up a powerful local organization
(Cordova 1990:45-53; De Felice [1966]
1995:506; Lyttelton 1987:171). Further,many
of the ruralleagues and chambersof labor,gen-
erally underthe pressurefrom the fascist mili-
tia, passed over in their entiretyto the fascists
in the early 1920s. This providedfascism with
an immediate mass organizationin precisely
those areas where socialist associationismhad
been most developed in the prefascist period
(Ridolfi 1997:340-2; Tasca 1950:164).
Regardingthe case of Ravenna,Italianhistori-
an MaurizioRidolfi (1996:262)writesthatthere
 ANDAUTHORITARIAN
CIVICASSOCIATIONS
"were several examples of self-dissolution [of
agrarianleagues],oftenpassingdirectlyoverthe
fascist syndicateorganizations." FromFebruary
to April 1921, masses of peasant leagues and
union organizationsshifted as a bloc to the fas-
cists (Cordova 1990:42-3). The fascists also
took over the entire structureof cooperative
societies, erectingin 1926 the Entenazionaledi
cooperazione(NationalInstituteof Cooperation)
(Degl'Innocenti1981:51).Fascistspurgedthese
organizationsof their previous leadershipand
then converted them to institutions linked to
the party (Degl'Innocenti 1981:53). In 1928,
after the operationof purging,there were still
over 3,000 cooperative societies in Italy with
over 800,000 members (Degl'Innocenti
1981:56). The fascists did not dismantle the
socialist organizations;they penetratedthem
and used them to build their own mass organi-
zations.
ORGANIZATIONALTECHNIQUES.The Italian
associationalsphere, in additionto facilitating
recruitment,provided specific organizational
techniquesthatthe fascistsused in constructing
theirown partyorganization.Manyof the asso-
ciations discussed previously undertookthree
maintypes of activity:resourcecollection, cul-
tural activities and social assistance. Fascist
party federationsconducted all three of these
activitiesin ways thatwere strikinglysimilarto
prefascistassociations.
The agrarianorganizationsdiscussed in the
precedingsection dependedupon contributions
from local owners. Specifically, these usually
took the formof "ordinarycontributions" based
on the area of land held and income, and
"extraordinary contributions"collected at fixed
rates for all the members (Ministero di
AgricolturaIndustriae Commercio 1912:13).
This was exactly the principle method of
resourcecollection used by the fascist federa-
tions.The fascistpartysecretaryAchille Starace
(1889-1945) codified the distinctionbetween
ordinarycontributionsbased on ability to pay
and extraordinarycontributionsin an adminis-
trative act in 1935 (PNF 1935:191-7).
Administrativedocumentsfromthe federations
themselvesshow thatthis distinctionwas wide-
ly used fromthe early 1930s. Further,prefascist
Italian associations (both elite and nonelite)
were often linked to a newspaper.Funding a
newspaperwas also one of the principleactiv-
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IN EUROPE 3ox
REGIMES
ities of all fascist federations.In additionto the
big national fascist papers, such as II Popolo
d'Italia, each federationhad its regionalpubli-
cation.Finally,the fascistfederationsdistributed
considerablesocial assistanceboth in the form
of small loans and in kind (this informationis
based on budgets containedin ACS; AF; PNF;
DN; Servizi; Series I; boxes, 708, 714, 827,
829, 1123, 1128 and Series II; boxes 1091,
1181, 1584).
Further,the fascist partyused specific polit-
ical techniques, especially drawn from the
sphere of socialist associationism,to establish
control over the working class. The clearest
example of such a technique was the labor
quota. One of the key achievementsof social-
ist organizationsin the Po Valleywas the impo-
sition of a laborquotaon employersthatwould
ease cyclical unemploymentamong day labor-
ers. Fascist unions generallykept labor quotas
as a means of threateningagrarianemployers
and winning some mass support (Lyttelton
1987:223).
Given the continuitiesbetween fascism and
the prefascist associational sphere in terms of
recruitmentmechanismsand organization,it is
not surprisingthat, where civic associationism
was less developed, especially in the south of
Italy,the fascist partyhad enormousdifficulty
consolidating.SouthernItalianfascism tended
to be one of three things: a criminalorganiza-
tion tied to the agrarians,a superficialpolitical
cover for personalisticclienteles, or an apoliti-
cal reform movement based on the military.
The weakness of southern fascism was
expressedin the greaterpowerthatprefectshad
in relation to the federal secretaries in these
regions.Fascismas an autonomouspartyorgan-
ization remaineda phenomenonof north-cen-
tral Italy (Colarizi 1977:156-63; Corvaglia
1989:822; Lyttelton 1987:189-90). The rela-
tively strong associational sphere in northern
Italy, then, provided key organizational
resources for the development of the fascist
movement, and then party.Thus, in the Italian
case, a relativelystrongassociationalsphere,far
from constituting a barrieragainst the devel-
opment of an authoritarianparty,providedthe
materials out of which the fascist party was
constructed.
302 AMERICAN REVIEW
SOCIOLOGICAL
SPAIN
The same general relationshipholds for Spain
with the fundamentaldifferencethatde Rivera
did not come to power on the basis of a party
movement, but ratherhe created a state party
afterthe seizure of power.To the limitedextent
thatfascist-likemovementsemergedin Spainin
the early 1920s, they were located in the areas
of the countrywith dense associationalspheres.
De Rivera's state party the Union Patri6tica
(UP) developed in part as an attemptto copy
Italianfascism, and in part as a union of vari-
ous spontaneous efforts to supportthe dicta-
torship.Spontaneoussupportfor the de Rivera
coup concentrated in Catalonia and the
provincesof Old Castile. In Cataloniathe mili-
tia organizationsreorganizedthemselvesintothe
Federacidn Civico-Somatenista. A group of
Catholic conservatives in Valladolid in Old
Castileformedthe UnionPatrirticaCastellana
in November 1923. When de Rivera formally
launchedthe statepartyin April 1924, a "pow-
erful networkof Catholic syndicates,newspa-
pers,andecclesiasticallay associations"formed
the initial basis of many party cells (Ben-Ami
1983:130). The relationshipbetween Catholic
associationismandthe UP is particularlystrik-
ing. As the researchof G6mez-Navarroshows,
two different types of UP cell organization
emergedafter 1926. In the southin the areasof
large landholdingthe old political bosses from
the liberalperiodpenetratedthe UP.In the cen-
terandnorth,however,it was men coming from
social Catholicism,eitheras unionorganizersor
leadersof local Catholicpolitical organizations
such as the Partido Social Popular (PSP) who
dominatedthe UP (G6mez-Navarro1991:255).
But these pockets of authoritarianmobiliza-
tionwereisolatedandthey couldnot supportthe
developmentof a mass nationalpartyas in the
Italiancase. The UP was nevera dynamicparty
organization.Its centraloffice was runout of the
Ministry of the Interior.Furthermoremany of
its memberswere stateemployeeswho hadbeen
forced to join in order to keep their jobs. In
additionformerpolitical bosses of the el turno
system flocked into the partyin ordergainjobs
and patronage (Ben-Ami 1983:140). Thus
regionaldifferencesaffectedthe UP as much as
theyhadthe partiesof the el turno.TheCastilian
andCatalangroupscompetedto gain controlof
the new state party.The dictator'sapproachto
these conflicts was to make the UP politically
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ecumenicalincludingeveryonefromthe fascists
to the old dynasticliberals(Ben-Ami 1983:131;
G6mez-Navarro1991:255-60). The UP had no
affiliatedprofessionalorganizations,little doc-
trinalbase, and an extremelyweak partypress.
To join the party one had simply to be recom-
mendedby a memberand pay an annualfee of
a single peseta (an incredibly small amount
considering that the wages of a day laborerin
the late 1920s were betweenthreeto five pese-
tas a day) (G6mez-Navarro1991:231-3). The
UP was basically a new organizationfor the
old politicalbosses or caciques.This was clear-
ly not an organizationthatprovidedthe regime
with structured support. One of the most
remarkablefeaturesof the de Riveraregime is
thatthe dictatordid not appealto supportfor the
UP when his othersources of supportbegan to
decline in the late 1920s (Ben-Ami 1983:388).
THE REGIMESCOMPARED
The existence of a strongauthoritarianpartyin
Italy and the absence of such a political force
in Spain in part determined the differences
between the two regimes. In both Spain and
Italy, authoritarianregimes consolidated only
several years afterthe seizure of power.By the
mid 1920s, both had brokenwith even formal
constitutionallegality(De Felice [1968] 1995:3;
G6mez-Navarro1991:264).Butthe two regimes
assumed an opposite stance towardtheir soci-
eties. Italianlaborunions,professionals'groups,
and industrialists'groupswere forced eitherto
dissolve or to become fascist organizations.
This entailedformalpoliticizationof a rangeof
previouslynonpoliticalorganizations.Thus,the
Italianregime tended to become a hegemonic
authoritarianregime because it expanded the
realm of politically relevant activity (Milza
2000:800). The Spanish regime, by contrast,
tendedto depoliticize the associationalsphere.
G6mez-Navarro(1991:394) writes the follow-
ing:
The regimeof Primode Riverasoughtandpro-
motedworkingclass and professionalassocia-
tionismwhilerepressingandcurtailingpolitical
associationism.
One key reasonfor these differentoutcomes
was the strengthof thepartyorganizationin Italy
comparedto Spain.
 ANDAUTHORITARIAN
CIVICASSOCIATIONS
FROM'LIBERAL
FASCISM'
T FASCISM
AS
REGIME
It was only fromJanuary1925 (threeyearsafter
the seizure of power in October 1922) that
Mussolini'sgovernmentbegansystematicallyto
eliminatelegal oppositionandsubordinateasso-
ciations to the fascist party (De Felice [1968]
1995:220-1; Lyttelton 1987:269). The driving
forceof this processwas the fascistparty,which
mobilizedagainst Mussolini'sattemptto estab-
lish a personalisticregime closely resembling
the parliamentarydictatorships of prefascist
Italy.Thepartythusconstitutesthe linkbetween
associationism and hegemonic authoritarian-
ism in the Italian context. By the end of the
1920s the partyestablishedcontrolover Italian
society.Only approvedfascist unions, employ-
ers' organizations,and professional organiza-
tions remained in effective existence
(Rosenstock-Frank 1934:80-1). Oppositionpar-
ties were outlawed.Citizenshipwas now con-
sidereda privilege reservedonly to those who
demonstratedpolitical loyalty to the regime.
Like all hegemonic authoritarianregimes, it
required citizens "to participate, and special
rights and privileges [were] reserved to those
who demonstrate[d]theiractivecommitmentby
joining the party" (Lyttelton 1987:149). The
fascistregimethus demandedactiveratherthan
passive consent.
This outcome was in part the result of the
defeatof Mussolini'sinitialpostseizureof power
strategyof establishinga personaldictatorship,
whichresembledin manyways the transformist
governments of Giolitti. After the March on
Rome, Mussolinimovedto eliminatethe fascist
party as a major player by establishing an
alliance with the bureaucracy, the General
Confederationof Labor(CGL),the confedera-
tion of Industry,and a numberof majorpoliti-
cal leadersof liberalItaly(Cordova1990:177).
The effort came close to succeeding.The CGL
initiallyseemed open to collaboration.In early
October 1922, the reformistunions renounced
their alliance with the socialist party (Milza
and Berstein 1980:180). Forthe next two years
an alliance between Mussolini and a depoliti-
cized labormovement,seemed not only possi-
ble butlikely (Cordova1990:168-78; De Felice
[1966] 1995:617). Many of the leaders of lib-
eral Italy also seemed willing to cooperate.
Mussolini's first government was a formally
constitutionalcoalition governmentin which
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IN EUROPE 303
REGIMES
his own partyhad only 35 of the more than400
seats (De Felice [1966] 1995:479). His entire
policy from 1923 to 1924 was devotedto estab-
lishing a Giolittianstyle big majorityand then
passingan electorallaw thatwouldfurthersolid-
ify this majority.In orderto govern, Mussolini
used exactly the same techniques that Giolitti
had perfectedduringthe previoustwo decades.
He workedto establisha big majorityof the cen-
ter by appealing to individualdeputies to join
his projectfor a big nationallist which most of
the liberal deputies joined (De Felice [1966]
1995:575; Sabbatucci2003:66-7). The regime
thatwould have emergedfrom such an alliance
would clearly have been much less hegemonic
thanthe fascistregimeactuallywas, andit prob-
ablywouldhaveclosely resembledthe de Rivera
regime in Spain, as Lyttelton(1987:236) sug-
gests.
That Mussolini was unable to establish a
regime of this type is closely linked to the fact
that it ran contraryto the basic interestsof the
fascist party.The formationof the party creat-
ed a social agent whose vital interestsconsist-
ed in politicallyincorporatingever-largerchunks
of Italiansociety.The moreunions,professional
organizations,andculturalactivitiescame with-
in orbitof the fascist partythe more posts there
were for party members, and the more dues
would flow into the organization (Lyttelton
1987:236; Pombeni 1984:487). Even relative-
ly limited political pluralismthreatenedthese
interests. Mussolini's maneuvering in 1922
through1924 had the predictablepolitical con-
sequence of creating an intransigent fascist
alliance made of up the militia organizations
headed primarilyby Farinacci,and the union
organizations led by Edmondo Rossoni
(1884-1965).
From 1923 to 1925, the Farinacci-Rossoni
axis organized a second wave of mass mobi-
lization along two parallel lines: militia squad
mobilization and a union offensive. Squadrist
mobilization throughoutthe summer,fall, and
winter 1924 combined with a series of delega-
tions to Mussolini demandinga radicalization
of the regime, constitutethe immediate back-
ground for Mussolini's speech on January3,
1925. This indicatedthe end of the parliamen-
tary regime in Italy.From 1924 to 1926 a par-
allel mobilizationof the fascistunions achieved
a fascist monopoly on labor representationin
April 1926 (De Felice [1966] 1995:453, 457;
304 AMERICAN REVIEW
SOCIOLOGICAL
Gentile 1984:259-60; Lyttelton1987:245-67;
Milza and Berstein 1980:180-7; Uva
1970:1031, 1052-3).
This analysis suggests then that the party
was the key agent establishing a hegemonic
authoritarianregime in the Italian case. As
shownin the previoussection,the party'sdevel-
opment in the Italiancase dependedupon the
existenceof a strongassociationalsphere.Thus,
this institutionconstitutesthe key link between
associationism and hegemonic authoritarian-
ism in the Italiancontext.
FRoMTHEMLITARY
DIRECroRATE
TOTHECVIL DIRECTORATE
As in the Italiancase, it was initially unclearif
de Riveraintendedto breakwith the constitu-
tional set up of 1876 andthe old two-partysys-
tem associatedwith it. Thetransitionto a regime
in the Spanishcase occurredbetweenDecember
1925 and September1926 (Ben-Ami 1983:57;
G6mez-Navarro1991:265).Thereis little doubt
thatItalianfascism constituteda model for the
Spanish. De Rivera and the Spanish king
Alfonso XIII traveledto Italy in November of
1923 (twomonthsafterthepronunciamento). To
VictorEmmanuelIII (1869-1947), the king of
Italy,Alfonso reportedlyintroducedde Rivera
as "his Mussolini," and both stated that they
hoped to "follow the path of fascist Italy"
(G6mez-Navarro1991:129-30). The historical
connection between the two regimes makes
theircomparisonespeciallyinteresting,because
it demonstrateshow similar political projects
produceddifferentregimes, in differenthistor-
ical contexts.
The establishmentof the civil directorateand
a nationalconsultativeassembly were the key
momentsin the turntowarda regime in Spain.
The UP playedno role in this turn.The driving
force was de Rivera'sdesire to establishstruc-
tured civilian support (G6mez-Navarro
1991:267). The lack of a strong authoritarian
partymeantthatlargeareasof societyremained
outside any regime organizations.For exam-
ple, the corporativistorganizationsof the de
Riveraregime in contrastto fascist Italyleft an
only marginalrole for the stateparty.The basic
principleof de Rivera'sconsultativeassembly
was representationon the basis of "interests"
ratherthanindividualrepresentation. Therewere
four groups of representatives: those of the
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state,those of the provinces,those on theirown
account, and those of "activities."All of these
representativeswere selected from these four
groups,andstateemployeesandUP partymem-
bersmadeup a substantialpartof the assembly.
However,highly specific interests, such as the
Basque and Catalanbourgeoisies, the orange
growersofValencia, andolive andwheat grow-
ers, all had men in the Assembly without hav-
ing any formal relationship to the UP
(G6mez-Navarro1991:277). The point of this
assembly was largely to represent important
economic interests socially, but not politically
(G6mez-Navarro1991:282).
The de Rivera Spanishregime set up a sys-
tem of labor relations that was modeled on
Italian fascism. But there was a huge differ-
ence between them. The fascists established
regime organizations for all interest groups.
The de Riveraregime pursueda differentstrat-
egy.The regimerepressedcommunistandanar-
chist organizations and compromised with
socialist and Catholic ones. The split between
these two strategies is apparentfrom the dif-
ferentway that strikeswere handledaccording
to who led them. If the striking organizations
were affiliated with the communists or anar-
chists, then they were turned over to general
SeverianoMartinezAnido (1862-1938) at the
Ministryof the Interiorandthereforedealtwith
as a police matter.If the strikingorganizations
were affiliatedwith the socialists,andthus con-
sidered politically safe, EduardoAun6s Perez
(1894-1967) at the Ministryof Labordealtwith
the strikeas a matterof social policy (G6mez-
Navarro 1991:412-3). Thus, the de Rivera
regime institutionalizedthe division between
political and apolitical activity, a distinction
thatthe Italianfascistregimedeliberatelysought
to erase.Thus,while the Mussoliniregime after
1926, drilledworkers,professionals,and own-
ers into organizationscontrolledby the politi-
cal organization of the fascist party, in de
Rivera's regime the workers could belong to
any organizationthey liked, and owners inter-
actedwith the regimelargelythroughtheirown
organizations (Ben-Ami 1983:292). Further,
unlikein fascistItaly,in de Rivera'sSpainwork-
ers could strike,as long as they made no polit-
ical demands(Ben-Ami 1983:309).
The Italianregime by 1926 consolidated as
a hegemonic authoritarianregime. In contrast,
the de Rivera regime consolidated as an eco-
 CIVICASSOCIATIONS
ANDAUTHORITARIAN
nomic-corporatedictatorshiprelyingon the tra-
ditionalinstrumentsof the police andthe army,
and a system of informalcooptationof interest
groups. The relationship of the regime to its
key supporting interests was quite different
from the case of the fascist regime. The de
Rivera regime established a sharp division
between social and political organizations,
whereasthe fascist regime overcamethis divi-
sion to a certainextent.
DISCUSSION
The analysis developed in the previoussection
suggests that a fascist regime in Italy emerged
partlyas the result of a relatively strong asso-
ciationalspherein the prefascistperiod.While
associational development occurred in Spain
as well, it was weaker.These differencesin the
associational sphere affected the strength of
authoritarianparty organizations in the two
cases. I show that fascist membershipand cell
organizations closely followed associational
strengthin Italy.The same generalrelationship
held in Spain. Where the associational sphere
was relatively strong in Spain, the UP was a
moreviable organizationthanit was in areasof
weak associational development. However,
because of regional differences and a general
lack of associational development, the party
organization in Spain was weaker. Different
types of authoritarianregimesresulted.In Italy,
a hegemonic authoritarian fascist regime
emergedpartlyas a result of the fascist party's
struggleagainstthe centralleadership.In Spain,
the absenceof a strongpartyallowedthe regime
to develop as a more relaxed economic corpo-
rate dictatorship.This evidence challenges the
Tocquevillian account of authoritarianism.
Associationism in Italy enabled both authori-
tarianparty formationand, indirectly,the con-
solidationof a hegemonicauthoritarian regime.
In Spain,precisely the weakness of the associ-
ationalsphereunderminedboth processes.
Other studies point in a similar direction
(Berman 1997; Hagtvet 1980; Kaufman1999;
Koshar 1986; Kwon 2004). The research of
Koshar(1986:96), Hagvet (1980), andBerman
(1997) has effectively demonstratedthat the
WeimarRepublicin Germanyhada dense asso-
ciationalsphere.Hagtvet(1980) shows thatthe
constituencies among which the National
Socialists drew the most support,white-collar
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REGIMES
IN EUROPE 305
employees and small peasants,had among the
strongest intermediate associations in the
Weimarperiod. Further,the regional distribu-
tion of Spanishmass right-wingmobilizationin
the Second Republic is interesting.Historians
suggest thatmass right-wingmobilizationcon-
centrated in the Basque Provinces and in
Navarre (Payne 1980:428). As I show, these
were also provinces that had among the high-
est levels of civic associationismin Spain.Some
work on contemporary Eastern Europe sug-
gests that a strong associational sphere can
sometimesaid partiesof the radicalright(Fisher
2003:91). The relationship between associa-
tionism and radical political parties does not
seem to be restrictedto right-wingradicalism.
For example, Bonnell (1983:444) shows that
the most organized,craftconscious sections of
the workforce, not deracinatedrural migrants
were most susceptibleto radicalpolitical ideas
in late Tsarist Russia. Service (1979:36) also
emphasizes the importance of working class
self-organization to the ascendancy of the
Bolsheviks.
These findings imply importanttheoretical
consequences for theoriesof civic association-
ism. As I indicate at the beginning of this arti-
cle, Tocquevillian work emphasizes two
mechanisms by which associations block the
developmenthegemonicauthoritarianregimes:
insulation and organizational balancing.
Tocquevillianstend to argue that strong asso-
ciationalspheresinsulatepopulationsfromover
politicization (Kornhauser 1959:97). Thus
scholarsin this traditionsuggest thatby aggre-
gating interests around local concerns, civic
associationism promotes political moderation
(Putnam 1993: 16-38; Tocqueville 1988:523).
The absence of local level interestaggregation
leaves the way open for totalitarianmovements
that appeal to mythical and inherentlyunreal-
izable political projects (Arendt 1958:311;
Kornhauser1959:46, 64). Tocquevilliansalso
suggestthata dense associationalsphereshould
inhibithegemonic authoritarianregime forma-
tionby substitutingprivateinitiativefor stateini-
tiative, and by balancing state power. Both of
these claims seem untenableon the evidence
presented here and in much other work.
Membership in associations oriented toward
local and readilyunderstandablepolitical proj-
ects not only seems compatible with, but an
essentialingredientof, the organizationof anti-
306 AMERICAN REVIEW
SOCIOLOGICAL
democraticmass partyformationin a varietyof
historical contexts. Furthermore,strong asso-
ciationalspherescan operateas highly effective
transmissionbelts for the consolidationofhege-
monic authoritarianregimes after an authori-
tarianseizure of power.
The Tocquevillian argumentis based on a
two-sector model in which the associational
sphereandthe sphereof statesandmass parties
act, to a certaindegree,as alternatives.It is pre-
cisely this model that Gramsci (1971:258-9)
implicitlychallenges.ForGramsci'sworkfocus-
es on the relationshipbetweenthe association-
al, party and state spheres,ratherthan parsing
them into separate conceptual boxes. The
Gramscian argument emphasizes the impor-
tance of political context in shaping the rela-
tionship between the associationalsphere and
regime formation. Civic associations, for
Gramsci,arean organizationallayerof modern
society thatmay be mobilized for variouspolit-
ical projects. None of this is to suggest that
associationismis unimportant.For,as this arti-
cle shows, associationism can shape authori-
tarianregimes. In this sense my argumenthas
implications for theories of regime variation.
The categories of dictatorshipand democracy
(or, for an earlierperiod,constitutionalismand
absolutism)miss importantdimensionsof vari-
ationwithineachtype. Muchrecentworkon the
statechallengesthese conceptualizations,either
by focusing on the microprocessesof political
power such as discipline (Gorski 2003), or by
stressingthe relativeindependenceof adminis-
trativeinfrastructure fromregimeform(Ertman
1997). In the spirit of this work, this article
stresses hegemony as an independentaxis of
regime variation. One of the most important
ways that authoritarianregimes vary is in the
degree to which they politicize the population
(that is achieve hegemony), ratherthan basing
themselves on a pragmatic bargain with key
social groups. It is in trying to understandthis
aspect of regime variationthat scholarsshould
take the development of civic associationism
seriously.As I show in two cases thatwere like-
the
ly to generatesome kindof authoritarianism,
of associational
degree developmentexplains
the specific formthatauthoritarianism took. In
this sense,my argumentis a plea to bringthe lit-
eratureon civic associationismdirectlyto bear
on the problemof regime variation.This links
to a final objectiveof this article:to developana-
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
lytically,and to demonstratethe empiricaluse-
fulness of, Gramsci's political sociology.
Gramsci'sreceptionin the social sciences, and
specifically in sociology, has been narrowly
focused around culturalist and economistic
interpretationsof hegemony.But Gramscialso
had a highly original and empirically useful
political sociology. His centralinnovationwas
to develop a typology of regimes based on the
conceptof hegemonythatbreaksradicallywith
the standard distinction between democracy
and dictatorship.The key point is that hege-
mony constitutesan analyticallydistinctaxis of
regimevariationconnectedto the strengthof the
associationalsphere.Futurescholarshipshould
attendto the interrelationshipof associationism
and hegemony in both authoritarianand dem-
ocratic contexts.
Dylan Riley is AssistantProfessorofSociology at the
Universityof California,Berkeley.His main interest
is the relationshipbetweenassociationism and pol-
itics, which he has examinedin a variety of histori-
cal and nationalcontexts.He is currentlyworkingon
a book manuscript investigating the role of civic
associationismand authoritarianregimevariationin
interwarEurope.
SOURCES
MANUSCRIPT
ArchivioCentraledello Stato (ACS); Ministero
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sicurezza(DGPS).
. ArchiviFascisti(AF);PartitoNazionale
Fascista nazionale
(PNF);Direttorio (DN);Servizi;
SeriesI-II.
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