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ABAD

Ferrer v. Bautista, G.R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015  

The  Quezon  City  Council  enacted  an  ordinance,  Socialized  Housing  Tax  of  Quezon  City,
collecting a half percent (0.5%) of the assessed value of the land in excess of Php 100,000.00.
The special assessment shall go to the General Fund under a special account for the Specialized
Housing Programs of the Quezon City. Ordinance No. SP-2235 and S-2013 were also enacted
collecting garbage fees on residential properties which shall be deposited solely and exclusively
in  an  earmarked  special  account  under  the  general  fund  to  be  used  for  garbage 
collections. Petitioner alleged that he is a registered co-owner of a 371-square-meter residential
property in Quezon City which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 216288,
and that, on January 7, 2014, he paid his realty tax which already included the garbage fee in the
sum of Php100.00.

Petitioner counters  that  in  enacting  Ordinance  Nos.  SP-2095  and  SP-2235,  the  Quezon 
City  Council  exercised  quasi-judicial  function  because  the  ordinances  ruled  against  the 
property  owners who must pay the SHT and the garbage fee, exacting from them funds for basic
essential  public services that they should not be held liable

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the tax ordinances are valid and Constitutional

RULING:

The Socialized Housing Tax is VALID. The 1987 Constitution explicitly espouses the view that
the use of property bears a social function and that all economic agents shall contribute to the
common good. Property has not only an individual function, insofar as it has to provide for the
needs of the owner, but also function insofar as it has to provide for the needs of the other
members of thesociety.

Property Rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the
objectives of the government in the exercise of police power. In this, jurisdiction, it is m well-
entrenched that taxation may be made the implement of the state’s police power. The principle is
this: Police power proceeds from the principle that every holder of property, however absolute
and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be
injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their
property, nor injurious to the right of the community. Rights of property, like all other social and
conventional rights, are subject to reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them
from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations established by law as the
legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may
think necessary and expedient. Property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government in the exercise of police power. In
this jurisdiction, it is well-entrenched that taxation may be made the implement of the state’s
police power. The SHT charged by the Quezon City Government is a tax which is within its
powerto impose.

Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan, G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014

Petitioner is the president and chief executive officer of Boracay Island West Cove Management
Philippines, Inc. (Boracay West Cove). On January 7, 2010, the company applied for a zoning
compliance with the municipal government of Malay, Aklan.2 While the company was already
operating a resort in the area, and the application sought the issuance of a building permit
covering the construction of a three-storey hotel over a parcel of land measuring 998 sqm.
located in Sitio Diniwid, Barangay Balagab, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan, which is covered by
a Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in favor of Boracay West Cove.

Through a Decision on Zoning dated January 20, 2010, the Municipal Zoning Administrator
denied petitioner’s application on the ground that the proposed construction site was within the
“no build zone” demarcated in Municipal Ordinance 2000-131 (Ordinance).

Petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor but despite follow up, no action
was ever taken by the respondent mayor. A Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal
government, enjoining the expansion of the resort, and on June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor
of Malay, Aklan issued the assailed EO 10, ordering the closure and demolition of Boracay West
Cove’s hotel.

PETITIONER CONTENTION: The hotel cannot summarily be abated because it is not a

nuisance per se, given the hundred million peso-worth of capital infused in the venture. And the
Municipality of Malay, Aklan should have first secured a court order before proceeding with the
demolition.

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: The demolition needed no court order because the municipal
mayor has the express power under the Local Government Code (LGC) to order the removal of
illegally constructed buildings.

ISSUE

Whether or not a judicial proceedings be conducted first before the LGU can order the closure
and demolition of the property in question.

RULING

Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such a thing is
a nuisance per se.
         Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, we still find in this
case that the LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition. This is because, in the
exercise of police power and the general welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be
subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise
stated, the government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property,
lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare.

Under the law, insofar as illegal constructions are concerned, the mayor can, after satisfying the
requirement of due notice and hearing, order their closure and demolition.

One such piece of legislation is the LGC, which authorizes city and municipal governments,
acting through their local chief executives, to issue demolition orders. Under existing laws, the
office of the mayor is given powers not only relative to its function as the executive official
of the town; it has also been endowed with authority to hear issues involving property rights
of individuals and to come out with an effective order or resolution thereon.20 Pertinent herein is
Sec. 444 (b) (3) (vi) of the LGC, which empowered the mayor to order the closure and
removal of illegally constructed establishments for failing to secure the necessary permits.

Kabataan Party-List v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 221318, December 16, 2015

 DOCTRINE/S: Regulating procedural matters such as the election is a valid exercise of police
power and Limitations to police power is due process and equal protection

FACTS:  Six organizations  and Sining Maria Rosa  Marfori filed instant petition with
application  for temporary  restraining   order   (TRO)   and/or   writ  of   preliminary  
mandatory  injunction  (WPI)   assailing constitutionality of RA 10367 or An Act Providing for
Mandatory Biometrics Voter Registration and various COMELEC Resolution Nos 9721, 9863,
and 10013. A brief summary of the mentioned law and resolutions: RA 10367 which mandates
COMELEC to implement mandatory biometrics registration system for new voters to establish a
clean, complete, permanent, and updated list of voters through the adoption of biometric
technology.

The act also directs that those whose biometrics have not yet been captured shall submit
themselves for validation. Voters who fail to submit for validation shall be deactivated.
Resolution   No.   9721   states   that   those   who   failed   to   be validated,   no   biometrics  
data,   and   have incomplete biometrics data will be deactivated and shall not be allowed to vote.
Resolution No. 9863 Election Regulation Board shall deactivate the Voter Registration Record
of those who failed to submit for validation on or before Oct 31, 2015. Resolution   No.   10013  
provides   a   procedure   in   deactivation   as   to   who  did   not   comply  with   the biometrics  
needed:   1)   post   list   of   voters   without   biometrics   data   in   public   places,   and   2) 
send individual notices to affected voters, any objections shall be filed not later than Nov 9,
2015.

ARGUMENT OF PETITIONERS:
1. Biometrics validation rises to the level of an additional, substantial qualification where there is
penalty of deactivation

2. Biometrics deactivation is not the disqualification by law contemplated by the 1987

Constitution

3. Biometrics validation gravely violates the Constitution applying the strict scrutiny test it is not
poised with compelling reason for state regulation and hence, unreasonable deprivation of the
right to suffrage

4. Voters to be deactivated are not afforded due process

5. Poor   experience   with   biometrics   should serve   as warning   against exacting  adherence 

to  thesystem.

6. Deactivation will result to premature termination of the registration period

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 10367 or An Act Providing for Mandatory Biometrics Voter
Registration andvarious COMELEC Resolution Nos 9721, 9863, and 10013 are unconstitutional.

DECISION: No, RA 10367 and listed COMELEC Resolutions are not unconstitutional. On
biometrics as a substantial qualification and deactivation as not the disqualification contemplated
by the 1987 Constitution, Supreme Court held that biometrics validation is not a “substantial
qualification to the exercise of the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration
procedure, of which the State has the right to reasonably regulate. The process of registration is a
procedural limitation on the right to vote. In the 1936 case of People of PH Islands v Corral, it
has been recognized that "the right to vote is not a natural right but is a right created by law.
Suffrage is a privilege granted by the State to such persons as are more likely to exercise it for
the public good. Sec V of 1987 Constitution provides parameters to exercise suffrage: first, he
must be a Filipino citizen;  second,   he  must  not  be  disqualified   by  law;  and   third,  he 
must   have   resided  in the Philippines for at least 1 year and 6 months in place where he
proposes to vote. The second parameter reflects that the State may therefore regulate the said
right. As resonated in various COMELEC cases, “The act of registration is an indispensable
precondition to the right of suffrage. For registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an
indispensable element in the election process.

Proceeding from the significance of registration as a necessary requisite to the right to vote,
the State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to
safeguard and regulate the act of voter's registration for the ultimate purpose of
conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election.”
BILAS

GERONIMO S. ROSAS, Petitioner VS.

DILAUSAN MONTOR and IMRA-ALI M. SABDULLAH, Respondents

Jafar Saketi Taromsari (Taromsari) and Jalal Shokr Pour Ziveh (Ziveh) both Iranian nationals,
arrived in the Philippines at the Mactan-Cebu International Airport (MCIA) After staying in a
hotel in Cebu City for a few days, they left for Narita, Japan

They were found to had counterfeit or tampered Mexican and Italian passports and used falsified
names, and thus denied entry. They bought the Italian and Mexican passports from a certain
"KURAM" in Tehran, Iran, whom they allegedly attached their respective pictures substituting
the pictures of the real owners and paid US$3,000 at US$1,500.00 each, for the purpose of
traveling in comfort without the requirement of entry visa to Japan and finally, to work thereat,
considering that JAFAR SAKETI TAROMSARI had worked there before for three (3) years
from 1999 to 2002 and earned a lot of money until he was caught and deported by Japanese
Immigration authorities, that they both arrived in the Philippines for the first time at MCIA on
December 07, 2004 on board MI 566 from Singapore using Italian and Mexican passports under
the names of MARCO RABITTI and JAIME HUMBERTO NECJARES GARCIA, respectively.
Subsequently, they left for Narita, Japan on December 14, 2004 and were sent back to MCAI on
December 16, 2004.

On December 19, 2004, Taromsari and Ziveh were released from detention and brought by
Napilot and Ugarte to the MCIA for deportation.[[10] They were allowed to leave for Tehran,
Iran via Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on board Malaysian Air Lines.

On January 18, 2005, respondents Imra-All Sabdullah and Dilausan S. Montor, employees of the
Bureau of Immigration (BI), Cebu, filed a Complaint-Affidavit- before the OMB against
petitioner, Napilot and Ugarte for grave misconduct, violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
(RA) No. 3019 and conduct prejudicial to the interest of public service. Respondents alleged that
petitioner irregularly and anomalously handled and disposed of the case involving two restricted
Iranian nationals by allowing them to leave the country without initiating any proceeding for
violation of immigration laws considering that said aliens were potential threats to the country's
national interest and security. It was further contended that the Iranian nationals should have
been charged for deportation because they violated Section 37(a)(9), in relation to Sections 45
and 46 of PIA.

 
Issue: WON petitioner's act of releasing the two Iranian nationals without initiating any
case for violation of immigration laws despite the results of the investigation undertaken
constitute gross misconduct?

Yes. Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon such
grounds as it may deem proper for its self preservation or public interest.

In this case, Petitioner had the duty under the law to oversee the filing of criminal actions and
deportation proceedings against Taromsari and Ziveh and not merely excluding them.

The facts on record established that at the time petitioner recommended their exclusion on
December 17, 2004, he was already aware that said Iranian nationals used the falsified Mexican
and Italian passports in entering and leaving the Philippines on December 7 and 14, 2004. Such
use of counterfeit passports by aliens entering our country is a criminal offense under Sec. 45 of
the PIA, as amended.

Instead of filing the appropriate criminal charge as mandated by law, petitioner allowed
Taromsari and Ziveh to depart and return to Tehran via Malaysia. While claiming that it was
only on December 17, 2004 that he came to know of the Iranian nationals' detention for illegal
entry into the Philippines, official log book records show that petitioner, along with security
guards Napilot and Ugarte, brought the two Iranian nationals to their detention cell on the same
night of their arrival from Japan on December 16, 2004 and detained them there for three days.
Custody over the two Iranian nationals caught violating our immigration laws was simply
handed over by petitioner to the two security guards whom he later instructed to escort the said
offenders to the airport to depart for Malaysia. In failing to initiate the proper proceedings
against the Iranian nationals and allowing them to escape criminal charges and thorough
investigation for possible terrorist activities or human trafficking. petitioner displayed a blatant
disregard of established immigration rules making him liable for grave misconduct that warrants
his removal from the service.

 
 

RIMANDO V. NAGUILIAN EMISSION TESTING CENTER

Topic: Mandamus Naguilian Emissions was running a business on land owned by the
government. It sought to renew its business license in 2008. However, the mayor of Naguilian
town refused to issue the license without the execution of a contract of lease between the
business and the municipality. They could not agree on the terms hence a petition for mandamus
was filed against the mayor by the business. This was granted by the lower court, whose decision
was then overturned by the CA, which found that a tax declaration is not sufficient proof of
ownership of the property by the municipality.

DOCTRINE A mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue a business permit since the
exercise of the same is a delegated police power, hence discretionary in nature.

FACTS

Naguilian Emission Testing Center, Inc. was operating an emission testing center in Naguilian,
La Union on land owned by the government, but was subsequently declared alienable and
disposable by the DENR.

From 2005 to 2007, the business operated without any problem. In 2008, the business applied for
a renewal of its business license and paid the fees therefor.

Abraham Rimando, mayor of Naguilian, La Union, refused to issue the license until the business
executes a contract of lease with the Municipality of Naguilian.

The business was amenable to this condition, subject to some proposed revisions. (What these
revisions were was not mentioned in the case.) However, these revisions were not acceptable to
the Mayor.

A petition for mandamus was filed by the business with the RTC against the Mayor.

The RTC denied the petition, based on the following findings: a. That the Municipality of
Naguilian was the declared owner of the subject property as evidenced by the tax declaration
over the property; b. Under Sec. 6A.01 of the Revenue Code, the municipality has the right to
require petitioner to sign a contract of lease; and c. A mayor’s duty to issue business permits is
discretionary in nature.

The Court of Appeals, while declaring the issue moot and academic since the period for which
the business permit was sought (year 2008) had already lapsed, and Mayor Rimando’s term had
already ended. Nonetheless, it proceeded to rule on the merits and found that the issuance of a
write of mandamus was justified.

It reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC. a. The CA held that the tax declaration was
insufficient basis to require the execution of a contract of lease as a sine qua non condition for
the issuance of a business permit. b. Also, the resolution of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
(2007-81), upon which the mayor anchored his imposition of rental fees, was void for its failure
to comply with the requirements of the Local Government Code. (the case fails to mention which
requirements) c. The mayor, however, may not be held liable for damages as his refusal was
done in the performance of official duties.

ISSUE: W/N a writ of mandamus to compel Mayor Rimando to issue a business license to
Naguilian Emission Testing Center should have been issued by the court.

HELD: a. No. A mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue a business permit since
the exercise of the same is a delegated police power, hence discretionary in nature. i. This
was the pronouncement of the Court in Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Hon. Villaflor, where a
determination was made on the nature of the power of a mayor to grant business permits
under the Local Government Code. ii. The Court in that case held that such power to grant
permits is a manifestation of delegated police power. Necessarily, the exercise thereof cannot
be deemed ministerial. iii. The proper remedy is a writ of certiorari, not mandamus. iv. The
grant of such power under the Local Government Code is found in Sec. 444. Such section states
that the municipal mayor’s power to issue licenses is pursuant to Sec. 16 of the same law.
Section 16 of the LGC is the general welfare clause, which encapsulates the delegated police
power to local governments. This is exercised through their respective legislative bodies.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: Wherefore, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of

Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union is
REINSTATED.

URBINA

Binay v. Domingo, G.R. No. 92389, September 11, 1991

Re: General welfare clause (Sec. 16, LGC 1991)

FACTS: The Municipality of Makati passed a resolution extending financial assistance to a
bereaved family whose gross income does not exceed P2000 a month. The resolution was
referred to respondent COA for its expected allowance in audit. However, COA disapproved the
resolution and disallowed in audit the disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof.

COA's objection is of the position that there is no perceptible connection or relation between the
objective sought to be attained under the resolution and the alleged public safety, general
welfare, etc., of the inhabitants of Makati.

COA's also argued that. "Resolution No. 60 is still subject to the limitation that the expenditure
covered thereby should be for a public purpose, ... should be for the benefit of the whole, if not
the majority, of the inhabitants of the Municipality and not for the benefit of only a few
individuals as in the present case."

ISSUES:

(1) WON the resolution of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under
the general welfare clause.

(2) WON the classification of pauper beneficiaries is violative of the equal protection clause in
the constitution.

HELD:

(1) Yes. COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is not unconstitutional
merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by
the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards
state policies to provide adequate social services (Section 9, Art. II, Constitution), the promotion
of the general welfare (Section 5, Ibid) social justice (Section 10, Ibid) as well as human dignity
and respect for human rights. The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The
support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the
common good.

(2) No. There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers as subject of
legislation. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying
treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of
the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled,
emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc.
City of Manila v. Laguio, G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005

Facts: The private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTOC) is a

corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels, and lodging houses. It
built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly
accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel.

March 30, 1993 - City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved an ordinance enacted which prohibited
certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as
tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and
adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community.

The Ordinance prohibited the establishment of sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars,
beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, cabarets, motels, inns. Owners and operators of the
enumerated establishments are given three months to wind up business operations or transfer to
any place outside Ermita-Malate or convert said businesses to other kinds allowable within the
area. The Ordinance also provided that in case of violation and conviction, the premises of the
erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently.

June 28, 1993 - MTOC filed a Petition with the lower court, praying that the Ordinance, insofar
as it included motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional for several reasons but mainly because it is not a valid exercise of police power
and it constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law.

Judge Laguio ruled for the petitioners. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.

Issue: WON the Ordinance is constitutional.

Ratio: SC held that the ordinance is unconstitutional for several reasons.

First, it did not meet the valid exercise of police power. To successfully invoke the exercise of
police power, not only must it appear that (1)the interest of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but (2)the means
employed must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive. The object of the ordinance was the promotion and protection of the social and moral
values of the community. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into
businesses allowed under the ordinance have no reasonable relation to its purpose. Otherwise
stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote
social and moral welfare of the community. It will not itself eradicate prostitution, adultery,
fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.

White Light Corp. vs. City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009

Facts: 

Manila Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed an Ordinance prohibiting short time admission in hotels,
motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.

The City claims that it is a legitimate exercise of police power.

Herein petitioners, assails the validity and constitutionality of the ordinance arguing that it
violates the right to privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police
power; and it is an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.

The RTC declared the ordinance null and void, thus, the City of Manila elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals. The CA reversed the RTC ruling.

Issue:

Whether or not the ordinance is valid.

Ruling:

The court ruled in the negative.

The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of
Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers
of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it
must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent
with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.

 
The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate
admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day.

The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are
unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the
desirability of these ends does not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means
must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the
people.

LAZAGA

 Zabal v. Duterte, G.R. No. 238467, February 12, 2019

The Case

Before this Court is a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with Application for Temporary
Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction, and/or Status Quo Ante Order filed by petitioners
Mark Anthony V. Zabal (Zabal), Thiting Estoso Jacosalem (Jacosalem), and Odon S. Bandiola
(Bandiola) against respondents President Rodrigo R. Duterte (President Duterte ), Executive
Secretary Salvador C. Medialdea, and Secretary Eduardo M. Año of the Department of Interior
and Local Government (DILG).
Facts:

In an information, Boracay has become a cesspool. President Duterte first made public his plan
to shut it down from April 26, 2018 to October 25, 2018 which is six months and place the
Boracay under a state of calamity. Later, President Duterte formally issue the Proclamation
Order no. 475 to temporarily closed the Boracay. The Petitioners, Mark Anthony Zabal, Thiting
Estoso Jacosalem and Odon S. Bandiola, a workers of Boracay Breach in Malay, Aklan who
seek
and petitioned the closure of the Boracay because it affects and injured their right to work and
earn a living which thrives solely on tourist arrivals. They alleged that it is violation of their right
of due process and claimed that they were deprived of their livelihood without due process and
it is not in exercise of the police power of the state and it is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. They file a
petition before the court a “Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with Application for
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), Preliminary Injunction, and/or Status Quo Ante Order. 
Issue/s:
- Whether or not the Proclamation Order No. 475 violated the right to work and earning
of the petitioners
-Whether or not the depravation of the present work or employment can prevent the
exercise of the Police Power of the State?

Rulings:

1. The Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus is DISMISSED by the Supreme

Court.

2. No, The nature of their livelihood is one wherein earnings are not guaranteed. As
correctly pointed out by respondents, their earnings are not fixed and may vary
depending on the business climate in that while they can earn much on peak
seasons, it is also possible for them not to earn anything on lean seasons, especially
when the rainy days set in. Zabal and Jacosalem could lose in this case are mere
projected earnings which are in no way guaranteed, and are sheer expectancies
characterized as contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest, just like in
Galicto. Concomitantly, an assertion of direct injury on the basis of loss of income
does not clothe Zabal and Jacosalem with legal standing.

3. No, it cannot prevent the exercise of police power of the state even if some
individuals in the Community may be deprived their present work or
employment

Suguitan v. City of Mandaluyong, G.R. No. 135087, March 14, 2000

Facts:
The respondent issued a resolution authorizing Mayor Banjamin Abalos to institute expropriation
proceeding over the property of Alberto Suguitan for the expansion of Mandaluyong Medical
Center. Alberto Suguitan refused the offer Mayor Abalos in buying his
property. City of Mandaluyong filed a complaint for expropriation with the RTC of Pasig.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss filled by Alberto Suguitan and allowed the
Expropriation of the subject property.

The petitioner asserted that the respondent may only exercise its delegated power of eminent
domain by means of an ordinance as required by Section 19 of Republic Act No. 7160 and not
by means of a mere resolution.
Petition for review for reversal of the Order by the RTC of Pasig.
Issue:
Whether a resolution is a sufficient antecedent for the filling of expropriation proceedings with
the RTC.

Held:
No. Petition is granted and the decision of RTC of Pasig is reversed and set aside. An
examination of the applicable law will show that an ordinance is necessary to authorize the filing
of a complaint with the proper court since, beginning at this point, the power of eminent
domain is already being exercised.

“Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.”
 The due process and equal protection clauses act as additional safeguards against the arbitrary
exercise of this governmental power. Since exercise of the power of eminent domain affects an
individual’s right to private property, a constitutionally-protected right necessary for the
preservation and enhancement of personal dignity and intimately connected with the rights to life
and liberty the need for its circumspect operation cannot be overemphasized.

The exercise of the rights of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its
authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is
that the authority must be strictly construed. No species of property is held by individuals
with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the constitution and the laws more
sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes
with that right, and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual
without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtful
interpretation. 
The power of eminent domain is essentially legislative in nature. It is firmly settled,
however, that such power may be validly delegated to local government units, other public
entities and public utilities, although the scope of this delegated legislative power is
necessarily narrower than that of the delegating authority and may only be exercised in
strict compliance with the terms of the delegating law. 

The courts have the obligation to determine whether the following requisites have been
complied with by the local government unit concerned:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief
executive,  in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain
or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the
benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought
to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. 
NOTE: The terms "resolution" and "ordinance" are synonymous. A municipal ordinance
is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a
declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An
ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in
nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently — a third reading is necessary for an
ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the
Sanggunian members.

Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of Pastor, G.R. No. 138896, June 20, 2000

NOTE: An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Accordingly, it falls

within the jurisdiction of the regional trial courts, regardless of the value of the subject
property.

The Facts

Petitioner filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Talisay, Cebu (Branch 1) a Complaint
to expropriate a property of the respondents. In an Order dated April 8, 1997, the MTC dismissed
the Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that "[e]minent domain is an
exercise of the power to take private property for public use after payment of just compensation.
In an action for eminent domain, therefore, the principal cause of action is the exercise of such
power or right. The fact that the action also involves real property is merely incidental. An
action for eminent domain is therefore within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court and not with this Court."

READ THIS!! 

Assailed RTC Ruling

The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed before it, holding that an action for eminent
domain affected title to real property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated would
determine whether the case should be filed before the MTC or the RTC. Concluding that the
action should have been filed before the MTC since the value of the subject property was less
than P20,000, the RTC ratiocinated in this wise:

The instant action is for eminent domain. It appears from the current Tax Declaration of the land
involved that its assessed value is only One Thousand Seven Hundred Forty Pesos (P1,740.00).
Pursuant to Section 3, paragraph (3), of Republic Act No. 7691, all civil actions involving title
to, or possession of, real property with an assessed value of less than P20,000.00 are within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts. In the case at bar, it is within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Talisay, Cebu, where the property
involved is located.
The instant action for eminent domain or condemnation of real property is a real action affecting
title to or possession of real property, hence, it is the assessed value of the property involved
which determines the jurisdiction of the court. That the right of eminent domain or condemnation
of real, property is included in a real action affecting title to or possession of real property, is
pronounced by retired Justice Jose Y. Feria, thus, "Real actions are those affecting title to or
possession of real property. These include partition or condemnation of, or foreclosures of
mortgage on, real property. 

ISSUE:

 Which court, MTC or RTC, has jurisdiction over cases for eminent domain or expropriation
where the assessed value of the subject property is below Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos?

RULING: 

THE DECISION OF THE COURT IS MERITORIOUS.

The Court ruled that the action for eminent domain is within the jurisdiction of the RTC. 
In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money but it
deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take private property for
public use. The subject of an expropriation suit is the government’s exercise of eminent domain,
a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.  The value of the property to be expropriated
is estimated in monetary terms, for the court is duty-bound to determine the just compensation
for it.  However, this is merely incidental to the expropriation suit.  The amount is determined
only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of the expropriation.

 
TUGAOEN

Republic v. Mupas, G.R. No. 181892, September 8, 2015

FACTS: (4 consolidated cases)

On October 5, 1994, Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) submitted an unsolicited proposal
to the Government for the construction and development of the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport Passenger Terminal III (NAIA-IPT III) under a build-operate-and-transfer (BOT)
arrangement. The DOTC and the MIAA invited the public to submit competitive and
comparative proposals to AEDC’s unsolicited proposal. Both AEDC and Paircargo Consortium
offered to build the NAIA-IPT III for at least $350 million at no cost to the Government and to
pay the Government: 5% share in gross revenues for the first five years of operation, 7.5% share
in gross revenues for the next ten years of operation, and 10% share in gross revenues for the last
ten years of operation. However, Paircargo Consortium offered to pay the Government a
total of P17.75 billion as guaranteed payment for 27 years while AEDC offered to pay the
Government a total of P135 million for the same period. After the AEDC’s failure to match the
competitive bid, the DOTC awarded, the project to the Paircargo Consortium (that later
organized itself as PIATCO).

On July 12, 1997, the Government executed a Concession Agreement with PIATCO. On March
31, 2000, PIATCO engaged the services of Takenaka, a local branch of a foreign corporation
duly organized under the laws of Japan and doing business in the Philippines, for the
construction of the NAIA-IPT III. On the same date, PIATCO,  likewise contracted the services
of Asahikosan, a foreign corporation duly organized under the laws of Japan, for the design,
manufacture, purchase, test and delivery of the Plant in the NAIA-IPT III. On November 29,
2002, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo declared in her speech that the Government would not
honor the PIATCO contracts. On the same day, Takenaka and Asahikosan notified PIATCO
that they were suspending the construction of the NAIA-IPT III for PIATCO’s failure to
provide adequate security.

On May 5, 200, in the Agan v. PIATCO Case, the Court nullified the PIATCO contracts after
finding that Paircargo Consortium (that later incorporated into PIATCO) was not a duly pre-
qualified bidder for failure to meet the minimum equity requirements for the NAIA-IPT III
project, as required under the BOT Law and the Bid Documents. On December 21, 2004 (The
Expropriation Case, Civil Case No. 04-0876), the Government filed a complaint for
expropriation of the NAIA-IPT III and informed the RTC that it had deposited with the Land
Bank the amount of P3,002,125,000.00, representing the NAIA-IPT III’s assessed value. On the
same day, the RTC issued a writ of possession in favor of the Government. On January 7, 2005,
the RTC appointed three Commissioners to determine just compensation without consulting the
Government and PIATCO. Due to these successive adverse rulings, the Government sought to
inhibit Judge Henrick F. Gingoyon, the RTC’s presiding judge, from hearing the case. (The
judge was ambushed and killed on December 31, 2005.) On December 14, 2005, Asahikosan
filed a motion for leave to intervene and Takenaka manifested its voluntary appearance before
the RTC. Pending the RTC’s resolution of Takenaka and Asahikosan’s motions for leave to
intervene in the expropriation case, the Government went directly to the Court seeking Judge
Gingoyon’s inhibition from the case; the nullification of the order of release of the sum of $62.3
million (P3,002,125,000.00) to PIATCO; and the nullification as well of the appointment of the
commissioners.

On May 5, 2006, the RTC ordered the engagement of the services of an internationally accepted
independent appraiser who shall conduct the valuation of the NAIA-IPT III. Thereafter, the
Government and PIATCO submitted their list of nominees for the appointment of an
independent appraiser. On May 3, 2007, the RTC appointed DG Jones and Partners as
independent appraiser. The Government directly challenged the order in a petition for certiorari
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary
injunction , which, the Court thereafter issued. Subsequently, the parties and the BOC conducted
a preliminary conference on April 22, 2010, to adopt an alternative course of action to avoid
further delay in the determination of just compensation. On August 5, 2010, the RTC ordered the
parties to submit their appraisal reports of NAIA-IPT III with supporting documents and
affidavits. The Government appraised the NAIA-IPT III at $149,448,037.00 while PIATCO
concluded that its replacement cost was $905,867,549.47. On the other hand,Takenaka and
Asahikosan claimed that the NAIA-IPT III’s construction cost amounted to $360,969,790.82.

RTC: The RTC adopted the Government’s computed just compensation of $149,448,037.00. The
RTC rejected PIATCO, Takenaka, Asahikosan, and the BOC’s computation for lack of factual
and legal basis.

CA: the CA modified the RTC rulings and arrived at its own formula of the NAIA-IPT III’s cost.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in computing just compensation in the expropriation of the NAIA-
IPT III.

HELD:

Eminent domain is a fundamental state power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is an

inherent power and is not conferred by the Constitution. The 1987 Constitution embodies two
constitutional safeguards against the arbitrary exercise of eminent domain: first, private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation; and second, no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.

Just compensation is defined as “the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner
by the expropriator. Simply stated, just compensation means that the former owner must be
returned to the monetary equivalent of the position that the owner had when the taking occurred.
To achieve this monetary equivalent, we use the standard value of “fair market value” of the
property at the time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation or at the time of the taking of
property, whichever is earlier.

Fair market value is the general standard of value in determining just compensation.
Jurisprudence broadly defines “fair market value” as the sum of money that a person desirous but
not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price
to be given and received for a property.

While jurisprudence requires the “fair market value” to be the measure of recovery in
expropriation cases, it is not an absolute and exclusive standard or method of valuation. There
are exceptional cases where the property has no fair market value or where the fair market value
of the property is difficult to determine.

In cases where the fair market value of the property is difficult to ascertain, the court may use
other just and equitable market methods of valuation in order to estimate the fair market value of
a property.

In the case at bar, this Court exercises its judicial function to fix just compensation in eminent
domain cases on the basis of the law, the rules, and the evidence — including the appraisal
reports and the embedded formula on how the parties arrived at the amounts of just
compensation — presented by the parties before the trial court and the entire record of the
consolidated cases.

The determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is essentially and exclusively a
judicial function. Fixing the formula with definitiveness and particularity in just compensation is
not the function of the executive nor of the legislative branches, much less of the parties in this
case. Any valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may not replace the court’s
own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how this amount should be arrived at.
Legislative enactments, as well as executive issuances, providing the method of computing just
compensation are treated as mere guidelines in ascertaining the amount of just compensation.

When acting within the parameters set by the law itself, courts are not strictly bound to apply the
formula to its minutest detail, particularly when faced with situations that do not warrant the
formula’s strict application. The courts may, in the exercise of their discretion, relax the
formula’s application to fit the factual situations before them.
JIL Christian School v. Municipality of Pasig, G.R. No. 152230, August 9, 2005

Fact: The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R. Santos Street, a municipal
road near the Pasig Public Market, to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig. The municipality then
decided to acquire 51 square meters out of the 1,791-square meter property of Cuancos. On April
19, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an Ordinance authorizing the municipal
mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings to acquire the said property and appropriate the fund
therefore, filed an expropriation of the property under R.A. No. 7160, deposited with the RTC
15% of the market value of the property, filed motion to issue a writ of possession which was
granted by the RTC, constructed therein a cemented road with a width of three meters. In their
answer, the Cuancos claimed that, as early as February 1993, they had sold the said property to
JILCSFI. When apprised about the complaint, JILCSFI filed a motion for leave to intervene as
defendant-in-intervention, which motion the RTC granted on August 26, 1994.10

In its answer, JILCSFI averred that the Respondent ’s exercise of eminent domain was only for a
particular class. JILCSFI also averred that it has been denied the use and enjoyment of its
property because the road was constructed in the middle portion and that the Respondent was not
the real party-in-interest. The intervenor, likewise, interposed counterclaims against the
Respondent for moral damages and attorney’s fees. On September 3, 1997, the RTC issued an
Order in favor of the Respondents. Dissatisfied, JILCSFI elevated the case to the CA. the CA
affirmed the order of the RTC

Issue: whether the respondent complied with the requirement, under Section 19 of the Local
Government Code, of a valid and definite offer to acquire the property prior to the filing of the
complaint;

Held: No, the respondent failed to prove that before it filed its complaint, it made a written
definite and valid offer to acquire the property for public use as an access road. The only
evidence adduced by the respondent to prove its compliance with Section 19 of the Local
Government Code is the photocopy of the letter purportedly bearing the signature of Engr. Jose
Reyes, to only one of the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco. Even if the letter was, indeed,
received by the co-owners, the letter is not a valid and definite offer to purchase a specific
portion of the property for a price certain. It is merely an invitation for only one of the co-
owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, to a conference to discuss the project and the price that may be
mutually acceptable to both parties.
Secretary of DPWH v. Sps. Tecson, G.R. No. 179334, April 21, 2015  
 

RAMIL

Masikip v. City of Pasig, G.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006

FACTS:

• Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of
4,521 square meters located at Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City, Metro Manila.

• The then Municipality of Pasig, now City of Pasig, respondent, notified petitioner of its
intention to expropriate a 1,500 square meter portion of her property to be used for the “sports
development and recreational activities” of the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was
pursuant to Ordinance No. 42, Series of 1993 enacted by the then Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig.

• Again, respondent wrote another letter to petitioner, but this time the purpose was allegedly “in
line with the program of the Municipal Government to provide land opportunities to deserving
poor sectors of our community.”

• Petitioner sent a reply to respondent stating that the intended expropriation of her property is
unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive, as the area of her lot is neither sufficient nor suitable to
“provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community.”

• In its letter, respondent reiterated that the purpose of the expropriation of petitioner’s property
is “to provide sports and recreational facilities to its poor residents.”

• Subsequently, respondent filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation, petitioner
filed a Motion to Dismiss

• Trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that there is a
genuine necessity to expropriate the property for the sports and recreational activities of the
residents of Pasig

ISSUE: Whether or not expropriation was valid

HELD: NO.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN; CONSTRUED. — In the early

case of US v. Toribio, this Court defined the power of eminent domain as “the right of a
government to take and appropriate private property to public use, whenever the public
exigency requires it, which can be done only on condition of providing a reasonable
compensation therefor.” It has also been described as the power of the State or its
instrumentalities to take private property for public use and is inseparable from sovereignty
and inherent in government. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch
of the government.

It delegates the exercise thereof to local government units, other public entities and public utility
corporations, subject only to Constitutional limitations. Local governments have no inherent
power of eminent domain and may exercise it only when expressly authorized by statute.
Section 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160) prescribes the
delegation by Congress of the power of eminent domain to local government units and lays down
the parameters for its exercise. Judicial review of the exercise of eminent domain is limited to
the following areas of concern: (a) the adequacy of the compensation, (b) the necessity of
the taking, and (c) the public use character of the purpose of the taking.

 Barangay Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150640,
March 22, 2007

Facts:

Pursuant to a resolution passed by the barangay council, petitioner Barangay Sindalan, San
Fernando, Pampanga, represented by Barangay Captain Ismael Gutierrez, filed a Complaint for
eminent domain against respondent’s spouses Jose Magtoto III and Patricia Sindayan, the
registered owners of a parcel of land Petitioner sought to convert a portion of respondents' land
into Barangay Sindalan's feeder road. The alleged public purposes sought to be served by the
expropriation were stated in Barangay Resolution No. 6.

Pending the resolution of the case at the trial court, petitioner deposited an amount equivalent to
the fair market value of the property. Respondents alleged that the expropriation of their property
was for private use, that is, for the benefit of the homeowners of Davsan II Subdivision Trial
Court: The herein plaintiff is hereby declared as having a lawful right to take the property here in
above described and sought to be condemned for the public purpose or use as aforestated, upon
payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the Complaint in
this [sic] expropriation proceedings.

Court of Appeals: REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Complaint for Eminent Domain is
DISMISSED for lack of merit

Issue:

Whether or not the proposed exercise of the power of eminent domain would be for a
public purpose.

Held:
No. The intended feeder road sought to serve the residents of the subdivision only. In general,
eminent domain is defined as "the power of the nation or a sovereign state to take, or to
authorize the taking of, private property for a public use without the owner's consent,
conditioned upon payment of just compensation."

The exercise of the power of eminent domain is constrained by two constitutional provisions: (1)
that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation under Article III
(Bill of  Rights), Section 9 and (2) that no person shall be deprived of his/her life, liberty, or
property without due process of law under Art. III, Sec. 1.

It has not been shown that the other residents of Barangay Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga
will be benefited by the contemplated road to be constructed on the lot of respondents spouses
Jose Magtoto III and Patricia Sindayan. While the number of people who use or can use the
property is not determinative of whether or not it constitutes public use or purpose, the factual
milieu of the case reveals that the intended use of respondents' lot is confined solely to the
Davsan II Subdivision residents and is not exercisable in common. Worse, the expropriation will
actually benefit the subdivision's owner who will be able to circumvent his commitment to
provide road access to the subdivision in conjunction with his development permit and license to
sell from the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, and also be relieved of spending his own
funds for a right-of-way. In this factual setting, the Davsan II Subdivision homeowners are able
to go to the barrio road by passing through the lot of acertain Torres family. Thus, the
inescapable conclusion is that the expropriation of respondents' lot is for the actual benefit of the
Davsan II Subdivision owner, with incidental benefit to the subdivision homeowners.

The intended expropriation of private property for the benefit of a private individual is clearly
proscribed by the Constitution, declaring that it should be for public use or purpose.

Land Bank v. Lajom, G.R. No. 184982, August 20, 2014

FACTS:

• Jose T. Lajom (Lajom) and his mother Vicenta Vda. De Lajom (Vda. De Lajom) were the
registered owners of several parcels of land with an aggregate area of 27 hectares, more or less,
located at Alua, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
NT-70785 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija (subject land).

• Sometime in 1991, a 24-ha., more or less, portion of the subject land (subject portion) was
placed under the government's Operation Land Transfer Program pursuant to Presidential Decree
No.· (PD) 27, otherwise known as the "Tenants Emancipation Decree," as amended.
Accordingly, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), through the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP), offered to pay Lajom the following amounts as just compensation for the
following constitutive areas of the subject portion: (a) 19,434.00 for 11.3060 has.; (b) 17,505.65
for 2.4173 has.; and (c) 80,733.45 for 10.3949 has. (DAR valuation).

• Records show, however, that despite non-payment of the offered just compensation, DAR
granted twelve (12) Emancipation Patents12 between 1994 and 1998 in favor of farmer-
beneficiaries. Lajom rejected the DAR valuation and, instead, filed an amended Petition18 for
determination of just compensation and cancellation of land transfers against the DAR, the LBP,
and the said farmer-beneficiaries.

• He alleged, inter alia, that in computing the amount of just compensation, the DAR erroneously
applied the provisions of PD 27 and Executive Order No. (EO) 228, Series of 1997, that have
been repealed by Section 17 of Republic Act No. (RA) 6657, otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988," which took effect on June 15, 1988.

• Thus, he asserted that the value of the subject portion should be computed based on the
provisions of RA 6657, and not of PD 27 and/or EO 228. In a Decision dated March 11, 2004,
the RTC rejected the DAR valuation. In a Decision dated February 26, 2008, the CA affirmed
with modification the RTC Decision, deleting the award of 6% interest p.a. and, in lieu thereof,
ordered LBP to pay Lajom, through his representatives and/or heirs, interest by way of damages.

• In its petition, the LBP contends that the CA committed reversible error in: (a) retroactively
applying the provisions of RA 6657 to land acquired under PD 27 and EO 228; (b) reckoning the
period to determine just compensation on the date of actual payment instead of the date of
taking; and (c) imposing interest at the rate of 12% p.a. on the just compensation award in the
nature of damages from March 11, 2004 until full payment.

ISSUE:

• Whether or not in determining just compensation for the acquired land from Lajom, the
provision of R.A.6657 should be applied retroactively

Held:

Yes, The petition is meritorious. Case law instructs that when the agrarian reform process under
PD 27 remains incomplete and is overtaken by RA 6657, such as when the just compensation
due the landowner has yet to be settled, as in this case, such just compensation should be
determined and the process concluded under RA 6657, with PD 27 and EO 228 applying only
suppletorily. Hence, where RA 6657 is sufficient, PD27 and EO 228 are superseded.

• Records show that even before Lajom filed a petition for the judicial determination of just
compensation in May 1993, RA 6657 had already taken effect on June 15, 1988.
• Similarly, the emancipation patents had been issued in favor of the farmer-beneficiaries prior to
the filing of the said petition, and both the taking and the valuation of the subject portion
occurred after the passage of RA 6657. Quite evidently, the matters pertaining to the correct just
compensation award for the subject portion were still in contention at the time RA 6657 took
effect; thus, as correctly ruled by the CA, its provisions should have been applied, with PD 27
and EO 228 applying only suppletorily.

• As to the proper reckoning point, it is fundamental that just compensation should be deter-
mined at the time of the property’s taking.41 Taking may be deemed to occur, for instance, at
the time emancipation patents are issued by the government.
• Since the emancipation patents in this case had been issued between the years 1994 and
1998, the just compensation for the subject portion should then be reckoned therefrom, being
considered the "time of taking" or the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and
benefit of his property.

• On this score, it must be emphasized that while the LBP is charged with the initial
responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under the land reform and, accordingly,
the just compensation therefor, its valuation is considered only as an initial determination and,
thus, not conclusive. Verily, it is well-settled that it is the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian
Court, which should make the final determination of just compensation in the exercise of its
judicial function.45 In this respect, the RTC is required to consider the factors enumerated in
Section 17 of RA 6657.

• As a final word, the Court would like to emphasize that while the agrarian reform
program was Undertaken primarily for the benefit of our landless farmers, this
undertaking should, however, not result in the oppression of landowners by pegging the
cheapest value for their lands. Indeed, although the taking of properties for agrarian reform
purposes is a revolutionary kind of expropriation, it should not be carried out at the undue
expense of landowners who are also entitled to protection under the Constitution and agrarian
reform laws.

CACULITAN (EMINENT DOMAIN)

Sps. Mercado v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 196707, June 17, 2015

DOCTRINE:
a. In eminent domain, the determination of just compensation is principally a judicial
function of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) acting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC). In
the exercise of such judicial function, however, the RTC must consider both Section 17
of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657 or Comprehensive Land Reform Law of 1988) and
the valuation formula under applicable Administrative Order (A.O.) of the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR).
b.
G.R. No. 196707, June 17, 2015
SPOUSES NILO AND ERLINDA MERCADO VS. LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
 
NATURE OF THE CASE
 
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the April 20,2011 Decision
of the Court of Appeals (CA) that granted the Petition for Review of respondent Land Bank of
the Philippines (respondent) and, concomitantly, reversed and set aside the December 28, 2006
Decision of the RTC of Davao City, Branch 15 in Civil Case No. 30,373-04.
 
FACTS
 
Petitioners' spouses Nilo and Erlinda Mercado were the registered owners of 9.8940 hectares of
agricultural land in Kilate, Toril, Davao City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
T-44107. Respondent, on the other hand, is a government financial institution organized and
existing by virtue of RA 3844, and is the financial intermediary for the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP).
 
Thru a Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office
(PARO) of Davao City informed petitioners that 5.2624 hectares of their aforesaid property
(subject portion) shall be placed under the CARP coverage, for which petitioners were offered
P287,227.16 as just compensation. Nilo rejected the said valuation claiming that the value of the
land is P250,000 per hectare. In view of petitioners' rejection of said valuation, summary
administrative proceedings were conducted to determine just compensation. The Regional
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) sustained the valuation made by the respondent.
 
On May 21, 2004, petitioners filed a Complaint for payment of just compensation before the
RTC acting as SAC. RTC ruled in favor of Petitioner fixing just compensation at P25.oo per
square meter. On appeal of respondent, CA reversed RTC’s ruling arguing that RTC should have
applied the formula under DAR A.O. No. 5 and considered the factors under Section 17 of RA
6657 in determining just compensation.
 
ISSUE
 
Whether or not RTC erred in fixing just compensation.
 
RULING
 
 
The rule is that the RTC must consider the guidelines set forth in Section 17 of RA 6657 and as
translated into a formula embodied in DAR A.O. No. 5. However, it may deviate from these
factors/formulas if the circumstances warrant or, as stated in Sta. Romana, "if the situation before
does not warrant its application." In such a case, the RTC, as held in Yatco, must clearly explain
the reason for deviating from the aforesaid factors or formula.
 
RTC did not strictly conform with the guidelines set forth under the said provision. Not all the
factors enumerated under Section 17 were considered and no reason for deviating from the same
was given. The considerations used by the RTC in determining just compensation as not fully
supported by evidence on record. It also did not explain how the aforesaid factors were used to
come up with the foregoing amount of just compensation.
 
Be that as it may, the Court likewise finds error on the part of the CA when it adopted the
valuation made by respondent. It must be noted that the data used in coming up with respondent's
valuation were gathered during the one-day inspection undertaken by Engr. Arceo on the subject
portion, who admitted to have simply counted the trees thereon and interviewed just one farmer-
beneficiary. It therefore appears that the data used was unreliable and unverified.
 
Given all these, the Court finds that both parties failed to adduce satisfactory evidence of the
property's value at the time of its taking. Thus, it is premature to make a final determination of
the just compensation due to petitioners. And as the Court cannot receive new evidence from the
parties for the prompt resolution of this case, its remand to the RTC is deemed proper. Suffice it
to state that "[w]hile remand is frowned upon for obviating the speedy dispensation of justice, it
becomes necessary to ensure compliance with the law and to give everyone - the landowner, the
farmers, and the State - their due."

Republic of the Philippines v. Heirs of Borbon, G.R. No. 165354, January 12, 2015

G.R. No.: 165354

Date: 12 January 2015

Facts: NAPOCOR entered a property located in Barangay San Isidro, Batangas City in order to
construct and maintain transmission lines. Respondents, heirs of Saturnino Q. Borbon, owned the
property. NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation in the Regional Trial Court in Batangas
City (RTC), seeking the acquisition of an easement of right of way over a portion of the
property.
The respondents staunchly maintained that NAPOCOR had not negotiated with them before
entering the property and that the entry was done without their consent; nonetheless, they
tendered no objection to NAPOCOR’s entry provided it would pay just compensation not only
for the portion sought to be expropriated but for the entire property whose potential was greatly
diminished, if not totally lost, due to the project.
During the pendency of an appeal, NAPOCOR filed a Manifestation and Motion to Discontinue
Expropriation Proceedings, informing that the parties failed to reach an amicable agreement; that
the property sought to be expropriated was no longer necessary for public purpose because of the
intervening retirement of the transmission lines installed on the respondents’ property; that
because the public purpose for which such property would be used thereby ceased to exist, the
proceedings for expropriation should no longer continue, and the State was now duty-bound to
return the property to its owners; and that the dismissal or discontinuance of the expropriation
proceedings was in accordance with Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether or not the expropriation proceedings should be discontinued or dismissed
pending appeal.
Ruling: The dismissal of the proceedings for expropriation at the instance of NAPOCOR is
proper, but, conformably with Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the dismissal or
discontinuance of the proceedings must be upon such terms as the court deems just and
equitable.
Before anything more, we remind the parties about the nature of the power of eminent domain.
The right of eminent domain is “the ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate, not
only the public but the private property of all citizens within the territorial sovereignty, to public
purpose.” But the exercise of such right is not unlimited, for two mandatory requirements should
underlie the Government’s exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that it is for a
particular public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the property owner. These
requirements partake in the nature of implied conditions that should be complied with to enable
the condemnor to keep the property expropriated.
Public use, in common acceptance, means “use by the public.” However, the concept has
expanded to include utility, advantage or productivity for the benefit of the public. “Public use”
has now been held to be synonymous with “public interest,” “public benefit,” and “public
convenience.”

DPWH Secretary v. Sps. Tecson, G.R. No. 179334, April 21, 2015

Facts: 

In 1940, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) took respondents-movants'

subject property without the benefit of expropriation proceedings for the construction of the
MacArthur Highway. In 1994, upon a letter submitted by the respondents, DPWH offered to pay
P0.70 per square meter of the property, the fair market value of the property at the time of taking
in 1940. Unsatisfied with the offer, the respondent-movants demanded the return of their
property, or the payment of compensation at the current fair market value, with P1, 500 per
square meter. The decision of the RTC and CA were in favor of the respondent-movants for the
payment of the current fair market value with P 1, 500 per square meter. The petitioner, on the
other hand, elevated the matter to the Supreme Court in a petition for review on certiorari that
just compensation should be based on the value of the property at the time of taking in 1940.

 Issue: 

Whether or not the valuation would be based on the corresponding value at the time of the taking
or at the time of the filing of the action 
Held: 

Current Market Value. At the outset, it should be stressed that the matter of the validity of the
State's exercise of the power of eminent domain has long been settled. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, the court also recognizes that the owner's loss is not only his property but also its
income-generating potential. Thus, when property is taken, full and just compensation of its
value must immediately be paid to achieve a fair exchange for the property and the potential
income lost. The just compensation due to the landowners amounts to an effective forbearance
on the part of the State—a proper subject of interest computed from the time the property was
taken until the full amount of just compensation is paid—in order to eradicate the issue of the
constant variability of the value of the currency over time. The interest rates applicable to loans
and forbearance of money for the period of 1940 to present are as follows: Law, Rule and
Regulations, BSP Issuances

ARIBUABO  (TAXATION)

Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board, G.R. No. L-75697, June 18, 1987

FACTS:

Presidential Decree No. 1987, entitled "An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board," was
promulgated on October 5, 1985.

A month later, Presidential Decree No. 1994 amended the National Internal Revenue Code,
providing that there shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback,
regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or
imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax.

In September 1986, Valentin Tio, who was doing business under the name and style of OMI
Enterprises, filed a petition challenging the constitutionality of PD No. 1987, on the following
grounds:
1. Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on the gross receipts payable to the local
government is a RIDER and the same is not germane to the subject matter thereof;
2. The tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive and/or in unlawful restraint of trade in
violation of the due process clause of the Constitution;
3. There is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise by the President of the vast powers
conferred upon him by Amendment No. 6;
4. There is undue delegation of power and authority;
5. The Decree is an ex-post facto law; and
6. There is over regulation of the video industry as if it were a nuisance, which it is not.

ISSUE:
WON The tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive and/or in unlawful restraint of trade in
violation of the due process clause of the Constitution

RULING:

No. Tax imposed under the Decree is not harsh; oppressive, confiscatory and in restraint of
trade but regulatory and a revenue measure; The levy is for a public purpose.

Petitioner also submits that the thirty percent (30%) tax imposed is harsh and oppressive,
confiscatory, and in restraint of trade. However, it is beyond serious question that a tax does not
cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activities
taxed. The power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and so searching in extent,
that the courts scarcely venture to declare that it is subject to any restrictions whatever,
except such as rest in the discretion of the authority which exercises it. 

The tax imposed by the DECREE is not only a regulatory but also a revenue measure
prompted by the realization that earnings of videogram establishments of around P600 million
per annum have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of an additional
source of revenue. While it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry,
the tax remains a valid imposition. 

Maceda v. Macaraig, G.R. No. 88291, May 31, 1991 

FACTS:

Commonwealth Act Commonwealth Act No. 120 was enacted creating the National Power
Corporation (NPC).  Its main source of funds was the flotation of bonds in the capital markets
which are exempt from taxes.   

Several laws were enacted in relation to NPC but the provision on tax exemption remained.

The President was later authorized through RA authorized through RA No.357 to guarantee the
payment of any and all NPC loans. He was also authorized to contract on behalf of NPC, for
NPC loans which shall be exempt from taxes.   

Subsequently, NPC was authorized to borrow from other sources of funds which shall be exempt
from all types of taxes. But RA No. 987 was later enacted withdrawing NPC’s tax exemption for
real estate taxes.  

NPC’s charter was later revised through RA No. 6395. A new section was added (Sec.13)
declaring the non-profit character and tax exemptions of NPC.   

PD No. 380 was issued for NPC to fulfill its role under PD No. 40 and was authorized to acquire
acquire foreign loans which shall be exempt from all direct and indirect taxes. However, PD
No.882 was issued withdrawing tax exemption of NPC with regard to its import.  
When PD No.938 was issued, NPC’s capital stock was raised to P8B, the total domestic
indebtedness ceiling was increased to P12B, the total foreign loan ceiling was raised to US$4B.
It was declared as well that NPC shall be exempt from paying all forms of taxes, duties, fees,
imposts, as well as costs and service fees in any court  in order for it to pay its indebtedness and
obligations. 

In this petition, petitioner asked the Court to reconsider its decision regarding the indirect tax
exemption of the NPC. It contends that PD No.938 repealed the indirect tax exemption of NPC
as the phrase “all froms of taxes, etc,”  does not expressly include “indirect taxes.”

ISSUE:

WON NPC is subject to indirect tax exemption under PD 938. 

RULING:

Yes. It succinctly exempts NPC from “all forms of taxes, duties, fees, imposts, as well as costs
and service fees including filing fees, appeal bonds, supersedeas bonds, in any court or
administrative proceedings.” The use of the phrase “all forms” of taxes demonstrate the intention
of the law to give NPC all the tax exemptions it has been enjoying before. The rationale for this
exemption is that being non-profit the NPC “shall devote all its returns from its capital
investment as well as excess revenues from its operation, for expansion. To enable the
Corporation to pay the indebtedness and obligations and in furtherance and effective
implementation of the policy . 

A direct tax is a tax for which a taxpayer is directly liable on the transaction or business it
engages in. Examples are the custom duties and ad valorem taxes paid by the oil companies to
the Bureau of Customs for their importation of crude oil, and the specific and ad valorem taxes
they pay to the Bureau of Internal Revenue after converting the crude oil into petroleum
products. 

On the other hand, “indirect taxes are taxes primarily paid by persons who can shift the
burden upon someone else.” For example, the excise and ad valorem taxes that oil companies
pay to the Bureau of Internal Revenue upon removal of petroleum products from its refinery can
be shifted to its buyer, like the NPC, by adding them to the “cash” and/or “selling price.” 

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, October 30, 1995 

FACTS:

PPI contends that by removing the exemption of the press from the VAT while maintaining those
granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. CREBA asserts that R.A. No. 7716
impairs the obligations of contracts, and violates the rule that taxes should be uniform and
equitable and that Congress shall “evolve a progressive system of taxation”.
CUP argues that legislature was to adopt a definite policy of granting tax exemption to
cooperatives that the present Constitution embodies provisions on cooperatives. To subject
cooperatives to the VAT would, therefore, be to infringe a constitutional policy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 7716 is unconstitutional.

RULING:

No. In withdrawing the exemption, the law merely subjects the press to the same tax burden to
which other businesses have long ago been subject. The VAT is not a license tax. It is imposed
purely for revenue purposes.

Equality and uniformity of taxation mean that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same
class be taxed at the same rate. It is enough that the statute or ordinance applies equally to all
persons, firms, and corporations placed in similar situation.

Notes:

Contract Clause is not a limitation on the power of taxation save only where a tax exemption was granted
for a valid consideration.

Regressivity is not a negative standard for courts to enforce since what Congress is required by the
Constitution to do is to “evolve a progressive system of taxation.”

The legislature is not required to adhere to a policy of “all or none” in choosing the subject of taxation.

The VAT registration fee is a mere administrative fee, one not imposed on the exercise of a privilege,
much less a constitutional right. 

China Banking Corporation v. City Treasurer of Manila, G.R. No. 204117, July 1, 2015

FACTS:

CBC was assessed by City Treasurer of Manila of local business tax, business permits, and other
fees. 

On January 15, 2007, CBC paid such and protested, thru a Letter dated January 12, 2007, the
imposition of business tax under Section 21 of the Manila Revenue Code in the amount of
₱154,398.50, on the ground that it is not liable of said additional business tax and the same
constitutes double taxation.
City Treasurer of Manila acknowledged receipt of CBC 's payment under protest.

On March 27, 2007, CBC wrote a letter-reply to City Treasurer Letter dated February 8, 2007,
reiterating that CBC already protested the additional assessment. In the same Letter, CBC
averred that City Treasurer had until March 16, 2007 within which to decide the protest, and
considering that CBC received the Letter dated February 8, 2007, four days after the deadline to
decide and City Treasurer did not even resolve the protest, CBC formally demanded the refund
of the amount of ₱154,398.50, representing the business tax collected under Section 21 of the
Manila Revenue Code.

On April 17, 2007, CBC filed a Petition for Review with the RTC of Manila raising the sole
issue of whether or not respondent is subject to the local business tax imposed under Section 21
of the Manila Revenue Code.

RTC rendered its decision granting the petition filed by CBC and ordered the City Treasurer to
refund the amount of ₱154,398.50. RTC denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the City
Treasurer.

Hence appeal to CTA Division, the latter reversed the decision of the RTC, effectively
dismissing CBC’s protest against the disputed assessment. CBC sought reconsideration of the
decision, but was denied by the CTA Division.

Aggrieved, CBC elevated the matter to the CTA En Banc. CTA En Banc affirmed the ruling of
the CTA Division in toto. CBC filed its motion for reconsideration of the said decision but the
CTA En Banc denied the same.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether CBC claim for refund should be dismissed

RULING: 

Yes. The Court finds that the claim of petitioner CBC for refund should be dismissed not only
for being filed out of time but also for not being filed before a court of competent jurisdiction. 

Claims for refunds are the exception, rather than the rule, and that each claim for refund, in order
to be granted, must be proceeded in accordance with the manner set forth by law. After all, in
every claim for refund of taxes paid, the burden is on the taxpayer to show that he has strictly
complied with the conditions for the grant of the tax refund or credit.

Clearly, with the passage of R.A. No. 9282, the authority to exercise either original or
appellate jurisdiction over local tax cases depended on the amount of the claim. In cases
where the RTC exercises appellate jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that there must be a
court capable of exercising original jurisdiction — otherwise there would be no appeal over
which the RTC would exercise appellate jurisdiction. The Court cannot consider the City
Treasurer as the entity that exercises original jurisdiction not only because it is not a “court”
within the context of Batas Pambansa ( B.P.) Blg. 129.

The RTC exercises appellate jurisdiction only from cases decided by the Metropolitan,
Municipal, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the proper cases. The nature of the jurisdiction
exercised by these courts is original, considering it will be the first time that a court will take
judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action. 

To constitute a valid protest, it is sufficient if what has been filed contains the spontaneous
declaration made to acquire or keep some right or to prevent an impending damage. Accordingly,
a protest is valid so long as it states the taxpayer’s objection to the assessment and the
reasons therefor. 

 
 

TENEZA

 ABAKADA Guro v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005 ●

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Petron Corp, G. R. No. 185568, March 21, 2012 ●

 Coca-Cola v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 161893 June 27, 2006 ●