THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA, & BENJAMIN

SAMSON y MAGDALENA, accused-appellants

FACTS: Deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends. Miranda used
to run errands for Pugay and at times they slept together. On the evening of May 19, 1982, a town fiesta
fair was held in the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite. There were different kinds of ride and one was a
ferris wheel. Sometime after midnight of the same date, Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel
and reading a comic book with his friend Henry. Later, the accused Pugay and Samson with several
companions arrived. These persons appeared to be drunk as they were all happy and noisy. As the group
saw the deceased walking nearby, they started making fun of him. They made the deceased dance by
tickling him with a piece of wood. Not content with what they were doing with the deceased, the
accused Pugay suddenly took a can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferris wheel and poured its
contents on the body of the former. Gabion told Pugay not to do so while the latter was already in the
process of pouring the gasoline. Then, the accused Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch
out of him.

ISSUE: WON Pugay and Samson guilty with the crime of murder.

RULING: No. As there was no evidence showing previous conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and
intention between the two accused immediately before the commission of the crime, the criminal
liability of the two accused is individual and not collective, and each of them is liable only for the act
committed by him. Accused Pugay can only be convicted of the crime of Homicide Through Reckless
Imprudence because of his failure to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable
consequence arising from any act committed by his companions. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the
diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act that may be committed
by his companions who at the time were making fun of the deceased. “A man must use common sense,
and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from
instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone might
foresee and for acts which no one would have performed except through culpable abandon. Otherwise
his own person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all manner
of danger and injury." Even assuming that accused Samson merely intended to burn the victims clothes,
this will not relieve him from criminal responsibility. Samson is liable for the death of the victim although
it was not his intention to kill the latter, but he shall be credited with the mitigating circumstance of lack
of intent to commit so grave a wrong. Article 4 of the aforesaid code provides, inter alia, that criminal
liability shall be incurred by any person commiting a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, petitioner, vs. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE, respondents.

FACTS: Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler was charged with two
separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No.
82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of
respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner
posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to
the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367. Petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No.
82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
MeTC refused quashal. Petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court for certiorari (S.C.A.
No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial
question. Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and,
because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest. The prosecution was obliged
to separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No.
82367 for the homicide and damage to property.

ISSUE: Whether or not Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the “same
offense.”

RULING: Yes. Reckless imprudence is a single crime, its consequences on persons and property are
material only to determine the penalty. The quasi-offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done,
would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result
thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not
qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result
should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the
same, and cannot be split into different crimes and prosecutions We hold that prosecutions under
Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or severity of the
consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article
365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under
Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level court.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, r.s. JOAQUIN CATANGAY, defendant and appellant.

FACTS: On the night of the crime the deceased, Mauricio Ramos, taking his shotgun with him, went to
hunt deer in the barrio. He took along with him Santiago Abandia, and later Joaquin Catangay, whom
they both invited to bring his shotgun and go with them for a hunt. While the three men were passing
along in the middle of a field of talahib (high grass), the deceased in front carrying a lighted lantern
fastened to his forehead, behind him the defendant, and lastly Santiago Abandia, the first two men saw
a deer and alighted from their respective horses, for they were all mounted Thereupon Santiago
Abandia stopped his horse and also dismounted, a few moments afterwards, two shots were heard in
quick succession and then the light the deceased carried went out; that Santiago Abandia, upon noticing
that the said light was extinguished, approached the deceased; and he found the defendant alongside of
him, raising him up, saying: 'What can have happened to my godfather?' The witness saw the wound in
the back of the head of the deceased, who was already dead; and that the said wound consisted of a
fracture of the left parietal region, the brain being exposed. The defendant, testifying in his own
defense, stated that upon seeing that the deer, which the deceased had also noticed, might escape, he
made haste to approach the latter, who had his back toward him and was on his left, and that, in taking
hurried steps for that purpose, the defendant stumbled against an embankment or pilapil that lay
between him and the deceased; that thereupon he fell on one knee, an accident which caused the
shotgun, which he had already loaded, cocked, and aimed at the deer, the half of whose body was now
lost from sight, to be discharged, this one charge striking the deceased in the head. After due trial, the
defendant was found guilty and sentenced to the penalty of four months and one day of arresto mayor,
to the accessory penalties of the law, to pay an indemnity of Pl,000.

ISSUES: Whether or not the defendant is guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless negligence

RULING: No. The accidental cause, then, of the discharge of the arm was not due to the fact of the
defendant's having it cocked and aimed, but to the accident of his stumbling against an embankment in
the way. The occurrence was entirely accidental and involuntary. Consequently, the crime charged in
this prosecution lacks the necessary element to allow of its being considered as reckless negligence
under article 568 of the Penal Code, as would have been the case if though through no malice on the
part of the defendant, the damage had been produced, nevertheless, by some voluntary act of his. In
order to determine, therefore, whether there was imprudence or negligenee on the part of the
defendant, or whether or not he took the necessary precautions to avoid the unfortunate accident that
occurred, the surrounding circumstances, the nature of the act that he was about to perform or was
performing and the situation in which he found himself, must be taken into account.
CHRISTIAN CABALLO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

FACTS: Christian Caballo, then 23 years old, met AAA, who was then 17 years old. AAA’s uncle was a
choreographer, and Caballo was one of the dancers. AAA was a sophomore college student at the
University of San Carlos, residing at a boarding house in Cebu City. On January 17, 1998, Caballo went to
Cebu to attend the Sinulog festival and visited AAA. They eventually became sweethearts. When AAA
went home to Surigao City in March 1998, Caballo persuaded her to have sexual intercourse with him.
He had promised to marry her and assured her that she would not get pregnant because he would be
using the withdrawal method. The sexual encounters happened several times more until AAA became
pregnant and gave birth on March 8, 1999. Opposed to the foregoing, Caballo claimed that during their
first sexual intercourse, AAA was no longer a virgin as he found it easy to penetrate her and that there
was no bleeding. He also maintained that AAA had (3) three boyfriends prior to him. Further, he posited
that he and AAA were sweethearts who lived-in together, for one (1) week in a certain Litang Hotel and
another week in the residence of AAA’s uncle. Eventually, they broke up due to the intervention of
AAA’s parents. At a certain time, AAA’s mother even told Caballo that he was not deserving of AAA
because he was poor. Lastly, he alleged that he repeatedly proposed marriage to AAA but was always
rejected because she was still studying. Caballo was charged for violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of
RA 7610 in relation to Section 2 of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases. Caballo contends that he should not
be convicted because he did not coerce AAA to have sex with him as it was consensual.

ISSUE: Whether or not child abuse punishable under Sec. 5, Art. III, RA 7610, a malum prohibitum

RULING: Yes. It is a malum prohibitum, an evil that is proscribed. A child cannot give consent to a
contract under our civil laws. This is on the rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is
not capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State, as parens
patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are
as yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Thus, the law should protect her from the harmful
consequences of her attempts at adult sexual behavior. For this reason, a child should not be deemed to
have validly consented to adult sexual activity and to surrender herself in the act of ultimate physical
intimacy under a law which seeks to afford her special protection against abuse, exploitation and
discrimination. A child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act
or sexual intercourse. Jurisprudence settles that consent is immaterial in cases involving a violation of
Section 5, Article III of RA 7610; as such, the argument that AAA and Caballo were sweethearts remains
irrelevant.. A child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse cannot validly give
consent to sexual intercourse with another person. The language of the law is clear: it seeks to punish
“[t]hose who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.” Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in cases
involving violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. The mere act of having sexual intercourse or
committing lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse
constitutes the offense.

EVANGELINE PATULOT y GALIA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

FACTS: On November 14, 2012, CCC gathered clothes from the clothesline outside her house. As she was
about to enter the house, she was surprised to see Evangeline Patulot there, holding a casserole.
Without warning, Patulot poured the contents of the casserole – hot cooking oil – on her. AAA , a three
year old minor, and BBB, a two month old baby, who were nearby, suddenly cried because they were
likewise hit by the hot cooking oil. CCC hurriedly brought AAA and BBB to her three neighbors who
volunteered to bring the children to the Polyclinic for treatment. She then went to the barangay hall to
report the incident. Dr. Vitales, who examined and treated CCC and her children, testified that the
injuries suffered by AAA and BBB would heal for an average period of thirty (30) days. DDD, the father of
the minors, testified that he incurred P7,440.00 in medical expenses for his wife and children. In two (2)
separate Informations, Patulot was charged with child abuse, defined and penalized under R.A. No.
7610. Solely testifying in her defense, Patulot denied the allegations against her. The RTC found Patulot
guilty of child abuse. While Patulot may not have intended to cause harm on AAA and BBB, her
negligence nonetheless caused injury on them, which left visible scars that are most likely to stay on
their faces and bodies for the rest of their lives. Besides, the trial court added that R.A. No. 7610 is a
special law such that intent is not necessary for its violator to be liable. On appeal, CA affirmed Patulot’s
conviction. Aggrieved by the CA’s denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, s filed the instant petition.
According to her, there was error in personae as the oil that was intended for CCC accidentally hit the
children.

ISSUE: Whether or not child abuse punishable under Sec. 10 (a), RA 7610 a malum in se.

RULING: No. In particular, it was clearly established that at the time of the incident, AAA and BBB were
merely three (3) years old and two (2) months old, respectively; that Patulot consciously poured hot
cooking oil from a casserole on CCC, consequently injuring AAA and BBB; and that said act constitutes
physical abuse specified in Section 3(b)(1) of R.A. No. 7610. Patulot’s criminal intent is not wanting for as
she expressly admitted, she intended on pouring hot cooking oil on CCC. As such, even granting that it
was not her intention to harm AAA and BBB, she was performing an unlawful act when she threw the
hot oil from her casserole on CCC. She cannot, therefore, escape liability from the same in view of the
settled doctrine that a person incurs criminal liability although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended. As defined in the law, child abuse charged against Patulot is physical abuse of
the child, whether the same is habitual or not. To the Court, her act of pouring hot oil on AAA and BBB
falls squarely within this definition. Thus, in view of the fact that her acts were proven to constitute child
abuse under the pertinent provisions of the law, she must be held liable therefor. The RTC found that
while Patulot may not have intended to cause harm on AAA and BBB, her negligence nonetheless
caused injury on them, which left visible scars that are most likely to stay on their faces and bodies for
the rest of their lives. Besides, the trial court added that R.A. No. 7610 is a special law such that intent is
not necessary for its violator to be liable.

JESTER MABUNOT, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

FACTS: Shiva and the petitioner were classmates at BNHS. On September 14, 2007, at around 11:00
a.m., Shiva and her group were sewing inside the classroom when the petitioner, who was then under
the influence of alcohol, arrived. The petitioner twisted the arm of Michael Fontanilla, strangled James
and boxed William Thomas (William). The rest of their classmates ran away, but the petitioner went
after them. He boxed Shiva on her left flank leaving the latter with a fractured rib. Shiva passed out and
was thereafter taken to Potia District Hospital, where she stayed for two days. Before finally leaving, the
petitioner also boxed Dennis Kenept (Dennis). Back then, Shiva was 14 years old, while the petitioner
was 19. The testimonies of the defense witnesses tend to prove that on September 14, 2007, at around
10:30 a.m., the class, to which both Shiva and the petitioner belonged, was doing its Technology and
Livelihood Education project. William suddenly threw an object at the petitioner’s back. The petitioner
reacted by boxing William. When the petitioner stepped out of the room, Dennis followed him and a
fistfight ensued between the two. Shiva came to pacify them, but she was shoved, causing her to fall to
the ground. The petitioner posited that since he and Dennis were grappling at that time, there cannot be
any certainty as to who actually injured Shiva.

ISSUE: WON the injury sustained by Shiva merely resulted from an accident and is not within the
contemplation of child abuse under R.A. No. 7610

RULING Article 265 of the RPC punishes physical injuries in general. On the other hand, R.A. No. 7610 is
intended to “provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation
and discrimination and other conditions, prejudicial to their development.” Child abuse refers to the
infliction of physical or psychological injury, cruelty to, or neglect, sexual abuse or exploitation of a child.
Physical injury includes but is not limited to lacerations, fractured bones, burns, internal injuries, severe
injury, or serious bodily harm suffered by a child It is clear that Shiva was 14 years old when she received
the blow, which fractured her rib. Being a child, she is under the protective mantle of R.A. No. 7610,
which punishes maltreatment of a child, whether the same be habitual or not. Moreover, R.A. No. 7610
even explicitly refer to fractured bones as falling within coverage of physical injuries, which may be
inflicted on a child, for which an accused shall be held liable. Further, under R.A. No. 7610, stiffer
penalties are prescribed to deter and prevent violations of its provisions. “When the acts complained of
are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special law.
Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise,
no crime is committed.” The petitioner was convicted of violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No.
7610, a special law. However, physical abuse of a child is inherently wrong, rendering material the
existence of a criminal intent on the part of the offender. In the petitioner’s case, criminal intent is not
wanting. Even if the Court were to consider for argument’s sake the petitioner’s claim that he had no
design to harm Shiva, when he swang his arms, he was not performing a lawful act. He clearly intended
to injure another person. However, it was not Dennis but Shiva, who ended up with a fractured rib.
Nonetheless, the petitioner cannot escape liability for his error. Indeed, criminal liability shall be
incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended.

ARNOLD JAMES M. YSIDORO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

FACTS: The Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office (MSWDO) of Leyte, Leyte, operated a Core
Shelter Assistance Program (CSAP) that provided construction materials to indigent calamity victims with
which to rebuild their homes. The beneficiaries provided the labor needed for construction. On June 15,
2001 when construction for calamity victims in Sitio Luy-a, Barangay Tinugtogan, was 70% done, the
beneficiaries stopped reporting for work for the reason that they had to find food for their families. This
worried Lolita Garcia (Garcia), the CSAP Officer-in-Charge, for such construction stoppage could result in
the loss of construction materials particularly the cement. Thus, she sought the help of Cristina Polinio
(Polinio), an officer of the MSWDO in charge of the municipality’s Supplemental Feeding Program (SFP)
that rationed food to malnourished children. Polinio told Garcia that the SFP still had sacks of rice and
boxes of sardines in its storeroom. And since she had already distributed food to the mother volunteers,
what remained could be given to the CSAP beneficiaries. Garcia and Polinio went to petitioner Arnold
James M. Ysidoro, the Leyte Municipal Mayor, to s eek his approval. After explaining the situation to
him, Ysidoro approved the release and signed the withdrawal slip for four sacks of rice and two boxes of
sardines worth P3,396.00 to CSAP. On August 27, 2001, Alfredo Doller, former member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte, filed the present complaint against Ysidoro Nierna Doller, Alfredo’s wife
and former MSWDO head, testified that the subject SFP goods were intended for its target beneficiaries,
Leyte’s malnourished children. She also pointed out that the Supplemental Feeding Implementation
Guidelines for Local Government Units governed the distribution of SFP goods. Thus, Ysidoro committed
technical malversation when he approved the distribution of SFP goods to the CSAP beneficiaries. On
February 8, 2010, the Sandiganbayan found Ysidoro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of technical
malversation. But, since his action caused no damage or embarrassment to public service, it only fined
him P1,698.00 or 50% of the sum misapplied. The Sandiganbayan held that Ysidoro applied public
property to a public purpose other than that for which it has been appropriated by law or ordinance.

ISSUE: WON technical malversation under Art. 220 of the RPC, a mala prohibita.

RULING: Yes. Criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law punishes the act of
diverting public property earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular public purpose to another
public purpose. The offense is mala prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act is not inherently immoral
but becomes a criminal offense because positive law forbids its commission based on considerations of
public policy, order, and convenience. It is the commission of an act as defined by the law, and not the
character or effect thereof that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Hence,
malice or criminal intent is completely irrelevant.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. AH CHONG, defendant and appellant.

FACTS: Defendant was a cook and the deceased was a house boy, and both were employed in the same
place and usually slept in the same room. One night, after the defendant had gone to bed, he was
awakened by some one trying to open the door, and called out twice, "Who is there?" He received no
answer, and fearing that the intruder was a robber, leaped from the bed and again called out: "If you
enter the room I will kill you." At that moment he was struck by a chair which had been placed against
the door. Believing that he was being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded
the intruder, who turned out to be his roommate. Thereupon he called to his employers and rushed
back into the room to secure bandages to bind up the wound. There had been several robberies in Fort
McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just described, one of which took place in a house in
which the defendant was employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated
robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection. The deceased and the accused,
who roomed together and who appear to have been on friendly and amicable terms prior to the fatal
incident, had an understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock at the door and
acquaint his companion with his identity.

ISSUE: WON the defendant is criminally liable.

RULING: There is no criminal liability because of mistake of fact, provided that the ignorance or mistake
of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith. In other words, if such ignorance or mistake of facts is
sufficient to negative a particular intent which, under the law, is a necessary ingredient of the offense
charged it destroys the presumption of intent and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the
circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions governing negligence, and in cases
where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code, a person voluntarily committing an act incurs
criminal liability even though the act be different from that which he intended to commit. The
defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder
who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent
peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all
the circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in
good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his
legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been
wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been
guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in
the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believed threatened
his person and his property and the property under his charge. Notes: Voluntary act is a free, intelligent,
and intentional act, and roundly asserts that without intention (intention to do wrong or criminal
intention) there can be no crime. Requisites of mistake of fact as a defense: 1. That the act done would
have been lawful had the facts been as the accused believed them to be. 2. That the intention of the
accused in performing the act should be lawful. 3. That the mistake must be without fault or
carelessness on the part of the accused.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. ANTONIO Z. OANIS AND ALBERTO
GALANTA, defendants and appellants.

FACTS: Appellants Corporal Galanta and Chief of Police Oanis were under instructions to arrest one,
Balagtas, a notorious criminal and an escaped convict, and, if overpowered, to get him dead or alive.
Proceeding to the suspected house, appellants went into a room and on seeing a man sleeping with his
back towards the door, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber
revolvers, without 'first making any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. The victim turned out to be an
innocent man, Tecson, and not the wanted criminal.

ISSUE: WON appellants are guilty of murder.

RULING: Yes. As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with the qualifying
circumstance of alevosia. There is, however, a mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in the
incomplete justifying circumstance defined in article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code. Person incurs
no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfilment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office.
There are two requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one: (a) that the
offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or
offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful
exercise of such right or office. In the instant case, only the first requisite is present— appellants have
acted in the performance of a duty. The second requisite is wanting for the crime by them committed is
not the necessary consequence of a due performance of their duty. Their duty was to arrest Balagtas, or
to get him dead or alive if resistance is offered by him and they are overpowered. But through
impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire to take no chances, they have exceeded in the fulfilment of
such duty by killing the person whom they believed to be Balagtas without any resistance from him and
without making any previous inquiry as to his identity. Ah Chong case and Oanis case distinguished.

In the Ah Chong case, there is an innocent mistake of fact without any fault or carelessness on the part
of the accused, because, having no time or opportunity to make any further inquiry, and being pressed
by circumstances to act immediately, the accused had no alternative but to take the facts as they then
appeared to him, and such facts justified his act of killing the deceased. In the Oanis case, the accused
found no circumstances whatever which would press them to immediate action. The person in the room
being then asleep, the accused had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard
to themselves and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been
made, as the victim was unarmed. This, indeed, is the only legitimate course of action for the accused to
follow even if the victim was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill Balagtas at sight, but to
arrest, and to get him dead or alive only if resistance or aggression is offered by him. Hence, the accused
in the Oanis case were at fault when they shot the victim in violation of the instructions given to them.
They were also careless in not verifying first the identity of the victim.
SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

FACTS: In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino
Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya’s house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental and asked
him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, Mandaya and Intod,
Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he wanted
Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should
accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he would also be killed. At about 10:00 o’clock in the evening of
the same day, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at
Palangpangan’s house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. At the instance of his
companions, Mandaya pointed the location of Palangpangan’s bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner,
Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in
another City and her home was then occupied by her son in-law and his family. No one was in the room
when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire. After trial, the Regional Trial Court
convicted Intod of attempted murder.

ISSUE: WON petitioner Pulpicio Intod guilty of the crime of attempted murder.

RULING: No. Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime as defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2,
and 59 of the Revised Penal Code. That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the
offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended
by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal
impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as
an impossible crime. The factual situation in the case at bar presents a physical impossibility which
rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime. Notes: Legal impossibility
occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. Factual impossibility
occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the
consummation of the intended crime.
GEMMA T. JACINTO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

FACTS:

In June 1997, Baby Aquino, handed petitioner -collector of Mega Foam, a postdated checked worth
P10,000 as payment for Baby’s purchases from Mega Foam International, Inc. The said check was
deposited to the account of Jacqueline Capitle’s husband-Generoso. Rowena Recablanca, another
employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call from an employee of Land Bank, who was looking for
Generoso to inform Capitle that the BDO check deposited had been dishonored. Thereafter, Joseph
Dyhenga talked to Baby to tell that the BDO Check bounced. However, Baby said that she had already
paid Mega Foam P10,000 cash in August 1997 as replacement for the dishonored check. Dyhengco filed
a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked out an entrapment operation
with its agents. Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia were arrested. The NBI filed a criminal case for
qualified theft against the two (2) and Jacqueline Capitle. RTC rendered a decision that Gemma, Anita
and Jacqueline GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT and each of the
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Five (5) years, Five (5) months and Eleven (11) days to Six (6) years,
Eight (8) months and Twenty (20) days.

ISSUE:

WON the petitioner is guilty with the crime qualified theft.

RULING:

No. Gemma T. Jacinto is found guilty of an impossible crime. The requisites of an impossible crime are:
(1) that the act performed would be an offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was done
with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was
either inadequate or ineffectual. In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime
of qualified theft, which is a crime against property. Petitioner’s evil intent cannot be denied, as the
mere act of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly
enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face value
thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the
check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime from being
produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be absolutely worthless, because the
check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value of said
dishonored check. NOTE: Since the crime of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner’s act of receiving
the cash replacement should not be considered as a continuation of the theft. At most, the fact that
petitioner was caught receiving the marked money was merely corroborating evidence to strengthen
proof of her intent to gain.