Metaphysics, Dialectic and the Categories

by Stephen Menn

Thesis: Categories does not belong to first philosophy, but to help dialectical disputant to decide whether
a given term can fall under a proposed definition or a proposed genus.

Presentation Division of the Task:

- Section 1: Distinguish between Categories and Metaphysics/What Categories belongs to
- Section 2-3: What function it serves in Aristotle’s Philosophy
- Section 4: Comparison between the Categories and Metaphysics Z

Section I (Ruiqi)
Argument 1: Categories cannot belong to first philosophy or to philosophy at all because it does not
consider causes.
First Philosophy is the study of the <the first causes and principles>
- First philosophy seeks the causes of being universally qua beings, while other seeks the cause
of some particular genus.
- All of these philosophies are epistêmai, sciences, and we have epistêmê of a thing only when
we know its cause.
Categories: Even it surveys the different kinds of being, it does not study the causes of any range
of beings.
Argument 2: Categories is a manual of the art of dialectic
P1: Categories has very little argument of any kind, and simply lays down rules on a wide variety
of subjects, supported by examples rather than by serious argument.
P2: It is not a science because it does not address the causes of anything.
P3: Only answers the “Yes” or “No” Questions and never addressing “Why”
C: Categories are not giving dialectical discussion nor argument about the subject. It teaches the
art of dialectic by giving principles for constructing dialectical arguments.

Section II (Pascale)
How do the Categories contribute to Philosophy?
1. The categories are a guide for dialecticians
a. What the Dialecticians cannot do: Produce epistêmê; A scientific definition ;Cannot give
us ti esti (the what it means to be/ essence)
b. What the Dialecticians can do: Ask yes or no questions; Help acquire scientific
knowledge; Give dialectical definitions
2. What are the categories supposed to contribute
a. Classification is the property of dialects
3. What are the dialecticians supposed to know
a. « the things which arguments are composed of and which deductions are about » {Topics
I 101M4-15 etc.)
i. Definitions
ii. Idia
iii. Genera
 iv. Accidents
Section III (Ming)
The dialectic in Categories DOES NOT: supply premises to be used directly in scientific arguments;
prove an effect from its causes: hence not scientific, not ontological
The dialectic in Categories DOES: help to classify to which genus an object X belongs; prepare for
further scientific investigations of what X is

Aristotle’s discussion of the soul in other works as examples of dialectics from Categories:
- De Anima
- Eudemus: “harmony has a contrary, disharmony; but the soul has no contrary; therefore the soul
is not a harmony”
- (Plato’s) Phaedo: the soul is not harmony because a better soul is no more a soul than a worse
soul, although a better harmony is more a harmony than a worse harmony

The arguments about the soul from the Phaedo and the Eudemus
- implicitly involve different idia of substance given in the Categories
- show that the soul passes one of these tests and harmony fails

The ontological reading of Categories will lead to the developmental interpretation, while the dialectical
reading will not: Menn thinks that Aristotle already considers the soul as a prime candidate for substance
when he was writing the Categories