1. Rodriguez v.

Borja
G.R. No. L-21993
June 21, 1966

Topic: Intestate Succession in general

Petitioner: Angela Rodriguez, Maria Rodriguez, Et. Al.
Respondent: Hon. Juan de Borja, CFI Bulacan, Anatolia
Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan
Ponente: Reyes, J.B.L., J.

DOCTRINE: Intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate

to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a
valid operative will.

FACTS: ​
• Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on February 12, 1963 in the City
of Manila and left real properties in Rizal, Quezon City, and
Bulacan.
• On March 4, 1963, private respondents delivered to the Clerk of
Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr.
Rodriguez. Petitioners moved to examine the will, but before
the court could act on it, the petition was withdrawn.
• At 8:00am on March 12, 1963, Petitioners filed before the CFI
of Rizal a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of
Fr. Rodriguez alleging that he was a resident of Paranaque,
Rizal and died without leaving a will. (Intestate proceedings)
• At 11:00am on March 12, 1963, private respondents petitioned
the CFI Bulacan for the probate of the will they delivered on
March 4. They alleged that Fr. Rodriguez was born in
Paranaque, Rizal and that he was a parish priest of the
Catholic Church of Hagonoy, Bulacan from 1930 up to the time
of his death. (Testate proceedings)
 • Petitioners moved to dismiss the testate proceedings on the
ground that the CFI Bulacan has no jurisdiction to try the case
due to the pendency of another action for the settlement of the
estate of Fr. Rodriguez in the CFI Rizal, considering that the
petition for settlement of intestate estate was filed ahead.
• Private respondents countered that the CFI Bulacan had
already acquired jurisdiction over the case upon their delivery
of the will to the Clerk of Court on March 4, 1963.
• The CFI Bulacan denied the motion to dismiss on the ground
that the difference of a few hours did not entitle one proceeding
to preference over the other. It invoked Ongsingco v. Tan, G.R.
No. L-7792, July 7, 1955, wherein the Court held that if the
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, his will shall be proved and his estate settled in the CFI
in the province in which he resides at the time of his death…
The court taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of
the decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts.
ISSUE: Whether or not the intestate proceedings take precedence over the testate proceedings

RULING: No, the testate proceedings in the CFI Bulacan take

precedence over the intestate proceedings under the CFI Rizal.
The jurisdiction of the CFI Bulacan became vested upon the
delivery thereto of the will of Fr. Rodriguez on March 4, 1963 even if
no petition for its allowance was filed yet because, upon the will
being deposited, the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to
fix the time and place for proving the will.

Sec. 3 of Rule 76 states that “when a will is delivered to, or a

petition for the allowance of a will is filed in, the court having
jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for proving the will
when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof…”
The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to
OR a petition for the allowance of a will is filed" plainly indicates
that the court may act upon the mere deposit therein of a
decedent's testament, even if no petition for its allowance is as yet
filed. Where the petition for probate is made after the deposit of the
will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the will
was delivered. Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted
and delivered to the Court of Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners
initiated intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
only on March 12, eight days later, the precedence and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable.

Additionally, intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate

to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a
valid operative will.

Art. 960 of the Civil Code provides that Legal or intestate

succession takes place:
(1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which
has subsequently lost its validity;
(2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all the
property belonging to the testator. In such case, legal succession
shall take place only with respect to the property in which the
testator has not disposed;
(3) If the suspensive condition attached to the institution of heir
does not happen or is not fulfilled, or if the heir dies before the
testator, or repudiates the inheritance, there being no substitution,
and no right of accretion takes place;
(4) When the heir instituted is incapable of succeeding, except in
cases provided in this Code.

Therefore, it is only after final decision as to the nullity of testate

succession could an intestate succession be instituted in the form
of pre-established action. The institution of intestacy proceedings in
the CFI Rizal may not proceed while the probate of the purported
will of Fr. Rodriguez is pending in the CFI Bulacan.

The CFI Bulacan was entitled to priority in the settlement of the

estate of Fr. Rodriguez.

DISPOSITIVE: Wherefore, the writ of certiorari applied for is

denied. Costs against petitioners Rodriguez.
​
2. De Los Santos vs Dela Cruz

De Los Santos vs Dela Cruz AUTHOR: Buera

G.R. No. Date : GR. No. L – 29192; January 22, 1971 Notes: Grandniece vs Nephew
TOPIC: Order of share in the intestate succession
PONENTE: Villamor, J.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Article 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct descending line,but never in the ascending. In
the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, whether they be of the full
or half blood

EMERGENCY RECIT:
An action for specific performance was filed by the grandniece (Gertrudes) of the deceased against Maximo
the son of the deceased’s niece to make do with the condition agreed upon during the extrajudicial partition
wherein Gertrudes along with several heirs agreed to divide the property of the deceased. This gave Maximo
three lots on top of his share with the condition that he would undertake the development and subdivision of
the estate. Maximo failed to comply with the obligation prompting for the filing of the action for specific
performance. In his answer, he stated that Gertrudes had no cause of action against him because she was not an
heir of the deceased and that her inclusion was by mistake therefore rendering the agreement void. The court
ruled that Gertrudes has no cause of action because being the grandniece she has no right to inherit the court
cited A
rticle 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct descending line,but never in the ascending.In the
collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, whether they be of the full or
half blood. In the case, the “nearest” relative to the deceased are the nephews and nieces one of them being
Maximo. Hence, Gertrudes is not an heir.

FACTS:
• An action for specific performance was filed against Maximo dela Cruz by Gertrudes De Los Santos the
grand niece of the deceased Pelagia dela Cruz. The action was filed since Pelagia died intestate the
heirs including plaintiff and defendant executed an extrajudicial partition. In the said agreement, the
parties agreed to adjudicate three parcels of land to Maximo with the condition that he would undertake
its development and subdivision of the estate. Maximo failed to comply with his obligations hence, the
action for specific performance against him.
• In his defense, Maximo alleged that Gertrudes has no cause of action because the agreement is void in
relation to her because she was not an heir of the deceased and that she was included by mistake.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not Gertrudes being the grandniece of Pelagia is considered an heir

HELD/RATIO:

No. Article 972 provides that the right of representation takes place in the direct descending line,but never in
the ascending.In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, whether
they be of the full or half blood. The court also cited Linart y Pavia vs. Ugarte y Iturralde, 5 Phil., 176 (1905),
said,
... [I]n an intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased and not participate with a niece in the inheritance,
because the latter being a nearer relative, the more distant grandniece is excluded. In the collateral line the right
of representation does not obtain beyond sons and daughters of the brothers and sisters, which would have been
the case if Pablo Linart, the father of the plaintiff, had survived his deceased uncle.
In the case, the relatives that are considered within the “nearest degree” are the nephews and nieces of Pelagia.
One of them is Maximo, hence, Gertrudes cannot be an heir or cannot inherit from Pelagia.

OTHER VERSION:

DELOS SANTOS V. DELA CRUZ, 37 SCRA 555(1971)

DOCTRINE: De los Santos illustrates the rule of proximity; i.e., the
nearer relatives exclude the more remote ones, except if the right of
representation is applicable. Thus, in intestate succession, the nephews and
nieces shall exclude the grandniece, who in the specific instance, is barred
from exercising the right of representation.
FACTS: Gertrude de los Santos for specific performance against
Maximino de la Cruz, alleging that she and several co-heirs, including
defendant, executed an extrajudicial partition agreement over a portion of
land and that the parties agreed to adjudicate 3 lots to the defendant in
addition to his share, on the condition that the defendant would undertake
the development of the estate, all expenses shall be defrayed from the
proceeds of the sale of the 3 lots.
1. Defendant asserts that plaintiff had no cause of action against him
because the agreement was void with respect to her, since the plaintiff
was not an heir of Pelagia de la Cruz, deceased owner of the property,
and was included in the extrajudicial partition agreement by mistake.
2. Defendant‘s counterclaim alleged that since the plaintiff had sold her
 share in the estate and that extrajudicial partition agreement being
void as to the latter, he is entitled to 1⁄4 of the proceeds as his share
by way of reversion.
3. The court held that the defendant, being a party to the extrajudicial
partition agreement, was stopped from raising in issue the right of the
plaintiff to inherit from the decedent Pelagia de la Cruz; hence he
must abide by the terms of the agreement.
4. The parties admit that the owner of the subject matter of the
extrajudicial agreement was Pelagia de la Cruz, whoo died instestate
on October 16, 1962; that defendant is a nephew of the said decedent;
that plaintiff is a grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, her mother,
Marciana de la Cruz, being niece of the decedent. Plaintiff‘s mother
died on September 22, 1935, thus predeceasing the decedent; and that
the purpose of the extrajudicial partition agreement was to divide and
distribute the estate among the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz.
ISSUE: WON plaintiff-apellee Gertrude de los Santos is a heir of the
decedent.
HELD: No, plaintiff-appellee being a mere grandniece of Pelagia de la
Cruz, she could not inherit from the latter by right of representation, much
less could plaintiff-appellee inherit in her own right.
Applying Art. 972 and Art. 962 of the Civil Code, the Court in Linarty y
Pavia vs. Ugarte y Itturalde said:
In and intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased and cannot
participate with a niece in the inheritance, because the latter being a nearer
relative, the more distant grandniece is excluded. In the collateral line the
right of representation does not obtain beyond sons and daughters of the
brothers and sisters.
In the case at bar, the relatives “nearest in degree” to Pelagia de la Cruz
are her nephews and nieces, one of whom is the defendant-appellant.
Necessarily, plaintiff-appellee, a grandniece is excluded by law from the
inheritance.
The legal effect of plaintiff-appellee inclusion and participation in the
extrajudicial partition agreement insofar as her right to bring the present
action did not confer upon her the right to institute this action. The express
purpose of the extrajudicial partition agreement, as admitted by the parties
in the stipulation of facts, was to divide the estate among the heirs of
Pelagia de la Cruz and in the said agreement itself states that plaintiff-
appellee was participating in representation of her deceased mother.
It is apparent therefore that the parties were laboring under the erroneous
belief that plaintiff- appellee was one of the legal heirs of Pelagia de la
Cruz. Plaintiff-appellee not being such heir, the partition is void with
respect to her, pursuant to Article 1105 of the Civil Code.
Partition of property affected between a person entitled to inherit from the
deceased owner and another person who thought he was an heir, when he
was not really and lawfully such, to the prejudice of the rights of the true
heir designated by law to succeed the deceased, is null and void. A fortiori,
plaintiff-appelee could hardly derive from the agreement the right to have
its terms enforced.
The extrajudicial partition agreement being void with respect to plaintiff-
appellee, she may not be heard to assert estoppels against defendant-
appellant. Estoppels cannot be predicated on a void contract, or on acts
which are prohibited by law or are against public policy.
In Ramiro vs. Graño, et al., the Court held:
No estoppels arises where the representation or conduct the party sought
to be stopped is due to ignorance founded upon a mistake. And which
there is authority to the contrary, the weight of authority is that the acts
and declarations of a party based upon an innocent mistake as to his legal
rights will not estop him to assert the same, especially where every fact
known to the party sought to be stopped is equally well known to the party
setting up the estoppels.
3. BAGUNU V. PIEDAD, 347 SCRA 571 (2000)
DOCTRINE: Under the rule of proximity, a maternal aunt (a relative
within the 3rd degree) excludes the daughter of the first cousin of the
decedent (a relative within the 5th degree), even if under the order of
intestate succession, both of them fall within sixth level of preference.
Moreover, the daughter of the first cousin is not entitled to the right of
representation in order to elevate her status to a relative of a nearer degree
because representation in the collateral line is limited to children of
brothers and sisters of the decedent. Niece and nephew
FACTS: Augusto H. Piedad died without any direct descendants or
ascendants. Respondent, PastoraPiedad (Pastora), is the maternal aunt of
the decedent, a third-degree relative of the decedent, while petitioner,
Ofelia Bagunu(Ofelia) is the daughter of a first cousin of the deceased, or
a fifth-degree relative of the decedent.
1. On 28 August 1995, herein Bagunu moved to intervene in Special
Proceedings No. 3652, entitled "In the matter of the Intestate
Proceedings of the Estate of Augusto H. Piedad," pending before the
Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 117, of Pasay City. Asserting
entitlement to a share of the estate of the late Augusto H. Piedad,
Bagunu assailed the finality of the order of the trial court awarding
the entire estate to respondent Pastora contending that the
proceedings were tainted with procedural infirmities, including an
incomplete publications of the notice of hearing, lack of personal
notice to the heirs and creditors, and irregularity in the disbursements
of allowances and withdrawals by the administrator of the estate.
2. The trial court denied the motion, prompting Ofelia to raise her case
to the Court of Appeals, sought the dismissal of the appeal on the
thesis that the issues brought up on appeal only involving nothing
else but questions of law to be raised before the Supreme Court by
petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 thereof
and consistently with Circular 2-90 of the Court.
3. "These facts are undisputed.
a) the facts that Ofelia is a collateral relative within the fifth
degree of Augusto H. Piedad;
b) the she is the daughter of the first cousin of Augusto H. Piedad;
that as such, Ofelia action seeking to inherit was published for
 three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation;
c) that there was no order of closure of proceedings that has been
issued by the intestate court;
d) and that the intestate court has already issued an order for the
transfer of the remaining estate of Augusto H. Piedad to Pastora.
ISSUE: Can Ofelia, a collateral relative of the 5th civil degree, inherit along
with Pastora, a collateral relative of the 3rd civil degree? Does the rule of
proximity in intestate succession find application among collateral
relatives?
HELD: No. The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives
nearest in degree to the decedent and excludes the more distant ones,
except when and to the extent that the right of representation can apply.
The right of representation does not apply to ―other collateral relatives
within the 5th civil degree (to which group both petitioner and respondent
belong) who are sixth in order of preference following:
First- legitimate children and descendants Second- the legitimate parents
and ascendants Third- illegitimate children and descendants Fourth-
surviving spouse
Fifth- brothers and sisters/ nephews and nieces of decedent
Among collateral relatives, except only in the case of nephews and nieces
of the decedent concurring with their uncles and aunts, the rule of
proximity, expressed in Art. 962 of the Code is an absolute rule. In
determining the degree of relationship of the collateral relatives to the
decedent, Art. 966 of the Civil Code gives direction.
In fine, a maternal aunt can inherit alongside a paternal uncle and a first
cousin or the full blood can inherit equally with a first cousin of the half-
blood, but an uncle or an aunt, being a third- degree relative, excludes the
cousins of the decedent, being in the 4th degree of relationship; the latter, in
turn, would have priority in succession to a fifth-degree relative.
Notes:
"ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the
more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes
place.
"Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to the
provisions of article 1006 with respect to relatives of the full and half
blood, and of article 987, paragraph 2, concerning division between the
paternal and maternal lines."
Article 966.xxx
"In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then
descent is made ancestor and then descent is made to the person with
whom the computation is to be made. Thus, a person is two degrees
removed from his brother, three from his uncle, who is the brother of his
father, four from his first cousin and so forth."
Accordingly-
Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late
Augusto H. Piedad excludes petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from
succeeding an intestato to the estate of the decedent.

4. HEIRS OF PASCASIO URIARTE V. CA AND BENEDICTO

ESTRADA, 284 SCRA 511 (1998)
FACTS: Private respondent Benedicto is the son of Agatonica Arrez,
whose parents were Pedro Arreza and Ursula Tubil. Upon the death of
Pedro, Ursula married Juan Arnaldo and had a daughter, Justa.
1. On the other hand, petitioners heirs of Pascasio Uriarte, are the
widow and daughters of Pascasio. Pascasio was one of the sons of
Primitava and Conrado Uriarte. Primitiva was the daughter of
Catalina and Domingo Arnaldo. Dominngo and Juan were brothers.
Petitioners are thus grandnieces and grandnephews of Justa by her
first cousin and are therefore, within the 6th degree.
2. The other petitioners are the children of Primitiva and those of her
brother, Gregorio. They are relatives of Justa within the 5th degree.
3. Private respondent Benedicto filed an action for the partition of the
land left by the decedent Justa. He claimed to be the sole surviving
heir ofJusta, and alleged that Pascasio worked on the property as
Justa‘s tenant. He contended that Pescasio had no right to the entire
property but could
- only claim 1⁄2 of the 0.5 hectare which Justa
inherited from her parents Juan and Ursula
 4. On the other hand, petitioners averred that the property was originally
owned by Ambrocio Arnaldo, their great-uncle. It was allegedly
bequeathed to Domingo and Juan in a will, in shares of 2/3 and 1/3
respectively. Petitioners alleged that private respondent did not have
any right to the property because he was not an heir of Ambrocio, the
original owner of the property.
5. The trial court held in favor of petitioners
_

6. On appeal, CA found that the .05 hectares had been acquired by

Justa‘s parents during
their marriage. As the nephew of Justa by her half-sister Agatonica,
private respondent was held to be entitled to the share of Justa.
ISSUES:
1. How is the subject property to be partitioned among the heirs?
2. Who among the petitioners and the private respondent is entitled to
Justa‘s esate as her
nearest relatives within the meaning of Art 962 NCC?
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: Since a portion of the subject property was acquired by
the parents of Justa, the property should be divided as follows:
1. The first 1⁄2 hectare should divided into two parts, the share of Juan
which will accrue to petitioners and the second hald which pertains to
Ursula, will accrue to private respondent
2. The second portion of the subject property which as was consolidated
with the 1⁄2 hectare originally belonging to the conjugal partnership
of Juan and Ursual, shall accrue to private respondent, who is only
three degrees from Justa whereas petitioners who are the children of
Primitivo and Gregorio, are six and five degrees removed from Justa.
SECOND ISSUE: Art 962 provides that in every inheritance, the nearest
relative in degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of
representation when it properly takes place.
Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to the
provisions of Art 1006 with respect to relatives of the full and half blood
and of Art 987(2), concerning division between paternal and maternal
lines.
In the case at bar, the private respondent is the son of Agatonica who is the
half-sister of Justa. He is thusa third degree relative of Justa. On the other
hand, petitioners are the sons and daughters of Justa‘s cousin. They are
thus fifth degree relatives of Justa.
Applying the principle that the nearest excludes the fartherst, then
Benedicto is the lawful heir of Justa. The fact that his mother is only a
half-sister of Justa is of no moment.
A nephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no
descendants, ascendants or spouse survive the decedent. The
determination of whether the relationship is of full or half blood is
important only to determine the extent of the share of the survivors.
5. ISABEL DELA PUERTA V. COURT OF APPEALS AND
CARMELITA DELA PUERTA, 181 SCRA 861 (1990)
FACTS: Dominga Revuelta died with a will leaving her properties to her
3 children: Aflredo, Vicente and Isabel. Isabel was given the free portion
in addition to her legitime and was appointed executrix of the will.
1. The petition for probate of the will filed by Isabel was opposed by
her brothers who alleged that their mother was already senile at the
time of the execution of the will (no testamentary capacity), and that
some of the properties were exclusively theirs
2. During the pendency of the proceedings, Alfredo died, leaving
Vicente as the lone oppositors
3. Meanwhile, Vicente filed a petition to adopt Carmelita dela Puerta
(private respondent). The adoption decree was subsequently granted.
4. Carmelita, then, intervened in the probate proceedings of Dominga‘s
will and filed a motion for the payment of her monthly allowance as
the acknowledged natural child of Vicente
5. The trial court granted the motion, declaring that since Carmelita was
a natural child of Vicente, she was entitled to the amounts claimed for
 her support.
ISSUE: May Carmelita claim support and successional rights to the estate
of Dominga?
HELD: No. This is because: (a) Vicente did not predecease his mother;
and (b) Carmelita is a
spurious child.
Art 970 NCC provides: Representation is a right created by fiction of law,
by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree
of the person represented and acquires the rights which the latter would
have if he were living or if he could have inherited.
In testamentary succession, the right of representation can take place only
in the following cases:
(a) When the person represented dies before the testator
(b) When the person represented is incapable of succeeding the testator;
and (c) When the person represented is disinherited by the testator
In all of these cases, since there is a vacancy in the inheritance the law
calls the children or descendants of the person represented to succeed by
right of representation.
CAB: Not having predeceased Dominga, her son Vicente had the right to
inherit from her directly or in his own right. No right of representation as
involved nor could it be invoked by Carmelita upon her father‘s death,
which came after Dominga‘s death. It would have been different if Vicente
was already dead when Dominga died. Carmelita could have inherited
from her in representation of her father Vicente, assuming she was a
lawful heir.
However, as a spurious child of Vicente, Carmelita is barred from
inheriting from Dominga because of Art 992, which lays down the barrier
between the legitimate and illegitimate families.
Art 992 Provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They
may have a natural tie by blood, but this is not recognized by law for the
purpose of Art 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate
family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and
incompatibility.
Even as an adopted child, Carmelita is still barred from inheriting from
Dominga because there are no natural kindred ties between them and
consequently, no legal ties to bind them either. As pointed out by
Tolentino: If the adopting parent should die before the adopted child, the
latter cannot represent the former in the inheritance from the parents or
ascendants of the adopted. The adopted child is not related to the deceased
in that case, because the filiation is created by fiction of law is exclusively
between the adopter and the adopted.
As a result, Carmelita, as spurious daughter of Vicente, has successional
rights to the intestate estate of her father but not to the estate of Dominga.
6. MAURICIO SAYSON V. COURT OF APPEALS AND DELIA
SAYSON, 205 SCRA 321 (1992)
FACTS: Spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson had 5 children: Maurico,
Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Teodoro (died 1972) married
Isabel Bautista (died 1981). Their properties were left in the possession of
Delia, Edmundo and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their
children
1. Petitioners who are the surviving siblings of Teodoro, and Juana
(Isabel‘s mother) filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the
intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel.
2. This was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel, who alleged
successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedent‘s lawful
descendants
3. Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint for accounting
and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson,
against the couple‘s surviving children. They alleged that Edmundo
and Delia were adopted by Teodoro and Doribel was a legitime
daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled to
inherited Teodoro‘s share in his parents‘ estate by right of
 representation
4. The trial court held that as legitimate descendants of Teodoro and
Isabel—Delia and Edmundo were legally adopted in 1967 and
Doribel was a legitimate daughter—they were entitled to inherit from
Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation
5. On appeal, CA disqualified Edmundo and Delia from inheriting from
spouses Eleno and Rafaela but affirmed that Doribel was entitled to
inherit from spouses Eleno by right of representation
6. Petitioners averred that Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted
because Doribel had already been born on February 27, 1967 when
the adoption decree was issued on march 9, 1967. The birth of
Doribel disqualified her parents from adopting pursuant to Art 335(1)
NCC prohibits to adopt those who have legitimate, legitimated,
acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction
7. Petitioners also contend that Doribel should be disqualified from
inheriting since Doribel herself is not the daughter of Teodoro and
Isabel but was in fact born to Editha Abila, who manifested in a
petition for guardianship of the child that she was her natural
daughter
ISSUE: Who is/are entitled to inherit from the estate of spouses Eleno and
spouses Teodoro.
HELD: On the intestate estate of spouses Teodoro: Doribel (as legitimate
child), and Delia and Edmundo (as adopted children). On the estate of
spouses Eleno: Doribel (by right of representation).
Petitioners‘ contention is inconsistent. They seek to annul the adoption of
Delia and Edmundo on the ground that Teodoro and Isabel already had a
legitimate daughter at the time but in the same breath, try to demolish this
argument by denying that Doribel was born to the couple.
Moreover, it is too late now to challenge the adoption decree after it had
become final and executory. Assuming they were the proper parties,
petitioners should have seasonably appealed the decree of adoption, which
they did not.
Doribel‘s legitimacy cannot be question in a complaint for partition and
accounting but in a direct action seasonable filed by the proper party.
Therefore, Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel, and
Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the exclusive heirs to
the intestate estate of the deceased couple, pursuant to Art 979. The
philosophy behind this article is that a person‘s loves descends first to his
children and grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter
spreads among his collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one of his
purposes in acquiring properties is to leave them eventually to his children
as a token of his love and as a provision for their continued care even after
his death.
On the right of representation, the following provisions of the Civil Code
apply:
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of
which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person
represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were
living or if he could have inherited.
Art. 971. The L representative is called to the succession by the law
tand not
by the person represented. The L representative does not succeed the person
represented but the one whom the person represented would have
succeeded.>

CO
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other
children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right,
and the latter by right of representation.
There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus
the granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has the right to
represent her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate
of her grandparents. Under Art 981, she is entitled to the share her
father would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be
equal to the shares of her grandparents’ children.
But it is not so in the case of Delia and Edmundo. While it is true that
the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have
the same rights as the latter, these rights do not include the right of
representation. The relationship created by adoption is between only
the adopting parents and the adopted child, and does not extend to the
blood relatives of either party.
7. ABELLANA-BACAYO V. FERRARIS-BORROMEO, 14 SCRA
986 (1965)
DOCTRINE: As an exception to the general rule that the right of
representation is available only in the descending line, Art. 975 of the
Civil Code permits representation in the collateral line (but only in
intestate succession) insofar as nephews and nieces of the decedent are
concerned. When such nephews and nieces inherit by representation, they
succeed to that portion which their predeceased or incapacitated father or
mother would have otherwise been entitled to inherit. By right of
representation, these nephews and nieces shall be deemed to be two
degrees remote from the decedent. However, the prerequisite for the
exercise of the right of representation is that the nephews and nieces must
concur with at least one uncle or aunt. Otherwise, nephews and nieces will
inherit in their own right as third degree relatives of the decedent.
It must also be noted that even when they inherit in their own right as third
degree relatives, nephews and nieces are preferred over the uncles and
aunts of the decedent (who are likewise relatives within the third degree of
the decedent). This is because of the order of intestate succession which
ranks brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces fourth in the order of
succession, whereas other collateral relatives, including uncles and aunts
of the deceased, are ranked fifth. Finally, the exercise of the right of
representation is subject to the barrier between the legitimate and
illegitimate families under Article 992.
In the more recent case of Delgado vda. de la Rosa v Heirs of Marciana
Rustia vda. de Damian [G.R. No. 155733, 27 January 2006 (480 SCRA
334)], the Supreme Court through Justice Corona ruled that ―(u)nder
Article 972 of the New Civil Code, the right of representation in the
collateral line takes place only in favor of children of brothers and sisters
(nephews and nieces), Consequently, it cannot be exercised by
grandnephews and grandnieces.ǁ
Likewise, in the case of Bagugu v Piedad, Justice Vitug clarified that the
right of representation is generally available only in the descending line,
never in the ascending. In the collateral line, the right is limited to children
of brothers and sisters who concur with uncles and/or aunts. No other
collateral relative can benefit from the right of representation.
FACTS: Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when
she transferred to Intramuros, Manila. She was known to have resided
there continuously until 1944. Thereafter, up to the filing on December 22,
1960 of the petition for the summary settlement of her estate, she has not
been heard of and her whereabouts are still unknown. More than ten (10)
years having elapsed since the last time she was known to be alive, she
was declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening her succession
and distributing her estate among her heirs.
1. The deceased Melodia Feraris was survived only by collateral
relatives, namely Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-
sister of decedent‘s father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by Gaudencia,
Catalina,Conchita, and Juanito, all surname Ferraris, her nieces and
nephew, who were the children of Melodia‘s only brother of full
blood, Arturo Ferraris, who predeceased the decedent.
2. The trial court ruled that the children of the only predeceased brother
of the decedent, exclude the aunt of the same decedent for the reason
that the former are nearer in degree (2 degrees) than the latter since
nieces and nephews succeed by right of representation, while the aunt
is 3 degrees distant from the decedent, and that other collateral
relatives are excluded by brothers or sisters or children of brothers or
sisters of the decedent in accordance with article 1009 of the New
Civil Code.
3. Petitioner-appellant contends that she is of equal degree of
relationship as the oppositors (3 degrees removed from the decedent)
and that under 975 of the New Civil Code, no right of representation
could take place when the nieces and nephew of the decedent do not
concur with an uncle or aunt, but rather the former succeed in their
 own right.
ISSUE: Who should inherit the intestate estate of a deceased person when
he or she is survived only by collateral relatives, to wit an aunt and the
children of a brother who predeceased him or her?
HELD: The Court held that as an aunt of the deceased she is as far distant
as the nephews from the decedent (3 degrees) since in the collateral line to
which both kinds of relatives belong degrees are counted by first
ascending to the common ancestor and hen descending to the heir (Civil
Code, Art. 966). Also, nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of
representation (i.e.. per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters
of the deceased, as provided by Art. 975.
The Court held that in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces of the de
cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunt and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from
the succession. Under Art. 1009, the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews
and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals
(uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession.
Tolentino expressly states:
Other collaterals. — The last of the relatives of the decedent to
succeed in intestate succession are the collaterals other than brothers
or sisters or children of brothers or sisters. They are, however,
limited to relatives within the fifth degree. Beyond this, we can safely
say there is hardly any affection to merit the succession of collaterals.
Under the law, therefore, relatives beyond the fifth degree are no
longer considered as relatives, for successional purposes.
Article 1009 does not state any order of preference. However,
this article should be understood in connection with the general rule
that the nearest relatives exclude the farther. Collaterals of the same
degree inherit in equal parts, there being no right of representation.
They succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them
on account of the whole blood relationship. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court ruled that under the laws of succession, a decedent‘s uncles and
aunts may not succeed ab intestate so long as nephews and nieces of the
decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed.
8. CUARTICO v CUARTICO
No. 11190-R, 16 November 1955 52 O.G. 1489
TOPIC: XX. Intestate Succession, Art 960, 1027, 1028, 1032; F.
The Iron Curtain, Art 992, 995
DOCTRINE: Cuartico explains the reason for the barrier in Article
992. The reason behind the absolute prohibition on intestate
succession is obviously the intervening antagonism and
incompatibility between members of the natural family and those of
the legitimate family.
NATURE: Appeal
PONENTE: Hernandez, J.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Tranquilino Cuartico was named administrator of the
Intestate Estate of said deceased. After all money claims
against the estate had been settled, the administrator and his
co- petitioners moved that they be declared the exclusive heirs
of the deceased.
2. The oppositors filed a similar motion praying that they, along
with the petitioners, be declared heirs of the deceased. After
trial, the court below, as aforestated, declared the petitioners
and oppositors legal heirs of Patricia Clavecilla whereupon the
petitioners, unsatisfied with the ruling, interposed the present
appeal.
3. It appears indisputably clear between the parties that Patricia
Clavecilla (decedent in this case) died single and ab intestato
and that she left an inheritance of six parcels of land and
houses. The petitioners-appellants named Tranquilino,
Cipriano, Luis, Demetrio and Pancrasio all surnamed Cuartico
are the legitimate children of Macario Cuartico and Maria
Clavecilla, now both deceased. The oppositors-appellees
along with the appellants' father Macario Cuartico, are the
 children of Eleno Cuartico and Susano Germodo, both
deceased.
4. The evidence for the appellants tends to show that their mother
Maria Clavecilla together with Patricia and Romana Clavecilla
were children by different women of a Chinese named Juan
Clavecilla; that Maria's mother is Sinforosa Romano who, after
Maria's birth, married one Benigno Martinez; that Patricia's mother
is Susana Germodo who upon Patricia's birth, married Eleno
Cuartico from which wedlock were born the appellees Feliciana,
Gregorio, Paula, Macario the appellant's father, and Macario now
deceased but represented by a daughter named Generosa; and
that Ramona's mother is a woman named Bonifacia with an
unknown surname. Romana died at an early age, single and
without issue. Maria's death occurred in 1925 while Patricia as
above indicated died on October 4, 1940.
5. The appellants claiming to be natural nephews of Patricia
Clavecilla aver, moreover, that their mother Maria Clavecilla is a
natural sister of Patricia Clavecilla and that both women were
recognized natural daughters of Juan Clavecilla, mainly on the
strength of a private instrument supposedly executed by the latter
on June 26, 1896.
6. Upon the other hand, the appellees contend that Juan Clavecilla
was legally married to Bonifacia Cardente on July 13, 1969 as
evidenced by the parochial church records of Malabuyoc, Cebu;
that from said marriage, Romana Clavecilla was born; and that
Bonifacia Cardente died on March 6, 1900 followed shortly by Juan
Clavecilla who died in 1903. The appellees further maintain that
Patricia Clavecilla and Maria Clavecilla, assuming that the latter
was a child of Juan Clavecilla, were both adulterous children and
could not have been validly recognized by Juan Clavecilla who,
during their conception and birth, was legally and validly married to
Bonifacia Cardente.
ISSUE: Who is entitled to succeed ab intestato to the inheritance
left by Patricia Clavecilla.
HELD:
In the trial below, the appellees tried to prove that Maria
Clavecilla was neither a natural nor an adulterous daughter of Juan
Clavecilla but was merely a maid of the latter; that Maria's real
name was Maria Romana; and that she was born of the wedlock
between Sinforosa Romano and Benigno Martinez. Appellees
admit that Maria Clavecilla was legally married to their brother,
Macario Cuartico; that from said marriage, the herein appellants
were born and that consequently, appellants are entitled to inherit
from Patricia Clavecilla namely in representation of appellants'
father, Macario, as ostensibly held by the trial court.
No dispute exists that the appellees are the children of Eleno
Cuartico and Susana Germodo. Susana Germodo being the natural
mother of Patricia Clavecilla, it results therefore, that the appellees
are natural half-brothers, half-sisters and half-niece respectively of
Patricia Clavecilla.
We begin with an inquiry into the alleged rights of the appellees
to be declared heirs of and to succeed Patricia Clavecilla. During
the trial, petitioners adduced in evidence a certificate issued by the
parish of Alegria, Cebu attesting to the marriage between Eleno or
Lino Cuartico and Susana Germodo, parents of the herein
oppositors. Said marriage purportedly took place in Alegria, Cebu
on June 1, 1880.
Remarkably, the oppositors proffered no objection to the
admission of said exhibit which explicitly shows that the oppositors'
parents were legally married and inferentially that said oppositors
were legitimate children.
It is plainly evident, therefore, that the oppositors who are
illegitimate children of Susana Germodo and Lino Cuartico are
seeking to inherit ab intestato from their half-sister, Patricia
Clavecilla. This pretension is certainly not countenanced under
Article 943 of the Old Civil Code which provision is substantially
reproduced as Article 992 in the New Civil Code. Article 943 reads:
Art. 943. A natural child has no right to succeed ab
intestato the legitimate children and relatives of the father or
mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall such children or
relatives so inherit from the natural child.
The reason behind the absolute prohibition on intestate
succession is obviously the intervening antagonism and
incompatibility between members of the natural family and those of
the legitimate family.
In the words of Manresa:
Among the natural son and the legitimate relatives or
parent the reconcio denies all the code succesoria relationship.
Cannot be said relatives and are not entitled to inherit. There is
of course a link blood, but this link does not recognize the
alleged facts and will stakeholders, the natural child is looked
down upon by family legitimate, the family is legitimate,
however, hated by the natural son this considers that the
privileged situation and the resources for it is deprived, that
instead, just go in the natural son of the product vice, the living
proof of a barron family. Every relationship is broken ordinarily
in life, the law does nothing to recognize truth, avoiding new
grounds for resentment.
The hojos relatives and legitimate parent who recognized
natural child, relatives are all in a straight line ascending or
descending, or collateral line. The family is legitimate
completely separate from the natural, or individuals to inherit
ista Aquila, nor that individuals can inherit those of ista. (p. 127
Comments to the Civil Code.)
The appellants, on the other hand, pretend to succeed Patricia
Clavecilla by reason of their alleged status of natural nephews of
the latter. The appellees attempt to refute appellants' claims by
alleging that Maria Clavecilla was merely a maid and not a child of
Juan Clavecilla and could not have been, therefore, a relative of
Patricia Clavecilla who was admittedly a daughter of Juan
Clavecilla. Moreover, appellees claim, that assuming that Maria
was a child of Juan Clavecilla along with Patricia Clavecilla, neither
Maria nor Patricia could have been recognized as natural
daughters by Juan Clavecilla who was, at the time of their (Maria's
and Patricia's) birth legally and validly married with Bonifacia
Cardente.
In view of all the foregoing, and finding that neither the
appellants nor the appellees are entitled to succeed ab intestato to
the inheritance left by Patricia Clavecilla, it behooves us to call
upon the State to succeed.
Wherefore, the appealed order should be, as it is hereby,
revoked and the court a quo is hereby instructed, when this
decision becomes final, to furnish the provincial fiscal of Negros
Oriental a copy of this decision for such action as may be proper
pursuant to Rule 92 of the Rules of Court. No special
pronouncement as to costs in this instance.
9. VDA. DE CRISOLOGO v COURT OF APPEALS
No. L-44051, 27 June 1985 137 SCRA 233
The petitioners filed an action against private respondents for ownership,
annulment of sale, and delivery of possession of various properties, with
writ of preliminary injunction and damages. Claiming to be legal heirs of
the vendor, they sought the annulment of four deeds of sale covering
seventeen (17) parcels of land and a residential house executed by
Lutgarda Capiao in favor of respondent Mallillin.
FACTS:
Julia Capiao, who maintained extra-marital relations with one Victoriano
Taccad, begot with him one child and/or forced heir, named Lutgarda
(Leogarda) Capiao, who was married to Raymundo Zipagan, both of
whom died at Cauayan, Isabela in 1970 and 1964 respectively, without
any children and/or immediate forced heirs
Lutgarda (Leogarda) Capiao, having died on November 11, 1970 at
Cauayan, Isabela, without any will intestate succession took place and the
herein plaintiffs, as relatives within the fifth civil degree to her (Lutgarda
[Leogarda] Capiao), were consequently instituted as Lutgarda's legal heirs
and were legally entitled to inherit all the properties which were hers by
virtue of the extra-judicial partition.
ISSUE: WON the relatives of Julia Capiao, namely: the plaintiffs in this
case, inherit from Lutgarda Capiao, the original owner of the properties in
question.
HELD:
No. Clearly, they can not because the legitimate relatives of Julia Capiao
cannot inherit from an illegitimate child of the latter, because that is the
clear and unmistakable provision of Article 992 of the new Civil Code.
Neither can Lutgarda Capiao inherit from the legitimate relatives of Julia
Capiao who are the plaintiffs in the instant case.
On certain occasions, this Court has allowed the filing of an appeal outside
the period prescribed by law in the interest of justice. Emphatic in the
decisions cited by the petitioner are strong considerations of substantial
justice. The present case does not warrant such liberality because the
decision of the lower court is satisfactorily supported by the records. It is
clear from the records that the petitioners cannot inherit the properties in
question because of Article 992 of the Civil Code. Being relatives on the
legitimate line of Julia Capiao, they cannot inherit from her illegitimate
daughter. Their relative Julia Capiao predeceased the daughter, Lutgarda
Capiao. As explained by Manresa, whom the private respondent cited:
​Between the natural child and the legitimate relatives of the
father or mother who acknowledged it, the Code denies any right of
succession. They cannot be called relatives and they have no right to
inherit. Of course, there is a blood tie, but the law does not recognize
it. In this Article 943 is based upon the reality of the facts and upon
the presumptive will of the interested parties; the natural child is
 disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the
legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the natural child; the latter
considers the privileged condition of the former and the resources of
which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the natural
child nothing but the product of sin, a palpable evidence of a blemish
upon the family. Every relations is ordinarily broken in life; the law
does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds
of resentment.
10. CACHO V. UDAN, 13 SCRA 693 (1965)
DOCTRINE: The Court reaffirms the exclusion of legitimate brothers
and sisters of the decedent by the latter's illegitimate child. Note, however,
that the Court disallowed the intervention of the brothers in the probate
proceedings, since regardless of the outcome of the probate, the brothers
cannot inherit from the deceased. Implicitly, the lower court also
disqualified the said brothers from claiming any right against the
illegitimate son of the deceased by reason of Article 992, when the said
court instructed the fiscal to study the propriety of instituting escheat
proceedings.
FACTS: Silvina G. Udan, single, and a resident of San Marcelino,
Zambales, died leaving a purported will naming her son, Francisco G.
Udan, and one Wencesla Cacho, as her sole heirs, share and share alike.
1. Wencesla Cacho, filed a petition to probate said Will in the CFI of
Zambales.
2. Rustico G. Udan, legitimate brother of the testatrix, filed an
opposition to the probate.
3. Francisco G. Udan, through counsel, filed his opposition to the
probate of this
4. After one witness, the Notary Public who made and notarize the will,
had testified in court, oppositor Francisco G. Udan died on June
1961.
5. After the death of Francisco G. Udan, John G. Udan and Rustico G.
Udan, both legitimate brothers of the testatrix Silvina G. Udan, filed
 their respective oppositions on the ground that the will was not
attested and executed as required by law, that the testatrix was
incapacitated to execute it; and that it was procured by fraud or undue
influence.
6. Petitioner-appellee filed a Motion to Dismiss Oppositions filed by the
Oppositors.
7. CFI issued an order disallowing the 2 oppositions for lack of interest
in the estate and directing the Fiscal to study the advisability of filing
escheat proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether the oppositor brothers, John and Rustico Udan may
claim to be heirs intestate of their legitimate sister, the late Silvina Udan.
HELD: The Court held that John and Rustico Udon cannot claim to be
heirs intestate of their legitimate sister, for t the time of her death,
Silvina‘s illegitimate son, Francisco Udan, was her heir intestate, to the
exclusion of her brothers. This is clear from Art. 988 nd 1003 of the Civil
Code, which was in force at the time of the death of the testatrix.
The legal provisions decree that collateral relatives of one who died
intestate inherir only in the absence of descendants, ascendants, and
illegitimate children. Albeit the brothers and sisters can concur with the
widow or widower under Art. 1101, they do not concur, but are excluded
by the surviving children, legitimate or illegitimate.
John and Rustico Udan had no standing to oppose the probate of the will.
For if the will is ultimately probated John and Rustico are excluded by its
terms from participation in the estate; ad if probate be denied, both
oppositors-appellant will be excluded by the illegitimate son, Francisco
Udan, as sole intestate heir, by operation of law.
The death of Francisco 2 yrs after his mother‘s demise does not improve
the situation of appellants. The rights acquired by the former are only
transmitted by his death to his own heirs at law not to the appellants, who
are legitimate brothers of his mother, for the reason that, the legitimate
relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child. (Art. 992,
Civil Code)
 11. TOMAS CORPUS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ADMINISTRATOR and/or EXECUTOR of the Estate of Teodoro
R. Yangco, RAFAEL CORPUS, AMALIA CORPUS, JOSE A. V.
CORPUS, RAMON L. CORPUS, ENRIQUE J. CORPUS, S. W.
STAGG, SOLEDAD ASPRER and CIPRIANO
NAVARRO, defendants-appellees.

TOMAS CORPUS V. ADMINISTRATOR/EXECUTOR OF THE

ESTATE OF TEODORO YANGCO, 85 SCRA 567 (1978)
FACTS: Teodoro Yangco died with a will. He left no forced heirs. At the
time of his death, his nearest relatives were: (a) his half-brother Luis
Yangco; (b) half-sister Paz Yangco and wife of Miguel Osorio; (c) children
of his half-brother Ramon Corpus; and (d) Juanita Corpus; daughter of his
half-brother Jose Corpus.
1. Teodoro was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona
Arguelles (widow of Tomas Corpus). Before her marriage with
Luis Rafael, Ramona had 5 children with Tomas, 2 of which
were Pablo and Jose.
2. Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition
was submitted but this was opposed.
3. From that order, Pedro Martinez, Juliana de Castro, Juanita
Corpus and the estate of Luis R. Yangco appealed. A
compromise agreement was entered into thereafter
4. Based on the compromise agreement, Tomas Corpus signed a
receipt acknowledging that he received from the Yangco estate
P2,000.
5. Tomas, as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus, filed an action to
recover the supposed share in Yangco‘s intestate estate. He
alleged that the dispositions in Yangco‘s will imposing perpetual
prohibitions upon alienation rendered it void under Art 785 Old
Civil Code and that the 1949 partition is invalid and as such, the
 estate should be distributed according to the rules of intestacy
ISSUE: WON Juanita Corpus, mother of Tomas, was a legal heir of
Yangco
HELD: No.To determine Juanita‘s right to inherit, it is necessary to
ascertain Yangco‘s filiation. Luis Rafael‘s will states that Teodoro was an
acknowledged natural child and not a legitimate child. On the other hand,
the children of Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus are presumed to be
legitimate following the principle of simper preasumitur pro matrimonio,
―that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are
presumed to have entered into a lawful marriage.ǁ
Since Teodoro was an acknowledged natural child (illegitimate) and
Juanita was the legitimate child of Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus,
petitioner-appellant Tomas has no cause of action for the recovery of the
supposed hereditary share of his mother in Yangco‘s estate. Juanita was
not a legal heir of Yangco because there is no reciprocal succession
between legitimate and illegitimate relatives.
Art 992 NCC provides that ―an illegitimate child has no right to inherit
ab intestate from the legitimate children or relatives of his father or
mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner
from the illegitimate child.ǁ This rule is based on the theory that the
illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by the legitimate family
while the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child. The
law does not recognize the blood tie and seeks to avoid further grounds of
resentment.
Following the rule in Art 992, it was held that:
1. Legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate
child
2. The natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession
to the estate of the legitimate grandfather
3. The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased
uncle, a legitimate brother of her natural mother.
12. BENIGNO MANUEL V. HON. FERRER AND MODESTA
 BALTAZAR, 247 SCRA 476 (1995)
FACTS: The property in dispute here is the inheritance left by an
illegitimate child who died intestate without any surviving descendant or
ascendant.
1. Petitioners are the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and
Beatriz Guiling. During his marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had an
affair with Ursula Bautista and sired a child, Juan Manuel.
2. Juan Manuel married Esperanza Gamba. A donation propter nuptias
over a parcel of land was executed in favor of Juan Manuel by
Laurenciana Manuel. Two other properties were purchased by Juan
and registered in his name. Spouses Juan Manuel did not have any
children however, the raised Modesta Manuel-Baltazar (ward) as
their own
3. After the death of Juan and Esperanza, Modesta executed an affidavit
of self- adjudication, claiming for herself the 3 parcels of land
4. Petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the instruments
Esperanza executed
5. The trial court dismissed the complaint holding that the petitioners,
not being heirs ab intestate of the illegitimate brother Juan Manuel,
were not real properties in interest
6. Petitioners argue that they are the legal heirs over 1⁄2 of Juan‘s
intestate estate (while the other half would pertain to Juan‘s surviving
spouse) under Art 994
7. On the other hand, respondent claims that Art 994 should be read in
conjuction with Art 992 NCC which provides that an illegitimate
child is barred from inheriting ab intestate from the legitimate
relatives of his father or mother and the latter are barred in the same
manner from inheriting from the illegitimate child
ISSUE: WON petitioners, who are legitimate children of spouses Antonio
and Beatriz, can inherit from their illegitimate sibling
HELD: No.
Art 992 enunciates what is commonly referred to in the rules of succession
as the ―principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and
the illegitimate family.ǁ The doctrine rejects succession ab intestate in the
collateral line between legitimate relatives and illegitimate relatives,
although it does not totally disavow such succession in the direct line.
Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it has no
application on testamentary disposition.
The SC has ruled in several cases that:
1. Where the legitimate child had half-brothers who were legitimate, the
latter had no right to the former‘s inheritance;
2. The legitimate collateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed from
her illegitimate child;
3. A natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to
the estate of the legitimate grandparent
4. The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased
uncle who is a legitimate brother of her natural father; and
5. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
illegitimate children and relatives of her father
In the case at bar, Modesta candidly admitted that she herself is not an
intestate heir of Juan Manuel. A ward (ampon), without the benefit of
formal (judicial) adoption, is neither a compulsory or a legal heir.
13. CRESENCIANO LEONARDO V. COURT OF APPEALS AND
MARIA CAILLES, 120 SCRA 890 (1983)
FACTS: Francisca Reyes died intestate in 1963. She was survived by 2
daughters, Maria and Silvestra Cailles, and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo,
the son of her daughter Pascuala who predeceased her. Sotero died in 1944
while Silvestra died in 1949.
1. Petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be the son of Sotero,
filed a complaint seeking to:
a. Be declared one of the lawful heirs of deceased Francisca,
entitled to 1⁄2 share in the estate of the deceased jointly with
 defendant Maria
b. Have the estate of Francisca partitioned between him and Maria
2. Respondent Maria Cailles asserted exclusive ownership over the
subject properties and alleged that petitioner is an illegitimate child
who cannot succeed by right of representation
3. The trial court held in favor of petitioner. On appeal, CA reversed the
trial court decision and dismissed the complaint
ISSUE: WON petitioner has legal right to inherit by representation to
Francisca‘s estate
HELD: No.
To determine petitioner‘s successional rights to the decedent‘s estate, his
filiation must first be ascertained. Petitioner failed to prove his filiation;
the name of the child described in the birth certificate presented as
evidence, is not that of the plaintiff but a certain ―Alfredo Leonardoǁ who
was born on September 13, 1938 to Sotero Leonardo and Soccoro Timbol.
Other than his bare allegations, plaintiff did not submit any durable
evidence showing that ―Alfredo Leonardoǁ mentioned in the birth
certificate is no other than he himself.
Even if it is true that petitioner is a child of Sotero, he still cannot, by right
of representation, claim a share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca
considering that he was born outside of wedlock as shown by the fact that
when he was born, his alleged putative father and mother were not yet
married; and his alleged father‘s first marriage was still subsisting. As
such, petitioner would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit
ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father, like the
deceased Francisca.
14. DIAZ V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 150 SCRA 645
(1987)
DOCTRINE: This case illustrates the harsh effects of Article 992. As will
be noted, the legitimate collateral relative of the intestate was preferred
over the illegitimate descendants. There was no showing that between the
grandmother and her illegitimate grandchildren, there was animosity. It
must likewise be noted that the deceased grandmother did not have any
other descendants other than the illegitimate children who were excluded
from her inheritance.
FACTS: The case is a review of the decision declaring Felisa Pamuti-
Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. The present controversy is confined
solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
1. Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate
children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion.
2. Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa
Pamuti and another child who died during infancy
3. Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and
the mother of Pablo Santero
4. Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual
Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
5. Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona
Santero in 1976
6. Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother
Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor
children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta
Pacursa.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero
could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of
representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
HELD: No
The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of
legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent.
Articles 902, 989, and 990 clearly speak of successional rights of
illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted to their descendants
upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who may
inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate or
illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the
persons to be represented are themselves illegitimate.
The rules laid down in Article 982 that 'grandchildren and other
descendants shall inherit by right of representation and in Article 902 that
the rights of illegitimate children ... are transmitted upon their death to
their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate aresubject to the
limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child
has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother."
"Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in
that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or
mother of said illegitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but
this is not recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992. Between the
legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an
intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is
disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; and the family is
in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged
condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived;
the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of
sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more
than recognize this truth, by avoiding further ground of resentment."
While the New Civil Code may have granted successional rights to
illegitimate children, those articles, however, in conjunction with Article
992, prohibit the right of representation from being exercised where the
person to be represented is a legitimate child. Needless to say, the
determining factor is the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person to be
represented. If the person to be represented is an illegitimate child, then
his descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, may represent him;
however, if the person to be represented is legitimate, his illegitimate
descendants cannot represent him because the law provides that only his
legitimate descendants may exercise the right of representation by reason
of the barrier imposed Article 992.
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase
"legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" is broad enough to
comprehend all the kindred of the person spoken of. In the case at bar, the
only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural
or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are
barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate
Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti Jardin
to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
The Court view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general
acceptation. According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in
Article 992 in a more restrictive sense than it is used and intended is not
warranted by any rule of interpretation. Besides, he further states that
when the law intends to use the term in a more restrictive sense, it
qualifies the term with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of
the New Civil Code. Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when
used in a statute it embraces not only collateral relatives but also all the
kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context indicates that it was
used in a more restrictive or limited sense.
15. ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO,
ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO, and
FELIXBERTA PACURSA, guardian of FEDERICO SANTERO, et
al., petitioners, vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and
FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN, respondents.
Doctrine:
This resolution settled the motion for reconsideration filed by the
illegitimate children on the decision immediately preceding. An argument
is raised that the word "relatives" used in Article 992 cannot possibly refer
to the grandmother of the illegitimate children, but only to the other
collateral relatives. The argument stresses the injustice resulting from the
fact that while the illegitimate children of an illegitimate child can
exercise the right of representation, the same right is denied the
illegitimate children of a legitimate child.
FACTS:
It is undisputed
1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. De Santero
who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate
children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion;
2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born
Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during infancy;
3) thatSimonaPamutiVda. deSantero is the widow of PascualSantero and
the mother of Pablo Santero;
4) that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents
PascualSantero and SimonaPamutiVda. deSantero;
5) that PascualSantero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and
SimonaSantero in 1976;
6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother
SimonaSantero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor
children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with
FelixbertaPacursa.
These six minor children, petitioners in this case, are the illegitimate
children of Pablo Santero.
ISSUE: The present controversy is confined solely to the intestate estate
of SimonaPamutivda. De Santero (Simona). We are tasked to determine
whether petitioners as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit
from Simona by right of representation of their father, Pablo Santero, who
is a legitimate child of Simona.
HELD: FelisaPamuti-Jardinis is declared to be the sole heir to the
intestate estate of SimonaPamutiVda. deSantero, to the exclusion of
petitioners.
1. Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in
that it prohibits absolutely a succession abintestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or
mother of said illegitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but
this is not recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992. Between the
legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an
intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is
disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; and the family is
in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged
condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived;
the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of
sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more
than recognize this truth, by avoiding further ground of resentment.
2. While the New Civil Code may have granted successional rights to
illegitimate children, those articles, however, in conjunction with Article
992, prohibit the right of representation from being exercised where the
person to be represented is a legitimate child. Needless to say, the
determining factor is the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person to be
represented. If the person to be represented is an illegitimate child,
then his descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, may
represent him; however, if the person to be represented is legitimate,
his illegitimate descendants cannot represent him because the law
provides that only his legitimate descendants may exercise the right of
representation by reason of the barrier imposed Article 992. In this
wise, the commentaries of Manresa on the matter in issue, even though
based on the old Civil Code, are still very much applicable to the New
Civil Code because the amendment, although substantial, did not consist
of giving illegitimate children the right to represent their natural parents
(legitimate) in the intestate succession of their grandparents (legitimate).
3. The record reveals that from the commencement of this case the only
parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late
SimonaPamutiVda. deSantero are FelisaPamutiJardin and the six minor
natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein
are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate
Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding FelisaPamutiJardin to
be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late
SimonaPamutiVda. deSantero.
4. According to Prof.Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992
in a more restrictive sense than it is used and intended is not warranted by
any rule of interpretation. Besides, he further states that when the law
intends to use the term in a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term
with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil
Code.
Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it
embraces not only collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person
spoken of, unless the context indicates that it was used in a more
restrictive or limited sense — which as already discussed earlier, is not so
in the case at bar.
5. Our legislation has not gone so far as to place legitimate and illegitimate
children on exactly the same footing. Even the Family Code of 1987 (EO
209) has not abolished the gradation between legitimate and illegitimate
children (although it has done away with the sub- classification of
illegitimates into natural and 'spurious'). It would thus be correct to say
that illegitimate children have only those rights which are expressly or
clearly granted to them by law
In the light of the foregoing, We conclude that until Article 992 is
suppressed or at least amended to clarify the term "relatives" there is no
other alternative but to apply the law literally. Thus, We hereby reiterate
the decision of June 17, 1987 and declare FelisaPamuti-Jardin to be
the sole heir to the intestate estate of SimonaPamutiVda. deSantero, to
the exclusion of petitioners.
Dispostive: WHEREFORE, the second Motion for Reconsideration is
DENIED, and the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED
 SUNTAY III V COJUANCO-SUNTAY (2010)
DOCTRINE: While the barrier in Art. 992 remains in force, Justice
Nachura sets the tone in what could lead to a reconsideration of the ruling
in Diaz v Intermediate Appellete Court, supra. Be mindful, however, that
the excerpt cited above is at best an obiter since the principal issue raised
in this case relates to the preference in the appointment of an
administrator.
FACTS:
On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina),
married to Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico), died intestate. In 1979, their
only son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina
and Federico. , Cristina was survived by her husband, Federico, and
several grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III
(Emilio III) and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay.
1. During his lifetime, Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and
they begot three children, namely: herein respondent, Isabel;
Margarita; and Emilio II, all surnamed Cojuangco-Suntay. Emilio I‘s
marriage to Isabel Cojuangco was subsequently annulled.
2. Thereafter, Emilio I had two children out of wedlock, Emilio III and
Nenita Suntay Tañedo (Nenita), by two different women, Concepcion
Mendoza and Isabel Santos, respectively.
3. Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio III, he was reared ever since
he was a mere baby, nine months old, by the spouses Federico and
Cristina and was an acknowledged natural child of Emilio I. Nenita is
an acknowledged natural child of Emilio I and was likewise brought
up by the spouses Federico and Cristina.
4. After the death of Emilio I, Federico filed a petition for visitation
rights over his grandchildren: respondent Isabel, Margarita, and
Emilio II. Federico was allowaed a one hour of visitation monthly,
initially reduced to thirty minutes and eventually stopped because of
a manifestation filed by respondent Isabel, articulating her sentiments
on the unwanted visits of her grandparents.
5. Federico, after the death of his spouse, Cristina, or on September 27,
1993, adopted their illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.
6. Respondent filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor for the administration of the estate of
Cristina
7. Federico filed his opposition, disavowing the allegations of Isabel.
He further alleged that being the surviving spouse of Cristina, he is
capable of administering her estate and he should be the one
appointed as its administrator; that as part owner of the mass of
conjugal properties left by Cristina, he must be accorded legal
preference in the administration thereof; that Isabel and her family
had been alienated from their grandparents for more than thirty (30)
years
8. After a failed attempt by the parties to settle the proceedings
amicably, Federico filed a Manifestation dated March 13, 1999,
nominating his adopted son, Emilio III, as administrator of the
decedent‘s estate on his behalf, in the event he would be adjudged as
the one with a better right to the letters ofadministration.
9. Emilio III filed his Opposition-In-Intervention, which essentially
echoed the allegations in his grandfather‘s opposition, alleging that
Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than
respondent to administer and manage the estate of the decedent,
Cristina
10. In the course of the proceedings, on November 13, 2000, Federico
died.
11. The trial court rendered a decision on November 9, 2001, appointing
herein petitioner, Emilio III, as administrator of decedent Cristina‘s
intestate estate.
12. Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the CA, which
reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of
Administration issued to Emilio III, and appointed respondent as
administratrix of the intestate estate of the decedent, Cristina.
ISSUE: Who, as between Emilio III and respondent, is better qualified to
act as administrator of the decedent‘s estate.
HELD:
The Court held that the CA erred in excluding Emilio III from the
administration of the decedent‘s estate. As Federico‘s adopted son, Emilio
III‘s interest in the estate of Cristina is as much apparent to this Court as
the interest therein of respondent, considering that the CA even declared
that "under the law, [Federico], being the surviving spouse, would have
the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the
decedent, aside from his share in the conjugal partnership."
Counsel for petitioner meticulously argues that Article 992 of the Civil
Code, the successional bar between the legitimate and illegitimate
relatives of a decedent, does not apply in this instance where facts
indubitably demonstrate the contrary – Emilio III, an illegitimate
grandchild of the decedent, was actually treated by the decedent and her
husband as their own son, reared from infancy, educated and trained in
their businesses, and eventually legally adopted by decedent‘s husband,
the original oppositor to respondent‘s petition for letters of administration.
We are not unmindful of the critiques of civilists of a conflict and a lacuna
in the law concerning the bone of contention that is Article 992 of the
Civil Code, beginning with the eminent Justice J.B.L. Reyes:
In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted
only within the legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code
prescribed that an illegitimate child can not inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father and mother. The Civil Code
of the Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it reproduced
Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but with fine
inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998) our Code allows
the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992
prevents the illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him
in the intestate succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of an
illegitimate child can now do so. This difference being indefensible and
unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil Code we shall have to
make a choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all
cases the right of representation, in which case Art. 992 must be
suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article and modify Articles 995
and 998. The first solution would be more in accord with an enlightened
attitude vis-à-vis illegitimate children.
Manresa explains the basis for the rules on intestate succession:
The law [of intestacy] is founded... on the presumed will of the
deceased... Love, it is said, first descends, then ascends, and, finally,
spreads sideways. Thus, the law first calls the descendants, then the
ascendants, and finally the collaterals, always preferring those closer in
degree to those of remoter degrees, on the assumption that the deceased
would have done so had he manifested his last will... Lastly, in default of
anyone called to succession or bound to the decedent by ties of blood or
affection, it is in accordance with his presumed will that his property be
given to charitable or educational institutions, and thus contribute to the
welfare of humanity.
Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis
of intestate succession, i.e., love first descends, for the decedent, Cristina,
did not distinguish between her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren.
Neither did her husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the status of
Emilio III from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The
peculiar circumstances of this case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel
for petitioner, overthrow the legal presumption in Article 992 of the Civil
Code that there exist animosity and antagonism between legitimate and
illegitimate descendants of a deceased.
It must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to refrain from
making a final declaration of heirship and distributing the presumptive
shares of the parties in the estates of Cristina and Federico, considering
that the question on who will administer the properties of the long
deceased couple has yet to be settled.
 The Court reversed and set aside the CA‘s ruling and declared that
Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-
Suntay shall issue to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and
respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each of a bond to
be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in
Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M- 95. The Regional Trial Court,
Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to make a determination
and to declare the heirs of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according
to the actual factual milieu as proven by the parties, and all other persons
with legal interest in the subject estate. It is further directed to settle the
estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch.
17. Aquino Vs. Aquino, G.R. Nos. 208912 and 209018,
December 7, 2021.
xxx
[The Supreme Court En Banc Reinterpreted Article 992 of the
Civil Code which pertains to the “Iron Curtain Rule”.]
In this case, a woman claims to be a nonmarital child of a
deceased father, who asserted her right to represent her late father
in benefiting from her deceased grandfather's fortune after the
latter's death.
Article 992 had previously been interpreted by the court in a
quite different way. Nonmarital children could not receive a portion
of their grandparents' assets under this rule. The "iron curtain rule"
is what the court calls it.
In this case, the court reversed its previous decision and ruled
in favor of the child's best interests. This conclusion was also based
on the Philippine Statistic Authority's data from 2007 to 2016, which
showed a 14.4% decrease in registered marriages in the country
from 2007 to 2016.
Grandparents and other ascendants, according to the court,
are not considered "relatives" under Article 992. The right of
representation of a nonmarital child should instead be governed by
Article 982 of the Civil Code, which does not discriminate based on
birth status.
xxx

AQUINO v. AQUINO (G.R. Nos. 208912 and 209018 • 07

December 2021 • En Banc • Leonen, J.)

SC Revisits 'Iron Curtain Rule' in Succession Law, Upholds

Best Interest of the Child
Children, regardless of their parents' marital status, can now
inherit from their grandparents and other direct ascendants by right
of representation.

In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F.

Leonen, the Court En Banc reinterpreted Article 992 of the Civil
Code, which prohibits nonmarital children from inheriting from their
siblings who are marital children, as well as "relatives of [their]
father or mother[.]" The Decision used the terms "marital" and
"nonmarital" to replace the terms "legitimate" and "illegitimate"
when referring to the children, as the latter terms are
pejorative(means expressing contempt or disapproval) terms when
used to describe children based on their parents' marital status.

This case involves a woman who claims to be the nonmarital

child of a man who died before she was born. After her alleged
paternal grandfather died, she asserted her right to represent her
deceased father-a marital child-in inheriting from her grandfather's
estate.

However, in previous cases, the Court had interpreted Article

992 as barring nonmarital children from inheriting from their
grandparents and other direct ascendants, as they are covered by
the term "relatives." The Supreme Court had called this prohibition
the "iron curtain rule," inferred from a perceived hostility between
the marital and nonmarital sides of a family.

Now, the Court reexamined the iron curtain rule, finding that
Article 992 "should be construed to account for other circumstances
of birth and family dynamics. Peace within families cannot be
encouraged by callously depriving some of its members of their
inheritance. Such deprivation may even be the cause of
antagonism and alienation that could have been otherwise
avoided."
 The Court also recognized that nonmarital children primarily
suffer the consequences imposed by laws, despite the status being
beyond their power to change. Some children may be nonmarital
because their parents choose not to marry; in 2016, the Philippine
Statistics Authority reported that, from 2007 to 2016, there was
14.4% decline in registered marriages in the country. Other children
may be nonmarital because one or both of their parents are below
marriageable age. In 2017 alone, 196,478 children were born to
mothers 19 years old and below, and 52,342 children were sired by
fathers 19 years old and below. There are also children who are
nonmarital when their mother was a survivor of sexual assault who
did not marry the perpetrator; or when one parent dies before they
can marry the other parent.

Departing from regressive conjectures about family life in favor

of the best interests of the child, the Court abandoned the
presumption that "nonmarital children are products of illicit
relationships or that they are automaticallv placed in a hostile
environment perpetrated by the marital family."

The Court ruled that grandparents and other direct ascendants

are outside the scope of "relatives" under Article 992. "Both marital
and nonmarital children, whether born from a marital or nonmarital
child, are blood relatives of their parents and other ascendants."
Thus, a nonmarital child's right of representation should be
governed by Article 982 of the Civil Code, which does not
differentiate based on the birth status of grandchildren and other
direct descendants.

The two amicus curiae appointed by the Court, Dean Cynthia

Del Castillo and Professor Elizabeth Aguiling-Pangalangan, also
contributed insights on the Civil Code, Family Code, and
jurisprudential treatment of nonmarital children.
 However, because of factual issues with the nonmarital child's
claim of filiation, the Court remanded the case to the Regional Trial
Court and ordered it to receive further evidence, including DNA
evidence. It emphasized that DNA testing is a valid method of
determining filiation in all cases where this is an issue.

18. IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO

SANTILLON V. PERFECTA MIRANDA, 14 SCRA 563 (1965)
FACTS: Pedro Santillon died intestate, leaving one son, Claro and his
wife, Perfecta Miranda. During his marriage, pedro acquired several
parcels of land Yes
- Lawyer ; enito
1. After his death, Claro Santillon filed petition for letters of µ -
y
administration. His mother, Perfecta and spouses Benito Miranda
opposed the petition on the following grounds:
a. Properties enumerated in the petition were all conjugal, except
for 3 parcels which Perfecta claims to be her exclusive property
b. Perfecta conveyed 3⁄4 of her undivided share in most of the
properties to spouses Miranda
c. Perfecta should be appointed administrator over her spouse‘s
estate
2. Thereafter, Claro filed a motion to ―declare shares of heirsǁ and
resolve the conflicting claims of the parties with respect to their
rights in the estate. Invoking Art 892, Claro insisted that after
deducting Perfecta‘s 1⁄2 share from the conjugal property, the
remaining property shall be divided as: 1⁄4 for Perfecta and 3⁄4 for
him
3. On the other hand, Perfecta claimed that she was entitled under Art
996 to another 1⁄2 of the remaining half
4. The trial court held in favor of Perfecta, declaring that the surviving
spouse Perfecta is entitled to 1⁄2 of Pedro‘s estate and the remaining
1⁄2 is given to Claro
ISSUE: How shall the estate of a person who dies intestate be divided
when the only survivors are the spouse and one legitimate child?
HELD: Half and half pursuant to Art 996 NCC.
Art 892 NCC falls under the chapter on Testamentary Succession, whereas
Art 996 comes under the chapter on Legal or Intestate Succession. Such
being the case, it is obvious that Claro cannot rely on Art 892 to support
his claim to 3⁄4 of his father‘s share. Art 892 merely fixes the legitime of
the surviving spouse and Art 888 thereof, the legitime of children in
testate succession. While it may indicate the intent of the law with
respect to the ideal shares that a child and a spouse should get when
they concur with each other, it does not fix the amount of shares that
such child and spouse are entitled to when intestacy occurs. As such,
the pertinent provision on intestate succession shally apply, i.e. Art
996.
In his commentary, JBL Reyes, noted that: if there is only one legitimate
child surviving with the spouse, since they share equally, 1⁄2 of the
estate goes to the child and the other half goes to the surviving spouse.
Although the law refers to “children or descendants,” the rule in statutory
construction that the plural can be understood to include the singular in
this case.
The theory of commentator‘s sharing Claro‘s position are premised on the
following arguments:
1. Art 996 speaks of “children” therefore it does not apply when there is
only one “child” and as such Art 892 should be applied through a
process of judicial construction and analogy
2. Art 996 is unfair because in intestate succession, the widow gets only
1⁄4 while in testacy, she would get 1⁄2 shares
It is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural include the
singular. As such, “children” in Art 996 also refers to a “child”
The equal shares theory seems to be a logical inference from the
circumstance whereas Art 834 Spanish Civil Code, from which Art 996
was taken, contained 2 paragraphs governing two contingencies: (a) where
the widow or widower survives with legitimate children; and (b) where the
widow or widower survives with only one child. Since Art 996 NCC
omitted to provide for the second situation, it can be deemed that the
legislator’s intent was to promulgate only one general rule applicable
to both situations.

19. ZOSIMA VERDAD, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SOCORRO C. ROSALES,
AURORA ROSALES, NAPOLEON ROSALES, ANTONIO
ROSALES, FLORENDA ROSALES, ELENA ROSALES AND
VIRGINIA ROSALES, respondents.
G.R. No. 109972 April 29, 1996
When a surviving spouse inherits, she acquires all the rights and privileges
of ownership pertaining to the property thus acquired. Hence, where a
surviving spouse becomes a co-owner of property through succession to
her deceased spouse, the former is entitled to the right of redemption in the
circumstances described in Article 1620 of the Civil Code. Verdad
confirms this fact when a widow was granted the right to redeem a
property in which she was a co-owner, that her brothers and sisters-in-law
sold to a third party without giving her prior written notice.

FACTS:
1. During her lifetime, MacariaAtega had a first marriage with Angel
Burdeos and had two children, Ramon and Estela. Upon the death of
Angel, she married Canuto Rosales, with whom she had four children,
David, Justo, Romulo and Aurora. Socorro Rosales, is the widow of David
Rosales who himself, some time after Macaria‘s death in March 8, 1956,
died intestate without issue.
2. ZosimoVerdad is the buyer of a 248 sq.m. residential lot in Butuan City,
sold to him by the widow of Ramon Burdeos and his children on June 14,
1982. Socorro seeks to exercise a right of legal redemption over the
property, trading her title to Macaria,her mother in law. Eldest in
1st marriage

3. Socorro discovered the sale on March 30, 1987 when she was at the
Treasurer‘s Office. She wanted to redeem the property by tendering to
amount of P23,000, as indicated in the deed of sale. Zosimo wanted the
current value of P80,000. The trial court ruled that the right of the private
respondents to redeem the property had already lapsed. Such was reversed
by the CA.
ISSUE: Does Socorro have a right to redeem the property?
HELD: Yes, because she is a legal heir of her husband David Rosales.
1. RIGHT OF REDEMPTION; WRITTEN NOTICE OF SALE,
MANDATORY. - When their interest in the property was sold by the
Burdeos heirs to petitioner, a right of redemption arose in favor of private
respondents. This right of redemption was timely exercised by private
respondents. Concededly, no written notice of the sale was given by the
Burdeos heirs (vendors) to the co-owners required under Article 1623 of
the Civil Code. The thirty-day period of redemption had yet to commence
when private respondent Rosales sought to exercise the right of
redemption on 31 March 1987, a day after she discovered the sale from the
Office of the City Treasurer of Butuan City, or when the case was
initiated, on 16 October 1987, before the trial court. The• written notice of
sale is mandatory. This Court has long established the rule that
notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still entitled
to a written notice from the selling co-owner in order to remove all
uncertainties about the sale, its terms and conditions, as well as its efficacy
and status. to the case
* connect
of Butte vs .
Manuel
Uyd Sons Inc
.

,
 2. David Rosales, incontrovertibly, survived his mother‘s death. When
Macaria died on 08 March 1956 her estate passed on to her surviving
children, among them David Rosales, who thereupon became co-owners
of the property. When David Rosales himself later died, his own estate,
which included his undivided interest over the property inherited from
Macaria, passed on to his widow Socorro and her co-heirs pursuant to the
law on succession.
―ART. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and
illegitimate children and their descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without
prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should
there be any, under Article 1001.

1 ―xxx xxx xxx

―ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with
the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.ǁ[4]
Socorro and herein private respondents, along with the co-heirs of David
Rosales, thereupon became co-owners of the property that originally
descended from Macaria.
When their interest in the property was sold by the Burdeos heirs to
petitioner, a right of redemption arose in favor of private respondents;
thus:
―ART. 1619. Legal redemption is the right to be subrogated, upon the
same terms and conditions stipulated in the contract, in the place of one
who acquires a thing by purchase or dation in payment, or by any other
transaction whereby ownership is transmitted by onerous title.ǁ
―ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption
in case the shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to
a third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the
redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.ǁ
All given, we find no error in the appellate court‘s finding that private
respondents are entitled to the redemption of the subject property.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

20. Treyes vs. Larlar, G.R. No. 232579, September 8, 2020

274 UST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65

CIVIL LAW

DR. NIXON L. TREYES v. ANTONIO L. LARLAR, et al.

G.R. No. 232579, 08 September 2020, EN BANC (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

]without any need of prior judicial determination, Larlar, et
CSubject to the required proof,
al., siblings of Rosie, by operation of law, are entitled to one-half of the inheritance of the decedent.
Thus, in filing their Complaint, they do not seek to have their right as intestate heirs established,
for the simple reason that it is the law that already establishes that right. What they seek is the
enforcement and protection of the right granted to them under Article 1001 in relation to Article
777 of the Civil Code by asking for the nullification of the Affidavits of Self-Adjudication that
disregard and violate their right as intestate heirs.

Unless there is a pending special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent’s estate or
for the determination of heirship, the compulsory or intestate heirs may commence an ordinary
civil action to declare the nullity of a deed or instrument, and for recovery of property, or any other
action in the enforcement of their ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession, without the
necessity of a prior and separate judicial declaration of their status as such.

FACTS
Rosie Larlar Treyes (Rosie), the wife of Dr. Nixon Treyes (Dr. Nixon),0 died
lar
without any children and without a will. Rosie left behind seven siblings, Antonio, Antonio Lar -

Emilio, Heddy, Rene, Celeste, Judy, and Yvonne (Larlar, et al.). L

At the time of her
death,>Rosie owned fourteen (14) real estate properties with Dr. Nixon as conjugal
properties. Subsequently,0 Dr. Nixon executed two Affidavits of Self-Adjudication,
transferring the estate of Rosie unto himself, claiming that he was the sole heir.

Hence, Larlar, et al. filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Complaint
for annulment of the Affidavits, cancellation of TCTs, reconveyance of ownership
and possession, partition, and damages.

Dr. Nixon filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground, among others, of lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter and, corollarily, lack of real parties in
interest. The RTC denied the Omnibus Motion, prompting Treyes to file before
the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. The CA,
however, denied the same. Hence, the instant petition.
2021] RECENT JURISPRUDENCE 275

ISSUE
Is a prior determination of the status as a legal or compulsory heir in a
separate special proceeding a prerequisite to an ordinary civil action for recovery
of ownership and possession of property?

RULING
NO. That Larlar, et al. do not really seek in their Complaint the
establishment of their rights as intestate heirs but, rather, the enforcement of their
rights already granted by law as intestate heirs finds basis in Article 777 of the Civil
Code, which states that “the rights of succession are transmitted from the moment
of the death of the decedent.”

O
The operation of Article 777 occurs at the very moment of the decedent's
death — the transmission by succession occurs at the precise moment of death
and, therefore, the heir is legally deemed to have acquired ownership of his/her
share in the inheritance at that very moment, "and not at the time of declaration
of heirs, or partition, or distribution."

Hence, the Court has held that the "title or rights to a deceased person's
property are immediately passed to his or her heirs upon death. The heirs' rights
become vested without need for them to be declared 'heirs.'" In fact, in partition
cases, even before the property is judicially partitioned, the heirs are already
deemed co-owners of the property. Thus, the heirs are deemed real parties in
interest without a prior separate judicial determination of their heirship.

The Civil Code identifies certain relatives who are deemed compulsory heirs
and intestate heirs. They refer to relatives that become heirs by virtue of
compulsory succession or intestate succession, as the case may be, by operation
of law. Here, subject to the required proof, without any need of prior judicial
determination, Larlar, et al., siblings of Rosie, by operation of law, are entitled to
one-half of the inheritance of the decedent. Thus, in filing their Complaint, they
do not seek to have their right as intestate heirs established, for the simple reason
that it is the law that already establishes that right. What they seek is the
enforcement and protection of the right granted to them under Article 1001 in
relation to Article 777 of the Civil Code by asking for the nullification of the
Affidavits of Self-Adjudication that disregard and violate their right as intestate
heirs.
276 UST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65

To delay the enforcement of such rights until heirship is determined with

finality in a separate special proceeding would run counter to Article 777 of the
Civil Code which recognizes the vesting of such rights immediately — without a
moment's interruption — upon the death of the decedent.

Moreover, jurisprudence supports the institution of an ordinary civil action

by legal heirs arising out of a right based on succession without the necessity of a
previous and separate judicial declaration of their status as such.

Henceforth, the rule is: unless there is a pending special proceeding for the
settlement of the decedent’s estate or for the determination of heirship, the
compulsory or intestate heirs may commence an ordinary civil action to declare
the nullity of a deed or instrument, and for recovery of property, or any other
action in the enforcement of their ownership rights acquired by virtue of
succession, without the necessity of a prior and separate judicial declaration of
their status as such.
 * Articles 1024 to 1040

1. TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE REVEREND FATHER PASCUAL RIGOR. THE

PARISH PRIEST OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF VICTORIA, TARLAC,
petitioner-appellant,
vs.
BELINA RIGOR, NESTORA RIGOR, FRANCISCA ESCOBAR DE RIGOR and JOVITA
ESCOBAR DE FAUSTO, respondents-appellees.
G.R. No. L-22036 April 30, 1979
FACTS:
AQUINO, J.:
Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died on August 9, 1935, leaving a will
executed on October 29, 1933 which was probated by the Court of First Instance of
Tarlac in its order of December 5, 1935. In addition to the devices contained therein, the
will had a provision to the effect that the testator intended to devise the ricelands to his
nearest male relative who would become a priest. It was stated therein that the parish
priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands only in two situations: one, during the
interval of time that no nearest male relative of the testator was studying for the
priesthood and two, in case the testator's nephew became a priest and he was
excommunicated.
ISSUE:

Whether or not a device in favour of a person whose identity at the time of the testator’s
death cannot be ascertained, may be efficacious.

RULING:

No.
The Supreme Court held that the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male
relative living at the time of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. "In order
to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment
the succession opens, except in case of representation, when it is proper" (Art. 1025,
Civil Code).

The said testamentary provisions should be sensibly or reasonably construed. To

construe them as referring to the testator's nearest male relative at anytime after his 3ationale
death would render the provisions difficult to apply and create uncertainty as to the
disposition of his estate. That could not have been his intention.
The reasonable view is that he was referring to a situation whereby his nephew living at
the time of his death, who would like to become a priest, was still in grade school or in
high school or was not yet in the seminary. In that case, the parish priest of Victoria
would administer the ricelands before the nephew entered the seminary. But the
moment the testator's nephew entered the seminary, then he would be entitled to enjoy
and administer the ricelands and receive the fruits thereof. In that event, the trusteeship
would be terminated.
Following that interpretation of the will the inquiry would be whether at the time Father
Rigor died in 1935 he had a nephew who was studying for the priesthood or who had
manifested his desire to follow the ecclesiastical career. That query is categorically
answered in paragraph 4 of appellant priest's petitions of February 19, 1954 and
January 31, 1957. He unequivocally alleged therein that "not male relative of the late
(Father) Pascual Rigor has ever studied for the priesthood."

Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the
unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative.
Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as
envisaged in the wilt was likewise inoperative.

It should be understood that the parish priest of Victoria could become a trustee only
when the testator's nephew living at the time of his death, who desired to become a
priest, had not yet entered the seminary or, having been ordained a priest, he was
excommunicated. Those two contingencies did not arise, and could not have arisen in
this case because no nephew of the testator manifested any intention to enter the
seminary or ever became a priest.

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article 888 of the old
Civil Code, now article 956, which provides that if "the bequest for any reason should be
inoperative, it shall be merged into the estate, except in cases of substitution and those
in which the right of accretion exists."

This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article 960 (2),
which provides that legal succession takes place when the will "does not dispose of all
that belongs to the testator." There being Cno substitution nor accretion as to the said
ricelands the same should be distributed among the testator's legal heirs. The effect is
as if the testator had made no disposition as to the said ricelands.
Art. 189. Adoption shall have the following effects: LPH

(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be

a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire
the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including the right of the
adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
(2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the
adopted shall terminate and be vested in the adopters,
except that if the adopter is the spouse of the parent by
nature of the adopted, parental authority over the adopted
shall be exercised jointly by both spouses; and
(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his
parents and other blood relatives. (39(1)a, (3)a, PD 603)
Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of * CS
the adopted shall be governed by the following rules: * PA
(1) Legitimate and illegitimate children and descendants * SIA
and the surviving spouse of the adopted shall inherit from * AIS
the adopted, in accordance with the ordinary rules of legal * A
or intestate succession; 4- E
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the
legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur with the
adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half to be
inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half,
by the adopters;
(3) When the surviving spouse or the illegitimate children
of the adopted concur with the adopters, they shall divide
the entire estate in equal shares, one-half to be inherited
by the spouse or the illegitimate children of the adopted
and the other half, by the adopters.
(4) When the adopters concur with the illegitimate children
and the surviving spouse of the adopted, they shall divide
the entire estate in equal shares, one-third to be inherited
by the illegitimate children, one-third by the surviving
spouse, and one-third by the adopters;
(5) When only the adopters survive, they shall inherit the
entire estate; and
(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted
survive, then the ordinary rules of legal or intestate
succession shall apply. (39(4)a, PD 603)

• hapter 3. Void and Voidable Marriages

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning: 18 ALB MY
- -

(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of

age even with the consent of parents or guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized
to perform marriages unless such marriages were
contracted with either or both parties believing in good
faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to
do so;
(3) Those solemnized without license, except those
covered the preceding Chapter;
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing
under Article 41;
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting
party as to the identity of the other; and
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under
Article 53.
Art. 37. Marriages between the following are
incestuous and void from the beginning, whether
relationship between the parties be legitimate or
illegitimate: AD BS
-

(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree;

and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half
blood. (81a)
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning for reasons of public policy: CASS SLACK-

(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or

illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent
and the adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and
the adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the
adopter;
(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry
the other, killed that other person’s spouse, or his or her
own spouse. (82) ¥
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
:
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage,
the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive ÷.÷¥¥
_÷¥÷÷÷÷÷
years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of
the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage
under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code
for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse. (83a)
Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the
preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the
recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent
spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous
marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of
reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the
residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the
instance of any interested person, with due notice to the
spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice
to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in
case such fact is disputed. (n)
Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage
referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the
following effects:
(1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived
prior to its termination shall be considered legitimate;
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal
partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and
liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in
bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the
community property or conjugal partnership property shall
be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are
none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous
marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid,
except that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad
faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by
operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of
the other spouse who acted in bad faith as beneficiary in
any insurance policy, even if such designation be
stipulated as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage
in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the
innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession. (n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted
in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all
donations by reason of marriage and testamentary
dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked
by operation of law. (n) CUFFIS
Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the
following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the
marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but
below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized
without the consent of the parents, guardian or person
having substitute parental authority over the party, in that
order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such
party freely cohabited with the other and both lived
together as husband and wife;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such
party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the
other as husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud,
unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the
facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other
as husband and wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force,
intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having
disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of

±÷ ÷ ¥
consummating the marriage with the other, and such
incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or
(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-
transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to
be incurable. (85a) ¥

Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4)
and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in
the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio
or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the
o•¥÷f÷§÷¥
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, the custody and support of the common children,
and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless
such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial
proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of
the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which
it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the
provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
LEGAL SEPARATION
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on
any of the following grounds: VIC RDL BIA- -

(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct

directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child
of the petitioner;
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the
petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the
petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner, to
engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or
inducement;
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to
imprisonment of more than six years, even if pardoned;
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the
respondent;
(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent
bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the
petitioner; or
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without
justifiable cause for more than one year.
For purposes of this Article, the term “child” shall include a
child by nature or by adoption. (9a
RULE 91
ESCHEATS

Sec. 1. When and by whom petition filed. - When a

person dies intestate, seized of real or personal property
in the Philippines, leaving no heir or person by law entitled
to the same, the Solicitor General or his representative in
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, may file a petition
in the Court of First Instance of the province where the
 deceased last resided or in which he had estate, if he
resided out of the Philippines, setting forth the facts, and
praying that the estate of the deceased be declared
escheated.chanrobles
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