G.R. No. 135216.

August 19, 1999]

TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Deceased Alfredo E.
Jacob, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO PILAPIL, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS for the Province
of Camarines Sur, and JUAN F. TRIVINO as publisher of Balalong, respondents.
Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J.:

Facts: Plaintiff-appellant, the petitioner herein, Tomasa Vda. De Jacob, claimed to be the surviving
spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates
of the deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the deceased.
Defendant-appellee, the private respondents herein, Pedro Pilapil, on the other hand, claimed to be the
legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In support of his claim, he presented an Order dated 18 July 1961 issued
by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the petition for adoption filed by
deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil. During the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased Alfredo in Case No. T-46 (entitled Tomasavda. de Jacob v. Jose Centenera, et al) herein
defendant-appellee Pedro sought to intervene therein claiming his share of the deceased estate as
Alfredos adopted son and as his sole surviving heir. Pedro questioned the validity of the marriage
between appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo. Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for
Intervention and filed a complaint for injunction with damages (Civil Case No. T-83) questioning
appellees claim as the legal heir of Alfredo. The lower court as well as the Court of Appeals ruled in favor
of the private respondent declaring that the Order dated July 18, 1961, and the signature of the issuing
Judge JOSE L. MOYA to be genuine and that the private respondent was the legally adopted child and
sole heir of deceased Alfredo and that the reconstructed Marriage Contract presented by the petitioner
was spurious and non-existent. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the

Issue: Whether or not Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob

Ruling: No. At the trial of this case at present, two expert witnesses were presented, one for petitioner
and one for Respondent Pilapil. The trial court relied mainly on respondents expert and brushed aside
the Deposition of Judge Moya himself. Judge Moya could not recall having ever issued the Order of
Adoption. More importantly, when shown the signature over his name, he positively declared that it
was not his. The fact that he had glaucoma when his Deposition was taken does not discredit his
statements. At the time, he could with medication still read the newspapers; upon the request of the
defense counsel, he even read a document shown to him. The Court find no reason to disregard and the
respondent has not presented any to disregard the Deposition of Judge Moya. Judge Moyas
declaration was supported by the expert testimony of NBI Document Examiner BienvenidoAlbacea,
who declared that the questioned and the standard signature Jose L. Moya were not written by one
and the same person. Other considerations also cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The alleged
Order was purportedly made in open court. In his Deposition, however, Judge Moya declared that he
did not dictate decisions in adoption cases. The only decisions he made in open court were criminal
cases, in which the accused pleaded guilty. Moreover, Judge Moya insisted that the branch where he
was assigned was always indicated in his decisions and orders; yet the questioned Order did not
contain this information. Furthermore, no proof was presented that Dr. Jacob had treated him as an
adopted child. Likewise, both the Bureau of Records Management in Manila and the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, issued Certifications that there was no record that
Pedro Pilapil had been adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these circumstances inexorably negate
the alleged adoption of respondent. The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person
claiming such relationship. This Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence presented
by petitioner shows that the alleged adoption is a sham. Thus, the Petition is grantedand the assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals was reversedandset aside.The marriage between Petitioner
TomasaVda.de Jacob and the deceased Alfredo E. Jacob was recognized and declared valid and the
claimed adoption of Respondent Pedro Pilapil is declared nonexistent.

Republic vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. G.R. No. 103695. March 15,
1996 MENDOZA, J.

FACTS: On September 21 1988 by private respondents spouses Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P.
Caranto filed for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, then fifteen years old, who had been living with
private respondent Jaime B. Caranto since he was seven years old. When private respondents were
married on January 19, 1986, the minor Midael C. Mazon stayed with them under their care and
custody. The Solicitor General opposed the petition insofar as it sought the correction of the name of
the child from "Midael" to "Michael." He argued that although the correction sought concerned only a
clerical and innocuous error, it could not be granted because the petition was basically for adoption,
not the correction of an entry in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The RTC
dismissed the opposition of the Solicitor General According to the trial court, the error could be
corrected in the same proceeding for adoption to prevent multiplicity of actions and inconvenience to
the petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the private respondents' petition for
adoption.

RULING: Yes. In this case the correction involves merely the substitution of the letters "ch" for the
letter "d," so that what appears as "Midael" as given name would read "Michael." Even the Solicitor
General admits that the error is a plainly clerical one. Changing the name of the child from "Midael C.
Mazon" to "Michael C. Mazon" cannot possibly cause any confusion, because both names "can be
read and pronounced with the same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono, tunog, himig)." The purpose of
the publication requirement is to give notice so that those who have any objection to the adoption
can make their objection known. That purpose has been served by publication of notice in this case.
Hence, the RTC correctly granted the petition for adoption of the minor Midael C. Mazon
Facts: On September 2, 1988, Spouses Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto filed a petition for
adoption of minor Midael C. Mazon, before the Regional Trial Court in Cavite City Branch XVI.

In their petition, Spouses Carato alleged that Midael C. Mazon had been living with them since he was
seven years old. They further alleged that when they got married on January 19, 1986, Midael C.
Mazon stayed with them under their care and custody.

In the petition, they prayed that after hearing, a judgment be rendered:

a) Declaring the Michael C. Mazon their child for all intents and purposes;
b) Dissolving the authority vested in the natural parents of the child; and
c) That the surname of the child be legally changed to that of the petitioners and that the first name
which was mistakenly registered as MIDAEL be corrected to MICHAEL.

The case was set for hearing on September 21, 1988, giving notice thereof by publication and by
service of the Order upon the DSWD and Office of the Solicitor General.

The OSG opposed the petition insofar as the correction of name of Midael was concerned. According
to the OSG, although the change in the name sought was clerical, the petition was basically for
adoption and not for correction of entry under Rule 108.

The RTC granted the petition for adoption and prayer of Spouses Caranto to change the name of the
child from Midael to Michael. The RTC ruled that Rule 108, contrary to the claim of the OSG, was only
applicable to concerns related to civil status of persons.

Issue: Whether or not change of name falls under Rule 108 (Correction of Entry).

Ruling: Yes. Contrary to the findings of the RTC, change of name falls under Rule 108. Section 2 (o) of
the said rule states:

"Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – xxx (o) changes of name."

Clearly, Rule 108 does not only concern civil status of persons but also concern changes of name.
This also means that the decision of the trial court, insofar as it granted the prayer for the correction
of entry, was void. This is so because the Local Civil Registrar, an indespensable party in proceedings
falling under Rule 108, was not notified. Section 3 of the said Rule states:

“3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be
made parties to the proceeding.”

Furthermore, the decision of the RTC was void also on the ground that the supposed Petition for
Correction of Entry (change of name) was not published. Meaning, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction
over the subject matter.
The petition below was filed on September 21 1988 by private respondents spouses Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto for the
adoption of Midael C. Mazon, then fifteen years old, who had been living with private respondent Jaime B. Caranto since he was seven years
old. When private respondents were married on January 19, 1986, the minor Midael C. Mazon stayed with them under their care and
custody. Private respondents prayed that judgment be rendered:

a) Declaring the child Michael C. Mazon the child of petitioners for all intents and purposes;

b.) Dissolving the authority vested in the natural parents of the child; and

c) That the surname of the child be legally changed to that of the petitioners and that the first name which was
mistakenly registered as "MIDAEL" be corrected to "MICHAEL."

The RTC set the case for hearing on September 21, 1988, giving notice thereof by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Province of Cavite and by service of the order upon the Department of Social Welfare and Development and the Office of the Solicitor
General.

The Solicitor General opposed the petition insofar as it sought the correction of the name of the child from "Midael" to "Michael." He argued
that although the correction sought concerned only a clerical and innocuous error, it could not be granted because the petition was basically
for adoption, not the correction of an entry in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Thereafter the case was heard during which private respondent Zenaida Caranto, Florentina Mazon (natural mother of the child), and the
minor testified. Also presented was Carlina Perez, social worker of the Department of Social Welfare and Development, who endorsed the
adoption of the minor, being of the opinion that the same was in the best interest of the child.

On May 30, 1989, the RTC rendered its decision. The RTC dismissed the opposition of the Solicitor General on the ground that Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) applies only to the correction of entries concerning the civil
status of persons. It cited Rule 108, §1, which provides that any person interested in an act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status
of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
thereto." It held that the correction of names in the civil registry is not one of the matters enumerated in Rule 108, §2 as "entries subject to
cancellation or correction." According to the trial court, the error could be corrected in the same proceeding for adoption to prevent multiplicity
of actions and inconvenience to the petitioners.

The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

Fact:
Petitioner Red Line Transport Co,(RED) opposed the application of Respondent Rural Transit Co
(RURAL) for a certificate of public conveyance (CPC) to facilitate bus trips from Manila to
Tuguegarao. After the Publice Service Commission approved Rural’s CPC, RED filed an motion
for hearing in which it called the attention of the CFI that the RURAL has an application of
voluntary dissolution of corporation in Manila. During the hearing, it was found out that
Bachrach Motors Company is the real operator of the said bus company. After admitting that
Bachrach was the actual operator of the bus line and only using Rural as a tradename, the CFI
order the commission to amend all the documents submitted as RURAL and change it to
Bachrach and that the RURAL application assumed Bachrach as it tradename. Hence this case.

FACTS: Rural Transit Company, Ltd., a Philippine corporation, filed with the Public Company
Service Commission an application in which it is stated in substance that it is the holder of a
certificate or public convenience to operate a passenger bus service between Manila and
Tuguegarao; that it is the only operator of direct service between said points and the present
authorized schedule of only one trip daily is not sufficient; that it will be also to the public
 convenience to grant the applicant a certificate for a new service between Tuguegarao and
Ilagan. However, this was opposed by Red Line Transportation Company alleging that it already
holds a certificate of public convenience and is rendering adequate and satisfactory service; that
the granting of the application of the Rural Transit Company, Ltd., would not serve public
convenience but would constitute a ruinous competition for the oppositor over said route. At
the trial of this case before the Public Service Commission an issue was raised as to who was the
real party in interest making the application, whether the Rural Transit Company, Ltd., as
appeared on the face of the application, or the Bachrach Motor Company, Inc., using name of
the Rural Transit Company, Ltd., as a trade name.

FACTS Universal Textile Mills, Inc. is a textile manufacturing firm for which it was issued a
certificate of registration. On the other hand, Universal Mills Corporation was registered having as its
primary purpose the "manufacture and production of hosieries and wearing apparel of all kinds." The
occurrence of a fire which gutted the latter's spinning mills in Pasig, Rizal prompted Universal Textile
Mills, Inc. to file a complaint because of the similarity of the corporate names which created uncertainty
and confusion among its bankers, friends, stockholders and customers. Thereafter, Securities and
Exchange Commission granted the petition and ordered Universal Mills Corporation to change its
corporate name for being "confusingly and deceptively similar."

FACTS: Lyceum of the Philippines Inc. previously obtained from the SEC a favorable decision on the
exclusive use of “Lyceum” against Lyceum of Baguio, Inc. such decision assailed by the latter before the
SC which was denied for lack of merit. Armed with the Resolution of the Supreme Court, the Lyceum of
the Philippines then wrote all the educational institutions it could find using the word "Lyceum" as part
of their corporate name and advised them to discontinue such use of "Lyceum." Unheeded, Lyceum of
the Philippines instituted before the SEC an action to enforce what Lyceum of the Philippines claims as
its proprietary right to the word "Lyceum." The SEC rendered a decision sustaining petitioner's claim to
an exclusive right to use the word "Lyceum." The hearing officer relied upon the SEC ruling in the
Lyceum of Baguio, Inc. case. On appeal, however, by Lyceum Of Aparri, Lyceum Of Cabagan, Lyceum Of
Camalaniugan, Inc., Lyceum Of Lallo, Inc., Lyceum Of Tuao, Inc., Buhi Lyceum, Central Lyceum Of
Catanduanes, Lyceum Of Southern Philippines, Lyceum Of Eastern Mindanao, Inc. and Western
Pangasinan Lyceum, Inc.,, which are also educational institutions, to the SEC en banc, the decision of the
hearing officer was reversed and set aside. The SEC en banc did not consider the word "Lyceum" to have
become so identified with Lyceum of the Philippines as to render use thereof by other institutions as
productive of confusion about the identity of the schools concerned in the mind of the general public.
Unlike its hearing officer, the SEC en banc held that the attaching of geographical names to the word
"Lyceum" served sufficiently to distinguish the schools from one another, especially in view of the fact
that the campuses of Lyceum of the Philippines and those of the other Lyceums were physically quite

Pursuant to the above provision, petitioner must comply with the following requisites: (1) the taxpayer is
engaged in sales which are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated; (2) the taxpayer is VAT-registered; (3) the
claim must be filed within two years after the close of the taxable quarter when such sales were made; and (4)
the creditable input tax due or paid must be attributable to such sales, except the transitional input tax, to the
extent that such input tax has not been applied against the output tax.

The Court finds that the first three requirements have been complied [with] by petitioner.

Dissatisfied with the above-quoted Decision, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, 15 insisting that
the administrative and the judicial claims were filed beyond the two-year period to claim a tax refund/credit
provided for under Sections 112(A) and 229 of the NIRC. He reasoned that since the year 2004 was a leap
year, the filing of the claim for tax refund/credit on September 30, 2004 was beyond the two-year period, which
expired on September 29, 2004.16 He cited as basis Article 13 of the Civil Code,17 which provides that when the
law speaks of a year, it is equivalent to 365 days. In addition, petitioner argued that the simultaneous filing of
the administrative and the judicial claims contravenes Sections 112 and 229 of the NIRC. 18 According to the
petitioner, a prior filing of an administrative claim is a "condition precedent" 19 before a judicial claim can be filed.
He explained that the rationale of such requirement rests not only on the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies but also on the fact that the CTA is an appellate body which exercises the power of
judicial review over administrative actions of the BIR. 20

Sec. 229. Recovery of Tax Erroneously or Illegally Collected. – No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in
any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or
illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, of any sum
alleged to have been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected without authority, or of any sum alleged
to have been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly
filed with the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty,
or sum has been paid under protest or duress.

In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from the date of
payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment: Provided,
however, That the Commissioner may, even without a written claim therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on
the face of the return upon which payment was made, such payment appears clearly to have been erroneously
paid.

Section 112(D) of the NIRC clearly provides that the CIR has "120 days, from the date of the submission of the
complete documents in support of the application [for tax refund/credit]," within which to grant or deny the
claim. In case of full or partial denial by the CIR, the taxpayer’s recourse is to file an appeal before the CTA
within 30 days from receipt of the decision of the CIR. However, if after the 120-day period the CIR fails to act
on the application for tax refund/credit, the remedy of the taxpayer is to appeal the inaction of the CIR to CTA
within 30 days.

In this case, the administrative and the judicial claims were simultaneously filed on September 30, 2004.
Obviously, respondent did not wait for the decision of the CIR or the lapse of the 120-day period. For this
reason, we find the filing of the judicial claim with the CTA premature.

Respondent’s assertion that the non-observance of the 120-day period is not fatal to the filing of a judicial claim
as long as both the administrative and the judicial claims are filed within the two-year prescriptive period 52 has
no legal basis.

Enano-Bote, et.al. vs Alvarez (G.R. No. 223572, 10 November 2022)

FACTS: Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) entered into a Lease Agreement with Centennial Air,
Inc. (CAIR), for the lease of the subject property located at Subic Bay International Airport (SBIA),
Subic Bay Freeport Zone (SBFZ), for a period of five (5) years. For the duration of the lease, CAIR
became delinquent and was constantly remiss in the payment of its obligations. As a result,
SMBA demanded CAIR to settle its outstanding obligation. To settle its account, CAIR proposed a
payment scheme for its overdue debts. However, while an initial payment was received, CAIR never
delivered the post-dated checks to SBMA. Despite repeated demands, CAIR still failed to comply.
Due to continuous refusal to settle its debts, SMBA filed a Complaint against CAIR and its stockholders
for the payment of the outstanding obligation. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) held that CAIR and Enano-
Bote et. al., its stockholders, are jointly and severally liable to pay SBMA. The Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the decision of the the RTC. The CA applied the trust fund doctrine to make said stockholders
personally and solidarily liable with CAIR for the unpaid rentals claimed by SBMA against CAIR because
of their supposedly unpaid subscriptions in CAIR's capital stock.

ISSUE: Whether Bote, et al. are personally and solidarily liable with CAIR on the basis of the trust fund
doctrine.
HELD: No. In the case of Halley v. Printwell, Inc., the Court recognized two instances when the creditor
is allowed to maintain an action upon any unpaid subscriptions based on the trust fund doctrine: (1)
where the debtor corporation released the subscriber to its capital stock from the obligation of paying
for their shares, in whole or in part, without a valuable consideration, or fraudulently, to the prejudice
of creditors; and (2) where the debtor corporation is insolvent or has been dissolved without providing
for the payment of its creditors. Clearly, the first instance finds no relevance in the present case.
It is the second which SBMA, as creditor, may invoke to collect from CAIR's stockholders for their
unpaid subscriptions and apply the same to CAIR's unpaid rentals. But, as stressed in Halley: "To make
out a prima facie case in a suit against stockholders of an insolvent corporation to compel them to
contribute to the payment of its debts by making good unpaid balances upon their subscriptions, it is
only necessary to establish that the stockholders have not in good faith paid the par value of the
stocks of the corporation."
Salido vs. Aramaywan Metals Development Corporation, et. al., (GR No. 233857, 18 March 2021)
FACTS: Sometime in April 2005, Cerlito San Juan, Ernesto Mangune, and Agapito Salido, Jr., along
with four other individuals (Salido faction) agreed to form two mining corporations, Aramaywan and
Narra Mining Corporation. They entered into an Agreement to Incorporate (Agreement), wherein it was
stipulated that San Juan would advance the paid-up subscription for Aramaywan amounting to
P2,500,000.00 and would assure the payment of the subscription of the capital stock of Narra Mining.
In exchange, San Juan would own 55% of the stocks of Aramaywan and 35% of the stocks of Narra
Mining. In line with the said Agreement, San Juan then advanced P2,500,000.00 paid-up subscriptions
of Aramaywan.