PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS REVIEW | ATTY. LYDIA C.
GALAS 1
Persons and Family
Relations Review
Case Summaries of Recent1 Jurisprudence
in the 2021 Syllabus of Atty. Lydia C. Galas
By: Kanal Clooney
Article 2 – Publication of Laws
VILLAFUERTE v. CORDIAL
G.R. No. 222450; July 7, 2020; Reyes, Jr.
Municipal ordinances are not covered
by the Civil Code, but by the LGC.
What was being assailed is Resolution No. 13-2013, which provides for
the rules of procedure concerning the conduct of investigation against
municipal officials in said province, issued by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. Clearly, it is neither penal in nature as it does not provide
for any sanction or punishment nor a tax measure. It is merely
interpretative of Title II, Chapter 4 of the LGC, which outlines the
procedure when a disciplinary action is instituted against an elective
local official. Based on the foregoing, Resolution No. 13-2013 need not
be published.
Article 4 – Prospectivity of Laws
WILLIAM G. KWONG MANAGEMENT vs. DIAMOND
HOMEOWNERS & RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION
G.R. No. 211353, June 10, 2019
In 2006, the Homeowners issued a "No Sticker, No ID, No Entry" Policy
in the subdivision. Petitioners argue that the 2010 Magna Carta for
Homeowners and Homeowners' Associations does not apply because it
was not yet in effect when the Policy was issued. Assuming that it
applies, they assert that respondent failed to comply with the stated
requisites.
Petitioners are correct. The Policy was approved in 2006, way before
the law was enacted in 2010. Diamond Homeowners, then, could not
have yet complied with the conditions provided. It would, thus, be
unjustified if the Policy were to be invalidated on the ground that these
conditions were not followed.
Laws are not retroactive. Article 4 of the Civil Code states that "laws shall
have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." Lex prospicit,
non respicit; the law looks forward, not backward. This is due to the
unconstitutional result of retroacting a law's application: it divests rights
that have already become vested or impairs obligations of contract.
Article 11 and 12 – Customs
ANABAN v. ANABAN-ALFILER
GR 249011, March 15, 2021, Lazaro-Javier
Pedrito and Virginia married in accordance of customs of Ibaloi tribe in
1942. Wife (Virginia) was found to be insane. Council of Elders granted
and approved divorce. In 1952, Pedrito married Pepang, also in
accordance with Ibaloi customs. Pedrito died leaving land. Heirs of first
marriage are claiming the land, but another title is also named under
Pedrito married to Pepang.
Children of the marriage claim that the 2nd marriage with Pepang was
null and void since there was no valid dissolution of the first marriage.
Children of 2nd marriage cited Article 78 of Civil Code referring to
marriage between Mohammedans or pagans (Article 33 of the Family
Code). But what is actually covered by this provision is the exemption
from obtaining a marriage license but not exempting them from the
provisions of the Civil Code or Family Code on the termination of
marriage. Thus, it finds no application.
1 Recent – Kaka add lang sa syllabus.
KANAL CLOONEY-RENALDI
SC: Assuming the divorce was in accordance to their customs, this has
yet to be proved. Article 12 provides that custom must be proved as a
fact, according to the rules of evidence. The proper authority to receive
evidence as to the validity of the custom is the NCIP.
Petitioners invoke PSA's AO 3 governing the procedures and guidelines
for civil registration of births, marriages, dissolution of marriages, and
other civil concerns of the ICCs and IPs. According to petitioners, AO 3
defines dissolution of marriage among IPs as the termination of marriage
per ruling of the council of elders for causes sanctioned by established
customary law or practice after exhausting all possible means of
reconciliation between the couple.
But, AO 3 only took effect in 2004, fifty-seven (57) years after the divorce
was supposedly granted by the Ibaloi council of elders to Pedrito and
Virginia. It cannot be applied retroactively, but only prospectively.
Besides, AO 3 is only a procedural avenue to recognize divorce or any
other form of dissolution of marriage where the substantive law already
recognizes such change in a person's civil status. AO 3 cannot confer
substantive rights because the role of the PSA [NSO] is to record the
civil status of persons but not to issue laws on how to obtain or confer
status.
Error in Case: Civil Code did not take effect in June 1949. It
was approved in June 1949 but only published in August 30,
1950. Published in 1949, so 1 year after its complete publication.
Article 15 – Nationality Theory
SIMUNDAC-KEPPEL v. KEPPEL
G.R. No. 202039, August 14, 2019
A Former Filipino, went to Germany, contracted marriage with another
Filipino and had another affair with George Keppel. When she became
a German citizen, Angelita divorced Filipino spouse.
They went to the PH where she bought real properties where she
constructed and rented out a building. Also bought another property
where family home constructed. She filed petition for annulment against
George since he refused to leave.
Under the Nationality Principle, Angelita cannot invoke Article 36
of the FC unless there is a German law that allows her to do so.
A fundamental and obvious defect of Angelita's petition for annulment of
marriage is that it seeks a relief improper under Philippine law in light of
both Georg and Angelita being German citizens, not Filipinos, at the time
of the filing thereof. Based on the Nationality Principle, which is followed
in this jurisdiction, and pursuant to which laws relating to family rights
and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad, it
was the pertinent German law that governed. In short, Philippine law
finds no application herein as far as the family rights and obligations of
the parties who are foreign nationals are concerned.
Accordingly, the petition for annulment initiated by Angelita fails scrutiny
through the lens of the Nationality Principle.
Firstly, what governs the marriage of the parties is German, not
Philippine law, and this rendered it incumbent upon Angelita to allege
and prove the applicable German law. Our courts do not take judicial
notice of foreign laws; hence, the existence and contents of such laws
are regarded as questions of fact, and, as such, must be alleged and
proved like any other disputed fact. Angelita did not comply with the
requirements for pleading and proof of the relevant German law.
Secondly, Angelita overlooked that German and Philippine laws on
annulment of marriage might not be the same. In other words, the
remedy of annulment of the marriage due to psychological incapacity
afforded by Article 36 of the Family Code might not be available for her.
In the absence of a showing of her right to this remedy in accordance
with German law, therefore, the petition should be dismissed.
Ang umaayaw ay di nagwawagi, ang nagwawagi ay
di umaayaw. SY 2021-2022
 PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS REVIEW | ATTY. LYDIA C. GALAS
SUZUKI vs. OSG
G.R. No. 212302, September 02, 2020
Suzuki is a Filipino and was the child from a former marriage between
Lorlie and her Japanese husband They divorced. Lorlie contracted
another marriage with Hayashi. While he was 16, was adopted by
Hayashi based on Japanese law.
Suzuki filed before RTC a Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Adoption Decree. RTC dismiss the petition since adoption is only valid if
made within the legal framework on adoption as enunciated in the Inter-
Country Adoption Act, and RA 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998).
Held: RTC erroneously ruled that a foreign judgment of adoption of a
Filipino citizen cannot be judicially recognized based on the view that
such recognition would render nugatory the Philippine laws on adoption.
It bears to emphasize that there are two parties involved in an adoption
process: the adopter and the adoptee. Hayashi, the adopter, is a
Japanese citizen.
Owing to the nationality principle in Article 15, the PH laws on adoption
are thus binding on Suzuki. However, Hayashi, who is a Japanese
citizen, PH courts are: precluded from deciding on his "family rights and
duties, or on his status, condition and legal capacity" concerning the
foreign judgment to which he is a party. Thus, as to the foreign judgment
of adoption obtained by Hayashi, if it is proven as a fact, the PH courts
are limited to the determination of whether to extend its effect to Suzuki,
the Filipino party.
Note: SC cited Article 184 (Par. 3, Sub. B) of the FC which allows
foreigners to adopt the legitimate child of the Filipino. Atty. Galas claims
this should no longer apply since it was repealed by DAA and the case
was filed after effectivity of RA 8552. (Family Code provisions on
adoption have already been repealed by DAA except Art. 190 involving
distribution of the estate of the adopted child if died intestate.)
Article 16 – Law Governing Intrinsic Validity of Wills
CAYETANO vs. LEONIDAS
G.R. No. L-54919 May 30, 1984
Adoracion died, leaving her father, Hermogenes and her sisters, Nenita,
Remedios and Marieta as the surviving heirs. As Hermogenes was the
only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication whereby
he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of the
deceased Adoracion.
Eleven months after, Nenita filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of
the Adoracion, which was allegedly executed in the US and for her
appointment as administratrix.
Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at the time of
her death and was a permanent resident Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the
testatrix died in Manila; that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her
will according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.
Hermogenes opposed alleging that the will in question is a forgery; that
the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void; and that even if
pertinent American laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the same
could not apply inasmuch as they would work injustice and injury to him.
Held: It is sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her
death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of
the Civil Code which respectively provide:
Art. 16 par. (2): Intestate and testamentary successions, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
Art. 1039: Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of
the decedent.
KANAL CLOONEY-RENALDI
2
The law which governs Adoracion's will is the law of Pennsylvania,
U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties
admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that
all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger,
Hermogenes argues that such law should not apply because it would be
contrary to the sound and established public policy and would run
counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of
the will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the
national law of the decedent must apply.
ANCHETA vs. GUERSEY-DALAYGON
G.R. No. 139868 June 8, 2006
Spouses Audrey and Richard were American citizens who have resided
in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle.
Audrey died, leaving a will. In it, she bequeathed her entire estate to
Richard, who was also designated as executor. The will was admitted to
probate in Maryland, U.S.A. The court also named Atty. Ancheta as
ancillary administrator.
Audrey’s will was also admitted to probate by the then CFI of Rizal. As
administrator of Audrey’s estate in the Philippines, Ancheta filed an
inventory and appraisal. Atty. Ancheta filed in Special Proceeding a
motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey. He also filed a
project of partition of Audrey’s estate.
Ancheta’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of
Audrey’s estate according to the terms of her will and as dictated
by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud.
Audrey was an American citizen domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A. Being a
foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey’s will, especially with
regard as to who are her heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the
law of the State of Maryland, as provided in Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that "capacity to succeed
is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent."
While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our
courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them; however,
Ancheta, as ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate, was duty-bound
to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland.
Ancheta admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the
State of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, and merely relied on the
presumption that such law is the same as the Philippine law on wills and
succession. Thus, the trial court peremptorily applied Philippine laws
and totally disregarded the terms of Audrey’s will. The obvious result
was that there was no fair submission of the case before the trial court
or a judicious appreciation of the evidence presented.
Article 19 – Principle of Abuse of Rights
LOMARDA vs. FUDALAN
G.R. No. 246012, June 17, 2020
Summary: Barangay people in bad faith didn’t want to issue the BAPA
certification so the guy had to tap on some other house’s electricity.
Fudalan, through his wife, Alma, applied for electrical service from
BOHECO I to illuminate their farmhouse. At the pre-membership
seminar, Fudalan paid the membership fee and was advised to employ
the services of an authorized electrician from BOHECO I. Accordingly,
Fudalan employed the services of Albelda, a BOHECO I authorized
electrician, who informed him that the electrical connection could only
be installed in his farmhouse if he procures a certification from Raso, the
Barangay Power Association Chairperson. Fudalan then instructed his
farmhand to get a certification from Raso but despite efforts to reach
Raso, the latter was unavailable. Thus, Fudalan consented to the
tapping of his electrical line to that of BAPA upon the assurance of
Albelda that he would not be charged with pilferage of electricity because
his electric usage shall be determined by the check meter of BOHECO
I at the base of the drop line and shall be billed accordingly.
Ang umaayaw ay di nagwawagi, ang nagwawagi ay
di umaayaw. SY 2021-2022
 PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS REVIEW | ATTY. LYDIA C. GALAS
Fudalan still tried again to obtain Raso's certification. However, during
their meeting, Raso allegedly got mad, vowed to never issue the said
certification, and eventually then reported the matter to BOHECO I for
disconnection.
Feeling aggrieved, Fudalan and his wife went to BOHECO I to complain
about Raso's malicious actuations. They were attended to by the
receiving clerk, Lomarda, who, after reviewing their documents, told
them that he would conduct an ocular inspection of their farmhouse. The
next day, Fudalan, together with his farmhand, went looking for Raso
and confronted her about the latter's threat of disconnection. To appease
them, Raso guaranteed not to order the disconnection of Fudalan's
electricity; nevertheless, she still refused to issue the certification on the
premise that Fudalan's farmhouse already had electricity. In the course
of their conversation, Raso uttered, "Sabut sabuton lang ni nato," which
translates to "let us just settle this."
Fudalan and his wife once more went to Raso to follow up on the
issuance of such certification. They met at the purok center, where Raso
was conducting a meeting with several purok members. Thereat, Raso
asked why Fudalan's electricity has not yet been installed. Fudalan took
this to be a sarcastic and rhetorical remark because Raso was, in fact,
the one withholding the issuance of the BAPA certification which was
precisely the cause of the delay of the aforesaid installation.
In another confrontation, Raso explained that she was about to issue the
certification but was prevented by Lomarda, who allegedly apprised her
of a pending complaint for premature tapping against Fudalan. To settle
the misunderstanding, Raso directed Fudalan to discuss the matter with
Lomarda at his house, and again uttered "Sabut sabuton lang ni nato."
During their conversation, Lomarda told Fudalan that he earlier received
a disconnection order issued a long time ago but misplaced the
document, and that an ocular inspection of Fudalan's farmhouse will be
conducted. When Fudalan informed Raso of the date of inspection, the
latter once again remarked, "Sabut sabuton lang ni nato.”
On the day of inspection, Fudalan was assured that his electricity will
not be disconnected and that Raso will issue the certification, provided
he would pay the amount of P1,750 or sign a promissory note. Fudalan,
however, refused to comply with the said conditions, reasoning that
there was no official order from the concerned office. After Fudalan
refused to pay, Lomarda allegedly posed in front of a camera and while
pointing at the slot provided for the electric meter, shouted, "This is an
illegal tapping." Thereafter, Lomarda, in the presence of policemen, the
barangay treasurer, and other several passersby, ordered his linemen
to cut off Fudalan's electricity.
Fudalan communicated with BOHECO I, through phone, and inquired
about his electric dues. He was informed that there was no system loss
or excess billed to the cooperative, and that his electric usage amounted
only to P20.
Fudalan filed a complaint for damages before the RTC. Fudalan alleged
that Lomarda and Raso confederated with one another to purposely
delay the approval of his application for electric connection by: (a)
withholding the issuance of the BAPA certification; (b) falsely accusing
him of premature tapping and pilferage of electricity; and (c) demanding
the payment of P1,750, when what was due him was only P20.
Petitioners mainly argue that they should not be held liable for damages,
considering that Fudalan made a premature and unauthorized tapping
of his electrical connection. In this regard, they invoke the principle that
he who comes to court must come with clean hands.
Petitioners should be held liable for damages
under Article 19, in relation to Article 21, of the Civil Code.
While it appears that petitioners were engaged in a legal act, i.e.,
exacting compliance with the requirements for the installation of
Fudalan's electricity in his farmhouse, the circumstances of this case
show that the same was conducted contrary to morals and good
customs, and were in fact done with the intent to cause injury to Fudalan.
Petitioners did not only fail to apprise Fudalan of the proper procedure
to expedite compliance with the requirements, they also misled him to
believe that everything can be settled, extorted money from him when
only a meager amount was due, and worse, publicly humiliated him in
front of many people which ended up in the disconnection of his
electricity altogether. To be sure, the clean hands doctrine - which was
invoked by petitioners herein – should not apply in their favor,
KANAL CLOONEY-RENALDI
3
considering that while Fudalan may have technically failed to procure
the required BAPA certification and proceeded with the tapping, the
same was not due to his lack of effort or intention in complying with the
rules in good faith. As exhibited above, it was, in fact, petitioners' own
acts which made compliance with the rules impossible. Hence, Fudalan
was actually free from fault, negating the application of the clean hands
doctrine.
NAVARRO-BANARIA vs. BANARIA
G.R. No. 217806, July 28, 2020
Summary: Birthday party but no celebrant. So it’s just a party choz.
Pascasio, the family patriarch, at the time of the filing of the complaint,
was already frail and suffering from physical and mental infirmity
incapacitating him to fully functioning on his own without any assistance.
The action for damages of respondents stemmed from the alleged bad
faith, malice, and deliberate failure of Adelaida to keep her word and
honor her promise to bring Pascasio to his 90th birthday celebration.
Such special event was prepared by the respondents and the non-
appearance of Pascasio during the event allegedly caused loss and
injury to the respondents.
Respondents alleged that the planning of the event started as early as
a year before the planned 90th birthday celebration. Respondents were
in continuous contact with Adelaida to remind her of the upcoming event.
Adelaida, for her part, confirmed Pascasio's attendance during the event
although it coincides with the death anniversary of Adelaida's mother.
Adelaida promised respondents that she will try her best to attend the
birthday celebration in the evening.
Relatives residing in the US, arrived in the country to attend the birthday
celebration of their father.
However, much to the dismay of the Banaria siblings as well as their
guests, Pascasio was nowhere to be found in his 90th birthday
celebration. Respondents continuously called Adelaida but they were
not able to contact her. Almost 200 guests were at the venue waiting for
Pascasio to come. The siblings deemed it proper to continue the
celebration even without the birthday celebrant himself. Worried that
there might be something untoward that happened to their father,
respondents went to the nearest police station to report Pascasio as a
missing person. However, they were advised by the police officers that
before a person can be considered missing, there should be a 24-hour
waiting period. Thus, respondents just entered their concern in the police
blotter. The next day, the missing person report was officially made after
Pascasio and Adelaida have not been seen or heard for more than 24
hours.
Marcelino, Pascasio's brother, told the other respondents that Pascasio
and Adelaida were at their residence at Quezon City. Respondents went
to the said place to ask Adelaida her reason why Pascasio was not able
to attend the birthday celebration. Adelaida reasoned that Pascasio did
not want to go to the party. When asked why Adelaida broke her
commitment to bring Pascasio to the party, Adelaida uttered the words,
"I am the wife." Thus, the Complaint for Damages filed by respondents
against Adelaida.
Adelaida rebutted by saying that she was not privy to the birthday
celebration for Pascasio. She also said that she deemed it wise to spare
Pascasio of the embarrassment and humiliation of defecating and
urinating without regard to the people around him brought about by his
advanced age.
Held: While Article 19 of the New Civil Code may have been intended
as a mere declaration of principle, the "cardinal law on human conduct"
expressed in said article has given rise to certain rules, e.g., that where
a person exercises his rights but does so arbitrarily or unjustly or
performs his duties in a manner that is not in keeping with honesty and
good faith, he opens himself to liability. The elements of an abuse of
rights under Article 19 are: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is
exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another.
Ang umaayaw ay di nagwawagi, ang nagwawagi ay
di umaayaw. SY 2021-2022
 PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS REVIEW | ATTY. LYDIA C. GALAS
Consequently, when Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is
proper under Article 20 and 21 of the New Civil Code. Article 20 pertains
to damages arising from a violation of law.
For starters, there is no question that as legal wife and guardian of
Pascasio, who is physically and mentally infirm, Adelaida has the
principal and overriding decision when it comes to the affairs of her
husband including the celebration of the latter's 90th birthday.
However, it must be noted Adelaida's right, as with any rights,
cannot be exercised without limitation. The exercise of this right must
conform to the exacting standards of conduct enunciated in Article 19.
Adelaida was clearly remiss in this aspect.
Adelaida was already informed about the event. A year before the
scheduled event, Adelaida was already reminded of the event by the
respondents to which she confirmed Pascasio's attendance. Even
though Adelaida alleges that she was not privy to any birthday
celebration for Pascasio, the fact remains that she was continuously
informed and reminded about the scheduled event. She even
contributed P5K for the costs.
Following Adelaida's testimony that Pascasio had already decided not
to attend his birthday celebration a day before such event, she should
have contacted the respondents immediately for the respondents to be
able to take appropriate action. Adelaida knew fully well that the
respondents already spent a considerable amount of money and earnest
efforts were already made to ensure the success of the event. The least
that Adelaida could have done was to inform the respondents
immediately of any unforeseen circumstance that would hinder its
success and to avert any further damage or injury to the respondents.
Moreover, considering that numerous guests were invited and have
confirmed their attendance, she placed the respondents in a very
embarrassing situation.
Instead of making good on her prior commitment, Adelaida allegedly
followed Pascasio's wish of going to Tarlac. At that time, Adelaida still
had the opportunity to contact the respondents and inform them that they
will not be able to come, but she did not. Her excuse, that Pascasio
grabbed her cellular phone and caused damage to it, is feeble and
unrealistic. We find incredulous that Pascasio, who was allegedly infirm,
would be able to grab the cellphone from Adelaida and throw it away,
when he cannot even move on his own without any assistance. And
even if true, there are certainly other means of communication aside
from her cellphone if she really wanted to call the respondents.
Adelaida also neglected to contact the respondents immediately after
their return to Manila. If she was sincere in bringing Pascasio to his
birthday celebration, then she would have immediately called the
respondents upon returning to Manila to inform them of their
whereabouts and to state the reason for Pascasio non-attendance.
We find it dubious that Pascasio would refuse to attend his birthday
celebration. Respondents have sufficiently established that it was an
annual tradition for the family to celebrate the birthday of their father
Pascasio. Besides, the allegation that Pascasio refused to attend his
birthday celebration because of an alleged misunderstanding with his
two sons was not duly proven. Common sense dictates that he should
have conveyed about the matter when they visited him, but he did not.
All in all, Adelaida intentionally failed to bring Pascasio to the birthday
celebration prepared by the respondents thus violating Article 19 of the
Civil Code on the principle of abuse of right. Her failure to observe good
faith in the exercise of her right as the wife of Pascasio caused loss and
injury on the part of the respondents, for which they must be
compensated by way of damages pursuant to Article 21 of the Civil
Code.
KANAL CLOONEY-RENALDI
4
Article 22 – Unjust Enrichment
YON MITORI INTERNATIONAL vs. UNION BANK
G.R. No. 225538, October 14, 2020
Tan, doing business under Yon Mitori, is a depositor of Union Bank. Tan
deposited in said account, P420K through a BPI Check. The BPI Check
was drawn against the account of Angli Lumber, one of Tan's alleged
clients.
The BPI Check was entered in Tan's bank record increasing his balance
to P513.7K from his previous deposit of P93.7K. Tan withdrew from the
said account the amount of P480K. Later that day, the BPI Check was
returned to Union Bank as the account against which it was drawn had
been closed. Union Bank discovered that Tan's account had been
mistakenly credited. Thus, the branch manager immediately called Tan
to recover the funds mistakenly released. However, Tan refused to
return the funds, claiming that the BPI Check proceeded from a valid
transaction between Angli Lumber and Yon Mitori.
Union Bank discovered that Tan previously deposited five BPI checks
drawn by Angli Lumber against the same BPI account, and that these
five checks were all previously dishonored.
Union Bank sent Tan a letter demanding reimbursement of the amount
since the funds against said deposit was inadvertently allowed due to
technical error on the system prior to actual return of your check deposit
which was not yet clear on withdrawal date, it appearing that the BPI
Check was dishonored by BPI for being drawn against a closed account.
Tan refused to return the said amount. Union Bank then debited the
available balance reflected in [Tan's] account amounting to P34.7K and
thereafter instituted a Complaint for Sum of Money for the recovery of
the remaining balance.
Held: Tan is bound to return the proceeds of the dishonored BPI Check
based on the principle of unjust enrichment.
In this case, Tan deposited the BPI Check in his account with Union
Bank for collection. Clearly, Union Bank stands as the collecting bank in
this case. By receiving the BPI Check from Tan, Union Bank obliged
itself, as collecting bank, to credit Tan's account only after BPI, as
drawee, shall have paid the amount of the said check or after the check
is cleared for deposit.
The dishonor of the BPI Check is not disputed. Evidently, Union Bank
was under no obligation to effect payment in favor of Tan precisely
because the BPI Check which Tan deposited for collection had been
dishonored. Allowing Tan to retain the proceeds of the dishonored BPI
Check despite not being entitled thereto would therefore permit unjust
enrichment at Union Bank's expense.
There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit
to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property
of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity,
and good conscience.
For the principle to apply, the following requisites must concur: (i) a
person is unjustly benefited; and (ii) such benefit is derived at the
expense of or with damages to another. Unjust enrichment claims do not
lie simply because one party benefits from the efforts or obligations of
others, but instead it must be shown that a party was unjustly enriched
in the sense that the term unjustly could mean illegally or unlawfully.
Moreover, to substantiate a claim for unjust enrichment, the claimant
must unequivocally prove that another party knowingly received
something of value to which he was not entitled and that the state
of affairs are such that it would be unjust for the person to keep the
benefit.
The requisites for the application of the principle of unjust enrichment
are clearly present in this case. Here, it was unequivocally established
that Tan withdrew and utilized the proceeds of the BPI Check fully
knowing that he was not entitled thereto.
Tan's testimony confirms that he was fully aware that Angli Lumber's
account with BPI had been closed. So he could not have expected that
the BPI Check in question would be honored. Stated differently, he was
Ang umaayaw ay di nagwawagi, ang nagwawagi ay
di umaayaw. SY 2021-2022
 PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS REVIEW | ATTY. LYDIA C. GALAS
cognizant of the BPI Check's impending dishonor at the time he
withdrew its proceeds from his Union Bank account. That Tan withdrew
the proceeds of the BPI Check soon after discovering that the
corresponding funds had been credited to his account despite his
knowledge that the account from which the BPI Check was issued had
been closed for some time smacks of bad faith if not fraud. Tan's refusal
to return the funds despite Union Bank's repeated demands is
reprehensible.
Tan, the depositor herein, was unjustly benefited by reason of the
erroneous credit made in his favor. Such benefit, in turn, was derived at
the expense of Union Bank as the collecting bank. Thus, based on the
principle of unjust enrichment, Tan is bound to return the proceeds of
the BPI Check which he had no right to receive. Since Tan refused to
return the mistakenly credited amount of P420K, Union Bank applied
Tan's remaining balance of P34.7K to set off his debt before it filed its
Complaint before the RTC.
Family Code
Article 26 (2) Marriage Between a Filipino and a Foreigner
NULLADA vs. CIVIL REGISTRAR OF MANILA
G.R. No. 224548 January 23, 2019
Marlyn and Akira obtained a divorce by mutual agreement. In 2009,
Akira and Marlyn secured a divorce decree in Japan.
Similar to the remedy that was allowed by the Court in Manalo to resolve
such failure, a remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings
and reception of evidence on the laws of Japan on divorce is allowed,
as it is hereby ordered by the Court.
ARREZA vs. TOYO
G.R. No. 213198 July 1, 2019
In actions involving the recognition of a foreign divorce judgment, it is
indispensable that the petitioner prove not only the foreign judgment
granting the divorce, but also the alien spouse's national law. This rule
is rooted in the fundamental theory that Philippine courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws.
Both the foreign divorce decree and the foreign spouse's national law,
purported to be official acts of a sovereign authority, can be established
by complying with the mandate of Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25.
RTC ruled that the documents petitioner submitted to prove the divorce
decree have complied with the demands of Rule 132. However, it found
the copy of the Japan Civil Code and its English translation insufficient
to prove Japan's law on divorce. It noted that these documents were not
duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan, the Japanese
Consul in Manila, or the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Notwithstanding, petitioner argues that the English translation of the
Japan Civil Code is an official publication having been published under
the authorization of the Ministry of Justice and, therefore, is considered
a self-authenticating document.
Petitioner is mistaken.
The English translation submitted by petitioner was published by Eibun-
Horei-Sha, Inc., a private company in Japan engaged in publishing
English translation of Japanese laws, which came to be known as the
EHS Law Bulletin Series. However, these translations are "not
advertised as a source of official translations of Japanese laws;" rather,
it is in the KANPO or the Official Gazette where all official laws and
regulations are published, albeit in Japanese.
Accordingly, the English translation submitted by petitioner is not an
official publication exempted from the requirement of
authentication.
The case is REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action,
including the reception of evidence, to DETERMINE and RESOLVE the
pertinent factual issues in accordance with this Decision.
KANAL CLOONEY-RENALDI
5
KONDO v. CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL
G.R. No. 223628, March 04, 2020
Divorce by agreement in Japan for which they were issued a Report of
Divorce.
Racho v. Tanaka
Petitioner was divorced by her Japanese husband. She obtained an
authenticated Divorce Certificate from the Japanese embassy which the
trial court deemed insufficient to prove the divorce decree. The Court,
nonetheless, ruled that the Filipino spouse may be granted the capacity
to remarry once it is proven that the foreign divorce was validly obtained
and that the foreign spouse's national law considers the dissolution of
the marital relationship to be absolute. For it would be unjust to insist, as
the OSG did, that petitioner should still be considered married to her
foreign husband. The Court noted that justice would not have been
served if petitioner was discriminated against by her own country's law.
Moraña v. Republic
Petitioner offered mere printouts of pertinent portions of the Japanese
law on divorce and its English translation from a website, sans any proof
of its correctness. The lower courts denied her action for recognition of
divorce report because she did not present an authenticated Divorce
Certificate issued by the Japanese government. The Court
acknowledged that petitioner duly proved the fact of divorce but failed to
prove the Japanese law on divorce. Relying on Racho and Manalo, the
Court nonetheless relaxed procedural requirements and granted the
petition. It likewise remanded the case to the trial court for presentation
of the pertinent Japanese law on divorce for a new decision on the
merits.
Garcia v. Recio
Court could not determine if respondent, a naturalized Australian citizen,
was legally recapacitated to remarry despite the evidence already
offered which included: Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution
of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia; Decree Nisi of Dissolution
of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia; and Decree Nisi of
Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate,
among others. Hence, the Court remanded the case to the trial court to
receive evidence to show respondent's legal capacity to remarry.
Indeed, the Court has time and again granted liberality in cases involving
the recognition of foreign decrees to Filipinos in mixed marriages and
free them from a marriage in which they are the sole remaining party. In
the aforementioned cases, the Court has emphasized that procedural
rules are designed to secure and not override substantial justice,
especially here where what is involved is a matter affecting lives of
families.
First. Edna presented an Authenticated Report of Divorce in Japanese
Language; an English translation of the Report of Divorce; and an
Authenticated Original copy of the Family Register of Katsuhiro. Too,
she actively participated throughout the proceedings through her sister
and attorney-in-fact, despite financial and logistical constraints. She also
showed willingness to provide the final document the trial court needed
to prove Katsuhiro's capacity to remarry.
Second. As the OSG noted, the present case concerns Edna's status.
Hence, res judicata shall not apply and Edna could simply refile the case
if dismissed. This process though would be a waste of time and
resources, not just for both parties, but the trial court as well.
Third. OSG did not object to Edna's prayer to have the case remanded.
Finally. The present case stands on meritorious grounds, as petitioner
had actually presented certified documents establishing the fact of
divorce and relaxation of the rules will not prejudice the State.
Verily, a relaxation of procedural rules is in order.
REMANDED to the RTC for presentation in evidence of the pertinent
Japanese law on divorce and the document proving Katsuhiro was
recapacitated to marry.
Ang umaayaw ay di nagwawagi, ang nagwawagi ay
di umaayaw. SY 2021-2022
 PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS REVIEW | ATTY. LYDIA C. GALAS
Article 36 – Psychological Incapacity
GO-YU vs. YU
G.R. No. 230443 April 3, 2019
Narcissistic Personality Disorder Not Proven
How can petitioner claim that she is suffering from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder when, as previously discussed, through her own
statements and admissions in her petition and in her testimony in court,
she has displayed full knowledge and understanding of her and her
husband's obligations and has, in fact, committed positive acts towards
building and sustaining a family?
SIMUNDAC-KEPPEL v. KEPPEL
G.R. No. 202039, August 14, 2019
Under Article 15 of the CC, Angelita cannot invoke Article 36 since she
is already a German, unless there is a showing German laws allow her
to do so.
Assuming the remedy was proper, the petitioner did
not prove the respondent's psychological incapacity.
Petitioner presented no evidence to show that the anti-social behavior
manifested by both parties had been grave, and had existed at the time
of the celebration of the marriage as to render the parties incapable of
performing all the essential marital obligations provided by law. As the
records bear out, the medical experts merely concluded that the
behavior was grave enough as to incapacitate the parties from the
performance of their essential marital relationship because the parties
exhibited symptoms of an anti-social personality disorder. Also, the
incapacity was not established to have existed at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. In short, the conclusion about the parties
being psychologically incapacitated was not founded on sufficient
evidence.
CASTRO v. CASTRO
G.R. No. 210548, March 02, 2020
The fact that respondent was jobless for a long period of time,
possessive, suspicious, reluctant to confide with petitioner, reckless in
regarding the safety of others, and lacks empathy do not merit the
pronouncement that respondent is indeed psychologically incapacitated
to fulfill his marital obligations. As discussed, the incapacity must be
grave, deeply rooted, and incurable for it to warrant the dissolution of his
marriage to petitioner.
REPUBLIC v. CALINGO
G.R. No. 212717, March 11, 2020
Borderline Personality Disorder
with Histrionic Personality Disorder Features Not Proven
Court refuses to accept as credible the assessment of Dr. Lopez as there
was no other evidence which established the juridical antecedence,
gravity, and incurability of Cynthia's alleged incapacity. While
jurisprudence recognizes the dispensability of personal examination of
the party alleged to be suffering from psychological incapacity, it is but
necessary to provide corroborative evidence to exhibit the required legal
parameters.
To recall, the report itself cited the testimonies of Ariel and their friends,
Bilason and Kalaw as bases for the findings. However, in the same
report, it displayed that Bilason and Kalaw are friends with the couple for
more or less thirty years, and the same does not show that they have
known Cynthia longer than such period of time so as to have personal
knowledge of her circumstances. Neither was it shown that Ariel likewise
had personal knowledge of Cynthia's family background. Thus, they
could not have known Cynthia's childhood nor the manner as to how she
was raised.
Likewise, Cynthia's sexual infidelity is not a satisfactory proof of
psychological incapacity. To be a ground to nullify a marriage based
on Article 36 of the Family Code, it must be shown that the acts of
unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which
makes him/her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations
of marriage.
KANAL CLOONEY-RENALDI
6
The fact that Cynthia is "mabunganga" and had extra-marital affairs
are not sufficient indicators of a psychological disorder.
CALMA v. SANTOS-CALMA
G.R. No. 242070, August 24, 2020
Marriage is Void
By identifying her as suffering from schizoid personality disorder, and
manifesting maladaptive behavioral patterns, Dr. Manrique's report
medically identified the root cause of her psychological incapacity, and
explored how she has been rendered incapable of fulfilling essential
marital obligations. Thus, her lack of interest in social relationships—
though not as grave as the degree manifested in schizophrenia —
prevents her from developing strong attachments and from staying in
relationships. Her maladaptive behavioral patterns affect her impulse
control and makes her susceptible to mood changes. This "invariably
strain[s]" her relationships and results in her lacking empathy and
concern.
It was clear from the onset how respondent was unsuited to fulfill the
essential obligations of marriage. She was unable to settle in what
should have been a common abode with her spouse and son. She never
contributed to and even squandered resources for their family's
subsistence and her child's rearing. She scoffed at petitioner's effort to
support their family; gaslighting him with the claim that he abandoned
her. Ever unsatisfied, she would come to a point when she would not
even offer a proper explanation for imploring more money. In the face of
her husband's fortitude and beneficence, she would leave him for
another partner. Worse, she only seemed all too satisfied to abandon
their son's rearing to her husband.
SANTOS-GANTAN v. GANTAN
G.R. No. 225193, October 14, 2020
There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated be personally examined by a physician.
Totality of evidence sufficiently established that respondent
is afflicted with psychological incapacity which hindered him
from performing his duties as husband to petitioner.
She mainly averred that they were no longer living together as husband
and wife. Respondent had abandoned her and is already living with his
paramour and their daughter. He had been abusing her physically,
mentally, and emotionally. He had been having illicit affairs with older
and married women while ignoring and rejecting her need for love,
affection and intimacy. He often mocked, insulted and called her names,
such as "thin," "ugly," and "old hag." He was short-tempered and violent.
He frequently hurt or assaulted her physically, even causing her to get
hospitalized and suffer a miscarriage. His lackadaisical and
irresponsible attitude often caused his termination from employment and
left him jobless and unable to support the family. All these reflect his lack
of remorse, deception, impulsivity, irritability, aggressiveness, physical
assault and intimidation, reckless disregard for the safety of others,
unwillingness to meet normal standards for work, support and parenting,
and failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors.
Dr. Dela Cruz diagnosed respondent to be suffering from "Axis II Anti-
Social Personality Disorder" characterized by a pervasive pattern of
disregard for and violation of the rights of others.
DYTIANQUIN v. DYTIANQUIN
G.R. No. 234462, December 07, 2020
The alleged incapacity of Eduardo is premised not on his personality
disorder or on some debilitating psychological condition, but rather on
his outright refusal or unwillingness to perform his marital obligations.
Narcissistic Personality of Disorder Not Proven
Dr. Tayag's finding of "careless disregard for personal integrity and a
self-important indifference to the rights of other" on the part of Elena was
even contradicted by the evidence on record, as Eduardo himself
admitted that whenever they would fight and he would leave their house,
Elena would fetch him and settle their issues.
Ang umaayaw ay di nagwawagi, ang nagwawagi ay
di umaayaw. SY 2021-2022
 PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS REVIEW | ATTY. LYDIA C. GALAS
While it is apparent to the Court that the union between Elena and
Eduardo was an acrimonious and unpleasant one, the same did not
invalidate their marriage. An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and
void marriage. Psychological capacity under Article 36 is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefor manifest themselves.
TAN-ANDAL v. ANDAL2
G.R. No. 196359 | May 11, 2021 | En Banc | Leonen, J.
Psychological incapacity is not a medical but a legal concept.
It refers to a personal condition that prevents a spouse to comply with
fundamental marital obligations only in relation to a specific partner that
may exist at the time of the marriage but may have revealed through
behavior subsequent to the ceremonies.
 It need not be a mental or personality disorder. There must
be proof, however, of the durable or enduring aspects of a
person's personality, called "personality structure," which
manifests itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality that
undermines the family. The spouse's personality structure
must make it impossible for him or her to understand and,
more important, to comply with his or her essential marital
obligations.
 It need not be a permanent and incurable condition.
 Testimony of psychologist or psychiatrist is not mandatory in
all cases.
 The totality of the evidence must show clear and convincing
evidence to cause the declaration of nullity of marriage.
Article 40 – Judicial Declaration of Nullity of Previous Marriage for
Purposes of Remarriage
JUMAQUIO v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 224742, August 07, 2019
Charged with Bigamy. Prudencio argued that his first marriage with
Arlene was void because the copy of their Marriage Contract, which was
secured from the National Statistics Office, did not bear the solemnizing
officer's signature.
CENOMAR Not Proof of Voided Marriage
Prudencio cannot claim to have been in good faith in assuming that there
was no legal impediment for him to remarry based merely on the NSO's
issuance of a Certificate of No Marriage Record. Based on Prudencio
and Arlene's Marriage Certificate, along with the photos of the wedding
ceremony, they were married. Thus, the Certificate of No Marriage
Record is not enough for Prudencio to assume that his previous
marriage with Arlene has been voided.
Non-Presentation of Marriage License Not Fatal
Moreover, Prudencio claims that the prosecution's failure to offer a copy
of the marriage license is fatal to its case. This contention lacks merit.
The presentation of the marriage license is not a sine qua non
requirement to establish the existence of a marriage as the certified true
copy of the Marriage Certificate is sufficient for such purpose.
Absence of Solemnizing Officer’s Signature Merely Inadvertent
Prudencio also claims that the absence of the solemnizing officer's
signature in the Marriage Certificate renders the marriage void. The
discrepancy was merely inadvertent since a copy of the Marriage
Certificate under the Local Civil Registry had been signed.
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution bears the signature
of the solemnizing officer. Upon the other hand, the NSO copy of the
marriage contract secured by the accused does not have the signature
of the solemnizing officer but after a careful scrutiny, it is shown that the
two (2) marriage contracts contain the same details of the civil wedding
ceremony between the accused and the complainant. Even the
signatures of the parties and their witnesses have a striking
resemblance to the naked eye. The only logical explanation for this is
that the duplicate original that must have been forwarded by the local
civil registry to the NSO was not signed by the solemnizing officer but
the other duplicate original on file with the local civil registry is duly
signed.
2 Taken from SC Press Briefer coz ang haba ng full text mars.
KANAL CLOONEY-RENALDI
7
Lastly, Prudencio's argument that the case should be dismissed due to
Arlene's Affidavit of Desistance is unavailing. Affidavits of desistance
that were executed after judgments of conviction had been
promulgated by trial courts are generally received with extensive
caution. Arlene's Affidavit of Desistance provides that she filed the
Complaint due to a misunderstanding, which both she and Prudencio
had agreed to reconcile. This Affidavit of Desistance cannot prove the
nonexistence of all the elements of bigamy.
ANABAN v. ANABAN-ALFILER
GR 249011, March 15, 2021, Lazaro-Javier
Citing De Castro v. Assidao De Castro (2008):
Other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action
is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is
necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on
the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in
Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need
not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño, the Court ruled that it is
clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of two marriages
despite the main case being a claim for death benefits. Reiterating Niñal,
the Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it
is essential to the determination of the case. However, evidence must
be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of
grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity.
Customs which are contrary to law,
public policy, and public order cannot be recognized.
Since there was no legal and valid ground for the divorce of Pedrito and
Virginia, in the eyes of the law, they were still married and their marriage
was not dissolved as to permit Pedrito to remarry. Pedrito's subsequent
marriage to petitioners' mother Pepang, therefore, is void for being
bigamous. CA did not err when they ruled so and declared petitioners
as Pedrito's illegitimate children.
DAVID AND THE HEIRS OF AGUAS v. CALILUNG
GR No. 241036 January 26, 2021
Lucila married Rene and had 5 children (Aguas heirs). Rene filed a
petition to declare his marriage void on the ground of PI.
2005 Nullity Decision rendered it null and void.
However, the decision, as well as the certificate of finality was not
registered with the ROD and no annotation was made in the Sunset
Valley Estate. Actual partition of the estate was not undertaken and the
presumptive legitimes were not delivered.
Subsequently, Rene entered a second marriage with Cherry. In 2015,
Rene died intestate. Cherry filed a petition for the settlement of the
instestate estate.
Aguas heirs opposed, alleging, among others, that they are the
legitimate children of the late Rene with Lucila; that the marriage of Rene
and Lucila was dissolved, but there was
 No liquidation or separation of the properties acquired during
their marriage in accordance with Article 102 of the Family
Code;
 That Article 52 of the FC requires that the judgment of
absolute nullity of marriage, the partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses and the delivery of the children's
presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate
civil registry and registries of properties;
Ang umaayaw ay di nagwawagi, ang nagwawagi ay
di umaayaw. SY 2021-2022
 PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS REVIEW | ATTY. LYDIA C. GALAS
 That the failure to comply with the requirements of Article 52
of the Family Code would have the effect of nullifying the
subsequent marriage between Rene and Cherry pursuant to
Article 53 of the same Code; and
 That when Rene married Cherry, the properties of Rene
acquired during the previous marriage should not have been
included in their property regime pursuant to Article 92.
Lucila and the Aguas heirs filed a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage of Rene and Cherry, citing Article 52 and 53.
Held: Applying the FC and AM No. 02-11-10-SC, they are not the real
parties-in-interest since the rule makes it the sole right of the husband
or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage. Lucila cannot be considered as an aggrieved spouse since the
2005 Nullity Decision already ruled their marriage as null and void.
Aguas heirs have no legal personality to file the petition. They can only
question the validity of the marriage of the said spouses in a proceeding
for the settlement of the estate of their deceased father filed in the
regular courts.
Aguas heirs can collaterally attack the validity of Rene &
Cherry's marriage in the settlement of the estate of Rene.
Aguas heirs can certainly amply protect their successional rights by
collaterally raising the issue on the validity of Rene and Cherry's
marriage in the aforesaid proceedings which they did when they filed a
Comment/Opposition to the Petition in together with Lucila and raised
the argument that Rene's marriage with Cherry is null and void.
Lucila can file a separate civil action for
partition against the administrator of Rene's estate.
The same remedy or recourse under the law is not available to Lucila
since she is not an heir of Rene, her marriage with the deceased having
been declared null and void from the very beginning on the ground of PI
in the 2005 Nullity Decision. Lucila is, therefore, considered as a
stranger in the estate proceedings with no right to succeed as an heir of
Rene, thus, she has no standing to participate in the Settlement
Proceeding.
Lucila, being a stranger to the Settlement Proceeding, should file a
separate civil action for partition before the regular courts against the
administrator of Rene's estate under Rule 87 Section 1.
NICXON L. PEREZ, JR v. AVEGAIL PEREZ-
SENERPIDA
G.R. No. 233365, March 24, 2021
Discussion:
 Article 87
 Article 147
Spouses Eliodoro and Adelita Perez owned a parcel of land. They had
two children where one was Avegail. Prior to his marriage with Adelita,
Eliodoro was married and had several children, one of whom was Nicxon
Perez, Sr., who sired Nicxon.
A sworn statement denominated as Renunciation and Waiver of Rights
(RWR) was executed by Adelita in favor of her husband Eliodoro.
Eliodoro donated the said parcel of land to Nicxon without the conformity
of Adelita (DOD). TCT was issued to Nicxon. Subsequently, a REM was
executed by Nicxon in favor of Ramos.
In 2005, Eliodoro filed against Adelita a petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage under Article 36. RTC declared the marriage void ab initio.
An entry of judgment was issued, stating that the Marriage Nullity
Decision became final and executory as of July 6, 2005.
Eliodoro died in 2008. In 2009, an Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs
with Waiver was executed and signed by his legitimate and compulsory
heirs.
In 2010, Avegail brought an action for Annulment of Donation and Title
against Nicxon. She claimed that the RWR and DOD are clearly
KANAL CLOONEY-RENALDI
8
prejudicial to her interest because it affected her future inheritance or
legitime.
SC: RTC and the CA committed a patent error in their factual finding that
the marriage between Eliodoro and Adelita remained valid and
subsisting until Eliodoro's death on June 28, 2008. Since the Marriage
Nullity Decision became final and executory on July 6, 2005, as
confirmed with finality in the CA Decision, prior to Eliodoro's death, then
the marriage between him and Adelita, which was celebrated on
December 10, 1975 was null and void ab initio pursuant to Article 36.
Note: CPG governs their property relations since marriage was
celebrated prior to FC.
Article 89 Inapplicable Since Marriage is Void
Article 89 of the FC, which provides in part that: "No waiver of rights,
interests, shares and effects of the absolute community of property
during the marriage can be made except in case of judicial separation of
property." Unquestionably, Article 89 cannot justify the nullification of
Adelita's RWR since Adelita and Eliodoro were not validly married.
Article 147 Applies
The subject property was registered in the names of Eliodoro and
Adelita, as spouses, and there being no proof to the contrary, the subject
property is presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work
or industry, and was owned in equal shares by them pursuant to Article
147.
What then is the effect of the Marriage Nullity Decision on the RWR
executed in 1995 by Adelita in favor of Eliodoro over the subject
property?
Nicxon contends that the RWR is valid on the ground that Eliodoro and
Adelita, being mere co-owners of the subject property, either of them
could donate or waive their respective shares therein provided that the
consent of either partner was obtained.
Donation is Void under Article 87
RWR is void pursuant to Article 87 of the FC. Undoubtedly, the RWR
was without valuable or material consideration. No material
consideration was given to Adelita in exchange of the execution of the
Renunciation and Waiver of Rights. It thus partakes the nature of a
donation or grant of gratuitous advantage between spouses which is
prohibited. Clearly, Adelita's waiver of her rights over the subject
property through the RWR is not allowed.
Nicxon's argument that there was material consideration given to Adelita
in exchange for her RWR is likewise unfounded. Adelita's admission that
she received her share from the conjugal partnership of gains was made
on March 2, 2005 when she executed an affidavit as maintained by
Nicxon. It must be recalled, however, that the RWR was executed on
October 29, 1995 or ten (10) years prior to the execution of the affidavit.
Hence, at the time Adelita renounced and waived her rights, there was
no material consideration extended to her.
While both the CA and the RTC correctly ruled in this case that the RWR
is void based on Article 87, their reliance on that provision referring to
"[e]very donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect,
between the spouses during the marriage shall be void" is incorrect —
borne out by the fact that they erroneously believed that the marriage
between Eliodoro and Adelita was valid and subsisting until Eliodoro's
death. To be clear, therefore, the provision of Article 87 that squarely
applies to the case is: "The prohibition shall also apply to persons
living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage."
If Validly Married, Still Void under Article 1490 of Civil Code
Assuming the marriage between Eliodoro and Adelita was valid at the
time the RWR was executed and it had valuable or material
consideration the RWR would have been valid. The RWR would still be
void because the sale between the spouses during their marriage is
proscribed under Article 1490 of the Civil Code.
Basically:
 If married, the donation is void under Article 87.
 If married, if it was a sale (with consideration), still void under
Article 1490.
Ang umaayaw ay di nagwawagi, ang nagwawagi ay
di umaayaw. SY 2021-2022
 PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS REVIEW | ATTY. LYDIA C. GALAS
Purpose of Article 87
This provision refers to donation inter vivos. It is dictated by the principle
of unity of personality of the spouses during the marriage, and is
intended to avoid possible transfer of property from one spouse to the
other due to passion or avarice. The intimate relations of the spouses
during the marriage places the weaker spouse under the will of the
stronger, whatever the sex, so that the former might be obliged, either
by abuse of affection or by threats of violence, to transfer some
properties to the latter. The law seeks to prevent such exploitation in
marriages which might have been contracted under this stimulus of
greed.
The prohibition of this article also applies to the parties in what are called
"common law" marriages; otherwise, the condition of those who incurred
guilt would tum out to be better than those in legal union.
Given the express prohibition under Article 87 of the Family Code, the
RWR executed by Adelita in favor of Eliodoro in respect of the subject
property is void.
Given the nullity of the RWR, is the DoD that Eliodoro executed in favor
of Nicxon over the subject property valid?
If the marriage between Eliodoro and Adelita was valid and their property
regime was either the ACP or the CPG, the donation would definitely
be void pursuant to Articles 98 and 125 of the Family Code. It has been
opined that a donation made by the husband, without the consent of the
wife, would be subject to attack as a fraudulent alienation, or an
alienation impairing the interest of the wife in the conjugal partnership
property.
For onerous dispositions or encumbrances of any community
property or conjugal partnership property by a spouse, the written
consent of the other spouse or an authority of the court is required.
Thus, among married couples wherein the ACP or the CPG is their
property regime, the consent of both spouses is required under the
Family Code whether the disposition is gratuitous or onerous.
Under a regime of separation of property, pursuant to Article 145 of the
Family Code, each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess, administer
and enjoy his or own estate, without need of the consent of the other.
Understandably, each spouse can donate or alienate onerously his or
her own estate without the need of obtaining the other spouse's consent.
Application of Article 147
1. Since marriage is void, Article 147 applies.
2. Article 147 provides that property acquired is governed by
rules on co-ownership under Article 493 of CC.
3. Applying Article 493, disposition is valid but only to the extent
of his share in the co-ownership.
4. But, Article 493 cannot prevail over Article 147 which
requires consent of the other party to the cohabitation, thus
donation is void.
Under Article 147, which covers the exclusive cohabitation of a man and
woman as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
void marriage, there is unfortunately no direct prohibition on donation
of any property acquired during the cohabitation by one party
without the consent of the other.
It is true that Article 147 provides that the property acquired during the
cohabitation shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership and
pursuant to Article 493 of the Civil Code. With Article 493 of the Civil
Code as basis, Eliodoro could have alienated onerously or gratuitously
his part or share in the subject property to Nicxon without the consent of
Adelita, who was half co-owner thereof, and the alienation would have
been limited to the half portion allotted to Eliodoro upon termination of
the co-ownership or partition.
Even the donation by Eliodoro of the entire subject property to Nicxon,
without the consent of Adelita, could produce valid effect under Article
493, which would be limited to his share.
Consequently, if Article 493 of the Civil Code were to be applied, the
donation to Nicxon of the subject property could only affect the one-half
share of Eliodoro and the one-half share of Adelita could not have been
transferred to Nicxon by virtue of the DoD.
KANAL CLOONEY-RENALDI
9
However, Article 493 of the Civil Code cannot supersede, and must
yield to, Article 147, which expressly mandates that: "Neither party can
encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the
property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without
the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation."
Ordinary Co-Ownership (493) Special Co-ownership (147)
A co-owner may validly alienate As long as the cohabitation lasts
or encumber his undivided share and the co-ownership exists, no
in the common property without disposition inter vivos of such
the consent of the other co- undivided share can be validly
owners. made by one party without the
consent of the other.
The donation of any property acquired during the cohabitation by one
party without the consent of the other can only be but void. The rules on
ordinary co-ownership cannot apply to vest validity on the undivided
share of the disposing party. The donation is simply void.
If a disposition of a party’s share in the property under special co­
ownership without the consent of the other party is proscribed by law,
then, and with more reason, should the disposition of the entire property
under such special co-ownership by a party without the other party's
consent be considered void as well.
CUENO v. BAUTISTA
G.R. No. 246445 | March 2, 2021 | En Banc | Caguioa, J.
Article 173 of the Civil Code is explicit that the action for the annulment
of a contract involving conjugal real property entered into by a husband
without the wife's consent must be brought 1) by the wife, 2) during the
marriage, and 3) within ten years from the questioned transaction.
It appears from the Escritura de Venta between Eulalio and his father-
in-law, Luis, that the former sold their share in the subject property to the
latter without Flora's consent on December 4, 1963. Pursuant to Article
173, Flora's action to annul the contract accrued upon the execution of
the sale in 1963 and she had 10 years from the questioned transaction
to file an action to annul the same. Unfortunately, she failed or refused
to exercise her right within the 10-year period. As her right to annul the
second sale prescribed in 1973, the action commenced on January 14,
2009 was filed out of time. In view thereof, petitioners have no more
right to question the subsequent sale by Luis in favor of respondents.
P.S.: Sobrang haba ng case and it didn’t tell me anything that’s not
already taught and explained by Ma’am G. Queen tingz.
SPOUSES HOFER v. YU
G.R. No. 231452, July 01, 2020
Pursuant to the provisions of the Compromise Agreement, petitioners
conveyed in favor of Yu the Talamban property as payment of their total
obligation to Yu, with the latter obligating himself to pay to petitioners the
excess of the value of the subject property over petitioners' obligation.
The parties agree to mutually withdraw whatever claims and
counterclaims they have against the other arising from the subject case.
The agreement of the parties was in the nature of dacion en pago or
dation in payment.
On May 29, 2003, Yu and Bernardita executed an Amended
Compromise Agreement modifying the terms of their previous
agreement and agreed that respondent shall be relieved from accepting
the Talamban property and that in exchange thereof, petitioners shall
hold in trust the amount of P1.5M that shall come from the proceeds of
their properties which were levied and previously attached by the court,
in effect modifying their previous agreement and converting it into a
monetary obligation.
To be valid, an amendment to the compromise agreement must be with
the concurrence and consent of all the parties involved. In the present
case, the Amended Compromise Agreement was executed only
between Yu and Bernardita, but without the consent and
participation of Tomas. There was no proof to show that Bernardita
was authorized by Tomas to enter into the Amended Compromise
Ang umaayaw ay di nagwawagi, ang nagwawagi ay
di umaayaw. SY 2021-2022
 PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS REVIEW | ATTY. LYDIA C. GALAS
Agreement in his behalf. Thus, being executed without the authority of
Tomas, an indispensable party to the case, the Amended Compromise
Agreement is not a valid compromise and cannot supersede the
previously approved Compromise Agreement. Clearly, it was erroneous
for the RTC to approve the Amended Compromise Agreement executed
in 2005 which was executed without the consent of Tomas and in
violation of his right to due process.
Authority of the wife to execute a contract
dealing with conjugal property during the marriage.
Under Article 172 of the New Civil Code, the wife cannot bind the
conjugal partnership without the husband's consent except in cases
provided by law. The husband, even if he is statutorily designated as
administrator of the conjugal partnership, cannot validly alienate or
encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife's
consent. Similarly, the wife cannot dispose of any property belonging to
the conjugal partnership without the conformity of the husband. Thus,
the trial court erred when it approved the Amended Compromise
Agreement which was entered only by Bernardita and respondent, as
the same could not bind the conjugal properties of both spouses.
Even under Article 124 of the Family Code
It is required that any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal
property must have the written consent of the other spouse; otherwise,
such disposition is void. The new law provides that the administration of
the conjugal partnership is now a joint undertaking of the husband and
the wife. In all instances, the present law specifically requires the written
consent of the other spouse or authority of the court for the disposition
or encumbrance of the conjugal property, without which the disposition
or encumbrance shall be void.
Thus, even on the supposition that the wife Bernardita encumbered her
respective share in the property, such encumbrance is still void for the
right of the husband or the wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does
not vest until liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
All told, the Amended Compromise Agreement entered into by
Bernardita with respondent over the conjugal properties of the spouses
was void for having been executed without the participation and consent
of Tomas.
SPOUSES ANASTACIO v. HEIRS OF COLOMA
G.R. No. 224572, August 27, 2020
A dispute over a parcel of land in San Jose, Tarlac. TCT shows Juan as
the registered owner thereof since January 14, 1965, with the certificate
of title likewise carried the inscription of his marriage to Juliana. Both
Juan and Juliana are now deceased, leaving Rudy Coloma and Marcela
Reyes (respondents) as their legitimate heirs.
Petitioners claimed right of ownership over the subject property by virtue
of an alleged DOAS executed by Juan during his lifetime.
Respondents filed the Complaint, claiming that the DOAS allegedly
executed by their father in favor of petitioners is void on two grounds.
First, that the signature of their father, Juan, as appearing thereon is a
forgery; and second, that there is no conformity or consent given by their
mother, Juliana, to the alleged sale.
SC: Article 105 of the Family Code provides that the provisions of CPG
shall also apply to CPG already established before the effectivity of the
Family Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. It will be recalled that
based on the stipulations of the parties, the subject property was
acquired in 1965 during the lifetime of Juan and Juliana while they were
married, and it was registered in the name of Juan married to Juliana.
In 1965, the prevailing property regime between husband and wife was
the CPG. There being no evidence to the contrary, the property regime
between Juan and Juliana was the CPG.
Article 116 of the Family Code is explicit that all property acquired during
the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made,
contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is
presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.
KANAL CLOONEY-RENALDI
10
A rebuttable presumption is established in Article 116 and the party who
invokes that presumption must first establish that the property was
acquired during the marriage because the proof of acquisition during the
marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption
in favor of the conjugal partnership. It is not necessary to prove that the
property was acquired with conjugal funds and the presumption still
applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does
not appear. Once the condition sine qua non is established, then the
presumption that all properties acquired during the marriage, whether
the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in
the name of one spouse or both spouses, are conjugal, remains until the
contrary is proved.
Given the very stipulations made during the Pre-Trial and TCT,
respondents had laid the predicate for the presumption under Article 116
to be invoked. They had established that the property was acquired
during the marriage of their parents. To overcome the presumption in
favor of the conjugal partnership, petitioners were required to prove the
contrary.
Unfortunately, petitioners' evidence that TCT was registered in the name
of Juan married to Juliana and the sale from the previous owner, Valete,
to Juan only mentioned Juan as the buyer fell short to overcome the
presumption. In fact, such evidence even bolsters the presumption that
respondents invoked. To reiterate, the presumption is created even if the
acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the
name of one spouse.
Therefore, petitioners' postulation that the certificate of title having been
registered in the name of Juan married to Juliana establishes a
conclusive presumption that the land described therein was owned
exclusively by Juan is incorrect because it directly runs counter to Article
116 of the Family Code.
Petitioners should have endeavored to prove their claim that the subject
property was the exclusive property of Juan in conformity with Article
109 of the Family Code
Regarding the 109 (4), petitioners could not have established that the
subject property was purchased with the exclusive money of Juan
through the testimony of his paramour Carmelita because she testified
that she became his live-in partner only beginning 1978 (until his death
in 2006),which was after the acquisition of the subject property by Juan.
Since petitioners have not presented strong, clear, convincing evidence
that the subject property was exclusive property of Juan, its alienation to
them required the consent of Juliana to be valid pursuant to Article
124
Under Article 1323 of the Civil Code, an offer becomes ineffective
upon the death, civil interdiction, insanity, or insolvency of either
party before acceptance is conveyed. When Juan died on August 26,
2006, the continuing offer contemplated under Article 124 of the Family
Code became ineffective and could not have materialized into a binding
contract. It must be remembered that Juliana even died earlier on August
17, 2006 and there is no evidence that she consented to the sale of the
subject property by Juan in favor of petitioners.
The fact that Juan and Juliana were separated from bed and board at
the time of the supposed sale of the subject property by Juan to
petitioners did not exempt the disposition from the requirement of
obtaining the other spouse's consent under Article 116 of the Family
Code. Juan was not without any recourse, he should have gotten the
required authority from the court.
Given that the subject property was the conjugal property of Juan and
Juliana, the sale of the subject property by Juan without the consent of
Juliana in favor of petitioners contemplated in the DAS is void.
The Court need not rule on the issues of forgery, and the presumption
of regularity in the notarization and execution of the DAS, given the
established nullity of the sale. It is now inconsequential for the Court to
rule on whether the signature of Juan appearing in the DAS is a forgery
because even if it were genuine, the DAS would still be void. In the same
vein, even if the Court overturns the CA in its finding on the irregularity
that attended the notarization of the DAS, the sale would not thereby be
validated.
Ang umaayaw ay di nagwawagi, ang nagwawagi ay
di umaayaw. SY 2021-2022
 PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS REVIEW | ATTY. LYDIA C. GALAS
Did not pray for return of what was allegedly paid.
Petitioners merely prayed in their Answer for the dismissal of the
Complaint and for respondents to be made liable to actual damages
(without any allegation as to what they constituted), moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees. They never prayed in the
alternative that in case the DAS is declared void, they should be allowed
to recover what they had paid to Juan. Moreover, their handwritten list
of the sums that they allegedly paid to Juan totaling P525K is self-
serving as it did not bear any date and the signature of Juan; and it even
included P40K for "additional cash for overhauling of Jeep" and P125K
"during the wake of [Juan]" which were purportedly given in 2005 and
2006, respectively, after the sale of the subject property to them.
DULTRA VDA. DE CANADA V. BACLOT
G.R. No. 221874, July 07, 2020
Spouses Sancho and Agrifina Canada were legally married on
September 4, 1937. Their union begot six children, namely: Elsa,
Norma, Estrella, Yolanda, Rogelio, and Anacleta. However, 15 years
into the marriage, the Spouses Canada parted ways. Sancho left the
conjugal abode in 1952.
Not long thereafter, Sancho entered into a common-law relationship with
Cresencia with whom he begot seven children, namely: Sanchito,
Roberto, Alfreda, Renato, Ronaldo, Ronel, and Rizalino, all surnamed
Canada. [Grabe so 13 na anak niya].
The feud among Cresencia and Agrifina aggressively materialized when
Sancho died intestate on February 10, 1973. As appointed Administrator
of the intestate estate of Sancho, Agrifina filed a complaint for recovery
of ownership and possession of properties, accounting, and damages
with application for injunction against Crescencia.
11
contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no
salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party
is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal
shares.
Failed to prove Sancho was a co-owner.
In this case, the subject properties were registered in the name of
Cresencia alone, except for the property in the name of Sanchito, who
is the son of Cresencia and Sancho. While it is true that a certificate of
title is not a conclusive proof of ownership as its issuance does not
foreclose the possibility that such property may be co-owned by persons
not named therein, the claimant must nonetheless prove his/her title in
the concept of an owner. As it is, respondents failed to put forth evidence
that Sancho is a co-owner. That Cresencia is a mere dressmaker who
cannot afford the subject properties is a scorch to her industry and a
condescending presumption.
Here, the subject properties were under the name of Cresencia alone.
Failure to show that Sancho made actual contributions in the purchase
of the same, the Court is bound to declare that Cresencia is the exclusive
owner of the subject properties.
In obvious terms, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as
determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an
affirmative issue. Thus, contrary to the assertions of petitioner, she has
the burden of proving their claim over the subject properties, registered
in the name of Cresencia.
In the absence of evidence which would demonstrate that Sancho had
contributed in the acquisition of the properties registered in the name of
Cresencia, the Court cannot declare petitioner and her children as
entitled thereto.

Agrifina sought to recover six parcels of land which were alleged to be

owned by Sancho.

Cresencia denied that the subject properties were owned by Sancho as

she bought them through diligence, industry, and effort. Cresencia died
and was substituted by her heirs (respondents).

SC: When Sancho and Cresencia cohabited in 1952, it is the Civil Code
which was in effect. Generally, what is applicable is Article 144 which
states that when a man and a woman live together as husband and wife,
but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning,
the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on
co-ownership.

However, Article 144 of said law applies only to a relationship between

a man and a woman who are not incapacitated to marry each other, or
to one in which the marriage of the parties is void from the beginning. In
other words, the provision does not apply when the cohabitation
amounts to adultery or concubinage.

In this case, Sancho and Cresencia entered into a common-law

marriage while the former's marriage with petitioner was valid and
subsisting. Clearly, Sancho was incapacitated to marry.

Retroactively Apply Article 148 of the Family Code

As Article 144 is inapplicable, the cohabitation between Sancho and
Cresencia is governed by Article 148, which has "filled the hiatus in
Article 144." The retroactive application of Article 148 is sanctioned by
law, provided that vested rights remained unimpaired.

The ownership of the properties jointly acquired by the parties who are
cohabiting under the circumstances provided is relative to their
respective contributions, requiring actual proof. In the absence of
proof of their quantifiable actual contribution, their contributions are
deemed equal. However, if proof of actual contribution per se was not
shown, co-ownership will not arise.

Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall
be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. It must be stressed that the actual contribution is required
by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the
care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as
Ang umaayaw ay di nagwawagi, ang nagwawagi ay
KANAL CLOONEY-RENALDI di umaayaw. SY 2021-2022
 PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS REVIEW | ATTY. LYDIA C. GALAS
Adoption
SUZUKI vs. OSG
G.R. No. 212302, September 02, 2020
Note: Suzuki was adopted by Hayashi (2nd husband of his mother)
based on Japanese law.
SC: The provisions of RA 8043 do not apply to him. Besides, as provided
in Section 8 thereof, "only a legally free child may be the subject of inter-
country adoption." By definition, a "legally-free child" means a child who
has been voluntarily or involuntarily committed to the DSWD, in
accordance with the Child and Youth Welfare Code. Suzuki is not a
"legally-free child" within the contemplation of the law; hence, he may
not be the subject of inter-country adoption.
Apparently, the adoption of petitioner by Hayashi may be validly effected
in accordance with the provisions of RA 8552. However, the Court
disagrees that adoption decrees involving Filipino citizens obtained
abroad cannot be judicially recognized in the Philippines for being
contrary to law and public policy.
Availability of RA 8552 as a means to adopt petitioner should not
automatically foreclose proceedings to recognize his adoption
decree obtained under Japanese law.
Adoption by an alien of the legitimate child of his/her Filipino spouse is
valid and legal based on Section 7(b)(ii), Article III of RA 8552. Thus, the
Court finds that the adoption of petitioner by Hayashi, if proven as a fact,
can be judicially recognized in the Philippines. The rules on domestic
adoption should not be pitted against the recognition of a foreign
adoption decree; instead, the better course of action is to reconcile them
and give effect to their respective purposes.
Surnames
ALANIS III v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 216425, November 11, 2020
A legitimate child is entitled to use the surname of either parent as a last
name.
Principally Does Not Mean Exclusively
Petitioner filed a Petition before the RTC to change his name. He wished
to remove his father's surname "Alanis III," and instead use his mother's
maiden name "Ballaho," as it was what he has been using since
childhood and indicated in his school records. He likewise wished to
change his first name from "Anacleto" to "Abdulhamid" for the same
reasons.
Article 364 of the Civil Code states that legitimate children shall
"principally" use the surname of the father, but "principally" does not
mean "exclusively." This gives ample room to incorporate into Article 364
the State policy of ensuring the fundamental equality of women and men
before the law, and no discernible reason to ignore it.
Granting Change of Name Under Rule 103 to Prevent Confusion
This Court sees fit to grant the requested change to avoid confusion.
This Court fails to see how the change of name would create more
confusion. Whether people inquire deeper into petitioner's parentage or
paternity because of a name is inconsequential here, and seems to be
more a matter of intrigue and gossip than an issue for courts to consider.
Regardless of which name petitioner uses, his father's identity still
appears in his birth certificate, where it will always be written, and which
can be referred to in cases where paternity is relevant.
Correction of Entries in Civil Register
GAN v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 207147, September 14, 2016
Petitioner was born out of wedlock to Pia Gan and Consolacion Basilio.
Petitioner sought to change the full name indicated in her birth certificate
from "Emelita Basilio" to "Emelita Basilio Gan." She claimed that she had
been using the name "Emelita Basilio Gan" in her school records from
elementary until college, employment records, marriage contract, and
other government records.
KANAL CLOONEY-RENALDI
12
A change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right; a proper
and reasonable cause must exist before a person may be
authorized to change his name.
The reason cited by the petitioner in support of her petition for change
of name, i.e. that she has been using the name in all of her records, is
not a sufficient or proper justification to allow her petition.
Born Prior to Family Code
In contrast, Articles 366 and 368 of the Civil Code do not give to an
illegitimate child or a natural child not acknowledged by the father the
option to use the surname of the father. Thus, the petitioner cannot insist
that she is allowed to use the surname of her father.
IN RE: YUHARES JAN BARCELOTE TINITIGAN
G.R. No. 222095, August 07, 2017
Barcelote bore a child out of wedlock with a married man named
Tinitigan. She was not able to register the birth of their child, whom she
named Yohan Grace Barcelote, because she did not give birth in a
hospital. To hide her relationship with Tinitigan, she remained in Santa
Cruz while Tinitigan lived with his legitimate family in Davao City and
would only visit her. On 24 August 2011, she bore another child with
Tinitigan, whom she named as Joshua Miguel Barcelote. Again, she did
not register his birth to avoid humiliation, ridicule, and possible criminal
charges. Thereafter, she lost contact with Tinitigan and she returned to
Davao City.
When her first child needed a certificate of live birth for school admission,
Barcelote finally decided to register the births of both children. She, then,
returned to Santa Cruz. The LCR approved the late registration of the
births of Yohan and Joshua.However, upon submission to the NSO,
Barcelote was informed that there were two certificates of live birth with
the same name of the mother and the years of birth of the children in
their office.
Barcelote filed a petition with the RTC for the cancellation of the subject
birth certificates registered by Tinitigan without her knowledge and
participation, and for containing erroneous entries.
Upon the effectivity of RA 9255, the provision that illegitimate children
shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother was retained, with an added provision that they may use the
surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by
their father.
In Grande v. Antonio, "the use of the word 'may' readily shows that an
acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the
surname of his illegitimate father.
Here, they are the illegitimate children of Tinitigan and Barcelote. The
children shall use the surname of their mother, Barcelote. The entry in
the subject birth certificates as to the surname of the children is therefore
incorrect; their surname should have been "Barcelote" and not
"Tinitigan."
Subject birth certificates are not express recognition of the
children's filiation by Tinitigan, because they were not duly
registered in accordance with the law.
In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and
sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only the mother if the father
refuses.
It is mandatory that the mother of an illegitimate child signs the
birth certificate of her child in all cases, irrespective of whether the
father recognizes the child as his or not. The only legally known parent
of an illegitimate child, by the fact of illegitimacy, is the mother of the
child who conclusively carries the blood of the mother. Thus, this
provision ensures that individuals are not falsely named as parents.
Since it appears on the face of the subject birth certificates that the
mother did not sign the documents, the local civil registrar had no
authority to register the subject birth certificates.
Ang umaayaw ay di nagwawagi, ang nagwawagi ay
di umaayaw. SY 2021-2022
 PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS REVIEW | ATTY. LYDIA C. GALAS
REPUBLIC v. UNABIA
G.R. No. 213346, February 11, 2019
Miller Omandam Unabia claims that his Birth Certificate contained
errors:
 Name entered was "Mellie Umandam Unabia", when it should
properly have been written as "Miller Omandam Unabia";
 Gender was erroneously entered as "female" instead of
"male"; and
 His father's middle initial was erroneously indicated as "U"
when it should have been "O".
When the SP was filed in 2009, the governing law then was the original,
unamended RA 9048. There was no provision then for the administrative
correction or change of clerical or typographical errors or mistakes in the
civil registry entries of the day and month in the date of birth or sex of
individuals, but only clerical or typographical errors and change of first
names or nicknames. Administrative corrections or changes relating to
the date of birth or sex of individuals was authorized only with the
passage in 2012 of RA 10172. Even then, the amendments under RA
10172 should still apply, the law being remedial in nature. Moreover,
under Section 11 of RA 9048, retroactive application is allowed "insofar
as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
with the Civil Code and other laws." [After asking Ma’am G, hindi man
daw retroactive].
Petitioner questions the Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Labis claiming
that it failed to include a certification that respondent "has not undergone
sex change or sex transplant" as required by Section 5 of RA 9048, as
amended, and that Dr. Labis was not presented in court in order that his
qualifications may be established and so that he may identify and
authenticate the medical certificate. However, the said Medical
Certificate is a public document, the same having been issued by a
public officer in the performance of official duty; as such, it constitutes
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. There was therefore no
need to further identify and authenticate Dr. Labis' Medical Certificate.
On the other hand, the record will support a finding that respondent was
indeed male. In his photograph attached to the record, it will be observed
particularly that respondent's Adam's apple - or, in medical terms, his
laryngeal prominence - was quite evident and prominent. This can only
indicate that respondent is male, because anatomically, only men
possess an Adam's apple.
As for petitioner's argument that the medical certificate failed to
specifically certify that respondent "has not undergone sex change or
sex transplant" as required by law, suffice it to state that this is no longer
required with the certification by Dr. Labis that respondent is
"phenotypically male", meaning that respondent's entire physical,
physiological, and biochemical makeup - as determined both genetically
and environmentally - is male, which thus presupposes that he did not
undergo sex reassignment. In other words, as determined genetically
and environmentally, from conception to birth, respondent's entire being,
from the physical, to the physiological, to the biochemical - meaning that
all the chemical processes and substances occurring within respondent
- was undoubtedly male. He was conceived and born male, he looks
male, and he functions biologically as a male.
Court must do away with the requirement of no-sex change
certification. The same is true with respondent's failure to include his
known aliases in his petition, simply because there appear to be none at
all; the bottom line issue is his gender as entered in the public record,
not really his name.
Nonetheless, it must be laid down as a rule that when there is a
medical finding that the petitioner in a case for correction of
erroneous entry as to gender is phenotypically male or female, the
no-sex change or transplant certification becomes mere
surplusage.
Respondent was actually using the name Miller Omandam Unabia; that
"Miller" and "Mellie" and "Omandam" and "Umandam" were confusingly
similar; and that respondent's medical certificate shows that he is
phenotypically male. Thus, respondent's birth certificate contained
clerical errors in its entries necessitating its rectification.
KANAL CLOONEY-RENALDI
13
OHOMA v. OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL LOCAL
CIVIL REGISTRAR
G.R. No. 239584, June 17, 2019
Petitioner averred that his birth was belatedly recorded on February 8,
2000. Unknown to him, his birth had been previously registered on June
13, 1986 under the first birth certificate; the first birth certificate contained
erroneous entries:
(i) His first name was erroneously recorded as Matron instead of
Matiorico and
(ii) His last name was erroneously recorded as Ohoma instead of
Ohomna;
(iii) He has been using the first name Matiorico and the last name
Ohomna, and has been known by such first and last names
both in his public and private transactions; and
(iv) The second birth certificate reflects the true and correct data of
petitioner; hence, must be the one retained.
SC: While the petition specifically prayed for the cancellation of
petitioner's first birth certificate and the retention of his second birth
certificate, the ultimate objective was to correct the erroneous entries
pertaining to petitioner's first and last names, i.e., from Matron Ohoma
to Matiorico Ohomna, as he claimed that people in the community know
him by the latter name rather than the former. Rule 108 implements
judicial proceedings for the correction or cancellation of entries in the
civil registry. The role of the Court under Rule 108 is to ascertain the
truth about the facts recorded therein.
The action filed by petitioner before the RTC seeks to correct a
supposedly misspelled name, and thus, properly falls under Rule 108.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or
error from." Considering that petitioner complied with the procedural
requirements under Rule 108, the RTC had the jurisdiction to resolve the
petition which included a prayer for "other reliefs just and equitable."
Failed to sufficiently establish that his father's last name was Ohomna
and not Ohoma through competent evidence, i.e., the latter's birth
certificate, the certificate of his marriage to petitioner's mother, Antonia,
on January 30, 1986, or a government-issued identification card or
record. On this score alone, the correction of petitioner's first and
last names should be denied. While the first name may be freely
selected by the parents for the child, the last name to which the child is
entitled is fixed by law. Although petitioner's Elementary School
Permanent Record and Driver's License identify him as Matiorico
Ohomna, the same are insufficient to grant the petition. It pears
stressing that the real name of a person is that given him in the Civil
Register, not the name by which he was baptized in his Church or by
which he was known in the community, or which he has adopted.
BARTOLOME v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 243288, August 28, 2019
In 2014, petitioner filed a petition for change of name under Rule 103,
seeking to correct the name Feliciano Bartholome as appearing in his
birth certificate since he has been using the name Ruben Cruz
Bartolome' since his childhood.
The administrative proceeding under R.A. 9048
applies to all corrections sought in the instant case.
As stated, the governing law on changes of first name and correction of
clerical and typographical errors in the civil register is currently RA
10172, which amended RA 9048. Prior to these laws, the controlling
provisions on changes or corrections of name were Articles 376 and 412
of the Civil Code.
Under the old rules, a person would have to file an action in court under
Rule 103 for substantial changes in the given name or surname provided
they fall under any of the valid reasons recognized by law, or Rule 108
for corrections of clerical errors.
Rule 103 – Change of Name
Applying Article 412 of the Civil Code, a person desiring to change his
or her name altogether must file a petition under Rule 103 with the RTC,
which will then issue an order setting a hearing date and directing the
order's publication in a newspaper of general circulation. After finding
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that there is proper and reasonable cause to change his or her name, Summary
the RTC may grant the petition and order its entry in the civil register. A person seeking: [1] Verified petition with the
a. To change his or her first local civil registry office of the city
Rule 108 – Clerical and Innocuous Mistakes name or municipality where the record
On the other hand, Rule 108 applies when the person is seeking to b. To correct clerical or being sought to be corrected or
correct clerical and innocuous mistakes in his or her documents with the typographical errors in the changed is kept, in accordance
civil register. It also governs the correction of substantial errors in the civil register with the administrative
entry of the information enumerated in Section 2 of this Rule and those c. To change/correct the day proceeding provided under R.A.
affecting the civil status, citizenship, and nationality of a person. The and/or month of his or her 9048 in relation to R.A. 10172.
proceedings under this rule may either be summary, if the correction date of birth
pertains to clerical mistakes, or adversary, if it pertains to substantial d. To change/correct his or her [2] Appropriate judicial
errors. sex, where it is patently remedies under Rule 103 or
clear that there was a Rule 108 in the aforementioned
Rule 108 also requires a petition to be filed before the RTC. The trial clerical or typographical entries after the petition in the
court then sets a hearing and directs the publication of its order in a error or mistake, administrative proceedings is
newspaper of general circulation in the province. After the hearing, the filed and later denied.
trial court may grant or dismiss the petition and serve a copy of its A person seeking Petition for change of name
judgment to the Civil Registrar. a. To change his or her under Rule 103, provided that
surname the jurisprudential grounds
The "change of name" contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103 b. To change both his or her discussed in Republic v.
must not be confused with Article 412 and Rule 108. A change of one's first name and surname Hernandez are present.
name under Rule 103 can be granted, only on grounds provided by law. Substantial cancellations or Petition for cancellation or
In order to justify a request for change of name, there must be a proper corrections of entries in the civil correction of entries under Rule
and compelling reason for the change and proof that the person registry 108. Rule 108 now applies only
requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his official name. To assess to substantial changes and
the sufficiency of the grounds invoked therefor, there must be corrections in entries in the civil
adversarial proceedings. register
In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other Petitioner seeks to change his first name, to include his middle, and to
innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised. Considering that the correct the spelling of his surname, i.e., from "Feliciano Bartholome" as
enumeration in Section 2, Rule 108 also includes "changes of name," stated in his birth certificate to "Ruben Cruz Bartolome."
the correction of a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule 108.
Suffice it to say, not all alterations allowed in one's name are confined The Court agrees that the changes and corrections are covered by R.A.
under Rule 103. Corrections for clerical errors may be set right under 9048 as amended by R.A. 10172.
Rule 108.
Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname
However, RA 9048 amended Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code, While the grounds for change of name under Rule 103 are found in
effectively removing clerical errors and changes of the name jurisprudence, the grounds for change of first name or nickname are
outside the ambit of Rule 108 and putting them under the expressly provided in R.A. 9048, Section 4:
jurisdiction of the civil registrar.
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to
authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or write or pronounce;
municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, (2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and
therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now continuously used by the petitioner and he has been
primarily lodged with the administrative officers. publicly known by that first name or nickname in the
community; or
RA 9048 also dispensed with the need for judicial proceedings in case (3) The change will avoid confusion.
of any clerical or typographical mistakes in the civil register or changes
in first names or nicknames. Petitioner seeks to change his first name from "Feliciano " to "Ruben, "
on the ground that he has been using the latter since childhood. Contrary
Rules 103 and 108 only apply if the administrative petition has been to petitioner's claims therefore, the change sought is covered by R.A.
filed and later denied. 9048 and should have been filed with the local civil registry of the city or
municipality where the record being sought to be corrected or changed
In 2012, RA 9048 was amended by Republic Act No. 10172. is kept.
In addition to the change of the first name, the day and month of The inclusion of petitioner's middle name
birth, and the sex of a person may now be changed without judicial is covered by R.A. 9048, as amended.
proceedings. Republic Act No. 10172 clarifies that these changes may While substantial corrections of entries in the civil register are still
now be administratively corrected where it is patently clear that there is covered by Rule 108, typographical or clerical corrections must now be
a clerical or typographical mistake in the entry. It may be changed by filed under R.A. 9048 as amended. Section 2 of the said law defines
filing a subscribed and sworn affidavit with the local civil registry office clerical or typographical errors as follows:
of the city or municipality where the record being sought to be corrected
or changed is kept. (3) 'Clerical or typographical error' refers to a mistake committed in
the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or
typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such
as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth, mistake in the entry of
day and month in the date of birth or the sex of the person or the like,
which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be
corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or
records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the
change of nationality, age, or status of the petitioner.

Evidently the test for whether a correction is clerical or substantial is

found in the provision itself. Misspelled names or missing entries are
clerical corrections if they are visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding and if they may be readily verified by referring to the

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existing records in the civil register. They must not, however, involve any
change in nationality, age or status.
In Republic v. Gallo, the Court unequivocally held that a prayer to enter
a person's middle name is a mere clerical error, which may be corrected
by referring to existing records. Thus, it is primarily administrative in
nature and should be filed pursuant to R.A. 9048 as amended.
Applying the aforementioned ruling to the instant case therefore,
petitioner's prayer that his middle name, "Cruz" be entered, is a mere
clerical correction, and must therefore be likewise undertaken
through the administrative proceeding provided under R.A. 9048.
The correction in the spelling of petitioner's surname
is likewise covered by R.A. 9048, as amended.
Typographical or clerical errors in a person's surname must likewise be
corrected through the administrative proceeding under R.A. 9048.
As allegedly misspelled surname, "Bartholome," may be readily
corrected by merely referring to the existing records of the civil registrar,
such as the surnames of petitioner's parents and immediate family
members, the petition should have been filed under R.A. 9048 and not
under Rule 103 of the Rules. It likewise follows that the petition should
have been filed with the local civil registry office of the city or municipality
where the record being sought to be corrected or changed is kept, in
accordance with Section 3 of R.A. 9048 and not in accordance with the
venue provided in Rule 103.
Order: Denied, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate
administrative action under R.A. 9048, as amended by R.A. 10172.
MILLER v. MILLER
G.R. No. 200344, August 28, 2019
The legitimacy and filiation of children cannot be collaterally attacked in
a petition for correction of entries in the certificate of live birth.
SC: Glenn's initiatory pleading before the RTC is a Petition for
Correction of Entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of Joan under Rule
108.
Petitioners sought the correction of respondent's surname in her birth
certificate as they want her to use her mother's surname, Espenida,
instead of Miller, claiming that she was not an acknowledged illegitimate
child of John.
What petitioners seek is not a mere clerical change.
It is not a simple matter of correcting a single letter in respondent's
surname due to a misspelling. Rather, respondent's filiation will be
gravely affected, as changing her surname from Miller to Espenida
will also change her status. This will affect not only her identity, but
her successional rights as well. Certainly, this change is substantial.
Legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack.
Moreover, impugning the legitimacy of a child is governed by Article 171
of the Family Code, not Rule 108.
REPUBLIC v. LAO
G.R. No. 205218, February 10, 2020
The birth certificate, more than a historical record of one's birth, is a vital
marker of identity. Therefore, acts and events, though occurring after
birth, may be annotated on the birth certificate so long as they are
consistent with a legal truth and a special law provides for its effects.
Lao Kian Ben and Chia Kong Liong married. They are the parents of Jon
Nicholas, Winston Brian, and Christopher Troy. In the respective CLB,
the indicated nationality of both Lao Kian Ben, as father, and Chia Kong
Liong, as mother, is "Chinese."
Lao Kian Ben applied for naturalization and was granted. Chia Kong
Liong, being the wife was likewise conferred with Philippine citizenship.
KANAL CLOONEY-RENALDI
15
Winston Brian and Christopher Troy then filed a Petition for correction of
entry in their respective Certificates of Live Birth and contended that the
nationality of their parents, Lao Kian Ben and Chia Kong Liong, should
be changed from "Chinese" to "Filipino," considering that they had
already been naturalized as Filipino citizens pursuant to Philippine laws.
Since the entry sought to be changed—citizenship—was substantial, the
trial courts correctly conducted an adversarial proceeding, notifying the
local civil registrar and all parties interested under the entry sought to be
corrected are impleaded. After having complied with the jurisdictional
requirements for a petition under Rule 108, they alleged and proved the
ultimate facts required to reflect the naturalization of their parents in their
respective certificates of live birth. They established that: (1) they are the
legitimate children of Lao Kian Ben and Chia Kong Liong, former
Chinese nationals; (2) their parents are naturalized Filipino citizens; and
(3) the nationality of their parents entered in their respective certificates
of live birth remains "Chinese." The trial courts correctly granted the
Petitions of Winston Brian, Christopher Troy, and Jon Nicolas, ordering
that their decisions be annotated in their certificates of live birth.
To prohibit the annotation of events subsequent to birth in the certificate
of live birth is to deny a person the right to form his or her own identity.
More than a "historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of
birth," the birth certificate is an instrument of individuation. It contains
entries that separates a person from others. We cannot fault Winston
Brian, Christopher Troy, and Jon Nicholas for wanting to change the
nationality of their parents as entered in their certificates of live birth.
They only want a vital marker of their identity to align with a legal truth.
REPUBLIC V. ONTUCA
G.R. No. 232053, July 15, 2020
Annabelle gave birth to her daughter. Corazon, a registered midwife,
assisted Annabelle in giving birth to Zsanine. After Zsanine was born,
Carabeo volunteered herself to register Zsanine's birth. Annabelle thus
provided Carabeo with the necessary details.
After several days, the midwife delivered the birth certificate to
Annabelle. Annabelle was, however, dismayed to see the erroneous
entries in the certificate, to wit:
(a) Entry No. 6 – the name "Mary" was added in her first name
while her middle name was misspelled as "Paliño;"
(b) Entry No. 18 – in the date and place of marriage, "May 25,
1999 at Occ. Mindoro" was indicated despite the fact that
Annabelle was not married with the father of her child; and,
(c) Entry No. 20 – Annabelle appeared as the informant who
signed and accomplished the form, instead of the midwife.
To correct these entries, Annabelle filed a Petition under Rule 108 and
prayed that the name "Mary Annabelle Peleño Ontuca" be corrected by
removing "Mary" and changing "Paliño" to "Peleño;" and that the date
and place of marriage of parents be changed from "May 25, 1999 at Occ.
Mindoro" to "NOT MARRIED."
SC: Rule 108 applies when the person is seeking to correct clerical and
innocuous mistakes in his or her documents with the civil register. It also
governs the correction of substantial errors affecting the civil status,
citizenship, and nationality of a person. The proceedings may either be
summary, if the correction pertains to clerical mistakes, or adversary, if
it involves substantial errors. The petition must be filed before the RTC,
which sets a hearing and directs the publication of its order in a
newspaper of general circulation. The RTC may grant or dismiss the
petition and serve a copy of its judgment to the Civil Registrar.
In 2001, RA No. 9048 was enacted, amending Rule 108. In 2012, RA
No. 10172, amended RA No. 9048, expanding the authority of local civil
registrars and the Consul General.
The correction of Annabelle's middle name from "PALIÑO" to "PELEÑO"
involves clerical or typographical error. It merely rectified the erroneous
spelling through the substitution of the letters "A" and "I" in "PALIÑO"
with the letter "E," so it will read as "PELEÑO."
Similarly, the error in Annabelle's first name is clerical that will neither
affect nor prejudice her substantial rights. Annabelle's postal ID and
passport satisfactorily show that her first name is "ANNABELLE" and not
"MARY ANNABELLE." Verily, by referring to Annabelle's existing
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records, or documents, the innocuous errors in her first name and middle
name may be corrected under RA No. 9048, as amended.

Furthermore, Annabelle may file the petition to correct her personal

information in the birth certificate of her child. The application of RA No.
9048, as amended, is not limited to cases in which the erroneous entries
in the birth certificate sought to be corrected pertain to the owner of the
birth certificate.

Meanwhile, the correction of the date and place

of the parent's marriage to "NOT MARRIED" is substantial
since it will alter the child's status from legitimate to illegitimate.
To be sure, the correction of entries in the civil register pertaining to
citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage
involves substantial alterations, which may be corrected, and the true
facts established, provide the parties aggrieved by the error to avail
themselves of the appropriate adversary proceedings. Here, Annabelle
correctly filed a petition for cancellation and/or correction of the entries
before the RTC under Rule 108. Nevertheless, we find that Annabelle
failed to observe the required procedures under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of
Rule 108.

The rules require two sets of notices to potential oppositors – one given
to persons named in the petition and another served to persons who are
not named in the petition, but nonetheless may be considered interested
or affected parties. Consequently, the petition for a substantial correction
must implead the civil registrar and other persons who have, or claim to
have any interest that would be affected.

Nonetheless, there are instances when the subsequent publication of a

notice of hearing may cure the failure to implead and notify the affected
or interested parties, such as when: (a) earnest efforts were made by
petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties; (b) the
parties themselves initiated the corrections proceedings; (c) there is no
actual or presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested
parties; or (d) when a party is inadvertently left out.

None of these exceptions, however, are present in this case. There was
no earnest effort on the part of Annabelle to bring to court the OSG, the
child's father, and siblings, if any, and other parties who may have an
interest in the petition. Also, these indispensable parties are not the ones
who initiated the proceedings, and Annabelle cannot possibly claim that
she was not aware, actually or presumptively, as to the existence or
whereabouts of these interested parties. Lastly, it does not appear that
the indispensable parties were inadvertently and unintentionally left out
when Annabelle filed the petition. In sum, the failure to strictly comply
with the requirements under Rule 108 renders the proceedings void for
the correction of substantial errors.

We, however, sustain the correction of Annabelle's first name and

middle name under Rule 108. Ideally, Annabelle should have filed the
petition for correction with the local civil registrar under RA No. 9048, as
amended, and only when the petition is denied can the RTC take
cognizance of the case. In any case, RA No. 9048, as amended, did not
divest the trial courts of jurisdiction over petitions for correction of clerical
or typographical errors in a birth certificate. To be sure, the local civil
registrars' administrative authority to change or correct similar errors is
only primary but not exclusive. The regular courts maintain the authority
to make judicial corrections of entries in the civil registry.

Moreover, the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction is not

absolute and may be dispensed with for reasons of equity.

“When you laugh at me or flirt with me, is that a duty? Are you
conforming to the fitness of things? Doing what’s expected?”
– Lady Mary Crawley (Downton Abbey)

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