Persons and Family Relations Review Cases | Evanne Maliones
Based on the syllabus of Atty. Lydia Galas A.Y. 2021-2022, 2018-2019 TSN and Matt Santiago’s Notes 2020-2021
*Includes new cases
ARTICLE 2 – Effectivity of Laws
Tanada vs. Tuvera
“unless otherwise provided” refers to effectivity of laws and not the publication
requirement. Publication is a due process requirement. (Tanada vs. Tuvera)
De Roy vs. CA
All laws must be published, but SC decisions (which are not laws, but form part
of the legal system of the PH) not required to be published (Art. 8); no law
requires them to be published and it is the lawyer’s duty to keep abreast of
decisions of the court. (De Roy vs. CA)
Villafuerte vs. Cordial
Art 2 does not apply to local ordinances – the LGC governs them. ONLY
ORDINANCES THAT ARE PENAL IN NATURE must be published prior to taking
effect.
Where are penal ordinances published?
Sec 59, LGC
all ordinances with penal sanctions shall be published in
1. a newspaper of general circulation within the province where the
local legislative body concerned belongs.
2. In the absence of any newspaper of general circulation within the
province, posting of such ordinances shall be made in all
municipalities and cities of the province where the Sanggunian of
origin is situated.
ARTICLE 3 – Ignorance of the law
Caranto vs. Caranto (GR 202889)
Question of law, definition
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain
state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the question
must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest
solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is
clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question
posed is one of fact.
Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is whether the
appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating
the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of
fact.
ARTICLE 4 – Operation of law
Carlos vs. Sandoval
On exception to retroactivity –
One of the exceptions to prospectivity are procedural laws since no vested right
can be had from them. But - if the law or rule expressly provides for
prospective application it will be applied prospectively.
This refers to Rules of Procedure on the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. It is
given prospective application. It only applies to cases already commenced on or
after March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of
the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule, which became effective on March
15, 2003 is prospective in application.
Cheng vs. Sy
The fact that procedural statues may somehow affect the litigants rights does
not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. It is axiomatic that
the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a
person who may feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally
objectionable. The reason is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach
to, nor arise from, procedural laws.
Carolino vs. Senga
Under Article 4 of the Civil Code, it is provided that laws shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. It is said that law looks to the
future only and has no retroactive effect unless the legislator may have formally
given that effect to some legal provisions, that all statutes are to be construed as
having only prospective operation, unless the purpose and intention of the
legislature to give retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily
implied from the language used; and that every doubt must be resolved against
retrospective effect. These principles also apply to amendments of statutes.
Note:
1. after an act is amended, the original act continues to be in force with
regard to all the rights that had accrued prior to its amendment.
2. Where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements,
he acquires a vested right to the benefits that is protected by the due
process clause.
3. Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the
enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new
obligations after the right has vested.
Kwong Management vs. Diamond Homeowners & Residents
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Laws are not retroactive. Lex prospicit, non respicit; the law looks forward, not
backward. This is due to the unconstitutional result of retroacting a law's
application: it divests rights that have already become vested or impairs
obligations of contract.
While the Legislature has the power to pass retroactive laws which do not
impair the obligation of contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights, it is equally
true that statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect
so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent is expressly declared or
clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the enactment.
Atienza vs. Brillantes
Prior marriage – pre- civil code w/o license; udner CC, no req’t for void marriage
to be declared void
Subsequent marriage under FC, now there is a need to obtain declaration of
nullity of previous marriage (due to Art 40 of FC).
Rule: Article 40 of the Family Code is merely a rule of procedure. Declaration of
the nullity of a void marriage for purposes of remarriage will be invoked on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Art 40
can be applied retroactively since no vested right was impaired by such
application.
Abalos vs. People
Retroactive effect of RA 10951 – modifying penalties of certain RPC crimes eg
in this case, swindling and estafa.
Rule: Section 100 of the said law, however, provides that it shall have
retroactive effect only insofar as it is favorable to the accused.
Here, upon comparison of old and new penalties, it was found that retroactive
application would prejudice the accused so the old penalties were imposed.
ARTICLE 6 – Waiver of rights
Famanila vs CA
Crew person on a ship had to stop working due to aneurysm. He was offered a
release and waiver, which he signed. He subsequently changed his mind and
sought nullity of the waiver claiming that it was void because at the time that he
signed it, his consent was vitiated, being in financial constraints and suffering
from physical disability
Rule: Not void – merely voidable.
Note:
1. Quitclaims & waivers frowned upon but where it is shown that the
person making the waiver did so voluntarily – valid
2. To be valid and effective, waivers must be couched in clear and
unequivocal terms, leaving no doubt as to the intention of those
giving up a right or a benefit that legally pertains to them.
Guy vs. CA
Mother signed a release and quitclaim to renounce inheritance on behalf of her
children – but no specification of purpose for signing. Only indicates “in
settlement of claims of whatever nature and kind”
Rule: To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and
unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up
a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be
attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince
an intent to abandon a right.
ART. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his property may accept or
repudiate an inheritance.
Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by
their parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance
left to their wards only by judicial authorization.
Parents and guardians may not repudiate the inheritance of their wards
without judicial approval. This is because repudiation amounts to an
alienation of property which must pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect
the interest of the ward.
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks
knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest.
Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be
established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of
fact.
Otamias vs Republic
[T]he doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any character. A
person may waive any matter which affects his property, and any alienable right
or privilege of which he is the owner provided
1. such rights and privileges rest in the individual,
2. are intended for his sole benefit,
3. do not infringe on the rights of others, and
4. further provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden
by law, and
 Persons and Family Relations Review Cases | Evanne Maliones
Based on the syllabus of Atty. Lydia Galas A.Y. 2021-2022, 2018-2019 TSN and Matt Santiago’s Notes 2020-2021
*Includes new cases
5. does not contravene public policy
Here:
When Colonel Otamias executed the Deed of Assignment, he effectively waived
his right to claim that his retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The
right to receive retirement benefits belongs to Colonel Otamias. His decision to
waive a portion of his retirement benefits does not infringe on the right of third
persons, but even protects the right of his family to receive support.
ARTICLE 9 – Duty of Courts/ Judges to render Judgment
Silverio vs Republic
Sivlerio underwent sex reassignment surgery and wanted to change his name
and sex but court refused because no law on the matter.
Rule – Since there is no law on the matter, the court cannot decide on it.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall
decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency
of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation.
The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
It is for the legislature to determine what guidelines should govern the
recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. It might be theoretically possible
for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as having
successfully changed his sex. However the Court cannot enact a law where no
law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of Congress.
ARTICLE 11 & 12 – CUSTOMS
Anaban vs Anaban
Note: NCC took effect August 30, 1950
Situation – marriage was solemnized according to tribe’s custom, divorce also
according to tribe’s custom, then there’s a subsequent marriage, then the man
died and children of 1st marriage claiming some property.
Argument: in asmuch was the marriage was in accordance w/ customs of ibaloi,
the divorce in accordance w/ same customs was proper.
Note this provi from NCC:
Article 78. Marriages between Mohammedans or pagans who live in the non-
Christian provinces may be performed in accordance with their customs, rites
or practices. No marriage license or formal requisites shall be necessary. Nor
shall the persons solemnizing these marriages be obliged to comply with article
92.
SC:
1. Art 78 did not expressly state that marriages may be dissolved
according to customs, rites or practices of non-christians p but
framers of law intended to recognize these exsiting customs.
2. There’s a PSA order (AO3) that governs the procedure for effective
civil registration of marriages, births, dissolution, etc
3. The divorce under the ibaloi custom not recognized under our laws
4. A valid divorce can be granted only by the courts and for reasons
specified in Act 2710 (the old law when divorce was still allowed –
good times)
5. There is no provision of law w/c authorizes the granting of divorces
in accordance w/ rites/practices of their religion. A divorce cannot
be had except in that court upon w/c the state has conferred
jurisdiction and then only for those causes and w/ those formalities
w/c the state has by statute prescribed.
6. The old civil code and IPRA –IRR limited state recognition to
“marriages performed” in accordance w/ customary laws, rites
traditions and practices – no mention of recognition of dissolution of
marriage in accordance w/ IP customs
ARTICLE 14 – Obligatory effect of Penal Laws
Del Socorro vs. Wilsem
Alien refused to give support to child, says his national law does not require him
to do so.
SC: Civil Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are governed
by their personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they belong even when
staying in a foreign country.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a
dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. It is incumbent upon
respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not
impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child. In view of the
failure to prove and plead, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern.
Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and
proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or
domestic or internal law.
Since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not
been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the
same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support
their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith – he may be
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liable for violation of RA 9262. Considering he is living in Philippines, the
territoriality principle applies.
Note:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations
or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
ARTICLE 15 – Nationality Theory
Van Dorn vs Romillo
We do not recognize divorce as a means of terminating marriage by reason of
public policy. But owing to the nationality principle embodied in Art. 15 of the
Civil Code, if the foreigner spouse validly obtained a divorce decree abroad, then
we give it due recognition. And thus, the foreigner husband ceases to be the
husband of the Filipino wife.
Only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces,
the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
-However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines provided they are valid according to their national law (Cf. Art. 26
(2) Family Code).
Pilapil vs Ibay-somerra
While it may be true that Philippines does not recognize divorce as a means to
terminate marriage, however, the divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent (german) is
concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of
status of persons.
Recio vs Recio
"aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law." Before a foreign divorce
decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Relevant provision:
Art. 21. When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens of a foreign
country, it shall be necessary for them before a marriage license can be
obtained, to submit a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage, issued by
their respective diplomatic or consular officials.
SC:
The legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the
party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code
would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he
duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima
facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a
marriage license.
Quita vs CA
Once proved that the petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of
their divorce, Van Dorn ruling applies.
Recap: Van dorn ruling
Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines
provided they are valid according to their national law.
Elmar vs Perez
It is basic that laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad. Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether he/she was
married here or abroad, initiates a petition abroad to obtain an absolute
divorce from spouse and eventually becomes successful in getting an
absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not recognize such absolute
divorce.
Note: in the subsequent case of Marilyn Tanedo Manalo, GR 221029
(2019), the bold ruling was not applied. See ruling below:
The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign
divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated
the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the
marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will
have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband
or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same
place and in like circumstances as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of
an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not
make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the
residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on a Filipinos whose marital ties to
their alien spouses are severed by operations of their alien spouses are severed
by operation on the latter's national law.
San Luis vs San Luis
 Persons and Family Relations Review Cases | Evanne Maliones
Based on the syllabus of Atty. Lydia Galas A.Y. 2021-2022, 2018-2019 TSN and Matt Santiago’s Notes 2020-2021
*Includes new cases
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as
a public or official record of a foreign country by either:
1) An official publication or
2) A copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document.
ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENT NOT PRESENT IN RECIO vs. RECIO:
If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:
a) Accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular official of the Philippines who is stationed in the foreign country where
the document is kept; and
b) Authenticated by the seal of his office.
Note: the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be
alleged and proved.
Lavadia vs Heirs of Luna
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule
adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property between the
parties of the 1st marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a
divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks competent judicial approval, and
cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband who contracts a
subsequent marriage. It was void without court approval.
Here, there was a property settlement attached to a petition for divorce – which
was approved but SC said sicne the divorce was ineffectual - the properties,
pursuant to Article 148 in the absence of any proof of actual contribution of
money, property, or industry, shall go to the subsisting valid marriage.
Noveras vs Noveras
How to prove and plead a foreign judgment:
Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign
authority or tribunal may be proved by:
(1) an official publication thereof or
(2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof.
Such official publication or copy must be accompanied, if the record is not kept
in the Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal
custody thereof.
The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or
consular officials stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept,
and authenticated by the seal of his office.
The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, asthe case may be, and must be under the
official seal of the attesting officer.
Section 25 - whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose
of evidence, the attestation must
1. state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or
a specific part thereof, as the case may be.
2. be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if
he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
Bayot vs CA (when the court relaxed certification reqt)
"[petitioner therein] was clearly an American citizenwhen she secured the
divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the
Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticatedby
the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient."
But in this case- no seal from the office where the divorce decree was obtained.
Orion Savings Bank vs Suzuki
In order for foreign laws to be given due recognition by our courts, they must
be alleged and proved. Otherwise, in the absence of proof as to the existence of
a foreign law, or there is failure to prove the same, then we apply the “Doctrine
of Processual Presumption” or the “Presumed Identity Approach”
Property relations between spouses are governed principally by the national
law of the spouses. However, the party invoking the application of a foreign law
has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is a question of fact
to be properly
pleaded and proved as the judge cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law.
Simundac-Keppel vs Keppel
Situation: german citizens filed for annulment of marriage
SC: Based on the Nationality Principle, and pursuant to which laws relating to
family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad, it was
the pertinent German law that governed. Philippine law finds no application as
far as the family rights and obligations of the parties who are foreign nationals
are concerned – they must prove that in their national law, an annulment is also
a ground to terminate marriage – Rule 132, S24 & 25 of ROC.
Suzuki vs OSG
Important points from the case:
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1. a foreign judgment of adoption of a Filipino citizen can be judicially
recognized in the PH. there are two parties involved in an adoption
process: the adopter and the adoptee.
In this case, the adopter was a foreign citizen (Japanese)
Article 15 of the Civil Code states that "[l]aws relating to family
rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad." Owing to this nationality principle, the Philippine
laws on adoption are thus binding on petitioner (adoptee-filipino).
However, with respect to the case of Hayashi (adopter) , who is a
Japanese citizen - the Philippine courts are: precluded from
deciding on his "family rights and duties, or on [his] status,
condition and legal capacity" concerning the foreign judgment
to which he is a party.
Thus, as to the foreign judgment of adoption if it is proven as a fact,
the Philippine courts are limited to the determination of whether to
extend its effect to petitioner, the Filipino party.
2. (this was also mentioned by ma’am in the lecture)
As already mentioned, the rules on inter-country adoption are not
applicable in the case of Hayashi pursuant to Article 184(3)(b) of the
Family Code. Specifically, the provisions of RA 8043 do not apply to
him. Besides, as provided in Section 8 thereof, "only a legally free
child may be the subject of inter-country adoption."
3. The adoption of petitioner by Hayashi may be validly effected in
accordance with the provisions of RA 8552.
The court disagreed that adoption decrees involving Filipino citizens
obtained abroad cannot be judicially recognized in the Philippines
for being contrary to law and public policy.
Just because we have RA 8552 in the PH – it should not automatically
foreclose proceedings to recognize the adoption decree obtained
under Japanese law.
Note that the principle behind the recognition and enforcement of a
foreign judgment derives its force not only from our Rules of Court
but from the fact that such act of recognition is considered part of
what is considered as the "generally accepted principles of
international law.
4. The adoption by an alien of the legitimate child of his/her Filipino
spouse is valid and legal based on Article 184(3) (b) of the Family
Code and Section 7(b)(i), Article III of RA 8552.
The foreign judgment against a person is already "presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties." Upon judicial recognition
of the foreign judgment, the right becomes conclusive and the
judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of
entry in the civil registry.
ARTICLE 16 – Law governing Real and Personal Property
Orion Savings Bank vs Suzuki
Real or immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of the country or
state where it is located. The reason is found in the very nature of immovable
property — its immobility.
Immovables are part of the country and so closely connected to it that all rights
over them have their natural center of gravity there.
On the other hand, property relations between spouses are governed
principally by the national law of the spouses.
Matters concerning the title and disposition of real property shall be governed
by Philippine law while issues pertaining to the conjugal nature of the property
shall be governed by South Korean law, provided it is proven as a fact.
Cayetano vs. Leonidas
Note: here, the deceased at the time of her death, was an American citizen and
a permanent resident of Philadelphia
Art. 16 par. (2).
Intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity
of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may
be found.
Art. 1039.
Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
 Persons and Family Relations Review Cases | Evanne Maliones
Based on the syllabus of Atty. Lydia Galas A.Y. 2021-2022, 2018-2019 TSN and Matt Santiago’s Notes 2020-2021
*Includes new cases
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the
will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law
of the decedent must apply.
Whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of
legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of
foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount
of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must
prevail over general ones.
Ancheta vs Guersey Dalaygon
Situation - Audrey Guersey was an American citizen domiciled in Maryland,
U.S.A. At the time of her death she resided in PH but was domiciled in Maryland,
U.S.A
SC: Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey’s will, especially
with regard as to who are her heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the law
of the State of Maryland, as provided in Article 16 of the Civil Code BUT
As to order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property
may be found. (Art 16, NCC)
While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts
are not authorized to take judicial notice of them; petitioner, as ancillary
administrator of Audrey’s estate, was duty-bound to introduce in evidence the
pertinent law of the State of Maryland – she failed to do so but the law was
introduced by appellants in the CA – so court took notice and divided the
properties in accordance w/ national law.
HUMAN RELATIONS
ARTICLE 19 – Principle of Abuse of Rights
FEB vs Pacilan
In order for an abuse of rights to arise, there must be the presence of three
elements:
a. the existence of a legal right or duty
b. which is exercised in bad faith;
c. for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence, dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of
known duty due to some motives or interest or ill will that partakes of the
nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to
duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad
faith or bad motive.
Uypitching vs Quiamco
True, a mortgagee may take steps to recover the mortgaged property to enable
it to enforce or protect its foreclosure right thereon. There is, however, a well-
defined procedure for the recovery of possession of mortgaged property: if a
mortgagee is unable to obtain possession of a mortgaged property for its sale
on foreclosure, he must bring a civil action either to recover such possession as
a preliminary step to the sale, or to obtain judicial foreclosure.
The failure to bring the proper civil action was an abuse of right.
There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure
another. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for
which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must
be no intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured
party will attach.
Cebu Country Club vs. Elizagaque
Recap: the blackball system of voting that the person who wanted to be a
member was not made aware of – left groping in the dark.
SC: While the country club has a right to choose who should be its members,
there was an abuse of rights on the part of the Cebu Country Club. It was
reasoned by the Club that they have a new rule on admission of new members
that there must be unanimous vote from the board of directors. This was not
stated in the application form submitted by Elizagaque but such rule already has
taken effect 13 years after the application. The Court said that there was bad
faith on the part of Cebu Country Club.
Calatagan vs Clemente
Situation: Clemente incurred delinquency in his payments of his dues.
Calatagan sent him collection notices but notices were sent back w/ note that
the address was closed –still 3rd demand letter sent to same address, then
clemente’s share sold in PA.
SC:
The utter bad faith exhibited by Calatagan brings into operation
Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code, under the Chapter on Human Relations.
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These provisions enunciate a general obligation under law for every person to
act fairly and in good faith towards one another.
A non-stock corporation like Calatagan is not exempt from that obligation in its
treatment of its members. The obligation of a corporation to treat every person
honestly and in good faith extends even to its shareholders or members, even if
the latter find themselves contractually bound to perform certain obligations to
the corporation. A certificate of stock cannot be a charter of dehumanization.
Ardiente vs Javier
Water District immediately disconnected the water connection w/o first
informing the customer – abuse of rights.
Sesbreno vs CA & Veco
Search warrant is only required when it is the government or any of the agents
of the state would make the search, not in this case since VECO is a private
establishment. The presence of the member of the Philippine Constabulary is
merely for assistance. It did not do the job of the VOC inspectors. There was no
basis for the award of damages.
Saladaga vs Astorga
One party to the contract was a lawyer- there was discrepancy whether it was a
contract of sale w/ right to repurchase or equitable mortgage. SC found it
violative of Art 19.
A lawyer who drafts a contract must see to it that the agreement faithfully and
clearly reflects the intention of the contracting parties. Otherwise, the
respective rights and obligations of the contracting parties will be uncertain,
which opens the door to legal disputes between the said parties. Indeed, the
uncertainty caused by respondent’s poor formulation of the "Deed of Sale with
Right to Repurchase" was a significant factor in the legal controversy between
respondent and complainant. Such poor formulation reflects at the very least
negatively on the legal competence of respondent.
Coca Cola Bottlers vs Bernardo
Coca Cola had a contract w/ bernardo – coca cola got B to submit a customer list
in exchange for a longer contarct period but once they got the list, the contract
was nto renewed and coca cola offered the clients lower prices. SC found this an
abuse of right.
COCA COLA’S contention: The act of "a merchant [who] puts up a store near
the store of another and in this way attracts some of the latter's patrons" is not
an abuse of a right.
The scenario in the present case is vastly different: the merchant was also the
producer who, with the use of a list provided by its distributor, knocked on the
doors of the latter's customers and offered the products at a substantially lower
price.
St. Martin Polyclinic vs LWV construction
"[Article 19], known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of
abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the
exercise of one's rights, but also in the performance of one's duties."48 Case law
states that "[w]hen a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with
the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.
Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations
and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its
violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21
would [then] be proper."
 Article 20 - applies to both willful and negligent acts that are done
contrary to law.
 Article 21 - applies only to willful acts done contra bonos mores.
Lomarda vs Fudalan
Person wanted to be a member of BOHECO (Electric company) he was told that
b4 his elec can be installed, he has to secure certification from BAPA; suggested
to tap the electricity w/ BAPA instead. There was refusal to issue the certificate
of authorization.
"Article 19 sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the
exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties."
Case law states that "[a] right, though by itself legal because [it is] recognized or
granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality.
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible."
Although Article 19 merely declares a principle of law, Article 21 gives flesh to
its provisions. Thus, we agree with private respondent’s assertion that
violations of Articles 19 and 21 are actionable, with judicially enforceable
remedies in the municipal forum.
Article 21 of the Civil Code “refers to acts contra bonos mores and has the
following elements:
 Persons and Family Relations Review Cases | Evanne Maliones
Based on the syllabus of Atty. Lydia Galas A.Y. 2021-2022, 2018-2019 TSN and Matt Santiago’s Notes 2020-2021
*Includes new cases
(1) an act which is legal;
(2) but which is contrary to morals, good customs, public order or public policy;
and
(3) is done with intent to injure.”
Navarro vs Banaria
Situation – failure of the 2nd wife to bring the b-day celebrant to his party
Article 19 sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the
exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties.
These standards are the following:
1. to act with justice;
2. to give everyone his due; and
3. to observe honesty and good faith.
A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in
a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and
results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible.
Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations
and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its
violation.
Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be
proper.
While Article 19 of the New Civil Code may have been intended as a mere
declaration of principle, the "cardinal law on human conduct" expressed in said
article has given rise to certain rules, e.g., that where a person exercises his
rights but does so arbitrarily or unjustly or performs his duties in a manner that
is not in keeping with honesty and good faith, he opens himself to liability. The
elements of an abuse of rights under Article 19 are:
(1) there is a legal right or duty;
(2) which is exercised in bad faith;
(3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Consequently, when Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper
under Article 20 and 21 of the New Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages
arising from a violation of law.
ARTICLE 21 – Acts Contrary to morals
Buenaventura vs CA
Article 21 states that the individual must willfully cause loss or injury to
another. There is a need that the act is willful and hence done in complete
freedom.
The trial court declared the marriage of the parties null and void based on
Article 36 of the Family Code, due to psychological incapacity of the petitioner.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.
Since psychological incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that one must assume and discharge as a consequence of
marriage, it removes the basis for the contention that the petitioner purposely
deceived the private respondent. If the private respondent was deceived, it was
not due to a willful act on the part of the petitioner. Therefore, the award of
moral damages was without basis in law and in fact.
ARTICLE 22 – Unjust enrichment
Filinvest vs Ngilay
Unjust enrichment exists "when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of
another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the
fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience."
There is unjust enrichment under Article 22 of the Civil Code when
(1) a person is unjustly benefited, and
(2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another.
Thus, the sale which created the obligation of petitioner to pay the agreed
amount having been declared void, respondents have the duty to return the
down payment as they no longer have the right to keep it. The principle of unjust
enrichment essentially contemplates payment when there is no duty to pay, and
the person who receives the payment has no right to receive it.
Gonzalo vs Tarnate
Unjust enrichment exists, according to Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc., "when a person
unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of another, or when a person retains money
or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and
good conscience."
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The prevention of unjust enrichment is a recognized public policy of the State,
for Article 22 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that "[e]very person who
through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or
comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or
legal ground, shall return the same to him."
It is well to note that Article 22 "is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human
Relations, the provisions of which were formulated as basic principles to be
observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the
stability of the social order; designed to indicate certain norms that spring from
the fountain of good conscience; guides for human conduct that should run as
golden threads through society to the end that law may approach its supreme
ideal which is the sway and dominance of justice."
NOTE: Art 22 is an exception to the pari delicto rule. No damages because they
are in pari delicto.
Bliss Development vs Diaz
Bliss dev’t received two payments from 2 persons for the same property. One
derived its rights from the heirs of the person himself. The other derived it from
another transaction.
SC: Notwithstanding the fact that Diaz is not an innocent purchaser in good faith
and for value, BDC is nevertheless liable to return to him the amortizations
which he already paid on the property, applying the rule on unjust enrichment.
Unjust enrichment exists when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of
another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the
fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience. Under Article 22
of the Civil Code, there is unjust enrichment when
(1) a person is unjustly benefited and
(2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another.
Allowing BDC to keep the amortizations paid by Diaz is tantamount to unjust
enrichment. It would result in BDC receiving amortizations twice the amount it
should have received, that is, the amortizations paid by Diaz and Arreza. While
BDC claims that it did not receive amortizations from both Diaz and Arreza
covering the same period, such a claim is self-serving, and is not amply
supported by any documentary evidence.
Even if BDC can prove that there was no overlap between the payments made
by Diaz and those made by Arreza, allowing it to keep the amortizations paid by
Diaz still amounts to unjust enrichment. As a direct result of the final and
executory ruling that Arreza is the rightful buyer of the subject property, the
buyer-seller relationship between Diaz and BDC is rendered null and void.
Yon Mitori vs Union Bank
Involved a check dishonored by a bank, deposited by Tan (yon mitori’s owner).
The ff day, he immediately w/drew money. A check issued was comepletey
unfunded because account was closed. Bank demanded from tan the money
w/drew. Tan found to be in BF.
There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss
of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the
fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good conscience.
For the principle to apply, the following requisites must concur: (i) a person is
unjustly benefited; and
(ii) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another.
Unjust enrichment claims do not lie simply because one party benefits from the
efforts or obligations of others, but instead it must be shown that a party was
unjustly enriched in the sense that the term unjustly could mean illegally or
unlawfully.
To substantiate a claim for unjust enrichment, the claimant must unequivocally
prove that another party knowingly received something of value to which he
was not entitled and that the state of affairs are such that it would be unjust for
the person to keep the benefit.
Unjust enrichment is a term used to depict result or effect of failure to make
remuneration of or for property or benefits received under circumstances that
give rise to legal or equitable obligation to account for them; to be entitled to
remuneration, one must confer benefit by mistake, fraud, coercion, or request.
Unjust enrichment is not itself a theory of reconvey but a prerequisite for
the enforcement of the doctrine of restitution.
ARTICLE 26 – Acts not constituting a criminal offense but shall produce a
cause of action for damages
Castro vs People
In CASTRO VS PEOPLE 599 SCRA 676 he was sued for a criminal offense, but
when it went to the Supreme Court, it held that utmost, he would only be liable
for damages under Article 26, (3) rather than the crime of grave oral slander.
What he said to the caller was to be careful of Mr. Tan because that would be
 Persons and Family Relations Review Cases | Evanne Maliones
Based on the syllabus of Atty. Lydia Galas A.Y. 2021-2022, 2018-2019 TSN and Matt Santiago’s Notes 2020-2021
*Includes new cases
dangerous. According to the Court, it does not constitute slander, but merely
constitutes a violation of the said
provision, so only for damages.
ARTICLE 27 – Liability of public servant/employee
Ledesma vs CA& Delmo
A case was filed where petitioner, who was then the President of the West
Visayas College was found liable for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines for failure to graduate a student with honors.
SC: We find no reason why the findings of the trial and appellate courts should
be reversed. It cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo went through a painful
ordeal which was brought about by the petitioner's neglect of duty and
callousness. Thus, moral damages are but proper.
Capugan vs Tolentino
The register of deeds upon the receipt of the compromise agreement,
immediately cancelled the adverse claim that was annotated at the back of the
title. Consequently, a complaint was filed against the ROD, because according to
them, there was no basis for the cancellation in as much as there is no court
order.
SC: The court found no abuse of authority or irregularity committed by ROD
with respect to the cancellation of the notice of adverse claim and the notice of
lis pendens annotated on TCT No. N- 290546. Whether or not the RTC order
dated May 16, 2008 or the letter-request dated June 30, 2008 had been falsified,
fraudulent or invalid was not for them to determine inasmuch as their duty to
examine documents presented for registration was limited only to what appears
on the face of the documents. If, upon their evaluation of the letter-request and
the RTC order, they found the same to be sufficient in law and to be in
conformity with existing requirements, it became obligatory for them to
perform their ministerial duty without unnecessary delay.
ARTICLE 29 -35
People vs Bayotas
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a
criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the
pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be
sufficient to prove the act complained of.
What Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate civil action which may
be brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense
independently of any criminal action. In the event that no criminal proceedings
are instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the quantum of evidence
needed to prove the criminal act will have to be that which is compatible with
civil liability and that is, preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of
the civil action despite extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the
question of whether civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the
criminal action due to death of the accused during appeal of his conviction. This
is because whether asserted in the criminal action or in a separate civil action,
civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of the accused while his
conviction is on appeal.
Article 30 of the Civil Code refers to the institution of a separate civil action that
does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding.
Daluraya vs Olivia
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against
him on the civil aspect of the case.1âwphi1 The extinction of the penal action
does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where:
(a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required;
(b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and
(c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the
crime of which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action based on delict
may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the
criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise
did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed
to him.
Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the
accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless
the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist. This is because when the accused files a demurrer to
evidence, he has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil aspects
of the case.
People vs Dionaldo
In People v. Quiachon, the Court explained that even if the death penalty was not
to be imposed on accused-appellants in view of the prohibition in RA 9346, the
award of civil indemnity was nonetheless proper, not being dependent on the
actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying
circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the
commission of the crime. In the present case, considering that both the
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qualifying circumstances of ransom and the death of the victim during captivity
were duly alleged in the information and proven during trial, civil indemnity in
the amount of ₱100,000.00 must therefore be awarded to the family of the
victim, to conform with prevailing jurisprudence.
Dy vs. People
Gloria Dy was sued by MCCI for Estafa, but the court found that there was failure
on the part of the prosecution to prove that element of conversion or
misappropriation. It was dismissed. The lower court however, incorporated in
the order of dismissal, the payment of Gloria Dy of the amount of 21m pesos.
Was it proper for the court to order payment of civil liability arising from
contract in a criminal case decision? NO. Because it should be instituted in a
separate civil action because the source of the obligation was a contract of loan.
People vs Calomia
Reiteration of People vs. Bayotas:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by
Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from
and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of
obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or
omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) xxx
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action
for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil
action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against
the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the
source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file
this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution
of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party
instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of
limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of
the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code,
that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription.
The death of an accused pending the appeal of his conviction extinguishes the
criminal action, as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; and
the civil action instituted therein for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto is
likewise ipso facto extinguished, as it is grounded on the criminal action.
Kane vs Roggenkamp
1. An acquittal from a charge of physical violence against women and their
children is not a bar to the filing of a civil action for damages for physical
injuries under Article 33 of the Civil Code if an acquittal was due to
reasonable doubt, without any declaration that the facts upon which the
offense arises are nonexistent.
2. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries., the civil action is
"entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action" and shall
"proceed independently of the criminal prosecution." Accordingly,
Article 33 "contemplates a civil action for the recovery of damages that is
entirely unrelated to the purely criminal aspect of the case.
3. The civil action under Article 33 may be pursued before the filing of the
criminal case, during the pendency of the criminal case, or even after the
criminal case is resolved. The only limitation is that an offended party
cannot "recover [damages] twice for the same act or omission" of the
defendant.
4. Defamation," "fraud," and "physical injuries," as used in Article 33, are to be
understood in their ordinary sense. "Physical injuries" contemplated in
Article 33 is bodily injury, not the "physical injuries" referred to in the
Revised Penal Code.
5. Under Rule 120, Section 2 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
a judgment acquitting the accused must state whether the prosecution
absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. - it must determine if the act or
omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
Without such declaration, it must be presumed that the acquittal was due
to reasonable doubt, and the accused is civilly liable ex delicto. Thus, the
general rule shall apply: every person criminally liable is also civilly liable.
 Persons and Family Relations Review Cases | Evanne Maliones
Based on the syllabus of Atty. Lydia Galas A.Y. 2021-2022, 2018-2019 TSN and Matt Santiago’s Notes 2020-2021
*Includes new cases
6. Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the
civil liability of the accused.
a. First - an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not
the author of the act or omission complained of. No delict,
no civil liability, civil action must be abased on other
grounds.
b. Second - an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the
guilt of the accused – even if the guilt has not been
satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil
liability which may be proved by preponderance of
evidence only. (ART 29)
ART 36 – Prejudicial Question
Tuanda vs Sandiganbayan
1. A prejudicial question is one that must be decided before any
criminal prosecution may be instituted or before it may proceed (see
Art. 36, Civil Code) because a decision on that point is vital to the
eventual judgment in the criminal case. It’s resolution is a logical
antecedent of the issues involved in said criminal case.
2. Arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of
the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the
question must be lodged in another court or tribunal.
Elements of a prejudicial question:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed.
Beltran vs People
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not
a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered
prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending
the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said
civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid
civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.
Art 40 - import of said provision is that for purposes of remarriage, the only
legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is
a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes
of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable.
In a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need not
present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence
in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final
judgment declaring his marriage void.
Philippine Aguila Satellite vs. Lichauco
To determine the existence of a prejudicial question in the case before the
Ombudsman, it is necessary to examine the elements of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019
for which Lichauco was charged and the causes of action in the civil case.
When, in the course of the actions taken by those to whom the complaint is
endorsed or forwarded, a prejudicial question is found to be pending, Section 6,
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court should be applied in a suppletory character. As
laid down in Yap v. Paras, said rule directs that the proceedings may only be
suspended, not dismissed, and that it may be made only upon petition,and
not at the instance of the judge alone or as in this case, the investigating
officer.
To give imprimatur to the Ombudsman’s dismissal of petitioner’s criminal
complaint due to prejudicial question would not only run counter to the
provision of Section 6 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. It would sanction the
extinguishment of criminal liability, if there be any, through prescription under
Article 89 vis a vis Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code.
Yap vs Cabales
If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues, or the issue in one is
intimately related to the issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial question
would likely exist, provided the other element or characteristic is satisfied. It
must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of the issues
raised in the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.
If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal
responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or
if there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up
the criminal case, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. Neither
is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according
to law, proceed independently of each other.
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The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its
presentation for payment. The determination of whether the petitioner is
liable to pay the private respondents the value of the checks and damages,
will not affect the guilt or innocence of the petitioner because the material
question in the criminal cases is whether petitioner had issued bad checks,
regardless of the purpose or condition of its issuance.
RULE: Determination of a civil case for collection of sum of money is irrelevant
to the guilt or innocence of the petitioner in the criminal cases for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22.
Dreamwork vs Janiola
Prejudicial question upon effectivity of the Rules of criminal procedure
Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which
must precede the criminal action and which requires a decision before a
final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which said
question is closely connected. The civil action must be instituted prior to the
institution of the criminal action.
2 cases
1. BP 22
2. Nullity of the contract from w/c the checks were issued
SC: not a prejudicial question. BP 22’s issue is the issuance of a bad check. The
purpose for which the check was issued, the terms and conditions relating to its
issuance, or any agreement surrounding such issuance are irrelevant to the
prosecution and conviction of petitioner.
The agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to
the prosecution for violation of BP 22.
Pimentel vs Pimentel
Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question in Criminal Case for
Parricide.
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the
crime of parricide, which punishes any person "who shall kill his father, mother,
or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or
descendants, or his spouse." The relationship between the offender and the
victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder or homicide. However,
the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the
issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the
offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is
whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was
charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts
of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioner’s
will.
Consing vs People
An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the defrauded party does
not raise a prejudicial question to stop the proceedings in a pending criminal
prosecution of the defendant for estafa through falsification. This is because the
result of the independent civil action is irrelevant to the issue of guilt or
innocence of the accused.
A civil action based on defamation, fraud and physical injuries may be
independently instituted pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not
operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of a criminal
case - in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the
independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice
for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
Caterpillar vs. Samson
A common element of all such cases for unfair competition - civil and criminal -
was fraud. Under Article 33 of the Civil Code, a civil action entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured party in cases
of fraud, and such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution. In view of its being an independent civil action, Civil Case No. Q-
00-41446 did not operate as a prejudicial question that justified the suspension
of the proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-108043-44.
A civil action for damages and cancellation of trademark cannot be considered
a prejudicial question by which to suspend the proceedings in the criminal cases
for unfair competition.
 Persons and Family Relations Review Cases | Evanne Maliones
Based on the syllabus of Atty. Lydia Galas A.Y. 2021-2022, 2018-2019 TSN and Matt Santiago’s Notes 2020-2021
*Includes new cases
In the suit for the cancellation of trademark, the issue of lawful registration
should necessarily be determined, but registration was not a consideration
necessary in unfair competition.
The determination of the lawful ownership of the trademark in the civil action
was not determinative of whether or not the criminal actions for unfair
competition shall proceed against Samson.
ARTICLES 40-42 – Personality Springs from birth
Quimiguiung vs Icao
A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality
of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to
support from its progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee
(whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to
dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived
child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742
of the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result
in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary
heir, even if such child should be born after the death of the testator Article 854,
Civil Code).
Continental Steel vs. Montano
Parents seeking bereavement leave and death benefits for their child – who died
in the womb.
SC:
Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it
is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42
plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death.
First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42
of the Civil Code on natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of
the same Code, the very first of the general provisions on civil personality, which
reads:
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations,
is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to
act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her
juridical capacity and capacity to act as a person are not in issue. It is not a
question before us whether the unborn child acquired any rights or incurred
any obligations prior to his/her death that were passed on to or assumed by the
child’s parents. The rights to bereavement leave and other death benefits
in the instant case pertain directly to the parents of the unborn child upon
the latter’s death.
Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition
of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality
may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have
acquired juridical personality could die.
Death has been defined as the cessation of life. Life is not synonymous with
civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she
could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the
Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception,25 that the State
must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life,
then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as
death.
Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As
Continental Steel itself defines, a dependent is "one who relies on another for
support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid of
someone else."
Under said general definition, even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents.
Hortillano’s child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life
without depending upon its mother, Hortillano’s wife, for sustenance.
Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions in question that the dependent
may be the parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or the parent,
brother, or sister of a single employee. The CBA did not provide a qualification
for the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have
acquired civil personality, as Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification,
then child shall be understood in its more general sense, which includes the
unborn fetus in the mother’s womb.
The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent child’s status in relation
to his/her parents.
ARTICLE 44-47 – Juridical persons
Mayor vs Tiu
Artificial persons include
(1) a collection or succession of natural persons forming a corporation; and
(2) a collection of property to which the law attributes the capacity of having
rights and duties. This class of artificial persons is recognized only to a limited
8|P a g e
extent in our law. Example is the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person. From
this pronouncement, it can be gleaned that the estate of the deceased person
is a juridical person separate and distinct from the person of the decedent
and any other corporation. This status of an estate comes about by operation
of law. This is in consonance with the basic tenet under corporation law that a
corporation has a separate personality distinct from its stockholders and from
other corporations to which it may be connected.
FAMILY CODE
ARTICLE 2-3 – Essential/ Formal Requisites
Republic vs CA & Castro
The new civil code, which governed the marriage of the parties provided that no
marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local
civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage,
absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio.
A certification of the local civil registrar of due search and inability to find a
record or entry to the effect that no marriage license was issued - enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of
all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Sy vs CA
Incongruity of dates in the marriage license - date of issuance of their marriage
certificate and marriage license are different and incongruous - show that on
the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license.
A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage
void ab initio.
Sevilla vs Cardenas
W/n the certifications from the Local Civil Registrar stating that no Marriage
License No. 2770792 as appearing in the marriage contract of the parties was
issued – not sufficient to declare the marriage as null and void ab initio.
“we exert all effort but we cannot find the said number…due to loaded work”
SC: presumption of regularity rebutted. It could mean the logbook just could not
be found. Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the
marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. The courts look upon this
presumption with great favor.
Silverio vs Republic
Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman.
One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who
must be a male and a female.
To grant the changes of name & sex in the birth certificate will substantially
reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will
allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex
reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual).
ARTICLE 4 – Effect of absence, defect, irregularity
Cosca vs Palaypayon
Situation – a judge solemnized marriages w/o marriage license. Couples were
married by just paying marriage fees, judge did not sign marriage contracts –
reason being he had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the
parties – days after the ceremony.
SC: Family Code pertinently provides that the formal requisites of marriage are
- a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for therein.
Absence of essential/formal Irregularity
requisites
GR- renders the marriage void ab Not affect the validity of marriage
initio but parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly,
criminally and administratively
liable.
Aranes vs Occiano
SC: In People vs. Lara, we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of
the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license
cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in
cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing
officer the authority to solemnize a marriage.
Morigo vs People
2 marriages; for bigamy but 1st – no marriage ceremony performed (formal
requisite)
SC: The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a
valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone,
without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for
 Persons and Family Relations Review Cases | Evanne Maliones
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*Includes new cases
which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial
declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
Alcantara vs Alcantara
to be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the
law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be
1. apparent on the marriage contract, or
2. at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil
registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties.
BUT in this case- there is a ML number on the marriage contract & a certification
was issued to the effect that an ML was issued – enjoys presumption of
regularity. Even discrepancy in numbers, sc said it could just be a typo error.
SO is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been
duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All he needs to know is that
the license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be
presumed from the issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty
to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of
law.
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the
validity of the marriage.
Nollora vs People
The elements of the crime of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil
Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.
Article 13 (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that “in case of a
marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance
with Muslim Law or this Code, the Family Code or Executive Order No. 209, in
lieu of the Civil Code shall apply”
Republic vs Albios
Marriage fraud in immigration
SC: Marriage NOT void
Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be
(1) freely given and
(2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer.
A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and
deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is
not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles
45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue
influence.
Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable
of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or
unfavorable consequences of their act.
Their understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or
hypnotism.
Here, consent was not lacking as best evidenced by their conscious purpose of
acquiring American citizenship through marriage.
Marriage in jest Marriage fraud in immigration
A pretended marriage, legal in form There is an intention to be bound to
but entered into as a joke, with no create the very bond necessary to
real intention of entering into the allow acquisition of foreign
actual marriage status, and with a citizenship.
clear understanding that the parties
would not be bound. The ceremony There’s an apparent intention to
is not followed by any conduct enter into the actual marriage status
indicating a purpose to enter into and to create a legal tie, albeit for a
such a relation. limited purpose. Genuine consent
clearly present.
This kind of marriage is VOID AB So long as all the essential and
INITIO, not for vitiated, defective, or formal requisites prescribed by law
unintelligent consent, but for a are present, and it is not void or
complete absence of consent. There voidable under the grounds
is no genuine consent because the provided by law, it shall be declared
parties have absolutely no intention valid.
of being bound in any way or for any
purpose.
Abbas vs Abbas
The certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a
marriage license was held adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license.
But if the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome,
it becomes the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the
marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been secured.
9|P a g e
Upon failure to discharge this burden, only conclusion is that no valid marriage
license was issued.
Go Bangayan vs Bangayan
Marriage not recorded w/ civ reg, no valid marriage license.
SC:
1. fact that the husband was the informant in the birth cert not
sufficient to prove marriage
2. marriage w/o ML – null & void
3. the marriage between Benjamin and Sally "was made only in jest"
and "a simulated marriage, at the instance of Sally, intended to cover
her up from expected social humiliation coming from relatives,
friends and the society especially from her parents seen as Chinese
conservatives." – a fictitious marriage.
4. No bigamy committed - if the second marriage was void not because
of the existence of the first marriage but for other causes such as
lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not committed. For bigamy
to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the
essential requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior
marriage.
Kho vs republic
Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized
without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality
where either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an
exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article
75.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear that a marriage performed
without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more
than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the
essence of the marriage contract.
The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State's demonstration
of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of
which the general public is interested.
The certification of the Local Civil Registrar, that their office had no record of a
marriage license, was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license.
Further, the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been
overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage
to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had
been secured.
Here, no ML presented – VOID.
ARTICLE 7-10 – Solemnizing officer
Aranes vs Occiano
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the
faithful is authorized to do so only within the area or diocese or place allowed
by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction
over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as
long as the requisites of the law are complied with. Judges who are appointed
to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas
and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid
down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage,
may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
Tilar vs. Tilar
Absence of essential/ formal Defect in essential requisite
requisite
shall render the marriage shall not affect the validity of the marriage
void ab initio, except as but the party or parties responsible for the
stated in Article 35 (2). irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.
No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is
required.
It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally
before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife.
This declaration shall be contained in the marriage certificate which shall be
signed by the contracting parties and their witnesses and attested by the
solemnizing officer.
A marriage license shall be issued by the local civil registrar of the city or
municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, except in
marriages where no license is required.
The proceedings for church annulment which is in accordance with the norms
of Canon Law is not binding upon the State as the couple is still considered
married to each other in the eyes of the civil law.
 Persons and Family Relations Review Cases | Evanne Maliones
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*Includes new cases
ARTICLE 21 – one/both parties are foreigners
Recio vs Recio
The legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the
party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code
would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he
duly presented it in court.
A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal
capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.
Article 26(2) – marriages between a Filipino & foreigner
Republic vs Iyoy
The benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can be extended to a Filipino citizen whose
spouse eventually embraces another citizenship and thus becomes herself an
alien.
Republic vs Orbecido
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O.
No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been
divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also
to remarry.
Corpuz vs Sto Tomas
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void15 and
voidable16 marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the
marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful
union for cause arising after the marriage.
Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces
cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The
inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the
direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution
of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court
finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can
declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another
marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration
for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose
status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.
Fujiki vs Marinay
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a
Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the
marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition
abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy.
The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies
because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage,
is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign
judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be
discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse
cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts
are empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied
to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. A critical
difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of
marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article
35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino
spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy
available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal
prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to
substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They
cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and
legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment.
Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to
the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts
only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of
lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine
(1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public
policy in the Philippines; and
(2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the
foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
10 | P a g e
If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel
the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign
judgment as part of the comity of nations.
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage
is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Koike vs Koike
Under Art 26(2) of FC, the law confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to
extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.
But the
1. foreign judgment and
2. its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence,
3. together with the alien's applicable national law to show the effect
of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.
The recognition may be made
1. in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or
2. in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an
integral aspect of his claim or defense.
It must be shown that the divorce decree is valid according to the national law
of the foreigner. Both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the
alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven.
Republic vs Tanedo-Manalo
Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." It does not distinguish
whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign
divorce proceeding.
Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a
favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien
spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively
be without a husband or wife.
A Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after
initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable
judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry.
GIST: even if the PH spouse in a mixed marriage is the one who initiated divorce
proceedings & obtained a favorable decision thereafter, PH courts can recognize
via Art 26 (2).
Republic vs Cote
A decree of absolute divorce procured abroad is different from annulment as
defined by our family laws. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only covers
1. void and
2. voidable marriages that are specifically cited and enumerated in the
Family Code of the Philippines. Void and voidable marriages
contemplate a situation wherein the basis for the judicial declaration
of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at
the time of the marriage.
It treats the marriage as if it never existed. Divorce, on the other hand, ends a
legally valid marriage and is usually due to circumstances arising after the
marriage.
Dela Cruz Morisono vs Morisono
Foreign divorce decrees obtained to nullify marriages between a Filipino and an
alien citizen may already be recognized in this jurisdiction, regardless of who
between the spouses initiated the divorce; provided, of course, that the party
petitioning for the recognition of such foreign divorce decree – presumably the
Filipino citizen – must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
Juego – Sakai vs. Republic
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments
and laws.13 This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be
proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.
Under the rules of court, what is required is proof, either by
(1) official publications or
(2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents.
If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be:
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
Racho vs. Tanaka
 Persons and Family Relations Review Cases | Evanne Maliones
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*Includes new cases
Article 26 of the Family Code is applicable only in issues on the validity of
remarriage. It cannot be the basis for any other liability, whether civil or
criminal, that the Filipino spouse may incur due to remarriage.
Mere presentation of the divorce decree before a trial court is insufficient.
Before a foreign divorce decree is recognized in this jurisdiction, a separate
action must be instituted for that purpose. Courts do not take judicial notice
of foreign laws and foreign judgments; thus, our laws require that the divorce
decree and the national law of the foreign spouse must be pleaded and proved.
Court found this sufficient compliance w/ rules of court:
1. The Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce was
accompanied by an Authentication issued by Consul of the Embassy
of the Philippines in Tokyo, Japan, certifying that Consular Service
Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan was an official in and for
Japan.
2. The Authentication further certified that he was authorized to sign
the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce and that his
signature in it was genuine.
According to the national law of Japan, a divorce by agreement "becomes
effective by notification."57 Considering that the Certificate of Acceptance of the
Report of Divorce was duly authenticated, the divorce between petitioner and
respondent was validly obtained according to respondent's national law.
Takahashi vs Republic
In japan, where there is divorce by agreement – a divorce report is what the govt
issues to couples when they apply for divorce. In this manner of divorce – such
proceeding is not coursed thru via courts but thru the mayor.
Note: our rules require more than a printout from a website to prove a foreign
law. In racho, the Japanese law was duly proved thru a copy of the English
version of the civil code of Japan.
Nullada vs Civil Registrar of Manila
Similar to Manalo
Arreza vs. Toyo
Rule in proving the foreign law - English translation submitted by petitioner is
not an official publication exempted from the requirement of authentication.
Neither can it be considered as a learned treatise.
Galapon vs Republic
Similar to Manalo;
Pursuant to Manalo ruling, Art 26(2) applies to mixed marriages where the
divorce decree is :
1. Obtained by the foreign spouse
2. Obtained jointly by the Filipino & foreign spouse
3. Obtained solely by the Filipino spouse
Kondo vs Civil registrar
Similar to Manalo
ARTICLE 34 – Marriages Exempt from marriage license
requirement/effect on falsity of affidavit of cohabitation
Ninal vs Bayadog
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in
order to establish the nullity of a marriage.
A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their
original rights.
Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can
enter into a second marriage and such absolute nullity can be based only on a
final judgment to that effect.
Other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare
a marriage an absolute nullity.
For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity
of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as
it is essential to the determination of the case.
Manzano vs Sanchez
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the
following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for
at least five years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
11 | P a g e
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present
at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for
at least five years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had
ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal
impediment to their marriage.
IF MARRIAGE UNDER THE FC - SC said “it is sufficient that at the time of the
marriage, that impediment is removed. What is only required is the cohabitation
of 5 continuous years. But in that case, the SC said that it is sufficient that the
impediment is removed at the time of the marriage.
De Castro vs De Castro
Presented a false affidavit stating that they had been living together for more
than five years –
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the
formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license
requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively
with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of
at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid
exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant
with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage license.
Dayot vs Dayot
The falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of a
couple’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an
exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere
irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required
to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter
in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force
and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
Carlos vs Sandoval
A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or wife.
Exceptions:
(1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC; and
(2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage.
The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects
of a healthy, loving, peaceful marriage. They are the only ones who can decide
when and how to build the foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are the
engineers of their marital life. They are simultaneously the directors and actors
of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone can and should decide
when to take a cut, but only in accordance with the grounds allowed by law.
The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation
line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized
under the Civil Code. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during
the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not
mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the
law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the
Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate
heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a
proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts.
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already
commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the
coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective
on March 15, 2003 is prospective in its application.
Santiago vs People
Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy,
the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for
validity.
If the accused wants to raise the nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it as a
matter of defense during the presentation of evidence in the trial proper of the
criminal case.
ARTICLE 36 – Psychological incapacity
 Persons and Family Relations Review Cases | Evanne Maliones
Based on the syllabus of Atty. Lydia Galas A.Y. 2021-2022, 2018-2019 TSN and Matt Santiago’s Notes 2020-2021
*Includes new cases
Santos vs CA
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability.
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable
of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in
the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or,
even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.
Chi Ming Tsoi vs CA
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non-
fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the
marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
Republic vs CA & Molina
Guidelines to interpret Art 36:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation
of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
a. medically or clinically identified,
b. alleged in the complaint,
c. sufficiently proven by experts and
d. clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological — not physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms
may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one
of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Expert evidence may be given qualified
psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(3) Juridical antecedence: The incapacity must be proven to be existing at
"the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
(4) Incurability: Such incapacity must also be shown to be
a. medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
b. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
c. such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise
of a profession or employment in a job.
(5) Gravity: Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
a. Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife
b. Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children.
c. non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should
be given great respect by our courts.
Marcos vs Marcos
relaxation of medical/ clinical examination – personal or medical or
psychological examination of the respondent is not a requirement for a
declaration of PI. if the totality of evidence sufficient to warrant a finding that
spouse is PI, no need for medical exam.
Dedel vs CA
Sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves
constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family
Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated
with psychological incapacity.
It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality
which make respondent completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity or
sexual promiscuity.
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Tenebro vs CA
Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument
for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings".
As soon as a second marriage is celebrated during the subsistence of the valid
first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated.
A declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas
lacks the essential requisites for validity.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage
insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to
note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that
children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the
marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is a recognition written into the
law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal
consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability
for bigamy.
Jarillo vs People
The prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be counted only from
the day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended party, the
authorities or their [agents]," as opposed to being counted from the date of
registration of the bigamous marriage.
Republic vs Hamano
"psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity
(b) juridical antecedence and
(c) incurability."
The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to
be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be
"medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. If
the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.
Antonio vs Reyes
Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily
on a case-to-case perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this
case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the parties
would have had no impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the time
this case was tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality
of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of
respondent’s psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner.
Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church
tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability as an integral requisite of
psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent was so
incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that annulment was
warranted.
Najera vs Najera
Even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of the decision of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is similar to the facts established by
petitioner before the trial court, the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal confirming the decree of nullity of marriage by the court
a quo is not based on the psychological incapacity of respondent. Petitioner,
therefore, erred in stating that the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina Gates
regarding the psychological incapacity of respondent is supported by the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal.
Ferraris vs Ferraris
In determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it must
be read in conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from Articles 35,21
37,22 38,23 and 41 that would likewise, but for different reasons, render the
marriage void ab initio, or Article 45 that would make the marriage merely
voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation.
Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter. Article 36 should
not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefor manifest themselves.
Neither it is to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not
be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure,
moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual
infidelity, abandonment and the like.
Paras vs Paras
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Ground: infidelity, profligacy which includes the falsification of her signature in
one of the loan documents, failure to support the children, and abandonment of
the family.
SC: While this Court is convinced that the charges hurled against Justo by Rosa,
such as sexual infidelity, falsification of her signature, abandonment and
inadequate support of children, are true, nonetheless, there is nothing in the
records showing that they were caused by a psychological disorder on his part.
In other words, the totality of the evidence is not sufficient to show that Justo is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
Halili vs Halili
Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term
concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term.
Particularly, personality disorders are "long-standing, inflexible ways of
behaving that are not so much severe mental disorders as dysfunctional styles
of living. These disorders affect all areas of functioning and, beginning in
childhood or adolescence, create problems for those who display them and for
others.
Ngo-Te vs Te
Courts should interpret Art 36 on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.
Ting vs. Velez Ting
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the
marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she
is about to assume.
Azcueta vs. Republic
- as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of
Kalaw vs. Fernandez
The husband presented his psychologist and a canon law lawyer who is the
advocate before the national matrimonial tribunal. The testimony of the
psychologist must not be taken in isolation. All three testimonies must be taken
into account. The testimony of the psychologist of the wife said that Elena (wife)
is suffering from narcissistic personality disorder and antisocial personality
disorder – was affirmed by the canon lawyer – declared psych incapacitated.
Republic vs Romero
Obsessive Compulsive Personality disorder; not properly explained and
dismissed due to lack of juridical antecedence.
Matudan vs Republic
'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental-- not merely physical -
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among
others, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological
incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.
Castillo vs Republic
The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere
statement of her theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that she can
render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for her criterion
and the reasons upon which the logic of her conclusion is founded.
Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity
and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a
person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.
In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity, the
respondent's unfaithfulness must be established as a manifestation of a
disordered personality, completely preventing the respondent from
discharging the essential obligations of the marital state; there must be proof of
a natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively incapacitated him from
complying with the obligation to be faithful to his spouse. It is indispensable that
the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
Del Rosario vs Del Rosario
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Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of the marital obligations; it is not enough that a
party prove that the other failed to meet the responsibility and duty of a married
person.
There must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person - an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage - which must be linked with the manifestations
of the psychological incapacity.
Dela Fuente vs Dela Fuente
When the husband has a paranoid personality disorder and the same was
hereditary in nature – jealousy & paranoia were so extreme that it led to poking
a gun at the wife’s head. There was repeated acts of violence towards the wife
showing intent to dominate her - a classic case of coercive control which is a
form of psychological abuse under VAWC Law. It would be of utmost cruelty to
decree that the wife should remain married to the husband. Marriage is void
ab initio.
Bakunawa vs Bakunawa
With regard to the Confirmatory Decree of the National Tribunal of Appeals,
which affirmed the decision of the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for
the Archdiocese of Manila in favor of nullity of the Catholic marriage of Manuel
and Nora, the Court accords the same with great respect but does not consider
the same as controlling and decisive, in line with prevailing jurisprudence.
Singson vs Singson
"[h]abitual drunkenness, gambling and failure to find a job, [while undoubtedly
negative traits are nowhere nearly the equivalent of ‘psychological incapacity’],
in the absence of [incontrovertible] proof that these are manifestations of an
incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness.
Republic vs Tionglico
Frequent fights, his insensitivity, immaturity and frequent night-outs can hardly
be said to be a psychological illness.
It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty
doing so due to some psychological illness. The psychological illness that must
afflict a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and
permanent as to deprive the party of his or her awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was then about to assume.
Dan vs Dan
"What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party's psychological condition."21 "[T]he complete facts should allege the
physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at
the time of the celebration of the marriage"22 such that "[i]f the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity,
then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted
to."
Republic vs Javier
While the Court has consistently followed the parameters in Republic v.
Molina,34 these guidelines are not meant to straightjacket all petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The merits of each case are determined on a
case-to-case basis, as no case is on all fours with another.
"Grandiose self[-]existence," which proceeded from his "ideas of preference
towards ideal love and ideal marriage." Dr. Adamos also found that Martin
lacked empathy, leading him to disregard and ignore the feelings of Michelle –
declared void.
Republic vs Mola Cruz
It is true that sexual infidelity and abandonment are grounds for legal
separation. A person with such a disorder was characterized as selfish and
egotistical, and demands immediate gratification.
Such blatant insensitivity and lack of regard for the sanctity of the marital bond
and home cannot be expected from a married person who reasonably
understand the principle and responsibilities of marriage.
Go-yu vs Yu
An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. This Court has
repeatedly stressed that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with
a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of the marriage. Mere irreconcilable differences and
conflicting personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity.
Simundac-Keppel vs Keppel
Based on the Nationality Principle, which is followed in this jurisdiction, and
pursuant to which laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad it was the pertinent German law that
governed - Philippine law finds no application herein as far as the family rights
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*Includes new cases
and obligations of the parties who are foreign nationals are concerned – cannot
invoke art 36.
Castro vs Castro
A medical assessment w/c declares a party’s psychological incapacity does not
guarantee the grant of a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. The facts
of each case must be examined to determine whether the same rationalize the
legal dissolution of a marriage.
The fact of being jobless, possessive, suspicious, reluctant to confide do not
merit a pronouncement of psychological incapacity.
Republic vs Calingo
Unequivocally, psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty,"
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of the marital obligations; it is not
enough that a party prove that the other failed to meet the responsibility and
duty of a married person.
Calma-Santos vs Calma
Expert findings on either of the spouses’ psychological incapacity obtained from
direct, personal examination is not an absolute and indispensable
requirememnt; can be based on totality of evidence.
Santos-Gantan vs Gantan
The oft-referred "totality of evidence" is a short and simple way of expressing
the allocation of the burden of proof in a civil case for nullity of marriage under
Article 36, Family Code. The burden of proof lies upon the petitioner to prove
his or her case by preponderance of evidence. The burden of proof is discharged
by the petitioner if he or she is able to prove his or her cause of action more
likely than not.
The rule of totality of evidence does not add a new dimension in terms of
structuring or facilitating the analysis in an Article 36 petition. Trial courts are
directed to apply the totality of evidence rule. The rule makes no reference to
how trial courts should assess facts that are asserted in the expert report but do
not appear in sworn proof on the trial of the civil case, being data outside of the
trial record or facts not in evidence. The lack of a precise framework impacts on
the evaluation of the totality of evidence.
Dytianquin vs Dytianquin
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of the marital obligations; it is not enough that a
party prove that the other failed to meet the responsibility and duty of a married
person. A mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. These differences
do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
ARTICLE 40 – Need for declaration of nullity of a previous void marriage
for purposes of remarriage
Domingo vs CA
“Solely” refers to the presentation of the decree of nullity to be able to contract
a subsequent marriage – and not that the sole purpose is remarriage.
A party may invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes
other than remarriage, such as an action for the liquidation, partition,
distribution, and separation of property, as well as custody, support of their
common children.
Atienza vs Brillantes
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage.
Under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which
is a rule of procedure.
Castillo vs. Castillo
A judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now expressly required
where the nullity of a previous marriage is invoked for purposes of contracting
second marriage. A second marriage contracted prior to issuance of this
declaration of nullity is thus considered bigamous and void. But note that this
requirement applies only if the second or subsequent marriage was entered into
during the effectivity of the Family Code.
But if the marriage is under the CC - if there was no judicial declaration that the
first marriage was void ab initio before the second marriage was contracted is
immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil Code.
Jumaquio vs People
A person cannot unilaterally declare his marriage void. The law provides that a
judicial declaration of nullity is indispensable for the purposes of remarriage.
"[t]he presentation of the marriage license is not a sine qua non requirement to
establish the existence of a marriage as the certified true copy of the [M]arriage
[Certificate is sufficient for such purpose."
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Anaban et al vs Anaban
Reiteration:
Other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare
a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the
court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of
the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When
such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if
the purpose is other than to remarry.
David vs Calilung
AM 2-11-10-SC, governing declaration of nullity & annulment of marriage
makes it the sole right of the husband & wife to file a petition for declaration of
nullity of a void marriage.
NOTE: In Juliano Llave vs Republic, SC stated that while AM 2- 11- 10 –SC limits
only to husband & wife the filing of a petition for nullity, it does not shut out
the prior spouse from filing a suit – if the ground is a bigamous subsequent
marriage.
But in this case, the petition was not anchored on the ground of bigamy – instead
on non-compliance w/ art 52 & 53. As such, the previous spouse was not
considered as an injured spouse in a bigamous marriage – SC said the prior
spouse was thus not entitled to file a petition for nullity of the subsequent
marriage.
Reiteration of ninal v bayadog
In that case, the SC allowed the children by a previous marriage to file a direct
action to declare a subsequent marriage void AFTER the death of their father –
unvolved a marriage under CC
As it stands now, Section 2, paragraph (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly
provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates
a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those
solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code.
Remedy of heirs:
while A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, the
compulsory or intestate heirs can still protect their successional right, for, as
stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and
Provisional Orders (Rationale of the Rules), compulsory or intestate heirs can
still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for
declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular
courts.
ARTICLE 41 – Necessity of obtaining decree of presumptive death
Republic vs Nolasco
Requisites for Art 41
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead;
and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee.
Calisterio vs Calisterio
Civil code Family Code
A judicial In order that a subsequent bigamous marriage
declaration of may exceptionally be considered valid, the
absence of the following conditions must concur; viz.:
absentee spouse is (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party
not necessary8 as must have been absent for four consecutive
long as the prescribed years, or two years where there is danger of
period of absence is death in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the
met. time of disappearance;
(b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse is already dead; and
(c) a judicial declaration of presumptive death
of the absentee for which purpose the spouse
present can institute a summary proceeding
in court to ask for that declaration.
Manuel vs People
Under the Family Code, a spouse who contracts a subsequent marriage without
securing a judicial declaration of presumptive death shall be liable for bigamy.
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*Includes new cases
The best evidence of contracting a subsequent marriage in good faith, despite
the existence of a previous one is the decree of presumptive death.
Civil Code Family Code
For purposes of the marriage, it is not necessary Judicial declaration is
to have the former spouse judicially declared an needed before the
absentee before the spouse present may contract spouse can remarry
a subsequent marriage.
The law only requires that
1. the former spouse had been absent for 7
consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage,
2. that the spouse present does not know his or
her former spouse to be living,
3. that such former spouse is generally reputed
to be dead and the spouse present so believes
at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Republic vs CA & allegro
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent
spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether
or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent
spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many
circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent
spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.
Although testimonial evidence may suffice to prove the well-founded belief of
the present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, the Court warned
against collusion between the parties when they find it impossible to dissolve
the marital bonds through existing legal means. It is also the maxim that "men
readily believe what they wish to be true."
SSS vs Vda de Bailon
Where a person has entered into two successive marriages, a presumption
arises in favor of the validity of the second marriage, and the burden is on
the party attacking the validity of the second marriage to prove that the first
marriage had not been dissolved; it is not enough to prove the first marriage, for
it must also be shown that it had not ended when the second marriage was
contracted.
The presumption in favor of the innocence of the defendant from crime or
wrong and of the legality of his second marriage, will prevail over the
presumption of the continuance of life of the first spouse or of the continuance
of the marital relation with such first spouse.
Civil code Family Code
A subsequent marriage being voidable, it No judicial proceeding to
is terminated by final judgment of annul a subsequent marriage
annulment in a case instituted by the is necessary – enter art 42 ---
absent spouse who reappears/ by either
of the spouses in the subsequent marriage
Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be
automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance
of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous
marriage or declaring it void ab initio. Xx
The termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit provided by Art 41 does
not preclude the filing of an action in court to prove the reappearance of the
absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent
marriage.
Mere reappearance will not terminate the subsequent marriage if the
absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage,
either
1. by affidavit or
2. by court action.
Since the second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that
the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues in spite of the spouse’s
physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as
legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by
law.
If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an affidavit of
reappearance or by judicial declaration but by death of either spouse –
(Tolentino) - [G]enerally if a subsequent marriage is dissolved by the death of
either spouse, the effects of dissolution of valid marriages shall arise. The good
or bad faith of either spouse can no longer be raised, because, as in annullable
or voidable marriages, the marriage cannot be questioned except in a direct
action for annulment.
Valdez vs Republic
Presumption of death cannot be the subject of court proceedings independent
of the settlement of the absentee's estate.
15 | P a g e
A petition for judicial declaration that petitioner's husband is presumed to be
dead cannot be entertained because it is not authorized by law. Under the Civil
Code, the presumption of death is established by law19 and no court declaration
is needed for the presumption to arise. Since death is presumed to have taken
place by the seventh year of absence.
Santos vs Santos
The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death obtained by
extrinsic fraud is an action to annul the judgment. An affidavit of reappearance
is not the proper remedy when the person declared presumptively dead has
never been absent.
Republic vs Villanueva
Mere absence of the spouse (even beyond the period required by law), lack of
any news that the absentee spouse is still alive, mere failure to communicate, or
general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice.
The premise is that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse
the burden of complying with the stringent requirement of well-founded belief
which can only be discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-to-goodness
inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse's whereabouts but,
more importantly, whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.
Republic vs Sarenogan
The "well-founded belief" requisite under Article 41 of the Family Code is
complied with only upon a showing that sincere honest-to-goodness efforts had
indeed been made to ascertain whether the absent spouse is still alive or is
already dead. Mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the
law), or lack of news that such absentee is still alive, failure to communicate [by
the absentee spouse or invocation of the] general presumption on absence
under the Civil Code [would] not suffice.
Legal remedies available in a summary proceeding for declaration of
presumptive death:
1. if aggrieved by RTC decision, file w/ CA a petition for certiorari –
Rule 65
2. Assail CA decision to SC via petition for review on Certiorari – rule
54
Republic vs Tampus
Similar ruling on well founded belief
Republic vs Catubag
Art 40 p(2)
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
Consequently, parties cannot seek reconsideration, nor appeal decisions in
summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code because by express
mandate of law, judgments rendered thereunder are immediately final and
executory.
In seeking a declaration of presumptive death, it is the present spouse who has
the burden of proving that all the requisites under Article 41 of the Family Code
are present.
Well founded belief = diligent search/ earnest efforts to find absent spouse.
Matias vs Republic
Under Art 41, the presumption of death established therein is only applicable
for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent.
Here, the purpose was solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 as
amended.
Given that her petition for the declaration of presumptive death was not filed
for the purpose of remarriage, petitioner was clearly relying on the
presumption of death under either Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code
as the basis of her petition.
But if 390/391 – no need for a judicial declaration – it’s just a presumption –
still disputable.
Republic vs Quinonez
The law did not define what is meant by '"well-founded belief." It depends upon
the circumstances of each particular case. Its determination, so to speak,
remains on a case-to-case basis. To be able to comply with this requirement, the
present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and
reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on
these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the
absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a mere
passive one).
ARTICLE 42 – requirement is absentee spouse reappear
 Persons and Family Relations Review Cases | Evanne Maliones
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*Includes new cases

Santos vs Santos Noveras vs Noveras

Situtaion – all the facts alleged by the present spouse in the declaration of
presumptive death were false – so the wife filed a petition for annulment of
judgment of the declaration of presumptive death.
What is the proper remedy?
Termination of the subsequent marriage is not done solely by mere reappearance.
It is subject to conditions:
(1) the non-existence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or
declaring it void ab initio;
(2) recording in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the
subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and circumstances of
reappearance;
(3) due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact of
reappearance; and
(4) the fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially determined.
The subsequent marriage can still subsist
(1) if the first marriage has already been annulled or has been declared a nullity;
(2) if the sworn statement of the reappearance is not recorded in the civil
registry of the subsequent spouses' residence;
(3) if there is no notice to the subsequent spouses; or
(4) if the fact of reappearance is disputed in the proper courts of law, and no
judgment is yet rendered confirming, such fact of reappearance.
NOTE: as between the 2 marriages, the presumption of validity is on the
subsequent marriage. Since the second marriage has been contracted because
of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues
inspite of the spouse's physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she
must still be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is
terminated as provided by law.
The provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to effect the
termination of the subsequent marriage does not preclude the spouse who was
declared presumptively dead from availing other remedies existing in law.
The presumptive legitimes of children shall be delivered in form of
1. cash,
2. property or
3. sufficient securities unless agreed and judicially approved.
An action to enforce such delivery may be made.
In one case, the legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-
half (1/2) of the hereditary share of father and the mother. The children are
therefore entitled to half of the share of each spouse in the net assets of the
absolute community, which shall be annotated on the titles/documents
covering the same.
ARTICLES 55-67 – Legal Separation/Grounds/Denial/Effects
Siochi vs Gozon
For purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance
with Article 43(2) and 63 No. 2, the said profits shall be the increase in value
between the market value of the community property at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its
dissolution.
What is forfeited in favor the common child is not the spouse’s share in
conjugal partnership property but merely net profits of the conjugal
partnership property. – defined by art 102, p4 of FC
Quiao vs Quiao
The net profits of the conjugal partnership of gains are
1. all the fruits of the separate properties of the spouses (referring to
net fruits; whatever is brought to marriage is paraphernal/capital
prop but what is the CPOG is the net fruits)
2. the products of their labor and industry.
Also - the increase in value between the market value of the community
property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at
the time of its dissolution

Here, where the spouse was never absent, the court agreed that for the purpose NOTE: the definition of "net profits" in Article 102(4) of the Family Code applies
of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but also of nullifying the to both the absolute community regime and conjugal partnership regime as
effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent provided for under Article 63, No. (2) of the Family Code, relative to the
marriage, mere filing of an affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. The provisions on Legal Separation.
choice to file an action for annulment of judgment will, therefore, lie.
ACOP CPOG
ARTICLE 45-47 – voidable marriages/ grounds/ prescriptive periods For purposes of computing the Each of the couple has his and her own
net profits subject to property and debts. The law does not
Villanueva vs CA forfeiture, said profits shall be intend to effect a mixture or merger of
Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a marriage. Otherwise, the the increase in value between those debts or properties between the
validity of the marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses who can the market value of the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete
terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate. The failure to cohabit community property at the separation of capitals.
becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the time of the celebration of the
grounds for annulling the marriage. marriage and the market value
at the time of its dissolution. STEPS in liquidation:
1. inventory of all properties shall be
Almelor vs RTC
STEPS: made listing couple’s conjugal &
Homosexuality per se is not the ground to annul – it is the concealment of 1. first find the market value separate properties
homosexuality that is the ground to annul. of the properties at the 2. the benefit received by a spouse from
time of the community's the conjugal partnership during the
ARTICLE 48 – Appearance of prosecuting attorney dissolution. marriage is returned in equal amount
2. From the totality of the to the assets of the conjugal
Ancheta vs Ancheta market value of all the partnership;81 and if the community
Guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code: properties, we subtract is enriched at the expense of the
the debts and obligations separate properties of either spouse,
of the absolute community a restitution of the value of such
The trial court must and this result to the net properties to their respective owners
1. order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear assets or net remainder of shall be made.
as counsel for the state. the properties of the 3. the couple's conjugal partnership
2. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a absolute community, shall pay the debts of the conjugal
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his 3. from which we deduct the partnership; while the debts and
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. market value of the obligation of each of the spouses shall
3. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to properties at the time of be paid from their respective separate
the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case marriage, which then properties.
is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. results to the net profits. 4. what remains of the separate or
4. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor exclusive properties of the husband
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. and of the wife shall be returned to
each of them.
In all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal
Here, properties were all acquired during the marriage.
separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to
1. appear on behalf of the State for the purpose of preventing any collusion
In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that
between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or
the spouses have no separate properties, there is nothing to return to any
suppressed.
of them.
2. If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot
declare him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting
Therefore, when the spouses did not bring any property into the marriage, all
attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties.
properties at the dissolution of the marriage are net profits. Consequently,
3. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal
forfeiture is of the entire share - like in the absolute community regime,
separation or annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if
nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership
in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.
regime, because there is no separate property which may be accounted for in
the guilty party's favor.
ARTICLES 50-51 – Effects if marriage is annulled under Art 45 or void
under art 40
Concept of vested right

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 Persons and Family Relations Review Cases | Evanne Maliones
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*Includes new cases
The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of
due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and
natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action; it includes not only
legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from
new obligations created after the right has become vested. Rights are
considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest, absolute,
unconditional, and perfect or fixed and irrefutable.
ARTICLES 68-73 – Rights & Obligations between husband & wife
Ilusorio vs Bildner
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with
his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus
carried out by sheriff or by any other process. That is a matter beyond judicial
authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice.
ARTICLE 87 – Donation between husband & Wife during marriage/
prohibition
Arcaba vs. Tabancura
F a widower was accompanied by A. Before F died, he had donated a parcel of
land to A. The heirs of F assail the legality of the donation arguing that it was
made between common-law spouses. A argues that it was in payment of her past
services and that sexual intercourse is impossible due to A’s old age.
Held: Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one
of parties is already old and no longer be interested in sex. At the very least,
cohabitation is the public assumption by a man and a woman of the
marital relation, and dwelling together as man and wife, thereby holding
themselves out to the public as such. Their public conduct indicated that
theirs was not just a relationship of caregiver and patient but that of exclusive
partners akin to husband and wife. Thus, the donation made by Francisco in
favor of Cirila is void under Article 87.
Perez vs. Perez-Senerpida
Situation: parties not validly married – article 147 applies, a property registered
in names of the not married people – there is a presumption it was acquired
thru joint efforts. But a renunciation & waiver of rights was executed [RWR] in
favor of the husband.
Effect of marriage nullity decision on the RWR.
SC: the RWR is void pursuant to Article 87 of the Family Code.
Art 87 - The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband
and wife without a valid marriage.
Even if the marriage was valid at the time the RWR was executed, it still would
have been void - because the sale between the spouses during their marriage is
proscribed under Article 1490 ofthe Civil Code –
ART. 1490. The husband and the wife cannot sell property to each other, except:
(1) When a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage
settlements; or
(2) When there has been a judicial separation of property under Article 191
Even if the marriage was valid, the donation would still be void pursuant to Art
98 & 125 of FC.
ART. 98. Neither spouse may donate any community property without the
consent of the other. However, either spouse may, without the consent of the
other, make moderate donations from the community property for charity or on
occasions of family rejoicing or family distress. (n) xxxx
ART. 125. Neither spouse may donate any conjugal partnership property
without the consent of the other. However, either spouse may, without the
consent of the other, make moderate donations from the conjugal partnership
property for charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or family distress.
Note: among married couples wherein the ACP or the CPG is their property
regime, the consent of both spouses is required under the Family Code whether
the disposition is gratuitous or onerous.
The donation of any property acquired during the cohabitation by one party
without the consent of the other can only be but void. The rules on ordinary co-
ownership cannot apply to vest validity on the undivided share of the disposing
party. The donation is simply void.
ARTICLES 88-104 – Absolute Community of Property
Nobleza vs Nuega
Husband sells property w/o wife’s consent. Husband adjudged as guilty spouse
and his share in profits forfeited. There was an argument that only 1/2 of the
property, if ever, shall be rendered void pertaining to that of the share of S.
SC: Sale is void in its entirety. While TCT shows that subject property was in the
name of Rogelio alone, Shirley was able to prove that she contributed to the
payment of purchase price. Based on Article 96 of the Family Code, Rogelio
could not sell the subject property without the written consent of Shirley or
authority of the court. Without such consent or authority, the entire sale is void.
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Shirley cannot be held liable to reimburse Nobleza for the payment she there
was no proof that amount received by Rogelio redounded to the benefit of the
family.
Actual contribution is not relevant in determining whether a piece of property
is community property for the law itself defines what constitutes community
property.
Article 91 of the Family Code thus provides:
Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriage
settlements, the community property shall consist of all the property owned by
the spouses at the time of the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter.
The only exceptions from the above rule are: (1) those excluded from the
absolute community by the Family Code; and (2) those excluded by the
marriage settlement.
Under the first exception are properties enumerated in Article 92 of the Family
Code:
1. Property acquired during marriage by gratuitous title by either
spouse + fruits as well as income, if any – unless expressly provided
by donor, testator or grantor that they shall form part of the
community property;
2. Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse; however,
jewelry shall form part of the community property;
3. Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has
legitimate descendants by a former marriage, and the fruits as well
as the income, if any, of such property.
Under Article 94 of the Family Code, the absolute community of property shall
only be "liable for x x x [d]ebts and obligations contracted by either spouse
without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been
benefited x x x."
ARTICLES 105-133 CPOG
Munoz vs Carlos
1. As a general rule, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the
acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the
name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary
is proved.
2. Pursuant to Articles 9236 and 10937 of the Family Code, properties
acquired by gratuitous title by either spouse, during the marriage, shall be
excluded from the community property and be the exclusive property of
each spouse.
3. Art 120 - in determining the ownership of the improvements that are made
on the separate property of the spouses, at the expense of the partnership
or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses. When the cost of the
improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than the value
of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of one
of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to
reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time
of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in
ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the
cost of the improvement.
Ruling: the property remained the exclusive paraphernal property of Erlinda at
the time she contracted with the petitioner; the written consent of Eliseo to the
transaction was not necessary.
Ayala Investments vs CA
(A) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly
received the money and services to be used in or for his own business or his
own profession, that contract falls within the term obligations for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough
that the benefit to the family is apparent at the time of the signing of the
contract. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does
not succeed. Where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family
business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to
the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
(B) If the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the
husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself,
alone be categorized as falling within the context of "obligations for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership." The contract of loan or services is clearly for
the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No
presumption can be inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of
surety or accommodation agreement, it is "for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." Proof must be presented to establish benefit redounding to the
conjugal partnership.
Ching vs CA
For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to
the husband alone, there must be a showing that some advantages accrued to
the spouses. To make a conjugal partnership responsible for a liability that
 Persons and Family Relations Review Cases | Evanne Maliones
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*Includes new cases
should appertain alone to one of the spouses is to frustrate the objective of the
New Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of
the family as a unit.
Francisco vs Gonzales
Two instances when the property relations between spouses shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership:
(1) when a man and woman capacitated to marry each other live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage; and
(2) when a man and woman live together under a void marriage.
Under this property regime of co-ownership, properties acquired by both
parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed
to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned
by them in equal shares.
Article 147 creates a presumption that properties acquired during the
cohabitation of the parties have been acquired through their joint efforts, work
or industry and shall be owned by them in equal shares. It further provides that
a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof
if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and
of the household.
Buado vs Nicol
Situation – conjugal property; wife adjudged criminal liability
Article 122 of the Family Code explicitly provides that payment of personal
debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall
not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to
the benefit of the family.
Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either
spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute
community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property
of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of
conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty
to make advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse. Conjugal
property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by
one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to
the conjugal partnership.
Pana vs Heirs of Juanite
5 instances of
Article 121 of the FC allows payment of the criminal indemnities imposed on
one spouse, out of the partnership assets even before these are liquidated.
It states that such indemnities "may be enforced against the partnership assets
after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding article have been
covered." No prior liquidation of those assets is required. This is not altogether
unfair since Article 122 states that "at the time of liquidation of the partnership,
such [offending] spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the
purposes above-mentioned."
Cases under the NCC
BA finance vs CA
- It was argued in this case that despite failure to secure consent of the other
Heirs of Ayuste vs CA
Under the Civil Code, the sale of conjugal partnership without the consent of the
other spouse is merely voidable not void and action must be:
(1) Made within 10 years from date of transaction; and
(2) During the subsistence of the marriage.
Heirs of Reyes vs Mijares
In case the sale is annulled, it refers to the entirety of the sale not only to the
share of the non-consenting spouse since the conjugal partnership is to be made
liable for certain obligations and even to personal obligation after
responsibilities in Article 161 of the Civil Code have been covered. These are
considerations that go beyond the mere equitable share of the wife in the
property.
Cueno vs Cueno
Pelayo vs Perez
The wife, by affixing her signature to the Deed of Sale on the space that was
provided for the witness is deemed to have given her implied consent to the
contract of sale. Consent need not be in writing and can be given expressly or
impliedly.
Aguete vs PNB
The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without
the consent, express or implied, of the wife. Should the husband do so, then
the contract is voidable.
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Article 173 of the Civil Code allows Aguete to question Ros’ encumbrance of the
subject property. However, the same article does not guarantee that the courts
will declare the annulment of the contract. Annulment will be declared only
upon a finding that the wife did not give her consent. In the present case, we
follow the conclusion of the appellate court and rule that Aguete gave her
consent to Ros’ encumbrance of the subject property.
Heirs of Hernandez vs Mingoa
Art 173, NCC on contracts for sale entered into by husband w/o consent of
spouse - the contract, in its entirety, executed by the husband without the wife’s
consent, may be annulled by the wife.
There is no ambiguity in the wording of the law. A sale of real property of the
conjugal partnership made by the husband without the consent of his wife is
voidable. The action for annulment
1. must be brought during the marriage and
2. within ten years from the questioned transaction by the wife.
Failure to do so bars the wife from questioning the sale of the subject property
to third persons.
Ko vs Aramburo
Governed by CC, merely voidable on part of the wife – thus subject to
prescription.
Upon prescription the remedy is to demand only the value of the property
invalidly sold w/o the consent of the wife.
Cases under the FC
Guiang vs CA
Any alienation or encumbrance made after August 3, 1988 when the Family
Code took effect by the husband of conjugal partnership property without the
consent of the wife is null and void. Such contract is void as one of the essential
elements of a contract is absent. Neither the amicable settlement can be
considered continuing offer that accepted and perfected. The order of events is
clear: after the sale, Guiang filed a complaint for trespassing against Corpuz,
after which the barangay authorities secured an ―amicable settlement. The
settlement, however, does not mention a continuing offer to sell the property or
an acceptance of such a continuing offer. Its tenor was to the effect that Corpuz
would vacate the property. By no stretch of the imagination can the Court
interpret this document as acceptance mentioned in Article 124.
Manalo vs Camaisa
The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as
administrator in the appropriate cases require the written consent of the wife;
otherwise the disposition shall be void. But being merely aware of a transaction
is not consent
Note: if the written consent of the other spouse cannot be obtained or is being
withheld, the matter may be brought to court which will give the same if
warranted by the circumstances.
However, it should be stressed that court authorization under Art. 124 is only
resorted to in cases where the spouse who does not give consent is
incapacitated.
Homeowners Savings Bank vs Dailo
spouse, the sale is valid as to 1/2 of the interest of the consenting spouse under
the rules on co-ownership. This is wrong. The rules on co-ownership do not
apply to CPOG even suppletorily.
By express provision of Article 124 of Family Code, in the absence of court
authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or
encumbrance of the conjugal property is void. The aforequoted provision does
not qualify with respect to the share of spouse who makes the disposition or
encumbrance.
Tan vs. Hosana
While a deed of sale made w/o consent of other spouse is null & void, it can be
made to prove to support an allegation on unjust enrichment. The principle of
unjust enrichment under Article 22 of the Civil Code requires Jose to return
what he or Milagros received under the void contract.
Fuentes vs Roca
If the spouse whose consent was not obtained died, Does this mean that right to
have the sale declared void is lost forever? No.
Even though Rosario Roca died, it does not mean that the right to declare the
sale void is forever lost because as stated above, the sale was void from the
beginning. When the two died, they passed their land to the heirs as such the
Roca’s are the lawful owners and have the right to exclude any person from
enjoyment or disposal.
Alejo vs Cortez
 Persons and Family Relations Review Cases | Evanne Maliones
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*Includes new cases
The law is unequivocal when it states that the disposition of conjugal property
of one spouse sans the written consent of the other is void. Here, it is an
established fact that the Kasunduan was entered into solely by Jacinta and
signed by her alone. By plain terms of the law therefore, the Kasunduan is void.
But it is construed as a continuing offer and Jorge had the option of either
accepting or rejecting the offer before it was withdrawn by Jacinta and/or
Dolores.
First letter - an outright and express repudiation of the Kasunduan.
Second letter - varied its terms on material points, i.e., the date of payment of
the balance and the purchase price.
Such counter-offer cannot be construed as evidencing Jorge's consent to or
acceptance of the Kasunduan for it is settled that where the other spouse's
putative consent to the sale of the conjugal property appears in a separate
document which does not contain the same terms and conditions as in the first
document signed by the other spouse, a valid transaction could not have arisen.
Neither can Jorge's subsequent letters to Dolores be treated as a ratification of
the Kasunduan for the basic reason that a void contract is not susceptible to
ratification. Nor can Jorge's alleged participation in the negotiation for the sale
of the property or his acquiescence to Dolores' transfer to and possession of the
subject property be treated as converting such continuing offer into binding
contract as the law distinctly requires nothing less than a written consent to the
sale for its validity. Suffice to say that participation in or awareness of the
negotiations is not consent.
Hofer vs Yu
authority of the wife to execute a contract dealing with conjugal property
during the marriage.
Under Article 172 of the New Civil Code, the wife cannot bind the conjugal
partnership without the husband's consent except in cases provided by law.
The husband, even if he is statutorily designated as administrator of the
conjugal partnership, cannot validly alienate or encumber any real property of
the conjugal partnership without the wife's consent.
Similarly, the wife cannot dispose of any property belonging to the conjugal
partnership without the conformity of the husband.
Even under Article 124 of the Family Code, it is required that any disposition or
encumbrance of the conjugal property must have the written consent of the
other spouse; otherwise, such disposition is void.
The new law provides that the administration of the conjugal partnership
is now a joint undertaking of the husband and the wife. In all instances, the
present law specifically requires the written consent of the other spouse or
authority of the court for the disposition.or encumbrance of the conjugal
property, without which the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
Spouses Anastacio vs Heirs of Coloma
Under Article 1323 of the Civil Code, an offer becomes ineffective upon the
death, civil interdiction, insanity, or insolvency of either party before
acceptance is conveyed. When Juan died on August 26, 2006, the continuing
offer contemplated under Article 124 of the Family Code became ineffective and
could not have materialized into a binding contract. It must be remembered that
Juliana even died earlier on August 17, 2006 and there is no evidence that she
consented to the sale of the subject property by Juan in favor of petitioners.
The fact that Juan and Juliana were separated from bed and board (a mensa et
thoro) at the time of the supposed sale of the subject property by Juan to
petitioners did not exempt the disposition from the requirement of obtaining
the other spouse's consent under Article 116 of the Family Code.30 Juan was
not without any recourse, he should have gotten the required authority from
the court.
Given that the subject property was the conjugal property of Juan and Juliana,
the CA correctly ruled that the sale of the subject property by Juan without the
consent of Juliana in favor of petitioners contemplated in the DAS is void.
On reimbursement of partnership funds
Ferrer vs Ferrer
It is the owner-spouse who has the obligation to reimburse the conjugal
partnership or the spouse who expended the acts or efforts, as the case may be.
Otherwise stated, [buyers] do not have obligation to respect petitioner‘s right
to be reimbursed
Muller vs Muller
Foreigner, married to PH, bought land. Separation of property made. Foreigner
sought reimbursement.
SC: Helmut cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear
that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional
prohibition. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy
the fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own.
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Neither can there be a grant of reimbursement based on unjust when it is
proscribed by the Constitution. However, the ban does not apply to the
improvements built upon the land, houses are co-owned.
ARTICLE 130 – Nature of disposition of Conjugal assets after death of 1
spouse w/o liquidation
Go vs. Servacio
Disposition of the conjugal property after the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership must be made only after the liquidation. – When Marta died in
1987, the CPG was dissolved leading to an implied co-ownership among the
husband and the heirs with respect to Marta’s share in CPG. But, Protacio Sr.,
although becoming co-owner with children, he could not yet assert or claim title
to any specific portion of Marta’s share without an actual partition of the
property being first done by agreement or by judicial decree. However, the sale
to Servacio is not entirely void, making Servacio a co-owner of the property,
thus the proper remedy is an action for Partition under Rule 69.
There are rules to consider:
(1) If property alienated pertain to the share of surviving spouse the transaction
is valid;
(2) If after liquidation no more conjugal assets remain then the whole
transaction is null and void;
(3) If half of property alienated belongs to husband and other half to the wife,
the sale corresponding to the husband’s share is valid.
(4)
The sale is void as to the share of the deceased spouse
Note:
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for
the recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the third person
who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the
division of the common property as if it continued to remain in the possession
of the co-owners who possessed and administered it.
Domingo vs Molina
Whether the sale of a conjugal property to the spouses Molina without Flora’s
consent is valid and legal?
Marriage: NCC; CPOG
Conjugal pp dissolved: 1968
FC not applied – it would prejudice rights already acquired
Setting when wife dies:
1. implied co-ownership between & among her heirs – children &
husband (as to wife’s share of conjugal pp)
2. husband owns other half of conjugal properties
3. husband, as co-owner cannot claim title to specific portion w/o
actual partition but he has the right to sell his undivided interest in
the property – not including share of co-owners
4. if husband sells his interest, it makes the 3p buyer a co-owner of the
subject property to the extent of the husband’s interest
Uy vs Estate of Fernandez
Article 130 of the Family Code is applicable to conjugal partnership of gains
already established between the spouses prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code pursuant to Article 105 thereof.
Sale of share in conjugal property prior to its liquidation is not void - under the
regime of conjugal partnership of gains, husband and wife are co-owners
of all the property of conjugal partnership.
Upon termination of the conjugal partnership of gains due to the death of either
spouse, the surviving spouse has an actual and vested one-half undivided
share of the properties, which does not consist of determinate and segregated
properties until liquidation and partition of the conjugal partnership.
With respect, however, to the deceased spouse's share in the conjugal
partnership properties, an implied ordinary co-ownership ensues among the
surviving spouse and the other heirs of the deceased.
3P becomes a co-owner of conjugal PP shares of by surviving spouse – there is
implied co-ownership- but 3p cannot yet assert/ claim title to any specific
portion w/o an actual partition of property by agreement/ judicial decree.
Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual or co-
owner can claim title to any definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner has
is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land or thing.
Nevertheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share.
Carlos vs Tolentino
Property acquired 1967 during marriage. Wife died. Prior to death, wife
donated to 3P
SC:
As to wife’s share; VALID - upheld by the SC – why invalidate her disposition of
½ her property when it would eventually be her share after termination (there
was already termination here, since wife died)
 Persons and Family Relations Review Cases | Evanne Maliones
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*Includes new cases
As to remaining undivided portion- null & void – husband did not consent to
donation.
Remedy: to ask for partition
ARTILCES 134-141 Judicial Separation of property during marriage
Maquilan vs Maquilan
Wife committed adultery- convicted & then petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage filed. Compromise agreement entered into but petition for
repudiation was filed alleging that petitioner was not apprised by the lawyer of
the effects of the compromise agreement. Is the compromise agreement valid?
Under Article 134, separation of property may be effected voluntarily or for
sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval – a compromise agreement – is
allowed under this provi.
There was no necessity for a public prosecutor to be present in the compromise
agreement proceedings – since the settlement had not relation to the questions
surrounding the validity of marriage.
The conviction for the crime of adultery does not carry with it the penalty
of civil interdiction that deprives the person of the rights to manage her
property and to dispose her property inter vivos.
Noveras vs Noveras
Filipinos turned foreighers, obtained divorce decree then wife sought judicial
relief to separate properties as they would have abroad. Divorce decree not
proven – still deemed married.
Proper remedy:
1. file petition under art 135 (judicial separation of property); since
records show they have separated in fact for > 1 year but liquidation
of properties limited to Phil properties under art 16
REGIMES OF UNION W/O MARRIAGE/ UNDER A VOID MARRIAGE
ARTICLE 147
Valdez vs RTC
Married – 1971
Declared null & void under art 36 – 1194
RTC directed them to start proceedings on liquidation of common properties
under Art 147, FC
RTC ruling being questioned: Considering that this Court has already declared
the marriage between petitioner and respondent as null and void ab initio,
pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner and respondent shall be
governed by the rules on ownership.
SC: Property relations of a void marriage is governed by Article 147/ Property
regime on co-ownership.
Application of 147 –
1. man & woman
2. suffering no legal impediment to marry
3. live together as husband & wife
4. under a void marriage or w/o benefit of marriage
Effect:
1. Rule is co-ownership
2. any property acquired during union prima facie presumed obtained
thru joint efforts
3. a party who did not participate in acquisition of property shall still
be considered as having contributed thereto jointly, if said party’s
efforts consisted in the care & maintenance of the family household.
Articles 102 and 129 are Only Applicable to Valid and Voidable Marriages;
Irrelevant to Void Marriages except Article 40 on Subsequent Marriages.
It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41
and 42, of the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made
applicable pro hac vice.
Buenaventura vs CA
Petition for declaration of nullity under art 36; declared void & liquidation
ordered. What governs their property relations?
SC: Art 147 (co-ownership) governs void marriages under art 36 - not Article
50, 51 and 52 in relation to Article 102 and 129 of the Family Code.
The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the ACP or CGP, the property
regimes the recognized for valid and voidable marriages, are irrelevant to
liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common law spouses.
Fruits acquired during the union would be covered by the co-ownership.
Abing vs Waeyan
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Proof is necessary to claim a property acquired buring cohabitation as
exclusive - The law is clear, in the absence of proofs to the contrary, any
property acquired by common-law spouses during their period of cohabitation
is presumed to have been obtained thru their joint efforts and is owned by them
in equal shares. Their property relationship is governed by the rules on co-
ownership.
Failure to pay balance of the property – not cause for ejectment – but for
collection of sum of money or rescission of agreement.
Metrobank vs Pascual
If after the declaration of nullity of marriage, but before liquidation & partition
– properties of spouses continue to subsist as conjugal properties until after
liquidation.
Pending liquidation, conjugal property is converted to implied co-ownership.
So conjugal prop, at this state, the wife has a right to mortgage her ½ undivided
share but not the interest of her husband.
Dino vs Dino
The liquidation and partition of properties is not a condition sine qua non before
issuance of a decree of nullity of marriage udner art 36. It is not necessary to
liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for the
declaration of nullity of marriage.
Salas vs Aguila
Petition for declaration of nullity granted under Art 36.
Article 147 Presumption of Joint Contribution as Co-owners Entitled to
Equal Shares; Not Defeated
The prima facie presumption was not defeated and rebutted as the declaration
was based on psychological incapacity. It presumes that the property is
obtained through the couple’s joint efforts and governed by the rules of co-
ownership which entitles them to equal shares upon termination of the union.
Accordingly, the partition of the Discovered Properties as ordered, should be
partition on the basis of co-ownership.
Venturan vs Abuda
In unions between a man and a woman incapacitated to marry each other –
ownership acquired during subsistence of relationship shall be based on actual
contribution of parties.
It is necessary for each one of the partners to prove actual contribution to the
acquisition of the property in order to lay any claim to any portion to it.
Failure to prove evidence of actual contribution does not raise presumption of
joint contribution under article 148.
Note: under Art 148 – only properties acquired by both thru actual joint
contribution owned in common in proportion to respective contributions.
Beumer vs Beumer
Foreigner married Filipina, lot bought, title in name of Filipina; filed for
dissolution of conjugal properties. Since there is a constitutional prohibition
against foreigners owning land, land awarded to Filipina. Foreigner wanted to
be reimbursed.
Can he be reimbursed? NO. He knew of the prohibition but still bought the land
and named it after his wife. A contract that violates the constitution is null and
void as Article XII, Section VII prohibits.
A case involving a foreigner seeking monetary reimbursement for money spent
on purchase of Philippine land, the provision on unjust enrichment does not
apply if the action is proscribed by the constitution.
Ocampo vs Ocampo
Marriage dissolved on ground of psychological incapacity – RTC said properties
belong to them 50-50. Should husband be deprived of his share in the conjugal
partnership because of bad faith and psychological perversity?
SC: Art 147 applies. Property acquired by both spouses through their work and
industry should be governed by rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired
during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their
joint efforts. Efforts in the care and maintenance in the family are regarded as
contributions.
Here, there was failure to prove that the properties were acquired via solo
efforts so presumption is co-ownership.
Paterno vs Paterno
While article 129 applies to Art 147 as to liquidation, it’s only up to the delivery
of presumptive legitimies because family home/ conjugal home is included in
the dissolution.
If parties decided to separate in fact PRIOR to the declaration of nullity,
proeprties acquired during separation is considered as his/hers & will not form
part of the properties subject matter of the division.
 Persons and Family Relations Review Cases | Evanne Maliones
Based on the syllabus of Atty. Lydia Galas A.Y. 2021-2022, 2018-2019 TSN and Matt Santiago’s Notes 2020-2021
*Includes new cases
NOTE:
Prevailing property regime prior to dissolution – Art 102/129
Fruits & income – Fruits of exclusive property not included in dissolution; under
art 147 – excluded.
When is it considered separate property?
Reckoning point. When did the other spouse stop making appearance to the
members of the family, or in short, is there abandonment? If there are
properties prior to abandonment they are deemed part of common properties
to be dissolved. But if he still visits from time to time, like in Salas v. Aguila, it
shall form part of the properties.
Nicxon Perez vs Senerpida
Parties who are living together as H&W under void marriage/ w/o marriage –
governed by co-ownership,
Article 493 of the Civil Code, in a co-ownership: "Each co-owner shall have the
full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and
he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved – alienation
limited to portion/c may be adjudicated to him upon termination of co-
ownership.
Q: So if 1 party to the cohabitation sells the ENTIRE property, what is the effect?
Art 493 of Civil code cannot supersede and must yield to Art 147 of FC. 493 is
ordinary co-ownership, 147 is special co-ownership.
Parties to cohabitation are prohibited from encumbering or alienating their
share in the property acquired thru cohabitation and owned in common until
after termination – w/o consent of other party.
Thus, the donation of any property acquired during the cohabitation by one
party without the consent of the other is void.
So sale/ disposition of the ENTIRE property during cohabitation is VOID,
(not valid as to share of one party to cohabitation)
If a disposition of a party's share in the property under special co-ownership
created by virtue of Article 147 without the consent of the other party is
proscribed by law, then, and with more reason, should the disposition of the
entire property under such special co-ownership by a party without the other
party's consent be considered void as well.
ARTICLE 148
Agapay vs Palang
M already married to C but also married E & jointly bought land. When M died,
C wanted to recover that property.
Under Article 148 properties acquired by both parties during cohabitation
through their actual joint contribution must be proven.
If the actual contribution is not proven, there will be no co-ownership and no
presumption of equal shares.
Malilin vs Castillo
Parties cohabited, under Art 148 –
Article 148 governs property relations of those parties in cohabitation but are
incapacitated to marry
Saguid vs CA
IF prop regime is governed by Art 148 –
Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, co-ownership will only be up to the
extent of the proven actual contribution, in absence of proof of extent of the
parties’ respective contribution their share shall be presumed to equal.
Atienza vs De Castro
Although the adulterous relationship commenced in 1983 Article 148 of the
Family Code applies because this provision is intended to fill up the hiatus/gap
in Article 144 of the Civil Code. Before Article 148 of the Family Code was
enacted, there was no provision governing property relations of couples living
in a state of adultery or concubinage.
Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred
before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.
Borromeo vs Descallar
One party was still married when the cohabited – in an adulterous relationship
– no co ownership exists.
It is then necessary to prove actual joint contribution to be able lay any claim of
any portion to it. Titles do not mean ownership, this applies especially
when the title is acquired in bad faith as in the case because there was no
contribution of at least single centavo and no income of her own at that
time.
21 | P a g e
If land is validly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a filipino or
transfers it to a filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is cured and the title
of the transferee is rendered valid.
Lavadia vs Heirs of Luna
Even though voluntary judicial separation of property is allowed under the law,
it is a requirement that such should be approved by the courts in order to be
valid. In this case, the mere execution of the agreement per se did not
dissolve their conjugal partnership of gains thus ineffectual.
2nd marriage here, being bigamous, was void; the properties acquired
during their cohabitation were governed by the rules on coownership. In
such a situation, whoever alleges coownership carried the burden of proof
to confirm such fact. It became imperative for petitioner to offer proof of her
actual contributions in the acquisition of the property. Her mere allegations on
her contributions, not being evidence, did not serve the purpose – thank you
notes not sufficient proof of contributions.
Dultra Vda de Canada vs Baclot
Cohabited 1952 – common law marriage while one was still validly married to
another- Art 148 applies.
Rule:
the ownership of the properties jointly acquired by the parties who are
cohabiting under the circumstances provided is relative to their respective
contributions, requiring actual proof. In the absence of proof of their
quantifiable actual contribution, their contributions are deemed equal.
However, if proof of actual contribution per se was not shown, co-
ownership will not arise.
Here, proeprties in name of wife alone- no proof of husband’s contributions.
ARTICLE149
Romero vs Singson
True, no suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should
appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made. However, the failure of a party to comply with
this condition precedent is not a jurisdictional defect. If the opposition
party fails to raise such defect in a motion to dismiss, such defect is deemed
waived.
Moreno vs Moreno- Kahn
Land, family issue but RTC motu proprio ordered dismissal even b4
respondents field motion or responsive pleading invoking such non-
compliance.
SC: As such ground is not a jurisdiction defect but is a mere condition precedent,
the courts clearly erred in finding that a motu proprio dismissal was warranted
under circumstances. Article 151 partakes of a condition precedent such
that the non-compliance therewith constitutes ground for dismissal of suit
should the same be invoked by the opposing party at the earliest
opportunity as in the motion to dismiss or in the answer otherwise such ground
is deemed waived.
Since the case involves nephews and nieces the case is not exclusively between
the “family” members as defined in Article 150 and are considered strangers to
Jose as Article 151 is concerned. Even though the dispute was between Jose and
his sister the property involved is still co-owned including the nephews and the
nieces.
O’Laco vs Cocho chit
the attempt to compromise as well as the inability to succeed is a condition
precedent to the filing of a suit between members of the same family. Hence,
the defect in the complaint is assailable at any stage of the proceedings –
for lack of cause of action. [There were earnest efforts when the half-sister
testified that she made arrangement with the other petitioners – deemed
cured.]
Guerrero vs Hernando
The attempt to compromise as well as the inability to succeed is a condition
precedent to the filing of a suit between members of the same family, the
absence of such allegation in the complaint being assailable at any stage of the
proceeding, even on appeal, for lack of cause of action.
It is not therefore correct that private respondent may be deemed to have
waived the aforesaid defect in failing to move or dismiss or raise the same in the
Answer.
Hiyas Savings bank vs Acuna
Article 151 applies when it is only among family members exclusively. – It
is applicable only in cases which are exclusively between or among
members of the same family, once a stranger becomes a party to a suit
involving the members of the same family, the law no longer makes it a
condition precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a compromise before
the action can prosper.
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*Includes new cases
Patricio vs Dario
Q; whether partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-owners
refuse to accede to such partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still
resides in the said home.
Notable ruling:
 The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the
owner thereof or by "any of its beneficiaries" must be actual. Actual
occupancy, however, need not be by the owner of the house specifically.
 Rather, the property may be occupied by the "beneficiaries" enumerated in
Article 154 of the Family Code,
a. may include the in-laws where the family home is constituted jointly by
the husband and wife.
b. but excludes maids and overseers.
 Requisites to be a beneficiary:
1. they must be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the
Family Code;
2. they live in the family home; and
3. they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.
Article 159 of the Family Code provides that the family home shall continue
despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family
for a period of 10 years or
a. for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and
b. heirs cannot partition the same UNLESS the court finds compelling reasons
therefor.
c. Rule applies regardless of who owns the property and who constituted the
FH.
Effect of Death of spouses/unmarried head of family in family home:
No more beneficiary left at the time of death
family home will be dissolved or cease, because there is no more reason for its
existence.
If there are beneficiaries who survive living in the family home
it will continue for ten years, unless at the expiration of the ten years, there is
still a minor beneficiary, in which case the family home continues until that
beneficiary becomes of age.
Definitive rule in Art 159:
If there are beneficiaries who survive and are living in the family home, it will
continue for 10 years, UNLESS at the expiration of 10 years, there is still a minor
beneficiary, in which case the family home continues until that beneficiary
becomes of age.
In this case, 3rd req not met - Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on
legal support not from his grandmother, but from his father.1âwphi1 Thus,
despite residing in the family home and his being a descendant of Marcelino V.
Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot be considered as beneficiary
contemplated under Article 154
Modequillo vs Bravo
FH constituted prior to effectivity of FC. Under CC, there was a need to constitute
a family home judicially or extrajudicially. SC: Ruling – while residential house
& lot not constituted as a family home judicially/ extrajudicially, it became one
by operation of law under art 153 of the FC.
It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of FC on Aug 3,
1988
Taneo vs CA
Sitch: there was a judgment in a civil case and property had to be
levied..including the family home. So can it be levied?
Notable ruling:
a. A family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family.
 It is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment,
constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated,
which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties,
which must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs.
 It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain specials cases.
Civil Code Family Code
FH can be constituted: Registration no longer
Judicially necessary
Extrajudicially Family home is deemed
constituted on a house and lot
22 | P a g e
Operative act of creation of FH from the time it is occupied in the
extrajudicially family.
registration in the Registry of
Property
1.
BUT, as ruled in the case of Manacop vs CA:
 While Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is
deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a
family residence, it does not mean that said article has a retroactive
effect such that all existing family residences, petitioner's included,
are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of
their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and
henceforth, are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations
incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988
(Mondequillo vs. Breva, 185 SCRA 766).
 What article 153 means
 that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family
Code are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the
benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code (Modequillo
vs. Breva, supra).
 So if the debt was incurred prior to the family code, the property is not
exempt from attachment. (same in this case, CC applies, they did not
constitute it as FH EJ/J)
 the "family home is the dwelling house where a person and his family
resides and the land on which it is situated," 13 it is understood that the
house should be constructed on a land not belonging to another.
Cabang vs Basay
Notable rulings:
 The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its
constitution, the amount of P300,000.00 in urban areas and P200,000.00 in
rural areas.
 family home must be constituted on property owned by the persons
constituting it
 The family home must be established on the properties of
a. the absolute community, or
b. the conjugal partnership, or
c. the exclusive property of either spouse with the consent of the other.
d. cannot be established on property held in co-ownership with third
persons.
e. can be established partly on community property, or conjugal
property and partly on the exclusive property of either spouse with the
consent of the latter
f. If constituted by an unmarried head of a family, where there is no
communal or conjugal property existing, it can be constituted only on
his or her own property.
In this case, the property on which the alleged home stands is owned by another
and petitioners stay was merely of tolerance.
Eulogio vs Bell
Issue/s
a. W.n a hearing to determine the value of respondent’s family home for
purposes of execution under art 160 is barred by res judicata
b. w/n FH may be sold on execution under Art 160 of FC
SC:
a. Settled rule - that identity of causes of action does not mean absolute
identity. The test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is
to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether
there is an identity of the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions.
 If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are
considered the same, and a judgment in the first case would be a bar to
the subsequent action.
 Hence, a party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a
different method of presenting the case, escape the operation of the
principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice
litigated between the same parties or their privies.
b. Family home cannot be sold on execution under art 160
The nature and character of the property that debtors may claim to be
exempt, however, are determined by the exemption statute. The exemption
is limited to the particular kind of property or the specific articles prescribed
by the statute; the exemption cannot exceed the statutory limit.
Analysis of Art 155, 157 160 + deliberations of Congress
the exemption of the family home from execution, forced sale or attachment is
limited to:
 P300,000 in urban areas and
 P200,000 in rural areas, UNLESS those maximum values are adjusted by
law.
 Persons and Family Relations Review Cases | Evanne Maliones
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*Includes new cases

If it is shown, though, that those amounts do not match the present value of the Code, but were existing thereafter, are considered as family homes
peso because of currency fluctuations, the amount of exemption shall be by operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the benefits
based on the value that is most favorable to the constitution of a family accorded to a family home under the Family Code.
home.
Note:
Any amount in excess of those limits can be applied to the payment of any of the  Rule- the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the
obligations specified in Articles 155 and 160. Family Code is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor
and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the
Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family home by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public auction.
persons constituting it, its owners, or any of its beneficiaries will still be
exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment provided the following  The family home’s exemption from execution must be set up and
conditions obtain: proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public
auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from later
(a) the actual value of the property at the time of its constitution has been claiming the exemption
determined to fall below the statutory limit; and
(b) the improvement or enlargement does not result in an increase in its value Salazar vs Felias
exceeding the statutory limit.
It is not sufficient for the claimant to merely allege that such property is a family
Otherwise, the family home can be the subject of a forced sale, and any amount home. Whether the claim is premised under the Old Civil Code or the Family
above the statutory limit is applicable to the obligations under Articles 155 and Code, the claim for exemption must be set up and proved.
160.
The law explicitly mandates that the occupancy of the family home, either by
To warrant the execution sale of respondents' family home under Article the owner thereof, or by any of its beneficiaries must be actual. This occupancy
160, petitioners needed to establish these facts: must be real, or actually existing, as opposed to something merely
possible, or that which is merely presumptive or constructive.
(1) there was an increase in its actual value;
(2) the increase resulted from voluntary improvements on the property In this case
introduced by the persons constituting the family home, its owners or any Felicitas cannot conveniently claim that the subject property is her family home,
of its beneficiaries; and sans sufficient evidence proving her allegation. It bears emphasis that it is
(3) the increased actual value exceeded the maximum allowed under Article imperative that her claim must be backed with evidence showing that the home
157. was indeed
(i) duly constituted as a family home,
De Mesa vs Acero (ii) constituted jointly by the husband and wife or by an unmarried
For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be head of a family,
made as to (iii) resided in by the family (or any of the family home's
a. what law applies based on when it was constituted and beneficiaries),
b. what requirements must be complied with by the judgment (iv) forms part of the properties of the absolute community or the
debtor or his successors claiming such privilege. conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either
spouse with the latter's consent, or property of the unmarried
Two sets of rules applicable: head of the family, and
FH constructed before effectivity FH constructed after effectivity of (v) has an actual value of Php 300,000.00 in urban areas, and Php
of FC (Aug 3, 1988) FC 200,000.00 in rural areas.
a. FH must have been constituted a. there is no need to constitute
either judicially or extra- extrajudicially or judicially, and Aside from her bare allegation, Felicitas adduced no proof to substantiate her
judicially as provided under claim that the property sought to be executed is indeed her family home.
Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of b. the exemption is effective from
the Civil Code. the time it was constituted and
END OF FIRST EXAM CASE COVERAGE
b. Judicial constitution of the c. lasts as long as any of its
family home requires the filing beneficiaries under Art. 154 Dying is easy, living is harder.
of a verified petition before the actually resides therein.
courts and the registration of
George Washington
the court’s order with the d. Family home should belong to the
Registry of Deeds of the area
where the property is located. 1. absolute community
or
c. Extrajudicial constitution is 2. conjugal partnership,
governed by Articles 240 to 242 3. or if exclusively by
of the Civil Code and involves one spouse, its
the execution of a public constitution must
instrument which must also be have been with
registered with the Registry of consent of the other,
Property. and
e. its value must not exceed certain
d. Failure to comply with either amounts depending upon the
one of these two modes of area where it is located.
constitution will bar a judgment
debtor from availing of the f. Further, the debts incurred for
privilege. which the exemption does not
apply as provided under Art. 155
for which the family home is
made answerable must have
been incurred after August 3,
1988.

Rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from

execution:
1. First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the
Family Code or before August 3, 1988 - must be constituted as a
family home either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with
the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be exempt from
execution;

2. Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the

Family Code on August 3, 1988 - are automatically deemed to be
family homes and thus exempt from execution from the time it was
constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually
resides therein;

3. Third, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially

constituted as a family home prior to the effectivity of the Family

23 | P a g e
 Persons and Family Relations Review Cases | Evanne Maliones
Based on the syllabus of Atty. Lydia Galas A.Y. 2021-2022, 2018-2019 TSN and Matt Santiago’s Notes 2020-2021
*Includes new cases
2nd Exam coverage
Paternity & Filiation
Badua vs CA
Under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child
by proving:
(1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with
his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately
preceded the birth of the child;
(2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have
been his child;
(3) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the
written authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained
through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence.
Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive
period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action
impugning the legitimacy of said child
Babiera vs Catotal
Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A close
reading of this provision shows that it applies to instances in which the father
impugns the legitimacy of his wife's child. The provision, however, presupposes
that the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The present case
alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In other
words, the prayer herein is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child
of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latter's child at all.
Verily, the present action does not impugn petitioner's filiation to Spouses
Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, because there is no blood relation to impugn
in the first place.
De Jesus vs Heirs of Dizon
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and
founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the
presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate.
This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there
is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days
of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to
(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his
wife;
(b) the fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such a way that
sexual intercourse is not possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse.
Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170,
and in proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code (which took effect on 03
August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be
legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and
unassailable.
Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount declaration of legitimacy
by law cannot be attacked collaterally, one that can only be repudiated or
contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose.
Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although
the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as having been an adulteress.
Liyao vs Tanhoti Liyao
While physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his
wife is one of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears
emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned
in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper
cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code.
Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband,
or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly
confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife
produces and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity
or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved.
It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such
legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy;
that would amount o an insult to his memory.
Concepcion vs CA
The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage,
particularly during the period of conception.28 To overthrow this presumption
on the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond
reasonable doubt that there was no access that could have enabled the husband
to father the child.29 Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal
access is not disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the
contrary.30
The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence
of physical impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within the first
120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child.31
24 | P a g e
To rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses must be such as
to make marital intimacy impossible.32 This may take place, for instance, when
they reside in different countries or provinces and they were never together
during the period of conception.33 Or, the husband was in prison during the
period of conception, unless it appears that sexual union took place through the
violation of prison regulations.
Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the
assumption should be presented by him who asserts the contrary. There is no
such evidence here. Thus, the presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose
Gerardo, as the issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands.
Ong vs Diaz
The burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative
father is the biological father of the child. There are four significant procedural
aspects of a traditional paternity action which parties have to face: a prima facie
case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance
between the putative father and child.
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed
legitimate. As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of
legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides:
Article 167. The children shall be considered legitimate although the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of
legitimacy.
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and
consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article
255 of the New Civil Code23 provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following
the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days
following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be
presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the
physical impossibility of the husband’s having access to his wife within the first
one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of
the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
1) By the impotence of the husband;
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that
access was not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.24
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of
the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall
be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.
There had been divergent and incongruent statements and assertions bandied
about by the parties to the present petition. But with the advancement in the
field of genetics, and the availability of new technology, it can now be
determined with reasonable certainty whether Rogelio is the biological father
of the minor, through DNA testing.
Petitioner argues that a remand of the case to the RTC for DNA analysis is no
longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio. To our mind, the alleged
impossibility of complying with the order of remand for purposes of DNA
testing is more ostensible than real. Petitioner’s argument is without basis
especially as the New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing,
either motu proprio or upon application of any person who has a legal interest
in the matter in litigation.
The death of the petitioner [putative father] does not ipso facto negate the
application of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological
samples of his DNA.
As defined above, the term "biological sample" means any organic material
originating from a person’s body, even if found in inanimate objects, that is
 Persons and Family Relations Review Cases | Evanne Maliones
Based on the syllabus of Atty. Lydia Galas A.Y. 2021-2022, 2018-2019 TSN and Matt Santiago’s Notes 2020-2021
*Includes new cases
susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva, and other body fluids,
tissues, hairs and bones.
Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as enumerated
above as may be available, may be used for DNA testing. In this case, petitioner
has not shown the impossibility of obtaining an appropriate biological sample
that can be utilized for the conduct of DNA testing.
[F]or too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who
choose to deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing
technology finally provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized and
abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the merits of DNA testing and
have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a perfect time
when DNA testing has finally evolved into a dependable and authoritative form
of evidence gathering. We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate
our stand that DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity.
Note: Ong v Diaz- exceptional case. Always remember Art 164 & 167.
Proof of Filiation
Fernandez vs CA
Pictures showing the presence of the alleged father in the baptism of the child
are far from proofs that he is the father of child. Baptismal certificates naming
respondent as father of the child has scant evidentiary value. The certificate of
live birth is not competent since it does not show that the alleged father has a
hand in preparation.
Fernandez vs Fernandez
Application for recognition of back pay - While it may be deemed as public
document, it was not executed to admit filiation of Jose with Rodolfo. The public
document under Article 172 refers to the written admission of filiation. [back
pay document is not executed to admit filiation. also discuss on can legitimacy
be collaterally attacked? YES. it can be collaterally attacked. the issue is not
about Rodolfo being not the child of jose but that the child was not the child of
both man and woman]
Labagala vs Santiago
The entries made in an income tax return only shows that income tax has been
paid and the amount thereof. The use of the family name does not establish
pedigree.
Bernabe vs Alejo
Child born 1981, father died 1993. can he still prove paternity?
Yes. His rights are governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code, which allows an
action for the recognition to be filed within 4 years after the child has attained
the age of majority. The enactment of the Family Code did not take away that
right. Family Code cannot impair vested rights. [art 285 is a substantive law,
gives child right to file petition for recognition – 4 yrs from attaining age of
majority]
Dela Rosa vs Vda De Damian
Any action for the compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the
lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative parent. On the death of
either, the action for compulsory recognition can no longer be filed. The claim
for voluntary recognition must likewise fail. An authentic writing is the public
instrument or private written document of written admission of filiation. The
report card and the obituary do not qualify as such authentic writing. The
published obituary is not the authentic writing, what could have been admitted
is the manuscript in the handwriting of Guillermo himself and signed by him.
Mere possession of status of ILC does not perse gives recognition to him as
ILC – it is merely a mode to compel the father to acknowledge the child.
Verceles vs Posada
Verceles admitted his affair with Clarissa, the exchange of love letters between
them, and his giving her money during the pregnancy. The letters are private
handwritten instruments which establish Aiza’s illegitimate filiation. In
addition, the array of evidence, the dates, letters, pictures, and testimonies, are
convincing and irrefutable evidence that Aiza is indeed is his illegitimate child.
[no signatures but the last portion merely indicates his nickname + photgraphs
given by verceles to clarissa with dedication and signed by verceles. In his
memorandum, verceles admitted that he had an affair with clarissa and gave her
money when she gave birth to the child]
Dela Cruz vs Garcia
Note: 9255 is silent as to signature of fr. but should be read in relation to art 175
in relation to art 172 p1(#2) which requires that if it is a private handwritten
instrument, it must be signed by the parent concerned.
The following are the rules respecting the requirement of affixing signature
of acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an
admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
(1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone evidence submitted
to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the
requirement of signature;
25 | P a g e
(2) Where private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant
and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim for filiation therein be
shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent, it
is merely corroborative with other evidence.
Nepomuceno vs Lopez
Araceli presented as proof a handwritten note where he obligated himself to
given thereon financial support – not sufficient proof. The rule is a notarial
agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted by the putative father
can be considered acceptable evidence but in this case, the note does not contain
any statement whatsoever about Arhbencel’s filiation to Nepomuceno. It is,
therefore not deemed as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation. In
addition, it was not even notarized.
Aguilar vs Siasat
Whether the SSS E-1 Form acknowledged and notarized before a notary public
executed by Alfredo Aguilar, recognizing petitioner as his son is a public
document that satisfies the requirement of Article 172 to establish petitioner as
son of spouse. – Yes. SSS Form satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and
relationship to the spouse; by itself, it constitutes ‘admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document.’ It is an express recognition.
Arado sv Alcoran
In this case Nicolas had duly acknowledged Anacleto as his illegitimate son.
Anacleto’s birth certificate appearing in the Register of Birth showed that
Nicolas himself caused registration of the birth of Anacleto. The showing was by
means of the name of Nicolas appearing in the column “Remarks” which was the
space provided for the name of the informant of the live birth to be registered.
Nicolas had a direct hand in the preparation of the birth certificate and reliance
on the birth certificate of Anacleto as evidence of his paternity was fully
warranted.
NOTE: Law applicable at the time of filing is FC – so court used provision of
FC.
Anacleto cannot inherit from Joaquina – Art 992 – Iron bar rule.
Geronimo vs Santos
Mere use of family name, does not by itself give rise to presumption of
legitimacy. Birth cert was tampered. Mere registration in child in BC as spouses’
LC, is not a valid adoption & does not confer status of legitimacy.
Calimag vs Heirs of MAcapaz
The assertion that the birth certificate must be signed by the father in order to
be a competent evidence of legitimate filiation does not fin support in law and
jurisprudence. In fact, the reliance in Roces is misplaced considering that what
was sought to be proved is the fact of paternity of an illegitimate child and not
legitimate filiation.
[only in cases where child is ILC where both signature of F&M should appear –
if father acknowledges that child is ILC]
If no recognition, only the signature of the mother is req’d
Such [2 signatures] is not req’d when it involves registration of LC – can be just
the mother.
Verily, under Section 5 of Act No. 3753, the declaration of either parent of the
new-born legitimate child shall be sufficient for the registration of his birth in
the civil register, and only in the registration of birth of an illegitimate child does
the law require that the birth certificate be signed and sworn to jointly by the
parents of the infant, or only by the mother if the father refuses to acknowledge
the child.
Respondent’s certificates of live birth were duly executed consistent with the
provision of the law respecting the law registration of birth of legitimate
children. The fact that only Fidela (mother) signature appear on said document
is of no moment because Fidela only signed as declarant or informant of the
respondents’ fact or birth as legitimate children.
Tamargo vs CA
Liability of the adopting parent. – Under Section 13 of RA 8552, a decree of
adoption shall be entered which shall be effective as of the date the original
petition was filed (even if adopter dies before decree). But in the case of
TAMARGO v. CA (209 SCRA 518), the Court ruled that such retroactive effect
should not be understood as to impose liability upon the adopting parents
accruing at a time when the adopting parents had no actual or physical custody
over the adopted child. No presumption of parental dereliction on the part of
the adopting parents could have arisen since the adopted child was not in fact
subject to their control at time when tort was committed.
Retroactivity only if it favorable to adopted child, not when it imposes a
burden
Lahom vs. Sibulo
Adopter can no longer rescind adoption. – RA 8552 had abrogated and
repealed the right of the adopter under the Civil Code and Family Code to
rescind a decree of adoption. The adopter while barred from severing the legal
 Persons and Family Relations Review Cases | Evanne Maliones
Based on the syllabus of Atty. Lydia Galas A.Y. 2021-2022, 2018-2019 TSN and Matt Santiago’s Notes 2020-2021
*Includes new cases
ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain
benefits like disinheritance (LAHOM v. SIBULO [2003]).
NOTE: Section 18 of RA 8552 does not give the adopter the right of
representation because this does not involve therein a “reciprocal” right
between parent and child.
Landingin vs Republic
The requirement of consent and notice to the natural parent. – It is
intended to protect the natural parental relation from unwarranted
interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best
interest of the child. Clearly, the written consent of the natural parents is
indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption. In this case, the aunt
failed to submit the written consent of the mother, Amelia, to the adoption. Even
if she alleges that Amelia left for Italy and never came back and that there was
abandonment, she should have then secured consent from the legal guardian if
indeed there was abandonment. It was shown that Amelia would even send
financial support thus it cannot be said that Amelia left for Italy with the
intention of abandoning her children (LANDINGIN v. REPUBLIC [2006]).
In re Lim
BQ
Adoption has, thus, the following effects:
(1) sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except
when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter;
(2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and
(3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including but not limited to:
a. the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be
known; and
b. the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory
heirs of each other.
Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is
still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate
child such as:
(1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother;
(2) to receive support from their parents; and
(3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the
adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits
to which biological parents are entitled20 such as support21 and successional
rights.
Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of
the child to be of paramount consideration. Every reasonable intendment
should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law. But, as we have ruled in Republic v. Vergara:24
We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the
promotion of the welfare of the children. Accordingly, the law should be
construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat said
purpose. The law must also be applied with compassion, understanding and less
severity in view of the fact that it is intended to provide homes, love, care and
education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a position
to affirm the trial court’s decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the
law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating the proscription against
judicial legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the matter is
amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses’ petition for adoption.
Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
should have jointly filed the petitions with her husband. We cannot make our
own legislation to suit petitioner.
Requirement to file jointly in case petitioner remarries. – It is undisputed
that at the time the petitions for adoption were filed for Michelle and Michael,
Monina already remarried. She filed the petition by herself, without being joined
by her husband Olario. As a rule, the spouse shall apply jointly. It was not shown
in this case that the exceptions apply since Michele and Michael are (1) not
Monina nor Olario’s legitimate child; (2) they are also not the illegitimate child
of Monina; and (3) Monina and Olario are not legally separated. In addition,
Olario being an American citizen must comply with the residency requirement.
Even if the fact that there is no more parental authority since Michele and
Michael are no longer minors, one of the effects of adoption is that of succession
Castro vs Gregorio
De facto separation is not an exception from obtaining consent or from
requirement of joint filing. – In absence of any decree of legal separation or
annulment, Jose and Rosario remained legally married despite their de facto
separation. His submission of a fraudulent affidavit of consent of Rosario’s name
cannot be considered compliance of the requisites of the law. Likewise, Joanne’s
written consent who was over 10 years old at the time of the adoption
proceedings, was necessary for the adoption to be valid, it ensures harmony
among prospective siblings
Bartolome vs SSS
Death of adopter when adoptee was minor reverts authority to the natural
parents in cases of claim for death benefits. – John was adopted by Cornelio,
who died when John was less than three (3) years old. John unfortunately died
in an incident in the course of work. John’s biological mother, Bernardino now
claim for the benefits but the ECC denied since John was deemed adopted by
Cornelio and under RA 8552, Section 16, relationship to her is severed.
26 | P a g e
Held: Even though parental authority is severed by virtue of adoption, the ties
between the adoptee and the biological parents are not entirely eliminated
because the latter may still inherit. Cornelio’s death at the time of John’s
minority resulted in the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority over the
adopted child. On top of this restoration, the fact of petitioner’s dependence on
John was established (BARTOLOME v. SSS).
Ma’am: no need for a court judgment to restore parental auth to parent – can
apply by analogy Sec 20, Ra 8552
In re petition for adoption of Jan Aurel Bulayo
Is an illegitimate child of the spouse of an adopting alien considered
“relative by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree” to
warrant exemption from the residency requirement?
MJ gave birth to Jan Aurel in 1997 not being married, Jan was an illegitimate
child. Since then MJ had no contact of the biological father of Jan Aurel.
In 2004, MJ married Kimura (Japanese) got married. In 2009, they filed a joint
petition for adoption of Jan Aurel to have him declared as legitimate son but the
RTC denied since Kimura was not compliant with residency/certification
requirement and was not shown to be falling under the exception.
RULE: RA 8552, Section 7(b)(i) and (iii) should extend and apply even to
illegitimate children. An illegitimate child is a relative within the first civil
degree of consanguinity of his biological mother. Unlike a nephew or niece, an
illegitimate child belongs to the direct maternal lineage, which is never
uncertain, and which is not as remote as the nephew or niece. Based on
deliberation in crafting RA 8552, it undoubtedly intended to include Jan Aurel,
the biological child of Mary Jane, in the term “relatives” under Section 7(b)(iii)
because he was her relative within the first civil degree. Finding otherwise
would engender a situation where the alien adopter would be able to undergo a
speedy and less expensive adoption process by being able to adopt, say, his
Filipina spouse’s nephew or niece instead of Filipino spouse’s own child. In
addition, Court took judicial notice of diplomatic relations of Philippines and
Japan.
Suzuki vs Office of Solgen
Petitoner’s parents, Filipina & Japanese but later divorced. Then mother met
another Japanese and remarried (Hayashi). Hayashi adopted the child based on
Japanese law. Petitioner sought the adoption to be recognized in the PH via
petition for recognition of foreing judgment. But court said, No- should be under
RA 8552.
SC: You are wrong RTC, this adoption is based on national law of adopting
parents, it being issued in japan. There must be compliance of Sec 24 & 25, Rule
132, and then relate to Rule 39, Sec 48. What should have been done was just
prove & plead pursuant to Sec 24 & 25 of Rule 132.
As already established, the adoption by an alien of the legitimate child of
his/her Filipino spouse is valid and legal based on Article 184(3) (b) of the
Family Code and Section 7(b)(i), Article III of RA 8552. Thus, contrary to the
RTC's sweeping conclusion against foreign adoption decrees, the Court finds
that the adoption of petitioner by Hayashi , if proven as a fact, can be judicially
recognized in the Philippines. Justice Delos Santos aptly propounds that the
rules on domestic adoption should not be pitted against the recognition of a
foreign adoption decree; instead, the better course of action is to reconcile them
and give effect to their respective purposes.
Judicial recognition of a foreign judgment 1s allowed under Section 48, Rule 39
of the Rules of Court. The rule states that the foreign judgment against a person
is already "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties." Upon
judicial recognition of the foreign judgment, the right becomes conclusive and
the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in
the civil registry.
De Asis vs CA
Right to receive support cannot be renounced nor transmitted to another
person. – To allow renunciation or transmission is virtually to allow either
suicide or conversion of the recipient to a public burden. An agreement for
dismissal of a complainant and support conditioned upon the dismissal of the
counterclaim is in the nature of a compromise that cannot be countenanced. If
paternity is at issue in a case, its existence or absence must be judicially
established and cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties (DE ASIS v.
CA [1999]).
Gan vs Reyes
Support immediately executory despite appeal. – The judgments in actions for
support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. This is
an exception to the general rule which provides that the taking of an appeal
stays the execution of the judgment. In all cases involving a child, his interest
and welfare are always the paramount concerns. It would be a travesty to refuse
him support until the decision of the trial court attains finality while time
continues to slip away (GAN v. REYES [2000]).
Mangonon vs CA
Support in arrears. – In MANGONON v. CA (2006), the SC allowed the payment
of support in arrears considering that the children, who should be given
support, must have already finished their schooling by the time the decision was
 Persons and Family Relations Review Cases | Evanne Maliones
Based on the syllabus of Atty. Lydia Galas A.Y. 2021-2022, 2018-2019 TSN and Matt Santiago’s Notes 2020-2021
*Includes new cases
rendered. The amount of support to be paid was computed from the time they
entered college until they have finished their studies.
Lim vs Lim
Concurrent liability of grandparents only extends to their descendants by blood.
– The liability of ascendants to provide legal support to their descendants is
beyond cavil. Here, there is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her
obligation to provide sufficient legal support to her children, then all school
bound. It is also undisputed that Edward can only give around P6000/month,
insufficient for such basic needs, this inability of Edward and Cheryl (as parents)
shifts a portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest degree in
both paternal and maternal lines – to hold otherwise would lead to extreme
material deprivation of children but this concurrent obligation extends only to
their descendants by blood of lower degree – thus only to the grandchildren in
this case. Cheryl (wife) can receive support from her maternal line and Edward.
In addition, the alternative option to live in the dwelling is not available since
one cannot expect Cheryl to live where Edward committed infidelity (LIM v.
LIM, 604 SCRA 691).
Dolina vs Vallecera
Action for RA 9262 is not the proper action to obtain support. – In the pro-forma
complaint involving RA 9262, Dolina added therein a handwritten prayer for
financial support for their supposed child. Held: RA 9262 is the wrong action to
obtain support for her child, to be entitled to legal support, it must be
established as to the filiation of the child – the proper action is to file for
compulsory recognition. Thus, if filiation is beyond question, support follows as
a matter of obligation. But in this case, Vallecera disowns Dolina’s child and
denies having a hand in preparation of certificate – thus must be resolved in
proper case (DOLINA v. VALLECERA [2010]).
B4 support can be had, there must be recognition by father. If father refuses,
compel him to recognize. if indeed he is the father, support follows as a matter
of law.
Lim-lua vs Lim
What expenses can be deducted from the total support in arrears? – A judgment
was made ordering payment of support in arrears, but deduction was made on
such arrears to cover for expenses of cars, tuition, groceries, etc. Held: CA should
have not allowed all expenses incurred by respondent to be credited against the
accrued support pendente lite. The deductions should be limited to those basic
needs and expenses under Article 194, (medical, dental, groceries) and should
not cover the value of two expensive cars, etc. (LIM-LUA v. LUA, (2013)].
What can be deducted from support in arrears – only basic necessities,
medicine, hospitalization, not for maintenance of cars.
BBB vs AAA
May a husband exempt himself from giving support to a child not actually his
but included in legitimation during the subsequent marriage? – The parties do
not dispute the fact that BBB is not the biological father of CCC. It was then
improper to have CCC legitimated after the celebration of BBB and AAA’s
marriage. Leading BBB to falsely acknowledge CCC as son. However, the court
applied here the principle of estoppel under Article 1431, it held that BBB is
bound by the effects of legitimation process and as such CCC is entitled to the
same rights as that of illegitimate child. BUT SC clarified that BBB is not
precluded from raising in a proper case (not in this RA 9262 case) the status and
filiation of CCC. Not in this case since a child’s legitimacy cannot be contested by
way of defense or as a collateral issue (BBB v. AAA, 750 SCRA 188).
Can the retirement benefits, which are exempt from attachment or execution, in
which half thereof be withheld for direct remittance for support? –
Pension and gratuity management center v. AAA (2018)
Facts: AAA filed an action for support against her husband BBB who was a
retired military person. RTC issued Permanent Protection Order decreeing BBB
to support AAA and minor child CCC consisting of 50% of monthly pension to
be withheld regularly by PGMC to be remitted by check directly to AAA.
Held: It has been settled in Republic v. Yahon, that PGMC may be ordered to
automatically deduct a portion from retirement benefits of member-recipient
for direct remittance to latter’s legal spouse as and by way of support in
compliance with a protection order issued by the trial court pursuant to
provisions of RA 9262 – construed as an exception to the general rule that
retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The Court therein noted that RA
9262 itself explicitly authorizes the courts to order the withholding of a
percentage of the income or salary of the defendant or respondent by the
employer, which shall be remitted directly to the plaintiff or complainant.
Paterno vs Paterno
Anent the issue on the propriety of the increase in the amount of support, Article
198 of the Family Code provides that the obligation of mutual support between
the spouses ceases when a judgment declaring a marriage void becomes final
and executory. As the parties’ marriage was declared void on March 11, 2005,
petitioner was only obliged to support, after such date, their three children,
Beatriz, Juliana and Margarita.
According to the petition, at the time the assailed Order of the RTC dated
November 29, 2011 was issued, two of their three daughters already attained
the age of majority. If such is the case, respondent ceased to have the authority
27 | P a g e
to claim support in their behalf. In increasing the amount of support due from
petitioner based on the needs of all three children, the RTC gravely abused its
discretion.
It is also to be noted that the instant petition was filed in 2014. Since then, the
parties’ youngest daughter had likewise reached the age of majority. In view of
this change in circumstance, petitioner can no longer be obliged to pay
P250,000.00 to respondent. This is without prejudice to petitioner’s liability for
support in arrears, if any, and for any subsisting obligation to provide support
directly to his daughters.
Indeed, petitioner is not precluded from seeking the reduction of the amount of
support he was obliged to provide in the event that he can sufficiently prove
that its reduction is warranted. After all, judgment of support does not become
final, and may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the
reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or
means of the person obliged to support.
Caravan Travel & Tours vs Abejar
Caravan – corpo engaged in travel & tours owner of van driven by bautista. van
hit someone. Caravan paid for expenses. The aunt of the victim field complaint
for damages.
Reyes [already 18 y/0] is the deceased person.
Caravan’s defense:
Abejar has no personality to bring this suit because she is not a real party in
interest. According to Caravan, Abejar does not exercise legal or substitute
parental authority. She is also not the judicially appointed guardian or the only
living relative of the deceased.
SC:
(mentions laws on parental & substitute parental authority)
Both of Reyes' parents are already deceased. Reyes' paternal grandparents are
also both deceased. The whereabouts of Reyes' maternal grandparents are
unknown. There is also no record that Reyes has brothers or sisters. It was
under these circumstances that respondent took custody of Reyes when she was
a child, assumed the role of Reyes' parents, and thus, exercised substitute
parental authority over her. As Reyes' custodian, respondent exercised the full
extent of the statutorily recognized rights and duties of a parent. Consistent
with Article 22061 of the Family Code, respondent supported Reyes' education
and provided for her personal needs.
Reyes was already 18 years old when she died. Having reached the age of
majority, she was already emancipated upon her death. While parental
authority is terminated upon emancipation, respondent continued to support
and care for Reyes even after she turned 18.
Except for the legal technicality of Reyes' emancipation, her relationship with
respondent remained the same. The anguish and damage caused to respondent
by Reyes' death was no different because of Reyes' emancipation.
In any case, the termination of respondent's parental authority is not an
insurmountable legal bar that precludes the filing of her Complaint.
anybody who suffers any damage from culpa aquiliana, whether a relative or
not of the victim, may recover damages from the person responsible therefor.
Masbate vs Relucio
(1) Illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of the mother. –
This is by express provision of Article 176 of the Family Code. Accordingly,
mothers are entitled to sole parental authority of their illegitimate children,
despite father’s recognition. In the exercise of that authority, mothers are
consequently entitled to keep their illegitimate children in their company, and
the Court will not deprive them of custody, absent showing of mother’s
unfitness.
(2) Choice of parent, not available to illegitimate children. – The choice of a child
over seven (7) years of age shall be considered in custody disputes only between
married parents, because they are according joint parental authority over the
persons of their common children. On the other hand, this choice is not available
to an illegitimate child, much more one of tender age such as Queenie, because
sole parental authority is only given to the mother. In addition, Article 213 on
tender-age presumption does not distinguish as to legitimate or illegitimate,
thus it is wrong to argue that such presumption only applies when parents are
married. [NOTE: Issue on the substitute parental authority discussed under
Article 216].
Standards in Custody Proceedings
[1] Default custodial regime or mandatory maternal custody regime – Apply the
principle of “Tender Age Presumption” under Article 213, par. 2 of the Family
Code vesting on the mother sole custody of a child under seven (7) years of age
absent compelling reasons not to award custody to her.
[2] Default standards on child custody proceedings – Apply the rule on the “Best
Interests of the Child” hence, it is not always an absolute rule that the tender-
age presumption shall apply as the courts shall also take all relevant
considerations to determine what is for the best interest of the child.
 Persons and Family Relations Review Cases | Evanne Maliones
Based on the syllabus of Atty. Lydia Galas A.Y. 2021-2022, 2018-2019 TSN and Matt Santiago’s Notes 2020-2021
*Includes new cases
School of Holy Spirit vs Taguiam
note: remember the teacher who went outing w/ kids & kids drowned.
SC: As a teacher who stands in loco parentis to her pupils, respondent should
have made sure that the children were protected from all harm while in her
company.
Respondent should have known that leaving the pupils in the swimming pool
area all by themselves may result in an accident. A simple reminder "not to go
to the deepest part of the pool" was insufficient to cast away all the serious
dangers that the situation presented to the children, especially when
respondent knew that Chiara Mae cannot swim.
Espiritu vs CA
In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated
by the Family Code to take into account all relevant consideration. If a child is
under seven (7) years of age, the law presumes that mother is the best
custodian. The presumption is strong, but it is not conclusive. It can be
overcome by “compelling reasons”” If the child is over seven, his choice is
paramount, but the court is not bound by his choice. In its discretion, the court
may find the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other parent, or even
to a third party as it deems fit under the circumstances. In this case, not only are
the children over seven (7) years old and their clear choice is their father, but
the illicit or immoral activities of the mother (including conviction for bigamy)
affected moral values of the child. Custody in this case was instead awarded to
the father.
Santos vs Santos
When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a parent or
godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and
does not constitute renunciation of parental authority. There is no proof that
the father cannot support the child and his efforts to get the child and take care
of him may be construed as act to rectify his past misdeeds.
His employment of trickery in spiriting away his own son from the maternal
grandparents, though unjustifiable is not a ground to wrest custody from him.
The right of custody accorded to parent’s springs from the exercise of parental
authority and such right is personal. There was no showing that he was an unfit
parent, and the rule is that the legitimate father is preferred over the
grandparents – wealth is not a deciding factor. Natural love of a parent
outweighs that of grandparents.
Eslao vs Ca
ESLAO v. COURT OF APPEALS (242 SCRA 407). – The law allows a waiver of
parental authority only in cases of:
(1) Adoption;
(2) Guardianship; and
(3) Surrender to a children’s home or orphanage.
But when a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a relative,
as in this case, or friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is
merely temporary custody and it does not constitute abandonment or
renunciation.
Laxamana vs Laxamana
Husband became drug dependent – made to rehabilitate & declared drug free.
Custody of children awarded to wife.
SC: In controversies involving the care, custody and control of their minor
children, the contending parents stand on equal footing before the court who
shall make the selection according to the best interest of the child.
The child if over seven years of age may be permitted to choose which parent
he/she prefers to live with, but the court is not bound by such choice if the
parent so chosen is unfit.
In all cases, the sole and foremost consideration is the physical,
educational, social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into
account the respective resources as well as social and moral situations of the
opposing parents.
note that no trial was conducted here – the parties merely submitted the case
for resolution on the basis of a psych report.
SC: the court a quo should have conducted a trial notwithstanding the
agreement of the parties to submit the case for resolution.
The fundamental policy of the State to promote and protect the welfare of
children shall not be disregarded by mere technicality in resolving disputes
which involve the family and the youth.
The results of the psychiatric evaluation showing that he is not yet "completely
cured" may render him unfit to take custody of the children, but there is no
evidence to show that respondent is unfit to provide the children with adequate
support, education, as well as moral and intellectual training and development.
Moreover, the children in this case were 14 and 15 years old at the time of the
promulgation of the decision, yet the court did not ascertain their choice as to
which parent they want to live with.
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It is clear that . . . every child [has] rights which are not and should not be
dependent solely on the wishes, much less the whims and caprices, of his
parents. His welfare should not be subject to the parents’ say-so or mutual
agreement alone. Where, as in this case, the parents are already separated in
fact, the courts must step in to determine in whose custody the child can better
be assured the rights granted to him by law. The need, therefore, to present
evidence regarding this matter, becomes imperative.
Gualberto v. Gualberto
Tender age presumption & principle of best interest of the child
The principle of "best interest of the child" pervades Philippine cases
involving adoption, guardianship, support, personal status, minors in conflict
with the law, and child custody. In these cases, it has long been recognized that
in choosing the parent to whom custody is given, the welfare of the minors
should always be the paramount consideration.
Courts are mandated to take into account all relevant circumstances that would
have a bearing on the children's well-being and development. Aside from the
material resources and the moral and social situations of each parent, other
factors may also be considered to ascertain which one has the capability to
attend to the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the children.
Among these factors are the previous care and devotion shown by each of the
parents; their religious background, moral uprightness, home environment and
time availability; as well as the children's emotional and educational needs
Tender-Age Presumption
As pointed out earlier, there is express statutory recognition that, as a general
rule, a mother is to be preferred in awarding custody of children under the age
of seven. The caveat in Article 213 of the Family Code cannot be ignored, except
when the court finds cause to order otherwise.
The so-called "tender-age presumption" under Article 213 of the Family Code
may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the mother's unfitness. The
mother has been declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or
more of the following instances:
1. neglect,
2. abandonment,
3. unemployment,
4. immorality,
5. habitual drunkenness,
6. drug addiction,
7. maltreatment of the child,
8. insanity or affliction with a communicable disease.
Not all sexual immorality is a compelling reason to overcome the tender-age
presumption. “Compelling reasons” can be that of neglect, abandonment,
unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, insanity. But
in this case, the alleged “lesbian relations” cannot be deemed as compelling
reason to deprive the mother of custody. Sexual preference or moral laxity alone
does not prove parental neglect or that of incompetence. The mere fact that the
mother is a lesbian is not enough justification to remove child from custody.
Salientes vs Abanilla
Remedy of a father who was separated in fact to get custody: File petition for
habeas corpus
Gamboa-Hirsch v. CA
Franklin and Agnes have a child, Simone. Franklin wants to stay in Boracay
while Agnes wanted to stay in Makati. Agnes brought Simone to Makati, upon
learning that neither Agnes nor Simone will be coming back to Boracay, Franklin
filed a petition for habeas corpus and the CA granted joint custody.
Held: It was error on the part of the CA to grant joint parental custody without
considering Article 213, here the parties are “separated in fact” and that in that
case, the tender age presumption applies – custody shall be with the mother of
Simone who was 4 years old. No proof that Agnes was unfit or due to compelling
reasons.
Dacasin v. Dacasin
Sharon and Herald obtained a divorce decree from Illinois court which granted
Sharon sole custody of Stephanie. But later, the parties executed in Manila an
agreement for joint custody of their daughter. Herald then sued Sharon for
violation of such joint custody agreement. At this time Stephanie was under 7
years old and they were no longer married under Philippine Law.
Held: The post-divorce joint custody agreement in not valid. This award of sole
parental custody to the mother is mandatory, grounded on sound policy
consideration, subject only to a narrow exception not alleged to be present in
this case. The agreement’s object to establish a post-divorce custody regime
between them over their minor child under 7 years old contravenes Philippine
law. The agreement would be valid if the spouses have not divorced because the
law provides for joint parental authority when spouses live together.
CHILD ABUSE, ETC
Torres vs People
Issue: Is the act of whipping AAA child abuse or merely slight physical injuries?
– Child abuse.
Held: Although it is true that not every instance of laying of hands on the child
constitutes child abuse, petitioner's intention to debase, degrade, and demean
the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child can be inferred from the manner in
which he committed the act complained of. To note, petitioner used a wet t-shirt
 Persons and Family Relations Review Cases | Evanne Maliones
Based on the syllabus of Atty. Lydia Galas A.Y. 2021-2022, 2018-2019 TSN and Matt Santiago’s Notes 2020-2021
*Includes new cases
to whip the child not just once but three (3) times. Common sense and human
experience would suggest that hitting a sensitive body part, such as the neck,
with a wet t-shirt would cause an extreme amount of pain, especially so if it was
done several times. There is also reason to believe that petitioner used excessive
force. Otherwise, AAA would not have fallen down the stairs at the third strike.
AAA would likewise not have sustained a contusion. Indeed, if the only intention
of petitioner were to discipline AAA and to stop him from interfering, he could
have resorted to other less violent means. Instead of reprimanding AAA or
walking away, petitioner chose to hit the latter.
Petitioner's act of whipping AAA on the neck with a wet t-shirt is an act that
debases, degrades, and demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child. It is
a form of cruelty. Being smacked several times in a public place is a humiliating
and traumatizing experience for all persons regardless of age.
PROCEDURE RE: SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY CODE
Republic vs CA
A petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding under
the Family Code and not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court.
Republic vs Lorino
The judgment of the court in summary proceedings under the Family Code is
deemed “immediately final and executory” it follows then that no appeal can be
had of the trial court’s judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It
goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for
certiorari to question abuse of discretion when it amounts to lack of jurisdiction.
But such petition should be filed with the Court of Appeals in accordance with
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
Republic vs Tango
The Solicitor General filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC and CA treated such
as an ordinary appeal under Rule 41. Here, the OSG committed a serious
procedural lapse when it filed a notice of appeal in the Court of Appeals instead
of a petition for certiorari. The RTC equally erred in giving due course to the said
appeal and ordering the said transmittal of the records of the case to the
appellate court. By no means did CA acquire jurisdiction to review the judgment
of the RTC, which, by express provision of law, was immediately final and
executory.
Republic vs Fenol
A petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the
purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family
Code involves a proceeding that is summary in nature, the judgment of the court
therein shall be immediately final and executory. Consequently, a judicial
declaration of presumptive death cannot be a proper subject of an appeal and
the filing of a motion for reconsideration or a notice of appeal is a procedural
misstep which warrants an outright denial or dismissal. The final and executory
nature of the judgment in a petition for declaration of presumptive death
renders the court's dispositions and conclusions therein immutable and
unalterable not only as against the parties, but even as against the courts.
Courts can no longer change, except for correction of clerical errors, the courts
- even if the modification is intended to correct erroneous conclusion of fact or
law.
But the losing party in a summary court proceeding is not left without a legal
recourse. When the present spouse successfully obtains a judicial declaration of
his/her spouse's presumptive death, the OSG may properly bring an original
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
gist: remedy of losing party in a summary proceeding is not appeal but a petition
for certiorari.
SURNAMES
Alfon vs. Republic(1980)
SC: But the word "principally" as used in the codal provision is not equivalent to
"exclusively" so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child
should choose to use the surname of its mother to which it is equally entitled.
Alanis vs CA
Courts, like all other government departments and agencies, must ensure the
fundamental equality of women and men before the law. Accordingly, where the
text of a law allows for an interpretation that treats women and men more
equally, that is the correct interpretation
Republic vs CA
Cynthia Vicencio field a petition for change of surname, from "Vicencio" to "Yu".
SC: "The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be "proper
and reasonable cause" for which the change is sought."
Private respondent Cynthia Vicencio is the legitimate offspring of Fe Leabres
and Pablo Vicencio. As previously stated, a legitimate child generally bears the
surname of his or her father. It must be stressed that a change of name is a
privilege, not a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the
29 | P a g e
court, which has the duty to consider carefully the consequences of a
change of name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown.
Confusion indeed might arise with regard to private respondent's parentage
because of her surname. But even, more confusion with grave legal
consequences could arise if we allow private respondent to bear her step-
father's surname, even if she is not legally adopted by him. While previous
decisions have allowed children to bear the surname of their respective step-
fathers even without the benefit of adoption, these instances should be
distinguished from the present case. In Calderon vs. Republic, and Llaneta vs.
Agrava, this Court allowed the concerned child to adopt the surname of the step-
father, but unlike the situation in the present case where private respondent is
a legitimate child, in those cases the children were not of legitimate parentage.
Julien Lin Wang vs Cebu Civil registrar
Mother filed petition to drop middle name as they would be permanently
residing in SG and there is no middle name in Singapore.
SC: cannot do.
Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as
well as further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name
and surname as he has.
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children
shall principally use the surname of the father.20 The Family Code gives
legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the
mother,21 while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother,
unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the
father’s surname.
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by
the father bears only a given name and his mother’s surname, and does not have
a middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore
identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the
subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public
document or private handwritten instrument that he bears both his mother’s
surname as his middle name and his father’s surname as his surname, reflecting
his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged illegitimate child.
Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such individuals
requires that the middle name be indicated in the certificate. The registered
name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains
a given or proper name, a middle name, and a surname.
Weighing petitioner’s reason of convenience for the change of his name against
the standards set in the cases he cites to support his contention would show that
his justification is amorphous, to say the least, and could not warrant favorable
action on his petition.
In the matter of the adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname
of her natural mother as her middle name?
SC: nothing in law grants the adopted child to continue using surname of the
mother BUT to allow the continuous loving relationship between the mother
and the child, let her continue using Garcia as her middle name.
Full text ruling:
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a
middle name. Even Article 17611 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 9255, otherwise known as "An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use
The Surname Of Their Father," is silent as to what middle name a child may use.
The middle name or the mother's surname is only considered in Article 375(1),
quoted above, in case there is identity of names and surnames between
ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle name or the mother's
surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use.
Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that "an adopted child shall bear
the surname of the adopter."
The members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the
Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the child's
mother as his middle name.
NOTE: since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her
natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother's surname, we
find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
Republic vs Capote
When the child is illegitimate & is not recognized by the father, he/ she has no
middle name.
Full text ruling:
The Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the
father and the mother, while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their
 Persons and Family Relations Review Cases | Evanne Maliones
Based on the syllabus of Atty. Lydia Galas A.Y. 2021-2022, 2018-2019 TSN and Matt Santiago’s Notes 2020-2021
*Includes new cases
mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may
bear the father’s surname.
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by
the father bears only a given name and his mother’ surname, and does not have
a middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore
identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the
subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public
document or private handwritten instrument that he bears both his mother’s
surname as his middle name and his father’s surname as his surname, reflecting
his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged child.
Remo v. Secretary
Can Maria, who originally used her husband’s name in her expired passport, can
revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport despite
subsistence of the marriage? Clearly, a married woman has an option, but not a
duty, to use the surname of the husband in any of the ways provided by Article
370 of the Civil Code. She is therefore allowed to use not only any of the three
names provided in Article 370, but also her maiden name upon marriage. She is
not prohibited from continuously using her maiden name once she is married
because when a woman marries, she does not change her name but only her
civil status. Further, this interpretation is in consonance with the principle that
surnames indicate descent.
BUT, under RA 8239 regulating passport issuance, a married woman’s reversion
to the use of her maiden name must be based only on the severance of the
marriage [special law prevails over general].
Grande v. Antonio
the Court has outlined the rule as to the surname of an illegitimate child
considering the amendment brought by RA 9255 as to Article 176 of the Family
Code.
Under the amendment RA 9255 provide:
(1) As general rule, an illegitimate child shall use the surname of the
mother;
(2) The exception, when the illegitimate child may use the surname of the
father is, in case filiation is expressly recognized by the father through
a. Record of birth appearing in civil register; or
b. When an admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made by the father.
But the use of the word “may” in the provision readily shows that an
acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of
his illegitimate father. It operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate
children.
Alanis vs CA
Courts, like all other government departments and agencies, must ensure the
fundamental equality of women and men before the law. Accordingly, where the
text of a law allows for an interpretation that treats women and men more
equally, that is the correct interpretation.
Thus, the Regional Trial Court gravely erred when it held that legitimate
children cannot use their mothers' surnames. Contrary to the State policy, the
trial court treated the surnames of petitioner's mother and father unequally
when it said:
In the case at bar, what the petitioner wishes is for this Court to allow him to
legally change is [sic] his given and registered first name from Anacleto III to
Abdulhamid and to altogether disregard or drop his registered surname, Alanis,
the surname of his natural and legitimate father, and for him to use as his family
name the maiden surname of his mother Ballaho, which is his registered middle
name, which petitioner claims and in fact presented evidence to be the name
that he has been using and is known to be in all his records.
In denying the herein petition, this Court brings to the attention of the petitioner
that, our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated
children shall principally use the surname of the father. The Family Code gives
legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother,
while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their
father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the father's
surname. Legitimate children, such as the petitioner in this case, has [sic] the
right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in conformity with the
provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames, and it is so provided by law that
legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the
father.
This treatment by the Regional Trial Court was based on Article 174 of the
Family Code, which provides:
ARTICLE 174. Legitimate children shall have the right:
(1) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in conformity with the
provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames[.]
In turn, Article 364 of the Civil Code provides:
30 | P a g e
ARTICLE 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the
surname of the father.
The Regional Trial Court's application of Article 364 of the Civil Code is
incorrect. Indeed, the provision states that legitimate children shall
"principally" use the surname of the father, but "principally" does not
mean "exclusively." This gives ample room to incorporate into Article 364
the State policy of ensuring the fundamental equality of women and men
before the law, and no discernible reason to ignore it.
Moreover, this Court in Haw Liong vs. Republic said:
"The following may be considered, among others, as proper or reasonable
causes that may warrant the grant of a petitioner for change of name;
(1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult
to write or pronounce;
(2) when the request for change is a consequence of a change of status, such as
when a natural child is acknowledged or legitimated; and
(3) when the change is necessary to avoid confusion
(Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed., Vol. 1, p. 660)."59
Given these irrefutable premises, the Regional Trial Court patently erred in
denying petitioner's prayer to use his mother's surname, based solely on the
word "principally" in Article 364 of the Civil Code.
Gan vs Republic
In Alfon, the name of the petitioner therein which appeared in her birth
certificate was Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte; she was a legitimate
child of her father and mother. She filed a petition for change of name, seeking
that she be allowed to use the surname "Alfon," her mother's surname, instead
of "Duterte." The trial court denied the petition, ratiocinating that under Article
364 of the Civil Code, legitimate children shall principally use the surname of
the father. The Court allowed the petitioner therein to use the surname of her
mother since Article 364 of the Civil Code used the word "principally" and not
"exclusively" and, hence, there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate child should
choose to use the mother's surname to which he or she is legally entitled.
In contrast, Articles 366 and 368 of the Civil Code do not give to an illegitimate
child or a natural child not acknowledged by the father the option to use the
surname of the father. Thus, the petitioner cannot insist that she is allowed to
use the surname of her father.
In Coseteng-Magpayo, the issue was the proper procedure to be followed when
the change sought to be effected in the birth certificate affects the civil status of
the respondent therein from legitimate to illegitimate. The respondent therein
claimed that his parents were never legally married; he filed a petition to change
his name from "Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo," the name
appearing in his birth certificate, to "Julian Edward Emerson Marquez-Lim
Coseteng." The notice setting the petition for hearing was published and, since
there was no opposition thereto, the trial court; issued an order of general
default and eventually granted the petition of the respondent therein by, inter
alia, deleting the entry on the date and place of marriage of his parents and
correcting his surname from "Magpayo" to "Coseteng."28 The Court reversed
the trial court's decision since the proper remedy would have been to file a
petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The Court ruled that the change
sought by the respondent therein involves his civil status as a legitimate child;
it may only be given due course through an adversarial proceedings under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. The Court's pronouncement in Coseteng-Magpayo
finds no application in this case.
Finally, Lim likewise finds no application in this case. In Lim, the petition that
was filed was for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; the
petition sought, among others, is the correction of the surname of the
respondent therein from "Yo" to "Yu." Further, the respondent therein, although
an illegitimate child, had long been using the surname of her father. It bears
stressing that the birth certificate of the respondent therein indicated that her
surname was the same as her father albeit misspelled. Thus, a correction of
entry in her birth certificate is appropriate.
Here, the petitioner filed a petition for change of name under Rule 103 and not
a petition for correction of entries under Rule 108. Unlike in Lim, herein
petitioner's birth certificate indicated that she bears the surname of her mother
and not of her father.
Republic v. Sali
Facts: Lorena Sali filed a petition for correction of entry under Rule 108 arguing
that the LCR erroneously entered her first name as “DOROTHY” instead of
“LORENA” and the date of birth as “June 24, 1968” instead of “April 24, 1968”.
To sustain the claims, she presented Certificate of Marriage and Postal ID Card.
OSG argues that a petition for correction of entries under Rule 108 should not
have been granted for failure to exhaust administrative remedies provided
under RA 9048.
Held: (1) As to change of name from “DOROTHY” to that of “LORENA”
administrative recourse under RA 9048 should first be taken. – At the time of
Sali’s petition, RA 9048 was already in effect, the local city or municipal registrar
or consul general has primary jurisdiction to entertain the petition. It is only
 Persons and Family Relations Review Cases | Evanne Maliones
Based on the syllabus of Atty. Lydia Galas A.Y. 2021-2022, 2018-2019 TSN and Matt Santiago’s Notes 2020-2021
*Includes new cases
when such petition is denied that a petition may either appeal to the civil
registrar general or file the appropriate petition with the proper court.
The intent and effect of RA 9048 is to exclude the change of first name from
coverage of Rule 103 and 108, until and unless an administrative petition for
change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. Thus, insofar as to Sali’s
prayer for change of first name, it was not within RTC’s primary jurisdiction. It
was improper since the remedy should have been administrative. For failure to
exhaust administrative remedies, RTC should have dismissed th petition to
correct Sali's first name.
(2) As to change of date of birth however, RA 9048 alone is not applicable, RA
10172 only in 2012, petition filed in 2008. – As to change of date of birth, RA
9048 is not applicable, and it was only in August 15, 2012 that RA 10172 was
signed into law including the day and month of birth and sex of a person.
Considering that Sali filed her petition in 2008, Rule 108 is the appropriate
remedy in seeking to correct her date of birth in the civil registry. In fact, the
OSG did not question the petition to correct Sali’s birth date, it only questioned
the change of first name.
In re: Yuhares Tinitigan
SC: In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn
to jointly by the parents of the infant or only the mother if the father refuses.
Thus, it is mandatory that the mother of an illegitimate child signs the birth
certificate of her child in all cases, irrespective of whether the father recognizes
the child as his or not. The only legally known parent of an illegitimate child, by
the fact of illegitimacy, is the mother of the child who conclusively carries the
blood of the mother.21 Thus, this provision ensures that individuals are not
falsely named as parents.22
The mother must sign and agree to the information entered in the birth
certificate because she has the parental authority and custody of the illegitimate
child. In Briones v. Miguel, 23 we held that an illegitimate child is under the sole
parental authority of the mother, and the mother is entitled to have custody of
the child. The right of custody springs from the exercise of parental authority.24
Parental authority is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to
parents for the purpose of the children's physical preservation and
development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of
their heart and senses.
only when father recognizes child as his ILC that is when his signature should
appear in BC- but no right to report and register birth of ILC.
Chua v. Republic
Avoidance of confusion was invoked in Alfon v. Republic, wherein the Court
granted the petition for change of name of Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva
Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon. In allowing the change of name, the Court held that:”
In the case at bar, it has been shown that petitioner has, since childhood, borne
the name Estrella S. Alfon although her birth records and baptismal certificate
show otherwise; she was enrolled in the schools from the grades up to college
under the name Estrella S. Alfon; all her friends call her by this name; she
finished her course in Nursing in college and was graduated and given a diploma
under this name; and she exercised the right of suffrage likewise under this
name. There is therefore ample justification to grant fully her petition which is
not whimsical but on the on a solid and reasonable ground, i.e. to avoid
confusion.
The same circumstances are attendant in the case at bar. As Eric has established,
he is known in his community as "Eric Chua," rather than "Eric Kiat." Moreover,
all of his credentials exhibited before the Court, other than his Certificate of Live
Birth, bear the name "Eric Chua." Guilty of reiteration, Eric's Certificate of
Baptism, Voter Certification, Police Clearance, National Bureau of Investigation
Clearance, Passport, and High School Diploma all reflect his surname to be
"Chua." Thus, to compel him to use the name "Eric Kiat" at this point would
inevitably lead to confusion. It would result in an alteration of all of his official
documents, save for his Certificate of Live Birth. His children, too, will
correspondingly be compelled to have their records changed. For even their
own Certificates of Live Birth state father's surname is "Chua." To deny this
petition would then have ramifications not only to Eric's identity in his
community, but also to that of his children.
Republic v. Michelle soriano gallo
Facts: Gallo prayed before for the correction of her name from "Michael" to
"Michelle" and of her biological sex from "Male" to "Female" under Rule 108. In
addition, Gallo asked for the inclusion of her middle name, "Soriano"; her
mother's middle name, "Angangan"; her father's middle name, "Balingao"; and
her parent's marriage date, May 23, 1981, in her Certificate of Live Birth, as
these were not recorded. As proof, she attached to her petition copies of her
diploma, voter's certification, official transcript of records, medical certificate,
mother's birth certificate, and parents' marriage certificate. RTC granted. But
OSG argues that Gallo failed to exhaust administrative remedies and observe the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction as RA 9048 now governs the change of first
name.
Held: (1) Understanding the Applicability of Rules vis-à-vis RA 9048 and RA
10172. - Under the old rules, a person would have to file an action in court under
31 | P a g e
Rule 103 for substantial changes in the given name or surname, or Rule 108 for
corrections of clerical errors. This requirement for judicial authorization was
justified to prevent fraud and allow other parties, to oppose the matter, as
decisions in these proceedings bind the whole world. However, Republic Act No.
9048 amended Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code, effectively removing
clerical errors and changes of the name outside the ambit of Rule 108 and
putting them under the jurisdiction of the civil register.
RA 9048 also dispensed with the need for judicial proceedings in case of any
clerical or typographical mistakes in the civil register or changes in first names
or nicknames. Thus, a person may now change his or her first name or correct
clerical errors in his or her name through administrative proceedings. Rules 103
and 108 only apply if the administrative petition has been filed and later denied.
In 2012, RA 9048 was amended by RA 10172. In addition to the change of the
first name, the day and month of birth, and the sex of a person may now be
changed without judicial proceedings. RA 10172 clarifies these changes may
now be administratively corrected where it is patently clear that there is a
clerical or typographical mistake in the entry. However, RA 10172 does not
apply in the case at bar as it was only enacted on August 15, 2012—more than
two (2) years after Gallo filed her Petition for Correction of Entry on May 13,
2010. Hence, RA 9048 governs.
(2) Following RA 9048, It is the Civil Registrar Which has Primary Jurisdiction
over Gallo’s Petition not the RTC. – As discussed in Republic v. Sali (2017), only
if her petition was denied by the local city or municipal civil registrar can the
Regional Trial Court take cognizance of her case. Likewise, the prayers to enter
Gallo's middle name as Soriano, the middle names of her parents as Angangan
for her mother and Balingao for her father, and the date of her parents' marriage
as May 23, 1981 fall under clerical or typographical errors as mentioned in
Republic Act No. 9048.
These corrections may be done by referring to existing records in the civil
register. None of it involves any change in Gallo's nationality, age, status, or sex.
(3) Since RA 10172 does not apply to Gallo yet, petition to correct biological sex
is correctly filed under Rule 108. - The petition to correct Gallo's biological sex
was rightfully filed under Rule 108 as this was a substantial change excluded in
the definition of clerical or typographical errors in Republic Act No. 9048. It was
only when RA 10172 was enacted on August 15, 2012 that errors in entries as
to biological sex may be administratively corrected, provided that they involve
a typographical or clerical error.
However, this is not true for all cases as corrections in entries of biological sex
may still be considered a substantive matter such as that in Cagandahan.
Republic v. Virgie (vergel) tipay
Facts: Virgel sought correction of several entries in his birth certificate, he filed
a petition with RTC on February 13, 2009
1. “FEMALE” to “MALE” as to his gender;
2. “VIRGIE” to “VIRGEL” as to his first name; and
3. His month and date of birth of “FEBRUARY 25, 1976”
Evidence presented was (1) Certificate of Baptism; (2) medical certificate
stating that Virgel is phenotypically male. RTC granted. OSG interposed a Notice
of Appeal arguing that he change of Virgel’s name should have been made under
Rule 103 and not Rule 108 since Rule 108 is confined to the correction of clerical
or innocuous errors, which excludes one’s name or date of birth.
Held: (1) RA 9048 governs correction of harmless and innocuous errors – With
the enactment of RA 9048 in 2001, the local civil registrars, or the Consul
General as the case may be, are now authorized to correct clerical or
typographical errors in the civil registry, or make changes in the first name or
nickname, without need of judicial order. This law provided an administrative
recourse for correction of clerical or typographic errors, essentially leaving
substantial corrections in the civil registry to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
(2) RA 10172 amendment does not apply to Virgel. – RA 9048 was amended
when RA 10172 was passed to expand the authority of local civil registrar and
the Consul General to make changes in the day and month in the date of birth,
as well as in the recorded sex of a person when it is patently clear that there was
a typographical error or mistake in the entry.
Unfortunately, however, when Virgel filed petition for correction with RTC in
2009, RA 10172 was not yet in effect, the proper remedy was to commence the
proper adversarial proceedings with the RTC, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.
The changes in the entries pertaining to gender and date of birth are
indisputably substantial corrections, outside contemplation of a clerical or
typographical error that may be corrected therein administratively. Rule 108 is
adversarial in nature.
Republic vs Unabia
Facts: "Petition for Correction of Entries on the Birth Certificate of Mellie
Umandam Unabia,"4 claiming that his Birth Certificate5 contained errors in that
the name entered therein was "Mellie Umandam Unabia", when it should
properly have been written as "Miller Omandam Unabia"; that the gender was
erroneously entered as "female" instead of "male"; and that his father's middle
initial was erroneously indicated as "U" when it should have been "O".
 Persons and Family Relations Review Cases | Evanne Maliones
Based on the syllabus of Atty. Lydia Galas A.Y. 2021-2022, 2018-2019 TSN and Matt Santiago’s Notes 2020-2021
*Includes new cases
Ruling:
Petitioner questions the Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Labis, Medical Officer
III of the Northern Mindanao Medical Center under the Department of Health,
claiming that it failed to include a certification that respondent "has not
undergone sex change or sex transplant" as required by Section 5 of RA 9048,
as amended, and that Dr. Labis was not presented in court in order that his
qualifications may be established and so that he may identify and authenticate
the medical certificate. However, the said Medical Certificate is a public
document, the same having been issued by a public officer in the performance
of official duty; as such, it constitutes prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. Under Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, "[d]ocuments
consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a
public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public
documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise
to their execution and of the date of the latter."
As for petitioner's argument that the medical certificate failed to specifically
certify that respondent "has not undergone sex change or sex transplant" as
required by law, suffice it to state that this is no longer required with the
certification by Dr. Labis that respondent is "phenotypically male", meaning that
respondent's entire physical, physiological, and biochemical makeup - as
determined both genetically and environmentally - is male, which thus
presupposes that he did not undergo sex reassignment. In other words, as
determined genetically and environmentally, from conception to birth,
respondent's entire being, from the physical, to the physiological, to the
biochemical - meaning that all the chemical processes and substances occurring
within respondent - was undoubtedly male. He was conceived and born male,
he looks male, and he functions biologically as a male.
RULE:
When there is a medical finding that the petitioner in a case for correction of
erroneous entry as to gender is phenotypically male or female, the no-sex
change or transplant certification becomes mere surplusage.
Finally, suffice it to state that, as correctly declared by the CA, respondent was
actually using the name Miller Omandam Unabia; that "Miller" and "Mellie" and
"Omandam" and "Umandam" were confusingly similar; and that respondent's
medical certificate shows that he is phenotypically male. The CA thus properly
held that respondent's birth certificate contained clerical errors in its entries
necessitating its rectification.
Ohoma vs Office of Municipal Civ Reg
2 registrations of birth both made by mother
The Court's Ruling
Under Office of the Civil Registrar-General Administrative Order No. 1, Series of
1983, as amended, the birth of a child shall be registered within 30 days from
the time of birth in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the city/municipality
where it occurred. In this case, petitioner's birth had already been reported by
his mother, Antonia Maingit (Antonia), and duly recorded in the civil register of
the LCR-Aguinaldo on June 13, 1986. Thus, as correctly pointed out by the CA,
there can be no valid late registration of petitioner's birth as the same had
already been lawfully registered within 30 days from his birth under the first
birth certificate.27 Consequently, it is the second birth certificate that should
be declared void and correspondingly cancelled even if the entries therein are
claimed to be the correct ones.
However, while the petition specifically prayed for the cancellation of
petitioner's first birth certificate and the retention of his second birth
certificate, the ultimate objective was to correct the erroneous entries
pertaining to petitioner's first and last names, i.e., from Matron Ohoma to
Matiorico Ohomna, as he claimed that people in the community know him by
the latter name rather than the former.28 Rule 108 implements judicial
proceedings for the correction or cancellation of entries in the civil registry
pursuant to Article 41229 of the Civil Code. The role of the Court under Rule 108
is to ascertain the truth about the facts recorded therein.
The action filed by petitioner before the RTC seeks to correct a supposedly
misspelled name, and thus, properly falls under Rule 108. To correct simply
means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from."31 Considering
that petitioner complied with the procedural requirements32 under Rule 108,
the RTC had the jurisdiction to resolve the petition which included a prayer for
"[o]ther reliefs just and equitable x x x."33 A general prayer for "other reliefs
just and equitable" appearing on a petition enables the court to award reliefs
supported by the complaint or other pleadings, by the facts admitted at the trial,
and by the evidence adduced by the parties, even if these reliefs are not
specifically prayed for in the complaint.34 Consequently, the CA erred in
holding that petitioner has to refile another petition before the trial court could
resolve his claim.
Nonetheless, the Court finds that petitioner failed to sufficiently establish that
his father's last name was Ohomna and not Ohoma through competent evidence,
i.e., the latter's birth certificate, the certificate of his marriage to petitioner's
mother, Antonia, on January 30, 1986, or a government-issued identification
card or record. On this score alone, the correction of petitioner's first and last
names should be denied. While the first name may be freely selected by the
parents for the child, the last name to which the child is entitled is fixed by
law.35 Although petitioner's Elementary School Permanent Record36 and
32 | P a g e
Professional Driver's License37 identify him as Matiorico Ohomna, the same are
insufficient to grant the petition. It pears stressing that the real name of a
person is that given him in the Civil Register, not the name by which he was
baptized in his Church or by which he was known in the community, or which
he has adopted.
In addition, the Court notes that Antonia was the informant in both instances
and the one who signed both birth certificates. However, a perusal of Antonia's
signatures on petitioner's two (2) birth certificates shows that the same are
materially different from each other. Further, petitioner failed to show any
plausible explanation why she signed as Antonia Ohoma39 on the first birth
certificate and as Antonia Ohomna40 on the second birth certificate.
Bartolome vs Republic
The inclusion of petitioner's middle name is covered by R.A. 9048, as amended
While substantial corrections of entries in the civil register are still covered by
Rule 108, typographical or clerical corrections must now be filed under R.A.
9048 as amended.
The test for whether a correction is clerical or substantial is found in the
provision itself. Misspelled names or missing entries are clerical corrections if
they are visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding and if they may be
readily verified by referring to the existing records in the civil register. They
must not, however, involve any change in nationality, age or status.
The correction in the spelling of petitioner's surname is likewise covered
by R.A. 9048, as amended
Labayo-Rowe v. Republic (Labayo-Rowe) held that a correction in the spelling of
therein petitioner's surname from "Labayo/Labayu" to "Labayo" was a mere
clerical error that could be corrected through a summary proceeding under
Rule 108.
R.A. 9048 expressly removed the correction of clerical or typographical errors
from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Miller vs Miller
The legitimacy and filiation of children cannot be collaterally attacked in a
petition for correction of entries in the certificate of live birth.
the summary procedure for correction of entries in the civil registry under
article 412 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is confined to
"innocuous or clerical errors, such as misspellings and the like, errors that are
visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding" or corrections that are not
controversial and are supported by indubitable evidence.
Here, petitioners sought the correction of private respondent's surname in her
birth certificate registered as Local Civil Registrar No. 825. They want her to use
her mother's surname, Espenida, instead of Miller, claiming that she was not an
acknowledged illegitimate child of John.
What petitioners seek is not a mere clerical change. It is not a simple matter of
correcting a single letter in private respondent's surname due to a misspelling.
Rather, private respondent's filiation will be gravely affected, as changing her
surname from Miller to Espenida will also change her status. This will affect not
only her identity, but her successional rights as well. Certainly, this change is
substantial.
Republic vs Lao
The birth certificate, more than a historical record of one's birth, is a vital
marker of identity. Therefore, acts and events, though occurring after birth, may
be annotated [no need to be corrected] on the birth certificate so long as they
are consistent with a legal truth and a special law provides for its effects.
Should birth cert ne corrected? NO. Civ reg should just annotate in the birth cert
the grant of the petition changing nationality from Chinese to PH.
Full text:
Clear from Presidential Decree Nos. 836 and 923 is that the naturalization
extends to the alien wife and minor children of the person naturalized upon the
wife's showing that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under
Letter of Instructions No. 270, and that she and her minor children reside
permanently in the Philippines at the time of her husband's naturalization. In
other words, the only persons to undergo the proceeding before the Special
Committee on Naturalization will only be the person naturalized and his wife.
The minor children, in the words of Letter of Presidential Decree No. 836 "follow
the acquired Filipino citizenship of their mother."
Besides, the entries sought to be changed are the nationalities of Lao Kian Ben
and Chia Kong Liong as appearing in the certificates of live birth of Winston
Brian, Christopher Troy, and Jon Nicholas. Therefore, the only relevant issue, at
least for the present proceedings, is whether or not Lao Kian Ben and Chia Kong
Liong have been issued their Certificates of Naturalization and have taken their
Oaths of Allegiance as Filipinos, an issue that has been resolved in the
affirmative.
 Persons and Family Relations Review Cases | Evanne Maliones
Based on the syllabus of Atty. Lydia Galas A.Y. 2021-2022, 2018-2019 TSN and Matt Santiago’s Notes 2020-2021
*Includes new cases
Republic vs Ontuca
The issues hinge on the RTC's jurisdiction to order the correction of Annabelle's
first name from "MARY ANNABELLE' to "ANNABELLE' and her middle name
from "PALINO" to "PELENO" and to change her civil status from married to
"NOT MARRIED" under the provisions of Rule I 08 of the Rules of Court.
Rule 108 applies when the person is seeking to correct clerical and innocuous
mistakes in his or her documents with the civil register. It also governs the
correction of substantial errors affecting the civil status, citizenship, and
nationality of a person. The proceedings may either be summary, if the
correction pertains to clerical mistakes, or adversary, if it involves substantial
errors. The petition must be filed before the RTC.
In relation to change or correction of an entry in the birth ce1tificate,
substantial refers to that which establishes, or affects the substantive right of
the person on whose behalf the change or correction is being sought. Thus,
changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well
as sex, civil status, or citizenship of a person, are substantial in character.
Section 2(3) of RA No. 9048, as amended, defines a clerical or typographical
error as a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing,
copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and
innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth, mistake in the
entry of day and month in the date of birth or the sex of the person or the like,
which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be
corrected or changed only by reference t o other existing record or records.
Republic v. Mercadera, - the correction of petitioner's misspelled first name
from "MARILYN' to "MERLYN' involves a mere clerical error.
Thus, the correction of Annabelle's middle name from "PALINO" to "PELENO"
involves clerical or typographical error. It merely rectified the erroneous
spelling through the subst itution of the letters "A" and "I" in "PALINO" with the
letter"£," so it will read as "PELENO."
Similarly, the error in Annabelle's first name is clerical that will neither affect
nor prejudice her substantial rights. Annabelle's postal 1D15 and passport16
satisfactorily show that her first name is "ANNABELLE' and not "MARY
ANNABELLE."
Furthermore, Annabelle may file the petition to correct her personal
information in the birth certificate of her child. The application of RA No. 9048,
as amended, is not limited to cases in which the erroneous entries in the birth
certificate sought to be corrected pertain to the owner of the birth certificate.
The correction of the date and place of the parent's marriage from "May 25,
1999 at 0cc. Mindoro" to "NOT MARRIED" is substantial since it will alter the
child's status from legitimate to illegitimate. To be sure, the correction of entries
in the civil register pertaining to citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation,
or legitimacy of marriage involves substantial alterations, which may be
corrected, and the true facts established, provide the parties aggrieved by the
error to avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceedings.17 Here,
Annabelle correctly fi led a petition for cancellation and/or correction of the
entries before the RTC under Rule 108. – but no compliance w/ rules
The rules require two sets of notices to potential oppositors -
1. one given to persons named in the petition and
2. another served to persons who are not named in the petition, but
nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties
Consequently, the petition for a substantial correction must imp lead the civiI
registrar and other persons who have, or claim to have any interest that would
be affected.
The phrase "and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby" in the title of the petition and the publication of the petition
are not sufficient notice to all interested parties.
BUT there are instances when the subsequent publication of a notice of hearing
may cure the failure to implead and notify the affected or interested parties,
such as when:
(a) earnest efforts were made by petitioners in bringing to
court all possible interested parties;
(b) the parties themselves initiated the corrections
proceedings;
(c) there is no actual or presumptive awareness of the
existence of the interested parties; or
(d) when a party is inadvertently left out
Silverio v. Republic
Rommel Jacinto decided to undergo a series of medical procedures to transform
him into a woman. Silverio filed a petition in the RTC for change of her first
name and sex that appears in her birth certificate. Alleging that she was a
male transsexual, she prayed that her first name be changed from Rommel
Jacinto to Mely, and that the identification of her sex be changed from male to
female.
33 | P a g e
Held: (1) Wrong remedy. – SC ruled that the applicable rule was under RA
9048 which authorizes civil registrars and the consul generals to summarily and
administratively change first names in the civil registry. But since Silverio filed
via Rule 103 and 108, it was not within the court’s primary jurisdiction as the
petition should have been filed first with the local civil registrar concerned,
assuming that it could be legally done.
But change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error, it is a
substantial change for which applicable procedure is Rule 108 shall apply.
No reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it
covers correction on the ground of sex reassignment. Sex reassignment is not
among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. [so not file w/ civ
reg]
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations,
are more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will,
such as being legitimate or illegitimate. A person’s sex is an essential factor in
marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil
status.
The sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth
attendant by examining genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no
law recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at
the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error is immutable.
Republic v. Cagandahan
Jennifer was born with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a
condition where she possess both male and female genital characteristic. At age
6 she was then diagnosed with clitoral hypertrophy (enlargement of clitoris)
and had small ovaries. But at age 13, tests revealed her ovarian structures had
minimized and had no menstrual development and by emotion became a male
person – she now prays for correction of her gender from ‘female’ to ‘male’
and her first name from ‘Jennifer’ to ‘Jeff.’
Held: Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender
classification at birth – inconclusive. The Court affirms as valid and justified
the respondent’s position and his personal judgment of being a male.
As for respondent’s change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a
change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be
exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that
will follow.
The trial court’s grant of respondent’s change of name from Jennifer to Jeff
implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the
consequence that respondent’s change of name merely recognizes his preferred
gender, we find merit in respondent’s change of name. Such a change will
conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas
Under Article 407, the law requires the entry of judicial decrees that produce
legal consequences touching upon a person’s legal capacity and status.
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting
a person’s legal capacity and status that must be recorded. But while the
law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and
submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s
registration. It should first be judicially recognized before it can be given res
judicata effect.
Iwasawa v. Gangan
Is the testimony of the NSO records custodian certifying the authenticity and
due execution of the public documents issued by the said office necessary before
they could be evidentiary weight?
In a petition to declare marriage void, RTC denied ruling that it was only
petitioner who testified about said marriage, that his testimony is unreliable
because he has no personal knowledge of Gangan’s prior marriage nor the death
of Arambulo and the latter’s death certificate – that he was a stranger to
preparation of the document.
Held: As public documents, the certificates or marriage, death and NSO
certification, are admissible therein as evidence even without further
proof of their due execution and genuineness. It was error for the RTC to
disregard on the sole ground that petitioner did not present the records
custodian of the NSO who issued them to testify since they constitute prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein – and was not then rebutted by the
other party.
Republic v. Olaybar (2014)
Intending to marry her boyfriend, Merlina sought to obtain a Certificate of No
Marriage (CENOMAR) from NSO but was shocked to find that she was already
married to a certain Sune which was not the case. Thus, she sought its
cancellation finding that the signature in marriage contract was forged. In short,
Merlina claims that no such marriage was entered into, or if there was, that she
was not the one who entered into such contract. OSG now argues that what the
petition seeks is to declare a marriage void ab initio which cannot be made in a
petition to cancel entries.
 Persons and Family Relations Review Cases | Evanne Maliones
Based on the syllabus of Atty. Lydia Galas A.Y. 2021-2022, 2018-2019 TSN and Matt Santiago’s Notes 2020-2021
*Includes new cases

Held: While it is true that a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the
mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry,
respondent sought not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to
speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as
set forth by the evidence.

Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was

entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence.

In allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the

wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage
void as there was no marriage to speak of.

THE END

You run from pain. We all do it. Something happens, we blame ourselves and
we don’t want to feel it so we run. We run from joy too, thinking we don’t
deserve it. But it’s a package deal – there is no joy, without pain.

Meredith Grey

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