Review of General Psychology © 2009 American Psychological Association

2009, Vol. 13, No. 2, 167–174 1089-2680/09/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0015104

The Impact of Human Intuition in Psychology

Murray J. Goddard
University of New Brunswick

An empirically valid outcome in psychology may differ in the degree to which the outcome does or does
not conform to human intuition. The author provides a brief history of three psychological outcomes
violating human intuition, notes the resemblance to the common sense revolution, and then discusses how
human intuition may be detrimental to behaviorism and evolutionary perspectives of human nature. The
role of human intuition in supernatural beliefs is considered and, finally, possible methods to improve the
plausibility of counterintuitive outcomes are suggested.

Keywords: intuition, behaviorism, evolution

In an important study by Peters and Ceci (1982), 12 psychology
articles were resubmitted to the identical journals that had pub-
lished the research 18 –32 months previously. Before resubmis-
sion, however, a fictitious author and obscure institutional affilia-
tion were substituted (e.g., Dr. Wade M. Johnston at the Tri-Valley
Center for Human Potential). Whereas resubmission was detected
in 3 articles, in the other 9 articles, 16 of the 18 reviewers
recommended against publication (often citing “serious method-
ological deficiencies”) and the editors concurred (Peters & Ceci,
1982).
The results from Peters and Ceci (1982) converge with other
evidence. First, journal rejection rates in psychology (typically
over 75%) are higher than journal rejection rates in other disci-
plines, such as physics (at around 20%; Cole, 2000). Whereas
physicists may enter the review process searching for small posi-
tive contributions, psychologists may enter the review process
searching for flaws (e.g., see Moravcsik, 1982; Sternberg, 2006).
Second, published psychology articles have increasingly numerous
self-citations (Adair & Vohra, 2003), raising the possibility that
publication decisions in psychology may be influenced by the past
publication record of the author. Given that in Peters and Ceci
authorship was fictional, the resubmitted articles could not contain
any self-citations. Finally, many scientific articles have very few
readers (Merton, 1973; Price, 1963). An interdisciplinary study
found that 36% of all citations consist of self-citations (Aksnes,
2003). This also converges with the results from Peters and Ceci,
given that only 25% of the resubmitted articles were detected as
resubmissions by the same journals that had published the articles
less than 3 years prior.
Murray J. Goddard, Department of Psychology, University of New
Brunswick.
This work was supported by a sabbatical leave from the University of
New Brunswick, Saint John (UNBSJ), and a grant from the Natural
Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada. During the article’s
preparation, Paul Gendreau, Andy Delamater, and all my psychology
colleagues at UNBSJ shared important insights. I would also like to thank
Marilyn MacLeod for her support.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Murray J.
Goddard, Department of Psychology, University of New Brunswick, Saint
John, New Brunswick, Canada, E2L 4L5. E-mail: Goddard@unbsj.ca
To reduce any actual, or perceived, bias, journals may encour-
age blind review, although blind review may not apply to editors
who decide whether an article merits review and whose choice of
reviewers may influence acceptance (Franzini, 1987). However, it
is difficult to imagine how blind review may be implemented when
an empirically valid outcome is intuitively plausible or implausi-
ble. Although psychologists may value objectivity, Mahoney
(2004) has assembled a substantial body of evidence showing that
psychologists may deviate from the objectivity valued by the
discipline. Empiricism may require adopting a “Why might I be
wrong?” perspective (Ruscio, 2007), but when empirical data
conflict with human intuition, defaulting to such a question may be
challenging (see also Tavris, 2003). As the famed Dutch psychol-
ogist Johannes Linschoten noted, because psychologists are also
persons, they are very unreliable instruments for knowing the
“innerness” of people in a way that is scientific (van Hezewijk &
Stam, 2008; see also Sternberg, 2002).
In this article, I first provide a brief history of three psycholog-
ical outcomes violating human intuition, note the resemblance to
the common sense revolution, and then discuss how human intu-
ition may be detrimental to behaviorism and evolutionary perspec-
tives of human nature. The role of human intuition in supernatural
beliefs is considered and, finally, possible methods to improve the
plausibility of counterintuitive outcomes are suggested.
Three Psychological Outcomes Violating Human Intuition
Milgram (1963) showed that many participants could be ordered
to deliver what they believed were painful electric shocks to a
confederate. Notwithstanding the ethical issues, the results were
unexpected as 40 psychiatrists predicted that less than 1% of
participants would administer the maximum voltage (Milgram,
1965).
The Milgram (1963) study was initially rejected by two journals
(Blass, 2004). Critics argued that an obedient attitude had little
ecological validity and would not generalize outside the laboratory
(Baumrind, 1964), that most participants knew the shocks were
faked (Orne & Holland, 1968), and that obedience would decline
over time as people became more enlightened (Gergen, 1973).
However, nurses may violate hospital guidelines when ordered by
a doctor (Krackow & Blass, 1995); a majority of subjects reported
moderate, or greater, tension (Milgram, 1965); and a meta-analysis

167
168 GODDARD
showed little change in obedience over time (Blass, 1999). Finally,
a recent partial replication of the Milgram study, which screened
participants and terminated the experiment at 150 V (rather than
450 V), found similar obedience rates (Burger, 2007; the partial
replication aired on ABC “Primetime” News on January 3, 2007).
The second journal rejection arrived before Milgram’s 30th
birthday (Blass, 2004, p. 114), and it may not have been unrea-
sonable for Milgram to consider relegating his study to the “file
drawer.” The published study was also preceded by pilot work in
which most participants went to the maximum voltage with a silent
confederate and vigorous verbal protests were needed to reduce
obedience to about 65% (Milgram, 1965). Compare the time
needed to complete pilot work, individually test participants in a
standard protocol, analyze and write up the results and, finally,
battle with reviewers and editors over publication, with the time
needed to write that obedience has low ecological validity or that
most participants knew the shocks were faked.
The Milgram (1963) study is not an isolated event. Garcia and
Koelling (1966) showed associative selectivity when an audiovi-
sual or taste stimulus formed a stronger association to electric
shock or illness, respectively, and Garcia, Ervin, and Koelling
(1966) showed associative formation with a 1-hr taste–illness
delay. Both studies were initially rejected, and the subsequent
controversy is now well known (Garcia, 2003). Perhaps less well
known, however, is how Garcia (1981) addressed the possibility
that animal learners may be “tough” experimentalists. To address
this possibility, Garcia (1981) pointed out a classic animal learning
study, featured in many textbooks at the time, which purported to
show that cats would rub up against a pole if they were allowed to
escape from a locked box (E. R. Guthrie & Horton, 1946). The
study resembled Thorndike’s work, conformed to general process
learning theory, and appeared to confirm the value of immediate
reinforcement. However, the study had no control group and as
many as 10 observers would watch the cats in plain view.
Using appropriate controls, Moore and Stuttard (1979) later
showed that the cats would rub up against the pole even when they
could not escape from the locked box. Most revealing was that the
pole rubbing was frequently displayed when a human was visible
to the cat and was much less frequent when a human was not
visible to the cat. Moore and Stuttard concluded that the behavior
was best conceptualized as a “greeting” response, initiated by a
human presence and familiar to any cat owner.
Although a “greeting” response may raise anthropomorphic
objections, this may be tempered when one considers that a classic
learning study never had a control group and more than 30 years
passed before Moore and Stuttard (1979) showed that cats may
behave differently when observed (see also Candland, Dresdale,
Leiphart, & Johnson, 1972). When a study lacking a control group
is widely cited in psychology, it is difficult not to suspect that
human intuition may influence the reception, and dissemination, of
some research findings (see also Bradley & Gupta, 1997, and
Stirling, 1959, showing that publication biases in psychology,
combined with Type I errors, likely inflate the effect size in
meta-analysis, particularly when the true effect size approaches
zero).
Finally, in a well-known meta-analysis of 59 studies, Rind,
Tromovitch, and Bauserman (1998) reported that the correlations
between self-reported child sexual abuse and 18 symptoms of
psychopathology were all below r ⫽ .14. The effect sizes were not
moderated by type of psychopathology or the frequency, duration,
or force of child sexual abuse. The authors noted that the lack of
apparent harmfulness did not imply a lack of wrongfulness, and the
editors later reported that many criticisms following publication
had been raised, and addressed, during the review process (Sher &
Eisenberg, 2002).
Following publication, the results became known to the host of
a popular radio talk show named Dr. Laura. Calling the article
“junk science,” Dr. Laura questioned the authors’ motives and
recommended that when results contradict conventional wisdom,
the results should be deemed erroneous. The U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives passed a resolution condemning the publication of
such a severely flawed study (unanimously passed later by the
Senate), and the American Psychological Association sought an
independent review of an article for the first time in its history
(Rind, Tromovitch, & Bauserman, 2000).
In summary, three psychological outcomes (one from social,
experimental, and clinical psychology) are consistent with the
possibility that human intuition may contribute to perceived schol-
arly value. Dr. Laura’s claim (i.e., when results contradict conven-
tional wisdom, they should be deemed erroneous) implies that the
effort required by the empirical method is wasted because ex-
pected outcomes reflect common sense and unexpected outcomes
are wrong.
The Common Sense Revolution
Francis Bacon (1994) provided an early description of common
sense, and the philosopher Thomas Reid suggested (in a statement
eerily similar to Dr. Laura’s) that humans are imbued with com-
mon sense, which provides the foundation of truth and is never in
error (Grave, 1967). Recently, politicians in some Western nations
report favoring common sense when adopting certain correctional
or economic programs (e.g., see Jeffrey, 1999).
Common sense may reflect reality, predict job performance, and
provide the basis of scientific knowledge (Gigerenzer, 2007; Stern-
berg, Wagner, Williams, & Horvath, 1995), but common sense
intuitions may not always be veridical (Kahneman & Tversky,
1996). In fields relevant to psychology, like corrections, common
sense policies to reduce criminal behavior have introduced pro-
grams that may be intuitively plausible but lack empirical validity
(Gendreau, Smith, & French, 2006). For example, beginning in the
1980s in the United States, some young first-time offenders were
placed in boot camps, in which military-style training putatively
reduced recidivism by combating youth defiance. Although boot
camps may have had intuitive appeal, they had little effect on
recidivism and diverted efforts away from empirically valid treat-
ments (Gendreau, Goggin, Cullen, & Andrews, 2000). When an
empirical analysis of a Georgian boot camp found no effect on
recidivism, the governor (who had fondly reminisced about his
Marine training) responded to this empirical analysis by stating,
“We don’t care what the study thinks” (Vaughn, 1994, p. 2). But,
whereas boot camps may have been legitimized by common sense
appeals, sustained and vigorous research may have diminished
their appeal (Cullen, Blevins, Trager, & Gendreau, 2005). The
publicized deaths of a few adolescents, possibly due to excessive
force (Lilienfeld, 2007), may also diminish their appeal and sadly
remind us that the Milgram (1963) study may have ecological
validity.
 SPECIAL ISSUE: HUMAN INTUITION
Other common sense programs include Scared Straight, in
which prison life exposure putatively frightens at-risk adolescents
away from crime, or Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE),
in which police officers warn children of the dangers of drug use.
Although both programs may be intuitively plausible, there is
evidence that both may lead to iatrogenic outcomes in some
participants (Petrosino, Turpin-Petrosino, & Buehler, 2003; Werch
& Owen, 2002; see also Snook, 2008).
Manual-based cognitive– behavioral therapy for adult bulimia
was awarded a grade of “A” by the National Institute for Clinical
Excellence (see G. T. Wilson, Grilo, & Vitousek, 2007), although
the treatment is not commonly used in clinical practice (Haas &
Klopton, 2003). If this trend continued, the unfortunate impression
conveyed would be that (like the Georgian governor) some clini-
cians may not care what the study thinks.
Programs like boot camps, Scared Straight, or DARE, in addi-
tion to an eclectic array of treatments, may be initiated by moti-
vated, and well-meaning, individuals. When these efforts fail, this
suggests that we may have a shared inability to have veridical
access to our shared nature.
Behaviorism Violates Human Intuition
Behaviorism suggests that organisms are influenced by learning
principles such as operant conditioning, classical conditioning, and
observational learning. A popular personality textbook nicely cap-
tures the problem faced by behaviorism:
Acceptability is one criterion by which theories are judged (see
Chapter 1). To the extent that both psychologists and laypeople have
difficulty accepting the behavioral approach, the approach has an
added burden to prove itself. (Liebert & Liebert, 1998, p. 383)
However, behaviorism, like Milgram’s (1963, 1965) research, may
consist of empirically valid, but counterintuitive, outcomes. Hu-
man examples may be informative.
In a human study resembling operant conditioning, an inter-
viewer used the word good to reinforce verbal responses of Har-
vard University students in what was ostensibly a telephone survey
of educational attitudes (Hildum & Brown, 1956). Results showed
that students gave more proeducation responses when proeduca-
tion, rather than antieducation, responses had been reinforced.
When later asked to guess the attitude of the interviewer, or
whether their answers were influenced by the interviewer, students
usually guessed that the interviewer favored education (even when
antieducation responses had been reinforced) and all students
believed that their answers were not influenced.
In a human study resembling classical conditioning, participants
first learned several word pairs (such as jelly–purple or ocean–
moon) and then rated the aesthetics of several pictures (such as a
fruit stand or beach scene). Later, participants were ostensibly
taken to another experiment to play a word game (T. D. Wilson &
Nisbett, 1978). In the word game, participants were given concepts
(such as fruits or detergents) and were asked to name the first word
that came to mind. Results showed that, on average, a word pair
and picture doubled the chances of an associatively related re-
sponse. For example, participants first learning jelly–purple (and
rating the aesthetics of a fruit stand) were more likely to say
“grapes” when asked to name a fruit and participants first learning
ocean–moon (and rating the aesthetics of a beach scene) were
169
more likely to say “Tide” when asked to name a detergent. When
participants were finally asked why they gave each response
(which may have included “grapes” or “Tide”), the prior word pair
learning and picture cues were rarely mentioned. Furthermore,
although prior word pair learning more effectively elicited an
associatively related response, participants felt the picture cues
were slightly more effective.
In a human study resembling observational learning, homicides
in the United States increased more than 10% following publicized
boxing matches (Phillips, 1983). Notably, there was a significant
increase in White male deaths when a White boxer was the loser
and a significant increase in Black male deaths when a Black boxer
was the loser. Although Phillips (1983) did not interview perpe-
trators, we may be surprised if several perpetrators reported being
influenced by the recent boxing match and particularly surprised if
several perpetrators recognized that, because males show higher
imitative aggression than females, particularly when the viewed
violence is rewarded (Bandura, 1986), publicized boxing matches
nicely fulfill important criteria for stimulating aggression.
In introductory psychology, students occasionally express dis-
belief when they learn that retinal images are upside down and
reversed because they have never noticed their brain properly
orienting their retinal image. If this is the first item on an “outside
introspective awareness” list, these examples from behaviorism
may bring the total up to four. Today, this list is lengthy (Hassin,
Uleman, & Bargh, 2005). For example, people impute self-
knowledge to others (Nickerson, 1999), form impressions of others
(Uleman, Saribay, & Gonzalez, 2008), project threatening self-
views on others (Newman, Duff, & Baumeister, 1997), and mimic
other’s behavior (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999) rapidly and with little
introspective awareness. Perceptual effects (Merikle, 2007), blind-
sight (Danckert & Goodale, 2000), self-perception theory (Bem,
1967), bystander intervention (Latane & Darley, 1968), and a wide
variety of egocentric biases (Pronin, Gilovich, & Ross, 2004)
involve a lack of introspective awareness—for example, in one
survey, 100% of the faculty rated their teaching performance as
better than the average performance at the institution (Friedrich,
1996). Finally, memory consolidation occurs in sleep (Marshall &
Born, 2007), people remember surgical events under general an-
esthesia (Merikle & Daneman, 1996), and a wide variety of me-
morial distortions occur outside awareness (Loftus & Davis, 2006;
see also Jacoby, 1999). We may now appreciate why Skinner cited
Freud more than any other author (Richelle, 1993; Richelle knew
Skinner personally, translated much of Skinner’s work into
French, and provided valuable insights into Skinner’s legacy).
Not only may behaviors arise outside introspective awareness
but veridical introspective understanding may be irrelevant. For
example, just as introductory psychology students do not see the
world upside down if they fail their perception exam, evolutionary
theory may still apply to those 42% of Americans who believe that
humans and other animals have existed in their present form since
the beginning of time (see Bloom & Weisberg, 2007). Similarly,
just as helping behavior may not be altered when seminary stu-
dents are hurrying to give a talk on the Good Samaritan (Darley &
Batson, 1973), taste-aversion learning may not be altered when a
person knows that food poisoning was not the cause of their illness
(Carey & Burish, 1988).
In Hildum and Brown (1956), there was no mention of partic-
ipants experiencing disturbing losses of free will; therefore, unlike
170 GODDARD
the Milgram (1963) study, debriefing was never an issue. But, how
can the word good causally influence behavior while participants
apparently maintained the belief that their answers were internally
driven? One possibility, provided by Wegner (2002), is that ex-
ternal events may unconsciously cause action and also elicit un-
conscious thoughts. When those elicited unconscious thoughts
generate an internal conscious intention just prior to behavior, the
person may perceive the internal conscious intention caused the
behavior because that is the only element in the chain available to
introspective awareness. Applied to Malle’s (2004) folk psycho-
logical theory, whereas conditioning studies show that human
behavior may be unintentional, humans usually perceive human
behavior as intentional, requiring reasons or desires as internal
causal explanations.
Metaphors have a long history of use in psychology (e.g., see
Leary, 1990), possibly because metaphors may underlie human
conceptual thought to a degree that may not be fully appreciated
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). As an example, Cosmides and Tooby
(1994) suggested that the mind was like a Swiss army knife, with
individual blades specialized for particular survival skills. Simi-
larly, a metaphor of human consciousness capturing current, and
often counterintuitive, research while assimilating behaviorism
and evolutionary psychology would be useful. Although psycho-
logical metaphors are rarely humorous, any humor (or lack
thereof) may not necessarily invalidate a metaphor’s potential
usefulness. The following is a rough draft.
Imagine consciousness as the fictional character of Homer
Simpson as President of the United States. Homer has only re-
cently arrived in Washington (Donald, 2001) and knows very little
about the workings of government (Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert,
2000). Supporting Dennett’s (1991) belief that Homer is not par-
ticularly useful, Bargh and Chartrand (1999) have shown that the
Washington staffers are doing most of the work because Homer
tires easily and needs frequent naps. Wegner (2002) notes that the
Washington staffers will politely wait for Homer to sign the papers
(between naps) before they efficiently complete the day’s business.
Unfortunately, their efficiency leads Homer to mistakenly think
that the country would fall apart if he were not there (Nahmias,
2002). Gollwitzer, Bayer, and McCulloch (2005) have shown that
although Homer used to misplace his pen, recently he has discov-
ered that if he duct tapes it to his hand, his day is much more
pleasant. The behaviorists believe that a key department is respon-
sible for the success of many governments (large and small),
although there are some intriguing modifications depending on the
particular country (Shettleworth, 1998; Timberlake, 1994). To
preview, the evolutionary psychologists believe that the Washing-
ton staffers have had many hirings and firings over the years, and
the remaining members today are quite competent and efficient,
albeit somewhat limited in their knowledge of what is happening
in the other offices (Buss, 2005). Gould and Lewontin (1979)
suspect that some Washington staffers are sneaking friends in that
play solitaire and get credit for work they did not perform, but
identifying such friends is not easy because the hiring records were
lost long ago. Of course, Homer could catch the culprits playing
solitaire, but the staff offices are scattered all over Washington,
and whereas many staff can easily find Homer’s office, Homer has
no idea where the staff offices are (Prinz, 2003; Thach, 1996).
Finally, Homer cannot believe how anyone could possibly think he
is not vital to the government and is now standing on his desk and
waving all his signed papers in the hand that is not duct taped to
his pen (Nahmias, 2002).
Evolutionary Psychology Violates Human Intuition
The anthropologist Margaret Mead conducted field work in
seven cultures in the South Pacific and Indonesia. Her work
popularized anthropology, introduced valuable research tech-
niques, and concluded, in part, that sexual jealousy, war, and
aggression were uncommon in select cultures. She received 28
honorary doctoral degrees, was awarded the Presidential Medal of
Freedom, and was commemorated on a U.S. postage stamp (Bate-
son, 2001).
With respect to empirical validity, however, Mead’s work usu-
ally lacked interobserver reliability checks, and conducting face-
to-face interviews on self-reported sexual behavior is not recom-
mended for obvious reasons (Schroder, Carey, & Vanable, 2003).
Freeman (1999) concluded that Mead’s work in Samoa was largely
impressionistic and erroneous, which generated controversy and
personal attacks that continue today (e.g., see Caton, 2005). How-
ever, the fact that the truth may never be known suggests that
Mead’s research may not have been on firm ground to begin with
(Orans, 1996).
Mead’s popularity suggests that human malleability may be
intuitively plausible and a universal human nature may be less
plausible (Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992). As evolutionary
psychology normally aligns with a universal human nature, this
may partly explain why Darwinism has been largely marginalized
within psychology in the 20th century (Candland, 1987; Tooby &
Cosmides, 2005). Like behaviorism, historical events may influ-
ence behavior outside introspective awareness, but the intuitive
plausibility of evolutionary psychology is further compromised
because historical events occurred long before ontogeny.
An example may be helpful. Given that male reproductive
success in mammals may depend on aggression and status (Daly &
Wilson, 2001), consider these two empirical outcomes: (a) Male
athletes show testosterone increases following athletic victories
(Mazur & Booth, 1998). (b) Women find the scent of symmetrical
men sexier (after smelling their sweaty shirts), particularly on days
when they are ovulating (Thornhill & Gangestad, 2003).
To evaluate empirical validity, a psychologist may need to read
both studies. Alternatively, a psychologist may decide that the first
outcome sounds somewhat plausible and the second outcome does
not. When psychologists are presented with various empirical
outcomes purporting to support evolutionary psychology, to what
extent are they accepting and discarding outcomes based on intu-
itive plausibility?
Note, also, that if the theory of evolution was disproven, the
empirical validity of both outcomes may not be affected. Katzko
(2002) has noted that when a set of empirical outcomes is grouped
within a theory, the subsequent dethroning of the theory does not
necessarily lower the empirical validity of the grouped outcomes.
For example, Paivio (1969) showed that memory was better with
concrete words (such as house) compared with abstract words
(such as truth). When Paivio’s dual-coding theory later lost favor,
some psychologists may also have discarded, or forgotten, the
empirically valid outcomes that went along with Paivio’s theory.
However, if that second outcome was empirically valid, even Paul
Meehl (1990) might be impressed. That second outcome may pass
 SPECIAL ISSUE: HUMAN INTUITION
Meehl’s “damn strange coincidence” test with flying colors
(what Meehl referred to as Salmon’s principle, in honor of
Wesley Salmon, 1984). Consequently, an empirical outcome
passing Salmon’s principle, and improving the verisimilitude of
evolutionary psychology, may work in opposition to the number
of psychologists believing in the verisimilitude of evolutionary
psychology.
The Role of Human Intuition in Supernatural Beliefs
A belief in supernatural beings, that is, human-like beings that
read minds, live forever, or posses special powers, may be a
cultural universal (D. E. Brown, 1991). For example, in the United
States, 78% of Americans believe in angels (Winseman, 2004).
Supernatural beliefs may stem from a universal predisposition to
interpret environmental changes as the product of an intentional
agent (S. Guthrie, 1993) and unconscious cognitive tendencies,
previously discussed, to impute self-knowledge (Nickerson, 1999)
or project self-views on others (Newman et al., 1997; see also
Candland, 1993).
Boyer (2001) has suggested that humans append one or more
counterintuitive properties to the ontology “person” to create a
minimally counterintuitive concept. For example, a ghost is a
person with no physical body, a deity is a person with special
powers, and a zombie is a person with no cognitive functioning
(Boyer, 2001). Cognitive research has shown that minimally coun-
terintuitive concepts are highly memorable, which may also aid in
their cultural transmission (Boyer & Ramble, 2001; but see Shtul-
man, 2008).
Déjà vu experiences may result from the activation of uncon-
scious familiarity without accompanying conscious recollection
(A. S. Brown, 2004), and homeopathic practices may be founded
on human intuitions that “like produces like.” For example, a
magical taboo in Madagascar forbade soldiers from eating the knee
of an ox to prevent soldiers from acquiring the ox’s weak knees
(Frazer, 1922). A belief in magic or superstition may also be a
common human response to uncertainty. For example, Malinowski
(1972) noted that Trobriand islanders employed standard and
reliable practices when fishing in calm lagoons but performed
elaborate magical rituals before fishing on the dangerous open sea.
There is now evidence that universal human intuitions and cogni-
tions may contribute to some supernatural beliefs (Vyse, 1997,
2007; see also Randi, 1982).
Improving the Plausibility of Counterintuitive Outcomes
Although Milgram’s work was eventually published, it is pos-
sible not every researcher has been so fortunate. If human bias
partially contributes to counterintuitive research residing in other
“file drawers,” how can the plausibility of counterintuitive out-
comes be improved?
One possibility is that the Milgram (1963) study may be more
plausible today because many people have seen videotaped foot-
age of actual participants. Consequently, some criticisms (such as
most participants knew that the shocks were faked) may carry less
weight. The chimpanzee sign language controversy, such as with
the chimp “Washoe,” may also have partly resulted because few
scientists at the time had observed signing behavior (Fouts, 1997,
p. 304). In studies of the “chameleon effect,” in which participants
171
unconsciously mimicked confederate behavior (e.g., see Chartrand
& Bargh, 1999), participants often did not believe that they en-
gaged in any imitation at all and frequently insisted on seeing their
own videotapes before becoming convinced (Bargh, 2008). Con-
sequently, a video segment showing participants in the “I Spy”
experiment (Wegner & Wheatley, 1999), or the placement of the
computer program from Dijksterhuis, Preston, Wegner, and Aarts
(2008) on a Web page, may better improve the plausibility of a
counterintuitive outcome than a written description or rebuttal
(e.g., see Wegner, 2004). Thus, authors may use other options,
outside print, that may improve the plausibility of a counterintui-
tive outcome.
In addition to providing a clear theoretical explanation on why
an outcome may run counter to human intuition, researchers may
also try to incorporate salient metaphors, explanations, or exam-
ples that may help bridge the gap. For example, Werch and Owen
(2002) noted that the iatrogenic outcomes associated with the
DARE program, particularly in increasing cigarette and alcohol
use, might be due to some children perceiving cigarettes and
alcohol as “less dangerous” than other drugs such as heroin. When
valid treatments, such as manual-based cognitive– behavioral ther-
apy, are combined with treatments of dubious validity (G. T.
Wilson et al., 2007), researchers might add that combining treat-
ments may lead to an unintended outcome if two reward-based
childhood treatments include treatment A, using cake and ice
cream, and treatment B, using rides on the Tilt-a-Whirl. Salient
metaphors, explanations, or examples may be helpful because
readers may not default to the question “Why might I be wrong?”
when human intuition and empirical validity do not correspond.
As previously mentioned, sustained and vigorous research di-
minished the appeal of boot camps, so the steps used by psychol-
ogists to sway policymakers may be of interest to the wider
academic community. Possibly most relevant is the recognition,
and rebuttal, of “knowledge destruction” arguments (Andrews &
Wormith, 1989) and the use of statistics conveying magnitude and
precision in an easily understandable format (Gendreau & Smith,
2007).
Neuropsychological evidence also improves the plausibility of
counterintuitive outcomes. For example, a direct perception– behavior
link, outside consciousness awareness, is supported by patients with
parietal lobe lesions who show appropriate action toward an object
without conscious awareness of the object itself (Goodale, Milner,
Jakobson, & Carey, 1991). Although human intuition may suggest
conscious thought precedes action, when conscious decisions follow
unconscious brain activity, as measured by an EEG, the only possible
conclusion is that conscious awareness occurs after unconscious ac-
tion preparation (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983; see also
Bargh, 2005; Frith, 2007).
Valuable work may also be residing in “file drawers” because a
researcher did not submit the work for publication. For example, a
researcher may have had an early intuition concerning a study’s
outcome. When that intuition was proven wrong, the dismayed
researcher may have relegated the study to the “file drawer” and
possibly overlooked a valuable counterintuitive finding. Research-
ers might be encouraged to take another look at that strange
outcome they vaguely recall from a few years back.
Kerr (1998) noted that some psychology articles have introduc-
tions that may be characterized by the acronym HARK (hypoth-
esizing after the results are known). That is, after an author
172 GODDARD
completes a study, the introduction is subsequently written as if
there was only one plausible hypothesis. When the results later
confirm this hypothesis, a suitably impressed reader may overlook
other plausible hypotheses that were ignored in the introduction.
Kerr’s research not only supports the role of human intuition in the
publication process but raises the possibility that other “tricks”
may be used. For example, one anonymous author noted that his or
her chances of publication improved when intentional, obvious,
and nonfatal flaws were added to the manuscript (Anonymous,
1987). Because, as previously mentioned, psychologists may enter
the review process searching for flaws, reviewers may feel that
they are doing their job when they discover such flaws (Anony-
mous, 1987). Would the editors and reviewers in Peters and Ceci
(1982) been less likely to conclude that the resubmitted manu-
scripts had serious methodological deficiencies if intentional, ob-
vious, and nonfatal flaws had been added first?
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Received September 23, 2008
Revision received November 10, 2008
Accepted November 12, 2008 䡲