Center for the National Interest

U.S., China and Thucydides

Author(s): Robert B. Zoellick
Source: The National Interest, No. 126 (July/August 2013), pp. 22-30
Published by: Center for the National Interest
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/42896498
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 U.S. y China and Thucydides

By Robert B. Zoellick

Thucydides trap": in explaining the cause

States, Chinese president Xi Jinping of the great Peloponnesian War of the
Last 1 States, introduced
1 introducedyear, Chinese
the idea of a during
"new typethe his president idea visit of to a Xi the "new Jinping United type fifth century bc, Thucydides pointed to
of great-power relationship." In March of the rise of Athens and the fear it inspired
this year, in apparent response, President in Sparta. In the centuries since, scholars
Obama's national-security adviser, Tom have pondered how power shifts have led
Donilon, suggested an interest in build- to competitive tensions, which sometimes
ing "a new model of relations between an have been managed and sometimes led to
existing power and an emerging one." This conflict.
June, the two presidents met in California This essay will pose a question: What
to explore whether their strategic outlooks might be the substance of a new type of
can be reconciled. great-power relationship between China
I suspect that President Xis concept and the United States?
reflects the senior leadership's study of Kevin Rudd, former prime minister
history. At last years meeting of the U.S.- and foreign minister of Australia, has also
China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, taken up this topic in a series of thoughtful
former president Hu Jintao stated, "We speeches. His approach points to the need
should prove that the traditional belief for reinforcing dialogues and cooperative
that big powers are bound to enter into efforts.

conflict is wrong, and [instead] seek new I will complement Rudd's observations
ways of developing relations between by suggesting specific policies that could
major countries in the era of economic forge this new type of relationship. I
globalization." will focus particularly on economic and
In the United States, professors Graham security issues, as well as on impediments
Allison and Joseph Nye at Harvard that China and the United States need to
have referred to this challenge as "the address.
In 2005, I suggested that the United
Robert B. Zoellick, former World Bank president, States should encourage China to
U.S. deputy secretary of state and U.S. trade become a "responsible stakeholder" in the
representative, is currently a distinguished visiting international system that had provided a
fellow at the Peterson Institute for International supportive context for Chinas extraordinary
Economics and a senior fellow at Harvard modernization and economic rise. Deng
Xiaoping
University's Belfer Center. This article is adapted had shrewdly recognized that
China's opening could capitalize on the
from an address delivered before the Shanghai
existing international system of trade,
Forum at Fudan University in Shanghai, on May
25, 2013. investment, technology, growth and

22 The National Interest U.S., China and Thucydides

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 security. Through the hard work of Chinas the second-largest economy in the world,
people, Deng was proven correct. the second-largest trader of goods and ser-
Yet the international system of the late vices, and the second-largest recipient of
twentieth century has to evolve with new foreign direct investment.
times. Responsibilities for preserving and But the United States still accounts
extending systemic interests - and adapting for about 22 percent of global gdp.
to new challenges - need to be considered Although productivity gains are harder
as part of great powers' national interests. to achieve as advanced economies move
The United States, China and others will to the technological frontier, recent
not be able to adapt to an evolving system American innovations in energy, software
successfully, however, if they do not share and business models reveal a developed
a basic commitment to that international economy that retains an unusual capability
system. to adapt and revitalize itself. In contrast
Some observers believe that China to most other advanced economies - and
has acted like a "reluctant stakeholder,"
even many developing ones - the U.S.
especially when it comes to translating
demographic outlook is modestly positive.
common interests into complementary U.S. integration with its North American
policies. In speculating why, they partners
have also offers good prospects.
Yet a host of global structural shifts,
asked: Is China still debating or adapting
to its role? Or, as some voices in China in particular the rapid rise of developing
suggest, does China want a new system? If economies, along with the stumbling global
so, what would it look like? Does China revival from the Great Recession, necessitate
want to add different ideological content more changes for China, the United States
to international relations - which would and the world.
China's developmental challenges are
represent a shift from past Chinese policy?
These uncertainties have prompted described well in last year's "China 2030"
another important query: Have Chinese report prepared by the Development
critics of the current international system Research Center of the State Council
considered the costs of, and others' along with other Chinese ministries and an
reactions to, new Chinese aims? Not international team from the World Bank
Group.
surprisingly, these questions are arising most
prominently in the Asia-Pacific region. The researchers sought to address the
basic problem of how China could avoid
Therefore, in considering a possible new
type of great-power relationship, we need athe so-called middle-income trap - the
serious, in-depth exchange about whether tendency for productivity and growth to
China and the United States share common slow after developing economies reach
systemic interests - as well as about specificmiddle-income levels. Our Chinese
policies. Interdependence, by itself, will notcolleagues wisely recognized that straight-
overcome twenty-first-century problems line growth projections rarely come to pass.
and threats. We need to consider how Consider this problem in historical
economics and security interconnect inperspective: when the World Bank reviewed
today's foreign policy. the performance of 101 economies that
the Bank categorized as middle income in
1960, it discovered that by 2008 - almost
China's growing
growing astounding
on average 10onpercent
averagea year
economic 10 percent success a year - fifty years later - only thirteen had made it
for thirty years - has propelled it to become to high income. And one was Greece!

U.S., China and Thucydides July /August 2013 23

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 and pricing resources for scarcity;
and considering the international
implications of Chinas structural
shifts.

I do not expect Chinas new

leaders to act through any kind
of "Big Bang" reform. I do think
they - and provincial leaders - will
pursue pragmatic experimentation.
Prime Minister Li Keqiang has
pointed to urbanization as the
portal through which China
can pursue connected change,
combining issues of labor, land,
China has relied heavily on investment in enterprises, education and other services,
fixed assets, principally by the government, consumption, living standards, new
and on export-led growth. China will need infrastructure, housing, sustainability,
to adapt to global structural shifts: now that financing and governance.
developing economies account for half of Just recognizing the need for change
global output - and indeed about two-thirds represents a big step forward. In contrast,
of global growth over the past five years - more than twenty years ago I watched
China can no longer base its growth model Japans political and bureaucratic system
principally on sales to developed economies. resist the need for a new growth model.
China needs to change its growth model Prime Minister Shinzo Abe now must
to rely on greater domestic demand and pursue bold steps to rectify Japan's
consumption - as well as on a greater role resistance to change.
for the private sector. Investment in human Yet Chinas next reform push will be
capital will be of increasing importance, as difficult. The Chinese leadership will need
will the encouragement of the innovative to balance a near-term growth strategy,
spirit of Chinas talented people. This shift relying principally on the current economic
could also enable more Chinese to benefit structure, with the need to change that
from their decades of diligence; in doing structure for future growth.
so, increased consumption might ease social
tensions as well.
The "China 2030" report outlined Anew would
wouldtype
anticipate
anticipate
theofeconomic
great-power
and the economic relationship and
a pathway to a new growth model thateven institutional changes that lie ahead.
would include: completing the transition China and the United States should identify
to markets for land, labor, enterprisesmutual interests in supporting structural
and financing; moving to an openreform and "rebalancing" in both countries.
innovation system, so as to enable China Consider what a search for a new,
to move up the value chain; offering equalcooperative economic approach might
opportunity and basic social protectionsentail:
to all Chinese; restructuring fiscal systems
to match accountability for revenues • For example, to boost productivity, create
and expenditures at various levels of jobs, expand entrepreneurial opportunities and
government; cleaning up the environment increase consumption, China needs to open

24 The National Interest U.S., China and Thucydieies

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competition in the services sector. The Chinese • Finally, China, the United States and others
private sector should expand its role. In ad- need better frameworks to encourage cross in-
dition, U.S. and other foreign businesses and vestment while managing national security and
investors can bring know-how, technologies other sensitivities.

and global connections to support an expanded

Chinese services sector. This cooperation can In a sense, Chinas twenty-first-century
help alleviate trade imbalances and frictions leaders can look to the logic of Deng
while promoting mutual interests. Xiaoping and Zhu Rongji: employ the
markets, rules, competition, opportunities
• Chinas innovation agenda needs to combine and standards of the international economy
education, technologies, venture capital, net- to foster Chinas structural reforms and
work effects, and better intellectual-property- advancement.
rights protection and enforcement; again, U.S. The United States also needs structural
participation could assist while benefiting the reforms - especially in pension and
United States and others, too. health-care systems, tax reform, public-
private partnerships for infrastructure, and
• Stronger but flexible social safety nets in education connected to skills and jobs. U.S.
China could draw from international experi- entitlement programs now cost every man,
ence with insurance, savings and delivery of woman and child in America $7,400 each
service models. The United States, in turn, year - more than Chinas income per person.
needs to address the costs, financing and in- China and the United States each have
centives of its older and much more expensive good, self-interested reasons to pursue
safety nets. structural reforms and global rebalancing.
Yet cooperation can boost mutual prospects
• Chinas food needs - and water conserva- and the likelihood of success. Moreover, the
tion - could be assisted by U.S. and foreign effectiveness of Chinese and U.S. reforms
products, technologies and systems, including will boost global economic conditions and
those focused on stronger food safety and qual- enhance the likelihood of structural reforms
ity. More open markets should expand comple-elsewhere.
mentary trans-Pacific agribusiness efforts while My sense is that the U.S. -Chinese
also boosting living standards. economic dialogues - whether under the
headings of "strategic," joint commercial,
• There are mutual opportunities in the energy G-20, Apec, WTO or other forums -
and environmental sectors - including lower- have become too stilted, defensive and
carbon sources, alternative technologies and unimaginative.
systems, and experience for clean air, water, Chinas new growth agenda and Americas
biodiversity and land use. recovery offer an opportunity. Both parties
need to explore win-win connections. Not
• All these adaptations need to be supported all ideas will prove workable. But a new
by deeper, more diverse and more liquid mar- type of relationship could seek creative
kets for savings, credit and investment - while openings and solutions.
ensuring safety, soundness and effective crisis Moreover, as two major economic
management. China needs to shift from beingpowers, developed and developing, the
a nation of savers with minimal returns to be- United States and China need to consider

coming a nation of investors who play a role in how their cooperation can catalyze
Chinas private-sector development. improved regional and global systems.

U.S., China and Thucydides July /August 2013 25

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 The current dialogue has taken up important topics , but too
briefly, too infrequently and with limited engagement at the
highest levels, where stratégu: decisions are likely to be made.

For example, moves to open up Chinas supply chains, service-sector development,

service sector - which are in Chinas own infrastructure or investment. China
interest - could be deployed to boost the and the United States should have
service-sector liberalization negotiations incommon interests in inclusive growth,
the World Trade Organization. The wtogood governance, transparency and
Information Technology Agreement (ita) anticorruption, trade and avoiding boom-
in the 1990s proved to be a great boon toand-bust cycles. This new era could foster
global sourcing, supply chains, logisticscooperation with multilateral institutions
systems, innovation and consumers, wto and private-sector networks.
members are now discussing a second ita Environmental topics need to be
to update the old product list and addexplored, too - from biodiversity and
services. China and the United States wildlife conservation to low-carbon
development.
should be driving this effort. There are other
opportunities, too, from trade-facilitationIndeed, if the United States and
China are at odds on topics that require
measures to rules for more open government
procurement. Pressures will increase cooperation
to across national borders, the
international system is unlikely to act
clarify the rules of fair competition for
state-owned enterprises. A few years ago,
effectively; conversely, if China and the
sovereign wealth funds demonstrated thatUnited States can cooperate, even if just
steps toward increasing transparency and
step by step, others are likely to join.
encouraging best practices could counter The economic agenda for a new type of
anxieties while improving performance. great-power relationship could be extensive.
The United States and China also need Of course, there will be sensitivities and
to be discussing the future international differences to manage, but the expanded
monetary system. That system has to adjust network of economic ties - governmental,
to both global shifts and the consequences of private, transnational and multilateral -
todays extraordinary monetary policies. The can be a source of problem-solving ideas,
world needs to be on watch for the risk of creativity and even some cushion to absorb
competitive currency devaluation. As China differences.
internationalizes the renminbi and moves
toward an open capital account, a new era of
bilateral
great-power relations will require the major On bilateral securityorormultilateral, China and
issues, multilateral, however, China whether and
economies to manage the evolution toward a the United States do not have such a net-
system of multiple reserve currencies. work. This gap can be traced in part to a
China and the United States have structural difference. In China, the Peoples
Liberation Army (pla) reports to the Cen-
experience and perspectives on development
that could assist other countries - whether
tral Military Commission, a party institu-
through natural-resource development, tion with only one or two civilians. Thus,
agriculture, expanded manufacturing Chinas
andsenior foreign-policy officials, up

26 The National Interest U.S., China and Thucydides

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to the level of state councilor, usually aren't worldviews, interests and conceptual
able to intervene on security topics until frameworks.
after the pla has acted and sometimes only A true high-level strategic discussion,
after damage to Chinas foreign relations has including pol-mil dimensions, should
already occurred. foster a dialogue on historical perspectives,
China does not have a national-security- geographical considerations, economic
council system to integrate security, foreign, dimensions, technological shifts, political
defense, and even economic and political constraints, perceptions of changing
considerations. As a result, there is no conditions, national interests and a search
institutional Chinese counterpart for what for mutual interests. It should also assist
would elsewhere be described as "pol-mil" China and the United States to manage
discussions (for political-military). differences.
At times, China and the United States In such a dialogue, the United States
have had military-to-military exchanges, should offer a clearer explanation why U.S.
but these are not at the appropriate levels. policies are not based on a "containment"
And China turns the discussions off and strategy, as some Chinese seem to think.
on to register displeasure, inhibiting the The United States should also explain its
in-depth exchanges and the trust that need strategic concept of relations with China
to be forged. Moreover, a new type of great- and why "hedging" policies by the United
power security relationship necessitates States and others are a reasonable reaction
more than discussions among militaries. to worrisome Chinese behavior.
Some Chinese officials and scholars Importantly, the United States and China
recognize the need for a fuller integration mutual interests that they should at
have
of Chinese views on security and foreign-
least understand and perhaps foster together.
policy topics. The Chinese system might,For example, these interests might include:
for example, look to a member of the
Politburo Standing Committee of the• Freedom of the seas and maritime security,
Chinese Communist Party (ccp) to pull
which are important for Chinas international
together defense, foreign-policy, security
economic interests, regional stability and U.S.
and economic topics, drawing together thelinkages, as a maritime and Pacific power, with
pla, officials of the government and theEurasia.
Communist Party. Or the ccp leadership
might rely on subcommittees. • Open skies and access to outer space, so as to
However structured, a political-military
facilitate movement of people, goods and infor-
discussion between China and the United mation - which are important to our econo-
States could supplement a renewed strategic mies and security.
dialogue. The current dialogue has taken
up important topics, but too briefly, too • Access to reasonably priced energy sources,
infrequently and with limited engagement including the development, transit and safe use
at the highest levels, where strategic of resources. This interest is served by security
decisions are likely to be made. stability in the Persian Gulf, multiple energy
The most effective Sino-American sources and pipelines, sea-lane security, techno-
strategic exchanges - Kissinger-Zhou,
logical development and energy efficiency.
Brzezinski-Deng - have been small and
involved many hours of conversation
• Development of other resources, in conjunc-
to develop a deeper understanding tion of
with social and environmental safeguards,

U.S., China and Thucydides July/ August 2013 27

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 while managing disputes over territories and
ownership. unreliableChinas
Today, unreliable and often isolated,
and Asian oftenwhile
allies isolated, are few, while poor,
Americas allies are prosperous and expand-
• Establishing a sense of security for other part- ing. If Chinas assertion of influence is in-
ners in the Asia-Pacific region, so as to avoid terpreted as a threat to others, China will
destabilizing and potentially threatening mili- inevitably evoke a counterreaction. To avoid
tary competition or miscalculation. creating its own encirclement, China has
an interest in building ties with U.S. allies
• Nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruc- and friends, not in increasing their fears.
tion, especially to states or terrorists that will The United States and China together have
endanger regional and global peace and stabil- an interest in fostering regional integration,
ity. within a global system, without threats that
weaken confidence or escalate tensions.
• Countering violent Islamic radical move- It seems that the countries of Southeast
ments while encouraging Islamic leaders who Asia recognize the mutual benefits of
seek peaceful development with respect for economic integration within a safe security
religious beliefs. framework. Yet the differences over resource
development are spilling over into fears
The identification of interests should be about maritime security. None of the parties
complemented by a sharing of assessments has an interest in escalation of anxieties
of threats to these interests and also or conflict. They share an interest in
negotiated, cooperative solutions.
perspectives on how to deal with the threats.
Yet these mutual interests - and even Northeast Asia, however, poses serious
deep economic interdependence - could
dangers. North Korea, with a failed economy
be overwhelmed by a failure to deal with and uncertain leadership, has used threats
and nuclear weapons to demand assistance
differences in the Asia-Pacific region. The
challenge for U.S. and Chinese leaders while
is mobilizing an isolated garrison state.
to use global cooperation as an incentiveIts international trade in dangerous weapons
to reduce regional friction, rather than and
to illegal activities create havoc elsewhere.
permit regional tensions to undermine North Korea has rejected the 1953
global cooperation. armistice. It has used military force against
South Korea twice in recent years, killing
China has an interest in the security of its
coastal approaches and in gaining influence
people and risking escalation that could slip
in the western Pacific. The United States has
out of control. North Korea has threatened
a network of alliance and partner countries preemptive strikes against South Korea and
the United States, while endangering Japan
that value the stability and economic security
provided by Americas presence. These and testing nuclear weapons and ballistic
missiles that it could use to implement
alliance ties are important to Americas
these threats.
regional and global standing, which has
reassured others. Therefore, Chinas relations China traditionally has believed North
with some neighbors, including Japan,
Korea offers a security "buffer." But this is
outdated logic. An invasion of China is not
cannot be separated from U.S. relations with
China or U.S. relations with its allies. At conceivable. But conflict precipitated by
the same time, these U.S. partners - like the North Korea is increasingly conceivable, and
United States itself - value their economic, it certainly wouldn't be in Chinas interest.
political and cultural ties to China. When Dai Bingguo, a longtime leading

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Chinese diplomat, and I had strategic responses by others that conflict with
discussions in 2005-2006, I suggested Chinas preferences for regional security.
that the United States would be contentYet all these substantive proposals for a
if North Korea became like China. How,
new type of great-power relationship are
I asked, could China object to that?likely to be stillborn unless China and
the United States remove a corrosive
Moreover, I pointed out that if the Koreas
ever united - however the process came that is eating away at our trust and ties:
about - China would then have an interest cybersecurity.
in the United States retaining a security Cybersecurity anxieties take different
alliance with Korea. This alliance would forms, which compound a rising risk of
reassure Koreans, who throughout history
confrontation. One dimension is espionage.
A second is commercial espionage, which
have seen their peninsula serve as a route for
U.S.
the militaries of much bigger neighbors. If a and other sources believe is rampant,
unified Korea inherited a nuclear weapon,
extremely costly and destructive. A third is
the U.S. alliance with Korea could be sabotage. And a fourth is the question of
cyberwarfare - and whether and how we
instrumental in persuading it to abandon
that weapon. A nuclear Korea would should
leave apply such principles of war as hot
Japan as the only Northeast Asian country
pursuit, collateral damage, proportionality
without nuclear weapons, a situationand unacceptable damage to conflict in
that
would worry the Japanese. cyberspace.
Moreover, I told Dai Bingguo thatDecades
it ago, with the advent of nuclear
weapons, security strategists developed
was my expectation, contrary to Chinese
speculation, that a U.S. alliance with a
doctrines and theories to manage risks of
unified Korea would be backed by airmass
anddestruction. I don't know whether
naval assets in the South, not largecybersecurity
land lends itself to similar
forces, and certainly not troops on the discussions.
Yalu. I do know that it is vital that
In contrast, if the U.S. alliance with Korea
the great powers of the twenty-first century
ended, Japan might eventually be concerned
about being the sole Asian host to U.S.
bases and forces.
That was years ago. Chinese and
U.S. strategists need to be having these
discussions about security in Northeast
Asia now - to head off dangers today and
prepare for a safer tomorrow.
I suspect, for example, that one reason
behind Chinas reluctance to press North
Korea to end its hostile acts and begin
reforms is a concern about being able to
manage the process of change in North
Korea. Perhaps South Korea and the United
States - and others in the region - can
discuss the possibilities for change with
China. While China may wish to avoid
considering this prospect, the reality is that
a threatening North Korea will prompt

U.S., China and Thucydides July/ August 2013 29

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 discuss how they might deal with these powerful country, doesn't simply want to
issues, which could undermine President preserve the existing order.
Xi Jinpings suggested response to history's One symbol of America's global
lessons. engagement is the one-dollar bill. Look
There is a debate in the United States
at the back of that bill, and you will see
about whether China's concept of a picture of the Great Seal of the United
"international relations" can ever acceptStates, in place since the approval of the
a system based on rules that support anU.S. Congress in 1782. It includes a
integrative approach. Some - includingVirgilian motto: "Novus ordo seclorum,"
Henry Kissinger - believe that Chinas viewor "new order of the ages." As my professor
of itself as the "Middle Kingdom" onlyof diplomatic history pointed out long
allows for tributary relationships. ago, much of American history is about
Different perspectives among American whether this new order is supposed to be
policy makers and experts may reflect, ingeographically limited to the just-created
part, variations in experiences on economicUnited States - or broadly applicable.
and security issues. Economic-policy makers In addition to security and power - and
observed how Deng Xiaoping employed freedom to trade and dollar diplomacy -
the international economic system as an American foreign policy has at times sought
enabler of dramatic internal reforms; Zhuto promote the principles of the eighteenth-
Rongji went further, using Chinas wtocentury Enlightenment that were embodied
accession to import international economicin America's revolution. Today, those
rules and relationships. Similarly, Chinas principles are reflected in discussions about
economic relations and actions over the human rights and freedoms. But those are
past five years of economic crisis have been also topics that China is debating under
generally cooperative. In my time at the such rubrics as good governance, limits on
World Bank Group, I also saw Chinasarbitrary governmental action and the rule
support for - and willingness to adapt to -of law.
multilateral development institutions and The challenge of crafting this new type
issues prompted by Chinas economic rise. of great-power relationship is intriguing.
The experience with security topics It involves much more than a new balance
raises more doubts, perhaps leading to theof power. China is a rising power but one
difference in perceptions about Chinas guided by many traditional views. The
concepts of international relations in the United States is an established power
twenty-first century. but one comfortable with change. Both
the United States and China are highly
successful economically and deeply
The er relationship ideadoesof not
er relationship a new doesthese
answer type not of answer great-pow- these interconnected with many other countries
questions. But it offers us an opportunity to and regions. Their relations will affect many
explore various answers. other nations and regions.
It is not only China that brings a special My hope is that these ideas and concepts
historical experience to this task. might assist these two powerful and vibrant
The United States, although it is the countries to avoid the Thucydides trap as
established power, is not a status quo power. they explore a new type of great-power
Many international observers are confused relationship. This could be an exciting
by this American quality. Commentators venture, with much at stake - for China,
ask why the United States, the world s most the United States and the world. □

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