WAR IN HISTORY a,WAR IN HISTORY EDITORS rib spaces Trg Mos intr ery ag Cg Br fe 485, U4 Pague Hoa Dg Te ok Cig: Cat Nb et Cao no OS BOOK REVIEW EDITORS SIMON DALL ye) Dayan € Morn Uso {eno Gg ago I2n00. 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Tek a4 avE NSO Tes ge sus CConyight 1 raat 187 Asin ov Nop pain mayb ‘epic selma ett et, eae ‘ay or a eevee mn ‘nln oer, wai hp fat {none fom he Pb Boe een ‘acd cpr. rte Ue Kas Esco ae bot by the Conybe Loe Asery UA 98 Toman Come Real ane WP [Note saberba in the USA The ppm of thetic de dow cans dhe spr ows ra ht ces ea apr fe he oul ‘ror hel br pasando sd eo he intone ersbucn The cier mt py the ee ‘Spee sb he Espen Clase Cane hr WP ycheweal he Bane AS) UNA ke peed torus! yn i ad sth Us Copy aw Fortes Howe “eva poms rate ug tem Pike soomae ten e k ean hing rset een “ctu promeawn prpncs orem e ‘Skene wks lH F468 taWhose Finger on the Trigger? 453 to allow women to do ything to Kill the enemy except pull the trig- ger’! Most of the objections to women in combat had been answered by the performance of the mixed baueries, but the one relating to gen- der roles in a civilized society remained. One likes to think that British society could not tolerate a mixing of the feminine role of mother with he masculine role of wartior. But one is hard-pressed to find contempor- aries able to distil the issue to its philosophical essence. In The Lnitation Game, a Play for Today by Ian McEwan about wartime life broadcast by BBC Television in 1981, Cathy Raines, an ATS recruit, state: You know, on the antiaircraft units, the ATS girls are never allowed to fire the guns. ... If girls fired guns, and women generals planned the battles... . chen men would fear there was no morality to war. They would have no one (o fight for, nowhere to leave their consciences, war would appear to them as savage and pointless as it really is. ‘The men want women to stay out of the fighting so they can give it meaning. As long as we're on the outside, and give our support don't kill, women just make the war possible . .. something the ‘can feel tough about. McEwan reveals the danger of imposing modem feminist awareness upon women of a different generation, This study found no former ATS gunner who exhibited such a precise sensitivity to the combat taboo, ‘either at the time or since. The taboo was formidable precisely because it was never discussed and seldom even contemplated. By carefully skirt ing the issue, Britain avoided having to address it. Mixed batteries did not in the end challenge the taboo because the British decided that they would not do so. The issue was not an issue. Women gunners were non combatants. Nothing had changed. University of St Andrews Acknowledgement I would like to hank Nicholas Evans, Lena Troth, Corinna Per Bird and Ian Kirby for helping with the research for this article. 1 would also like to thank Norma Porter, who transcribed the recorded interviews. Financial assistance was provided by the Carnegie Trust and by the University of St Andrews. Acdech, p18, McEwan, The Jaton Game (London, Cape, WA), pp. 174 War Hisery 1997 48)Debate Catapults Are Not Atomic Bombs: Towards a Redefinition of ‘Effectiveness’ in Premodern Military Technology Kelly DeVries Donald Allen Dugan, the first American soldier Peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. The weapon which killed according to the intial news reports, was a land-mine. The these unexploded mines is extraordinary: some six million are buried 2elow the soil of Bosnia, with only 20 per cent known or ‘remembered’ by the warring factions.! Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of soldiers and civilians may die from these mines, as they did from the numerous mines laid in Vietnam and Korea. Yet military historians and historians of tech- nology would never refer to this weapon as ‘decisive’, ‘invincible’ or ‘rey- ‘olutionary’, Indeed, very few modern military technologies are referred to by these terms, Despite playing significant roles in the outcome of the First World War, neither the machine gun, the tank, noxious gas, the aeroplane or the submarine is determined to have ‘won’ or “lost” that war.? And if last year’s discussion of the use of the atomic bomb to end the Second War War is any guide, the ‘decisive definition of even that weapon is in dispute Such seems not to be the ease in scholarly discussions of premoder military technology. There continues, as can be seen in recent publi cations by Robert Drews, George Raudzens, Clifford J. Rogers, David Eltis ‘National Public Radio repors, 4 Feb. 1996. * EM, Teagarden, “Tanotalion Over Time: A SemiTechnical Survey of European Military Change before the Great War Hislon and Technology VII (1000), pp. 31-40; J Elis, hw Seal History ofthe Machine Gum (Baltimore, MD, Jobs Hopkins UP. 1075). Wear in Hisery 1997 4 (4) 454-70 0968: 445(97)WHLISINX © 1997 AmokdCatapults Are Not Atomic Bombs 455 and Geoffrey Parker, among others,* to be an almost constant willingness to describe premodern military technology in those deterministic terms which modern military technology prohibits. The question of ‘effective ness" js at issuc here. To these authors and many others who have favour- ably accepted their works, many premodern weapons were effective because they did more than kill, and kill many. Some premodern wea- pons were invincible against other weapons. Some were decisive on the battlefield and at sieges. Some were effective because they turned the tables on older, more traditional military practices: they reversed military social classes ~ medieval peasants being able to defeat knights, etc. - or they created economic and political catastrophe. Still others were revol- uutionary in that they determined the course of later world history. Alll these recent efforts to define the ‘effectiveness’ of premodern mili tary technology in deterministic terms have done military history and the history of technology a disservice. Not only has this inhibited progress in understanding premodern military history in general, and premodern military technology in particular, but it has also too often and too easily removed the individual soldiers and their leaders from the military his torical equation, replacing them with a technological, deterministic explanation.* To illustrate where these and other recent military his- torians have gone wrong in their definition of premodern military tech- nological effectiveness, let me present three case studies: (I) military technology as a cause of what ancient historians call ‘the Catastrophe’; (2) the invincibitity of the English longbow; and (3) the ever-growing acceptance of the Military Revolution thesis. * Drews, The Fd ofthe Brome Age Changes in Warfare andthe Caastraphe ex. 1200 AG. (Princeton, NJ Princeton UP, 1088) C. Raudzens, "So Why Were the Aztecs ‘Conquered, snd What Were the Wider Implication? Testing Miltary Supesionty 25 ‘Cause of Burope's Preingustrial Colonial Conquest’, War m Hisioy 1 (1925), pp 87-104, and "War Winning Weapons: The Measurement of Technologies, Beterminisa in Miltary History’, Jounal of Miliary Hisry LV (1980), pp 409-33; G4, Rogers, "The Mibtary Revolutions of the Hundred Vents War’, four of Midary ‘History LNW (1998), pp. 261-78; D. Elis, The Miltary Revlon in Stenth Contry Eunpe (London, LB, Tauris, 195): G. Parker, ‘in Defense of The Miltary Remi’, In Gf, Rogers, e., The siary Rerdiion Debate: Readings on the Mtry ‘Transformation of Early Moder Exrppe (Boulder, CO, Westview Press 1998), pp. 337= 65, See also G. Parker's The bier Revolution (Cambridge, CUP, 1988), whic [prompted the collection of readings above. All the extaye i that cllecion, some {eprinted from earlier works and others newiy written forthe cllection, should also bbe noved. Another attempt at this is A Ayton and JL Price, eds, The Motion! ‘Miiary Revsuton: Sau, Scity and Miliary Change in Media! end Early Modern Europe (London, 1B. Tauris, 1995), Bt the essays contained in this woluine, with the exception of the introduction, have litle to say about tltary technology ‘Alex Rofand has secendy writiens “(AJ characteristic ofthe hstovography of technology and war that ik often more deterministic than other work: See “Science, Technology, and War’, Tabnaigy and Cult XXXVI (1988), pp 589-91 Although Roland’ comments are about military history in genera, his examples are taken primarily from premodern military technology. Warm Hisory 1997 4 (8)456 _ Kelly DeVries I. Military Technology as a Cause of the Catastrophe Ancient historians have always been bothered by the historical phenomenon known as ‘the Catastrophe’. This event, dated 1200 ac, saw a number of attempted, but ultimately futile, invasions of Egypt the destruction of more than 40 towns and cities in Greece, Anatolia, the Mediterranean islands and the Levant, and the fall of the Mycenacan and Hittite civilizations. Because of the sparsity of evidence for this period in the history of the eastern Mediterranean region, and its almost entirely artistic nature, historical theses explaining the cause ‘of the Catastrophe have been numerous and highly speculative. Some historians have suggested that earthquakes were the cause. Others have blamed the invention of ironworking, Still others have felt that drought caused the Catastrophe; while some have even ascribed it to a shift in the traditional trade and production networks and patterns. A few blame small groups of raiders. Finally, the most popular expla. nation for the Catastrophe has been that massive migrations of “bar- barians’ caused the immense destruction that took place around 1200 nc: In 1993 a new theory entered the historical arena. Robert Drews’ book The End of the Bronze Age: Changes in Warfare and the Catastrophe ca, 1200 BC. built upon the thesis of massive barbarian migrations by adding a new twist: the Catastrophe was the ‘result of a radical inno- vation in warfare, which suddenly gave to the “barbarians” the military advantage over the long established and civilized kingdoms of the east- ‘em Mediterranean’.° But this was not an advantage that was tactically or strategically determined, nor was it the result of finer barbarian generalship. It was to Drews a technologically determined advantage. Up to this time, the Bronize Age kingdoms of the Middle East do: nated their lesser opponents by using chariots: “A king’s military might was measured in horses and chariots: a kingdom with a thousand char- ots was many times stronger than a kingdom with only a hundred.” However, by the beginning of the twelfth century sc the dominance of chariots began to give way to the new weapons used by barbarian infantries which opposed the chariot forces. These troops used long slashing swords and javelins to stop and outmatch (Drews’ word) the chariots of their day. Since this work appeared, reviews have been positive, if not en favourable.* Only i rely ‘Anthony M. Snodgrass’s review, which appeared For a dscusion of oriogn End of te Onan par Op. ct These include JP. Kaveas, Joga of Miuary Hist LVI (1994), pp. 194-5: HL van ‘Wes, Grve aad Rome XL (1994), pp. Zi MP. Paskovie, Phe Historian LU (1998), pp. 194-5: TG. Young, Jr, Journal uf thy Amercan Onna! Sane CXV (1995), pp. 815-18; CG. Thomas, Amicon Hiei! Ring © (1998), pp. M4, NV, hy, see Drews, War in itary 1992 4 (8)Catapults Are Not Atomic Bombs 457 in the Times Literary Supplement, was there significant criticism of the book, and this was based on Snodgrass's different chronology of mili- tary events.* To date, no one has criticized Drews for his technological determinism, and yet this is the most vulnerable part of his thesis. Drews makes three conjectures which may be, or simply are, incorrect. First, because of the sparsity of documentary or literary evidence and because of the difficulty in determining weapon type and technology from artistic evidence, Drews must rely on archaeology to substantiate his claims of new barbarian weapon use. Yet, even he must admit to the difficulty of this task: Surprisingly little iMumination has come from in eorpue evidence. In the Near East, first of all, archaeologists have found considerably fewer weapons and pieces of armor than have their counterparts at work in the Aegean or in prehistoric Europe. ... And for both the Aegean and the Near East, what has been found has received less attention that it deserves, Although specialists have catalogued the weapons of the Bronze and early Iron Age, they have seldom ven- tured (o speculate - on the basis of the particulars ~ about the evol- ution of warfare during this period.”” Archaeologists are a cautious lot; few speculate about any knowledge ‘which can be derived from the artefacts which they unearth, Part of this may be because historians have generally criticized their speculation, especially when there is no nonarchaeological evidence to support this speculation. But in this instance the lack of speculation may be because of the lack of specific dates for these weapon finds. None of the weapons. can be dated specifically (0 1200 nc, leaving even Drews admitting that ‘neither the long sword nor the javelin was an invention of the late thi teenth century: a long slashing sword had been available in temperate Europe for centuries, and the javelin everywhere for millennia." This statement is, however, conveniently forgotten a few pages later when Drews declares, ‘in a few decades before and after 1200 nc the eastern Mediterranean world underwent a transformation in the tools of war."® This fact he attributes to a number of those earlier discredited Aegean archacologists, of whom only Jeremy Rutter, Nancy Sanders and James Mubly are quoted." No military historian or historian of technology has Schunda, Clasical Review XLY (1985), pp. 119-21; D.C. Haga, American foun of Phidogy CXV1 (1988), pp. 321-4; TR Hobs, Gaile Bisa Quarts LV (1995), pp. 1. » AIM. Snodgrass, Times Liteary Supplonent, 22 Oct. 1998, . 30 © Drews, Bul of the Bronze Ag. 29. (Opt, p.97. For a more detailed description of these weapons and armour, see pp. 17408, Op. at, p14, Op. ot, pp. 103, 174 |. Rute, ‘Cultural Novelties in the Post Platial Aegean World Indices of Vitality or Decline” in W.A. Ward and M. Jouowy, eds, Te Crs Yor ‘The 120 Cotary B.C: (Dubuque, 1A, Kendall Hunt, 1092) p- 67, N. Sanders, The Sou Prop: Wanvars of the Auten’ Medteranean, 1250-1150 HC (London, Thanes Se Huldeon, 197), p. 92: JD. Muhly, "The Role ofthe Sea Peoples in Cyprae during the LCI Perio, in V. Karageorghs and J. Mubly, eds Cyr al thr Close of he Late Wor in Hisry 1997 4 (4)458 _ Kelly DeVri yet agreed with these findings, including Anthony M. Snodgrass or Yigael Yadin, whose works are extremely important, if not seminal, for this per- ind." Drews’ own proof for this point, which rests on several Egyptian artistic works, some archaeological exemplars and a few later quotes from Homer, is unconvincing of anything more than a long-drawn-out process of barbarian adaptation to these weapons, and not something which can be attributed to ‘a few decades before and after 1200 nc’ Drews’ second conjecture, that chariot warfare began (o decline at this time, is also highly speculative, and even if correct may not be attibu- table to tactical alterations caused by the weaponry which faced it. There is little question of the dominance of chariot warfare in the Bronze Age. Originating in Mesopotamia at the beginning of the third millennium Bc as clumsy, solid-whecled and ox-drawn war wagons, by 1700 Bc char- jots had become fast, light and horse-drawn vehicles. By this time they ‘were, in the words of William McNeill, ‘the supreme arbiter of the battle- field in all Eutasia’."" OR. Gurney even went so far as to claim that the chariot ‘created a revolution in the mature of warfare: henceforward speed was to be the determining factor in the battle." (The determinism of this statement in itself should probably be questioned.) There is also little question that by 1200 nc the use of the chariot was in decline. But it would not altogether disappear in that period although one might come to this conclusion from reading Drews’ book Indeed, the evidence in this case, sparse as it may be, proves otherwise ‘The Egyptians continued to use the chariot for many centuries after 1200 nc, encouraged by the fact that their chariots had not been defeated at Megiddo in 1460 8c or at Kadesh in 1275 no." David, or perhaps Saul, introduced the chariot to the Israelites, but not until after 1200 nc, David’s force of chariots would eventually reach 2600." Sargon I's Assyrian army, which dominated the Near East in the late eighth ‘century 16, was a chariotbased force." Persia was still fighting with the chariot when Alexander the Great invaded.® And in England and Ire- ‘rome Age (Nicosia, Zayas, 1884), p. 42 Drews notes that one of the weapons referred to by Muhly is now dated to « 1400 ne "AM. Snodgras, Bury Gest Armour and Weapons Pom the Bronze Age to 600 BC (Gadinburgh, Edinburgh UP. 1964); Arms aad Armour ofthe Combs (ithaca, NY. Cornell 7): ¥. Yan, The Ari of Warfare ix Bibel Lande (2 vols New York, McGraw il, 1963), 1 WH, MeNeil, The Rie of the We A History ofthe Human Cammomity (Chicaga, Univ. ‘of Chicago Pres, 1969), p, 104. I wish to thank Alex Roland Yor proving me a copy (of his unpublished paper, “Chasiots of the Mind: The Socal Construction of the Wat ‘Wagon’, om which ths and the following quote are taken. Fora survey af the history of chariot warfare, see Drews, Bnd of the Brae Age pp. 104-84 OR. Gurney, The Hite ud edn, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1951, p10, Drews, End ofthe Bronce Age pp. 29-84 [A Feil, The Origins of War: From th Slone Age to Alxende the Great (London, ‘Thames & HHucson, 1985), p. 6, J. Keegan, A Hite of Warfare (New York, Alfted A. Knopf, 1998), pp. 173-4 = Opt, pp. 108-7, © LK Anderson, ‘Greek CharioeBome and Mounted Infantry’, American Jounal of “Aehaclogy UXXIX. (1975), pp. 175-87, Wer in Hisry 197 444)Catapults Are Not Atomic Bombs 459 land Celtic troops fought on chariots past the meridian of time.*" Finally, although speaking of events which occurred during the Catastrophe as well as misunderstanding the use of the chariot in battle, Homer's liad thas this military technology play a major role in the conflict outside the walls of Troy, a role which would continue to celebrate chariot warfare up to the present.®® Yet, even if there was a decline in chariot dominance, this cannot be, and probably should not be, blamed on an opponent's use of alternative ‘weapons. In fact, the answer to what caused the decline might not be found in any military technology of the time except in the chariots them selves. Before 1200 nc, chariots were used almost specifically as mobile archery platforms, Manned by a driver and one or more archers using composite bows, the chariots would race around the battlefield, launch ing missile attack after missle attack against the enemy. The results were deadly. Other chariots could only defend against them using similar tac tics. One mobile archery platform must have been very difficult to hit by archery from another mobile archery platform. Because of their speed, chariots could not be caught by footsoldiers; thus infantry simply could not be used effectively against such a mobile long-range weapon, even with the advent of the new weapons which Drews advocates, The only means infantry had of stopping chariot horses, or cavalry for that matter, was to form a solid fine and not allow them- selves to be flanked. Meeting this solid line, the horses would stop, and the infantry could then attack their charioteers/riders.** However, for this to work it necessitated a direct chariot shock attack, and even Drews admits that this was not the nature of chariot warfare in 1200 Bc. Therefore, the decline of chariot dominance must be looked for else- where. There are three possibilities. First, the cost of maintaining a large chariot-based army was extraordinary, and few kingdoms in the ancient world were able to do so. This must have been especially true if the Catastrophe was caused by something which hampered economic pros perity - earthquakes, drought, raiders, shifting wade patterns, etc® Second, the development of horse-riding and cavalry presented a lighter and thus faster alternative (o the chariot. Cavalry could deliver everything, ‘a chariot could, including being a mobile archery platform, at much less *N. Chadwick, The Guy (Harmondswont, Penguin, 1970), p. 38. Peshaps the most Interesting and colourfl sxe of chariow in the Bish Iles can be Found in the Old Ith epics the Tain Ba Cuaiings See T. Kinsella, trans, The Tain (Oxford, OUP, 1969), Homer, The Hed rans. E.V. Rieu (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1950), 1: If v 2500, vs 72M, xe S2UE, xn HF, xe 795-800, Xvi 4551, and Xx: 498A My thanks to Andrew Tomminia, who provided these references, Drew's discussion ofthe use of chariots in bate (ind ofthe Brome Ag, pp. 118-29) Sg-eorect here, but i seems to convadiet his argument of what caused the eharioe decline 21200 "Fora comincing discussion of this phenomenon atthe bate of Agincourl, sc J. Keegan, The Foe of Bate A Study of Agincourt, Watoloo and the Somme (isemondeworth, Penguin, 1978), pp. 345, © On dhe cont of chariot, ace Dre, Bnd of the Brow Age pp. 110-18, Wor in Hitory 1997 4(4)460 _ Kelly DeVries rece eee rer HST Seeen eee cost and with much more manoeuvrability. There was naturally more skill required to ride and fight at the same time, but this skill could easily be taught and, once learned, could provide an army both with a speedy offensive weapon, which would eventually be used as a shock weapon as well as an archery platform, and with a defensive weapon, one which could even be used to defend against chariots. Cavalry use was also begin ning to appear at the time of the Catastrophe.” Finally, the decline of chariot warfare could be just as easily attributed to a non-technological change of battlefield tactics. Because of the nature of chariot watfare +1200 nc, there was a need for a flat battlefield, Chariots were not able to fight easily in mountainous terrain, and chariot armies alvays sought to fight on flat plains. When opposing armies discovered this tactical flaw they began to use it to their advantage, forcing battles on nom Slat terrain, Such, for example, was the case of the Israelite judge Deborah, who forced an army of Canaanite charioteers to fight her army in the Valley of Jezreel. Before the batile she seized the high ground and refused 10 move from it. Eventually the Canaanites became impatient and rushed the Israelite position, only to see their chariots bog down in the over- flowing waters of the Kishon River. The Israelites then charged down on their helpless foes and destroyed them.” In a limited sense the weapons which Drews describes as deterministic were certainly effective, but they cannot be credited with initiating the ‘Catastrophe’. Il. The ‘Invincibility’ of the English Longbow Since at least the sixteenth century most historians have believed that the longbow significantly changed English strategy and tactics in’ the later Middle Ages. In fact, it has been thought that this weapon atone determined many victories for England, the only military entity skilled or ‘privileged’ enough to possess the longbow, during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The origin of the longbow is uncertain; in fighting with or against the Welsh some time during the thirteenth century, the English encountered a bow which made them discard their traditional how. This was constructed in a similar way and with similar wood to the taditonal English bow, but it was longer, and its string was drawn to the ear instead of to the chest, allowing for the discharge of a longer arrow. The English army quickly adopted the longbow, recruiting for % Op: cite pp. 16I-6. See ao Roland, “Chariots of the Min! ° Judges'9 Sce also Sanders, The Sa Peply, p72, Agni I wish to thank Alex Roland this reference Inthe sinteenth century 0 hr value was placed on the victorious longbow that some English general were reluctant to accept the handgun the Engish amy, Deticving that Ht could never duplicate the syccesses ofthe longbow. See T. Espey, “The Replacement of the Longbow by Firearms in the English Arty" Tecniog sid Cute V1 (1968), pp SH, War m Hisny 1997 4 (4)Catapults Are Not Atomic Bombs 461 their army large numbers of Welsh and Cheshire archers proficient in the weapon.” Itseems evident to many historians that the longbow altered English warfare from the late thirteenth until the end of the fifteenth century. In 1298, for example, Edward I took a troop of over 10.000 archers with him on his conquest of Scotland (a ratio of three archers to one mounted man-atarms), an extremely large number in comparison with numbers of archers included in English armies previous to this time. And he was victorious. Also victorious was the English army, again including a large contingent of archers, which faced the Scots at Dup- plin Moor in 1332 and at Halidon Hill in 1333. Finally, English archers participated in the decisive victories over the French and Scots armies a the battles of Sluys (1340), Morlaix (1342), Crécy (1946), Neville's Gross (1346), Poitiers (1356) and Agincourt (1415). Could it not be that all of these victories were brought to the English army because their opponents were unable to face the longbow arrows, fired at a rate of ten flights per minute ‘like snow on the battlefield’2®* ‘These facts, some of them mere assumptions, have led many his- torians to draw conclusions about the technology of the longbow. Since the longbow was longer than the traditional English bow and its string could be dravn to the ear, the range of its arrow, itis believed, ‘was almost twice that of an arrow discharged from a short how, up to 400 metres, and it could also deliver a much greater ballistic impact. ‘Arrows fired from the longbow, these historians ultimately claim, were capable even of piercing chain armour at a distance of 200 metres, a feat impossible at any distance by an arrow fired from a short bow." In using this weapon, English longbowmen were easily able to ‘mow down’ opposing heavy cavatries, bringing both victory and social revenge, This has been further asserted by the discovery in 1979 of two boxes of bows, containing 84 longbows in total, found on the wreck of the ® On the adoption of the longbow, se J. Bradbury, The Medieval Arser (New York, St Martin's Press, 1985). pp 71-90; Michael Powicke, Miliary Obigarion in Medieval Englond (Oxford, 1962), p.119, Fo an altecnatve view of the adoption of the mighow, see CH, Ashdown, Amour and Wirpors i the Mile Agr (London, Holland Press, 1025), pp. 84-6. Mathew Strickland and Roberi Hardy are in the process of reexarining the wadiional English bow and it Tater cousin, » Sceeg TH. MeGulfe “The Long-bow as a Decne Weapon", Histon Taday V (1985): pp. 787; Bradbury, Motion! Arche, pp 91-138; M, Prestwich, The Thor Edwards! Wor and Sue im England, 1272-1377 (Uondan, Weidentel fe Niccleon, 1980), p80, 70,178, 197; 3nd Ashdoven, Armow and Weghans, pp. 121-5. In actuaigy there wis ot mich ive of fonghows at Slaps, and the weapons certain ‘cannot be seen atthe caute of victory. See K. DeVries, “Gov, Admirals, Arche Flemings: Perceptions of Vieory and Detest atthe Battle of Shas, [340 Amancon [Aare LV (1995), pp. 228-42. Nor was there any substantial use of Tonggows 2 Marat. See K. DeVties, Infenty Wife inthe Bay Faurtenth Century: Daily, Tact, end Technaegy (Woadbridge, Boyell Pres. 1886) Gn the range of the longo, se Prestwich, The Hn Bisa, p. 70; M. MeKiack, ‘The Reetarth Contry, 1307-1399 (Oxford, OUP, 1950}, p.241; Asdown, Armour an Wiajons, pp 346 Wer m Hisery 1997 4(4)462_ Kelly DeVries Mary Rose. According to at least one author, Robert Hardy, their pull ranged between 100 and 180 pounds, and their effectiveness was decis ive on the battlefield, even against the most heavily armoured of foes.** Not too long ago, however, two historians, John Keegan and Claude Gaicr, cast doubt on the thesis of English longbow ‘invincibility’. In particular Keegan, in a study of the battle of Agincourt, has shown that the tactical use of the English archers at this battle, and for that matter in all the battles since the beginning of the fourteenth century, with the longbowmen cither skirmishing in a ‘shootout’ with their ‘opponents’ archers or flanking their infantry troops, could not have ‘caused the losses of life attributed to them by some historians. In fact, he claims that there is little evidence that the longbowmen, needing to fire with an extremely steep arc to cover the distance between them selves and the enemy and thus unable to penetrate their opponents’ armour, did any more damage than the killing of a few horses and the wounding of even fewer men.’ Keegan's and Gaier’s assertions have been echoed by Peter N. Jones, a scientist at the Royal Armaments Research and Development Estab- lishment, Although Jones admits to the longbow’s effectiveness against flesh, his findings show that unless an arrow discharged from a long- bow hits an armoured target at a 90° angle, which would rarely have ‘occurred, the amount of penetration into either chain or plate armour would have been minimal. In his tests, ‘at 45° the material [1 mm mild steel sheet ~ quite thin for medieval armour] had flowed forward, but backwards only on one side, and the perforation was smaller. At 60° the arrow made a hole but the bending stresses fractured the arrow tip {a long bodkin head] and the main body ricocheted. At 70° the projectile ricocheted with- out penetration. Stil, the ‘invincibility’ thesis has refused to die. Since the publication of Keegan's and Gaier's works, two scholars have tried to resurrect the old claim of longbow effectiveness, Jim Bradbury and Clifford J. Rogers, while another, Robert Hardy, has twice reprinted his work Longéew since % R Hardy, Lomgloas A Soil and Military Hitry (Srd edn, London, Bois #’Ate Press, 1992), pp. 184-222. See ako Hardy, "The Longbow’. in A. Cutty and M. Hughes, leds, Arms, Armies and Forfiations ithe Hundred Years War (Woodbridge, Boydell Press, 1994), pp. 161-82 1 J. Keegan, The Face of Bale pp. 78-116; C. Cale, ‘L'lvincibiie anglase et le grand arc aprés la Guerve de Cent Ars: un mythe tenace’, Tic wor gcheidnit XC1 978), pp. 578-85, See also K DeVries, Medina! itary Technoingy Weterborough, oacview Press, 1992), pp. 37-0 P. Jones, “The Target, appendix 8 in Mardy, Longhow, pp. 282-6 (quote on p. 286), Sce also PIN Jones ‘Metallography and Relaive Elfecivenes of Arrowheads and Armour daring the Middle Ages’, Materials Charaerzation XXIX (Sept, 1992), pp 11-13 War in Hizey 1997 44)Catapults Are Not Atomic Bombs 463 its initial appearance in 1976, each time building on and reinforcing his agreement with the invincibility thesis.*® Rogers sums up their argument: The new success of infantry forces in Western Europe [during the fourteenth century] rested on a number of developments. In the case of the English, the development of the six-foot yew longbow, substan- tially more powerful than the approximately four-foot Welsh elm bows of the early thirteenth century, played an important role, .. . The long- bow .... is drawn to the ear rather than the chest (as the Welsh bow was), increasing draw distance by several inches. .., It seems reason- able to hypothesize that this increase could make the difference between effectiveness and lethality when attempting to penetrate an. enemy's armor. ‘This gave the English an impressive advantage over all their opponents, but in particular the French, As for the French, their inability to have longbows determined their defeats on the battlefield. Rogers concludes: The French, despite numerous attempts, never succeeded in produc- ing a comparable body of skilled archers. Indeed, one could argue that France failed to join in on the Infantry Revolution until the Tate fifteenth century, and that many of her military failures prior to the advent of the Artillery Revolution in the mid-fifteenth century could be ascribed to that fact. But the problem with using this paradigm (Rogers' word) is that although the English in many fourteenth- and fifieenth-century battles had in the longbow a technological advantage which no one clse had, the effectiveness of this weapon was not as ‘a ki whine’; it was used by the English instead to narrow their opponents’ charges and to Protect against flank attacks. Using their archers as the English did, ordered along and protruding out from the flanks of the infantry lines, as shown at the battles of Halidon Hill, Crécy, Neville’s Gross, Poitiers and Agincourt, they had little need for the longbowmen to kill many ‘opponents. The archers’ purpose was simply to narrow and confuse the attackers’ charge so that when it fell onto the infantry troops, it did s0 in a disrupted and relatively impotent manner. The perfect staging of this may have occurred at Halidon Hill, where the English chronicler Thomas of Burton describes what happened to the Scottish charge after encountering the English longbow fire: “The smaller squadrons, so cut by the archers, were forced to cling to the Bradbury, Medial Arr, pp. 71-138: C,. Rogers, “Miltary Relations’, yp, 248-515 Handy, Longhoa See also Hardy, “The Longbow" G. Rees, "The Longbow Deadly Secret", New Scott GRXXVIT (5 June 1999), pp. 24-8; C. Bartle Engh Longbuman, 1330-1515 (London, Osprey, 1995) D, Featherstone, Hitny ofthe English Lange (New York, Barnes & Noble, 1967) Rogers. ‘Miliary Revostione’ pp. 249-80, That the French were not constantly ‘defeated in the Hundred Years War, parsiculaly between 1360 and L4l5 and ar 128, not explained by Roger, War in Hisry 1997 4 (4)464 Kelly DeVries larger army, and in a short time, the Scots massing together were pressed fone into the other." And at Grécy, Jean le Bel notes: On their side the archers fired so skilfully that some of those on horses, feeling the barbed arrows, did not wish to advance, while others charged forward as planned; some resisted them tirelessly, while others turned their backs on the enemy. Any deaths of men and horses which occurred would obviously have added to the disruption of the charge, but they need not have been numerous or (o have occurred at all to gain the desired result. Finally, if the archers found themselves in range of the opposing troops before the attack, their fire could hasten a charge which was being formed, again effectively disrupting it; this occurred, if we are again to trust ‘Thomas of Burton, at Neville’s Cross.** The English simply did not use the archers in a way that necessitated their using an ‘invincible’ weapon. Indeed, when other means (o narrow an opponent's charge without using archers was present, as at the battle of Morlaix, longbowmen hardly make their presence known on the battlefield. At Morlaix, the earl of Northampton dug pits and ditches both on the flanks and in front of the infantry which, when combined with the woods behind them, created what contemporary Henry Knigh- ton described as a ‘narrow cave’ The archers appear to have stood in the cave, fighting with weapons other than their bows. The English found the longbow to be effective without its killing of many opponents. If this was thus the case, why then must we ascribe a ‘killing machine’ status to this premodern military technology? Ill. The Increasing Acceptance of the Military Revolution Thesis By now so many historians, military or otherwise, know the story of the origin of the Military Revolution thesis that it is necessary only to repeat the simple details here. Originating as a lecture delivered by Michael Roberts at Queen's University, the "Military Revolution’ thesis proposed that the evolution and proliferation of early gunpowder * See Thomis of Burton, Chronioa monaiter de Midea a fundationeusque ad anu 1396 Im EA. Bonds, ed, Ros Sos (London, HISO, 1866-68) 1: S64. "Minores vero trae, per sgittarios nimivm laceratae, adhacrere magnd exerektl compeluntr, conglchat alas ab alia premehati. le Bel, “Chroniques de Jean le Bel, in} Viard and £. Duprer, ed, Socidé de ‘Phd de France (Pais, Revcuatd, 1904-5) w: 10 Et aulre par les achlers oient S| mervellesement que ceuly & cheval, sentans ce fleathes barbies [qui [asoieat mervelles Pung ne voulot avant wer, Paulie salloitcontremont si comme ‘aulte regimbor hydeusement, Vaulre setournat le cul par devers les Thomés of Buston, ‘Cheoniques de Jean le Bel 1: St Henry Knighton, Chroncon, in LR Lumby, ed, als Serer (London, HMSO, 1s 95) 1 35, War in History 1997 44)Catapults Are Not Atomic Bombs _ 465, weapons had caused significane changes in the art of European warfare between 1560 and 1660. These changes included revolutions in tac- tics ~ gunpowder weaponry-armed infantry soldiers replaced the more conventional medieval cavalry and infantry ~ and strategy — better- armed, more professional soldiers became capable of performing more challenging strategies ~ as well as an increase in the scale of warfare ‘waged throughout society. This in turn increased the impact of war on society. Printed in 1956 as a pamphlet under the title The Military Revolution, 1560-1660 by Queen's University, Belfast," for more than 20 years Roberts’ thesis stood without significant criticism directed against it Only in 1976, in an article entitled “The “Military Revolution”, 1560 1660: A Myth?’, did a young historian, Geoffrey Parker, question the accuracy of Roberts’ technological determinism." Yet 12 years later Parker somewhat reversed himself by publishing The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800. Initially presented asa series of four lectures given at Cambridge University and dedicated to Michael Roberts, this book showed that Parker had become con- vineed that a revolution in military tactics and strategy had indeed been effected by the innovation of gunpowder weaponry. This, com- bined with a belief in the supremacy of trace italienne fortifications, a thesis which he had presented in his 1976 article, led Parker to propose that not only were the organization and education of early modern soldiers altered, the scale of warfare enlarged and society adversely affected, but the use of gunpowder weapons also meant significant changes in supplying armies, naval warfare and, ultimately, the ability of Europeans to make conquests against non-European powers not blessed with such technologically destructive weapons”? Parker's work quickly received praises and awards, all of which were certainly well deserved, for if nothing else it publicized and popu- larized a relatively dormant thesis. Some historians ~ like David Ralston in his Importing the European Army: The Introduction of European Military Techniques and Institutions into the Extra-European World, 1600-1914%, Brian M. Downing in his The Military Revolution and Political Change in Early Modern Europe’, and Weston F. Cook, fr. in his The Hundred Years War for Morocco: Gunpoueder and the Military Revolution in the Early Modern tess later ao reprinted ina collection of Robert's articles, say i Suudsh History (London, Weidentel Nicolwon, 1967}, pp. 195-225 © G. Parker, "The Miliary Revolution", 1500-1660: A Myth, Journa of Modem Misery XLVI (1976), pp. 195-214. This article was aso reprinted in G. Parker, Spat and ‘te Nahelands, 1359-1639 Ten Studi: (London, Fontana, 1979), pp. 85-108 © G. Parker, The Mite Revetation Mikor onovation and Bh Riss of hx Wil, 1300- 1800 (Cambridge, CUP, 1988). D. Ralston, /porting the European Army: The Enraducton of Eurpean Mitary Technique ‘and stations nto the Exo tianpean World, 1600-1914 (Chicago, Unis, of Chicage Press, 1990) BM. Downing, The Mltary Rratution aud Pobtical Change in Bary Moon Bure (Princeton, NI, Princeton UP, 1992), War in History 1997 448)466 Kelly DeVries ‘Meustim World® ~ have even used Parker's work as the jumping-off point for their own studies, But The Military Revolution las not been without its critics. Parker himself, in a recent ‘rejoinder’ to a collection of readings on the thesis, The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modem Europe, edited by Clifford J. Rogers, has identified four general areas of criticism against his work: conceptual, chronological, technological, and geographical.” Although he discounts these areas of criticism, it is necessary in this essay to return to one of them, tech- nological criticism, in order to understand how the Military Revolution thesis has exaggerated the effectiveness of premodern gunpowder weaponry. Although Parker a few lines later asserts, ‘we must not fall into the trap of technological determinism’, he begins his defence of the Mili- tary Revolution thesis against technological critics with these words: No one has yet cast doubt on the chronological coincidence of the diffusion of the artillery fortress and the rise in army size in France, ltaly and the Netherlands in the first half of the sixteenth century." ‘This is in fact only partly true, While no one may have cast doubt on the chronological coincidence which Parker refers to above, John Lynn's article, “The Trace lalienne and the Growth of Armies’, claims that ‘military architecture was at best only one factor urging army growth {in France during the grand siécle|'. To Lynn, far more plausible a an explanation for the growth of French armies during the seven- teenth century is the French economic and demographic development which allowed for this military growth. With th “Parker's theory survives this critique, but not More damning to Parker's defence against technological criticisms, and to the Military Revolution thesis on the whole, is the question of accuracy in his claims of trace italienne development. and of the increase in army sizes determined by the invention and proliferation of gun- ponder weapons. On the one hand, in considering the development of the trace #talienne in reaction to gunpowder weapons, when a connec- tion seems evident, it is in fact more evolutionary than revolutionary. On the other hand, in considering the rise of army sizes in early mod- ‘ern Europe, both the rise itself and its connection to gunpowder wea- pons must be questioned. ‘The adoption of the trace italienne system of artillery fortifications or, better put, antiartillery fortifications is not something that sprang fully formed from the head of Zeus at the beginning of the sixteenth cen- " WuF Cook, Jr, The Hundred Yes for Morac: Gunpowdar and the Miitary Revlon in ‘Ye Ealy Modem Muslin Wed (Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1994) "Parkers rejoinder is enuided “In Defence of hr Niitary Realtor” ands Found on pp. 837-65. = Op rite p35, © Lymn, "The Trace Hetieme and the Growth of Armies: The French Case’ Jounal of ‘Miltary Hisiry LV (1951), pp. 297-980 (quotes on p 330), TH article has been ‘eprinted in Rogers, The Miltary elution Debate. pp 168-98, Warm Hinory 1997 44)Catapults Are Not Atomic Bombs 467 tury. By that time, gunpowder weapons had been attacking fortif- cations in Europe for more than a century and a half, and from at least 1374 onwards they had been effective in bringing down fortifi- cation walls."® Indeed, during the fifteenth century no castle or town wall could ensure its safety against an opponent's cannons without (Finances permitting) attempting at least some anti-gunpowder-weapon alterations, In a recent article, ‘The Impact of Gunpowder Weaponry ‘on Siege Warfare in the Hundred Years War’, published in The Medievat ity Under Siege, L raced the evolution of anti-gunpowder fortification defences. Suffice it to say that all the characteristics which Parker ident- iffes as original in the trace italienne artillery fortifications have medieval precedents, Gunports which pierced fortification walls can be found in England as early as 1347 and in France, Germany, Spain and {taly before the end of the fourteenth century. Other changes occurred later, but still preceded the trace ilalienne: carthen ramparts thickened walls and deadened ballistic impact; sloping glacis of masonry also thickened walls, while at the same time creating a surface which pro- duced glancing rather than direct blows; artillery towers, filled with numerous gunports and a large number of gunpowder weapons, increased the amount of defensive firepower and added protection to vulnerable walls and gates; and boulevards, low earth and wood defens- ive structures placed in front of fortifications, created small, alternative, more ‘modern’ fortresses which needed to be defeated before their medieval structures could be attacked. In all of these can be found the origin of the low, sloping, gun-filled trace italienne artillery fortifications, complete with their ravelins, casements, hornworks and bastions. Even the concept of flanking fire to protect ‘dead zones’ along the lengths of fortification walls can be found in Burgundy by the middle of the fifteenth century, developed as theory by fortification engineer Fran- cois de Surienne in 1461 and placed in practice at the castle of Pos- anges and probably elsewhere about the same time." (This may be an even carlier concept; indeed, I recently found flanking fire, which Parker insists is a trace italienne idea, using arrowslits instead of gun- ports at Beaumaris Castle in Wales, built ¢ 1295.) ‘On the rise of army size in carly modern Europe and its connection to gunpowder weapons, there is certainly more dispute than Parker lets on. First, while it seems that early modern armies must be larger than those in the Middle Ages, in fact this is not always the case. While it is well known that William the Conqueror invaded England in 1066 with only 7000-15 000 men, that Edward, the Black Prince, defeated the French king, John If, at the battle of Poitiers in 1356 with only {6000-8000 imen, and that Henry V won at Agincourt with only 6000 Oo the effectiveness of fourteenth. and fitenth: century siege guns, see K. DeVries, Ganpowder Weaponry on Siege Warfare in the Hundred Years War Me Wolle, eds, The Medial (iy Under Suge (Woelbrge, Beyeell War in Hisory 1997 4 (4)468 Kelly DeVries soldiers, these armies were in fact unusually small by medieval stan- dards Most medieval armies were much larger: it is estimated that Charlemagne's force of horsemen easily numbered more than 35 000, with another 100 000 foot soldiers and auxiliaries which could also answer his call to arms; 70 000-80 000 ‘troops’ answered Urban II's call to serve in the armies of the First Crusade; Edward I attacked Wil: liam Wallace in Scotland in 1298 with an army perhaps as large as 29.000; Edward II's force at Calais in 1346-7 numbered more than 82000; the French force at Agincourt was about 24.000 strong; the army of the Burgundian Duke Charles the Bold attacked Switzerland in 1476 with more than 25000 men; and Ferdinand of Aragon’s army which conquered Granada in the last two decades of the fifteenth cen- tury numbered between 36 000 and 56.000. Few early modern armics could equal these tallies, and most were much smaller, at least until the eighteenth century.** Indeed, John Lynn found in looking at more than 135 sieges undertaken in France or by French forces between 1451 and 1714 that few exceeded the 32.000 troop total that Edward III had at Calais.*° Even when garrison troops placed in trace ilalienne fortresses are included in the total numerical strength of early modern armies, as Parker insists they must be, the numbers rarely reach a percentage of the total population to rival those of the non-garrisoned medieval forces, certainly not enough the Conqueror’ army, see BS. Bachsach, ‘On the Origine the Conqueror's Horse Transports, Tehnelogy and Culare XXVI (1985), ‘pp 505-31, n.3;RLA Brown, The Normans and the Norman Conquest (London, Boydell Pres, 1968), p. 150. On nuunbers at Posters, see A, Burney The Cry War. A Mitary Zit of the Hardie Years Wer fom 1937 tothe Pence of Brig, 1360 London, Eyre & Spouswonde, 1955), p.208; Hy. Hewitt, The Black Prince’ Espatiton of 1353-1397 (Manchester, Manchester UP, 1958), p. 114. And on the bers al Agincourt, see AL. Burne, The Agincow War: A Miliary Hay ofthe Later Pot ofthe Handed Years Wor from 1369 to 1153 (London, Eyre & Sparitwoode, 1956), pp-00-94 (On the strength of Charlemagne's army, see KE. Werner, “Heeresonganization und Kriegsohcung im deutschen Konigreich der 10, and 11 jahchundert ia Ondnament nuttan in occ nal ato medics (Spoleto, Centzo leliane ci Stud sullAlto Medioevo, 1968) n, pp. 791-843, P. Contamine, War mn the Middle Ags, trans. M, Jones (London, Bas! Blackwell, 1984), p.25. On the number of crusader ops i the Fits Crusade, see J-France, Vitor im the East A Mibtary Fry of the ‘rt Crusade (Cambriige, CUP, 1994), pp, 122-42. On Edvard I's army, wee CContamine, War i the Middle Ages, pp. 16-18. Oo Edvard I's force at Calais, soe J. Verbruggen. ‘La Tactque de la chevalevie angaive de 1340-8 L415), Picatons de [Universe de aed Eluselole | (1861), p. 42:5 8, Henneman, Roya! Taxation ix Prarie Contry France: The Dawe of War Financing, 1322-1336 (Princeton, Nh, Princeton UP. 1971}, pp. 218-19, On the French at Agincourt, see Burne, Aginoit| Wier, pp: 90-64. On the Burgundians in Switzerland, see C. Bristen, "Les Compagics ordonnance dans Varmée bourguignonne’, Rene Internationale tie Mittare XL (1978), p. 158. And on Fevdinand of Aragon's force, sce M.A. Ladero Queda {Catia a comqusta del rena de Granada (atladoid, Universidad de Valls, 1967); Contamine, Wr in the Midi dee, p 138. See B'S. Hall, "The Changing Face of Siege Warfare: Technology and Ta Transition’ iy Conis ane Wolle, Medioad City Under Sige. pp. 257-75 JA, pp 297-830, Wer in Hiwory 1997 444)Catapults Are Not Atomic Bombs 469 to attribute their rise to the Military Revolution proliferation of gun- powder weapons. Finally, all these targe numbers, both medieval and early modern, may simply be bureaucratic exaggerations. Bert S. Hall has recently calculated the supply and sewage problems that an army of 25 000 would have in their daily operations. As an example, if only 2500 of these soldiers possessed horses, the animals alone would require more than 40 000 litres of water and 30.000 kilograms of fodder a day; this, in turn would produce 50.000 kilograms of solid horse waste and 50.000 litres of liquid waste per day. Were this army at siege for a period of 60 days, the solid biological wastes of the horses would prob- ably exceed 3.000 000 kilograms, with the liquid waste equalling that amount, thus producing an environmental and sanitation problem which would be difficult to handle for even the most technologically advanced and health-conscious modern forces." Even beyond these two technological criticisms, other recent work on gunpowder weaponry in the late Middle Ages has continued 10 discredit the revolutionary characteristics of the military revolution. The use of hand-held gunpowder weapons has now been scen to date from the 1380s," with the Swiss and Burgundian armies pairing off in hand-held gun duels in the 1470s;™ the advocates of the Military Revolution thesis once thought this tactical innovation dated from the sixteenth century. Increasingly sophisticated shipboard gunpowder ‘weapons date at least from 1445, with artistic evidence of ship gunports from as carly as the 1470s." And powder chemistry went through its modernizing changes between 1410 and 1450, and not later." All of this points to a technological evolution happening slowly and over a long period of time and not a technological revolution, The slow, con- tinually progressive effectiveness of these weapons can be more easily compared to a modern non-revolutionary weapon system than to the ‘one which the Military Revolution theorists depend on for the accuracy of their deterministic thesis. Hall, “Changing Face’, pp. 260-63. © Op ti, pp. 205-7 >» Rnralled Accounts PRO, #101/400/28, See also TF, Tout, Firearms in England in the Fourteenth Centr, English Historical Bnview XVI (1911), pp, 678, 684-6, * Sce K DeVries, "The Guns of the Burgundian Dukes in Uhe Later Middle Ages forthcoming) See ab J.C.W. Willer, Narnberger Banden bis sr Mite des 16 Jabrhsouis(Niaremberg, Sclviftenrelive des Stadvrchivs, 1973}, pp. 5, which shows that in HR, of 2280 guns ready for the defence of the town, 2052 were hand-held © K. DeVries, ‘A L445 Reference t Shipboard Aue’, Tachoiogy end Callue XXXL (1990), pp. 818-29. BS. Hall, ‘The Corning of Gunpowder and the Development of Fears in the Renaissance’, in B. Buchanan, ed, Ginpoudar The Hi of an Imation! Tecbnaogy (Bath, Bath UP, 1996), pp. 87-120, GW. Kramer, Barhold Sowers: Chen sexd Wofentechni im 15, falhunden (Munich, Dewtaches Miseum, 1994, War in Hisry 19974 (4)420_Kelly DeVries LV. Conclusion To criticize the use of the term ‘revolution’ by Geoffrey Parker, and at the same time to explain why he wishes to redefine the term ‘military revolution’ to include his own late medieval revolutionary theses, Clif ford J. Rogers, in his ‘Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years War’, adopted the scientific phrase ‘punctuated equilibrium’. By this he argues for ‘evolution proceeded by short bursts of rapid change inter- spersed with long periods of near stasis rather than constant, slow alter- ation’. It is a phrase which Parker himself now agrees with ® In many ‘ways this is similar to Thomas Kuhn’s idea of the paradigmatic shifting of ‘scientific revolutions’. But this is not the structure of technological ‘revolution’. As R, Angus Buchanan has recently shown, the structure of technological tevolution is not revolution at all, but evolution. Buchanan, building fon the ideas of George Basalla, Arnold Pacey and Joel Mokyr before him, writes: What can be said [about the process of technological revolution] is that the process appears to advance by cumulative interconnections for which the image of the ratchet seems most appropriate, suggest- ing as it does the necessity for backward and forward linkages for every successful innovation.” This statement works very well for military technology, and especially for premodern military technology. No one living during the Catastrophe, or in the Hundred Years War, or even in the early modern period looked. at the weapons which they used and described their effectiveness with the words ‘decisive’, ‘invincible’ or ‘revolutionary’. They did not see their military technology determining anything more than victory for them- selves and defeat for their opponents. They viewed their weapons as we view ours now: effective in defeating an enemy, and yet a technology which one day would be replaced by something more effective in defeating an enemy. To that goal, and nothing else, the military engin: ‘cers and artisans laboured. Loyola College Rogers, ‘Miltary Revolutions’. p- 277 cs a phase which seems to have originated in the works of Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould. For bibliography of these ‘works, see n. 188 inthe reprinting of Roger's article in Rogers, The Miler Reston Debut, pp. 55-25. ‘Parker Ta Defense of The Miltary Revolution’, p. 340. “TS. Kuhn, The Soucur of Scijic Rawtutons, 2nd ede, (Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Pres, 1970) © RA Buchanan, “The Structure of Technological Revolution’, Hisy of Tehnolgy XVI (1994), pp. 198-211 (quote on p. 200). See also G. Basia, Tae Enon of Technolog (Cambridge, Massachuseus Istitwe of Technology Press, 188) A. Pacey, The hace of Ingen Hens ad Idle the Deslopment of Tehraloy, nd cin (Cambridge, Masset Institue of Technology Press, 1992): ]. Mokyr, The Lever of Riches: Technoagcal Creativity and Ecnoic Praga: (Oxford, OUP, 1990). War Hisory 1997 4 (8)WAR IN HISTORY [AIMS AND SCOPE. Wav Hatoyioterpre i sobjec brs 2 posible: isa receptive othe stacy of asia or feud ware to Napoleonic i fmibracs the study of confit a ses and the air a well a on and views wars ‘conomic soca, and polit 3s mich 3 parely miliary specs INSTRUCTIONS TO AUTHORS You may send your submision to ether of the iors oddeses inside fon cover. 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