Memory as a instrument of foreign policy

Valerie-Barbara Rosoux

Research Fellow
National Fund for Scientific Research
Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium

"Memories are highly selective, inscriptive rather than descriptive, serving

particular interests and ideological positions. (...) Memories are not things we
think about, but things we think with. As such they have no existence beyond
our politics, our social relations, and our histories. We must take responsibility
for their uses and abuses."
John R. Gillis

Memory is increasingly being investigated in human sciences - mostly in

History, Philosophy and Sociology. However, the role of memory in
international relations is hardly examined. Few scholars attempt to analyze how
memory is used by official representatives in order to cope with actual or
potential conflicts among states or nations. This contribution will consider the
peculiarities of such use.

To do so, it will consider the transformation of relations between former

opponents in a long term perspective. At the end of an international or inter-
community conflict, the question which will undoubtedly be raised is not only
"what happened?", but also - and above all - "what shall we do with the past?".
The relations between parties are indeed characterized by mistrust, disdain and
discrimination. One can thus question the possibility of a real rapprochement
between both sides : how to imagine that former adversaries transform their
relationship in order to become partners?

Numerous authors have examined how relations broken by conflict could be

reconstructed on a firm basis. In this framework, they have envisaged a series of
political, economic or cultural tools likely to produce such an outcome. The
path I intend to follow is rather different. This paper will not attempt to
evaluate efforts aimed at developing future cooperation among former
adversaries. It will rather examine how belligerents look at common events they
have endured on opposite sides. The attention will be focused on the evolution
which may or should possibly occur in the representations such opponents
develop on these events. It is my conviction that a real process of reconciliation
cannot fully succeed without coping with the different representations of the
past.

In order to carry out this study, the present paper is divided in three parts. The
first one will clarify the main concepts which be used in the paper. The second
will analyze the attitudes which may be adopted by adversaries vis-à-vis their
conflictual past. Among them, only one appears likely to bring opponents closer
in a durable manner. It will be called in this paper, the "work of memory", after
a concept proposed by the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur . The third part will
focus on the work of memory in order to emphasize its impact and its limits.

I. MAIN CONCEPTS

It seems easy to guess the stakes which underlie the problematic of memory
with regard to the conflict resolution. However, that notion is far from being as
univocal as it looks at the first glance. It appears thus appropriate to start the
discussion with a conceptual clarification.

1. Nature of memory

Systems of memory - be they natural or artificial - generally consist of three

steps : (i) encoding information, in order to introduce it in the system; (ii)
stocking information, so as to keep it and impede oblivion; (iii) referring the
information where it is necessary to found an action or a thinking process.

These steps may also be found in human memory. However, the latter should
not be confused with any other system, as it implies, unlike the others, an
attitude which is not neutral or objective. Events are not encoded per se - only
their representation by the person concerned. As a result, memory may not be
considered as an exact and truthful remembrance of the past. It rather consists
of a representation of events which occurred in the past. Therefore, it may
probably be defined, with Saint Augustine, as "the present of the past" .

This peculiar nature of human memory has consequences. Events are never
conserved literally. No single human memory is able to retain all events which
occurred. A selection inevitably occurs. Events are constantly reshaped and
reconstructed. In that process, nations and individuals select, in their memory,
the elements which should be given more importance in view of the
circumstances as well as the objectives which are pursued by the person.

Human memory thus presents a selective and fluctuating character. This should
however not be considered as a negative attribute. It is on the contrary inherent
to any situation where a person resorts to memory. It results from the fact that
memory may not be limited to a mere repetition or conservation of past events.
It is always in the process of rearranging, reorganizing perceptions that actors
have of the past.
2. Official memory

What we generally call memory, in the context of human behavior, refers to the
individual representations of lived or transmitted experiences. It also refers to
the official representation of the past. Any given group or society manages its
past through official discourses, commemorations or monuments . This paper
will not address individual memory. It will rather focus on official memory as
expressed by representatives of each former belligerents.

Official memory entirely rests on the mechanism whereby the past is adjusted
to the situation in which the subject currently lives. Events which are described
in official speeches or texts often took place in a remote time. However, the
interest of such representations rarely lies in information they provide on these
events. They rather contain interesting clues as to the attitude which is adopted
by the author at the time he expresses his representations (present). In the
context of official memory, historical elements are selected on the basis of
current political objectives. In that regard, it should be emphasized that the past
is often considered as a useful tool rather than an immutable narrative.

The process may be illustrated by the interpretation that is given by France to

Franco-German past conflicts. That interpretation may not be considered
constant : it rather varies from a period to another. In fact, the interpretation
appears to be determined by context. Foreign policy actors appear to change
their perception of the past according to the national and international
circumstances where they intervene.

Before the Second World War, Charles de Gaulle often described the relation
between France and Germany as marked by natural hostility, ontological
incompatibility and quasi-visceral mistrust. A few years later, that same person
underlined the complementary relation between the two nations and the deep
affinity which always attracted them towards each other. A change has
obviously occurred between the two moments where these perceptions were
expressed. How may that change be explained ? The only possibility is to
consider that a modification has intervened in the circumstances where the
declarations successively took place, as well as in the objectives which are
pursued by the author. The first declaration came at a time where de Gaulle
was seeing neighboring Germany building up forces for a possible conflict in
the thirties. By contrast, the second took place after the Second World War, as
de Gaulle sought to create a strong relationship between France and Germany
because life not longer appeared possible in Europe without such a
rapprochement.

3. Events and meaning

This sort of modification in the representation of past events may only be

understood if one resolutely abandons a preconceived idea that we generally
share in our society. Most of us indeed have the feeling that the future is open
and not yet determined, whereas the past would be immutable. In fact, one can
probably consider that the past is never altogether closed. Concededly, events
may not be erased : one cannot undo what has been done, or make that what
has happened has never occurred. However, the meaning which can be
attributed to these events is not fixed once for all. In that context, one can
consider that "one never knows what yesterday will consist of" .

These reflections underline the ambivalent and teleological character of

memory. References to the past are rarely made to it per se. They are rather
inspired by a current interest on the part of the persons which are involved.
They depend on the finality which is pursued at the time they are made. As a
result, it is important - if not essential - to investigate the various uses which are
made of memory in international relations.

II. USES OF MEMORY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

How to cope with the past ? That question is systematically raised at the end of
international or inter-community conflicts. It is impossible to forget the events
and the sufferings which have been inflicted. However, former belligerents may
adopt three distinct attitudes towards the past.

_ In a first attitude (over-accentuation), officials may seek to impose a single

interpretation of the conflict and of the events which are relating to it. To that
effect, they may stress a vision of history that presents their nation as a victim
and the other as an aggressor.

_ A second attitude (obliteration) may consist of avoiding all kinds of references

to the conflict. The objective is not anymore to accentuate the past but, at the
opposite, to put it into brackets.

_ Eventually, a third attitude (work of memory) may be adopted by officials

trying to take into account the various interpretations which are given by the
parties to the conflict. Such attitude tends to recognize the past in its
complexity. The objective is neither to call for revenge nor to occult the events :
it is to reconstruct links between former enemies.

The study of these three attitudes will be based on different cases considered as
particularly significant. The purpose is not to present an argumentation in favor
of one form of memory which would constitute a normative model. It is rather
to analyze how memory is used in the official discourse. The question is
actually to wonder weather the use of memory leads to an escalation of violence
or contributes to the rapprochement of former adversaries.

1. Over-accentuation of the past

The process of over-accentuation may be illustrated by the conflicts which have

consumed the Balkans since the collapse of the communist system. Some Serb
leaders have justified with historical arguments their confrontation with other
people of ex-Yugoslavia. According to them, the wounds inflicted today should
be considered as a mere revenge for the suffering they underwent in the past.

In this regard, they firstly referred to the victims of the Second World War. In
1990, the Orthodox Church underlined the necessity to remember the Serb
victims of the so-called Oustachis (Croatians pro-nazi during the war). The
question which is raised here does not concern the reality of the past which is
emphasized. No one could deny the bloody character of the Ante Pavelic's
regime. The problem lies not in the souvenir in itself but in its accentuation. The
constant repetition of the painful remembrances of the past allowed some Serbs
to consider that "the current war is imposed to us by the greatest criminals of
ever, the Oustachis, the same who slaughtered us from 1941 to 1945" . In
reaction to the identification of all the Croatians with the Oustachis, the
Croatian newspapers designated the Serb people as the Tchetniks in reference
to the Serb nationalists during the Second World War. Both parties succeeded
then in reactivating the emotional charge of the memories.

But the recourse to the past does not only concern the Second World War. It
also refers to the Middle Ages. In 1989, Slobodan Milosevic celebrated with
splendor the commemoration of the Kosovo battle (1389). His message was then
revealing : "We are still obliged to fight or at least to prepare to" . These words
took root in the call that the Orthodox Church made seven years before. It was
indeed claimed that "the Serb people leads their battle of Kosovo since 1389.
Kosovo is our memory, our home, the flame of our being" .

In both examples, memory is used as a tool in a political process which can be

summarized as follows : injuries suffered by our ancestors may not be forgotten
; they should be repaired ; the best way to attain this objective is to inflict like
injuries on the people who have caused them ; in this manner only will the
memory of our ancestors be honored.

How may that situation be assessed ? As long as a strong leadership existed in

Yugoslavia, mutual hostility was contained. The wounds suffered at several
occasions, including during the Second World War, were somehow hidden.
Similarly, the consciousness of belonging to different groups or communities
was attenuated. Mix marriages even emerged, together with the seeds of a
social life in common. The promise of a joint future was however dissolved
with the disappearance of the unifying power. Past sufferings and persecutions
then came back to light again. Street names, hymns and flags were changed
accordingly. Similar modifications took place in school manuals as well as
historical narratives. The past has thus undergone a process where it has been
wholly reconstructed. This process occurred with one underlying question -
why should we be administered by them? In that framework, We and they
were defined in a Manichean manner and the reciprocal hate, which ex post
facto appeared to be eternal, has been reactivated .

This use of the past cannot be really modified in a negotiation. Look at the
Dayton agreement. This agreement maintains a united Bosnian state. However,
three entities have been allowed to subsist - a Serb, Croatian and Muslim part.
Each of these entities harbors a community which lives completely separated
from the other ones, with which it is however supposed to form a common
State. At school, children still learn, in each of these communities, that the
aggression was perpetrated by the other, which remains the enemy. Thus, an
author of a manual in Bosnia-Herzegovina confirms that "the genocide of
Bosnians by Tchetniks during the Second World War is granted substantial
treatment in the new texts" . A symmetrical scenario takes place in schools of
Sarajevo : young Serbs learn that the "first Yugoslavia" (1918) created the
framework whereby Croatians and Slovenes could establish their domination
upon Serbs . As for the Croatian pupils, they are being taught that Yugoslavia
was a centralized State "which was derived from the Serb domination" .

In those establishments, education confirms the verdict provided by battles.

Official memory is by no means used to promote peace and stability. It rather
turns into a propaganda for conflict. Serbs attempt to forget the events which
are recollected by Croats and Muslims of Bosnia - and conversely. When the
same event is remembered by the various parties, what appears to be a crime
for some is interpreted as a glorious act by the others. Beyond these
divergences, one goal only is apparently shared by the parties : erase any
remembrance which might look encourage reconciliation and set aside any
aspect which might be used as a ferment for common live.

As is obvious from these examples, over-accentuation of past conflicts often

leads to an escalation of violence. Its effects may be said to be "belligenous". The
representations that one party has of past events are not taken in consideration
by the other. There is, among the parties, a sort of division that seems to be
reinforced rather than attenuated. The goal pursued by the over accentuating
party is to impose a single interpretation of the past : his own.

2. Obliteration of the past

Rather than underlining them, the actors of official memory may attempt to
hide certain aspects of the past or at least pass over them in silence. A good
illustration of that mechanism may be found in the attitude which has been
adopted by the French authorities vis-à-vis the so called "Algerian war". For
France, this conflict represents an unbearable mirror showing past failures and
erring ways. It is only after seven years of confrontation that the negotiations
held by the French and Algerian delegations led to a final treaty signed in
Evian. This negotiation undoubtedly then appeared to be salutary. However, it
apparently did not provide the firm basis for a real rapprochement. One of the
reasons probably has to be found in the relation with past events : both
countries were apparently blocked by the "weight of the past".

During decades, French authorities resorted to various tools in order to put into
brackets all traces of the conflict. Numerous texts and images were concededly
available to commemorate this period of the French history. But the Algerian
war was however confined to the register of private memory. The official level
was dominated by a silent vacuum. This "oblivion" was however betrayed by
several signs : among others, the unease when referring to the Algerian drama,
the censure on the repression and torture that had taken place there, the battle
to determine what side would be allowed to retain the archives related to the
colonial period, the absence of commemorations meant to pay tribute to
Algerian war veterans and, above all, the juridical mechanisms - e.g. amnesty
and presidential pardon - which were used in order to avoid any reactivation of
memory.

Yet, occultation often leaves many problems unresolved. It does not really act as
a barrier impeding the reminiscence of past somber episodes. In most cases, it
only provides a tool to postpone the moment where these facts will have to be
considered. Such an attitude does not appear to have a positive impact on the
relation with the other party. It implies that the violence previously adopted
vis-à-vis that party is not recognized. As a result, misunderstandings are not
solved, and with them all elements which hinder any rapprochement.

3. Work of memory

The work of memory has a very different objective than those which were
examined previously. Those who resort to it take into account the conflict which
is likely to exist among the interpretations given by different parties to a
common event - a war in our context. The mechanism thus implies a form of
recognition about the plurality of the interpretations which may be given to the
past. Parties do not attempt to put forward representations which would be
toned down or by contrast exaggerated with regard to the events which
effectively took place. They rather try to accept the past as a whole - with the
complexity and the contradictions that often characterize it.

The work of memory does not really concern the events which occurred (they
cannot be denied by anybody), but rather the meaning which is attached to
them. While working on this meaning, the protagonists attempt to establish a
narrative which may favor a rapprochement among the parties. The aim, in that
process, is not to discover the Truth. It is rather to examine the past in the light
of the cooperation which is being sought . The memory which is involved in
this framework takes the form of a compromise among several representations.

That several points of view be taken into consideration does not imply that all
perceptions are to be considered as equivalent. A sort of plurality appears to be
inherent to the representations parties have of the past. Recognizing this
plurality does not imply that one questions the existence of a reality beyond
representations. The idea of a shared memory is not based on a theory where
everything would be presented as relative to a peculiar perspective (relativism).
It rather entails the hope that a common history is possible.

That perspective may be enlightened by the process which has taken place
between France and Germany since the end of the Second World War. It indeed
proves fascinating in that it provides an opportunity to see how former
belligerents progressively developed a new interpretation of their past with the
explicit aim to avoid further hostility.

During more than a century and a half, the incessant reminder of past
confrontations created solid representations on each side of the Rhine. These
perceptions gave rise to blazing discourses calling for revenge and the crushing
of the ancestral enemy. They were based on the same events, but were in fact
totally different if not contradictory. The discourses were thus based on
versions which, most of the time, were mutually incompatible : one excluded
the other as both could not be correct at one at the same time.

As of 1958, Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer decided to put an end to

these calls for mutual destruction. Concededly, their dialogues are not always
exempt from ambiguity and disagreement. They are however considered by
French and German representatives as the basis on which a common past could
be constructed - a past which "fills the spirit with pride and at the same time
painful regrets" .

Since then, the authorities of the two States systematically underline the
common memory they want to build on this ambivalent past. In doing so, their
objective is to avoid being locked into memories which would be strictly
national. They want to recognize that national perceptions are overlapping and
should be considered mutually dependent. The purpose is then to develop a
"common language" able to designate the past they have lived in common. At
least, it is to establish a minimum basis for a common interpretation they could
apply to future events - the ultimate goal being to increase in this manner the
occasions of a rapprochement rather than nourish a logic of further distance.
This process is summarized in a good fashion by the French prime minister
Lionel Jospin. For him, memory should not be considered as "a way to awaken
ancient sufferings". It should rather be considered as "a tool allowing to make
peace with the past, without forgetting previous wounds" .

One may thus observe that official representatives do not only evoke past
events : they use them to pursue present or future goals. In this context, the
representation of the past appears to form a "usable" tool . In that regard,
official memory can be considered as an instrument of foreign policy. As all
instruments, the recourse to the past is neither positive, nor negative in itself : it
depends on the finality which is pursued. Foreign policy actors may decide to
use it in order to justify the recurrence of the conflict. At the opposite, they may
refer to the past in order to avoid any further confrontation. Let us now focus
our attention on this last perspective. It is indeed the only one that can favor the
conflict transformation.

III. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WORK OF MEMORY

After comparing the different uses of memory in international relations, it

appears essential to examine the impact and the limits of the work of memory.
To do so, it is worth considering the work of memory as a process involving
several steps.

1. Steps inherent to the work of memory

Any concrete situation turns out to be unique. Its circumstances and its context
are of course specific. Nevertheless, it is quite useful to underline a pattern in
the work which can be made on memory. The aim of such outlook is not to
reduce the complexity of each conflict transformation. Even the Franco-German
case (which constitutes one of the most remarkable cases as far as the work of
memory is concerned) does not present a smooth succession of uninterrupted
phases. But even so the observation of the rapprochement between France and
Germany allows to distinguish different phases that can be used as markers.
These may prove very useful to organize the events and to contribute to
address new cases.

From that perspective, analysis shows that the work of memory implies five
main steps : the preliminary phase, the information phase, the argumentation
phase, the reconstruction phase and the elaboration of a shared memory.

Preliminary contacts

The initial phase of the work of memory often takes the form of informal
and/or official encounters among representatives of the parties. At this stage,
mistrust and hostility characterize the relations between the populations which
are concerned. Therefore the leaders try to develop on each side a certain
degree of confidence. Classically, they argue that a rapprochement might lead
to an improvement in the situation of the population.

This first step, for instance, was implemented by de Gaulle and Adenauer
through various journeys on both sides of the Rhine between 1958 and 1962.
Both leaders were convinced that a popular adhesion would be necessary to
attain a real and durable reconciliation. As a result, they adopted behavior
aimed at helping the population to overcome preconceived ideas and fears
brought about by past events. The purpose of this first step was to witness the
"immense transformation" that had changed the two countries : whereas they
were "yesterday hereditary enemies", they had become "determined friends" .

Information and argumentation

The information and argumentation phases occupy the back stage of the work
to be performed on memory. But it is important to specify that they do not
always appear explicitly in the relations among the parties. Two situations may
be envisaged in that regard.

Firstly, the work of memory may take place in the framework of negotiations
undertaken at the very end of the conflict. In that context, the relevant phases
may generally be found. Each party is called to describe the interpretations it
retains of the past (information). That description is normally backed with
arguments meant at justifying one's behavior and disputing that of the other
(argumentation).

An example of that mechanism may be found in the works performed by the

Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. Beyond imperfections
which have often be criticized, that Commission had at least one merit. It has
opened the floor to victims of both sides and has given them a chance to "tell
their story". The hope was that the process of talking would somehow alleviate
the suffering endured in silence for so long.

However, the work of memory is not undertaken in all cases as soon as

hostilities cease. In the Franco-German case, for instance, the first official move
only took place more than ten years after the end of the war. A second
hypothesis must thus be envisaged. In that hypothesis, the data which could
serve as a basis for the information and argumentation phases, are perfectly
known by the parties. Official memories are filled in both countries with the
expression and the justification of divergent, let alone contradictory,
interpretations.
Such interpretations are however rarely expressed in an explicit form. Most of
the time, they appear to be passed into silence in the official documents and
speeches which are addressed to the other party. The reason for that behavior
seems to be that the interpretations nourished by each side on past events are
perceived as possible threats. They might endanger the process which is taking
place. One is afraid that opening a space for the expression of perceptions could
reactivate the emotions which are attached to past combats and wounds. Such
an outcome would contradict the pursued objective i.e. appease the hate and
the sufferings which may still be perceived in the relations.

Reconstruction

In the reconstruction phase, the parties attempt to go beyond the conflict they
perceive between the interpretations given to the same event. They are no
longer engaged in activities which may be considered as descriptions,
justifications and dispute. They recognize the plurality which is at the heart of
the representations given to the past.

Therefore, they have to accept listening to the experience which has been
undergone by the other party. They also have to examine in a critical fashion
the representation they give to what they have gone through. Such an approach
requires a certain capacity of empathy, which is made possible through actively
listening and expressing one's self. The understanding and the official
recognition of the sufferings which have been endured by the other turn out to
be a decisive step within the work of memory. They appear as necessary
conditions to temper, or alleviate, the pain which is associated with the
remembrance of difficult past events. The distance which is acquired through
the formulation of the emotion, as well as the feeling that such emotion is
recognized, form a back scene which allows the parties to consider their conflict
as belonging to the past, without experiencing it as belonging once more to the
present.

Thus, it comes as no surprise that all leaders of the Federal Republic of

Germany have successively called their people not to forget the past but rather
to face it : all underlined the necessity, for the younger generation, to take upon
her the most difficult episodes of the national history . In France, de Gaulle
clearly showed at several occasions that he refused any interpretation which
would be based on a Manichean representation of the past : he described
Germany as a "great nation", reminded that the French people also caused
injuries to the German population "in certain circumstances" and paid tribute to
the victims of the 1870 and 1914-1918 wars in front of the Feldherrnhalle
(Munich, Germany). In 1984, François Mitterrand had a similar attitude vis-à-
vis "the German soldiers" who died as a result of their implication in combats .
So did Jean-Pierre Masseret, then a Secretary of State for war veterans, in honor
of "German soldiers, our enemies of then" .
The Franco-German case is not the only illustration concerning that
reconstruction phase. Another example may be found in the relation between
Germany and the former Czechoslovakia. Richard von Weizsäcker, then the
President of the Federal Republic, and Vaclav Havel, President of the former
Czechoslovakia, also examined in a critical fashion their national history. Their
attitude was manifested at the 51st anniversary of the invasion of
Czechoslovakia by Germany (15th March 1990). The German President then
insisted on the "six years of occupation and oppression" which were imposed
by his country, the "painful scars" and the "deep feeling of mistrust" which still
exist nowadays as a result of what happened. As for Vaclav Havel, he examined
"the faults and sins committed by our fathers", thereby alluding to the faults
committed by Czechs and Slovaks against the three millions of Sudeten German
in 1945-1946 .

It is important, however, to underline the limits which are to be attributed to

such attitude. The reconstruction may be envisaged in classical wars, i.e. in
conflicts opposing combatants. It appears more difficult to imagine in a-typical
conflicts, such as those where the roles are clearly and unequivocally defined
between a victim and a torturer. Thus, it would be difficult to envisage, for a
victim, the possibility to take into account the torturer's point of view, as the
burden of responsibility appears to rest on one party only.

Shared memory

The last phase in a work of memory does not take the form of an agreement or a
declaration that might be considered as bringing an end to the opposition
among the interpretations. In some cases, the reconstruction may however lead
to the elaboration of an interpretation which is common to the parties and has
an appeasing effect on both of them. What needs to be done to that effect ? On
the one hand, the representatives of each party must recognize the
interpretation given by the former adversary to the events which have occurred
- or at least attempt to do so. On the other hand, both have to develop jointly a
common language which will pave the way for an integration of both
interpretations in a common story. The objective is to avoid any national
memory to be locked in a distinct space - thereby seeding the ferments for
renewed exclusive and thus aggressive remembrance.

At that stage, the work of memory transcends the opposition which is often
established between memory and oblivion. In fact, it requires a form of
oblivion, if the process is to succeed. Oblivion must however be defined
carefully. It is not a form of obliteration. The work of memory does not attempt
to obliterate the past. In that context, oblivion should not be defined as the
manifestation of a failure to cope with past events, or even as an escape from
these events. In the context of the work of memory, oblivion should rather be
described as the outcome of an "active" and "curative" strategy . It does not
affect the events as such but the remembrance we still have of them - the
"impression" which has been left by the time passing. The emotional charge
which is inevitably attached to difficult events is thus progressively alleviated.
The path is than open to construct a new interpretation to be given to the
events.

In that perspective, the work of memory in fine allows former belligerents to

reminisce the past by forgetting the initial meaning of the events (hostilities
among enemies) and developing a new one (brotherly disputes, for instance).
Cruel battles may thus be reinterpreted as "fratricide wars" - a character which
somehow reassures the parties as it does not come as real surprise that brothers
sometimes resort to violence to solve their difficulties. The new interpretation
does lead to a conclusion, according to which it is time to bring an end to
"ancient family quarrels" .

Such an evolution is illustrated by the Franco-German case. French Presidents

resorts, in particular, to meaningful expressions in order to describe past
conflicts. For instance, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing depicts the Second World War
as a war "fratricide for Europe". The two world conflicts are described by
François Mitterrand as "civil wars in Europe". Jacques Chirac recalls that the
"long fratricide war" began in 1914 in Europe .

The images given to the battle of Verdun in the official representation is also
characteristic of that kind of transformation. The number of victims - a quarter
of a million of young soldiers - added to the ruthless nature of the combats
created fearful remembrances in the consciences on both territories. As early as
1916, a patriotic representation of the combats was being elaborated, separately,
in France and in Germany. On the French side, Verdun witnessed the glory, the
heroism and the victorious spirit of the French combatants. On the other side of
the Rhine, it was quickly recovered by the national-socialist ideology.

Twenty years later, the Franco-German rapprochement paved the way for an
new interpretation to be given to this event. Verdun became a symbol with a
similar meaning to all combatants - French and Germans. The memories were
not presented any longer as national and separate. They were rather unified as
a result of the reconciliation which has occurred : the soldiers which combated
in the opposite camps were then gathered in a common tribute. This re-
interpretation was given a symbolic expression when François Mitterrand et
Helmut Kohl stood hand in hand in front of the ossuary of Douaumont
(France). The wars carried out in the past against each other were then
presented as a common past of collective sufferings. The groups ceased to be
presented in the official memory as opposed by conflicts. They somehow lost
their heterogeneous character of groups leaving separately from each other, to
be considered as brothers who suffered reciprocally as a result of a tragedy they
all had to endure.
The effort which is realized to integrate national memories does not imply that
events will be given in the future a uniform representation on both sides.
Integration does not bring about plurality to be set aside. In fact, it supposes
that a form of disagreement may be accepted to a certain extend. On may speak,
in that regard, of a "reasonable disagreement", which appears to be admitted by
the parties. In that sense, the work of memory remains a process concerning
memories - that concept being then used in a plural form.

Thus, the shared memory which has been elaborated between France and
Germany has not completely erased the differences that still exist in the
representations one can find in both countries. As recently indicated by Gerard
Schröder and Lionel Jospin, gaps and misunderstandings will continue to exist
in connection with memory "as long as we will remain French and German and
as long as our identities will still be different" .

As a result, a memory shared by several states or communities may not be

considered linear or smooth. To use a visual metaphor, it may be presented as a
"mosaic". The official memory may by no means be considered as the
expression of a unique and final truth. It rather appears to be formed as a result
of a dynamic tension between differing and/or conflicting representations in
perpetual evolution.

2. Variables

Let us finally emphasize that the outcome of the work of memory depends
above all on the population adherence. For, even if this work seems necessary
to the representatives of each party, it cannot be imposed by decree. Its impact
on the population varies according to three main variables.

1. The first one concerns the individual experience. The interpretation of the
past produced by spokespersons can normally not contradict the lived or
transmitted experience of individuals. These must be able to recognize
themselves in the official narration concerning the past. The story of a fraternal
wrench, for instance, sometimes offends those who have suffered or have lost a
relative.

One can thus affirm that "the farther the interpretation stemming from the work
of memory is from the individual representations, the weaker its impact".

2. Time is the second variable affecting the efficiency which may be recognized
to the work of memory vis-à-vis the population. Time is needed to
progressively transform the relation between former opponents. Some events
particularly traumatizing can be inexpressible and inaudible for a period of
time, which is called "latent period". There does not appear to exist any rule in
this matter. However, one can reasonably think that the elaboration of a really
shared memory will last several generations. That kind of memory will
probably never be imposed on a population which is still deeply wounded by
the stigmata of the past.

One can thus affirm that "the shorter the delay between the conflict and the
work of memory, the sharper the resistance within the population".

3. Eventually, the personal variable turns out to be fundamental. The

representatives of each party must of course show attributes of successful
negotiators (i.e. flexibility, interpersonal sensitivity, inventiveness, patience or
still tenacity). But in addition to these qualities, they must be able to gain the
population's adherence. In this respect, a very important factor of credibility lies
with the personal past of the leader. Things will go more smoothly where the
rapprochement is advocated by a person which has accomplished heroic actions
against the enemy with whom the reconciliation is being sought. That person
then asks the population to undergo a transformation he has himself gone
through, i.e. overcome the resentment towards the former enemy. For instance,
the historical legitimacy of Charles de Gaulle probably helped the French
people to change the representation he had about wars against Germany. A
similar comment can be made concerning Nelson Mandela in South Africa.

One can thus affirm that "the more legitimate the representatives of each party,
the greatest the effect produced by the work of memory on the remembrances
shared by individuals".

**
*

At the end of this paper, one point must be highlighted. The work of memory
tends to offer a path to overcome the contradiction between peace and justice.
On the one hand, it breaks away with a logic of revenge. The focus is not placed
on past injustices in an attempt to "repair" them by calling for revenge. The
work of memory rather implies that the other's point of view be taken into
account in order to overcome the legacy of the past. Instead of justifying
recurrent fights, it sets the basis for a lasting rapprochement between former
opponents.

On the other hand, the work of memory breaks away with a logic of oblivion.
Opening the floor to victims of each side heels the feeling related to injustice.
The work of memory implies the establishment of facts and responsibilities.
Emotions can only be addressed, and the meaning granted to past events, can
only be changed, where victims are clearly identified and fully recognized.

In all cases, one has to consider the context where the parties are located. For
instance, the constraints are not similar if conflicts end with a military victory or
if they terminate as a result of negotiation. In that latter case, parties may
impose an amnesty. The amnesty often appears the price to pay in order to
obtain the cooperation of all parties. The balance of power between former and
new leaders then determines the way History is being re-written by officials.
Even in that case the recognition, by officials, of the atrocities which have been
endured by victims, constitutes a form of reparation which is concededly
symbolical, albeit often essential for said victims.

Uncertainties remain substantial. For that reason, it is difficult to think of any

definitive conclusion. On the basis of the analysis which has been carried out,
one can however state that the work of memory does not constitute a normative
model or a magical solution that could be applied to any international conflict.

The attitude adopted by political leaders does not appear to be dictated by the
mere wish of dispensing justice. It does probably depend on the context and the
objectives which are pursued by the parties. As a result, it would be vain to
express general considerations about the use which is sometimes made of the
past, without taking into account the concrete circumstances where things
occur. Thus, the work of memory has fundamentally a pragmatic character.
That characteristic does not modify, however, the importance of realizing such
a work and the interest that the latter may have for all interested parties. One
may probably not deny that reconstruction imply another attitude than
obliteration - which is a form of amnesia - or over-accentuation - which is the
basis for revenge.