Samajwadi Party in Uttar Pradesh

The Samajwadi Party has been facing the dilemma of carrying forward its anti-BJP politics
even while it must avoid becoming part of a Congress-led coalition. It is an important example
of a party engaged in consolidating social cleavages and, simultaneously, in overcoming
them. In its multi-pronged strategy, it seeks to consolidate the caste cleavage by uniting OBCs
and also appealing to upper caste voters in the name of development and globalisation.

A K VERMA

O
ne of the beneficiaries and carriers of the Mandal upsurge
in north India has been the Samajwadi Party (SP). A major
player in the politics of the largest state of the Indian
union, the SP is a classic case of the rise and fall of other backward
caste (OBC) politics. The Samajwadi Party has been at the centre
of controversy ever since it formed a coalition ministry in Uttar
Pradesh (UP). Since 1998, the party is facing the dilemma of
carrying forward its anti-BJP politics and at the same time,
avoiding joining a coalition led by the Congress Party. The first
concern originates from the party’s ‘secular’ stand while the latter
is the legacy of its non-Congressism of the earlier era. These
two concerns have meant that the party has remained confined
to the politics of UP, although it claims to have support in other
parts of the country. These concerns of the Samajwadi Party are
also relevant to its ambition of playing a major role at the national
level and of catapulting its leader, Mulayam Singh Yadav, to
national prominence. In the rapidly changing political scenario
of the country over the last 15 years, very few players have actually
retained a steady strength and the Samajwadi Party is one among
them. Therefore, it becomes an interesting exercise to trace the
journey of this party particularly with reference to the politics
of Uttar Pradesh. The SP has been both the product of and catalyst
for the political process that had been evolving in UP for quite
some time, i e, the decline of the Congress [Wright 1995:20].
The decline of the Congress created a political space for socially
marginalised groups to move into the arena of power sharing.
A historic opportunity was created and new instruments of social
and political mobilisation such as the Samajwadi Party sought
to occupy that space. To be fair to the SP, nothing more or less
could have been expected of the party.
Antecedents
The Samajwadi Party was formed by Mulayam Singh Yadav
in October 1992. Mulayam Singh considers Ram Manohar Lohia
his political guru and in this sense, the SP represents the socialist
tradition in Uttar Pradesh. Mulayam Singh Yadav entered the
UP legislative assembly on the ticket of the Samyukta Socialist
Party (SSP) in the 1967 assembly elections, and since then, has
played a significant role in shaping the future of the socialist
movement, at least, in Uttar Pradesh. Mulayam Singh joined the
Bharatiya Kranti Dal (BKD) after the death of Lohia in 1968.
That was the time the first signs of the threat to the ‘Congress
system’ had appeared as it lost in several states (Bihar, Kerala,
Tamil Nadu, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, UP, West Bengal) in the
fourth general elections held in February 1967. The Congress
was a catch-all party and represented a ‘rainbow coalition’ of
socially differentiated groups cutting across caste and communal
lines. This was responsible for the formation of a national political
constituency, and did not permit the consolidation of social
cleavages on that basis. Hence, marginalised groups remained
unrepresented in the leadership structure although its upper class
and upper caste leadership claimed to be representative of the
entire society [Yadav and Palshikar 2003:12].
When the BKD led by Charan Singh in 1967 challenged the
Congress, there was a possibility that it would work to consolidate
social cleavages on the basis of its rural, middle peasantry base
consisting of middle castes, since it claimed to represent the
interest of the rural peasantry. But a review of the political
tradition from the BKD through the Bharatiya Lok Dal (BLD)-
Lok Dal (LD)-Janata Dal (JD) to the SP, reveals a story of failed
attempts at defining the class-caste cleavage on the basis of the
rural peasantry. The more prosperous Jat peasants of western UP
and the more numerous but poor ‘kisans’ of eastern UP could
not constitute a common political platform. Once the Mandal
factor entered the politics of UP, the BLD-LD could not sustain
their position in the politics of the state. The Lok Dal split (after
the death of Charan Singh in 1987) into LD (A) led by Ajit Singh
and LD (B) led by Mulayam Singh. The present Rashtriya Lok
Dal (RLD) and SP are the latest incarnations of the LD (A) and
LD (B) respectively. The former retaining the loyalty of the
western prosperous Jats and the latter capturing the middle and
lower peasantry and the backward castes. As opposed to this,
the opportunity to create a common political constituency on the
basis of the peasant and backward classes was capitalised in Bihar
by Laloo Prasad Yadav. Some scholars feel that the social
cleavages formed in Bihar are so deep that they are almost
irreversible [Yadav 1999].
There was a possibility of the emergence of a similar political
formation in UP in 1989, for the Lok Sabha and assembly
elections, which were held simultaneously in the state. Mulayam
Singh’s LD (B) had merged with the JD before the 1989 elections.
The JD stunned everyone by its performance in both the LS and
the assembly elections in UP. It got 54 Lok Sabha seats with
35.9 per cent votes, and 208 assembly seats with 29.71 per cent
votes. That was a very massive show of the possible consolidation
of peasants and backward classes. Some opine that it represented
the coming together of the rich and the middle peasantry in the
medium and semi-medium land size holding areas due to the
green revolution [Pai 1993:11-12]. But others challenge the thesis
by pointing to the disintegration and decimation of JD in less
than 18 months, when, in the assembly and Lok Sabha elections
in 1991, JD was reduced to half of its size [Verma 2003:256].
The issue of the inadequacy of the political mobilisation of
backward castes and classes could also be linked to the evolving
paradigm of the party system in India, especially in the backdrop
of the demise of the Congress system. The strong presence of
the JD (to which Mulayam belonged) in the 1989 elections in

Economic and Political Weekly April 3-10, 2004 1509

UP had raised the possibility of a bipolar party system model its efforts to evolve a Yadav-Gujar-Muslim combine. Even when
in UP akin to that of Kerala, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka the SP entered into an electoral alliance with the BSP during
and Punjab. But even the coming of Mulayam Singh as the chief the 1993 assembly elections, the performance of the party did
minister of UP did not help, and he too became a casualty of not improve. That explains the success of the RLD in western
the factional fight of the JD led by V P Singh and Chandrashekhar UP where Ajit Singh continues to enjoy the legacy of his father
respectively. By the time Mulayam could extricate himself from Charan Singh and dominates the scene. The party has also
that imbroglio and form his own party SP (1992) it was too late. to worry about Bundelkhand where its seatwise performance in
Another important player, the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) had the assembly elections had been consistently poor (1989-4,
already sealed the fate of any movement towards a bipolar model 91-1, 93-1, 96-3, 2002-4). The BJP and the BSP have been doing
of party system in UP by consolidating dalit votes. That led to better. These parties got an almost identical share of votes in
the emergence of a multipolar divergence model of a party system the 1999 Lok Sabha elections (BJP-27.46 per cent, BSP-28.89
in UP (1989-96), that, later, got changed to the multipolar per cent) [Verma 2003:269], but in the previous assembly elec-
convergence model (since1996) as multiple parties’ agendas tions the SP, with 23.1 per cent votes in the region, was not far
converged on the core ethnic issue of mandalisation and dalits, behind the BJP (24 per cent) and the BSP (28 per cent). So, we
etc [Yadav and Palshikar 2003:21].
Table 1: Evolution of SSP-BKD-BLD-LD-SP in U P (1968-2004)
When the JD split at the all-India level in 1990, Mulayam Singh
chose to part ways with V P Singh and joined the faction led 1967 Mulayam Singh elected to UP assembly on SSP ticket.
1968 Lohia dies and, before the next election can take place, Mulayam
by Chandrashekhar, the Samajwadi Janata Party (SJP). Mulayam Singh joins the BKD.
Singh also established cordial relations with Kanshi Ram during 1974 Mulayam elected to UP assembly on a BKD ticket. The BKD and SSP
the campaign for the 1991 assembly elections. An understanding merged to form the Bharatiya Lok Dal (BLD).
was reached between the BSP and Mulayam Singh which led 1977 BLD merged with Bharatiya Jan Sangh (BJS), Cong-O, Congress for
Democracy (CFD) to form the Janata Party. Mulayam Singh becomes
to two major developments: one, the departure of Mulayam Singh a minister in the state cabinet.
from the SJP and the formation of the SP, and, two, the alliance 1979 Charan Singh forms the Lok Dal; Mulayam stays with Charan Singh.
between the BSP and the SP in the 1993 assembly elections. That 1980 Mulayam loses in election to UP assembly.
1985 Mulayam elected to UP assembly on LD ticket, and appointed leader
was perhaps the last attempt by Mulayam Singh to bring the of the Opposition in Vidhan Sabha
backwards and the dalits together and forge a backward class 1987 Lok Dal split after the death of Charan Singh in May, into LD (A) and
political constituency in UP. The SP was attempting a difficult LD (B). Mulayam leads the LD (B) faction in UP.
proposition because the peasant OBCs had always exploited the 1989 LD (B) merges with the JD. Mulayam elected to UP assembly.
Becomes leader of the JD legislature party and appointed chief
dalits. Besides, the inherent contradiction in their alliance was minister of UP for the first time.
that both the parties were trying to woo the same set of voters 1990 JD split, Mulayam remains with SJP.
– the backwards, the dalits and the Muslims [Wright 1995:22]. 1992 In September, Mulayam leaves SJP and formed Samajwadi Party (SP).
1993 In November, Mulayam Singh elected leader of the SP legislature
party. He becomes chief minister of the state for the second time, and
SP and Electoral Politics of UP leads the SP-BSP coalition government till June 1995.
1996 In May, Mulayam wins the Mainpuri Lok Sabha seat for the first time
The electoral of politics of Uttar Pradesh were in a volatile and becomes union defence minister in the government led by HD
Deve Gowda.
situation throughout the 1980s. This was the period when Mulayam 1998 Mulayam Singh Yadav elected for the second time as MP from the
Singh was building his constituency in the state. Under the Sambhal Lok Sabha constituency. Meanwhile, he becomes president
leadership of Charan Singh, the Lok Dal cornered almost 30 per of the Rashtriya Loktantrik Morcha (RLM) with RJD, which was formed
cent votes in the 1980 elections. But its vote share in the assembly on June 24.
1999 Mulayam Singh leads SP to victory in the 1999 Lok Sabha elections in
election was just a little over 20 per cent. In 1984-85 too, the UP in the month of October.
party managed to retain over 20 per cent vote share. While the 2002 In UP assembly elections held in February, Mulayam leads SP to an
leadership of Charan Singh could not effectively exploit the caste impressive performance winning 143 seats.
2003 After a brief interval of president’s rule, and a BSP-BJP coalition
cleavage, political developments contributed to the communal government, he forms the government and becomes chief minister of
polarisation of the UP electorate in the mid-1980s. Rajiv Gandhi’s UP for the third time on August 29, 2003.
raw attempts to satisfy communal elements both among the 2004 The SP decides not to join any coalition, led either by the BJP or the
Hindus and Muslims produced a polarisation, which was ex- Congress, and to go it alone in the Lok Sabha elections declaring that it
would give and take support on issues. But, soon forms an alliance with
ploited effectively by the BJP. As the Hindu vote turned more the RLD.
and more towards the BJP, the newly formed Janata Dal was
able to project itself as the party that cared for the minorities,
Table 2: Seat and Vote Share of LD/SP in Lok Sabha
a legacy that Mulayam Singh later exploited to his advantage. and Assembly in UP (1980-2002)
As the election results reported in Table 2 make clear, the JD
in UP was able to post an effective performance in 1989 with Party Name of SP Year Lok Sabha UP Assembly
Seats Vote Seats Vote
a combination of backward castes and Muslims. However, (Per Cent) (Per Cent)
Mulayam Singh was not able to carry this base into the SJP
when the JD split in 1990. Once the Samajwadi Party came LD 1980 29 28.9 59 21.5
LD 1984 2 21.6 – –
into being, Mulayam Singh was able to get the support of LD 1985 – – 84 21.43
sections of the OBC and the Muslim community. This has JD 1989 54 35.9 208 29.71
produced a more or less stable voter base for the SP (between SJP/JNP (JP) 1991 4 10.1 34 12.52
SP 1993 – – 109 17.82
20 and 25 per cent). SP 1996 16 20.8 110 21.8
However, there was no uniformity in the success of the party SP 1998 20 28.7 – –
in different regions of the state. The party graph was declining SP 1999 26 24.06 – –
SP 2002 – – 143 25.41
particularly in western UP which clearly showed that the SP had
not been successful in making inroads into the Jatland, despite Source: CSDS Data Unit.

1510 Economic and Political Weekly April 3-10, 2004

cannot write off the SP from Bundelkhand. The SP has improved
its position there, rising from a poor 3.68 per cent vote share
in the 1993 assembly elections to 24.13 per cent votes in the
1999 Lok Sabha elections and 23.1 per cent votes in the 2002
assembly elections [Verma 2002:1977]. The SP has been able
to evolve a base among the OBCs of Bundelkhand, but that has
not been enough for it to win seats in the region. Thus, despite
poor performance in terms of seats, the party has a significant
presence in Bundelkhand. In other regions, viz, Ruhelkhand,
Doab, Avadh and Poorvanchal, the SP continues to perform well
(Table 3). In the erstwhile Uttarakhand region, the SP was an
insignificant force: it never went beyond 6 per cent votes there.
Thus, it may be said that the SP has a weak base in western UP
and Bundelkhand as far as today’s UP is concerned.
This has a major implication as far as the relationship between
demographic composition of the electorate and the mobilisation
strategy adopted by the party is concerned. Even limited and
partial backward caste mobilisation could not be an all-UP
phenomenon owing to differences in social stratification, pro-
duction relations and power structures in different parts of the
state [Hasan 1989:133]. Western and eastern UP, the Bundelkhand,
and Uttarakhand (now a separate state of Uttaranchal) are es-
pecially different. That is why the party could not even attempt
limited caste homogenisation in the entire state, and hence, could
not strengthen itself in all areas especially in Bundelkhand and
Uttarakhand.
While assessing the electoral performance of the SP, we must
also keep in mind the fragmented nature of the UP electorate
and the multipolar competition in the state. This puts certain
limitations on the electoral performance of all parties. For in-
stance, this has meant that the SP has very few constituencies
that it can call ‘safe’ as there is a tendency of constituencies
changing hands frequently. Thus, there are only four consti-
tuencies that the SP has won in all the three Lok Sabha elections
from 1996: Badayun, Kaisarganj, Phulpur, and Mainpuri. Among
the seats it won in 1998 and 1999, six seats were common and
in five other constituencies, it won in 1996, lost in 1998 and
won in 1999 again. If we add the two seats it had won in both
1996 and 1998 but lost in 1999 (Bijnor and Moradabad), then
we may claim that these 17 constituencies are the stronghold of
the SP. In the 1999 Lok Sabha elections, the SP lost its vote
share by almost five per cent from the last election and yet gained
six seats. It has been conjectured that this may have happened,
not only because of the first-past-the-post system but also due
to a conscious tactical voting against the BJP to ensure the defeat
of its candidates [Frontline, November 19, 1999:41]. A similar
consideration seems to have prevailed over the electorate in the
assembly election of 2002 as well. In that election, both SP and
BSP improved their respective positions in the legislature.
However, as we shall see later, the performance of the SP in
2002 had much to do with its appeal to different sections of
society, including the upper castes. What is noteworthy, however,
is that the SP has been able to retain its vote share and in fact
Table 3: Regionwise Electoral Performance of SP in LS and Assembly Elections in UP
Year 1989(JD) 1991(JNP-JP)
Region LS Assembly LS Assembly
WUP 12(54.5) 47(42.28) 0(9.72) 2(5.97)
Ruhelkhand 6(35.19) 21(27.60) 0(2.58) 3(11.80)
Doab 11(43.77) 47(36.28) 1(12.08) 12(20.23)
Bundelkhand 2(18.78) 5(13.18) 2(18.0) 0(8.94)
Avadh 10(28.9) 34(22.98) 0(7.83) 10(15.85)
Poorvanchal 11(30.99) 52(27.71) 1(9.74) 7(11.56)
Source: Compiled using CSDS data. Figures in parenthesis show vote percentage.
Economic and Political Weekly April 3-10, 2004
improve upon it, in comparison to its vote share in the 1999
elections (from 24 per cent to 25 per cent).
Alliances
Electoral politics has become so complex in the 1990s that
no consistency can be predicted in the alliance-making pattern
adopted by various parties. State based parties in particular have
shown a tendency to be flexible in opting for choices that would
maximise electoral gains and chances of sharing power. The
Samajawadi Party, however, underwent a long period during
which its alliance making strategy was apparently guided by
ideological considerations as much as electoral calculations. The
party was in the forefront of anti-BJP political combinations all
through the 1990s, and particularly after 1996. Mulayam Singh
was, in fact, seen as the main leader of ‘secular’ forces in the
country. This had two difficulties, though. One was the political
history from which Mulayam Singh has evolved and the politics
of anti-Congressism. For some one like Mulayam Singh, it has
been very difficult to cooperate with the Congress Party and this
issue came to the forefront in 1999 after the fall of the BJP-led
NDA government. The position of the SP at that time frustrated
attempts to form a non-BJP government. Later, SP has been very
cautious in accepting the support of the Congress Party in running
its ministry in UP. So, this anti-Congress position, which is a
remnant of the previous era of Indian politics, restricts the alliance
making choices of the SP. Another restricting factor is the social
relations among the OBCs and between the OBCs and dalits of
Uttar Pradesh. As noted earlier, the dalits of UP have had to put
up with oppression from the OBCs as much as from the upper
castes. On the other hand, within the sections identified as OBCs,
there is considerable stratification and this has led to the for-
mulations that there are ‘more’ backward and ‘most’ backward
castes. These factors mean that the SP cannot have a long-
standing alliance with the BSP and, at the same time, cannot
have durable alliances with parties of smaller castes. These
factors force the SP to have only limited and unreal choices even
at the all-India level.
In this background, we can discern at least three shifts in the
national alliance making strategies of the SP. One, in the earlier
stages, the party worked for a non-Congress, non-BJP, third-front
coalition which included the Janata Dal and other left and secular
parties. The first success came when the coalition succeeded in
forming a third front government at the centre in 1996 with Deve
Gowda as the prime minister (PM). The Congress was not
included in the coalition but was allowed to support the coalition
from outside. Two, the SP diluted its anti-Congressism, and was
prepared to enter into a coalition of left and secular parties that
included the Congress in 1998-99, but was very rigid about not
accepting the leadership of Sonia Gandhi (on the ground that
she was of foreign origin). Many criticised Mulayam for that
decision, but perhaps, as George Fernandes has said, that is one
reason why Mulayam will go down in the history for saving the
1993(SP) 1996(SP) 1998(SP) 1999(SP) 2002(SP)
Assembly LS Assembly LS LS Assembly
5(8.67) 1(18.40) 10(14.14) 0(22.73) 1(13.96) 7(20.8)
16(22.62) 4(25.46) 15(23.83) 4(32.62) 3(23.73) 22(25.6)
25(25.32) 3(20.89) 22(28.19) 5(33.69) 8(30.44) 27(23.1)
1(3.68) 0(17.27) 3(16.71) 0(27.72) 0(24.13) 4(23.1)
41(27.20) 3(22.15) 35(25.52) 7(30.77) 8(24.9) 29(28.17)
20(12.89) 5(21.38) 25(22.03) 4(29.03) 6(28.59) 57(26.7)
1511
nation from slipping into the hands of a leader with a foreign
origin. Three, of late (2003), the SP has even dropped its op-
position to Sonia Gandhi becoming PM, and hence, is prepared
to go in for an alliance with all left and secular parties including
the Congress under the leadership of Sonia Gandhi. That shows
consistent dilution in the coalition-making strategies of the SP.
At the state level, the SP entered into an alliance with the BSP,
a party with a solid dalit base, as far back as 1993 in the UP
assembly elections. The SP-BSP alliance did form a government
in the state, but their relations were not harmonious and the
experiment was short lived (1993-95). The SP was emerging a
dominant partner in the SP-BSP coalition. By June 1995, the
SP had cornered the BSP by taking credit for reservation in
schools, appointment of Urdu teachers, inducting the backwards,
especially the yadavs, in the state police force and the Public
Accounts Committee (PAC), and swept the panchayat polls. The
deteriorating relations between them culminated in the form of
an ugly and infamous circuit house incident in June 1995 in which
Mayawati alleged that the goons of the SP tried to kill her. Soon,
the SP-BSP alliance came to an end. That was an end of the
possibility of developing a social cleavage on the basis of the
backward classes and consequently, the consolidation of the same
as a political constituency in UP.
In the 2002 assembly elections in the state, the SP tried to form
a post-poll alliance of like-minded parties but did not succeed.
However, when the Mayawati government fell, Mulayam Singh
formed the government in August 2003 by putting together a
coalition comprising of the Congress, SP, RLD, Rashtriya Kranti
Party (RKP), Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPM),
Samajwadi Janata Party (SJP), Janata Party (JP) and National
Loktantrik Party (NLP), etc. The RLD was originally in the BJP-
led coalition and it was only when it decided to withdraw from
the BJP-BSP coalition in May 2003 that the RLD joined Mulayam
Singh-led coalition. This was the first time that the Congress,
SP and RLD had come together.
However, ever since the SP came to power in 2003, it has been
alleged that the party has entered into an understanding with the
BJP. No confirmation has come yet, but it is variously suggested
that the SP would tacitly help the BJP in defeating BSP can-
didates. Besides, the refusal of the SP to enter into any electoral
understanding with the Congress has further strengthened the
allegations that SP would help the BJP by effecting a division
of the anti-BJP votes. For the Lok Sabha elections of 2004, the
SP has been quick to enter into an electoral alliance with the RLD
in western UP though its declared stand was not to enter into
a pre-poll alliance, but to seek and extend support to other parties
on issues after the polls. Hence, the pre-poll alliance with the
RLD is a reversal of its earlier stand and appears to be influenced
by the need to avoid any division of votes of rural peasantry in
the state. Under the agreement, the SP is to leave 10 LOK SABHA
seats for the RLD in the western UP (Bijnor: SC, Kairana,
Baghpat, Bulandshahar, Aligarh, Amroha, Meerut, Hapur, Khurja:
SC, Mathura ), and the RLD has agreed to campaign for the SP
throughout the state. In the 1999 LS elections, the RLD contested
only seven seats in western UP and won only two. It cannot be
denied that the RLD and the SP are the two most natural allies
so far as professed ideological position is concerned: both rep-
resent the rural peasantry though belonging to different classes,
and hence, can be quite complimentary to each other.
The intransigence of the SP in refusing to ally with the Congress
can be variously explained. Sensing a threat to its OBC support
from the desertion of the lower OBCs or most backward castes
(MBCs), the SP now intends to cultivate the upper castes,
1512
particularly the rajputs. An alliance with the Congress would
mean that the Muslim as well as the upper caste votes would
probably turn to the Congress rather than the SP. This makes
the alliance untenable at least as a pre-election strategy. Secondly,
the SP has a national ambition. It wants to see its president as
the PM of the country. On many occasions, party office bearers
and even Mulayam Singh has given signals to that effect. An
alliance with the Congress does not ensure the pre-eminence of
the SP in the post-election scenario. On the other hand, given
the fact that national politics appears as a conglomerate of state
politics, the one who performs well in the UP elections becomes
a natural choice for prime ministership in any coalition. This
explains Mulayam’s taciturn strategy of aligning with the Lok
Dal at the state level but keeping his other options open. These
developments have put the SP under pressure and the earlier
consistency in its electoral alliances has weakened considerably.
Perhaps, it may be more accurate to say that the SP is on the
threshold of yet another shift in its alliance-making strategy.
Just as Mulayam Singh’s attempt to forge a social alliance at
the state level through SP-BSP alliance failed, the short-lived
attempt to forge an alliance of OBCs across states also failed.
In June 1998, SP and RJD of Laloo Yadav floated the Rashtriya
Loktantrik Morcha (RLM) and Mulayam Singh became its
president. But this front could not take off and after the Lok Sabha
elections, it withered away. With both the leaders (Laloo and
Mulayam) nursing ambitions at the all-India level and also claiming
to be leaders of the backward community, this front was bound
to be a non-starter. But the example of the Morcha illustrates
the difficulties involved in forging alliances in the complex
political situation of the 1990s.
Leadership and Organisation
Like many other state level parties, the SP too, does not take
the issue of organisation very seriously. It is centred on the leader,
Mulayam Singh Yadav. It is unthinkable to imagine the Samajwadi
Party without him. Since the formation of the SP in 1992, the
party has really never discussed and debated the issue of leader-
ship. Mulayam Singh continues to be the party’s undisputed
leader.1 This has not allowed any second line of leadership to
emerge in the party, and hence, inner party working has been
based not on any collective leadership and decision-making but
on the whims and the fancies of the leader. In the course of the
evolution of the party, Amar Singh was roped in by the party,
who was elected to the Rajya Sabha on the ticket of the SP in
1996 and, since then, the rapport between Mulayam and Amar
Singh has been excellent. Amar Singh with his business links
and five star culture proved to be a good compliment to the
otherwise rustic and rural face of the SP. But the way Amar Singh
has been promoted as the number two in the party has created some
consternation in the SP. Many influential local yadav leaders feel
that Mulayam is steadily becoming more inaccessible to them
and some resentment is brewing inside. Besides that, there are
two others from the yadav family – Shiv Pal Singh Yadav
(Mulayam’s brother) and Akhilesh Yadav (Mulayam’s son) – who
may in due course, vie with each other for that position. In 1999,
another interesting development took place. Akhilesh Yadav, the
son of Mulayam Singh, entered the party political arena and
contested the election from the Kannauj Lok Sabha seat vacated
by his father. It is likely that Akhilesh may soon be accepted
as the natural heir as far as party leadership is concerned.
Apart from leadership, the other issue that the SP faces is that
of organisational network. Over the years, the SP has developed
Economic and Political Weekly April 3-10, 2004
a party cadre and multiple party affiliates more than a dozen in industrialists to invest in the state. This reconfirms the identity
number.2 In tune with modern technology, the party has a website of SP basically as a party of UP.
also.3 But, the one-man show has always thwarted the devel-
opment of collective leadership in the party. To add to that, the Social base of the Party
party never imparted the kind of political training to workers and
supporters that could give them a solid and clear orientation in Critics and opponents of the Samajwadi Party would point out
the ideology of the party. Mulayam’s Muslim appeasement line that it is a Yadav Party. More uncharitable criticisms of Mulayam
also exposed the de-ideologised political perspective of the party. Singh used to mention him as Mulla Mulayam, an oblique
Notwithstanding his claim to represent the secular face of UP reference to his ‘pro-Muslim’ policy. On his part, Mulayam Singh
politics, the lack of ideological training to party cadres results has also been responsible for creating such an image, the latest
in ignorance about the raison d’etre of the party’s existence and being his decision to declare Fridays as holidays for Muslim
opposition to the BJP [Ramasheshan 1995:25]. The Samajwadi students. Although the decision was withdrawn, it shows that
Party has emerged out of the legacy of social justice and survives the Samajwadi Party has to locate itself at the junction of some
on the forward-backward cleavage. It claims to be the secular or other social cleavage. It has been pointed out that SP had a
force in UP, which protects the Muslim minority not as charity two-pronged strategy for winning a social base. On the one hand,
but as a matter of conscious policy. While the party appeals to it attempted to build a solid bloc of Muslim votes and for that
the Hindus also, it wants to defeat the political Hindutva of the purpose, visualises an undifferentiated Muslim community. It
BJP. In this background, the party has failed to impress upon then, juxtaposes this section of the society in terms of the threat
its followers and in particular, active members the significance emanating from the BJP. On the other hand, the SP seeks to
of these ideological positions. In day-to-day activities, the classify Hindu society into two sections, the forward and the
party operates only at the level of cynical politics and manipu- backward classes. It hopes to be the sole representative and
lation in order to keep its activists satisfied. Farther is the rel- protector of the backward community [Chandra 1999:77-78].
evance of socialism to the party’s programmes and functioning. Realpolitik forces it to concede the support of the dalits to the
Mulayam’s continued association with industrial magnates like BSP and in the imagination of the SP, the backward classes
Amar Singh, Anil Ambani, Subrato Roy, etc, is viewed with consist mostly of the OBCs. Although it is true that the Yadavs
suspicion. Yadav defends that by suggesting that the capitalists constitute the rock foundation of the base of the SP, the party
are really social assets, their cooperation should be taken for the claims that it has support among various sections of the OBCs.
overall development of the state. The ideological position of Of late, the party has also been alleged of wooing the Rajputs.
the SP seems to have adjusted itself to the broad socio- The decision of the Mulayam Singh government to drop cases
economic policy paradigm of the national government – the pending against Raja bhayya is often cited in this connection,
acceptance of the policy of Liberalisation, Privatisation and as well as the growing clout of Amar Singh in the affairs of the
Globalisation (LPG). Thus, the emphasis is on big projects, SP. However, along with the expansion of the SP, there has been
industrialisation and urban development – though the party this effort to produce a conciliation between the forward and
continues to retain the agenda of the rural, agricultural and the the backward classes. These only became significant in the 1998
poor citizens of the state. elections, but they existed even in 1996 [Chandra 1999:80].
It is a well known fact that Mulayam Singh has all-India Even in terms of caste homogenisation, the SP could not work
political ambitions, however, it is not clear whether the party for the consolidation of the entire backward community. The
should actually be an all-India party or not. Ideally, Mulayam party claimed to be representing the rural peasantry and the
would like the forward-backward cleavage to operate at the all- backwards, but the fact remained that the party could not even
India level. Similarly, his anti-BJP position is also not confined get the middle and lower castes among the backwards integrated
to UP alone. In this sense, the SP can be an all-India party. into the party owing to the domination of the upper crust,
However, in its existence in the last 12 years the party has not represented by the Yadavs and Ahirs. Many a middle and lower
mustered enough strength in any of the other states. As noted castes among the backwards continued to support the BJP: it got
earlier, the efforts to align with Laloo Prasad failed because of
the attempts by the SP to poach in the latter’s territory. The Table 4: Social Base of Samajwadi Party
Samajwadi Party has consistently made efforts to register its Social Characteristic 1996: 1998: 1999: 2002:
presence in MP, Gujarat and Maharashtra, but has not met with Lok Sabha Lok Sabha Lok Sabha Legislative
much success. In the 2004 Lok Sabha elections also, the party Assembly
has decided to contest over 250 seats in different parts of India, Female 20.5 28.2 16.8 24.5
including Bihar, Jharkhand and Haryana. At the same time, the Male 21.0 29.2 19.3 24.9
survival politics of the SP means that the party must concentrate Urban 23.1 35.8 19.3 25.7
Rural 20.0 26.4 17.9 24.6
and win as many seats as possible from UP itself. This dilemma, Upper caste 2.7 3.7 3.3 8.3
coupled with the party’s refusal to set up an organisational Yadavs 73.5 76.0 77.4 70.8
network confines the SP to Uttar Pradesh. Thus, the SP is a Other OBCs 28.8 18.1 19.9 17.4
regional party in UP, and one of its listed priorities in the party SCs 5.3 9.3 4.9 6.8
Muslims 54.3 71.7 34.5 51.2
manifesto (2002) was restoring the honour of the state, and Non-literate 21.5 28.5 19.1 26.0
working for its economic upliftment. Ever since Mulayam Singh Upto primary 23.5 27.3 23.9 27.7
regained chief ministership of the state, he has been assiduously Upto matric 21.3 31.8 16.8 21.0
College and above 13.5 29.3 12.7 15.8
cultivating the image of some one who is doing UP proud. He Very poor 19.8 – 17.3 19.4
has reduced college fees, withdrawn the VAT scheme, attended Poor 18.2 – 21.5 30.0
to the problems of sugar cane growers and sugar mills, etc. Middle 23.8 – 21.2 22.5
Rich 22.3 – 13.5 15.6
But he has specifically tried to focus on the development of
UP by forming the UP Development council and by persuading Source: Verma 2003: 272-75.

Economic and Political Weekly April 3-10, 2004 1513

39.9 per cent, 44.9 per cent and 24.7 per cent OBC votes in UP
in 1996, 1998, and 1999 Lok Sabha elections in UP respectively
[Verma 2001:4454]. Even in the assembly elections held in
February 2002, while only 7.6 per cent Yadavs voted for the BJP,
51.5 per cent of the More Backwards (MRBCs) and 31.6 per
cent the MBCs voted for the BJP [Verma 2002:1977]. That shows
that the SP could not even capitalise on the possibility of a
backward caste homogenisation, which was limited and partial.
In many ways, the SP has consolidated its base during the
assembly elections. It has been successful in retaining the support
of the Muslims and also the OBCs. What it lacks is the support
of the dalits. With the BSP in the competition, the SP does not
stand much chance of support from dalit voters. Another area
for concern for the party is the weak support among the more
backward castes. A party which came into being on the basis
of the caste-class cleavage, it is indeed intriguing that only the
less backward among the OBCs tend to support it while the more
backward sections choose to vote for the BJP. Another paradox
for the SP is the tensions between the social justice policy of
the party and the Charan Singh legacy of upholding the interests
of the rural peasantry. It has been observed that the party has
resolved this paradox by continuing ‘quota politics’ and aban-
doning ‘kisan politics’ [Jaffrelot 2003:368-78]. However, this
again means that the support base of the party would be narrower
than what it expects.
Table 4 gives details of the support for SP among different social
sections. The survey data clearly shows the dominant pockets
of the SP social bases – the Muslims and the OBCs. The data
shows that after a less than impressive performance in 1999, the
base of the party improved among various sections in the 2002
assembly elections. What is striking is the fact that the SP has
been gradually developing a more balanced social base. This is
paradoxical since the party functions in a framework of cleavage
politics and yet evolves a significant social base among groups
across those cleavages. Overall, there is no significant difference
in terms of age, locality and gender. The data for 2002 shows
that the SP is gaining ground among the upper castes but losing
among Muslims and that it has weak support among the more
backward OBCs. It appears that there are two areas in which
the base of the SP is improving: the upper castes and the non-
Jatav dalits. If the SP is able to retain its base and gain support
from sections of upper and dalit castes, it may well become a
formidable combination in the electoral maze of Uttar Pradesh.
Whether the SP can spread to other states or not, it is sure
to play an important role in the politics of Uttar Pradesh and
by implication, in politics at the all-India level. The SP, along
with the RJD is an important example of a party continuously
engaged in the formation and consolidation of a cleavage as well
as in overcoming that cleavage. It seems to have adopted a multi-
level strategy to overcome the constraints of its cleavage politics:
on the one hand, by-passing the cleavage, it seeks the support
of the upper castes and on the other, it consolidates that cleavage
by trying to unite the OBCs. It also seeks to gain support among
the dalits, but above all, the SP has learnt the trick of engaging
in ‘development’ rhetoric. Since everyone likes to imagine that
all the ills of our society would be satisfactorily addressed by
the magic of development, the SP has started appealing to the
voter on these grounds. Like almost all other parties, the SP, too,
is following the framework of liberalisation and globalisation.
Thus, it can appeal to the upper castes in the name of development
and globalisation, and at the same time, continue with its caste
based cleavage. In the coming Lok Sabha election, the party has
aligned with the RLD. This coalition with the RLD, may, to some
1514
extent, especially in western UP, help the SP in winning more
seats. This is the area where the SP is desperately trying to improve
its performance. However, since the SP is also the ruling party
in the state, it may have to bear some anti-incumbency disad-
vantage, which may marginally harm the SP votes. However, the
overall picture of the electoral alliance before the polls will matter
a lot. If the SP-Congress alliance does not materialise, it may
lead to triangular or even quadrangular electoral contests result-
ing in the division of votes that may, ultimately, benefit the BJP.
Unfortunately, the SP has no space for any political manoeuvring
to ward off that situation. Moreover, despite the ‘development
focus’ of the SP coalition in UP, much may also depend on the
actual conduct of the election campaign and the pattern of
electoral competition. Whatever the result of this electoral contest,
the indications are that the cleavage for which the Samajwadi
Party stood for over the last decade would be lost or soft peddled
in the campaign and in the near future after the elections. EPW
Address for correspondence:
akverma2001@yahoo.com
Notes
1 The organisational composition of the Samajwadi Party is as follows:
president Mulayam Singh Yadav, vice-president Janeshwar Mishra, general
secretaries Kiranmay Nanda, Mohd Azam Khan, Beni Prasad Verma,
Amar Singh, Ram Gopal Yadav, Reoti Raman Singh, Surendra Mohan
Agrawal, Ramji Lal Suman.
2 The Samajwadi Party has the following 15 affiliated organisations:
(a) Samajwadi Yuvjan Sabha, (b) Samajwadi Chatra Sabha, (c) Samajwadi
Lohia Wahini, (d) Samajwadi Mahila Sabha, (e) Samajwadi Vyapar Sabha,
(f) Samajwadi Alpsankhyak Sabha, (g) Samajwadi Adhiwakta Sabha, (h)
Samajwadi SC/ST Sabha, (i) Samajwadi Party Pichda Warg Sangarsh
Samiti, (j) Mulayam Singh Youth Brigade, (k) Samajwadi Shikshak
Sabha, (l) Samajwadi Sainik Prakosth, (m) Samajwadi Khel Prakosth,
(n) Samajwadi Sanskratik Prakosth, (o) Samajwadi Sahkarita Prakosth.
3 Samajwadi Party web site – www.samajwadiparty.org
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Economic and Political Weekly April 3-10, 2004