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UNESCO and French Cultural Relations 1945-1970
Author(s): William R. Pendergast

Source: International Organization , Summer, 1976, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Summer, 1976), pp.
453-483
Published by: University of Wisconsin Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706174
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UNESCO and French cultural relations
1945-1970
William R. Pendergast
Cultural expansion has been a major component of postwar French foreign policy.
The creation and operation of UNESCO afforded opportunities for pursuit of French
cultural relations. French authorities determined to secure the location of UNESCO
in Paris, the privileged use of the French language, and to direct the organization
towards activities with appeal to an international intellectual clientele. France also
endeavored to divert UNESCO from paths detrimental to French cultural policy.
These dangers included the creation of international norms and mandatory reports on
bilateral cultural relations, adherence by UNESCO to a philosophy inimical to French
cultural policy, and penetration by multilateral organs into areas of French cultural
predominance. At the same time, France availed itself of UNESCO to supplement its
independent actions, to infiltrate a French presence into new areas, to facilitate the
operational conduct of cultural relations, and to diversify the conventional in-
struments of cultural action. Additionally, the French National Commission for
UNESCO emerged as an agent for the conduct of French cultural diplomacy.
Observers frequently construe international organizations as instruments of state

policy, although there have been few detailed studies of state participation in
specific organizations. This paper provides an intensive examination of the rele-
vance of UNESCO to French cultural relations during the postwar period. France
conceived specific instrumental objectives for UNESCO as an adjunct to French
cultural relations. The attainment of these ambitions eventually was vitiated by
unforeseen developments and erroneous assumptions concerning the French role in
UNESCO. As a consequence, the tone of French evaluation of UNESCO changed
qualitatively.
William R. Pendergast is Assistant Professor in the Overseas Graduate Program at Boston

University. Mark Kesselman and James P. Sewell commented on an early draft of the material
in this article; Luther H. Evans made available his personal archives; the late Philip Mosely
assisted the early stage of research; numerous interviewees and anonymous reviewers made
useful suggestions. I wish to thank William T.R. Fox for his encouragement.

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454 International Organization
France has employed diverse instrumentalities to advance its international

cultural presence. Official statements and budget allocations reveal this central role
of cultural relations in French foreign policy.' The importance to France of cultural
relations reflects both opportunities and limitations in French resources and in the
international situation. Internally, the French fund of culture is an inducement to
cultural relations, and postwar French material weakness limited reliance on alter-
native economic and military components of foreign policy. Externally, disintegra-
tion of the empire required substitute means to retain allegiance while American
preponderance stimulated French cultural nationalism. Cultural relations have par-
ticular uses, moreover, which appealed to French politicians.2
France conducts the major portion of its cultural activities bilaterally, con-
sistent with general patterns of French foreign policy. Jean Basdevant,3 Director of
French Cultural Relations, articulated this French conception: "The main part of
the French cultural program is carried out in the framework of bilateral rela-
tions.... In France's view, bodies like UNESCO or the Council of Europe fall on
different levels but the second should supplement the first and not, as is too often
the case, try to replace it."4 In cultural relations, as in other sectors, bilateral
relationships augment control over program planning and execution, enhance a
donor's prestige, and assure indebtedness by recipients.
In supplementary ways, however, UNESCO has relevance to French cultural
relations. An international organization in the field of cultural affairs was of evident
potential utility to French pohcies. UNESCO is an institutional "stake" which
French policy makers wished to capture and define according to French preconcep-
tions. France also endeavored to prevent UNESCO interference in matters which
could impinge on French cultural diplomacy. Finally, UNESCO provided auxiliary
resources for a state with an aggressive program of cultural relations.
I UNESCO as a "stake"
French officials viewed UNESCO as a "stake" of political competition and

desired to mold it into an instrument of French foreign relations. This involved
early efforts to affect the structural basis of the organization. Three dimensions of
UNESCO were particularly important to this facet of French policy. A dominant
French concern was to ensure UNESCO's functional preoccupation with intel-
lectual and cultural affairs against the efforts of other states to diversify UNESCO
'See, for instance: Suzanne Balous. L'Action Culturelle de la France dans le Monde (Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1970); Louis Dollot, Les Relations Culturelles Internationales
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964); Louis Dollot, La France dans le Monde Actuel
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967); William R. Pendergast, "French Cultural
Relations," Chronique de Politique Etrang&re, Vol. 27, No. 3 (1974): 339-56.
2Wlliam R. Pendergast, "The Political Uses of Cultural Relations," R Politico, Vol. 38, No. 4
(December 1973): 682-96.
'A biographical identification of French participants appears in Appendix I.
4"France's Cultural Action Throughout the World," French Affairs, No. 182 (August 17,
1965): 2.

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UNESCO and French cultural relations 455
activities. The French were also anxious to guarantee a prominent position for the
French language in UNESCO. Probably the single most pressing French objective,
however, was to secure the presence of UNESCO headquarters in Paris.
UNESCO's orientation
The most subtle French effort to extend its cultural influence through
UNESCO entailed efforts to determine the overall orientation of the organization.
France wished to define UNESCO as an organization of "intellectual cooperation"
and to pattern its activities after the prewar Institut international de Cooperation
Intellectuelle (IICI) which had headquarters in Paris and reflected French interests.5
The French expected that association of French and foreign intellectuals in
UNESCO would augment French international cultural prestige. This anticipation
rested on the traditional self-image of cultural universalism which suffused French
cultural relations and colonial administration. The assumed efficacy of primary
contacts and the universal appeal of French culture would ensure the extension of
French influence through international intellectual cooperation. The usefulness of
UNESCO for French cultural relations, therefore, required primary attention to
"intellectual cooperation" as opposed to technical assistance or education which
were the preferred emphases of the United States, Britain, and eventually many
Third World states.
Early French efforts to invest UNESCO with an "intellectual" cast were
evident during the wartime gatherings in London which established UNESCO.6 The
French wished to define its structure and ethos as an institution to engage an
international intellectual clientele. These ideas clashed with the American
preference for activities with immediate and tangible relevance to international
peace and security. For example, the United States had proposed that UNESCO be
named the "United Nations Organization for Educational and Cultural Coopera-
tion." French delegates objected that "Organization of Intellectual Cooperation"
was more consistent with French ideas. Likewise, American proposals for a pre-
amble to the constitution emphasized the requirements of international peace and
welfare whereas French suggestions urged instead the "development of culture,"
"universal solidarity," and a "higher moral and intellectual standard" as phrases to
define the organizational ethos of UNESCO.
5The IICI served as the Secretariat for the League's International Committee on Intellectual
Cooperation (ICIC). The French government voluntarily formed, subsidized, and housed the
IICI in the Palais Royal in Paris.
6The establishment of UNESCO occurred during two conferences: the Conference of Allied
Ministers of Education (CAME) met in London from 1942 to 1945; the London Conference
which founded UNESCO sat during November 1945 in the British capital. Subsequently, a
Preparatory Commission convened to recruit a Secretariat and to prepare a program for
submission to the first General Conference. The politics of the creation of UNESCO is
recounted in William R. Pendergast, "La Politique Etrang6re FranQaise et la Cr6ation de
l'UNESCO," Revue d'Histoire de la Deuxieme Guerre Mondiale, Vol. 96 (October 1974):
67-88.

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A similar divergence during the constituent meetings distinguished French

and American ideas on specific UNESCO programs. France proposed sundry ac-
tivities to facilitate the work and conditions of intellectuals while American
proposals confined UNESCO to projects with an immediate and concrete effect on
international peace, security, and welfare. The French also wished to provide a major
place within UNESCO for international nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) in
the intellectual field. The US preferred to limit NGO participation to a secondary
role. French proposals for the Secretariat envisaged that body as a collection of
reputed intellectuals whereas American delegates emphasized criteria of administra-
tive competence. France desired to conduct General Conference sessions as round-
table discussions by noted intellectuals independent of government control instead
of the structured framework which finally developed.' Finally, France hoped to
limit the degree of government control over UNESCO in order to maximize the
organization's appeal to intellectuals. To this end, the French attempted to pattern
the UNESCO Executive Board after the interwar Commission Internationale de
Cooperation Intellectuelle (CICI) at Geneva and to limit its membership to re-
nowned intellectuals, to extend the role of the Board, and to allow delegates to
General Conferences to vote independent of government control. The Americans,
by contrast, insisted on close official surveillance of UNESCO operations.
Subsequently, French participants directed their efforts towards the develop-
ment of UNESCO's program to provide an incentive for intellectuals to associate
with the organization. This required projects relevant to intellectual interests and
professional concerns and implied an emphasis within UNESCO on cultural
activities from the IICI inheritance and concentration on basic research. Julien
Cain defined this French position: "UNESCO cannot do without the collaboration of
educators, scientists, and intellectuals and if it wishes to retain their interest then
it absolutely must continue certain activities."8
Successive French draft resolutions at General Conference sessions reveal this
preoccupation with activities for the cultural elites. -France advocated international
exchanges, conferences, seminars, and art exhibitions.9 Proposals for copyright,
photographic archives, and museums fall within the same pattern. French representa-
tives asserted the priority of discovery and research over the dissemination of knowl-
edge through education, and French draft proposals urged research in areas within
UNESCO's competence.'0 For example, French proposals in education frequently
7UNESCO: 12EX/SR10 (1948), 4-5; 13EX/SR3 (1948), 14; 4GC/General Committee/SR3

(1949), 228; 4GC/General Committee/SR7 (1949), 239; 14EX/SR9 (1949), 4, 6.
860EX/SR15 (1961), 130.
9 2GC/General Committee/SR7 (1947), 352; 3GC/Sub-Committee on Education/SR2 (1948),
311; 7GC/Program Committee (1952), 463; 7GC/Plenary Conference/VR10 (1952), 145.
10 37EX/SR15 (1954), 79; 8GC/Program and Budget Commission (1954), 375; 59EX/SR3
(1961), 23; 12GC/PRG/SR12 (1962), 5; 8GC/Program and Budget Commission (1954), 375,
859; 43EX/SR23 (1956), 244; 9GC/Program Commission (1956), 467; 43EX/SR23 (1956),
244; 11GC/Reports of Member States (1960), 57; 11GC/PRG/SR21 (1960), 8; 45EX/SR13
(1956), 86; 35EX/SR2 (1953), 7; 44EX/SR23 (1956), 244; 35EX/SR2 (1953); 7; 8GC/Pro-

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involved pedagogical research rather than activities to promote the actual diffusion
of knowledge. France also favored international stimulation of artistic creativity,
and a recurrent suggestion to accomplish this goal was to give UNESCO prizes
for creative work.1"
Neither the United States nor Britain shared these French preoccupations.12
Both countries opposed many programs which appealed only to restricted intellec-
tual elites and sponsored a broader clientele and the contribution of UNESCO to
"international peace and security." The admission to UNESCO of new members
resulted in demands for concentration on aid distribution. Concern with access to
existing knowledge and construction of educational facilities animated many new
member states. French officials feared consequently that technical assistance
through UNESCO would submerge cultural activities. This problem arose in two
forms. Initially, the availability of extraneous funds for technical assistance
threatened to unbalance UNESCO's overall activities. Second, internal pressures for
technical assistance eventuated in the eclipse of purely cultural programs within
UNESCO's own regular budget.
The former danger arose in 1949 with UNESCO participation in the UN
Expanded Program of Technical Assistance (EPTA). UNESCO's own Participation
Program of Aid to Member States followed, and in 1959 UNESCO entered into
cooperation with the UN Special Fund. These external funds eventually almost
equalled the entire UNESCO regular budget. Roger Seydoux warned against
UNESCO budget reductions for cultural activities following the addition to
UNESCO's resources by Technical Assistance funds."3 Julien Cain even suggest
that some projects from the regular budget be transferred to the Technical Assis-
tance Program to free their appropriations for purposes more consistent with
French interests.14
As foreseen by French participants, however, the addition to UNESCO
resources of Technical Assistance and Special Fund money altered the direction of
UNESCO's overall activities, since these funds were concentrated in Education and
Natural Sciences. In 1963-64, 76.3 percent of Technical Assistance and 93.5
percent of Special Fund resources which UNESCO received were allocated to these
areas. In the same biennium, whereas cultural activities comprised 10.7 percent of
gram and Budget Commission (1954), 750; 43EX/SR11 (1956), 102; 62EX/SR21 (1962),
234-5.
11 66EX/SR27 (1963), 284; 71EX/SR32 (1965), 362; UNESCO/preparatory Commission/
Social Science Commission/SR4 (1946), 4; 1GC/Sub-Committee on Mass Communication/SR5
(1946), 160; 35EX/SR2 (1953), 8; 37EX/SR21 (1954), 117.
12 8GC/Program and Budget Commission (1954), 375-6; 9GC/Program Commission (1956),
467; 62EX/SR15 (1962), 152; 63EX/SR9 (1962), 85; 71EX/SR30 (1965), 330.
13 16EX/SR3 (1949), 5. The regular UNESCO program and budget contains subject areas to
which the departmental organization of the Secretariat corresponds. These activities are funded
by ordinary budget appropriations. In addition, UNESCO accepted extraneous funds for
activities not within its regular program.
14 7GC/Program Commission (1952), 329.

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the UNESCO regular budget, they accounted for only 6.7 percent of overall
UNESCO resources (Appendix II).
Concern with Technical Assistance eventually created pressures to make the
regular program itself contribute to economic development. The cultural sectors of
the regular program ceded to priority concentration on educational and scientific
activities coordinated with Special Fund projects. As a percentage of the regular
budget, cultural activities increased from 6.7 percent in 1949 to a peak in 1959 of
11.1 percent. This remained stable until 1965 when the consolidation into a single
program activity of cultural activities, social sciences, and the humanities presaged a
substantial budgetary decline (Appendix III).
French delegates reacted strongly against this trend. Henri Laugier con-
demned a "policy tending to restrict general activities concerned with intellectual
cooperation and to convert UNESCO into an organization principally concerned
with providing experts for Member States."' 'He insisted that technical assistance
be channelled elsewhere since UNESCO's essential task was to promote intellectual
development and cooperation and he complained that UNESCO funds "were being
frittered away in the form of Aid to Member States."'6 The French assessment of
the transformation of UNESCO was categorical: "France considers that the
Organization should devote the majority of its resources and energies to its cultural
and universal mission rather than to operational activities which concern the
technical bodies of the United Nations."'7 France combatted this tendency in two
ways. First, French delegates tried to halt the unbalanced development of
UNESCO's program. Second, they interpreted cultural activities as essential to
well-planned economic growth.
French delegates couched the defense of cultural activities in terms of alleged
concern with the equilibrium and balance of UNESCO's program.'8 This principle
of equilibrium implied restoration of resources to cultural affairs in view of the
disproportionate growth of other sectors. Julien Cain invoked "program balance"
to justify increased cultural activities.'9 Louis Franqois reproved the "drive for
greater concentration" and urged a "reasonable variety of activities."20 Julien Cain
contested the principle of concentration and observed that this notion had created
a "severe disequilibrium within the program."-I
15 38EX/SR11 (1954), 69, 71.

16 42EX/SR26 (1955), 50; 42EX/SR11 (1955), 96.
17 UNESCO Document 14C/11 (1966), 6.
18 Observers of French society and culture have remarked the recurrent idea of "equ
in French thought. See, for example, Stanley Hoffmann, "Paradoxes of the French Political
Community," in In Search of France, by Stanley Hoffmann et al (New York: Harper & Row,
1965), p. 6. More pertinently, Michel Crozier perceived it as a conservative tendency in French
bureaucracy. The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (London: Tavistock Publications, 1964) p. 257.
'9 6GC/Program Commission/SR11, 338; also, Ibid., SR7 (1951), 315.
20 8GC/Program and Budget Commission (1954), 788; 8GC/Plenary Conference (1954), 109;
8GC/General Committee (1954), 294.
21 42EX/SR8 (1955), 66; 71EX/SR14 (1965), 141.

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French delegates operationalized this concern for equilibrium by insisting on

a budgetary "linkage" between cultural activities and technical assistance. French
spokesmen insisted that increases in special assistance activities should auto-
matically entail augmented cultural activities.22 Later, they turned to the notion
of "planning" as a way to preserve the relationship among program sectors.
Christian Fouchet remarked that a four-to-six year plan should incorporate an
equilibrium between different program components.23
The second strategem employed by France was to advise new states con-
cerning the most reasonable path to economic and social development. French
representatives discouraged concern with economic growth at the expense of social
and cultural development. Roger Seydoux deplored the purely economic implica-
tions of the March 4, 1949 ECOSOC resolution on "UNESCO and UN Technical
Assistance." He reiterated the importance of the social dimension which "included
the cultural point of view," and proposed a resolution that "no technical progress
(is) of lasting effect unless it is accompanied by corresponding social and cultural
progress."24
Initially, the French government secured collaboration with UNESCO by
prominent French intellectuals by appealing to their own occupational self-interest,
the identification of French culture with national prestige, and widespread opposi-
tion to postwar American hegemony. The French failed, however, to preserve
UNESCO as a strictly "intellectual" institution. Differences with the United States
and Britain revealed political and philosophical divergencies concerning the purpose
of UNESCO, and new member states provided votes for a more practical orienta-
tion. Incentives for the association of literary and cultural intellectuals with
UNESCO diminished as the organization emphasized technical assistance, and the
intrusion of Cold War political tensions into UNESCO disturbed the insulated haven
which the French had hoped to establish. The usefulness of UNESCO as an
instrument of cultural expansion through international intellectual collaboration
consequently declined.
French language
A postwar French objective was to restore the French language to its forme
international prominence. Considerations of prestige, diplomatic effects, and
national identity created a preoccupation with the purity and diffusion of the
French language which has guided French cultural relations. In UNESCO, more-
over, linguistic politics involved influence over policy decisions. Consequently, the
French five-year plan for cultural relations asserted an unequivocal priority: "The
22 13GC/Plenary Conference (1964), 336.

23 8GC/General Committee (1954), 294.
24 15EX/SR1 (1949), 6; 15EX/SR3 (1949), 10; 38EX/SR4 (1954), 24-5; 38EX/SR5 (1954),
32; 4GC/Technical Assistance Sub-committee/SR1 (1949), 360; Ibid., SR3 (1949), 368-9.

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expansion of the French language must be the dominant preoccupation of all our
cultural action."25
The diplomatic role of the French language contracted during the Second
World War. The danger of displacement by English and Spanish led French repre-
sentatives at UNESCO constituent assemblies to insist successfully on French as an
official and working language.26 Subsequently, France resisted within the organiza-
tion the tendency of English to achieve de facto currency and the dilution of the
privileged position of both French and English. These French efforts involved dual
language reproduction of documents, working languages used in UNESCO field
projects, and the "second language" concept.
Roger Seydoux complained early that some lNESCO publications included
only chapter introductions in both English and French. He claimed that "both
languages should be given equal preponderance" in order to "respect an inter-
national spirit."27 French delegates refused to proceed with committee meetings
without documents in the French language.28 In UNESCO institutes and field
projects, France claimed a privileged place for its language. For example, they
insisted on French as a working language at two proposed Latin American social
science research centers at Santiago and Rio de Janeiro.29
French delegates suggested UNESCO approbation of the "second language"
concept to secure international recognition for the propriety of French overseas
language instruction. Colonial sensitivity to the "depersonalization" of native cultures
focused on the assimilationist ethos of French cultural policies. This insis-
tence on the integrity of national cultures threatened the international use of
French. UNESCO legitimization of the second language idea could undercut
nationalist hostility and create an international obligation to which France was
anxious to conform. During the 1946 UNESCO Preparatory Commission, France
recommended adoption by every country of "one universally used cultural
language."' At the 1946 General Conference the French proposed "the teac
in every country of one of the great and most commonly spoken cultural
languages" to achieve the "interpenetration of cultures."31 In 1962, Julien Ca
opposed the reassertion of native tongues: "The provision of education in these
languages will not resolve the great questions of culture and education. English and
French. . . are simultaneously an element of culture and a means of communica-
tion."32
25Second plan quinquennal d'Expansion du Ministere des Affaires J?trangeres (1 964-1 968), p.
5 (cited hereafter: Second Plan quinquennal).
26 Discussion of this aspect of French diplomacy appears in Pendergast, "La Politiq
Etrang&re Frangaise et la Creation de l'UNESCO."
27 UNESCO/Conseil Executif/2nd session/SR5 (1947), 7.
28 7GC/Legal Committee (1952), 838-9.
29 9GC/Program Commission (1956), 416.
30 UNESCO/Preparatory Commission/Letters and Philosophy Commission (1946), 5.
31GC/lst session/Documents: "Program of UNESCO. Comments by the Delegation of
France. Letters," by Jean Hytier (1946), 2.
32 61EX/SR20 (1962), 228.

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The third feature of French linguistic politics in UNESCO was to prevent the
dilution of the privileged French position. This entailed opposition to Esperanto as
a universal second tongue and to the adoption of additional UNESCO working
languages. France predicated support for a universal second language on the
condition that it be "one of the leading cultural languages and not an artificial
one."33 Charles Lucet opposed a UNESCO study of "artificial languages" proposed
by the Universal Esperanto Association.34 France also opposed additional working
languages in UNESCO. In 1947, Roger Seydoux opposed the adoption of Spanish
as a third working language and cited the recent breakdown of international
conferences "owing to the use of three working languages."35 French delegates
cited "technical" problems and suggested "study" of the issue.36 Seydoux pre-
dicted that adoption of Spanish would transform UNESCO into a "Tower of
Babel."37 It might stimulate adoption of still more working languages, would be
expensive, and decrease the efficiency of international conferences.38 French
spokesmen dismissed as irrelevant the cultural value of Spanish and the argument
that it would facilitate Latin involvement in UNESCO. Subsequent to defeat on the
question of Spanish, the same scenario recurred in later years with the candidacy of
other languages.
Despite the proliferation of working languages, France defended successfully
the use of French itself in international organizations such as UNESCO. The French
were able, therefore, to point with satisfaction to the international use of their
language. Jean Basdevant, Director of Cultural Relations, remarked the increased
currency of French in the UN, UNESCO, and EEC, and international con-
gresses.39 In 1958 NGO's used French more often than English.40 During the 1964
UNESCO General Conference, French achieved equality with English as the tongue
of preference used by delegation Presidents.41 At the 1967 UN General Assembly
Francophone states required that UN communications be published simultaneously
in English and French.
The admission of African and Asian Francophone states to UN bodies made
possible these achievements. Decolonization was not without its compensation:
"The admission of these states into the international organizations cannot help but
strengthen the present position of French as the language of cooperation among
nations."42 Significantly, the use of language is measurable by reference to treaties,
3 3GC/Joint Sub-Committee on Cultural Questions and Natural Science/SR3 (1948), 317.

34 29EX/SR17 (1952), 228.
3 UNESCO/Conseil Executif/2nd session/SR12 (1947), 10.
36 2GC/Plenary Conference/VR18 (1947), 209.
3 3GC/Procedure Committee/SR6 (1948), 463.
38 4GC/Procedure Committee/SR5 (1949), 470; SGC/Procedure Committee/SR2 (1950), 662.
39 "France's Cultural Action Throughout the World," p. 4.
40 "The Role of the French Language Today," Education in France, No. 16 (January 1962):
31.
41 Rapport d'Activite de la Direction Ggngrale des Affaires Culturelles et Techniques (Paris:
Minist6re des Affaires Etrangeres, 1964), p. 5 (cited hereafter: Rapport d'Activit6).
42"The Role of the French Language Today," p. 31.

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international organizations, and NGO's. Few aspects of cultural relations possess

such objective indicators and this fact makes the use of French a common referent
for the estimation of French cultural influence as well as a resource in bureaucratic
politics.
UNESCO in Paris
The central French objective at the London Conference in November 1945

which adopted the UNESCO constitution was to locate UNESCO headquarters in
Paris and thereby secure French preeminence as the world's cultural capital.43 This
position was threatened by the wartime IICI inactivity enforced by German
occupation authorities. In response, Latin American states had continued IICI
projects at Havana. Further, London posed a strong alternative claim based on its
wartime role and cultural prominence.
Initially, France attempted to promote the Paris IICI as the Secretariat of the
new organization. This would ensure continuation of French traditions of intel-
lectual cooperation and a central role for French personnel as well as the selection
of Paris. Eventually, this initiative was withdrawn when agreement was obtained on
Paris for UNESCO headquarters.
France strengthened its bargaining position when it secured for itself the role
of co-sponsor with England of the founding London Conference. In April 1945
allied governments had entrusted to Britain alone the organization of a constituent
conference. Then, in July, Henri Laugier asserted that sole British sponsorship was
incompatible with an "international spirit" and could provoke unnamed other
governments to convene similar conferences elsewhere.44 This gambit successfully
secured for France the role of co-host with Britain of the London Conference.
Finally, during the London Conference itself France bartered several aspects
of its own constitutional draft for UNESCO in return for American agreement on
Paris. Initially, the joint allied constitutional draft developed during the wartime
conferences was the only text prepared for consideration at London. In August
1945, however, the French presented their own constitutional proposals as a
bargaining alternative. Subsequently during the London Conference, to obtain
UNESCO headquarters in Paris the French withdrew their suggestion that the IICI
continue as the UNESCO Secretariat; they agreed not to present a candidate for
Director-General; they rescinded demands for NGO representation in the General
Conference; and they made concessions regarding the name of UNESCO and voting
in the organization.
4 Detailed consideration of points in this section occurs in Pendergast, "La Politique

etrangere franqaise et la Creation de l'UNESCO."
4 CAME, Summary Records, 19th Plenary Session, July 1945, p. 3. See also: CAME,
Summary Records, 35th session of Executive Bureau, No. 265, p. 3. Laugier probably was using
the threat of possible Franco-Russian collaboration which had become a theme of French
foreign policy since the December 1944 treaty.

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France derives several significant advantages from UNESCO headquarters.

The prestige of Paris is extensive as the center of international intellectual activities.
Scholars, government representatives, and intellectuals converge for biennial
General Conference sessions and numerous NGO's have established headquarters
near the central organization. Frequent conferences are held in UNESCO facilities
so the economic return is considerable for the administrative inconveniences suf-
fered by French authorities. France has been well-represented by personnel in
Secretariat ranks, and the communication advantage of proximity permits diplo-
matic flexibility and influence.
II Preventive exclusion
French opposition to developments in UNESCO centered on three dimen-

sions which threatened the integrity of French cultural relations. First, France
opposed UNESCO adherence to a philosophy which could undermine the legiti-
macy of national cultural expansion. Second, the French were concerned lest
competitors penetrate areas of French cultural influence under the aegis of multi-
lateral UNESCO programs. Finally, France endeavored to exclude UNESCO from
regulatory activities which might restrict the flexibility and autonomy of French
cultural policy.
1. Huxley versus Maritain. The early French attitude was ambivalent towards
either universalism or diversity as the basis of interstate cultural relations. This
ambivalence derived from the conflict between the traditionally universalistic French
colonial and cultural policies, and the precarious French position in a postwar
world characterized by tendencies towards cultural standardization under American
auspices. An unequivocal position in favor of the diversity of cultures compromise
the pursuit of French cultural expansion, while acceptance of a standardized wor
civilization threatened the viability of French culture itself.
The dangers for France in this situation materialized shortly after the creatio
of UNESCO. During 1946-47 UNESCO entertained discussions of a guiding
philosophy for the organization. Julian Huxley, the first Director-General, propo
for UNESCO a philosophy of "scientific and evolutionary humanism" which as-
sumed the inevitability of a unified world civilization.45 The French insisted th
this statement be considered merely an expression of personal conviction rather
than an official doctrine of UNESCO. At the 1947 General Conference, Jacques
Maritain advanced a French alternative to Huxley's views: a theory of pluralism
which would involve a "foregoing of consideration of ultimate [values] in favor of
agreement at the level of practical values."46
4 See: Julian Huxley. UNESCO: Its Purpose and Its Philosophy. Washington: Public Affairs
Press, 1947.
46 Alexander Ranasinghe UNESCO's Cultural Mission: An Evaluation of Policies, Programs
Projects (New York: Carlton Press, 1969), p. xvi.

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This French formulation was partly a compromise effort to avoid an East-

West altercation over ideological questions which would paralyze UNESCO, destroy
French hopes for an understanding between the blocs, and alienate intellectuals. It
also revealed French Catholic opposition to the materialistic character of Huxley's
ideas.
The threat to French cultural relations, however, elicited concern since
French cultural expansion assumed competition between linguistic blocs. This
assumption would become untenable in the context of an organizational philosophy
of emergent homogeneity. Huxley's views threatened to undermine the rationale f
French cultural policy and to deprive France of an institutional forum in UNESCO.
Homogeneity along other than French lines was inimical to the reassertion of
French cultural influence. Jean Basdevant confirmed these reservations during a
dicussion of French cultural policy: "I confess my uneasiness, even fright, when I
foresee the sort of planetary humanism which certain international organizations
have proposed."47 In the event, Huxley's views aroused enough opposition and too
little enthusiasm to warrant adoption by the plenary UNESCO assembly.
2. Competiton and penetration. Postwar French foreign policy pursued the
consolidation of a bloc of Francophone states. Decolonization required the substitu-
tion of more subtle links for a relationship of direct control. During the movement
for colonial independence the defensive French attitude was mistrustful towards
UNESCO and other competitive units lest other powers attempt through multi-
lateral operations to infiltrate their presence into areas of French influence. France
wished no direct extraneous presence in newly independent countries of Franco-
phone Africa.
A UNESCO project which met typical French hostility during this period was
a plan to establish in African states a system of ecoles normales superieures to train
school teachers. This conception clashed with the French practice of sending
French professors to Africa or else training African personnel in France. It also
implied the development of independent African capabilities in the sensitive area of
educational facilities. Eventually, a compromise agreement provided for UNESCO
to establish the schools and later for France to assume their direction. Similar
concerns accounted for French opposition to attempts by ULNESCO chiefs-of-
mission in member states to decentralize the organization.48
Subsequently, the resilience of France's links with its former colonies became
apparent. The competitive stimulus of the Cold War to superpower penetration of
Africa diminished and former dependencies themselves clamored for UNESCO
projects. France soon devised ways to utilize UNESCO as an instrument in its
relations with African states so that diffidence gave way to more confident
three-way collaboration.
4 "The Direction of Cultural Affairs in France," interview with Jean Basdevant in Education
in France, No. 18 (May 1962): 4.
48 62EX/SR2 (1962), 12; 62EX/SR7 (1962), 65; 62EX/SR22 (1962), 239-40; 60EX/SR13
(1961), 105; 70EX/SR3 (1965), 15; 71EX/SR3 (1965), 25.

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3. State reports and model clauses. Finally, France feared UNESCO inter-
ference with the independent administration of bilateral cultural relations by
member states. The French desired to maintain control and flexibility and to
prevent the establishment of standards which could reduce diplomatic options.
A 1947 draft resolution introduced in UNESCO proposed reports on govern-
ment fellowships and exchanges. Roger Seydoux opposed this requirement on the
basis that states should not "in every case make them entirely public."49 Charles
Lucet also opposed UNESCO inquiry into the nature and possibilities of bilateral
cultural conventions since this might encroach upon government "diplomatic
powers."50 Elsewhere, Marcel Abraham enumerated the disadvantages in proposed
model clauses on cultural exchanges and insisted that the diversity of contexts
precluded the usefulness of standard agreements among states in this field.5
III UNESCO as a resource
France has used UNESCO as a resource to advance specific components of its

cultural policy. In the first place, UNESCO augmented particular French policies
with international resources. Second, worldwide UNESCO programs presented an
opportunity to infiltrate French cultural influence into new regions through multi-
lateral projects. UNESCO also was a forum for the establishment of procedural
regulations (conventions, agreements) to assist the implementation of important
national programs. Finally, UNESCO was a natural locus for the development of
diversified means for the adaptation of cultural relations to requirements of the
contemporary world.
Augmentation
The Cold War constituted both an irritation and a diplomatic opportunity for
France. The opportunity derived from the latitude afforded by American unwillin
ness to renounce protection of its French ally. The irritation arose from the
objective reality of American preponderance. French foreign policy passed through
a succession of stages to exploit this opportunity and to reduce the irritation of
dependence. Mediation between East and West, promotion of a Third Force
Europe, and detente were alternative means to brandish French autonomy. Coupled
with this resolve was recognition of the diminished consequence of nations in a
world of continental superstates. Through regional integration in the EEC and by
leadership of Francophone states France intended to extend its own resources.
492GC/Program and Budget Commission/VR8 (1947), 356.

so 29EX/SR16 (1952), 213.
51 4GC/Program and Budget Commission/SR10 (1949), 300.

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The French attempted through UNESCO to pursue goals related to these

themes of postwar policy. First, France desired to contribute to East-West inter-
change through UNESCO programs. UNESCO was ideally suited as a ground of
East-West rapprochement. Second, France endeavored to direct UNESCO assis-
tance to former colonies to solidify the French presence. Additionally, UNESCO
furnished assistance to the French program of literary translations.
The French desired to limit government control and to exclude volatile
political issues from UNESCO in order to insulate the organization from Cold War
political dynamics. Discussion of political issues would stimulate government sur-
veillance of the organization and diminish the role of intellectuals. Polarization
would negate the value of UNESCO as a bridge between two worlds. French
determination to limit formal government participation in UNESCO was evident
during early debates on the constitutional framework. Several components of
French constitutional proposals in 1945 which minimized government involvement
included: a significant role for independent NGO's in UNESCO; individual voting
rather than unit solidarity by national delegates at the General Conference; Execu-
tive Board independence from government control; and an expanded role for
National Commisssions.52
Although governments did assume a substantial role in UNESCO, France
continued to insist on the exclusion of political debate. Roger Seydoux stressed the
conception of UNESCO as a force for mitigating ideological antagonisms.53 He
envisaged UNESCO's role in terms of an assumed separability of political from
technical issues: "If, despite a world divided in two, UNESCO had been able to
carry out work of a purely technical nature, it was precisely because it had
remained aloof from political and other considerations which had practically
paralyzed other international organizations."54 To avoid political issues in
UNESCO, French delegates variously maintained silence during discussion, medi-
ated between disputants, or insisted that political issues be referred for resolution
to the UN. This position imposed on French delegates an unaccustomed reticence
on questions with political ramifications such as admissions, telecommunications,
and uses of the mass media.55
Unilateral French opposition, however, was unable to keep UNESCO apart
from Cold War tensions. This was one reason for the eventual disillusionment of
many intellectuals with the organization. Also, France itself lapsed occasionally
from consistency in its non-political conception of UNESCO. Especially after 1958,
French policies assumed an outspoken political tone.
It was inadequate, moreover, merely to insulate the organization from Cold
War issues. French interests implied the active engagement of UNESCO in projects to
52 These French proposals were traded for American agreement to place UNESCO in Paris, as
discussed earlier.
5 UNESCO/Conseil Executif/Second session/SR2 (1947), 8-9.
54 20EX/SR2 (1950), 2; 3GC/EX-HS/SR1 (1948), 8.
55 1OEX/SR1 (1948), 17; EX/6CP/SR4 (1946), 13; 67EX/SR11 (1964), 94.

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associate East and West. This had been evident in t

invitation for Russia to join UNESCO with an assured seat on the Executive
Board.56 It became clear on subsequent issues as well.
In the aftermath of war many European states were unable to reestablish
viable newspaper industries. UNESCO proposed to investigate the technical needs
of the press in devastated countries and to distribute this information to relief
agencies. American delegates opposed any allocation of UNESCO funds to non-
member states and complained that the Ukraine and Byelorussia were included in
the investigation. Roger Seydoux countered that UNESCO was obligated to dis-
seminate its principles into Communist countries and that such surveys were an
entering wedge for this purpose.57
French delegates also sponsored UNESCO resolutions for pan-European coop-
eration. These regional conferences of National Commissions were one form of
East-West cooperation within the context of UNESCO and the first European
conference of Commissions occurred in 1956 at Aix-en-Provence. The French
National Commission also engaged in bilateral projects with East European Com-
missions. Among these were a joint French-Polish study of the role of leisure in
culture, and bilateral French-Hungarian meetings on textbook revision. Similar
projects sponsored by national commissions occur in the context of bilateral
cultural agreements.
French policy towards the Vienna Center for Social Science Documentation
also had East-West ramifications. A UNESCO resolution in 1962 called for a
"European Center for Research Coordination and Documentation in Social
Sciences," which would stimulate East-West collaboration in the social sciences. A
Belgian delegate noted that it would facilitate scientific dialogue with East Euro-
pean researchers and function as a terrain de rencontre between East and West.58
Both the United States and England questioned its utility.59 French delegate Jean
Stoetzel supported the organization and substantial UNESCO financial assistance.
The French government itself extended the Center a subvention and, once estab-
lished, the Center was marked by French influence with a Frenchman as Director.
Similarly, French policies on UNESCO relations with NGO's concerned
East-West politics. For many years UNESCO had rejected consultative relations
with Communist organizations and until 1967 France voted regularly to refuse
admission to these bodies because of their partisan nature and membership limita-
tions.60 The French decided abruptly in 1967 not to oppose their acceptance for
56 UNESCO/Preparatory Commission/P.V. 1 (1946), 2. This French effort to extend a hand to

Russia was rejected by other states.
57 UNESCO/Conseil Executif/2nd session/SR7 (1947), 2-4.
58 12GC/PRG/SR17 (1962),18; 13GC/PRG/SR31 (1964), 3-4.
59 12GC/PRG/SR17 (1962),13.
60 These included the International Union of Students, the World Federation of Teache
Unions, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, the International Organizati
Journalists, and the World Council of Peace.

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consultative status. Henri Laugier indicated that French support for such organiza-
tions could "assure useful relations between East and West."61
French opposition to UNESCO penetration into Francophone Africa was
recounted earlier. With the dissipation of this initial defensiveness a modus vivendi
evolved. Superpower competition waned as costs rose and rewards appeared
tenuous. African states themselves requested UNESCO assistance and France recog-
nized the utility of UNESCO resources and expertise with little danger of displace-
ment. There resulted an increased French disposition to coordinate multilateral
with bilateral aid. By 1965 the Foreign Ministry reported: "In an increasing number
of cases French bilateral aid and multilateral assistance associate their efforts within
the same operation."62 Given the exigencies of working with French-educated
indigenous populations, France contributed the majority of experts on many
multilateral missions and was able thereby both to profit from international finance
for projects in Francophone states and to retain operational influence.
Previously, France had opposed both regionalism in UNESCO and voluntary
contributions for specific activities.63 By 1960, however, France supported in-
creased UNESCO allocations for African states when projects posed no danger of
foreign influence. Julien Cain urged more experts and scholarships for the African
region.64 At the 1960 General Conference a French resolution proposed funds to
support social science research centers in African states.65 The same year France
supported a budget increase specifically for educational assistance to African
countries.66 In 1962 France proposed an African regional center to train adminis-
trators and included an incentive contribution of one and one-half million francs.67
An elaborate instance of formal cooperation between France and UNESCO oc-
curred with the Ivory Coast project of audio-visual primary education.68 France
also encouraged contacts with African National Commissions: "The cooperation of
the French Commission with African Commissions has become a permanent and
privileged task."69 A harmonization of positions among Commission representative
occurred before the 1966 General Conference during the Journees franco-africaines.
NGO's were again relevant to the extension of French influence in Africa.
The United Towns Federation (UFT) engaged in "town-twinning" and cultural
cooperation at the municipal level. Its President, LUopold Senghor, espoused the
traditional French people-to-people approach of cultural exchange and it was
popular among African states and an instrument in French promotion of bilingual-
ism. A French observer commented: "the object of the movement for town-
6150EX/SR19 (1958), 198.

62Rapport d'Activite (1965), 57.
63 3GC/Joint Program and External Relations Commission/SR4 (1948), 421; 8EX/SR2
(1948), 4.
64 56EX/SR32 (1960), 359.
65 11GC/DR/87.
68 Balous, p. 139.
69 Rapport d'Activitg, Commission Frangaise pour 1'UNESCO, CN. 130 (1968), 11.

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twinning . . . is to create . . . a permanent interest for the associated French town

and to foster this interest... ."70 France promoted the UFT in UNESCO and voted
for large subventions. Britain and the US felt its contribution to UNESCO was
negligible.71 Both supported instead the older International Union of Towns a
Local Authorities (IUTLA), which undertakes practical cooperation among munici-
pal governments on common problems such as water supply and sewage disposal.
Besides these regional objectives of French policy, the functional task of
translations animated French interest in UJNESCO. The Foreign Ministry pursued
the translation of foreign literature into the French language: "If the universality of
the French language can today be anything but a myth, a large collection of French
translations of international masterpieces would be of great assistance." They
expressed ambivalence about translation of French works into other tongues,
asking "whether not translating would not sometimes serve better the cause of
French as a language."72 France itself has an extensive program of translations and
many editors' catalogues show in paperback editions more foreign than French
authors.73 One French writer commented: "Those books which will pro-
vide . . . the keys to the modern world are either written directly in or translated
into French.. ."74
French interest in UNESCO centered on the Index Translationum and on
assistance to translators. Julien Cain claimed that translation and publication of
classics "were of the very essence of UNESCO's work," and advocated increased
assistance for translations.75 He proposed an international institute for translat
and a "code for translators."76 In tune with changing priorities of French cultu
policy, Henri Laugier asked translation of scientific as well as literary works.77 T
the extent that linguistic expansion is based on demographic, economic, scientific,
or cultural preeminence France attempted in UNESCO to undercut growing Ameri-
can predominance by French wrapping for the fruits of foreign enterprise.
Infiltration
France attempted to utilize multilateral UJNESCO projects to establish a

toehold to exploit later bilaterally. The Foreign Ministry indicated in 1957 this
70J-M Chevalier, "Pour Une Doctrine Coherente et Liberale d'Action Culturene, La Revu
Administrative, No. 69 (May-June 1959), 285.
71 72EX/SR3 (1966), 47; 13GC/PRG/SR46 (1964), 6-13; 75EX/SR3 (1966), 23; 76EX/SR9
(1967), 104.
72 Rapport sur les Projets gtablis, par la Commission des Suggestions de Travaux, r6unie 'a la
Direction G6nbrale des Relations Culturelles du 27 avril au 27 juin, 1945, presentee par Mme.
Marie-Jeanne Durry, 4-5 (mimeograph, Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres).
73 14GC/PRG/S-CI/SR25 (1966), 7.
74 "The Role of the French Language Today," 31.
75 5GC/Program and Budget Commission/SR22 (1950), 410; 6GC/Program Commission/SR10
(1951), 333.
76 67EX/SR15 (1964), 141; 71EX/SR32 (1965), 363.
7 8GC/Program and Budget Commission (1954), 470.

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intention to penetrate new areas. French technical experts for UNESCO missions
were central to this policy: "The Service assures . . . that French candidates of high
quality are advanced for recruitment to expert posts in the multilateral frame-
work.... French participation is appreciated by beneficiaries of multilateral pro-
grams and . . . the occasion is presented us to expand further the ties between these
countries and France in informing them of the means that we can place at their
disposition and of the activities in France oriented to problems of social and
economic development."78 In 1958 a regional target was set: "Latin America must
be a priority zone for our cultural and technical expansion . . in the framework of
UNESCO projects."19
Consequently, France became a major supplier of experts for UNESCO field
projects. A 1963 report stressed this role of French experts: "Our experts on
mission with UNESCO continue a first-rate role; with 154 experts ... France
remains at the head of states which provide specialists to UNESCO."80 French
experts establish a cultural presence and constitute an experienced corps of trained
personnel for later bilateral use.
France derives similar advantages from UNESCO scholarships. The bilateral
French scholarship program for foreign students increased from 2,924 grants in
1959 to 15,731 during 1967-68.81 The French supported UNESCO scholarships
and urged financial equality with technical assistance programs. Henri Laugier
discarded the view of many recipient countries that they derived greater benefit
from the services of experts than from fellowship grants.82 He urged more fellow-
ship funds because of their long-run efficacy in the formation of indigenous
experts.83 French delegates proposed "as much allowance for fellowships and
training grants as for missions of experts."84
This emphasis on fellowships rested on three considerations. Both inter-
national programs and French bilateral activities require numerous technical experts
so that French experts on UNESCO missions diminish the personnel available for
bilateral relations. This requires an alternate means to meet demands for technical
expertise. Second, many fellowship trainees select France as a place of study. From
1958 to 1963 the number of internationally financed scholarships expended in
France rose from 185 to 982.85 Finally, more permanent influence may derive
from education than from the transitory services of French experts on mission. The
French National Commission nourishes associations established through these study
78 Rapport d'Activitt (1959), 25; Ibid (1960), 26: Ibid (1961), 36.
79 Projet de Program d'Expansion en Cinq Ans 1958-1961, Direction G&n6rale des Affaires
Culturelles et Techniques, Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, 6-7.
80 Rapport dA'ctivitt (1963), 5 7.
81 Balous, 105.
82 5OEX/SR23 (1958) 252-4.

83 Ibid.
84 56EX/9 Addendum (1960), 59.

85 Rapport d'Activitt (1963), 40-1.

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tours: "The Commission has been able to continue its documentary service for
foreign correspondents: former UNESCO scholarship holders who exercise responsi-
bilities for which they studied in France. . . . The complete collection of documents
permits some of them to establish a small reference and documentation center of
French education and culture."86
Procedural facilitation
The success of French cultural expansion requires cooperation by other

states. Regulations that restrict circulation of cultural material or collaboration
among intellectuals are therefore detrimental to French policy. Consequently, in
UNESCO France urged agreement on standards for the regulation of cultural
transactions.
The distribution of books and periodicals to promote the global availability
of French culture is a traditional instrument of French cultural expansion. The
French government subsidizes the exportation of books and periodicals and pub-
lishes literature on various aspects of France. In 1968 the Quai d' Orsay distributed
500,000 volumes at a cost of 15,000,000 francs.87 The practical success of these
programs depends on mundane problems such as transport difficulties and tariff
restrictions. UNESCO is a natural forum for multilateral removal of such hindrances.
Paul Rivet urged diminished transport and tariff barriers to international exchange
of publications.88 A 1958 French resolution suggested study of obstacles which
impede the exchange of art works. Roger Seydoux credited UNESCO with effective
action to facilitate the exchange of persons.89
The cinema has also become a major French cultural asset since the growth of
worldwide interest in the "seventh art."French films of the New Wave are assured
distribution in university communities and cosmopolitan centers. The Foreign
Ministry recognized the opportunity which this affords: "More than any other
means of diffusion, the cinema assures a French presence in all milieux."90 An
immediate French postwar problem was to secure financial resources for film-
makers. French delegates suggested UNESCO assistance for the "unchallengeable
right of every country to express its own genius through the cinema" and advocated
customs exemptions on cultural films.9' At the first General Conference France
proposed an international convention for free circulation of cultural films.92 Since
national regulations frequently are sensitive to questions of morality in the cinema,
86 Rapport d'ActivitW, Commission Francaise pour l'UNESCO, CN. 121 (1967), 13-4.
87 Balous, p. 77.
88 2GC/Working Parties. H: Libraries and Documentation/SRl (1947), 4.

90 Rapport d'ActiviuW (1958), 7.
91 Preparatory Commission/Mass Media of Communication Commission/SR3 (1946), 4.
92 1GC/Documents: "Program of UNESCO: Comments by the Delegation of France. Media of
Mass Communication," by Jean Painleve (1946), 1.

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French delegates proposed UNESCO certificates to certify the "cultural worth" of

films and to provide a moral endorsement in the "interests of art."93 In 1958 a
French resolution called for international agreement on film print standardization
to facilitate distribution.94
A final French procedural concern in UNESCO pertained to educational
certification. Cross-national differences in educational levels and methods deter
student exchanges. As a major recipient of foreign students, therefore, France had a
pressing interest in interstate agreement on educational certification. The French
cultural plan declared that in order to maintain the number of foreign students in
France, "pending problems of diploma equivalences must be resolved."95 Hence, a
French proposal at the first UNESCO assembly in 1946 suggested study of equiva-
lences between diplomas and teaching systems.96
Means diversification
Changes in world politics during the postwar years necessitated diversification

of the instruments of French cultural policy. Increased competition by other states
and a changing clientele required the modernization of methods. In 1963 the
Foreign Ministry stressed this task: "One of the preoccupations of the General
Direction of Cultural and Technical Affairs is to stimulate and direct the elabora-
tion of modern methods of instruction of the French language."97 France pursues
this domestically through research institutions for the study of educational innova-
tions such as CREDIF, BEL, and AUDECAM.
UNESCO appeared attractive as a laboratory for the study of new techniques.
French officials were interested in the perfection of audio-visual media for use in
metropolitan France and in overseas cultural expansion. Audio-visual techniques
promised to extend the social area of instruction and to increase the rapidity and
quality of education.98 In 1954 Henri Laugier proposed a UNESCO study of radio
broadcasting for education in underdeveloped countries.99 Later, he deplored
UNESCO's lethargy in using the "invaluable educational possibilities offered by the
cinema and radio," and he urged inclusion of the use of audio-visual media in the
Major Project for the Extension of Primary Education in Latin America. '0? Robert
Lefranc supported UNESCO experimental studies in the use of audio-visual meth-
ods in less-developed countries.101 France eventually joined UNESCO in an exten-
sive project of educational television in the Ivory Coast.
93 4GC/Program and Budget Commission/SR11 (1949), 310.

94 1OC/DR/32.
95 Second Plan quinquennal, 12.
96 1GC/Program Commission/SR3 (1946), 129.
97 Rapport d'ActivitU (1963), 25.
98 Second Plan quinquennal, 12.
99 37EX/SR9 (1954), 46.
100 44EX/SR7 (1956), 62; 44EX/SR13 (1956), 126.
101 12GC/PRG/SR30 (1962), 19; 12GC/PRG/SC. ED/SR4 (1962), 5.

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During the renaissance of French cultural relations in 1958 French delegates

attempted to convince the UNESCO Secretariat to publicize and improve the
quality of reports on field missions. Henri Laugier complained that expert reports
were too seldom available and did not exhibit the critical character which would
enable them to be "put to good use." He felt in particular that he could use a
document on radio education in Colombia to increase French attention to audio
instruction. 102 In 1958 Roger Seydoux proposed a UNESCO "Study Bureau" for
countries to obtain advice concerning their bilateral relations. He called for publica-
tion of UNESCO's "vast store of all too unfamiliar documents." 103 Julien Cain urged
more conscientious preparation and wider availability of critical reports on expert
missions. 104 French delegates called for "analysis and dissemination of the mass of
information and experience yielded by the work of UNESCO's experts, missions,
and regional centers." 105 In 1960 the French proposed that UNESCO "analyse the
means of cultural action and the priorities to give them; research the respective
roles of television, cinema, libraries, discotheques; define the ideal conditions for
creation and operation of 'maisons de culture'; study the administrative and
financial structures best adapted to cultural action." 106
In these ways France endeavored to convert UNESCO into a laboratory and
research institution for the study of cultural diffusion and the development of new
techniques. A major problem for France was to accommodate its cultural programs
to the cultural and sociological milieux of indigenous peoples. 107 The variety of
cultures and local environments represented in UNESCO presented opportunities
for comparative analysis unavailable to any single country. UNESCO could mobilize
international personnel of diverse experience and training. Such knowledge ac-
quired by UNESCO field missions is applicable in bilateral relations.
IV Conclusion
The French experience in UNESCO is suggestive from the standpoint of

broader perspectives concerning the interaction between governmental actors and
international organizations. Particular interest attaches to the process by which
government policy is formulated, and the roles and incentives for participation in
international organizations.
The preceding presentation embodies an implicit model of French policy in
UNESCO which suggests the predominance of official governmental concerns. This
102 48EX/SR3 (1957), 28: 48EX/SR5 (1957), 38.

103 1OGC/Plenary Conference (1958), 169.
104 62EX/SR10 (1962), 98.
10 Document 13C/8/Add. I.
106 14GC/PRG/S-CII/SR24 (1966), 6.
107 Balous, p. 85.

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is only a partial representation of reality. The French government is not monolithic,

nor does it act consistently as a unit. Private interests cut across conflicts which
involve governmental bureaucracies. French policies emerge from a process of
conflict and compromise which occurs among participants within the French
national arena and penetrates into environing political systems of other member
states, NGO's and UNESCO itself.
The French conception of UNESCO may be seen as a multinational expres-
sion of a historical French governmental impulse towards the institutionalization of
culture. Successive French governments have sought to institutionalize and to
magnify French culture through the Institut, the Academie Franqaise, and other
devices. This has typically been for the dual purpose of government legitimization
and cultural expansion by means of the co6ptation of representatives of the
national culture. 108 These purposes, combined with characteristics of French
politics, required a structural solution to French participation in UNESCO which
replicates many features of the "tutelage" relationship which is evident at various
levels of French society. 109 This eventuated in considerable latitude for French
intellectual elites represented on the National Commission in the formulation of
program policy. It also explains the early French efforts to minimize the participa-
tion of governments in UNESCO.
It is consequently possible to identify numerous "pet projects" which indi-
vidual French participants have sponsored within UNESCO. 110 Henri Laugier was a
persistent advocate of audio-visual means of instruction and of cancer research.
Pierre Auger was instrumental in securing UNESCO cooperation in the establish-
ment of CERN. Jean Thomas worked actively for a convention on the status of
teaching personnel. Julien Cain was interested in the educational use of museums,
construction of libraries in developing countries, and the preservation of cultural
objects. Rene Cassin advocated studies of comparative and international law and of
respect for human rights. Lucien Febvre and Paul Rivet provided a major impetus
for the Scientific and Cultural History of Mankind. Vadim Elisseef promoted the
East-West Cultural Project. Jean Stoetzel collaborated in the Trend Report on
Social Sciences and was instrumental in the creation of the Vienna Center of Social
Science Documentation.
French government authorities, however, define the political limits within
which delegates are constrained. Thus, French support for the admission of Franco
Spain to UNESCO in 1952 provoked widespread threats of resignation from the
108 I develop this point further in my doctoral dissertation, "French Policy in UNESCO,
Columbia University, 1971.
109 On tutelage in France, and its expression in advisory bodies, see: Frederick Ridley an
Jean Blondel. Public Administration in France (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), pp.
70ff.
110 James Sewell points out that within UNESCO individuals from many countries have
"hobbyhorses" which they ride from year to year (James P. Sewell, "UNESCO: Pluralism
Rampant" in The Anatomy of Influence: Decision-Making in International Organization by
Robert W. Cox and Harold K. Jacobson, eds. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), p. 173.

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National Commission. In such situations, the tensions implicit in the tutelage

relationship become apparent. Furthermore, the French government promoted
specific projects in UNESCO to advance its program of cultural expansion.
From this perspective, the usefulness of a "bureaucratic politics" model for
understanding French policy in UNESCO does not negate a rational-actor concep-
tion so much as it explicates the nature of French government objectives. The
responsiveness of French policy to the parochial interests of individuals and groups
was the instrumental means to the realization of central government objectives. The
association of French intellectuals with the National Commission and UNESCO was
necessary for each facet of the dyad of French goals and required sensitivity to
French intellectual interests. In this way, UNESCO could function as a multina-
tional device for the co6ptation of French intellectuals in the service of cultural
expansion and for the consolidation of government authority within France.
This situation of government tolerance within broad political parameters
maximizes the probable incidence of both transnational and "transgovernmental"
political relationships. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye suggest that conspiratorial
coalition-building between bureaucratic sub-units of governments is most likely to
occur on issues where there exist inter-elite communication networks, lax control
by hierarchical authority, conflicts of interest within governments, and evident
convergence of interest between governmental sub-units in different countries. I"
These conditions often occur in combination in the case of French participation in
UNESCO. Here, the situation is even more complex because the actors are not
solely governmental agencies but include as well the quasi-public National Commis-
sion, domestic interest groups, prominent individuals, NGO's, the UNESCO Secre-
tariat, and counterparts in other member states. In such a context a priori distinc-
tions dissolve in a fusion of transnational and transgovernmental relationships.
At the same time, French officials defined the relevance of UNESCO to a
central dimension of postwar French foreign relations. The clear utilitarian relation-
ship between aspects of French cultural relations and French proposals for UNES-
CO suggests that the rational actor may not be entirely moribund. French authori-
ties made a determined effort to secure the location of UNESCO in Paris, the
privileged use of the French language, and to direct the organization towards
activities with appeal for an international intellectual clientele. The eventual redefi-
nition of UNESCO as a technical assistance agency mitigated the import of their
success in the first two tasks. In other ways, France endeavored to divert UNESCO
from paths detrimental to French cultural policy. These dangers included the
creation of international norms and reports on bilateral cultural relations, adher-
ence by UNESCO to a philosophy inimical to French cultural policy, and penetra-
tion by multilateral organs into areas of French cultural predominance. In none of
these cases has UNESCO substantially harmed French cultural relations. In a more
. Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "Transnational Relations and International

Organizations," World Politics, 27, No. 1 (October 1974): 3942.

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positive vein, France availed itself of UNESCO to augment its independent actions,
to infiltrate a French presence into new areas, to facilitate the operational conduct
of cultural relations, and to diversify the conventional instruments of cultural
action. Additionally, the semi-public French National Commission emerged as an
agent for the conduct of French cultural diplomacy.
Such instrumental rationality, however, occurred within the framework of
basic and yet questionable assumptions about the French role in UNESCO which
eventually undermined its effectiveness. This helps to explain why French gains
were greatest initially. French officials consistently advocated a restricted func-
tional scope for UNESCO and the value of multilateralism within that area. The
determination to restrict UNESCO's jurisdictional boundaries to "intellectual"
activities revealed a traditional French belief that the universality of French culture
would suffuse an international organization confined to this sector. This anticipa-
tion seemed reasonable from the experience of the early IICI and had been
institutionalized in assimilationist French colonial policies, but it failed to foresee
the impact of emerging trends. It assumed a world of states with internal social
stratification and cultural predilections similar to those of the Old European core.
Further, the expanded component of science in the concept of culture and the
appeal of contemporary American scientific advances threatened the prominence of
France as representative of the humanist tradition.
In contrast, France opposed multilateralism in the area of technical assis-
tance. This represents a sophisticated perception of the differential utility for
French policy of different structural approaches to particular problems. The
effects of cultural relations are internal and affective. An admiration for French
culture and language is a permanent advantage for French diplomacy and commerce
which may be cultivated through both bilateral and multilateral instruments.
Technical assistance, on the other hand, is a less durable form of influence based
on control over funds and expertise which may be available from competitive
sources. The influence which France obtains from technical assistance suffers
greater diminution from transferral to multilateral programs than does the impact
of cultural relations.
French policy also revealed an elitist bias in its emphasis on intellectual
activities as opposed to the populistic diffusion of knowledge through mass educa-
tion. Roger Seydoux reflected this basic French position when he remarked that
"scientists and research workers needed UNESCO's help as much, and perhaps
more, than did illiterates, and it was only through the former that UNESCO could
really reach the general public in every country." 112 This attitude reflects the
elitist appeal of French high culture but also reveals a fundamental image of the
way in which societies are governed. Bilateral French cultural relations also mani-
fest disproportionate concern with foreign elites almost to the exclusion of the
112 26EX/SR1 (1951), 35.

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mass public.113 The effectiveness of this strategy declined during a period of

expanding popular participation in political and economic decision making.
The belief that politics could be excluded from UNESCO also rested on
unwarranted assumptions which doubtless derived from contemporary functionalist
enthusiasm for the separation of technical and political sectors. In the case of
UNESCO it proved untenable. It was also less than candid since the desire to
proscribe politics was itself a guiding political design for the extension of French
influence through cultural cooperation and for the other political uses which
France conceived for the organization.
Finally, French preoccupation with the role of the French language in
UNESCO rested on assumptions concerning the efficacy of linguistic links in
producing diplomatic and commercial effects. Although it remains an empirically
unsubstantiated premise, this belief amounts to a dogma of French cultural rela-
tions. It is imbued with the patina of the historic association between the era of
French primacy in Europe under the monarchy and the contemporaneous status of
French as lingua franca among European elites. It also finds a practical current basis in
the pragmatic concerns of French teachers overseas and the commercial
interests of French publishers.
Subsequent changes undermined many of these French assumptions. Interna-
tional organizations are not merely passive instruments of state policy but are
subject to diverse influences and are themselves participants in world politics which
display a measure of operational autonomy varying with the nature of institutional
tasks, leadership, internal structure, and the international environment.
France was unable unilaterally to determine UNESCO's structure and program.
measured against initial French expectations, the course of UNESCO's developm
towards technical assistance was reason for disappointment. The advent of forma
government control and recurrent political dispute was also at variance with Fre
preferences. This explains eventual changes in the tenor of French policy towa
UNESCO.
UNESCO was generally a favored institution from the standpoint of Fr
participation. One can discern successive stages, however, in the official Fr
evaluation of UNESCO. The changing tone of this French assessment was mani-
fest particularly in policy towards the budget and on matters concerning Head-
quarters arrangements.114 Until 1950 French policy passed through a period
of uncertainty during which French delegates urged budgetary caution and were
reluctant to extend UNESCO's activities. By 1950 a new generosity marked French
policy. On budgetary matters French delegates opposed preliminary budget ceilings
and urged expansionary programs despite the economic drain in Indochina and in
113 Pendergast, "French Cultural Relations." But there were indications of change during the
mid-1960s.
114 The following section is developed more fully in my doctoral dissertation, "French Policy
in UNESCO."

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the face of British and American opposition. During this period the French also
offered an attractive site and advantageous financial terms for the construction of a
UNESCO Headquarters building in order to ensure its permanence in Paris. After
1958, however, a restrictive budgetary attitude and quibbling over Headquarters
amenities accompanied a general politicization of French policy. In 1964 French
delegates even suggested that UNESCO remove itself from Paris to a more pastoral
environment. 115 In 1966 the French refused a new loan request for Headquarters
expansion, and in 1967 they denounced the 1949 UNESCO tax accord. 116
This transition in French policy demonstrates the variability over time as well
as among different organizations and countries in the incentives for state participa-
tion in intergovernmental structures. French policy makers worked within an
instrumental framework which was heavily influenced by expectations. The French
attitude changed in response to the disintegration of early assumptions and political
and economic changes within France so that eventually France formed a core of
resistance to the extension of UNESCO's activities to new sectors. The development
of UNESCO represents a transfer of constituency support from early French
enthusiasm for cultural projects to alternate sources of advocacy for institutional
expansion in new directions. The extension of UNESCO's tasks was not a consen-
sual process based on satisfaction with initial performance or intricate linkages with
related activities, but occurred in response to opportunities and demands articu-
lated by new client states.
The most important variables behind the development in French attitudes
were changes in French domestic politics and economics, and in UNESCO itself.
The economic and political instability in France after the conclusion of World War
II precluded a confident French policy towards the organization. It was some time
before UNESCO was integrated into a coherent program of French cultural rela-
tions. During the 1950s the economic situation improved and the French govern-
ment achieved stability despite surface agitation. The accession of Charles de Gaulle
to the Premiership, and later Presidency, altered the domestic context of French
politics, and economic austerity diminished French willingness to subsidize
UNESCO expansion. The UN impinged in numerous ways on Gaullist foreign
policy. Within France, bureaucratic servility to perceived Presidential predilections
extended de Gaulle's animosity towards the UN even to preferred bodies like
UNESCO.117 The transformation of UNESCO itself altered the structure of French
interests and the expense of UNESCO technical assistance funds which were
expended overseas outstripped French tolerance for multilateralism within this
sector.
115 13GC/ADM/SR21 (1964), 6;14GC/ADM/SR17 (1966), 6.

116 14GC/ADM/SR17 (1966), 8; 76EX/SR7 (1967), 69.
117 President de Gaulle made an unusual personal visit to UNESCO Headquarters in November
1966 to celebrate its twentieth anniversary and dispelled some of the gloom which radiated
from contemporaneous French negativism towards the UN.

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Appendix I: Biographical sketch of French participants
Marcel Abraham4 -Chef de Cabinet, Ministry of National Education, 1932-34; Inspector,

Academy of Paris, 1936; Directeur du Cabinet, Ministry of National Education, 1936-39;
General Inspector of Public Education, 1945; General Inspector of Overseas Instruction,
1946; Directeur du Cabinet, Ministry of National Education; Director, University Service
of Relations Overseas and Abroad; Member, Superior Council of National Education;
Member, French National Commission for UNESCO; President of Council, International
Bureau of Education.
Pierre Auger' -Professor of Physics, University of Paris, 1937-69; Founder and Director,
Documentation Service of CNRS, 1939-41; Researcher, University of Chicago,
1941-44; Director of Higher Education, 1945-48; Member, Atomic Energy Commission,
1945-48; Director, UNESCO Department of Sciences, 1948-59; Director, European
Organization of Space Research, 1962-67; Director, CNRS Cosmic Physics Service,
1959-62; President, National Center of Space Research, 1961-62; Member, High
Committee for Protection and Defense of the French Language.
Jean Basdevant' -Director-general of Cultural Relations, Foreign Ministry, 1960-68; Ambassa-

dor to Algeria, 1968-71.
Julien Cain2-General-director of National Library, 1930; Member of the Institut; President

of French National Commission for UNESCO; Director Musee Jacquemart-Andre.
Rene Cassin' -Professor of Law, University of Paris, 1929-60; Secretary, Conseil de Defense
Nationale, 1940-41; Commissioner of Justice and Education, Free French government,
1941-43; French Representative, League of Nations, 1924-38; French Representative,
United Nations, 1946-68; French founding member of UNESCO, 1944; French delegate
to UNESCO, 1945-52; President, European Court of Human Rights, 1965-68; Member,
French Constitutional Council, 1960-71; President, UN Commission of Human Rights,
recipient, Nobel Peace Prize, 1968.
Vadim Elisseef-Professor, Sorbonne.
Lucien Febvre6 -Professor of History at Universities of Besanqon and Dijon; Prof

College de France, 1930; Director, Institute of Modern History at University of Stras-
bourg.
Christian Fouchet2 -Secretary, Moscow Embassy, 1944-45; delegate to Provisional Govern-

ment at Lublin and Warsaw, 1945-47; delegate to India, 1945-47; Member, Directorate
of RPF, 1947-51; Ambassador to Denmark, 1958-62; President, Study Committee on
European Political Unity; High Commissioner in Algeria, 1962; Minister of National
Education, 1962.
Louis Franqois' -General Inspector of Public Education, 1945; Vice-President, French Nat
Commission for UNESCO, 1957-1975; President, Federation of UNESCO Clubs; Mem-
ber, Superior Council of National Education, 1959-73.
Henri Laugier3-Professor of Industrial Physiology, Conservatoire des Arts et Metiers, 1929-38;

Director, Conseil National de Recherche Scientifique, 1938-40; Professor of Physiology,
University of Montreal, 1940-43; Rector, Algerian Academy, 1943-44; Director of
Cultural Relations, Foreign Ministry, 1944-46; Assistant Secretary-general for Social
Affairs, United Nations, 1946-51; Professor of Physiology, Sorbonne, 1937-73; Found-
ing Member, High Committee for Protection and Defense of the French Language.
Robert Lefranc3-Director, Audio-visual center of Ecole Normale Superieure; Chef of Audio-

visual techniques at Institut Pedagogique National; Charge-de-Mission for Audio-visual
problems.

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Charles Lucet'-Attache, French Embassy in Washington, 1935; Chef de Service, Relations

Culturelles, 1950; Plenipotentiary Minister, 1952; French delegate, UN Security Council,
1953; Director of Political Affairs, 1959; Ambassador to Washington, 1965-72; Ambassa-
dor to Italy, 1972-74.
Jacques Maritain-Professor and Philosopher.
Paul Rivets -Professor of Anthropology; Founding Member, Committee for Restoration of

French Republic, 1943; Founder, Paris Musee de 1' Homme; Deputy, French National
Assembly.
Roger Seydoux1 -Director, Ecole libre de Science Politique, 1942-45; Director, Institut d'Etudes
Politiques, 1945; Chef du Cabinet, Foreign Ministry, 1946; Vice-President, UNESCO
Executive Board, 1948; French Consul to New York, 1950-52; Minister to Washington,
1951-54; Director-general of Cultural and Technical Affairs, Foreign Ministry, 1956;
Representative to UN Security Council 1962-67; Representative to NATO, 1967; Ambas-
sador to Moscow, 1968-72.
Jean Stoetzel' -Professor, University of Bordeaux, 1945-55; at Paris since 1955; President and
founder, Institut FranQais de l'Opinion Publique (IFOP), 1938-75; President, Social
Science Committee of French Commission for UNESCO, 1958-75; Member, Executive
Board of Vienna Center for Social Science Documentation and Research, 1963-75.
Jean Thomas' -Professor, Universities of Poitiers and Lyons, 1934-36; Chef de Service,
Ministry of National Education, 1944-46; Deputy Director-General of UNESCO,
1946-60; General Inspector of Public Education, 1962-71; Council President, Interna-
tional Bureau of Education, 1968-72; President, French National Commission for
UNESCO, 1974-75.
Sources:
1. Who's Who in France, 1975.
2. Who's Who in Europe, 1972.
3. Who's Who in Europe, 1966-67.
4. Dictionnaire Biographique Franqais Contemporain, 1954-SE. Paris: Agence Internatio
de Documentation Contemporaine, 1954.
5. New York Times, 1958.
6. Who's Who in France, 1955-56.

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Appendix III: Major-item allocation of UNESCO budgetary
General General Common Natural

policy administration services Education sciences
19491 268,740 2,019,798 1,000,000 810,165 679,505

(3.4%) (25.9%) (12.8%) (10.4%) ( 8.7%)
19501 308,504 1,966,202 673,318 1,055,815 755,975
(3.8%) (24.5%) ( 8.4%) (13.1%) ( 9.4%)
19511 235,219 1,035,745 672,216 1,113,556 857,439
(2.8%) (12.6%) ( 8.1%) (13.5%) (10.4%)
19521 313,292 987,213 699,525 1,353,994 874,086
(3.5%) (11.3%) ( 8.0%) (15.5%) (10.0%o)
19531 76,878 1,301,568 715,539 1,735,061 797,155
( .8%) (14.4%) ( 7.9%) (19.2%) ( 8.8%)
19541 567,985 1,344,416 696,437 1,750,212 799,689
(5.8%) (13.8%) ( 7.1%) (18.0%) ( 8.2%)
19551 64,837 1,422,175 643,684 1,721,112 1,029,918
( .6%) (13.8%) ( 6.2%) (16.7%) ( 9.9%)
1956' 783,024 1,452,943 642,943 1,721,239 1,036,822
(6.9%) (12.8%) ( 5.6%) (15.2%) ( 9.1%)
19571 167,386 1,554,059 889,289 1,609,571 967,919
(1.5%) (13.9%) ( 7.9%) (14.4%) ( 8.6%)
19581 539,260 1,690,843 1,029,226 1,906,131 1,070,630
(4.0%) (12.6%) ( 7.6%) (14.2%) ( 7.9%)
195 92 503,012 1,450,073 1,136,858 1,902,530 1,031,360
(4.0%) (11.5%) ( 9.0%) (15.1%) ( 8.2%)
19602 884,912 1,473,151 1,053,231 1,855,923 1,022,405
(6.9%) (11.5%) ( 8.2%) (14.4%) ( 7.9%)
19612 488,500 1,714,212 1,499,277 3,150,683 1,408,790
(3.0%) (10.7%) ( 9.3%) (19.6%) ( 8.7%)
19622 841,039 1,747,555 1,561,783 3,434,490 1,398,005
(5.0%) (10.5%) ( 9.4%) (20.8%) ( 8.4%)
1963-643 1,552,745 4,264,412 3,664,339 8,529,287 4,387,063
(3.9%) (10.9%) ( 9.3%) (21.8%) (11.2%)
1965-663 1,983,772 6,027,503 4,883,748 9,807,844 7,622,186
(4.0%) (12.3%) ( 9.9%) (20.0%) (15.6%)
1967-683 2,487,662 7,483,329 4,948,747 14,034,984 9,051,281
(4.0%) (12.1%) ( 8.0%) (22.8%) (14.7%)
1969-703 1,368,684 12,398,527 6,212,747 16,337,907 10,495,053
(1.7%) (16.0%) ( 8.0%) (21.1%) (13.5%)
*This budget summary omits regular program items such as: Reconstruction, General Resolutions,
Exchange of Persons, Documents and Publications, Statistical Service, Reserve.

129.199.59.249 on Fri, 31 Mar 2023 09:15:51 UTC
resources 1949-70 (in dollars and as percentages of annual budgets)*
Arid Latin
Philosophy Mass lands America East-West Total
Social and Cultural communi- major major major regular
sciences Humanities activities cation project project project program
286,514 119,399 523,667 1,518,048 7,780,000

(3.6%) ( 1.5%) ( 6.7%) (19.5%)
386,947 131,866 631,799 1,693,565 8,000,000
(4.8%) ( 1.6%) ( 7.8%) (21.2%)
414.824 856,023 978,129 8,200,000
(5.0%) (10.4%) (1 1.9%)
520,082 896,982 1,107,854 8,718,000
(5.9%) ( 9.9%) (12.7%)
540,642 886,677 1,118,750 9,017,849
(5.9%) ( 9.8%) (12.4%)
542,364 894,686 1,127,694 9,695,115
(5.5%) ( 9.2%) (11.6%)
753,788 1,118,026 1,314,673 10,299,618
(7.3%) (10.8%) (12.7%)
761,413 1,176,841 1,352,192 11,318,212
(6.7%) (10.3%) (11.9%)
750,763 1,141,882 1,202,787 252,952 300,788 369,999 11,142,215
(6.7%) (10.2%) (10.7%) (2.2%) (2.6%) (3.3%)
1,079,677 1,449,396 1,518,669 349,469 381,876 417,708 13,406,544
(8.0%) (10.8%) (11.3%) (2.6%) (2.8%) (3.1%)
1,020,685 1,394,909 1,409,170 299,083 355,116 372,482 12,534,210
(8.1%) (1 1. 1%) (11.2%) (2.3%) (2.8%) (2.9%)
976,981 1,363,939 1,454,886 315,169 359,641 355,524 12,801,009
(7.6%) (10.6%) (11.3%) (2.4%) (2.8%) (2.7%)
1,260,893 1,723,523 1,773,546 342,985 438,262 5 19,328 16,015,382
(7.8%) (10.7%) (1 1.0%) (2.1%) (2.7%) (3.2%)
1,180,515 1,686,526 1,765,223 336,194 398,844 478,039 16,497,846
(7.1%) (10.2%) (10.6%) (2.0%) (2.4%) (2.8%)
2,809,015 4,194,999 3,987,703 1,376,415 1,138,218 39,000,000
(7.2%) (10.7%) (10.2%) (3.5%) (2.9%)
3,081,188 627,257 3,784,796 4,436,865 1,572,454 1,474,812 48,857,000
(6.3%) ( 1.2%) ( 7.7%) ( 9.0%) (3.2%) (3.0%)
social sciences, humanities, cultural 9,449,364 61,506,140
activities combined in 1967 (15.3%)
8,307,597 9,519,176 77,412,500
(13.5%) (12.2%)
8,367,620
(10.8%)
ISource: UN Yearbook
2Source: UNESCO Proposed Program and Budget Estimates. These are provisional figures.
3Source: UNESCO Program and Budget.

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UNESCO and French Cultural Relations 1945-1970

Author(s): William R. Pendergast

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706174

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Observers frequently construe international organizations as instruments of state

William R. Pendergast is Assistant Professor in the Overseas Graduate Program at Boston

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France has employed diverse instrumentalities to advance its international

French officials viewed UNESCO as a "stake" of political competition and

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A similar divergence during the constituent meetings distinguished French

7UNESCO: 12EX/SR10 (1948), 4-5; 13EX/SR3 (1948), 14; 4GC/General Committee/SR3

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15 38EX/SR11 (1954), 69, 71.

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French delegates operationalized this concern for equilibrium by insisting on

22 13GC/Plenary Conference (1964), 336.

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3 3GC/Joint Sub-Committee on Cultural Questions and Natural Science/SR3 (1948), 317.

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international organizations, and NGO's. Few aspects of cultural relations possess

The central French objective at the London Conference in November 1945

4 Detailed consideration of points in this section occurs in Pendergast, "La Politique

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France derives several significant advantages from UNESCO headquarters.

French opposition to developments in UNESCO centered on three dimen-

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This French formulation was partly a compromise effort to avoid an East-

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III UNESCO as a resource

France has used UNESCO as a resource to advance specific components of its

492GC/Program and Budget Commission/VR8 (1947), 356.

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The French attempted through UNESCO to pursue goals related to these

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associate East and West. This had been evident in t

56 UNESCO/Preparatory Commission/P.V. 1 (1946), 2. This French effort to extend a hand to

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6150EX/SR19 (1958), 198.

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twinning . . . is to create . . . a permanent interest for the associated French town

France attempted to utilize multilateral UJNESCO projects to establish a

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82 5OEX/SR23 (1958) 252-4.

84 56EX/9 Addendum (1960), 59.

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The success of French cultural expansion requires cooperation by other

88 2GC/Working Parties. H: Libraries and Documentation/SRl (1947), 4.

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French delegates proposed UNESCO certificates to certify the "cultural worth" of

Changes in world politics during the postwar years necessitated diversification

93 4GC/Program and Budget Commission/SR11 (1949), 310.

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During the renaissance of French cultural relations in 1958 French delegates

The French experience in UNESCO is suggestive from the standpoint of

102 48EX/SR3 (1957), 28: 48EX/SR5 (1957), 38.

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is only a partial representation of reality. The French government is not monolithic,

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National Commission. In such situations, the tensions implicit in the tutelage