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Vietnam: Challenging Four
Major Assumptions About
Recent Leadership Change

March 7, 2023

We request your assessment of key assumptions in the article by Tomoya Onishi,

“New Vietnam president moves party chief Trong closer to one-man rule,” Nikkei Asia,
March 3, 2023 (https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/New-Vietnam-president-moves-
party-chief-Trong-closer-to-one-man-rule).
ANSWER: This article makes four highly contestable assertions about the current
political situation in Vietnam:
1. General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong is emulating China’s Xi Jinping by using
an anti-corruption campaign to oust his political rivals.
2. General Secretary Trong, by consolidating power, is moving Vietnam towards
a system of one-man rule.
3. The victims of General Secretary Trong’s anti-corruption campaign are mainly
pro-western and pro-business, while Trong and his supporters lean towards
China.
4. General Secretary Trong’s consolidation of power will lead to the party’s
greater control over the economy.
Assertion 1 – Vietnam’s Party Leader is Emulating China’s Xi Jinping in Ousting Rivals
The Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are both
in agreement that widespread corruption in their country is a major threat to the
legitimacy of one-party rule. Vietnam’s formal efforts to combat corruption on a
national basis predate China’s. In August 2006, Vietnam’s National Assembly
established the Central Steering Committee for Anti-Corruption headed by Prime
Minister Nguyen Tan Dung.
In January 2011, at the VCP’s eleventh national congress, Nguyen Phu Trong was
elected General Secretary. In 2012, Trong succeeded in gaining approval from the
Central Committee to transfer responsibility for the anti-corruption campaign from
the Prime Minister to the Central Steering Committee on Corruption Prevention and
Control. The reason for this is that the anti-corruption campaign under Prime Minister
Dung was lacklustre.
When Trong launched his anti-corruption campaign there were allegations that he was
specifically targeting allies and supporters of Prime Minister Dung, particularly after
Dung’s retirement in 2016. In retrospect, however, it appears there was very little
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distinction between corrupt officials who supported Prime Minister Dung because
they benefitted and other corrupt officials who took advantage of lax law
enforcement.
Recently, some analysts and journalists have erroneously characterized President
Nguyen Xuan Phuc as a political rival of General Secretary Trong. The basis for this
allegation is that Phuc challenged/stood against Trong for election as party secretary
after the Central Committee unexpectedly failed to ratify Tran Quoc Vuong, Trong’s
chosen successor, as party leader at a plenum on the eve of the thirteenth party
congress.
The full account of what happened at this time is not known. Trong picked a successor
and showed every sign that he would retire at the expiration of his second term as
General Secretary. The Central Committee’s action produced an unprecedented
situation at the eleventh hour before the national party congress. There appears to
have been no Plan B and Central Committee members were left to identify a suitable
candidate. Did members of the Central Committee insist on a choice? Was Trong
persuaded to seek a third term or did he throw his hat into the ring at the urging of
his supporters? Was Phuc drafted to satisfy the call for a choice or did he actually move
to block Trong from a third term? Where is the evidence Phuc’s nomination was a
“hostile” act to oppose Trong?
Finally, General Secretary’s anti-corruption campaign has been so wide-ranging as to
defy being classed as simply aimed at allege political opponents. In 2022, for example,
investigations were caried out against 2,474 cases involving at least 4,646 persons for
alleged corruption, abuse of power and economic misconduct. An estimated seventy
party officials, including five ministers or former ministers were disciplined since 2021.
Assertion 2 – System of One-Man Rule
Xi Jinping was elected CCP General Secretary in 2012 and President of the People’s
Republic of China in 2013. After Xi election to both positions in 2018, he changed the
rules to lift all restrictions on his term in office. Xi is sometimes referred to as the
“General Secretary of Everything” and the General Secretary for Life.”
Vietnam has a long political tradition of collective leadership and power sharing
among its most senior party leaders. Nguyen Phu Trong was elected as VCP General
Secretary in 2011 and again in 2016. In October 2018, on the death in office President
Tran Dai Quang, Trong assumed the concurrent office of President of the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam. Trong made no move to amend the state Constitution to merge
the positions of General Secretary and President. Trong, to all intents and purposes,
showed every sign of retiring as party leader at the thirteenth party congress. When
he was given an unprecedented third term as General Secretary, he stepped down as
state president at the expiration his term in office in April 2021.
The concept that General Secretary is seeking to consolidate his power needs to be
unpacked and examined critically. VCP regulations stipulate that one of the duties of
the General Secretary is to groom a successor; but the party leader isn’t given a free
pass. As noted above, the Central Committee can override decisions made by the
Secretary General.
 3

General Secretary Trong was dealt his hand when the Central Committee elected at
the thirteenth party congress elected an eighteen member Politburo, instead of
nineteen as planned, out of some twenty to twenty-three candidates. The General
Secretary needs a majority of members to support his initiatives. The resignation of
Phuc as president and the election of Vo Van Thuong does not change the electoral
calculus. Trong needs a majority of the current sixteen member Politburo.
The President of Vietnam is not just a ceremonial role. The President is vested with
considerable power under the state Constitution to appoint and dismiss government
officials. But all of these powers are subject to ratification by the National Assembly.
The President does not have any special powers as a member of the Politburo, even
while he may be considered one of the four pillars. In sum, the elevation of Vo Van
Thuong to state president does not ipso facto enhance the powers of the General
Secretary. Assuming Thuong was a protégé of the General Secretary prior to March
2023, he still remains a protégé with only one vote.
In sum, the evidence just isn’t there to make the assertion that Nguyen Phu Trong is
seeking to stay on in power like Xi Jinping. Vietnam’s system of collective leadership,
in which the General Secretary is primus inter pares is not about to be replaced with
a system of one man rule.
The best perspective to evaluate General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong’ motivations
is that he will retire at the next national party congress (or as some analysts claim at
a mid-term party congress). Trong’s drive against anti-corruption and negative
phenomena should be viewed as his legacy to his life-long commitment to party-
building.
Assertion 3 – Victims are Pro-Western and Pro-Business, General Secretary Trong
and his supporters lean towards China
The basis for the claim that the victims of General Secretary’s anti-corruption
campaign are pro-western and pro-business is spurious. This claim is based on two
major cases involving Deputy Prime Ministers Pham Binh Minh and Vo Duc Dam who
were educated in the United States and Belgium, respectively.
Vietnam has seventeen strategic partners, including seven western countries (United
Kingdom, Italy, France, Germany, Spain, Australia. New Zealand) and two close U.S.
allies, Japan and South Korea.1 Minh served two terms as Foreign Minister, while
Dam’s portfolio included science, technology, information, and communication. In
sum, the two Deputy Prime Ministers were only doing their jobs by interacting with
“western countries” that collectively make up over half of Vietnam’s strategic
partners. In addition, these countries also include major world economies and are
members of the G7 and G20.
The argument that the victims of Trong’s so-called “consolidation of power” are pro-
business may be dismissed out of hand. In 2022, investigative officials attached to the
anti-corruption campaign that uncovered evidence of alleged fraud by executives

1
The other strategic partners include: Russia, China, India,Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia,
and the Philippines.
 4

involved in corporate bond issuance, equity trading and stock price manipulation. In
sum, Vietnam’s weak regulatory system over the economic sector, including the
private sector, created an environment for corruption and evasion of the law and legal
regulations. The fact that Vietnam, under General Secretary Trong, is tackling
corruption of all varieties in including corporate crime should not be read as anti-
business. Under General Secretary Trong Vietnam has improved its ranking on
Transparency International’s Perceptions of Corruption Index; but Vietnam still has a
long way to go as it is currently ranked 87th out of 180 countries ranked in 2021.
The high-profile resignations of two Deputy Prime Ministers were not because they
were pro-business but because they failed to supervise subordinates who were
heavily involved in highly emotive COVID-related corrupt practices.
The assertion that General Secretary Trong and his supporters lean towards China is
equally spurious. Vietnam consistently pursues a foreign policy of diversifying and
multilateralizing its external relations through a network of seventeen strategic
partnerships and an additional number of comprehensive partnerships.
Vietnam, with a population of nearly 100 million, is comparable to a middle size
province in China. The two countries share land and maritime borders. China is
Vietnam’s largest trade partner. Both are one-party states led by their respective
communist parties. Both follow their own brand of socialist ideology. The latter two
factors provide a special conduit for bilateral relations that are not available in
Vietnam’s other foreign relations. Xi Jinping is both General Secretary of the party and
President of state and this factor largely explains the role of Vietnam’s party General
Secretary Trong in relations with China. Trong outranks Vietnam’s state president and
this gives him unique access to Xi.
Vietnam’s leaders are committed to pursuing relations with China (and other
countries) on the basis of their national interests and protecting Vietnam’s sovereignty
and territorial integrity. Maritime disputes in the South China Sea are the main irritant
in bilateral relations and both party leaders appear to be in agreement that South
China Sea disputes should not hold hostage the development of their broader bilateral
relationship.
The fact that Vietnam’s leaders continually engage with their northern neighbour
should not be taken as an indication they are leaning towards China at the expense of
their relations with the United States and other western countries. In sum, Vietnam’s
engagement with China should not be viewed as leaning towards China but practical
everyday realpolitik.
Assertion 4 – Greater Party Control Over the Economy
This assertion begs the question who is in control of the economy if not the Vietnam
Communist Party itself?
The key day-to-day locus of decision-making on economic matters rests with the Prime
Minister and relevant ministers in the Cabinet. The Prime Minister is invariably a
member of the Politburo and several ministers are members of the Central
Committee. There are party committees in all of Vietnam’s ministries or equivalent
organisations as well as state-owned enterprises and private sector businesses.
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In March 2019, the VCP Secretariat issued Instruction No 33-CT/TW that underscored
the importance of party and government policies “to make private economic entities
into a driving force for the country’s socialist-oriented market economy.” Instruction
No 33-CT/TW called for the creation of party cells and mass organisations in all
economic entities operating in Vietnam.
Instruction No 33-CT/TW decreed that “party cells in private economic entities should
adopt their own operational agenda in line with the conditions and characteristics of
each type of enterprise. They must co-ordinate closely with the enterprises’
management boards and follow their day to day activities to ensure workers’ rights,
obligations and interests are protected.”
The thirteenth national party congress set the long-term objectives of the VCP.
Subsequent Politburo meetings and Central Committee executive sessions or plenums
operationalize this guidance by developing annual and five-year socio-economic
development plans. The Central Committee is advised by the Central Economic
Commission and other bodies. The National Assembly revises or adopts new
legislation to enact these plans according to directions from the VCP.
The VCP has long been committed to developing a socialist market economy by
domestic reform (privatisation of state-owned enterprises), attracting foreign direct
investment, and proactive international economic integration. In sum, it is difficult to
see how the VCP could assume more power over the economy than it already has.

Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam: Challenging Four Major Assumptions

About Recent Leadership Change” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, March 7,
2023. All background briefs are posted on Scribd.com (search for Thayer). To remove
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