Chang Et Al, 2019

The Governance and
Management of Universities
in Asia
This volume seeks to identify and explore the dynamics of global forces on
the development of higher education in Asia, in particular, how neoliberalism
has affected reforms on university governance and management in the region.
It includes a set of country-specific studies on how various countries have
responded to the dominant neoliberal ideology at the systemic, institutional,
and process levels. The focus is on the relationship between the state and
the universities, which is usually reflected in the degree of autonomy and
accountability allowed in a particular higher education system. The selected
countries are Cambodia, China, Indonesia, India, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore,
South Korea, and Thailand. Each case study examines the establishment of
corporatised or autonomous universities in the country focusing on (i) the acts,
reports, and/or policies that led to such a move as well as the rationales behind
the move; (ii) the changes in the governance and organisational structure
of the universities, highlighting the kinds of autonomy that the universities
have; (iii) the new management strategies, techniques, and practices that have
been introduced to the university including the internal and external quality
assurance mechanisms, and (iv) some of the tensions, conflicts, and acts of
resistance that may have emerged.
Chang Da Wan (C.D. Wan) is Senior Lecturer and Deputy Director at the
National Higher Education Research Institute, Universiti Sains Malaysia. His
main interest includes higher education policy and practice, specifically on
issues of governance and management, access and equity, doctoral education,
the academic profession, and internationalisation. He has been involved in a
number of research and consultancy projects with UNESCO-Bangkok, OECD,
Commonwealth Tertiary Education Facility (CTEF), Asia Pacific Higher Education
Research Partnership (APHERP) Research Cluster, The Head Foundation, Bait
al-Amanah, and the Ministry of Higher Education Malaysia. He was a team
member of the Higher Education Strategic Plan Review Committee to review
the Malaysian National Higher Education Strategic Plan. He is also an affiliate
member of Young Scientists Network-Academy of Sciences Malaysia and a member
of the Global Young Academy.
Molly N.N. Lee was the Coordinator of the Asia-Pacific Programme of
Educational Programme for Development (APEID) and Programme Specialist
in Higher Education at UNESCO Asia and the Pacific Regional Bureau for
Education in Bangkok. Recently retired, she was also a Professor of Education
at Universiti Sains Malaysia. Dr Lee has a PhD and a master’s degree from
Stanford University, and a master’s degree in Education Planning and Development
from University of London Institute of Education. Her research interests include
higher education, science education, teacher education, globalisation and education,
and gender and education. She is a Fellow at The HEAD Foundation.
Hoe Yeong Loke is Adjunct Research Manager at The HEAD Foundation,

Singapore, and Associate Fellow at the European Union Centre in Singapore,
National University of Singapore. He completed an MSc in Comparative Politics
at the London School of Economics and Political Science and has since researched
and published in a wide range of fields in the social sciences. His work in the field
of higher education includes research on Southeast Asia with D. Bruce Johnstone
and the International Comparative Higher Education and Finance project at the
University of Buffalo, and in managing a higher education periodical with Philip
Altbach and the Center for International Higher Education at Boston College.
Routledge Critical Studies in Asian Education
Series Editors: S. Gopinathan, Wing On Lee and Jason Eng
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Routledge-Critical-Studies-in-Asian-Education/book-series/RCSAE
The Governance and
Management of Universities
in Asia
Global Influences and Local Responses
Edited by Chang Da Wan,

Molly N.N. Lee, and Hoe Yeong Loke
First published 2019
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2019 selection and editorial matter, Chang Da Wan, Molly N.N.
Lee and Hoe Yeong Loke; individual chapters, the contributors
The right of Chang Da Wan, Molly N.N. Lee, and Hoe Yeong Loke
to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the
authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance
with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act
1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or
reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical,
or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including
photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or
retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks
or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and
explanation without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Wan, Chang Da, 1982– editor. | Lee, Molly N.N., editor. |
Loke, Hoe Yeong, editor.
Title: The governance and management of universities in Asia : global
influences and local responses / edited by Chang Da Wan, Molly
N.N. Lee, Hoe Yeong Loke.
Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2019. |
Series: Routledge critical studies in Asian education | Includes
bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2018058025 | ISBN 9781138370807 (hardback) |
ISBN 9780429427831 (e-book)
Subjects: LCSH: Universities and colleges—Asia—Administration. |
Education, Higher—Asia.
Classification: LCC LB2341.8.A78 G69 2019 | DDC
378.0095—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018058025
ISBN: 978-1-138-37080-7 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-0-429-42783-1 (ebk)
Typeset in Galliard
by Apex CoVantage, LLC
Contents
List of contributors ix
1 Introduction 1
M O L L Y N . N . LEE, CH A NG DA WA N, A ND HO E YEONG LOK E
2 Governance in “public administrative institution”

universities: towards public autonomous universities
in Cambodia? 5
S AY S O K, LEAN G U N, A ND RINNA BU NR Y
3 World-class university construction and higher education

governance reform in China: a policy trajectory 21
YAN N AN C AO A ND RU I YA NG
4 Institutional autonomy and governance of higher education

institutions in India 43
N . V. VARG H ES E A ND GA RIMA MA L IK
5 Autonomous higher education institutions in Indonesia:

challenges and potentials 56
PAU LI N A PAN NEN, A MA N WIRA KA RTA KU S U MAH, AND
H AD I S U B H AN
6 National university reforms introduced by the Japanese

government: university autonomy under fire? 81
AKI Y O S H I Y O NEZAWA
7 Governance and management of public universities in

Malaysia: a tale of two universities 94
CH AN G D A WA N, MO RS H IDI S IRAT, A ND BEN EDICT
W EERAS E N A
viii Contents
8 University governance and management in Singapore:
the case of the Singapore Institute of Management
University (UNISIM) 112
J AS O N TAN
9 Governance and management under transformation in

Korean higher education: perception gaps between senior
managers and academics 119
J U N G CH E O L S HIN A ND YA NGS O N KIM
10 Governance and management of universities in Thailand 137

RATTAN A L A O
11 Conclusion: reforms of university governance and

management in Asia 156
M O LL Y N . N . L EE, CH A NG DA WA N, A ND HOE YEONG LOK E
Index 163
Contributors
Rinna Bunry has been working at the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport
since 2006. Currently, she is Vice Chief of the Office of Policy and Curriculum
of the Department of Higher Education. She received a Bachelor of Arts in
French from the Institute of Foreign Languages, Royal University of Phnom
Penh, in 2005. She worked as a high school English teacher for five years upon
her graduation from the National Institute of Education with a teacher cer-
tificate in English-Khmer Literature in 2006. She obtained a Master of Edu-
cation specialising in Education Administration and Leadership from RUPP
in 2010 and a Master of Development Studies in Gender and Development
from the University of Melbourne, Australia, in 2014. Her research interests
include gender issues, higher education governance and management, and
school administration and leadership.
Yannan Cao is a Post-doctoral Researcher at the Institute of Education at Tsin-
ghua University, China. He earned his PhD from the Faculty of Education at
the University of Hong Kong. His research addresses political economy and
sociology of higher education, including questions related to governance, aca-
demic culture, and academic life.
Yangson Kim is a full-time Lecturer at the Research Institute for Higher Edu-
cation (RIHE) at Hiroshima University. Dr Kim received her PhD from
Seoul National University. She previously worked as a senior researcher at the
Korean Council of University Education and as a research fellow at the Edu-
cation Research Institute at Seoul National University and at the Center for
Innovation, Technology and Policy Research at Instituto Superior Técnico –
Universidade de Lisboa. Her areas of research interests focus on interna-
tionalisation of higher education, research productivity and collaboration
of academics, academic profession, institutional context and governance of
higher education, and comparative higher education in Asia-Pacific countries.
Rattana Lao is a Senior Program Officer of the Asia Foundation. She obtained
a doctorate in Comparative and International Education (Political Science)
from Teachers College, Columbia University. She is the author of A Criti-
cal Study of Thailand’s Higher Education Reforms: The Culture of Borrowing.
x Contributors
Before joining the Asia Foundation, she was the Head of the Thai Studies
International Program at the Pridi Banomyong International College, Tham-
masat University, and a Senior Consultant at the Kenan Institute Asia.
Garima Malik is currently an Assistant Professor at the Centre for Policy Research
in Higher Education (CPRHE) in National Institute of Educational Planning
and Administration (NIEPA), New Delhi. She holds a PhD in Economics
from Ohio State University, USA. Before joining NIEPA, she was an Assistant
Professor of Economics at the University of Delhi. She was a Fellow at the
Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER)
and worked as an Economist with Tata Services Limited and Pricewater-
houseCoopers. At CPRHE, she is coordinating a major research project on
“Governance and Management of Higher Education in India”. She has pub-
lished in several journals and presented papers at national and international
conferences. Her recent publications include an edited book India Higher
Education Report 2015 (Routledge, 2016), with N.V. Varghese. Her current
research focuses on governance and management in higher education.
Paulina Pannen, MLS, is an expert in higher education, e-learning, distance

education, educational technology, and curriculum development. She has served
various organisations and been in the field for more than 30 years. She pub-
lishes in scholarly journals and speaks at national and international education
forums. Currently, she is working as Senior Adviser on Academics to the Min-
ister of Research, Technology and Higher Education.
Jung Cheol Shin is Professor at Seoul National University. He served the Korea
Ministry of Education for about 20 years. His research interests are higher
education policy, knowledge and social development, and academic profes-
sion. He is Co-editor-in-Chief of the Encyclopedia of International Higher
Education Systems and Institutions. He is an editorial board member of Stud-
ies in Higher Education, Tertiary Education and Management, and Peabody
Journal of Education.
Hadi Subhan is a Lecturer in law at Airlangga University and has a Doctor of

Law degree. He is Director of Student Affairs at Airlangga University. He
has experience in participating in the process of making the Law of Higher
Education No. 12/2012 as well as being a member of the legal aid team at
the Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education. He has been
appointed as the review team chairman of the draft of 7 Autonomous HEIs
and their Government Regulations; at the time of transformation will become
autonomous HEIs. He is often an expert witness to the trial process as in the
Constitutional Court and other courts in Indonesia. He was invited to the
University of Leiden Netherlands to become one of the examiners of PhD
defense.
Morshidi Sirat is Professor and Senior Research Fellow at the National Higher
Education Research Institute (IPPTN), Universiti Sains Malaysia, Pulau Pinang,
Malaysia. Until the end of September 2017, he was the Founding Director
Contributors xi
of the Commonwealth Tertiary Education Facility (CTEF), based at Univer-
siti Sains Malaysia. CTEF is a collaborative initiative between the Ministry
of Higher Education Malaysia and the Commonwealth Secretariat, London.
He was the first chairperson and now the advisor to the Malaysian Associa-
tion for Research and Higher Education Policy Development (PenDaPat). In
February 2011, he was appointed as Deputy Director-General (Public Sector),
Department of Higher Education, Ministry of Higher Education Malaysia
(MoHE) and as the Vice-Chancellor of Universiti Malaysia Sarawak (UNI-
MAS) in March 2013. In April 2013, he was appointed as the Director-Gen-
eral of Higher Education/Registrar General for Private Institutes of Higher
Education, Malaysia. He conducts consultancy/advisory services on various
aspects of higher education planning and development and trainings on uni-
versity leadership. He also sits on the editorial boards of several higher educa-
tion journals.
Say Sok, PhD, is an independent researcher and writer. He is currently serv-
ing as a senior research advisor to KHANA Center for Population Health
Research and the advisor to the Cambodia Communication Institute of the
Royal University of Phnom Penh. He has served as the editor of the Cambo-
dian Communication Review since 2013. Between 2014 and 2017, he worked
as the technical advisor on higher education governance and management in
the Higher Education Quality and Capacity Improvement Project, funded by
the World Bank and implemented by the Ministry of Education, Youth and
Sport. He has been a lecturer at a few departments/programmes of the Royal
University of Phnom Penh since 2002.
Jason Tan is Associate Professor in Policy and Leadership Studies at the National
Institute of Education, Singapore. He received his doctoral degree in com-
parative education at the State University of New York at Buffalo. He has
published widely on education reform and higher education in Singapore.
Leang Un, PhD, has served as Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences and
Humanities of the Royal University of Phnom since 2016 and is the co-editor-
in-chief for the Cambodia Education Review, a bilingual and biannual journal
of the Education Research Council, Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport.
He is also the co-editor for the upcoming special issue for the Asia Pacific
Journal of Education: Education, Development and Social “Progress” in Asia:
Critical Insights From Comparative Research.
N.V. Varghese is currently the Vice Chancellor of National Institute of Edu-
cational Planning and Administration (NIEPA) and Director of the Centre
for Policy Research in Higher Education (CPRHE), New Delhi. He holds a
doctoral degree in Economics with specialisation in educational planning. He
was Head of Governance and Management in Education at the International
Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP/UNESCO), Paris, until October
2013 and Head of its Training and Education Programmes from 2001 to
2006. He was responsible for designing and introducing the IIEP master’s
programme in educational planning and management. In the 1990s, he was a
xii Contributors
Professor and Head of the Educational Planning Unit at NIEPA, New Delhi.
He has been closely associated with educational planning at the federal and
decentralised levels and with the design and development of externally funded
education projects in India. While in NIEPA, he was responsible for manag-
ing an Asian regional network – the Asian Network of Training and Research
Institutions in Educational Planning (ANTRIEP) and was editor of its News-
letter. While in IIEP, he was the Secretary General and responsible for the
Secretariat of the International Working Group on Education (IWGE) which
is a network of funding agencies in education. He has directed several research
projects and has published around 25 books and research reports and more
than 180 research papers and articles in areas related to educational planning,
financing, and higher education.
Benedict Weerasena is an Economist at Bait Al-Amanah (House of Trust). As
a first class honours Bachelor of Economics graduate, he is also a recipient of
the Conference of Rulers’ Royal Education Award and Gold Medal Award
for Best Student in Economics 2015/2016 at Universiti Sains Malaysia.
He previously worked with the National Higher Education Research Insti-
tute (IPPTN), researching university autonomy and shadow education. His
research interests include development economics, public finance, interna-
tional political economy, and education policy.
Aman Wirakartakusumah is an Emeritus Professor of Food Science and Tech-
nology at Bogor Agricultural University and Chairman of the Engineering
Commission at the Indonesian Academy of Sciences, Indonesia. His interest
and involvement in research and education is reflected in his distinguished
career at the Bogor Agricultural University, where he served as Rector from
1998 to 2002 and held positions as Head of Department, Dean of Faculty,
and Director of Research Center. He was also the Indonesia Ambassador
to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) based in Paris, France, from 2004 to 2008. In 2003, he was
elected as a Fellow of the International Academy of Food Science and Tech-
nology, the International Union of Food Science and Technology. From 2009
to 2014, he served as the Chairman of the National Education Standards
Board and the Higher Education Committee Higher Education Council,
Ministry of Education and Culture. He obtained his Ir degree from Bogor
Agricultural University in 1972 and his MS and PhD in Food Science and
minor in Chemical Engineering from the University of Wisconsin-Madison,
USA, in 1977 and 1981, respectively.
Rui Yang is Professor and Associate Dean for Cross-border and/or International
Engagement in the Faculty of Education at the University of Hong Kong.
Bridging the theoretical thrust of comparative education and the applied
nature of international education, his research interests include education
policy sociology, comparative and cross-cultural studies in education, inter-
national higher education, educational development in Chinese societies, and
international politics in educational research.
Contributors xiii
Akiyoshi Yonezawa is Professor and Vice-Director, International Strategy Office,
Tohoku University. With a background in sociology, he mainly conducts
research on comparative higher education policy – especially focusing on
world-class universities, internationalisation of higher education, and public-
private relationships in higher education. He established his expertise in
higher education policy and management though working experience at uni-
versities and public organisations such as Nagoya University, OECD, and the
University of Tokyo. He is a board member at Japan Association for Higher
Education Research. He is a co-editor of Higher Education in Asia: Quality,
Excellence and Governance book series (Springer).
1 Introduction
Molly N.N. Lee, Chang Da Wan, and
Hoe Yeong Loke
University reforms are very much the result of interactions between global influ-
ences and national responses. The development of universities is embedded in
their socio-economic and political context and, at the same time, it is also influ-
enced by global trends which provide a source of policy borrowing and a back-
drop of policy choices. In recent years, the development of higher education
throughout the world has been heavily influenced by the hegemonic economic
discourse of neoliberalism. The purpose of this book is to examine how neolib-
eral ideology has been incorporated in university reforms in the Asian region, in
particular, in the realm of university governance and management.
Neoliberalism and higher education

Neoliberalism is defined as a “theory of political economic practices which pro-
poses that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entre-
preneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterised by
strong private property rights, free markets and free trade” (Harvey, 2005, p. 2).
The policy tenets that derived from this ideology emphasise (i) re-establishing
the rule of the market, (ii) reducing taxes, (iii) reducing public expenditure, (iv)
deregulating the private sector, (v) privatising the private sector, and (vi) replac-
ing the concept of “public good” with “individual responsibility” (Nef & Robles,
2000). Neoliberalism privileges the market over the state in the provision of pub-
lic services. Market is deemed the best mechanism to allocate resources to society.
Neoliberalism seeks to make the existing market wider and to create new markets
where they did not exist before (Connell, 2013).
Under the neoliberal ideology, many governments are cutting back their public
and social expenditure, which has resulted in drastic cuts in public funding to
universities. In more matured higher education systems such as those in the West,
the “retreat of the state” from direct funding and provision of higher education
began in earnest in the 1980s, most notably in the United Kingdom under Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher (Sirat & Kaur, 2010; Barr & Crawford, 2005). To
overcome these budgetary constraints, universities needed to seek alternative
sources of funding, and they were given the freedom to generate their own rev-
enues through engaging in different kinds of market-related activities. In many
2 Molly N.N. Lee, Chang Da Wan, and Hoe Yeong Loke
aspects, higher education is often seen as a dynamic business which seeks profit
from the buying and selling of education “services” (Ball, 2012).
As universities find themselves operating increasingly in a competitive and
market-oriented environment, they need to be flexible and to respond quickly
to changing market demands. Therefore, many academic leaders recognise the
nature and force of these pressures and have started searching ways to make their
universities more entrepreneurial and autonomous. As many universities continue
to grow and expand within this climate of limited resources, their stakeholders,
including the state, become concerned with the quality of education they are
able to provide. This leads, in turn, to universities being increasingly subjected to
external pressures to achieve greater accountability for their performances.
Besides the marketisation of higher education, neoliberal policies also place
great emphasis on accountability and performativity. As pointed out by Olssen
and Peters (2005),
In neoliberalism the patterning of power is established on contract, which in

turn is premised upon a need for compliance, monitoring and accountability
organized in a management line and established through a purchase contract
based on measurable outputs.
(p. 325)
The role of the state in higher education is to create an appropriate market by

providing the conditions, laws, and institutions for its operation. The state in its
new role develops techniques of auditing, accounting, and management. Uni-
versities are encouraged to formulate clearly defined visions and missions, adopt
new public management techniques and a results-based management approach.
Under neoliberal influence, the relationship between the state and universities is
being redefined in that the state demands more accountability on the one hand
and the universities insisting on more autonomy on the other hand (Neave & van
Vught, 1991). The emerging trend in university governance and management
is an increase in institutional autonomy in return for more public accountability.
Following this global trend, a number of countries in the Asian region have
undertaken reforms on the governance and management of their public universi-
ties. For example, in Japan in 2004, national public universities were corporatised
and became independent administrative corporations in the country’s move to
revitalise the university system and in its attempt to create dynamic, internation-
ally competitive universities (Yamamoto, 2004). Similarly, Malaysia, Singapore,
and South Korea have corporatised their public universities whereas autonomous
universities were established in Indonesia and Thailand. Generally, the shift in uni-
versity governance and management has been towards greater institutional auton-
omy and public accountability. University leaders and ministry officials have to
work out different ways in relating and working with one another. Furthermore,
ministries have established external quality assurance mechanisms to supervise and
monitor the performance of universities while university leaders have institution-
alised new management practices so as to increase efficiency and productivity.
Introduction 3
Outline of the book
However, much of the aforementioned debates and discussion has hitherto
focused on the systemic level. Both policymakers and university leaders have
been exploring and experimenting with innovative ways to institutionalise these
reforms, yet not much have been written on the implementation and outcomes
of these reforms. The aim of this book is to examine what happens when various
countries adopt neoliberal higher education policies, in general, and more spe-
cifically, what actually happens at the institutional level as a result of the reforms
in the governance and management of universities. The nine selected cases are
Cambodia, China, Indonesia, India, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea,
and Thailand. The comparative study examines the establishment of corporatised
or autonomous universities in these countries focusing on (i) the acts, reports,
and/or policies that led to such a move as well as the rationales behind the move;
(ii) the changes in the governance and organisational structure of the universities,
highlighting the kinds of autonomy that universities have; (iii) the new man-
agement strategies, techniques, and practices that have been introduced to the
university including the internal and external quality assurance mechanisms, and
(iv) some of the tensions, conflicts, and acts of resistance that may have emerged.
The Cambodian chapter examines the governance and management of pub-
lic universities that are granted the status “public administrative institution”
(PAI), which can be considered as semi-autonomous institutions. The chapter
on Chinese higher education focuses on the dual concerns of the Chinese state,
that is, developing world-class universities while maintaining political stability.
It examines the complexity of changing higher education governance under the
state’s twin expectations. The Malaysian case studied two selected universities to
examine how their governance and management have changed and evolved over
time at the institutional and process level. The case study on India analyses the
multiple layers of decision-making – federal, state, and institutional levels – and
multiplicity of regulatory bodies thus making the governance and management
of the system a complex task. The Indian higher education system is moving
towards a new system of graded autonomy based on the academic performance
of institutions. Under the new framework of graded autonomy, a small number of
institutions will enjoy a high degree of autonomy, and a large share of institu-
tions will be under close scrutiny and control. In the Indonesian case, the key
focus is on the higher education institution’s readiness to receive institutional
autonomy, as there are many challenges faced in the implementation of this new
policy. In the case of Japan, the author analyses the impact of national policy
in institutional settings. It focuses on government interventions on university
governance and management against the historical background that Japanese
universities have always enjoyed a high level of academic autonomy and freedom
for a long time, particularly at the level of individual professors. The case study
on Singapore focuses on one particular privately run university to gain insights
into how the concept of autonomous university is operationalised in the tightly
state-controlled environment. The South Korean case examines the perception
gap between senior managers and academics on the amount of decision-making
power they have over various matters relating to the governance and manage-
ment of universities. The Thai case presents the stories of two public universities
which have undergone university reforms to see how they differ in their gover-
nance and management practices.
The main argument of the book is that the interplay between global influ-
ences and national responses could result in hybridised reform agenda. Using
the hybridisation perspective (see 2017 special issue of Studies in Higher Educa-
tion), the book analyses how the governance and management of universities
have changed over time in the selected Asian countries. It examines how the
hegemonic spread of neoliberal ideology has impacted on the development of
higher education systems in the region. It also analyses how different countries
have responded to this dominant ideology at the systemic, institutional, and pro-
cess levels. The focus is on the relationship between the state and the universities,
which is usually reflected in the degree of autonomy and accountability allowed
in a particular higher education system. Generally, it is concluded that while it is
possible to find convergence in university reforms in the region, their impacts at
the institutional level do vary among the universities within a country and across
countries.
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2 Governance in “public
administrative institution”
universities
Towards public autonomous
universities in Cambodia?
Say Sok, Leang Un, and Rinna Bunry
Introduction
The provision of higher education prior to 1997 was entirely within the domain
of the state, and the eight higher education institutions (HEIs) were tasked to
produce graduates on government subsidy to serve the (respective) state machin-
eries. They were all public HEIs receiving national budget for the operation and
aid from Eastern bloc countries for technical and personnel support up to 1991
and bilateral aid from different donor agencies after then. In between 1997 and
1998, some public HEIs were allowed to begin offering fee-paying academic
programmes, and this practice was later extended to all public HEIs to generate
revenue for institutional development and quality improvement, albeit not neces-
sarily through legislation.
In the meantime, the government passed the Royal Decree on Public Admin-
istrative Institution (PAI) in 1997 as a public entity with “semi-autonomy” in
terms of the freedom to generate and manage the self-generated revenue (Un &
Sok, 2014). The government then used this sub-decree to transform some public
HEIs that generated revenues into PAI HEIs. The first public university trans-
formed into a PAI was the Royal University of Agriculture, and three other public
universities, namely the Royal University of Fine Arts, National University of
Management, and University of Health Sciences, were subsequently transformed
into PAI HEIs too. As of now, there are nine PAI HEIs in Cambodia (Touch,
Mak, & You, 2014).
Cambodian public higher education landscape has transformed significantly
over the past two decades; however, the transformation has not been docu-
mented, analysed, discussed, and debated in the academic literature extensively.
The first attempt to understand PAI HEIs was a small survey-based study by
Visalsok Touch et al. (2014), which tries to understand the perception amongst
the staff and institutional administrators of two PAI HEIs in terms of the change
within their institutions following the transformation. This chapter, therefore,
represents another rare attempt to look into governance in PAI HEIs and expands
upon the previous study. The information and data presented are based on the
authors’ years-long interactions and discussions with five of the nine PAI HEIs
and other key stakeholders on various occasions and settings. The study also relies
6 Say Sok, Leang Un, and Rinna Bunry
upon other previous studies and reports – published and unpublished – policies,
and regulations.
This chapter is divided into five sections. Section 1 discusses the key issues of
university governance and management in the Cambodian context. Section 2
presents the system level governance that enables the establishment of PAI HEIs.
Section 3 discusses the structure, processes, and objects of decision-making in
PAI HEIs, and is followed by Section 4, which highlights some of the intended
and unintended outcomes of the reform. The final section concludes with a ten-
tative proposal as to how the public higher education governance can be moved
towards more “complete autonomy and accountability” and some potential
opportunities and challenges for such a reform to materialise.
National context
Cambodia is yet to establish a “fully autonomous university”. The few HEIs des-
ignated as PAIs can, however, be regarded as “semi-autonomous HEIs” given
that they are granted relatively more autonomy. Despite the more autonomy, PAI
HEIs, like their public HEIs counterpart, have relatively much less autonomy –
both substantive and procedural – and less rigorous institutional accountabil-
ity mechanisms and instruments, compared with their counterparts in more
advanced ASEAN countries (see ADB, 2012; Berdahl, 1971; Sok, 2016; Var-
ghese & Martin, 2013). They are still treated like “government machinery” and
run likewise (Touch et al., 2014).
In 1997, the state, apparently led by the Ministry of Economy and Finance
(MEF), issued the Royal Decree on Legal Statutes of PAIs to regulate the man-
agement of all public institutions that generate and manage revenues. The decree
is thus generic and broad in scope rather than tailor-made for university affairs
(RGC, 1997). Key academic and human resources issues like academic manage-
ment and freedom, student and personnel management, and quality management
are not covered. Still, in 1999, the Royal University of Agriculture became the
first university to be transformed into a PAI HEI (RGC, 1999).
By law, the transformation into a PAI HEI has significant implication for insti-
tutional governance, especially institutional accountability and autonomy. Institu-
tional accountability mainly relates to the establishment of a governing board,
and institutional autonomy concerns financial procedures and staffing arrange-
ments (RGC, 1997, 2015). However, the reform has fallen short of granting PAI
HEIs with “complete autonomy” in all areas of operation, especially institutional
set-up; financial, personnel, and academic management; and mechanisms, instru-
ments, and practices to ensure complete institutional accountability. Despite the
tremendous change across many facets of higher education, the required reforms
do not seem to keep pace with the reality. Cambodian higher education is still
known as one of the least reformed among the countries in ASEAN (ADB, 2012;
Sok, 2016). This is the reason why this initiative has fallen far short of rolling out
to all public HEIs generating revenue.
Another instance from the government to revise the 1997 decree started in
mid-2010s, culminating in the revised PAI Royal Decree in August 2015. There
Governance in “PAI” universities 7
are three key points in this last revised version. The first one dictates all revenue-
generating public institutions to be transformed into PAIs. The last two points
were the most controversial where there was a subsequent implicit protest from
many public and PAI HEIs alike, especially large public HEIs located in Phnom
Penh. This prompted immediate discussion between MEF and public HEIs.
These two points are (i) depositing all revenues generated by PAI HEIs into a
designated treasury single account at the National Treasury, and (ii) the removal
of the rector’s membership in the governing board (RGC, 2015). It was later
approved by the government that the implementation of this revised decree shall
be pending “until further notice”. In this regard, the 1997 decree is still in force.
Though public HEIs continue their business-as-usual practices, in the future, all
public HEIs shall become PAIs, according to the decree.
Institutional level governance

There is no study or report documenting the rationale behind PAI HEI establish-
ment. However, before its application to selected public HEIs, it was generally
known that the management of public HEIs could be said to be ad hoc given
that they are implicitly allowed to generate and manage revenue and hire on-
contract staff, and yet there is no regulation in place to adequately regulate how
they would manage the resources. The application of the decree was perhaps
to formalise the status quo and to better manage public HEIs – especially their
financial management.
What changes in the governance and organisational structure does the appli-
cation of the decree have on public HEIs? For the first time, the establishment
of a board of directors is initiated and formalised through the national regula-
tion. PAI HEIs shall be governed by a board of directors, which is the “highest
decision-making body” in each institution. This body shall comprise between five
and 11 members, with the following five members as mandatory: an appointive
representative of the technical supervising ministry, an MEF appointive represen-
tative, an appointive representative of the Council of Ministers, an elected staff
representative, and the rector/executive director,1 who is an officio member with
voting rights (RGC, 1997). In practice, some PAI HEIs choose the minimum
requirements while others have more members, even up to the maximum. How-
ever, virtually all members are from government or government-affiliated institu-
tions with no or few external representatives from the economy and society and
merely one internal staff representative. The chair is often a public figure, mainly
politicians, rather the technical supervising person from the ministry, and this
contradicts the regulation. The chair and appointive members have a mandate
of three years, and the elected staff representative has a two-year term, all with
the possibility of reappointment and re-election (RGC, 1997; Un & Sok, 2014).
The decree allows PAI HEIs to generate and manage revenue as well as spend-
ing and keeping the income they earn. The income can be deposited into the
respective treasury single account at the National Bank of Cambodia or a private
bank account, per the approval from MEF. In practice, the money is deposited
in a private bank, usually to earn interest. With the permission to earn income,
PAI HEIs have significantly increased the intake of students, to the extent that
concerns on quality compromise were raised (Ford, 2013). Due to the limited
space, the study programs are often offered/run around the clock and seven
days a week. Some of the larger PAI HEIs even offer study programs up to four
shifts during a day (morning, lunch time, afternoon, and evening class). Before
1996, all students were charged no fees, but now the fee-paying students in these
PAI HEIs can account for up to 80 to 90 percent of the total student enrolment
(Mak, et al., forthcoming). To accommodate the increasing number of students,
PAI HEIs are allowed to hire contract teaching staff to teach fee-paying pro-
grammes. Another related key change the decree has brought about is the fact
that PAI HEIs can hire on-contract staff for teaching and non-teaching jobs, and
through a joint prakas (edict) between MEF and the Ministry of Civil Service
(which is implemented more in breach), they are allowed to top up the civil ser-
vants for their extra teaching load too. This has resulted in significant and rapid
increase in the number of part-time teaching staff and number of teaching hours
of civil servant staff, who are paid according to the number of hours they teach.
Compared with other ASEAN countries, Cambodian PAI HEIs have much less
autonomy. However, their institutional accountability mechanisms and instru-
ments are not robust enough for the delegation of more authority too. Generally,
there is a trust deficit between the government and HEIs as well as within the
respective HEIs, and these present key challenges for dialogues for meaningful
reforms (MoEYS, 2017). Broadly speaking, PAI HEIs have no appointive author-
ity to every position within the university machinery, but they do have the authority
to propose and nominate candidates from positions of vice rectors downwards. The
appointive members and chairperson of the board are appointed by the govern-
ment. The rector/director is appointed by the king on the recommendation from
the prime minister on the proposal of a candidate from the technical supervising
ministry. The vice rector/deputy director and dean and deputy dean are appointed
by the prime minister on the recommendation of the minister of the technical
supervising ministry on the proposal of a candidate from the rector/director. A
department/office head and deputy are appointed by the minister of the technical
supervising ministry through the proposal of a candidate from the rector.
In practice, there are reported cases whereby the election and nomination of
candidates by faculty members (mainly civil servants) are done pro forma and
cases of external influence in nomination or appointment of institutional admin-
istrators in public and PAI HEIs alike (Ahrens & McNamara, 2013; Un & Sok,
2014). Academic managers at all levels of PAI HEIs can, however, appoint/
assign faculty members to ad hoc academic committees or working groups such
as staff or student disciplinary measures and curriculum development and manage-
ment, although such committees or groups are yet to work in full force, and
academic management by permanent committees is still alien to PAI and public
HEIs alike.
Institutional financial autonomy is perhaps the stickiest issue. While PAI HEIs
have little control over the financial management of the funds from the govern-
ment and external partners, they have much control over the “self-generated”
revenue. Hence, the financial management varies depending on the sources of
revenues, and multiple “parallel systems” in financial management exists (Ting,
2014).
Some PAI HEIs no longer receive recurrent budget from the government,
except for the salary of civil servants, which goes directly to the individual staff’s
private bank account. For those receiving government funding, the national
rules and regulations on financial and accounting management and control are
applied, which have limited flexibility. Line item budgeting continues to be the
norm, and movement of budget from one line to another shall be approved by
different levels/agencies of the government depending on the nature of budget
movement. Procurement of goods and services shall conform to the national
rules and regulations issued by MEF, with large package procurement managed
by the respective technical supervising ministry. Unspent budget at the end of
the fiscal year shall be returned to the National Treasury. Despite this rigidity,
not much is known about the actual management of the government fund. Such
budget is managed at the university level, with little involvement from the lower
levels of university administration, and there is some degree of flexibility in actual
practice in its management due to the lack of a well-written annual budget plan
and the linkage between budget expenditure and key performance indicators
(MEF, 2017; Wan et al., 2018).
PAI HEIs, however, have significant control over the self-generated revenues
and revenue-generating activities, with the rector/executive director as the des-
ignated budget manager. They can conduct revenue-generating activities of their
preference within the limit of the law. Likewise, they have good freedom in man-
aging the resources, albeit a certain degree of prior endorsement from the techni-
cal supervising ministry and MEF is needed.
PAI HEIs have less control over the management of external non-state fund-
ing, although funding from this source is small. Management of such budget
including its planning, execution, procurement, and auditing shall conform to
rules and regulations of respective funding agencies. However, reporting of flex-
ibility during implementation exists.
Despite the varying degree of freedom, a consensus is that certain limits in
financial autonomy exist and consent from and involvement of the government,
especially MEF, is needed in financial management. This is well reflected in that
the government, including MEF, tries to exert its control at every level of insti-
tutional operation and management.
PAI HEIs have limited freedom and flexibility in institutional set-up. Their
institutional establishment, dissolution, and merger shall be enacted via the prime
ministerial sub-decree upon the recommendation from the technical supervising
ministry. Any modification to or abolishment of existing institutional structures
and addition of new structures – be it faculty/dependent institute, department,
or administrative office/division – shall be reviewed and approved by different
layers of the government.
Like financial autonomy, institutional autonomy in staffing matters (academic
and non-academic) is likewise dual, depending on whether the staff are hired
within the civil service framework or as on-contract staff. The former is a decreas-
ing category in almost PAI HEIs, and PAI HEIs have little freedom in manag-
ing them. They are hired and paid for by the central government, according to
the Legal Statutes of the Civil Service and other relevant national regulations.
Recruitment, payment, promotion, and firing are determined and decided upon
by the government. They are secured with “life-time” employment and a public
pension. The introduction of PAI HEIs has resulted in another key category
of staff: part-time, on-contract teaching and annually contracted administrative
staff. PAI HEIs have complete control over this staff category, including the
recruitment, payment, and termination. The government has shown little inter-
est to reform the management of this staff category, although the current prac-
tice has created no career path and job security for them and is hence unhealthy
for institutional development. Given that they are not civil servants, they cannot
be promoted to take up administrative or academic management positions at all
levels.
An area PAI HEIs have the most freedom is academic freedom and academic
management broadly or curriculum development and management, more spe-
cifically. Academic freedom, including determination of course contents, course
materials, teaching methodology and pedagogy, and research preference and pub-
lication is generally good, although some degree of self-censorship is reported.
PAI HEIs have good control over the curriculum and its review, revision, and
update, although the curriculum or its revision need to be approved in advance
by the technical supervising ministry, which is usually done pro forma and simply
goes through the motion. Given the loose regulation from within and without
and limited technical support and incentives from the government and limited
commitment from and capacity of the PAI HEIs, including the teaching staff and
the top administrators and the board, the quality and relevance of the curriculum
to the need of the market and society is a big question, and curriculum manage-
ment, including review, revision, and update, is mainly left to the goodwill of the
respective faculty deans, heads of departments or, in some cases, even individual
faculty members. At the university level, an ad hoc curriculum development com-
mittee led by the rector is usually established to review and endorse the revised
curriculum. Curriculum revision is reportedly done once every two or three years
(see ADB, 2012; Un & Sok, 2014; Sok, 2016; Mak et al., forthcoming). Internal
quality assurance is another case in point – it is perhaps one of the most neglected
areas at almost all HEIs. No public HEIs are known to have a well-functioning
internal quality assurance mechanisms and instruments.
Another area PAI HEIs have almost complete autonomy is student admission.
PAI HEIs can determine the total number of annual student intake – both schol-
arship and fee-paying students. Annually, PAI HEIs that offer scholarships via
the Directorate General of Higher Education (DGHE)/Ministry of Education,
Youth and Sport (MoEYS) shall report the number of “free seats” they offer to
MoEYS, and the latter shall recruit the students, accordingly, per the agreement.
They also offer scholarships to other recipients in the name of selected public fig-
ures and some “non-governmental organisations”, and the recruitment of such
students is reportedly managed by the respective organisations. The HEIs are
free to determine the number of fee-paying students to take and the levels of
tuition fees charged, which shall be approved by the board. They can decide upon
the admission criteria and requirements too (Mak et al., forthcoming).
In sum, PAI HEIs have significant substantive autonomy in terms of academic
affairs and research, which at times have been taken quite lightly by respec-
tive HEIs. An area they have less autonomy is teaching staff management and
appointive power of the academics for professorial positions. They have less pro-
cedural autonomy, especially in management of government budget and the
appointment and promotion to administrative/management positions, while
they have generally much freedom in managing the “self-generated” revenue and
the on-contract staff.
With limited and inadequate investment from the government, PAI HEIs are
required to generate revenues from other sources to maintain their operation
and for institutional development. However, there are few revenue-generating
activities and options besides tuition fees. University-industry linkages are in an
infancy stage. This is understandable given that existing PAI HEIs are teaching
oriented, and given the nature of the Cambodian economy, which relies heavily
on small and medium-sized enterprises, which seldom seek support from pub-
lic HEIs and the emerging small pool of international multinational corpora-
tions, which seldom rely on local HEIs for research and innovation but choose
to export such services to their regional offices or regional HEIs (see Un &
Sok, 2014; Sok, 2016; Mak et al., forthcoming). It can be concluded that PAI
HEIs have thus far picked the low-hanging fruits and chase “easy money”, and
there has been little effort to pick up more value-added activities. Income from
research and innovation has been minimal.
Process level within the institution

A previous study by Touch et al. (2014) suggests that the reform towards PAIs
has brought about some positive changes in institutional management, although
it has yet to produce drastic transformation in institutional management. The
most significant change as discussed earlier is perhaps the introduction and estab-
lishment of the governing board, which, as the decree states, is the highest lead-
ing body at the institutional level. At the five PAI HEIs, one reports that it rarely
has board meetings; another one reports that it has around five meetings per year.
The other two report that the boards meet quarterly, with a number of ad hoc
meetings when necessary, and at the other the meetings are quite regular too.
At the institutional level, another practice that has gained more attraction
is the increasing use of on-contract staff, together with part-time on-contract
service of the staff employed within the civil service framework. On-contract
staff are hired to help with day-to-day administrative work under the super-
vision of administrative office/division heads, who are civil servants. The use of
on-contract teaching staff has also surged alarmingly. At two PAI HEIs, the on-
contract staff now represents 70–80 percent of the entire staff; at two others,
where fee-paying programmes are fewer, it accounts for some 20 percent and
50 percent, respectively.
Compared with the national rules and regulations and de facto practice at pub-
lic HEIs, innovative management strategies and practices are few. When it comes
to management of academic affairs (teaching and research/innovation), there is
scarcely any significant different. Academic management, particularly curriculum
management, is ad hoc or sometimes done pro forma and conducted by ad hoc
committees or working groups, and academic management by permanent academic
committees and systemic engagement of the academic in institutional management
are still a distant dream (Mak et al., forthcoming; Wan et al., 2018). As practices in
autonomous HEIs in advanced ASEAN countries, management and rule by com-
prehensive institutional by-laws and regulations (including detailed policies and pro-
cedures) is yet to begin, and institutional management is quite ad hoc, reactionary,
or even verbal, or at best based on institutional rules and regulations that lack any
details. All administrative and academic management positions continue to be filled
with civil servants, with the appointment done “for life” and sometimes political
affiliation, personal loyalty, and seniority are known to take precedence over academic
credential and prominence (Ahrens & McNamara, 2013; Chet, 2009; Sok, 2016).
While the reliance on external and internal quality assurance mechanisms and
instruments to ensure and promote quality has become more and more popu-
lar and mandatory in more advanced countries in the region, Cambodian PAI
and public HEIs alike are yet to embrace the notion of quality assurance fully.
By law, external quality assurance is mandatory, and the Accreditation Commit-
tee of Cambodia (ACC), a government-affiliated body established in 2003 and
now affiliated with MoEYS, is tasked to do this job. None of the PAI HEIs (all
HEIs, to be precise) have ever had their entire institutions accredited. While
HEIs are free to have their institutions and academic programmes accredited by
regional/international bodies; none bother with regional/international accredi-
tation. Programme accreditation is yet a distant aspiration of HEIs, and none of
the professional bodies have worked on programme level accreditation as well
(for discussion of ACC, see Chet, 2006; Vann, 2012; Un & Sok, 2014, and for
regulations on ACC, see RGC, 2003a, 2003b, 2014).
The 2007 Law on Education credited “ministries responsible for education”
for assessing and monitoring education quality (RGC, 2007). In 2007, MoEYS
issued a notification to all HEIs under its jurisdiction to establish an internal
quality assurance unit to assess, monitor, and evaluate institutional academic
performance. This notification, which contains few details, has been practiced
more in breach. At the five PAI HEIs, internal quality assurance offices are not
adequately staffed and funded and internal quality assurance activities are limited,
and the offices/working groups were recently active mainly to collate documents
and conduct other preparatory work prior to the pilot institutional assessment by
the ACC in the past two years as well as foundation year accreditation earlier. In
a sense, the current structure and processes of internal quality assurance of PAI
and public HEIs are yet to respond to quality maintenance and enhancement (see
Vann, 2012; Sen & Ros, 2013; Un & Sok, 2014).
Corporate culture has yet to fully invade the traditional institutional culture of
PAI HEIs, and the notion of performance (e.g. key performance achievements
and indicators) and numerical measurement of individuals’ performance are still
alien to Cambodian PAI and non-PAI HEIs alike. The government has never
imposed any performance targets upon any PAI HEIs or their administrators, nor
has the governing board set any precise targets for achievement and performance
upon the executive. Neither has the top institutional administrator prescribed
any targets on the lower levels of administration. Institutional performance is still
business as usual and goes “at your own pace” with little pressure (or incentives)
for the institutions and its administrators to perform and excel.
Outcomes and impacts

Has the adoption of the reform towards the public administrative system in the
higher education sector produced any significant outcomes and impact on higher
education quality and institutional management? So far, few studies on this issue
exist; however, anecdotal evidence and informal discussion with stakeholders
seem to indicate that its impact on higher education quality is perhaps not very
significant. And the outcomes and impact on institutional management and per-
formance is ambivalent at best and the reform is inadequate to transform the
traditional “system” and institutional culture of university administration. Some
observations over the outcomes and impact are as follows.
The reform has produced some minor explicit and implicit tensions within the
HEI. For the first time, the staff are provided with an opportunity and a platform
to voice their concern and opinion to the institutional management and the rep-
resentatives of the concerned ministries via having a representative on the board.
Discussion with several staff representatives indicate that there are cases where
the sole “elected” staff representatives are not active or proactive enough in advo-
cating for staff welfare or education quality. Nonetheless, there are cases where
such representatives are active and vocal in board meetings in protecting the inter-
est of the staff, and in such a case, there are instances where there is a subtle
tension between him or her and the institutional administrator as well as some
other board members. There is tacit feeling of discontent from the top institu-
tional administrators towards some appointive representatives on the board too,
as some top administrators confide that there are cases where some government
agencies merely appoint junior staff with little or no knowledge and/or experi-
ence in higher education and its management, and such representatives often
bring little positive impact or are of little benefit to the board.
In more advanced higher education system, the feeling of collegiality and
trust amongst the institutional managers is high or designed to be so. In Thai-
land, for example, the university president is allowed to nominate his or her
deputy presidents and appoint assistant presidents to enforce the spirit of team-
work. They all come to and leave office simultaneously. In Cambodia, in general,
collegiality and team spirit amongst the entire leadership can be questionable,
but generally the rector does have a good working relationship with some of
the vice rectors. There are cases where vice rectors are reportedly proposed
and nominated from outside with little involvement of the HEIs, and there is
implicit inadequate collaboration amongst the institutional administrators (at
all levels, to be fair) and report of instances of favouritism. Tacit discontent and
disagreement between the teaching staff and administrative staff as well as with
the “management team” in general reportedly exist. However, the issue is not
adequately explored or documented.
The attempt to enforce the new PAI decree onto all public HEIs that gener-
ate and manage revenues has created implicit tension between top institutional
administrators (especially rectors/directors of large HEIs) and MEF. Tension
particularly arises from three provisions: management of the self-generated bud-
get, the removal of the rector/director from the governing board and, to a much
lesser extent, the appointment of a financial controller by MEF to each public
HEI. After a few rounds of negotiation and perhaps lobby, the issue has now
subsided, and a notification from MEF issued on 31 October 2017 indicates
that the self-generated budget can now be deposited in private bank accounts
managed by the respective HEIs. In the past years, MoEYS has never attempted
to introduce any stringent measures on the academic management of PAI HEIs;
little manifestation of tension between the two exists.
Given that the initiatives of institutional governance reform emanate from
MEF, the central focus of such reform has always been financial and accounting
management and control and the working relationship between the PAI HEIs
and the government (mainly MEF and the technical supervising ministry). Given
that the rectors/directors of prominent public HEIs, including PAI ones, have
access to other influential politicians and policymakers, negotiation with MEF
has often resulted in compromise. Besides, many key issues in the other three key
areas of institutional set-up, personnel management, and academic management
have rarely been properly addressed in public policy. The reform has so far pro-
duced some (un)intended outcomes.
First, while the introduction of institutional management by a governing
board has created a new institutional structure to take on more collective decision
is plausible, this institutional body is still very small, narrow, and government-
centric rather than corporate and/or stakeholder-representative in nature as prac-
ticed in more advanced countries in ASEAN. The governing board is designed
to be a stand-alone aloft institution with no permanent secretariat and, more
important, specialised sub-committees to provide it with technical support and
guidance. This stand-alone nature has created heavy reliance of the board on the
executive, especially the rector, for every decision it makes as well as for coordina-
tion and information, and this has certainly compromised its work and integrity.
The nature of the board has also reduced its impact on policy direction and guid-
ance and its ability to act as an engine to mobilise external funding to support
each PAI HEI. On many occasions, the board simply acts as an endorser of the
top administrators’ initiatives and even decides upon petty matters. The culture
of governing by a board is yet to take firm roots, and as some top administrators
attest, some members need to learn how to work on the board.
The reform has resulted in intense “entrepreneurship” within public HEIs.
Arguably, the main intent of the reform is to enable public HEIs to self-sustain
and self-support, given the limited national budget, which needs to be invested
elsewhere. Perhaps this is where the reform has achieved its intended purpose.
Government funding to public higher education, including to PAI HEIs, has
been low; hence, PAI HEIs are forced to be “entrepreneurial” to survive (and
grow) generally despite the quality improvement consideration. With limited state
funding, including for research and innovation and little investment from private
firms and foundations, the easy source of income is tuition fees and associated
non-fees. This has pushed public HEIs into teaching enterprises like their private
counterparts competing for students with little concern on research/innovation
activities and community engagement. At the individual level, teaching staff often
become entrepreneurial; focus merely on teaching; increase their teaching hours
to the maximum, even beyond the government requirement; and moonlight.
The reform towards PAI HEIs has so far paid scant attention to the issues
of academic management and promotion of research/innovation. Curriculum
management has taken a back seat in institutional management. Related to the
issue are the involvement of the academic in institutional management or aca-
demic management, specifically, and the proper career path for them. These too
have never been properly addressed in public policy terms and at the institutional
level. The management by permanent committees is alien to Cambodian public
HEIs. The limited engagement of the academic in institutional management is
also reflected in that there is merely one staff representative on the board. The
voice of the staff in the governing board is, therefore, limited, if at all.
Despite all the shortcomings, the application of the PAI decree onto selected
public HEIs should be applauded and can be considered a step in the right direc-
tion. It has certainly created some degree of accountability (at least in structural
terms), transparency, and participation in institutional management, although
the reform (or at least the institutions) has failed to maximise the benefits of the
reform. The reform has formalised/legalised the practice of public HEIs generat-
ing revenue, enabling them to earn the needed money for “institutional develop-
ment” and to keep the staff at the institutions as well as managing the financial
resources, with little control from the government.
The current system (or, more so, practice) of “public administrative” institu-
tions does not seem to guarantee higher education quality and improve insti-
tutional performance. The reform (or practice) has not been comprehensive
enough to ensure quality and performance. In the medium term, Cambodia will
need to address, inter alia, the twin issues of institutional autonomy and account-
ability, should it wish to improve the quality of its higher education. This is a big,
yet tenable, dream if it takes some proactive measures and mobilises collective
effort to achieve it.
Under the Higher Education Quality and Capacity Improvement Project
(2010–2017), funded by the World Bank, an attempt from MoEYS, spearheaded
by the DGHE, was made to prepare the regulation on institutional autonomy
and accountability. This effort has resulted in the Policy on Higher Education
Governance and Finance for Cambodia in August 2017. Currently, an initial
draft Regulation on Public Autonomous Universities has been drafted, pending
further stakeholder consultation and endorsement by the state. It is beyond the
scope to address the issue of public autonomous universities in details through
examining these recent attempts made by the government; hence, it suffices here
to indicate what approach should be taken and some key themes such reform
may consider and to outline key opportunities and challenges to be confronted.
Towards establishing an autonomous public university in

Cambodia?
A big question about public higher education reform that needs to be debated
and addressed is whether to take a big bang approach to higher education gov-
ernance reform or to take a more gradual approach (ADB, 2012). Perhaps given
the limited national budget and state capacity to steer the entire sector, the sec-
ond approach is more realistic, at least up to the medium term – that is, to
move towards the establishment of and pilot with a small pool of selected public
autonomous universities. The reform should target large public universities that
generate significant revenue and that have relatively good institutional manage-
ment systems.
The future reform towards public autonomous universities shall address the
three key interlocking institutional actors: the governing board, the rectorate team,
and the academic board. The current arrangement and functioning of the govern-
ing board are not conducive enough for them to contribute meaningfully to insti-
tutional performance, development, and oversight. Likewise, the current rectorate
team (if there is one), whereby the rector is quite powerful and there are limited
detailed formal/written delegation and authorisation of authority and high team-
work spirit amongst the leadership, is not appropriate for this body to drive the
institution towards excellence. The academic board is simply absent, leaving aca-
demic management to ad hoc committees and working groups. The future reform
may wish to properly address the issues of structure; compositions; appointment/
election of the members and leaders; authority, roles, responsibilities, and func-
tions and the delegation of the three key bodies – that is, governing board, rector-
ate team, and academic board (see Cramer, 2017; Mortimer & Colleen, 2010).
The governing board, which should be more inclined towards a stakeholder-cum-
corporate type, shall be tasked with overall policy direction and guidance, over-
sight, and mobilisation of external funding (see Trakman, 2008); the rectorate
team (rather than emphasis on the rector alone) with the task of institutional man-
agement broadly, and the academic board, to be managed by the academic, with
the academic management and maintenance and guarantee of academic freedom.
The issues of terms and term limits, terms of references, and performance moni-
toring and assessment of the administrators at all levels need to be discussed. So is
perhaps the idea of tenure and longer-term contract for academic positions.
The four core issues of institutional set-up, academic management, personnel
management, and financial management need to be tackled head-on and the
decision over approval of changes be delegated to the lowest level of the govern-
ment and/or institution possible. Institutional set-up (abolishment, modifica-
tion, and establishment of institutional structure) together with endorsement
of institutional written by-laws and regulations (which need to be introduced)
should be perhaps at the highest approved by the technical supervising ministry
and/or the governing board. To enable the academic to engage meaningfully
in institutional management, there is a need for holistic personnel management
reform. A big question to address is the dual personnel system, job security/
tenure, and career path for the teaching staff. With regard to finance, more inno-
vative approaches to financial management and more national funding to incen-
tivise and institutionalise good practices are needed.
Underlying this reform will be the enforcement of regulation by clear and
comprehensive institutional by-laws and regulations. A senior colleague once said
there is prevalence of “rule of lips” rather than “rule of law” in Cambodia, and pub-
lic HEIs are generally of no exception. In the longer term, it is unhealthy and
unsustainable to run an institution without instituting “institutional memories”
and enforcing them, accordingly. A practice can be that university by-laws shall
be the highest institutional rule, and they shall be issued by the governing board
and formally endorsed by the minister of the technical supervising ministry. The
governing board, the rectorate, and the academic board shall be entitled to issue
detailed regulations to govern issues under their respective jurisdictions.
Reform in higher education will not be attainable without a “capable devel-
opmental state” – one that can properly steer the sector development (for develop-
mental state, see Evans, 1995; Sok, 2012). In the long term, there is a need to
prepare relevant central state agencies to take on the steering roles (rather than
the current predominantly pre-emptive, reactive, and pre-auditing regulatory
roles). This is very much beyond the scope of this section. It suffices here to say
that there is a need to properly address the relationship between the respective
autonomous public universities and the supervising ministries and reforming key
government departments to activate and manage the required reforms. Key deci-
sions over the institutional management and the nitty-gritty of such arrangement
shall be left to the university to decide, and the technical supervising ministry
(and MEF, if it wishes) shall steer the governance and management of the public
autonomous universities via its endorsement of the by-laws and provision of nec-
essary funding. Broadly speaking, the state shall take a key role in steering broad
policy direction, directing the universities from a distance and to the minimum,
and providing funding support.
The anticipated journey towards the public autonomous universities is not cov-
ered with roses. Cambodia needs to address a number of key challenges to realise
this proposed dream. Currently, there has been a lack of open, frank, and mutual
dialogues amongst the key stakeholders, especially amongst and between promi-
nent political figures, policymakers, (senior) technocrats, and institutional admin-
istrators, let alone with the faculty members and staff, as to how Cambodian
higher education governance can travel a better journey. In a sense, the feeling of
urgency and public crisis is missing, and feeling of complacency seems to prevail.
There is also a lack of strong political support and clear political direction – and,
perhaps more important, limited communication and a good platform and space
for such between senior politicians, policymakers, and the (senior) technocrats,
who are a key to the policy reform. The proposed governance reform will need
more careful injection of national budget into public higher education, at least to
the selected universities that attempt to become public autonomous. The discus-
sion with and involvement of MEF in the reform process is crucially important.
Lessons from Thailand and Indonesia indicate the importance of accommodat-
ing the “money holder” and the success or failure of required reforms (Sok,
2016). Preparing the selected universities for this reform is likewise necessary
and is a (pre)requisite for the proposed reform to materialise. Many key stake-
holders strongly opine that the current structure (and instruments), practices,
resources (including human) and culture at public universities are not yet ready
for complete institutional autonomy. Presently, the communication between the
institution administrators, let alone the faculty members and staff, and senior
technocrats, let alone junior technocrat, is far from being ideal to conduct any
meaningful deep reform, and this too needs to be addressed head-on.
To conclude, there is certainly a need for a strong political support and political
good will from senior politicians and policymakers as well as appropriate “politi-
cal direction” to senior technocrats and top institutional administrators to kick-
start meaningful higher education governance reform. Open, frank, and regular
dialogue and discussion between these three key actors hold the key to any deep
reform. The bureaucracy is required to be prepared to ignite and conduct the
reform too. Similarly, the other institutional stakeholders, including the faculty
members and even students, need to better understand and be informed about
the reforms, including the costs and benefits (to the individuals and the system)
of the reform towards complete autonomy. A lesson can be learned from Thai
reform towards public autonomous universities: The government is required to
be firmly committed to achieving the reform and openly guarantee that no or
few institutional actors are disenfranchised from the reform, especially during the
transition (Sok, 2016). A committed, powerful champion of urgency is perhaps
needed to push the reform forwards – more quickly. However, for higher educa-
tion governance reform and the public autonomous university to be meaningful,
the linkage between the issues of autonomy, accountability, efficiency, and effec-
tiveness of the reform and the more philosophical question of reform for what
ultimate end must be addressed (Un & Sok, forthcoming). In the current con-
text where public goods and social justice are deteriorating, promoting socially
responsible graduates and social change agency to achieve broad social progress
must be the core mission of the reform.
Note
1 Rector is used for the university and executive director is used for the institute (with
an equivalent status to a university) such as the Institute of Technology of Cambo-
dia and the National Institute of Education.
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3 World-class university construction
and higher education governance
reform in China
A policy trajectory
Yannan Cao and Rui Yang
Introduction
A key contradiction in China’s development has been the party-state’s twin
expectations: economic development and political stability. Its origin can be
expressed in the slogan “red and expert” that was first introduced by Mao
Zedong in 1957 when he talked about the issue of agricultural and industrial
development and claimed that cadres and workers needed to be both politically
reliable and technically professional (CCCPC Party Literature Research Office,
1999). During the post-Mao era, Deng Xiaoping proposed a new version of
such contradictory expectations: “development is the hard truth” and “stability
overrides everything”. When Hu Jintao came into power, he proposed “scientific
outlook on development” and promoted the building of a “harmonious society”,
representing the successive leadership’s strong preoccupation with development
and determination to maintain political authority (Yang, 2017).
Chinese higher education has been inevitably torn between these two impera-
tives which continue to be stressed to this day. In May 2017, Education Minister
Chen Baosheng called for higher education to be both “red and expert”, that is,
to be both politically loyal and academically excellent (Ministry of Education,
2017). Against a backdrop of knowledge economy and world-class university
(WCU) construction, national leaders understand that China is standing at a
crucial moment in its economic development and needs to promote research and
higher education to avoid the “middle-income trap”. In the meantime, they also
insist on keeping a firm political and ideological grip over its higher education
system, in particular, the universities.
This chapter traces the policy trajectory of WCU construction and higher edu-
cation governance reforms in China against a backdrop of global policy envi-
ronment. It pays special attention to the changing relationship between the
dual concerns of the Chinese state: developing WCUs and maintaining political
stability. Attempting to examine the complexity of changing higher education
governance under the state’s twin expectations, it focuses on the changing mech-
anisms of state control and liberal-oriented reforms and analyses three aspects
of governance reform: government regulation, market mechanisms, and party
intervention.
22 Yannan Cao and Rui Yang
WCU construction and higher education neoliberalisation
As Altbach (2015, p. 5) suggests, “Everyone wants a world-class university. No
country feels it can do without one. The problem is that no one knows what a
world-class university is, and no one has figured out how to get one”. Academia
has not reached a consensus on the definition of WCU, and policymakers have
not identified an effective way to build one (Mohrman, 2008). However, the
eager quest for “world-classness” and better rankings in the global league tables
has become the norm across the world especially in East Asian societies (Cheng &
Liu, 2010; Deem, Lucas, & Mok, 2009; Yang, 2008). The major international
dynamics of this global trend may be attributed to globalisation and the rise of
knowledge-based economy (Robertson, 1992; Yang, 2005b).
Globalisation defines our era (Suárez-Orozco & Qin-Hilliard, 2004). Higher
education has been hugely affected by the myriad changes in our world brought
about by globalisation and its related effects (Yang, 2009, 2005b). The forces of
globalisation have given birth to a global knowledge-based economy (Castells,
2010; Waters, 2001). At the centre of this trend is the production, dissemination,
and application of knowledge as a core engine of economic development (Jessop,
2017), creating demand for diverse forms of knowledge as a key input into the
new creative and knowledge-intensive industry. Knowledge assets and intellectual
capital have thus attracted an increasing amount of attention, from academics,
CEOs, and national policymakers (Lin, Edvinsson, Chen, & Beding, 2013). For
many countries, intellectual capital becomes one of the most important resources
in their scramble for global profits (Brown, Green, & Lauder, 2001). The ability
of a country to compete successfully in the global market place has increasingly
relied on knowledge and continual innovation (Naidoo, 2003).
In this era of global knowledge economy, research universities are playing a
very prominent role as they increasingly influence a nation’s economic competi-
tiveness in the global economy (Altbach, 2013). Higher education has become a
crucial site for the production, dissemination, and transfer of economically pro-
ductive knowledge (Carnoy, 1994). Some governments have even reconfigured
higher education as a “global commodity” (Naidoo, 2003). Therefore, universi-
ties have reformed themselves to respond to the requirements of a more varied
and changing set of stakeholders, may they be local, national, or international.
These requirements are often driven by demands of “the knowledge-based econ-
omy” (Stensaker & Harvey, 2011).
The social and economic imaginary of a knowledge-based economy has been
guiding structural reforms and governance transformation of higher education
worldwide. To enhance national competitiveness and compete successfully in the
global knowledge economy, governments and policymakers have made serious
efforts to build WCUs by looking for new modes of higher education gover-
nance, with the aim of boosting their universities’ productivity and efficiency.
The major reforms induced by the rise of the global knowledge economy can
be summarised as the eager pursuit of WCU status and the neoliberalisation of
higher education governance (Mok, 2016). State appropriation schemes and
WCU construction and governance 23
policies along the line of marketisation, devolution, and corporatisation are seen
as effective strategies to restructure universities so as to achieve higher positions
in global league tables and also to be more competitive in international higher
education market place (Yang, 2012a).
The quest for WCUs and global university ranking is a prominent policy
agenda across different parts of the globe. WCUs are often seen as power-
house for national innovation, economic development, and global competitive-
ness. Research universities have become policy priority in many governments,
especially in developing countries which usually have catch-up strategies in the
development of their higher education (Altbach, 2007; Huisman, 2008). Many
governments have launched various kinds of “excellence initiatives” to stimulate
the development of their research universities in the hope of securing higher posi-
tions in the global university rankings. A common feature of these initiatives is
the concentration of resources in a small number of universities in order to accel-
erate their development. There are over 30 such excellence schemes in 20 countries
with their total funding exceeding USD 40 billion (Salmi, 2016).
These excellence initiatives are often accompanied by a process of higher educa-
tion neoliberalisation (Mok & Lo, 2007; Yang, 2006). Simply defined, the term
“neoliberalisation” refers to a process of restructuring all aspects of existence in
economic terms (Berg, Huijbens, & Larsen, 2016). Neoliberal ideology fore-
grounds the notion of free market and advocates the reductions in governmental
role in the economy and society (Davies, 2014). In the past decades, neoliberal
ideas have started to dominate public sectors including higher education in many
countries. Various neoliberal-oriented reforms have injected market principles of
competition into all aspects of university life and academic system (Gane, 2012).
The rationale for the reforms is to bring competition into higher education in
order to improve its productivity, effectiveness, and quality.
Such reform policies have greatly altered the pattern of university governance at
both systemic and institutional levels. Aiming to encourage competition among
universities, governments allocate public funds on the basis of the productivity
and quality of educational and research programmes. Furthermore, the govern-
ments encourage the private sector to play a more active role in the provision
of higher education at a time of reduced public support. Against this backdrop,
higher education systems in many parts of the world have undertaken a series of
neoliberal reforms, characterised by diversification of funding sources, increase
in university-industry partnerships, and introduction of market mechanisms in
the internal governance and management of universities such as outcome-based
performance management and monetary incentive practices (Mok, 2010a; Rob-
ertson, 2007; Yang, 2012a).
The relations between the market, the state, and universities have experienced
radical transformation in the last two to three decades due to the changing roles
of universities in the new knowledge-based economy. It could be one of the most
drastic changes since the emergence of the modern universities over the past one
and a half centuries (Schuetze & Álvarez Mendiola, 2012). This is clearly the
case in East Asian societies that are particularly decisive to reform Clark’s triangle
(Clark, 1983). These societies are increasingly experiencing pressure to compete
in the global knowledge economy and desire to stimulate their domestic uni-
versities to be included in the global league tables. Their conventional mode of
strong state and centralised approaches are regarded as ineffective in governing
universities in comparison with the market approaches of resource distribution.
The governments have introduced new ideas and practices, such as third-party
revenues, private sector values, and business management, to run universities in
order to improve their productivity and efficiency. These neoliberal changes to
the higher education system as a whole and each individual university are com-
monly referred to as a process of neoliberalisation (Palfreyman & Tapper, 2014;
Schuetze & Álvarez Mendiola, 2012). They can be understood in two dimen-
sions: (i) the governance of higher education system as a whole or the governance
at the system level, and (ii) the governance of individual institutions or the gov-
ernance at the institutional level.
At the system level, state funding strategies and the way universities are sup-
ported and evaluated have been profoundly changed due to the growing financial
dependence of higher education on external revenues such as income generated
from collaboration with industries. The process of neoliberal reform is usually
accompanied by the decrease in public funding and resources to universities.
Governments force universities to compete for external revenue in conjunction
with market-related practices, whether these moneys are in the form of tuition
fee, contract research, intellectual property, or fund-raising income (Clark, 2004;
Etzkowitz, 2002). The national policies of neoliberalisation often include the
introduction of tuition fees, privatisation of higher education, industry-oriented
reforms of curriculum, promotion of commercial and applied research, and
encouragement of university-industry collaborations.
Universities are expected to reorient their research and teaching to meet the
market needs by developing public and private partnerships. To secure external
moneys, they have to collaborate closely with businesses, for example, in build-
ing science and technology incubators, running university spin-outs, engaging
in technology transfer, and providing industry-friendly curricula and commercial
consultancy services (Slaughter, 2014). These expectations reorient universities
from the so-called isolated ivory tower towards closer contact with the market
and the state and push them to produce marketable knowledge and to serve the
wider community.
At the institutional level, the transformation of relations between universities,
state, and market are reflected in changes made in the internal management of
knowledge production, dissemination, and application. As a result of the mar-
ketisation of higher education at the system level and the state’s keen pursuit of
WCU, universities are pushed to reorganise their internal governance along the
lines of market principles such as adopting New Public Management techniques.
Universities adopted management tools that are more commonly associated
with private enterprise to govern the knowledge production process. Terms like
“outcome-based performance management”, “metric-based evaluation”, “cost-
benefit analysis”, “accountability and quality management”, “publish or perish”,
“effectiveness”, and “competition” have become normal in the discourse of uni-
versity governance and management.
Some commentators refer to this aspect of higher education neoliberalisation
at the institutional level as corporatisation (Bose, 2012; Parker, 2011). The cor-
poratised university is characterised by decision-making models, management
practices, and organisational culture which have their origins in modern business
company (Steck, 2003; Schrecker, 2010). The management is geared towards
standardised quality assurance, effectiveness, and efficiency, and performance
evaluation is based on explicit targets and outputs (Blair, 2011). In the neoliberal
discourses, universities are expected to produce useful knowledge and to supply
the workforce for economic development. This growing involvement of universi-
ties in market-related activities is sometimes referred to as “academic capitalism”
(Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). The process of marketisation and corporatisa-
tion includes both direct market behaviours and market-like behaviours, with
profound impacts on teaching, research, and social services (Ball, 2003; Hall &
Bowles, 2016).
Higher education governance reforms in China

Higher education governance worldwide experiences intensive transformation
shaped by globalisation and knowledge-based economy (Kosmutzky & Putty,
2016; Yang, 2005b). Some argue that the current transformation is even greater
than that caused by the industrial revolution during the end of the 19th cen-
tury (Park, 2012; Slaughter & Leslie, 1997). Chinese higher education institu-
tions (HEIs) are not immune to this far-reaching change. Intending to improve
national competitiveness and create national innovation system, China launched
a WCU construction agenda and used liberal-oriented strategies to reorganise its
higher education system, particularly in the governance of its universities. Mean-
while, the Chinese party-state still maintains its control over universities and aca-
demics through bureaucratic supervision and political intervention. University
governance is a combination of two seemingly contradictory forces, that is, cen-
tralised state control and liberal-oriented mechanisms, so as to strike a balance
between WCU development and the state’s tight control over higher education.
The changing relationship between government regulations, market practices,
and political intervention indicates China’s pursuit of a new model of university
governance and WCU construction.
Chinese WCU construction agenda: new project, old contradiction

At the 100th anniversary ceremony of Peking University in 1998, China’s then
President, Jiang Zemin, set a goal to build a number of WCUs to serve the
country’s modernisation mission (Jiang, 2006), which led to the official launch
of the national agenda of WCU construction. It is linked to China’s development
strategy in revitalising the nation through science and education (Deng, 2002;
Yang & Welch, 2012). Following the previous governments that have promoted
the principles and policies of “scientific outlook on development”, “innovative
country”, “created in China” and “Made in China 2025” (China Daily, 2007,
2015; People’s Daily, 2012a; The State Council, 2016a, 2016b), the launch of
the “Double First-Class” initiative in September 2017 aims to further reform and
advance Chinese research universities. Universities and disciplines on the given
list will be the main targets of government’s support and extra funding so as to
achieve higher international rankings by the year 2050.
Like Projects 211 and 985, the “Double First-Class” project cherry-picks a
small number of universities and disciplines for generous financial support (Alt-
bach, 2016). However, the party continues to exert tight control over these listed
universities. While the state recognises the need for university governance reform
by giving universities more autonomy in certain domains, at the same time, it
resolutely maintains the party’s ideological grip over these selected universities.
The State Council (2015) requires that “project universities must further enhance
ideological work in the new circumstance, boost party organisations in all units,
strengthen the influence of party organisations, and ensure the firm grip of the
party over the leadership and operation of institutions”. The new project contin-
ues to rely on heavy governmental support and, at the same time, calls for strong
political loyalty from the universities. It does not appear to be able to solve the
old contradiction of “red and expert”. First, the rigid constraints of the state-run
funding scheme are likely to restrict institutional independence and individual cre-
ativity as its predecessors did. Second, the party-state’s interference continues to
be a threat to institutional efficiency and autonomy. It is unlikely to reach a deli-
cate balance of maximising the utility of state funding while minimising its harmful
effects on university autonomy (Yang & Welch, 2012). As a result, the two goals
of political control and WCU construction remain difficult to reconcile.
Government regulation: financial support and

bureaucratic supervision
Borrowed from the Soviet model, pre-reform China employed a highly central-
ised model to govern its higher education system and universities (Yang, 2006).
Serving as an instrument to meet the needs of a planned economy of the country
and political control of the ruling party (Hayhoe, 1999; Mok, 2005), Chinese
higher education then was solely provided and funded by the government. Uni-
versities were more like an arm of the government affiliated with different min-
istries and were assigned various tasks in national development plan (Douglass,
2012; Hayhoe, 1989; Yang, 2006), with little institutional autonomy (Wang &
Mok, 2013). Such government-university relationship has been transformed in
accordance with the broader market economy reforms since the late 1970s. Uni-
versities now have more decision-making power in their daily operation, which
includes teaching, research and public service, student enrolment and interna-
tional cooperation as well as personnel and property management. The central
government established a system of autonomy and accountability to empower
universities while holding them accountable to meet national needs. As part of
the WCU construction agenda, the central government has launched a set of
national funding projects since the 1990s. Through heavy financial support for
top performing universities, it uses evaluation schemes to guide their develop-
ment. By doing so, government regulation has gradually shifted from a direct
control mode to a state supervision mode (Neave & Van Vught, 1994).
Government financial support

Chinese government invests heavily on elite universities (Yang, 2005a). Such
heavy investment takes the form of major national projects designed to assist Chi-
na’s top universities to bid for world-class status within a relatively short period
of time, a strategy justified by “concentrating limited resources on the most
needed” (People’s Daily, 2015; Xinhua News Agency, 2016). These schemes are
backed by substantial investment from central and local governments (People’s
Daily, 2012b; University World News, 2015; Zhang, Patton, & Kenney, 2013;
Zhao, 2012). A small number of elite universities were chosen and given the
explicit goal of speeding up their transformation into WCUs (Yang & Welch,
2012). Since 1990, the central government has launched three major attempts,
Project 211, Project 985, and Double First-Class. Over 100 universities were
involved, and they were given vast sum of public money to boost their standings
in international rankings.
Project 211
Initiated and implemented in the mid-1990s, Project 211 was the first national
priority-funding project aiming at building WCUs. Around 100 key universities
and disciplines were selected to receive additional financial support in order to
educate highly talented students and to produce world-class research. Universi-
ties included in the project were given extra funds for their teaching resources
and research facilities. Such funding continued to increase throughout the project
period between 1995 and 2016. During phases one, two, and three, around 0.43,
0.96, and 1.6 billion US dollars were allocated, respectively (People’s Daily Online,
2008; Zhao, 2012). The project focused almost exclusively on elite research-
intensive universities (Yang, 2005a). During 2007–2011, for example, project
universities which composed 6 percent of China’s regular HEIs received 70 per-
cent of public research funding, two-thirds of postgraduate students, four-fifths
of doctoral students, half of students abroad, 96 percent of the nation’s key labo-
ratories, and 85 percent of the nation’s key disciplines accredited by the Ministry
of Education (MOE) (People’s Daily Online, 2008; Xinhua-Global Times, 2014).
Project 985
In 1998, the central government launched Project 985, which was more selective
than Project 211. The original plan involved only Peking University and Tsin-
ghua University to increase their competitiveness with the major universities in
the world. In 1999, seven universities were added. By 2004, the project involved
39 universities. The project involved both national and provincial authorities. It
aimed to strengthen the research capacity of the selected Chinese universities.
Similar to Project 211, the government’s investment in this project focused on
developing national key research centres, importing world-renowned academ-
ics, attracting first-class visiting scholars, hosting international conferences, and
assisting international collaboration and communication.
Talent programmes
In conjunction with Projects 211 and 985, various talent programmes were initi-
ated by the government to enhance universities’ research profile and international
visibility. These programmes generously provided financial support to a small
number of top scholars to elevate their research to the international standard. For
example, the Yangtze River Scholars Program was initiated in 1998 under Project
211, with funding from the MOE and Li Ka Shing Foundation. The scheme pro-
vided significant research money and housing allowance to awardees with the aim
of luring them back to China in order to raise the reputation and competitive-
ness of Chinese research universities internationally. Similarly, in 2008, the MOE
initiated the national “Thousand Talents Program” to recruit top Chinese and
foreign scholars from overseas to work in China for a period of time. Each recipi-
ent received over USD 160,000 research funding from the central government.
Double First-Class initiative

The latest governmental initiative is the Double First-Class project, which can
be considered as an upgraded version of Project 211 and 985. The project was
announced in November 2015 and its implementation started in January 2017.
According to the MOE, more competition was introduced under this new proj-
ect. Any Chinese universities can potentially receive special funding from the cen-
tral government as long as their educational programmes and research outputs
have reached international standards. Selected universities would be removed
from the list if they slip in their performance. This policy change is likely to
encourage more HEIs to compete actively in building world-class universities
and disciplines.
The second strategy adopted by the government was to institutionalise vari-
ous research grant schemes with funding from either ministerial, provincial,
or municipal governments. Such a strategy has also taken two forms. One is
through the national key R&D funds and mega-project funding schemes, such
as the 863 Program and the 973 Program, which dedicates huge sums to the
development of the natural sciences and advanced technologies. The other is
through regular research fund schemes which support research projects in a wide
range of fields in universities. At the national level, this includes the National
Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC), the National Social Science Fund
of China (NSSFC), the Humanity and Social Science Fund of the Ministry of
Education, and the National Education Science Fund of China. There are also
other ministerial, provincial, and municipal projects and funds available for uni-
versity research.
The national key WCU construction projects and various public research grant
schemes constitute major sources of funding for Chinese universities. While the
government encourages diversification of higher education funding, China’s uni-
versities still relies heavily on government funding. The extremely uneven distri-
bution of WCU construction projects forces universities to compete intensively
with each other (Yang, 2005a). With massive investment from the government,
Chinese universities are closely supervised by the government at different levels
and by various means. The universities need to meet the standards laid out by
national evaluation bodies and follow the guidelines of national key funding proj-
ects and public research grants.
National evaluation schemes and research

funds guidelines
The central government exerts its powerful influence on the development of
higher education and research universities through national evaluation mecha-
nisms and research funds allocation. Two most influential government-run evalua-
tion mechanisms are the Quality Evaluation of Undergraduate Education (QEUE)
and the China Discipline Ranking (CDR). These evaluations are undertaken by
the Higher Education Evaluation Centre, which is affiliated with the MOE.
Issued in 2002, the QEUE assesses the quality of teaching in the universi-
ties. All HEIs in the Chinese mainland are to be evaluated once every five years
on a rolling basis. It is a top-down and compulsory process, with the aim of
monitoring and assessing the performance of the university based on the criteria
identified by QEUE (MOE, 2002; Zhou, 2004). QEUE sets out the evaluation
procedures, methods, and regulations; defines specific performance indicators;
and appoints evaluators who are responsible for site visits and review report-
writing. The report produced by evaluators consists of judgement of quality of
university education and recommendations for reforms. Universities must follow
the recommendations and implement reforms accordingly (Higher Education
Evaluation Center, 2008; MOE, 2002). The evaluation exercise has significant
impact on universities (Liu, 2008; Zhou, 2004), functioning as a baton to guide
the development of the university. To perform well in these evaluation exercises,
the university would need to reorganise their academic activities to comply with the
standards set by QEUE.
CDR evaluates academic programmes in HEIs. It is undertaken by China
Academic Degrees and Graduate Education Development Center (CDGDC),
which is under the Academic Degrees Committee of the State Council and
MOE. CDGDC is responsible for assessing and accrediting academic degrees
and graduate education. It ranks 95 disciplines across the Humanities and Social
Sciences, Sciences, Engineering, Agriculture, Medicine, Management, and Arts
(China Academic Degrees and Graduate Education Development Center, 2016)
and publishes its reports every four years. The reports cover areas such as qual-
ity of research, teaching staff, academic degree education, and reputation of
disciplines. Widely seen by universities as the most respected ranking scheme of
disciplines and research capacity, it also serves as a baton to steer universities to
meet national priorities and needs. The ranking of a particular university on the
CDR has a significant impact on the reputation of that university.
Another approach to government supervision is via national key funding proj-
ects and public research grants. The central government and funding agencies
provide guidelines and encourage universities to follow their research priorities
in order to meet national socio-economic development needs. Both Projects 211
and 985 and the Double First-Class initiative give priorities to those disciplines
that are directly related to national interests. Oriented to support key technical
areas and the basic sciences, key R&D grants, such as the 863 Program and the
973 Program, are designed to concentrate resources on selected institutions and
scientists to achieve breakthroughs in chosen subjects and disciplines to catch
up with cutting-edge research (Ministry of Science and Technology, 2015).
Research grants administered by various government-run funding agencies also
guide applicants every year with prioritised research topics to ensure university
research is in line with the party-state’s political considerations.
Provincial and institutional responses: intensified

internal competitions
As noted earlier, the Chinese central government has transformed its controlling
strategy from strict control to indirect supervision. The government supervision
mode has been built on the concentration of national resources on a few research
universities. Consequently, provincial and municipal governments and universi-
ties compete for resources on the basis of their performances in accordance with
national evaluation and funding requirements, leading to intensive internal com-
petition among provinces and universities.
The announcement of the national Double First-Class project has sparked a
funding “arms race” between provinces and started a new wave of university
reorganisation. Many provincial education authorities have initiated key invest-
ment projects as a response to the race with the intention to push their univer-
sities to be included in national key funding projects and research grants. On
a similar competitive basis, the provincial education authorities select a limited
number of universities in their jurisdiction for heavy investment focusing on
research productivity (China Youth Daily, 2017). Their projects have introduced
a dynamic adjustment mechanism based on university research performance. The
evaluations of the provincial projects target key indicators of national evaluations
such as CDR. Under-performing universities would be removed from the lists of
funding support. Chinese universities are thus pressured to become competitive
in their internal governance in order to improve their productivity and efficiency.
At the institutional level, universities rely on government funding to operate.
Those listed by Projects 985 and 211 received over 60 percent of their research
funding from government. Tsinghua University, for example, obtained USD
0.62 billion of research funding in 2013, more than 70 percent out of which
were funded by the government (Xinhua-Global Times, 2014). Universities strive
to enhance their research profile both to cater to national priorities and to com-
ply with provincial evaluation and national projects’ requirements. They imple-
ment human resources reforms to be more competitive (Xinhua News Agency,
2017) and reorganise their academic programmes in line with national criteria
(Gu, 2016). For individual academics, such developments have fundamentally
transformed the way they do their work. The establishment of merit-based hir-
ing practices and remuneration system has forced them to improve their research
productivity and efficiency and to compete for research grants.
Market mechanisms: state-led marketisation, devolution,

and corporatisation
The transformation of higher education governance is aligned with China’s wider
reforms from a planned economy to a market economy (Wang & Mok, 2013).
The reforms have not only facilitated the emergence of a market economy but also
led to a structural change in education. The state has reformed its education provi-
sion along the lines of marketisation and decentralisation to allow local govern-
ments and non-state actors to provide more resources and create more education
opportunities (Mok, 2000; Yang, 2006). The transition in the Chinese education
system provides a backdrop for higher education governance reforms. China has
introduced neoliberal ideas and practices in reforming the governance of its uni-
versities (Mok, 2010a; Yang, 2012b). The underlying assumption of these reforms
is based on a neoliberal approach to running the public sector like the private sec-
tor (Cheung, 2008). It is believed that the introduction of private sector manage-
ment tools will make Chinese universities more effective, efficient, and flexible to
serve their stakeholders (Brown, 2011; Mok, 2010b; Yang, 2012b).
The Chinese state has adopted strategies such as marketisation, devolution, and
corporatisation to reform its higher education system in the past three decades.
Liberal-oriented market mechanisms as defined by Brown (2012, 2015) and
Schuetze and Álvarez Mendiola (2012) have been introduced into higher educa-
tion governance at different levels. At the system level, the state has promoted
marketisation and privatisation to deploy resources from the private sector to sup-
port university development. The MOE has encouraged different actors to engage
in creating more educational opportunities and providing more choices for higher
education. At the institutional level, devolution has allowed certain degree of
autonomy for universities to function more effectively and respond more actively
to state goals and market economy. Corporatisation is increasingly used in internal
management to employ private sector practices for efficiency and effectiveness.
Marketisation: diversification of higher education provision and the

emergence of revenue-generating activities
Marketisation refers to a process whereby higher education and research become
a commodity provided by competitive suppliers. Private enterprises, students and
their parents, and other market forces engage in the provision and funding of
teaching and research, and consumers are charged for accessing to education
services (Brown, 2015; Yang, 2006; Yin & White, 1994). All such characteristics
are easy to find in government policies and practices in China including fee-
paying practices, the development of minban (non-government-run) HEIs, and
university-industry partnership.
During pre-reform era, the central government exerted tight control over
higher education. All students not only enjoyed free higher education, but also
received living stipends from the government. This practice began to change
during the mid-1980s. In May 1985, the Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) promulgated the Decision on the Reform of the Edu-
cational System which stated that HEIs could enrol commissioned training and
self-supporting students. Commissioned students were those enrolled based on
contracts with private enterprise and public organisations. The commissioning
institutions provided tuition fees for the students, and the students must work in
the institutions after graduation. Self-supporting students were those who paid
their own tuition fees. This policy change was reinforced by the Points Regarding
Accelerating Reforms and Developing Higher Education in 1992 which further
proposed that a greater proportion of HEIs funding would have to be derived
from tuition fees. From the late 1990s onward, all students in China have to pay
for their higher education.
The 14th Congress of the CCP in 1992 proposed establishing a socialist mar-
ket economy which emphasises using market mechanism as a key measure to
allocate social resources. This policy change paved the way for the development
of minban HEIs. National policies then began to encourage the development of
non-government-run educational institutions. Minban educational institutions
ranged from kindergartens to HEIs. By 2015, there were 1,547 non-government
HEIs across the country (MOE, 2016). Their major financial sources were
tuition fees, donations, and support from local communities and governments.
This development helped to meet the excess demand left over by the public uni-
versities (Mok, 2000). The mission of these minban universities is to train people
with vocational skills and practical knowledge to serve local needs. Thus, they are
fundamentally different from the national research-intensive universities.
Another strategy for the marketisation of higher education in China is the
growing number of partnerships between university and industry. Since the late
1980s, the central government has urged HEIs to raise funds through non-state
channels (Yin & White, 1994). HEIs are required to collaborate with industries.
A major form of such partnership is “horizontal collaboration” (Xiong, 2012).
HEIs carry out research or social service projects commissioned by industries,
enterprises, and sometimes local government agencies. Since the 1990s, hori-
zontal collaborative projects commissioned to HEIs have been increasing rapidly
in terms of scale and intensity. Another significant form of university-industry
partnership that has been strongly advocated by the government is technology
transfer. HEIs encourage academic staff to commercialise their research outputs
through patents, intellectual properties, or joint-venture with private enterprises.
Third, with increasing financial pressure, HEIs also generate revenue by setting
up university-run enterprises. Some of these companies bring in huge incomes
for universities. With the commercialisation of research, many academics hold
concurrent jobs in HEIs and in business companies.
Devolution: more autonomy in exchange for more accountability

With the transition from a centralised planned economy to a socialist mar-
ket economy since the 1980s, the Chinese state has decentralised much of its
administration and granted more institutional autonomy in exchange for public
accountability (Zha & Hayhoe, 2014). It has strategically devolved much of the
decision-making power to local governments and individual HEIs so as to push
them to be efficient and to be more responsive to local contexts. The key higher
education reforms carried out under the Decision in 1985 were aimed at reduc-
ing excessive state control over HEIs and strengthening institutional autonomy
and flexibility. The Outline of Chinese Education Reform and Development pro-
mulgated by the MOE in 1993 and the Higher Education Law issued in 1998
reinforced these two policies. The relationship between the central government
and individual HEIs has since been significantly changed, with the state giving
more autonomy to the universities and at the same time demanding more public
accountability from the universities.
The central government has shifted from micro-control to macro-control over
HEIs by holding universities accountable through education laws, funding allo-
cations, policy guidelines, and evaluation schemes. Under the emerging system
of governance, the state has motivated HEIs to improve their efficiency and to
engage in national and international competitions. HEIs have to compete for
governmental funding based on their performances in national key projects and
evaluation schemes. During the past two decades, corporate practices character-
ised by competition and performance management were introduced into Chinese
HEIs. The autonomy-accountability relationship is not merely a matter between
the central government and HEIs. The pressure of performing well in evaluation
and ranking trickles down the system to individual departments and academics.
Corporatisation: emerging self-regulation and introduction

of corporate management
The processes of marketisation and devolution have had profound impact on var-
ious aspects of the Chinese higher education system. One of the most important
consequences was the introduction of internal market and competition between
HEIs. The intensified competition between HEIs fostered a process of corpo-
ratisation in universities’ internal management. Corporatisation refers to a pro-
cess whereby universities introduce private enterprise principles and practices to
transform their internal management approaches and techniques (Cheung, 2008;
Parker, 2011; Pop-Vasileva, Baird, & Blair, 2011). The corporatisation of Chinese
HEIs is the result of the deepening of marketisation and devolution reforms since
the 1980s. It can be illustrated in three areas of institutional reforms, namely,
internal administrative system, personnel system and remuneration system (Yang,
2010; Yin & White, 1994).
First, in line with the reforms at the system level, reforms of internal administra-
tive system in universities have led to devolution of power and responsibility from
institutional level to departmental and individual levels. Chinese HEIs used to
have little motivation to improve their management efficiency before the 1980s.
Since the late 1990s, attitudinal change took place after universities obtained
their self-regulating status. Departments and academic staff now enjoy greater
decision-making power and they are more aware of the need to be accountable
and responsible in meeting the goals set by higher authorities of their institutions.
They know very well that the survival and development of their institutions are
increasingly dependent on their ability to financially support themselves and to
perform at a level set by various evaluation and ranking agencies.
Second, led by Peking University, the corporate-style reforms of personnel sys-
tem in Chinese universities started in the late 1990s (Yang, 2010). Prior to the
reforms, Chinese academic staff enjoyed permanent employment that did not take
their performance and workload into consideration, and promotion was mainly
based on seniority. Such practice was often referred to as “iron rice bowl”. With
the recent reforms, more academic appointments are performance-based contracts.
Academics now must perform to meet institutional and departmental expectations
before they could retain their positions, renew their contracts, or be promoted.
Third, universities have adopted corporate-style management tools, such as
performance-based reappointment, quality monitoring schemes and merit-based
salary, to reform their personnel and remuneration systems in order to boost
institutional efficiency and academic productivity. Chinese universities have used
appraisals and incentive mechanisms to determine academic salaries. Salaries con-
sist of two components, namely, state salary and internal allowance. The former
includes basic and post salaries stipulated by the state. The latter includes post
allowance and performance-based salary that are provided by institutions and
departments. Compared with the old system, a key change to the remuneration
system is the introduction of performance-based internal allowances. Under this
corporatised remuneration system, academics would strive to achieve highly in
institutional and departmental evaluation so as to receive the financial incentives
from internal sources.
Party intervention: from entire control to stability

maintenance
The CCP has always maintained a strong grip over China’s higher education
system (Huang, 2006). In Mao’s era, political loyalty was the major concern of
Chinese HEIs whose main function was to promote ideological propaganda and
serve the political agenda (Hayhoe, 1999; Min, 2004; Zhou, 2006). Since the
1990s, such party-university relationship has changed fundamentally. Attaching
great importance to academic excellence, the party has been constantly adjusting
its intervention strategies to balance the twin goals of WCU construction and
political stability for over three decades.
Organisational and institutional apparatuses of

party control over higher education system
Organisational arrangements of party control in Chinese higher education system
are sophisticated and well-functioned (Wang, 2010). Party branches are institu-
tionalised in all educational authorities and organisations at all levels, from the
MOE and local education bureaus to all schools and HEIs. Within the HEIs,
party branches are set up in each faculty and department. They are under the
leadership of each institution’s party committee. These organisational arrange-
ments build a party network for monitoring university operations and staff mem-
bers. According to the MOE (2008), the party branches built in HEIs are to
ensure party control and to supervise party members in each unit. Since most
university administrators are party members, the CCP virtually not only super-
vises party work but also controls administrative and academic affairs (Chen,
2013). Within the party’s cadre system, higher-level cadres have authorities over
their subordinates. The CCP, therefore, can powerfully influence the develop-
ment of the university.
The line between party leadership and university management has been further
blurred by the introduction of “president-responsibility system led by the Party”
in the 1990s (Huang, 2006; Law, 1995). The party committee and branches in
each HEI have the ultimate decision-making power over university management,
something later institutionalised by the Higher Education Law. The CCP has
constructed a political controlling infrastructure consisted of a network of party
organisations and a system of party-led university presidents. These arrange-
ments are beachheads of the party’s direct and tight control over universities and
academics.
Stability maintenance: new strategy for political control

The CCP has used Chinese HEIs as an instrument of political education and
ideological propaganda. In the pre-reform era, the first and foremost function of
HEIs was to educate socialist successors and constructors and produce a politi-
cal reliable workforce. The Maoist educational administration had entire con-
trol over every aspect of university life (Wang, 2010). It assigned political tasks
directly to universities and required them to participate in political activities and
to serve political movements. Such practice has changed since reform and open-
door policy. Multiple factors including liberal-oriented reforms in higher educa-
tion, growing international exchanges, and the increasing use of the internet have
made it extremely difficult for the party to craft a unified ideology in favour of its
control in HEIs. However, the party continues to monitor the HEIs closely in
order to bring them in line with the party’s interests. To do so, the party works
hard to keep political order and to prevent undesirable academic activities on
campuses while, at the same time, trying to promote academic excellence and to
construct WCU.
Stability maintenance is the party’s major means for political control and social
order in a context of rapid economic growth and growing dissent in the past few
decades (Yang, 2017). The strategy of stability maintenance comprises a complex
set of practices and structures which penetrated to nearly every aspect of Chinese
higher education. The aim is to allow certain autonomous space for various sec-
tors to flourish while suppressing undesirable components that could pose threat
to the legitimacy of the current regime and political stability of the country (Hou,
Liu, Yang, & Xue, 2018). In higher education, it involves an array of policies and
practices which set boundaries of institutional autonomy and academic freedom
and curb undesirable events that are politically sensitive and to keep university
development and academic work under the party’s surveillance. Recently, the
CCP has attempted to depoliticise everyday life on campus by playing a less active
role in university’s daily operation and moving away from micro-management
over most aspects of academic life.
Conclusion
This chapter has provided an analysis of Chinese higher education governance
transformation over the past four decades. It shows that the Chinese government
has shifted from a direct-control mode to a government-supervision mode by
introducing market principles to improve the effectiveness of resource allocation
and to boost university development. Reforms along the lines of marketisation,
devolution, and corporatisation have fostered a system of autonomy and account-
ability and have led to fierce competition among universities and academics. The
CCP has also transformed its party work at universities from tight control to a
strategy of stability maintenance which has led to the depoliticisation of campus
life, but the party continues its firm grip over university administration and aca-
demic work.
University governance reforms in China reflect the party-state’s contradic-
tory twin expectations on higher education: “red or expert”, implying stabil-
ity or development. Successive Chinese authorities have tried to strike a balance
between promoting WCU construction and keeping political control over uni-
versities. However, the two goals could be difficult to reconcile. To create the
best universities in the world, university administrators and academics must have
autonomy and freedom to do their work. Over the past two decades, Chinese
higher education has experienced remarkable growth in quantity and the natural
sciences but has stagnated with respect to quality and the humanities and social
sciences. These two contradictory trends may imply that the state’s desire to
keep firm political control on campuses could impede its effort in constructing
of WCUs.
In an era of WCU construction, the extent and scope of political stability main-
tenance in higher education has waxed and waned with changing national poli-
cies. Successive Chinese leaderships have continuously reformed their governance
strategies to adjust the tension between government controlling mechanisms and
liberal-oriented approaches. Depending on one’s perspective, those governance
reforms could have been the handmaiden of higher education development and/
or of political control. On one hand, liberal-oriented reforms and the mainte-
nance of political stability have adopted a top-down authoritative approach. On
the other hand, these moves have indeed provided universities and academics
considerably more autonomous space that is necessary for academic excellence
and WCU construction.
To conclude, Chinese current higher education structure implies a contradic-
tion of two governance philosophies: authoritarianism and liberalism. The chang-
ing dynamics of these two sets of principles and practices in the past decades
have evolved into a unique model of university governance. Inevitably, China’s
research universities have been caught between the complicated forces of govern-
ment supervision, market mechanisms, and political stability maintenance.
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4 Institutional autonomy and
governance of higher education
institutions in India
N.V. Varghese and Garima Malik
Introduction
Indian higher education sector is in a phase of revival from the turn of this cen-
tury. The revival of the sector is reflected in terms of an unprecedented expan-
sion in student numbers, emergence of private sector as a dominant player, and
increased willingness and availability of household investment in higher educa-
tion. With over 900 universities, nearly 40,000 colleges, 1.3 million teachers, and
36.6 million students, India has the second largest higher education system in the
world after China. With a gross enrolment ratio of 25.8 percent, Indian higher
education is in initial stages of massification (MHRD, 2018). The massification
of the sector is also due to the change in policy from a state controlled, publicly
funded system to a system dominated by private institutions and markets.
The fast expansion of higher education in India has, no doubt, improved access
conditions. However, the benefits of the expansion of the sector are not shared
equally among regions and social groups in India, resulting in widening regional
inequalities and persisting social inequalities in access to higher education. The
governance and management of higher education in India is challenged by the
market influence and massification of the sector, on the one hand, and institu-
tional and student diversity and scarcity of public funds, on the other. This chap-
ter analyses some of the issues related to managing markets and massification in
higher education in India.
From direct state control to steering from distance

The governance reforms in higher education imply a redefinition of the relation-
ship between the state and institutions of higher education. Globally, the state
played a dominant role in higher education development during the post-World
War II period. The favourable public policies and encouraging state funding sup-
port helped establish national institutions of higher education and expand stu-
dent enrolment in most countries, especially in the newly independent countries.
In many instances, the national political leaders and heads of state became heads
of the governing bodies in the public universities and the ministry played a pro-
active role in the appointment of the head of the institutions (vice chancellors/
44 N.V. Varghese and Garima Malik
rectors). In a sense, this was a stage of near state monopoly in higher education
development whereby funding, governance, and management were under the
direct control of the state and ministries of education. In other words, public
funding and state control characterised higher education governance in many
regions of the world (Varghese, 2015).
The fiscal crisis of the 1980s and the reduced capacity of the governments to
finance an expanding system of higher education resulted in virtual stagnation or
a decline in student enrolment in many countries (Altbach, 1989). The policies
followed during the structural adjustment regime in the 1980s helped reassign-
ing priorities in educational investments in favour of primary education. The
decline in public funding led to a state of crisis in higher education. After a pause,
the higher education institutions attempted to devise strategies for their survival
in the 1990s. The core elements of the survival strategies included a withdrawal
of state initiatives in higher education and a decline in the dominance of public
authorities in financing higher education.
The single most important strategy adopted was to open the higher education
sector to markets. This strategy of incorporation of markets in higher educa-
tion decision-making had two elements, namely, privatisation of public institu-
tions and promotion of opening private higher education institutions (Varghese,
2004). Privatisation measures reduced state control of public institutions even
when their ownership remained with the state. The private sector, on the other
hand, does not rely on state funding support and represented an alternative to
the state-supported model of higher education development.
The public universities adopted cost-saving measures and diversified their
sources of funding. Many countries reduced, if not eliminated, subsidies, introduced
cost-recovery measures and self-financing courses, and initiated income-gener-
ating activities. In other words, the public universities became entrepreneurial
(Clark, 1998) and market oriented in their governance and management. Mobili-
sation of resources, improving efficiency in operation and in the use of human
and financial resources, became a major consideration for governance and man-
agement of institutions of higher education.
The reforms initiated for institutional survival needed decisions to be taken at
the institutional level, and it implied a marked shift in governance and manage-
ment of higher education institutions. The shift in the locus of decision-making
shifted from ministries of education to institutions of higher education and
marked the beginning of an end to the state-controlled model of higher edu-
cation governance and development. Some authors consider this change as a
change to a stage of steering from distance or state supervision and the “rise of
the evaluative state” (Neave, 1998, p. 267). Some others consider this as a state
of increased reliance on the self-regulative capacities of the universities (Kivisto,
2005). The institutions of higher education became increasingly autonomous
in their functioning. The institutional autonomy included both academic and
administrative and financial matters.
Autonomy permitted institutions to set priorities, evolve strategies, develop
study programmes and courses, recruit staff, diversify funding sources, and decide
Autonomy and governance of HEIs in India 45
on internal resource allocation criteria. The regulations governing the sector and
the regulatory authorities need to negotiate and manage markets and public
policy governing them. The bureaucratic model of management was found to
be rulebound and less flexible and was found to be less reliable to face the new
situation. The new situation is characterised by an interplay of state, market, and
household (student) as partners in decision-making. This partnership needs more
flexible modes of decision-making to ensure that the interests of all the stake-
holders are taken into account.The collegial model of management became less
relevant since most decisions were bound more by resources constraints than by
academic considerations (Austin &Jones, 2016; Bush, 2003).
Changing context of higher education governance in India

The higher education developments in India also followed the changes in the
global trends in governance and management of higher education. Higher edu-
cation was an area of priority action in independent India. The first commission
on education was on higher education and was established immediately after
independence. The recommendations of this commission (Radhakrishnan Com-
mission) (MoE, 1949) laid the foundations for higher education development
and establishment of regulatory bodies in higher education.
Following the global trends of the time, India adopted a public-sector-led
model of higher education development. The growth and expansion of higher
education was almost an exclusive domain of the public authorities. Public insti-
tutions and government funding characterised the higher education development
in the 1950s and 1960s (Varghese & Malik, 2016). This period also witnessed
the establishment of several technological institutions and management institu-
tions of global standards. The most commonly found governance pattern was a
form of state-controlled model of higher education development. The govern-
ment played an important role in planning, funding, and managing higher educa-
tion institutions.
The universities in India were seen as autonomous institutions at this stage.
Although the funding came from the government, institutions of higher edu-
cation were given the freedom to set priorities, offer courses of their choice,
and award degrees. The institutions of higher education enjoyed a considerable
degree of academic freedom during this period. The emphasis was on the need
to maintain high-quality higher education, and it was felt that academic freedom
and institutional autonomy were important to identify and recruit high-quality
faculty, develop study programmes, and initiate research in the areas of national
importance. This was a stage of harmonious coexistence of availability of public
funding and autonomy of higher education institutions and academic freedom
for the professoriate.
Two factors seem to have influenced changes in the state-controlled model
of higher education development in the subsequent period: the emergence of
private higher education institutions and a relative decline in the public funding
for higher education. The 1970s and 1980s saw the emergence of private sector
in higher education which questioned the state-controlled model of governance
and state monopoly in decision-making. The private sector emerged initially as
an aided (state-supported) sector, later progressed to the introduction of self-
financing courses, and further to self-financing private institutions and to private
universities in the 2000s. Today, the private sector accounts for a major share of
institutions of higher education and a major share of student enrolment. These
developments certainly reduced the role of the state in decision-making.
The declining public funding reduced the authority enjoyed by the govern-
ment in matters related to governance and management of public institutions of
higher education. The public institutions were starved of funds, and they were
compelled to mobilise their own resources from non-traditional sources. The
introduction of cost saving, cost-sharing, and income-generating activities in
institutions of higher education necessitated decisions to be taken at the institu-
tional level. These changes helped shifts in governance structures from a state-
controlled model to a state-supervised model whereby institutions became more
autonomous in their functioning. The state interventions became more regula-
tory and supervisory in nature.
It can be argued that the privatisation of public institutions reduced state con-
trol on the governance and management of public higher education institutions.
The public institutions became more autonomous, and they diversified their
sources of funding. In many instances, a reduction in student subsidies and an
introduction/increase in student fees and income-generating activities such as
self-financing courses and programmes are measures adopted to overcome severe
resource paucity experienced by higher education institutions. It seems that the
centrally funded institutions are less severely affected by resource constraints than
state-funded higher education institutions.
The emergence and expansion of private higher education institutions is influ-
enced by the permeation of neoliberal values in the governance and management
of higher education in India. Neoliberalism reflects the belief that free market
mechanism is the optimal way of organising all exchanges of goods and services
in a society. Neoliberal ideas in higher education means promoting market princi-
ples in the operation of higher education institutions. The higher education insti-
tutions should promote competition, price their services, and produce a profit.
The influence of neoliberal values was more at the macro level since issues
related to institutional autonomy were not a major concern for private institu-
tions. The major concern was on the extent of regulation to be exercised by the
public authorities. The experience in the pattern of expansion of private institu-
tions showed that they were confined mostly to professional, technical, and man-
agement subject domains and are mostly located in the states of Andhra Pradesh,
Karnataka, Maharashtra, and Tamil Nadu.
There were adverse public perception and open criticism that the private sec-
tor is led by commercial interests and that there is a need to regulate them. The
number of court cases and court orders on many issues pointed to the efforts to
discourage commercial motivations to run educational institutions. While the
private institutions felt that they are over-regulated and controlled by the state,
others felt that there is a need for more regulated growth of the private sector
institutions. These debates in the 1990s also brought to light the need for regula-
tions and accountability of both public and private higher education institutions.
Regulatory bodies in higher education

According to the constitution of India, education was a state/provincial sub-
ject. Through a constitutional amendment in 1976, education was transferred
to the concurrent list, making it a joint responsibility of the central and state
governments. Although education is a joint responsibility, India adopted a cen-
tralised model of regulation in higher education. The regulatory bodies played an
important role in mediating between the government and institutions of higher
education. There exist regulations related to granting of permission to open and
operate an institution, to decide on the intake of students and introduction of
courses, and to ensure equity and social justice.
The first regulatory body in higher education in India was the Medical Council
of India (MCI), which was established in 1934. The MCI had the authority to
lay down norms and standards and recognise or de-recognise courses and institu-
tions. The first commission on higher education, the Radhakrishnan Commission
(1948), made several recommendations which form the basis for creating some
of the important regulatory bodies in higher education in India. The recom-
mendations of the Radhakrishnan Commission led to the establishment of bodies
such as the University Grants Commission (UGC) and the All India Council for
Technical Education (AICTE).
The UGC came into existence in 1953. It became a statutory body set up by
the parliament “for coordination and determination of standards in Universities”
in 1956. It plays an important role in advising the central and state governments
on the measures to improve higher education. UGC is more of a recommenda-
tory body, and it has recommended the closing of several deemed universities
which were found to be of poor quality by the Tandon Committee in 2009.
Whereas the UGC is responsible for universities and general higher education,
the AICTE is responsible for technical education institutions in the country.
These two bodies (UGC and AICTE) together regulate a major share of higher
education institutions and study programmes in India. However, India has mul-
tiplicity of regulatory bodies in higher education other than UGC and AICTE.
They also reflect the way higher education is organised and governed in India.
Several ministries are involved in providing higher education and each has its own
body to regulate the study programmes offered in their respective domains. For
example, the central regulator for higher general and technical education remains
the Ministry of Human Resource Development (MHRD), whereas that for pro-
fessional education rests with other ministries. The UGC and AICTE serve as
a vital link between the Union and State governments and the institutions of
higher learning.
Another important institutional arrangement is the State Higher Education
Councils (SHECs) that were established as per the recommendations of the
National Policy on Education (NPE) of 1986. According to the UGC guide-
lines of 1988, the SHECs are entrusted with planning and coordination and aca-
demic, advisory, and administrative functions. Although only a few SHECs were
established in the 1990s, their number has increased in the current decade since
it became mandatory under the newly initiated sponsored scheme (RUSA) to
rejuvenate higher education in India. The relationships among SHECs, depart-
ments of higher education, state planning boards, and state universities define
the governance and management processes in higher education at the state level.
Governance structures at the institutional level

The public higher education in India is offered through two types of institutions:
universities and colleges. Public universities in India can be entities owned by the
central or state governments. A majority of the public universities (more than
90 percent) are in the state sector. India has an affiliating system whereby sev-
eral colleges are affiliated with a university. The central universities, with very few
exceptions, do not have colleges affiliated with them. Around 99 percent of the
colleges are affiliated with state universities, and they account for nearly 94 percent
of the student enrolment in higher education in India.
The universities mostly offer graduate and postgraduate study programmes
such as master’s-level courses and research programmes,whereas the colleges
mostly offer undergraduate courses leading to first level university degree. These
graduate and postgraduate courses account for only 11–12 percent of the student
enrolment. The colleges do not have the freedom and authority to design their
own curriculum, develop their own examinations, or award degrees. Each college
follows the curriculum and carries out examinations as per the stipulations of the
universities to which they are affiliated. The universities have authority to award
degrees, but colleges do not have that kind of authority.
The division of labour between the colleges and universities is important to
understand the governance structure and management process in higher educa-
tion institutions in India. Universities are more autonomous, and they focus more
on research and teaching at graduate and postgraduate levels. The colleges are
more of teaching institutions than research entities and their focus is on teaching
undergraduate level courses. Universities are responsible for developing curricu-
lum and syllabus for study programmes which are offered in the colleges. The uni-
versity sector plays a more important role in enhancing quality of course contents
while colleges play an important role in the quality of curriculum transactions.
The vice chancellor is the chief executive in the university administration. The
governance structure at the university level consists of bodies such as senate/
syndicate, executive council/governing body, and academic council. Some of the
universities have courts. The senate is mainly responsible for financial and bud-
getary estimations and appropriations. The executive council or the governing
body is the executive body of the university and is responsible for all management
and administrative matters. The academic council is mainly responsible for study
programmes and research in the university.
The composition of the senate in affiliating state universities includes the
principals of affiliated colleges making the number too large for discussions and
decision-making. The syndicate wields powers and has more political clout than
other bodies. The senate reviews the policies and programmes of the university
and suggests measures for improvement and development of the university and
exercises such powers as prescribed by the statutes. The syndicate has powers
to make statutes and ordinances and then amend or repeal the same. The state
governments put their nominees into the syndicate and, at times, a majority of
the members may be directly or indirectly connected to the government. These
factors influence the decision-making process at the institutional level and, at
times, there is a domination by the syndicate on other bodies influencing their
proceedings (Qamar, 2016).
Thus, very often the syndicate in many affiliating universities is dominated by
elected members and non-academics. This has important implications for how
the university is run. In some universities, the ex-officio members of the syndi-
cate include four directors: Collegiate Education, Medical Education, Technical
Education, and three secretaries from Education, Health, and Law. This leads to
a large concentration of power in the syndicate thus compromising the indepen-
dence of the academic council and other statutory bodies.
The governance structure at the college level consists of government nominees,
and the others are university nominees whose names are approved by the govern-
ment; the principal, teachers from the university, and from the college. Governing
body of the colleges meet once or twice in a year to discuss various issues and
aspects related to the development of the college and its academic standards.
There have been reported cases of a tussle between colleges and government
administration over constitution of governing bodies in colleges which are partly
or fully funded by state government. In some extreme cases, there has been a
freeze on release of funds to colleges. These are some of the ways in which there
is interference by the government in governing body constitution in affiliated
colleges. In the case of autonomous colleges, the governing body of the college
has representatives from the state government, the parent university, and the
UGC apart from the principal and the representatives of the staff and students.
The academic council has representatives from the state government, the prin-
cipal of the college, heads of the department, staff, and student representatives.
The other statutory bodies in the case of autonomous colleges are the Board of
Studies and Finance Committee.
Autonomous colleges have the freedom to determine and prescribe their own
courses of study and syllabi, and restructure and redesign the courses and make
them skill oriented. They can prescribe rules for admission in consonance with
the reservation policy of the state government/national policy. Further they can
promote research in relevant fields and evolve methods of assessment of students’
performance, the conduct of examinations, and notification of results. The parent
university supports the autonomous college in designing and framing the curricula
and upgrading the method of delivery, and they also help to set up a framework in
the autonomous college for evaluation and examination of the students.
Institutional autonomy and accountability
Institutional autonomy is one of the important elements influencing gover-
nance and management of higher education institutions. In the present context,
the relationship between universities and the government revolves around the
issues of autonomy and accountability. The state and universities are constantly
engaged in redefining their mutual relationship, with the state introducing more
and more accountability measures, on the one hand, and universities demanding
more autonomy, on the other.
The universities in India were seen as autonomous entities from the beginning.
The first commission on higher education in independent India (Radhakrishnan
Commission of 1948), which laid the foundations for higher education develop-
ment in India, emphasised the importance of autonomy of universities to free
them from interference by the government. It emphasised the legislative frame-
work for the universities to operate and a strong governing body with external
members thus leaving the universities “free from interference”. The commission
felt that higher education institutions should be seen as self-governing organisa-
tions to ensure academic excellence.
The commission recommended setting up of regulatory bodies as buffer insti-
tutions mediating between the government and the universities. The subsequent
commission (Kothari Commission report of 1966) also underlined the impor-
tance of institutional autonomy(GOI, 1966), as did the UGC Committee on
university governance in 1968. The Gnanam committee report asked for greater
autonomy of universities from the government and participation of teachers and
students in managing the universities (UGC, 1990). The government appointed
a CABE Committee on university autonomy (MHRD, 2005), which also upheld
the importance of autonomy for institutions of higher education. The commit-
tees in the recent period too argued for increased institutional autonomy.
It can be seen from the previous references that all committees and commis-
sions on higher education recommended for autonomy of higher education insti-
tutions. However, the translation of these recommendations into operational
practices varied. As we will discuss in the subsequent sections, in practice, certain
categories of institutions enjoyed more autonomy than other categories of higher
education institutions.
University autonomy can be substantive or procedural. Substantive autonomy
gives institutions authority to take decisions and operate with regard to their
own goals and programme matters. However, procedural autonomy implies
freedom regarding administrative and financial matters. Substantive autonomy
includes the freedom to design the curriculum, identify research priorities, for-
mulate student admission policies, and staff recruitment criteria and criteria for
the awarding of degrees. Procedural autonomy involves the freedom to prepare
and administer budget and financial administration, appoint non-academic staff,
and procure and enter into a contract with others outside the institution (Raza,
2009; Varghese & Malik, 2015). The actual exercise of autonomy depends on the
governance structure and management practices at the institutional level.
Let us consider some of the important governance and management aspects
and see how autonomous the institutions of higher education in India are.
Autonomy in academic matters: Academic autonomy is the freedom to decide
on academic issues such as curriculum, instructional material, pedagogy, and
methods of student evaluation. Universities in India enjoy a considerable degree
of freedom on academic matters. Although UGC provides guidelines on new
courses and programmes, universities enjoy autonomy and freedom in academic
matters. The colleges affiliated with universities, on the other hand, enjoy limited
freedom on academic matters since most of the academic decisions are taken by
the university. For example, the UGC has devised the Choice Based Credit Sys-
tem (CBCS) programme for comprehensive continuous assessment in which the
students have a choice to choose from the prescribed courses. The universities
have freedom to introduce new courses to choose from or decide on the set of
courses from which choices can be made.
Recruitment of teachers: Most universities in India have autonomy in teacher
recruitment. Unlike some Western countries, university teachers are recruited
to the institutions concerned and the teachers are not part of the civil service.
The universities notify the faculty positions, constitute a selection committee,
invite candidates for interviews, and declare selection results. However, the insti-
tutions are governed by the rules, regulations, and salary and service conditions
stipulated by the UGC. The qualifications requirements, the salary structure, and
norms for promotions of faculty members are mostly common and do not vary
among the universities.
The teacher recruitment pattern in the government colleges affiliated with
state universities is different. The teachers are appointed to the system and not to
any institution. They can be transferred from one government college to another.
Many appear for the common competitive test to qualify for the teaching posi-
tions. They are posted to different institutions. These teachers are part and parcel
of the state civil services and are governed by the rules and regulations applicable
for the state civil service (Tilak & Mathew, 2016; Malik, 2017).
Administrative and financial autonomy: Institutions of higher education in
India enjoy limited autonomy in matters pertaining to administrative and finan-
cial issues. The resource allocation criteria and the rules governing financial man-
agement gives limited scope for deviations from the established norms. Over
a period of time, the resources allocated to higher education institutions meet
only a declining share of their budgetary requirements. The state universities are
more affected than central universities by the declining share of the budgetary
allocation to institutions. The colleges are more starved for funds than universi-
ties. Most public institutions of higher education are compelled to mobilise their
own resources since the allocations may not meet even the salary expenditure of
the employees.
The strategies adopted at the institutional level to mobilise additional resources
include cost-saving, cost-recovery and income-generating activities. Needless to
add, student fees become a major source of sustainable resource mobilisation.
These changes have been associated with decisions taken at the institutional level
and give scope for exercising of autonomy at the institutional level. However, it
seems the improved institutional autonomy is not benefitting the departments
since there is more centralisation of decision-making at the institutional level.
The decisions pertaining to financial and administrative are becoming more and
more centralised at the offices of the vice chancellor, registrar, and finance.
There are two important initiatives by the present government on issues related
to autonomy and financing of higher education. These initiatives are in the pro-
cess of being implemented.
Graded autonomy: With the NITI Ayog (GOI, 2017), in its agenda for devel-
opment released in 2017, and with the approval of UGC, there is a plan to grant
graded autonomy to institutions on the basis of their performance. This means
essentially that the institutions performing extremely well will be completely free
of government control and the poor performers will be subjected to more of
regulation and control. UGC-recognised public, private, and deemed universities
will be divided into three categories according to the “UGC (Categorisation of
Universities for Grant of Graded Autonomy) Regulations 2017”, and according
to those categories, each institute will be awarded different degrees of autonomy
(GOI, 2017).
Universities either accredited by National Assessment and Accreditation Coun-
cil (NAAC) with a score of at least 3.5 or ranked in the top 50 institutions of
National Institutions Ranking Framework (NIRF) for two consecutive years will
be under the “Category I”. Universities under this category will be free to start
a new course, department, and school without UGC’s approval. They will also
be exempted from UGC’s regular inspections and can collaborate with foreign
educational institutions without the regulator’s permission. Their performance
will be reviewed on the basis of self-reporting.
To be eligible for “Category II”, universities should either have been accred-
ited by NAAC with a score between 3.01 and 3.49 or ranked between 51 and
100 in the NIRF ranking. Such universities will be exempted from UGC’s regular
inspections but will be subjected to stricter control in comparison to “Category
I” institutions. So “Category II” universities will need the UGC’s permission to
sign MoUs with foreign universities. Their performance will be reviewed by a
peer group. Finally, institutions categorised as “Category III” will be the most
regulated universities. They will not enjoy any of the exemptions granted to those
in “Categories I andII”.
India also has established accreditation agencies such as NAAC for universities
and colleges and National Board of Accreditation (NBA) for technical educa-
tion while professional education is under their respective councils. Further, most
universities have established internal quality assurance cells. These are additional
efforts made to monitor quality at the institutional level.
Higher Education Financing Agency (HEFA): The setting up of the Higher
Education Financing Agency (HEFA) is being heralded as one of the key reforms
in higher education sector in India. The financing agency HEFA, approved by
the Union Cabinet, would provide financial assistance to centrally aided institutes
for promotion of world-class infrastructure. It would provide the much-needed
funds for premier institutions like Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), National
Institute of Technology (NIT), and Indian Institute of Management (IIM).
The agency would function as a special purpose vehicle circumscribed under
government-owned Non-Banking Financial Company or Public Sector Banks,
which would later increase the value of HEFA to approximately USD 3 billion
specified for the building of world-class labs and infrastructure for centrally aided
institutes including the IITs/IIMs and NITs.
The HEFA will be set up with joint participation by the government and phil-
anthropic donors. It would be set up under Companies Act and will be registered
with Reserve Bank of India (RBI) as a Non-Banking Finance Company (NBFC).
It will be headed by a banker and will have a board with five donors and five insti-
tutions selected on rotation basis. It would leverage the equity to raise up to USD
3 billion to fund projects for infrastructure and development of world-class labs
in institutions like IITs, IIMs, and NITs. The HEFA would mobilise CSR (cor-
porate social responsibility) funds from PSUs and corporates, which would be
released from them for promoting research and innovation in these institutions.
HEFA would finance the civil and lab infrastructure projects through a ten-
year loan and principal portion of the loan will be repaid through the “internal
accruals” of the institutions. The government would service the interest portion
through the regular plan assistance. All the centrally funded higher educational
institutions would be eligible to join as members of the HEFA.
Accountability
NAAC, set up in 1994, has many dimensions along which institutions are assessed,
and while the process was voluntary earlier, now UGC funding is linked to accred-
itation. Some of the dimensions of assessment of universities are that of gover-
nance, leadership, and management. Under this criterion, there are key aspects
like institutional vision and leadership, strategy development and deployment,
faculty empowerment strategies, financial management and resource mobilisa-
tion, and internal quality assurance system. However, only a small share of higher
educational institutions has been accredited in India. It is not a straightforward
act to introduce and implement accountability measures due to the limited size
and strength of NAAC vis-à-vis the large number of higher education institutions
which need to be accredited.
The MHRD is introducing a new idea of accountability under which each
institution is expected to sign a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the
MHRD on the activities that will be carried out by the university. The monitoring
of institutional performance will be based on the items included in this MOU.
This is similar to performance contracts introduced in several universities abroad.
Conclusion
Higher education in India suffers from a lack of effective leadership, especially at
the level of vice chancellors, and the erosion of autonomy is, at times, a reflection
of weak leadership. There are questions raised about the process of selecting
institutional heads. Some of the institutional leaders do not have academic cre-
dentials and research experience to command respect of the professoriate. Many
universities remain “headless” for years and are headed by interim in-charges who
do not enjoy the academic and administrative authority to effect changes in the
institutions.
Effective academic leadership in higher education is a function of several factors
which include leadership in teaching, leadership in research, strategic vision and
networking, collaborative and motivational leadership, fair and efficient manage-
ment, and the development and recognition of performance and interpersonal
skills. Many heads of institutions do not have all these qualities.
There is also a flight of good academics to North America and other advanced
countries, and it is important to attract them back along with other global talent
to help Indian universities to reach world standards (Ramsden, 1998; Chandra,
2017a; Chandra, 2017b). This is more important in a situation when the perfor-
mance of higher educational institutions in India is deteriorating.
Many universities, especially the state universities, are operating under condi-
tions of severe financial crisis. The allocations from the state governments are at
times less than 50 percent of the budgetary requirements. The salary bill for the
regular employees exceeds the allocation from the government. These institu-
tions are compelled to mobilise resources. Many of them do not replace vacant
faculty positions and rely on part-time and guest faculties. These financial uncer-
tainties severely and adversely affect the academic activities of the institutions.
Therefore, any revival of the system need to ensure the provision of minimum
essential funding support.
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5 Autonomous higher education
institutions in Indonesia
Challenges and potentials
Paulina Pannen, Aman Wirakartakusumah, and
Hadi Subhan
Introduction
Higher education in Indonesia is currently experiencing a huge transformation.
In the past, there were discourses about higher education institutions (HEIs)
being teaching-focused versus research-focused. However, the challenge has
been elevated into the role of HEIs as agents of knowledge, culture, and tech-
nology transfer as well as for economic development. The present Government
of Indonesia expects higher education to contribute significantly to the nation’s
competitiveness. As such, the success of HEIs is measured on the basis of two
major performance indicators: skilled labour and innovation (see Kementerian
Riset, Teknologi dan Pendidikan Tinggi, 2015).
With the spirit of deregulation to give HEIs more room to innovate in creative
ways – especially in organisational, financial, and also academic management, by
considering HEIs’ individual uniqueness and context – the Government of Indo-
nesia has provided some public universities with autonomy. Globally, the concept
of an autonomous HEI has been outlined in the Magna Charta Universitatum –
“The university is an autonomous institution at the heart of societies.” The concept
was introduced in Indonesia in the late 1990s (Direktorat Jenderal pendidikan
Tinggi Kementerian Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 2012). On the basis of the Gov-
ernment Law No. 61/1999, there were four HEIs stipulated to be autonomous,
namely, Universitas Indonesia, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Institut Teknologi Band-
ung, Institut Pertanian Bogor, Universitas Sumatera Utara, and Universitas Pendi-
dikan Indonesia. The autonomous status granted by the government was aimed at
empowering HEIs with flexibility in managing their respective institutions on the
basis of their strength, vision, and goals as they respond to external challenges, and
as they develop their reputation and credibility.
With autonomy, each HEI will have the flexibility in making decisions, man-
aging its assets, carrying out its own business model, collaborating with other
parties, innovating, and introducing initiatives to develop the institution’s unique-
ness and strength within its particular context. As such, each HEI can manage its
inputs as well as outputs to become more productive. Nevertheless, autonomous
HEIs are still required to base their activities on the government’s regulations
and law which apply specifically for autonomous HEIs. Where specific regulation
Autonomous HEIs in Indonesia 57
for autonomous HEIs is still lacking, autonomous HEIs are then required to
comply with the existing generic regulations for higher education in Indonesia.
Furthermore, autonomous HEIs are expected to file an end-of-year report to the
Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education (MORTHE) on their
performance based on the performance contract (Menristekdikti, 2014).
The autonomous status of HEIs in Indonesia has been regarded to be the most
conducive for the achievement of the nation’s competitiveness as well as develop-
ment, as it gives more flexibility to HEIs to innovate and be creative in making
entrepreneurial breakthroughs. Under the HE Law 12/2012, the autonomous
status has been regarded as the highest status of public HEIs in Indonesia which
gives HEI a higher degree of freedom in managing its institution. The second
level of status is “public service institution” which receives limited autonomy in
financial management, and then the third level is “operational unit” which oper-
ates fully under the MORTHE. In future, the number of autonomous HEIs is
expected to increase, until the majority of public HEIs are autonomous. Auton-
omy has impacted the business process and certainly the productivity measures,
as the HEIs are allowed to receive and earn income from their educational as well
as research activities. Government financial support will be provided on the basis
of a performance contract which is renewed annually. Meanwhile, the autono-
mous HEIs can receive funding from other funding agencies on the basis of their
research and services contracts as well as product dissemination.
In 2013, autonomous HEIs were provided with special regulations on Fund-
ing Mechanism for Autonomous University (Government Regulation Num-
ber 58/2013, which has now been replaced by Government Regulation Number
26/2015). The regulation specifically defines an autonomous university as a pub-
lic university, established by the Government of Indonesia, and provides it with
the status of an autonomous legal entity. Autonomous universities are provided
with the rights and responsibilities to manage and direct the operation of higher
education while implementing the Tridharma Perguruan Tinggi (Three Pillars of
Higher Education: Education, Research, and Community Services).
Being a legal entity, each autonomous HEI has been given a separate govern-
ment regulation signed by the seal of the President of Republic of Indonesia, as
shown in Table 5.1. The later four universities, namely, Universitas Padjadjaran,
Universitas Diponegoro, Universitas Hasanuddin, and Institut Teknologi Sepu-
luh Nopember Surabaya, despite having obtained their autonomous statuses in
2014, had their statutes released in 2015 and were given a transition period of two
years until 2017. Table 5.1 shows the government regulations related to the des-
ignated autonomous universities, including their statutes which were used as the
basis for implementing the transformational changes towards autonomous status.
Requirement to be an autonomous HEI

Under the Law of Higher Education No. 12/2012, institutional autonomy was
invoked in article 65 line 1, which states that autonomy can be selectively granted
58 Paulina Pannen et al.
Table 5.1 Autonomous HEIs and their government regulations
Education Institution Government Regulation
1 Institut Teknologi Bandung No. 65/2013 on the Statute of Institut

Teknologi Bandung
2 Institut Pertanian Bogor No. 66/2013 on the Statute of Institut
Pertanian Bogor
3 Universitas Gadjah Mada No 67/2013 on the Statute of
Universitas Gadjah Mada
4 Universitas Indonesia No. 68/2013 on the Statute of
Universitas Indonesia
5 Universitas Pendidikan Indonesia No. 15/2014 on the Statute of
Universitas Pendidikan Indonesia
6 Universitas Sumatera Utara No. 16/2014 on the Statute of
Universitas Sumatera Utara
7 Universitas Airlangga No. 30/2014 on the Statute of
Universitas Airlangga
8 Universitas Padjajaran No. 80/2014 on the Autonomous Status
of Universitas Padjajaran; and No.
51/2015 on the Statute of Universitas
Padjajaran
9 Universitas Diponegoro No. 81/2014 on the Autonomous Status
of Universitas Diponegoro and No.
52/ 2015 on the Statute of Universitas
Diponegoro
10 Universitas Hasanuddin No. 82/2014 on the Autonomous Status
of Universitas Hasanuddin and No.
53/2015 on the Statute of Universitas
Hasanuddin
11 Institut Teknologi Sepuluh No. 83/2014 on the Autonomous
Nopember Surabaya Status of Institut Teknologi Sepuluh
Nopember and No 54/2015 on the
Statute of Institut Teknologi Sepuluh
Nopember
to public universities by the government on the basis of a performance evaluation

of the public university being managed as the public service institution. As such,
the autonomous status can be granted to existing public universities with good
performance or, in special cases, to a newly established public university.
In 2014, MORTHE issued a Ministerial Decree No. 88/2014 on the Trans-
formation of Public Universities to Autonomous Public Universities. The decree
specifically iterates the requirement for any public university to transform into
autonomous university, so as to allow public universities in Indonesia to prepare
themselves for the autonomous status. Autonomy is given on the basis of several
criteria of institutional performance, as shown in Figure 5.1.
1 Quality
To be granted the autonomous status, a public HEI has to provide evidence
of quality in terms of having obtained institutional accreditation of Excellence
Quality Good Governance Financial Feasibility Social Role in Economic
Responsibility Development
a. Excellent accreditation for the a. Accountability; a. Financial and a. Percentage of a. The role of HEI in
institution and at least 80% of the study b. Transparency, assets disadvantage development of
program accreditation; effectiveness, and management students in small and medium-
b. Relevance and coherence among vision, efficiency; based on the scholarship = no sized enterprises;
mission, and goals with national higher c. Not-for-profit existing less than 20%; b. The role of HEI in
education standard and institutional orientation; regulations; b. Percentage of providing solutions
standards; d. Compliance with b. Unqualified students from to problems in
c. Quantity and quality of international rules, regulations, opinion for disadvantage industry;
publications and/or intellectual property and policy; financial report for areas: border c. The role of HEI in
rights; e. Good reporting the last two years; and/or remote developing and
d. Students’ achievement in international mechanism – c. The capacity to areas; nurturing
and national competition; period, accuracy, raise funds other c. Involvement in entrepreneurship.
e. Participation of HEI in various and timing. than Government HEI in
government activities and projects; source/funding. community
f. Participation in various activities and services.
collaboration/partnerships of HEI with
business and industry.
Figure 5.1 Requirement to be an autonomous HEI

and excellent study programme accreditation for a minimum of 80 percent
of its study programmes. The accreditation can be national accreditation or
international accreditation such as AUN or AACSB. It is assumed that when
a HEI has achieved excellent accreditation for its institution and a majority
of its study programmes, the management of the institution must be sustain-
ably good, with the potential of further improvement.
2 Good Governance
To be granted the autonomous status, a public HEI has to provide evidence
of having implemented good governance as a public service unit that is the
second category of public HEIs in Indonesia. As a public service unit, it is
provided with financial autonomy to engage in commercial activities that
generates revenue for the institution. The institution is held accountable
in managing the funding provided by the government as well as income
from other sources. Good governance is measured by indicators relating to
accountability; transparency; compliance with governmental regulations;
subscription to good reporting mechanisms for the government, stakehold-
ers, and public; and also the implementation of a non-for-profit orientation
in its activities. Good governance is assumed to be a good indicator of the
capacity becoming an autonomous institution in the future.
3 Financial Feasibility
To be granted the autonomous status, a public HEI must indicate that it can
manage the funding allocated from the government and, at the same time,
that it has been able to raise its own income from various business units and
collaboration. It also has to show a business model that guarantees a sustain-
able income for its future operation, and that the HEI has a steady income
from its business units, and savings that can serve as an endowment fund or
an operational budget in the future. The limit for saving is a minimal 300
billion rupiah (US$ 22 million) to be able to apply for autonomous status.
With such an amount of saving, the HEI is expected to be able to operate on
its own at least for three years.
4 Social Responsibility
To be granted the autonomous status, a public HEI must indicate that it
has active engagement with community through its academic activities and
products. Usually, social responsibility is considered a spending activity using
the funding mainly from the government. However, to be autonomous, the
public HEI must transform its spending social responsibility into income
generating activities, while maintaining its goal – that is, to solve public
problems using the results of its research, collaboration with industry, and
its academic programmes. The fulfilment of social responsibility with high
income-generating activities indicates a strong capacity for the HEI to be an
autonomous institution in the future.
5 Role in Economic Development
To be granted the autonomous status, a public HEI must indicate that it has
products of innovation that have the potential to be commercialised, and
strong collaboration with businesses and industry. Innovation is measured
through research endeavours, international scientific publications (includ-
ing citation index and collaboration index), patents or intellectual proper-
ties, and innovative products for industry. As such, the HEI will be able to
assume a significant role in economic development, especially in increasing
the nation’s competitiveness.
The preparation for autonomous status is an initiative to be taken by each

individual public HEI. While maintaining the status of public service institution,
receiving autonomy in financial management, the public university can make
efforts to achieve the criteria to be autonomous. Information on the fulfilment
of the five aforementioned criteria is to be presented in the form of proposal to
be submitted to the MORTHE, along with other documents – that is, a self-
evaluation report, a long-term strategic plan, a draft of the statute, and a transi-
tion plan. Once the autonomous status is granted, the HEI may then start work
on its transition to the autonomous status.
Approach in implementation of autonomy

To fulfil the objective of implementing autonomy at the HEI, one must first
understand, be committed, and be convinced that the autonomy will bring ben-
efits to all university’s major constituents, namely, faculty members, staff, and
students, and if implemented through the right process, it will also bring man-
ageable transformational change (Fasich, 2013; Nulhaqim, et al., 2016). First,
the autonomy received by the HEIs provides HEIs with authority:
1 to manage the government’s owned assets for operational purposes, except

lands;
2 to govern and make their own decisions with emphasis on transparency and
accountability;
3 to establish units to ensure accountability and transparency;
4 to manage funds, independently, transparent, and accountable;
5 to establish business entities and endowment fund on the basis of the prin-
ciples of transparency and accountability;
6 to recruit, manage, replace, and dismiss academics as well as non-academic
staff; and
7 to open, implement, and close study programmes on the basis of the prin-
ciples of academic quality.
Second, the scope of autonomy granted to HEIs includes academic and non-
academic autonomy. Academic autonomy includes the establishment of norms
and an operational policy to carry out the Tridharma Perguruan Tinggi. This
includes the authority to open, implement, and close study programmes based on
the principles of academic quality.
Meanwhile, non-academic autonomy includes the establishment of norms and
an operational policy regarding organisation, finance, students, human resources,
facilities, and infrastructure. Under organisational autonomy, HEIs have been
granted autonomy in governing and making their own decisions, with transpar-
ency and accountability, to establish the institutional structure suitable for their
operation. In terms of financial autonomy, HEIs have the autonomy to manage
their own budget, to manage the government’s assets for operational purposes,
and to establish business entities and endowment fund based on the principles of
transparency and accountability. Under student autonomy, HEIs have the author-
ity to determine the number and source of students, recruitment policy, and the
maintenance of the student body. Under human resource autonomy, autonomous
HEIs have the authority to recruit, manage, replace, and dismiss academics as
well as non-academic staff. Under the facilities and infrastructure, autonomous
HEIs have the authority to make use of the existing government asset and facili-
ties, erect new buildings, and establish new infrastructure deemed necessary for
their operation.
Under the Law of Higher Education No. 12/2012, the scorecard for the
autonomy of HEIs in Indonesia, as depicted in Figure 5.2, covers six major areas
of autonomy: academics, organisation, finance, students, human resources, and
facilities.
The coverage of HEI’s autonomy is wide. As such, Brodjonegoro (2012)
states that before embarking on the journey towards autonomous status, eight
factors should be weighed: the benefits of change, legal framework, accountabil-
ity, financial plan, financial formula, monitoring and evaluation, transition period,
and the readiness of the HEI.
1 Benefits of Change
Globally, the transformation of higher education specifically includes the
provision for the HEIs to be more autonomous and have more freedom in
governing themselves. For a public HEI to be autonomous, it must undergo
many changes. As such, it is necessary that all change agents – the leaders
in a HEI and other invisible leaders – are committed to the change which
would bring about national development. Such change usually encounters
resistance from some stakeholders. In most cases, it is because the concept
of autonomy and its boundaries are not well understood by the stakehold-
ers. Faculty members who feel comfortable with routine and with a secure
salary from the government tend to be unhappy with the new ventures of an
autonomous university. Students are concerned about an increase in tuition
fees if the university were to be financially autonomous. Further, the pub-
lic could also question the commitment of the government, because they
believe that an increase in autonomy would mean the end of support from
Academics Organisation Finance Students Human Resources Facilities
a. Norms, operational Norms, operational Norms, operational Norms, operational Norms, operational Norms, operational
policy, and operation policy, and operation policy, and operation policy, and operation policy, and operation policy, and operation
of: of: of: of: of: of:
a) Strategic and a) Budgeting, short- a) Intra- and extra- a) Criteria and a) Ownership of
• Academic operational term and long- curricular procedures of HR facilities and
requirement for plan of the term financial activities for recruitment; infrastructure;
new students; organization; management; students; b) Assignment, b) Appropriation of
• The opening, b) Organizational b) Tariffs and unit cost b) Students professional facilities and
changes, and structure and of all kinds of organization; development, infrastructure;
closing of a study administration educational services; c) Talent scouting and evaluation of c) Utilization of
program; procedure; c) Income, and talent HR; facilities and
• Curriculum of c) Internal control, expenditure, development. c) Development of infrastructure;
study programs; monitoring, and and financial key performance d) Maintenance of
• Learning process; evaluation management; indicator and facilities and
• Assessment and mechanism; d) Short-term and long- targets; infrastructure.
evaluation d) Internal quality term investment; d) Dismissal
process. assurance e) Collaboration with procedures and
• Exit requirement; system. third parties on mechanism.
• Graduation. three pillars of
higher education
b. Norms, operational (teaching,
policy, and operation research, and
of research and innovation);
community f) Short-term and
services. long-term liabilities;
g) Financial recording
and reporting
mechanism.
Figure 5.2 The scorecard of HEI’s autonomy in Indonesia

the government (Surachman, 2016). Non-academic staff are very sceptical
of the autonomous status, because they usually do not have enough infor-
mation regarding their own positions, such as whether they would remain
as civil servants supported by the government and be promoted to certain
positions, or whether they would become university employees and have to
compete with other newly recruited employees for certain positions. The
benefits of being an autonomous HEI need to be explained and be under-
stood by the various stakeholders. Within the boundaries of more flexible
governance and better quality higher education, an autonomous HEI is
expected to become a moral academic force to reform the higher education
in Indonesia with multiplier effects (Brodjonegoro, 2012).
2 Legal Framework
Legal framework and regulation on autonomous HEIs must be congruent.
An autonomous HEI must also be ready to devise its own regulations to
manage its autonomous institution, so as to keep to its intention of imple-
menting good governance and be held accountable. In many cases, there
may be more problems than solutions. For example, the overreach of author-
ity in establishing new organisation structures may result in the existence of
many units without any clear function, or with no consideration of costs,
which would later be a burden to the institution as well as the government.
The synchronisation of HEIs’ national regulation and an autonomous HEI’s
regulations needs to be done to ensure smooth operations in the autono-
mous HEIs. When the autonomous HEI does not devise its own regula-
tions, then the operation is to comply with the national regulations, which
may not be well tailored for the HEI.
3 Accountability
An autonomous HEI must be accountable to the public. Accountability is
measured on the basis of the representativeness of membership and work-
ing mechanism of the board of trustees, an independent validation of the
HEI’s outcomes based on public assessment, valuation and/or rank, and
audit mechanism on public fund expenditure. The board of trustees is the
main mechanism for public accountability, especially when the public is rep-
resented in its membership. The board of trustees usually consists of public
representatives, government representatives, students, academics, university
management, and non-academic staff members. The board usually meets
regularly to determine the performance of the autonomous university, the
achievement, and improvement needed as well as the roadmap for its future
development. As such, the public is allowed to contribute to the strategic
development of the HEI, and conversely, the HEI is able to provide feed-
back to its stakeholders. Thus, the autonomous HEI is transforming into an
open and transparent institution instead of a closed ivory tower. At the end
of the year, the management report is to be made public, along with the
results of the public audit of the university’s finances. The MORTHE will
evaluate its performance on the basis of its innovation (that which has been
commercialised), skilful graduates (graduates with employment, with no or
short waiting time), and also on a management (productivity) index.
4 Financial Plan
An autonomous HEI needs to have a very strong financial plan to enable it
to be accountable, self-sufficient, and sustainable. A block funding mecha-
nism is needed to allow flexibility in financial management for attaining opti-
mal results. Thus, output/outcome-based funding mechanism is becoming
important in autonomous HEIs based on strong justification and policy.
Along with the right of the HEI to independently manage funding alloca-
tion and spending from the government and other funding sources comes
the requirement of transparency and public accountability.
5 Financial Formula
The financial formula needs to be determined. Currently, the funding sup-
port for autonomous HEIs from the government is granted in block-funding
on the basis of the performance evaluation and the annual financial plan by
the HEIs themselves. The government block funding is intended to fill the
gap between income earned and operational expenditure of the autonomous
HEI. Each autonomous HEI is expected to have its own financial formula
and plan to generate revenue from sources other than the government,
such as through research, innovation, and other innovative endeavours. An
autonomous HEI needs to establish its new business model to ensure their
income, operation, and sustainability.
6 Monitoring and Evaluation
The monitoring and evaluation of the autonomous HEIs is important. The
public and the government must be able to obtain information regard-
ing the funding allocation and spending by the autonomous HEI, which
includes income and funding received from various sources. A public audit
is required for HEIs with autonomous funding management. The peri-
odic evaluation of autonomous HEIs is carried out by MORTHE on the
basis of their performance contract and their proposal for the government’s
support.
7 Transition Period
A transition period is needed to bridge the transformation from the insti-
tution’s existing status as public service HEI to the stage of being an
autonomous HEI. Transition strategies can be devised differently for each
HEI according to its own existing condition. For example, for the first four
autonomous HEIs – Universitas Indonesia, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Insti-
tut Teknologi Bandung, and Institut Pertanian Bogor) – the government
provided a ten-year transition period for the conversion of their staff from
government officials to staff of the HEI. The two HEIs – Universitas Suma-
tera Utara and Universitas Pendidikan Indonesia – were not provided suf-
ficient time for transition, and they barely managed to become autonomous
HEIs. The last four HEIs were then given a two-year transition period.
The longer the transition, the more ready HEIs in implementing their
autonomy.
8 Readiness of HEI
Prior to its transformation into an autonomous HEI, a HEI must prepare its
students and courses (academic), management of human resources, finance,
income, and administration to be ready at the systemic level as well as the
operational level. Most HEIs do not have problems in preparing the trans-
formation of its academic system. However, the preparation for management
of human resource issues, finance, income, and administration systems and
operation has been more challenging.
While the five factors in Figure 5.1 are prerequisites for a HEI to be autonomous,
the eight factors from Brodjonegoro (2012) indicate the steps to be taken after
the autonomous status is granted.
Assessment of the seven autonomous universities

Although the official government regulations regarding each autonomous
HEI were issued recently in 2013 and 2014, the seven autonomous HEIs have
been in operation since the late 1990s. For the purpose of this study, the most
recent autonomous universities – Universitas Padjadjaran, Universitas Dipo-
negoro, Universitas Hasanuddin, and Institut Teknologi Sepuluh Nopember
Surabaya – are not included in the assessment, since they are still in the relatively
preparatory stage to becoming autonomous and do not have much informa-
tion on their progress to be shared. Therefore, the assessments and analyses in
this study will be focused on the earlier seven autonomous universities namely,
Institut Teknologi Bandung, Institut Pertanian Bogor, Universitas Gadjah Mada,
Universitas Indonesia, Universitas Pendidikan Indonesia, Universitas Sumatera
Utara, and Universitas Airlangga. The aim of this study is to elaborate the model
and the experience of each HEI, especially the first seven autonomous HEIs in
Indonesia.
Framework of the study

The study on implementation of institutional autonomy is intended to collect
data on the experience of HEIs in implementing their autonomy statuses and the
challenges and opportunities faced.
As such, the study framework (Figure 5.3) is as follows:
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Constraint and Problems

Inial assets separated from the government’s
owned assets, except lands
Signiﬁcant Development
Targets
Governance and independent decision-making
Organic Regulaon
Breakthrough
Degree of Autonomy
Authority to establish units to ensure accountability
and transparency
Authority to manage funds independently,
transparent, and accountable
Authority of recruing and dismissing
lecturers and supporng staﬀ
Authority to establish business units and
endowment funds
Authority to open, implement, and close
study programmes
Figure 5.3 Research framework
Axis X = seven areas of authority (Law of HE No. 12/2012)

1 Initial assets separated from the government’s owned assets, except
lands;
2 Governance and independent decision-making;
3 Authority to establish units to ensure accountability and
transparency;
4 Authority to manage funds independently, transparent, and
accountable;
5 Authority of recruiting and dismissing lecturers and supporting
staff;
6 Authority to establish business units and endowment funds; and
7 Authority to open, implement, and close study programmes.
Axis Y = six areas of inquiry regarding the implementation of autonomy by
the HEIs:
1 Degree of Autonomy
• How autonomous do the autonomous HEIs perceive them-
selves to be?
• What is the meaning of autonomy for them?
2 Organic Regulations
• Have the HEIs devised their own regulations?
• Which areas are already covered by their own regulations and
which are not?
3 Breakthrough
• What are the breakthroughs or innovations they created to imple-
ment autonomy in their institution?
4 Significant Development
• How significant has the autonomous status been to the devel-
opment of the institution?
5 Targets
• Do the autonomous HEIs have targets for development?
• What are the prioritised programmes?
• What are their targets?
6 Constraints and Problems
• Were there any constraints and problems faced during the imple-
mentation of their autonomy?
Axis Z = 11 autonomous public universities (only seven analysed)
Method of study
The study employs a survey method for data collection complemented with
a study of documentation and in-depth interviews during visits to each indi-
vidual institution. A guide was devised for the interview based on the research
framework. The interview was conducted in seven HEIs, each involving HEIs’
leaders (all echelon 1 and 2 in each HEI, ranges from n = 20–40 per HEI),
academics (n = 25 per HEI), and non-academics (n = 25 per HEI), during the
period from April to August 2017. Data analysis has been conducted qualita-
tively using constant comparison procedures to arrive at coding, categories,
and concepts in the form of written narrative regarding the implementation of
autonomy by HEIs.
Results and findings
From the collected data and interviews, the implementation of autonomy for
HEI has been revealed to be somewhat challenging for the government as well
as for the HEIs.
For the government, the biggest challenge has been the regulation of institutional
autonomy for HEIs. The provision of institutional autonomy to universities has
been legally integrated into one of the articles of the National Education System
Law issued in 2003, thus securing legal status for it. However, in order to equip
the first four autonomous HEIs as well as future autonomous HEIs with stronger
and unique regulations of their own, the Government of Indonesia issued in 2009 a
specific law focused on institutional autonomy for HEIs. The specific law was then
revoked by the Supreme Court, due to the disagreement between public and private
HEIs on the concept of education as a tradable entity as one part of the law.
Meanwhile, on the basis of the existing law, the autonomous status was also
given to additional HEIs, that is, Universitas Sumatera Utara, Universitas Pendi-
dikan Indonesia, and Universitas Airlangga. In 2012, a new regulation – the Law
of Higher Education – was issued, and the HEIs’ autonomy was included into one
of its articles, and the seven autonomous HEIs were specifically mentioned in the
law. In 2014, two regulations were issued as to equip autonomous HEIs with an
operational base. First was the Government Regulation on Managing and Gov-
erning HEIs No. 4/2014, which provides guidance for managing and govern-
ing autonomous HEIs as mentioned in articles 22 to 26. The articles specifically
define the scope of autonomy of the HEIs, that is, academics and non-academics
(organisation, finance, students, HR, and facilities) as depicted in Figure 5.2.
Then there was the Ministerial Decree on the Transformation of Public Universi-
ties to Autonomous Public Universities No. 88/2014, which guides public HEIs
on the requirements for them to transform into autonomous university.
On the basis of the 2012 Law of Higher Education and Government Regula-
tion No. 4/2014, another four HEIs were given autonomous statuses in 2014.
Thus, at present, among 4,565 HEIs in Indonesia, there are already 11 HEIs
designated as autonomous – they are Universitas Indonesia, Universitas Gadjah
Mada, Institut Teknologi Bandung, Institut Pertanian Bogor, Universitas Pen-
didikan Indonesia, Universitas Sumatera Utara, Universitas Airlangga, Universi-
tas Diponegoro, Universitas Hasanuddin, Universitas Padjadjaran, and Institut
Teknologi Sepuluh Nopember Surabaya.
The autonomous HEIs receive strong legal status because each of them has
their own law and regulation (see Table 5.1), and the first seven autonomous
HEIs was even specifically mentioned in the Law of Higher Education issued in
2012. With such a strong legal status for the HEIs, the government is constrained
in taking action when an autonomous HEI does not adhere to its performance
contract. For example, one university was engaged in an internal dispute because
the rector wanted to extend his term beyond that allowed by the regulations.
Further, nepotism was also in the picture: the establishment of new units in the
university – without clear function and targets – is merely to serve the interests of
a staff member’s relatives. As such, financial management in the university as well
as the governance of the university was in jeopardy. The academic atmosphere
was affected by this unconducive situation; thus, the institution’s accreditation
was downgraded. The terms of the performance contract were not respected.
Nevertheless, the government could not revoke its autonomous status unless the
government changed the Law of Higher Education No. 12/2012 and the spe-
cific regulations for the particular university which was sealed by the President of
Indonesia. Changing the law could take more than two years, and would have to
go through the People’s House of Representatives, which could take on a politi-
cal impact beyond that which would be expected. In that case, MORTHE took
over the university for a temporary period and assigned a caretaker to manage the
university until a new rector was elected. It was a laborious situation. It is a major
effort for the government to nurture a public HEI to become autonomous, and
one that requires resources, but at the end, the government was not able to take
action in revoking the status due to the regulations. It is apparent that there is
a need for more accommodative regulation to support government’s action to
revoke the autonomous status whenever such incidents happened.
Meanwhile, for the HEIs, to be autonomous also presents some challenges. If
managed carefully, creatively, and innovatively by autonomous HEIs such challenges
can open up new opportunities to grow and improve their performance. From the
data collected, the implementation of autonomy, especially the seven areas of author-
ity within the scope of HEI’s autonomy, are varied from one institution to the other
institutions, in terms of understanding autonomy, governance, breakthrough, signifi-
cant advancement, targets and constraints. In general, the challenges by autonomous
HEIs in implementing their autonomy in their institutions is as follows.
1 The most notable challenge has been “understanding of being an autono-

mous HEI” – which is varied from one HEI to the others.
The autonomy of a university itself has been defined simply as the rights
and responsibility of an HEI in flexibly and independently managing its own
operations. Nevertheless, it has not been defined in any legal instruments for
autonomous HEIs. The boundaries of autonomy were provided under two
broad categories of academic and non-academic autonomies, and covering
seven areas of autonomy, that is, ownership of initial assets separated from
the government’s owned assets, except lands; governance and independent
decision-making; authority to establish units to ensure accountability and
transparency; authority to manage funds independently, transparent, and
accountable; authority of recruiting and dismissing lecturers and support-
ing staff, authority to establish business units and endowment funds; and
authority to open, implement, and close study programmes.
When compared with the European Higher Education Autonomy Score-
card (see Pruvot & Estermann, 2017), the coverage of autonomy provided to
Indonesian HEIs is relatively similar, albeit with different emphasis. The Euro-
pean Higher Education Autonomy Scorecard covers four major categories:
organisation, finance, staffing, and academic autonomies, and provides a highly
detailed description of the coverage of each category of autonomy. Meanwhile,
Indonesia HE Autonomy (2012) has its own scorecard for autonomous HEIs
(see Figure 5.2). It does not provide detailed descriptions as the European HE
Autonomy Scorecard does. As such, each autonomous HEI in Indonesia can
define its own autonomy and set its own boundaries and coverage. This has
been perceived to be the major challenge for autonomous HEIs.
The boundaries and coverage set by each autonomous HEI is the under-
lying foundation for the policy, implementation, and operation strategy of
the HEI’s autonomy. On the one hand, it demonstrates the autonomous
powers they wield in setting their own definitions and boundaries of their
autonomy, but since each autonomous HEI has different boundaries and
coverage, autonomous HEIs are frequently misunderstood or not being rec-
ognised by the other government bodies and ministries in relation to assets,
finance, tax, and personnel matters.
A lack of understanding on the autonomy rights and authority by the
universities has caused the university not to be able to perform optimally in
executing its vision and mission in conducting higher education programme
and activities. Some examples were demonstrated for the cases of tax pur-
poses, the tax and revenue office of the Ministry of Finance categorised the
university legal entity as a government-owned enterprise in the form of a
corporation, and the university must comply with corporate tax obligations,
which differs from being an educational institution. There are different inter-
pretations among the government authorities such as the Office for Finance
Oversight and Finance Control and the internal inspectorate general who is
responsible for supervising the management of universities.
2 The other challenge has been “governance and independent decision-
making” of autonomous HEIs.
University governance and the relationship between the state and higher
education institutions are issues that have generated intense debate and reflec-
tion over the past decade. Institutional autonomy is widely considered as an
important prerequisite for modern universities to be able to develop institu-
tional profiles and to deliver efficiently on their missions (Pruvot & Ester-
mann, 2017). In Indonesia, university governance is shifting from centralised
governance by the government to decentralised governance by the individual
HEIs. As such, each individual HEI is given the privilege to autonomously
manage its own operation on the basis of its uniqueness and context. Estab-
lishment of university governance is to demonstrate the university ability in
making decisions autonomously through a board of trustees, public auditor,
academic senate and, in some cases, an established council of professors. The
mechanism was set to ensure the accountability and transparency in managing
resources in the hope of resulting in high-quality higher education.
Since definition and boundaries of autonomy is to be determined by each
individual HEI, there are high degrees of differences that an individual HEI
sets in its definition and boundaries. Thus, each HEI has a unique definition
and boundaries regarding its autonomy. As such, each HEI also drafts its
own roadmap to implement its autonomy.
One university defines autonomy as having power and authority to act. Sud-
denly, the organisational structure of HEI becomes a “fat” organisation, espe-
cially at the middle level. The given autonomy has been defined as having power
to establish units and appoint people at certain positions thus causing the organ-
isational structure to grow fat. The fat organisation has caused a sharp increase
in personnel salaries and wages. The fat organisation is neither effective nor effi-
cient and thus becomes a constraint for the HEI in becoming autonomous.
Further, the new positions in the new fat organisational structure are
mostly filled by academics, on the assumption that they have the knowledge
and capability to carry out their responsibilities in the new autonomous con-
text. Nevertheless, this strategy has reduced the academic manpower of the
institution, thus affecting the quality of teaching and learning, research and
publication, and community services, for now the academics have become
bureaucrats, busy managing the new units in the HEI. Meanwhile, the sup-
porting administrative staff are sidelined with routine administrative work
which may not be challenging to them. As such, most of the supporting staff
reported that they “do not feel the benefit” of their HEI being autonomous.
Most are even showing high resistance, since they do not have the opportu-
nity to participate actively in the change and getting benefit out of it. The
staff’s opportunities are mostly taken away by the academics.
Other universities define autonomy as the authority to have as much as
possible endowment funds but continue to request extra funding from the
government for their operations. Some of the operations can be classified as
investments, where the fund should come from their endowment fund and
not from the government support at all, because the nature of government
support is only to fill the gap of operational expenditure.
3 Another notable challenge in this case is that many autonomous HEIs are
not prepared with comprehensive internal regulations to guide the imple-
mentation of their autonomy.
Although some autonomous HEIs are already equipping themselves with
internal regulations, many have incomprehensive regulations. In lieu of their
own internal regulations, many turn to the existing regulations from the
government which are not meant for autonomous HEIs, and which are con-
sidered as being rigid and binding thus hindering the implementation of
their autonomy.
After several interviews and discussions, it is apparent that autonomous
HEIs do not have a good understanding of a number of existing laws and
regulations for managing autonomous HEIs. Among these are:
• the Law of Higher Education No. 12/2012;
• the Government Regulation of Managing and Governing HEIs No.
4/2014;
• the Ministerial Decree on National HE Standards No. 44/2015;
• the Ministerial Decree on the Transformation of Public University to be
Autonomous Public University No. 88/2014;
• the Law on State Finance No. 17/2003;
• the Law on Treasury and State-owned Assets Management No. 1/2004;
• the Government Regulation on Funding for Autonomous HEIs No.
58/2013, renewed by the Government Regulation on Funding for
Autonomous HEIs No. 26/2015;
• the Law on Civil Servants No. 5/2015.
Each autonomous HEI is expected to devise its own regulations to fit the
purpose of its institution, on the basis of the existing laws and regulations
which are laid down by several ministries. With comprehensive and sound
internal regulations, the autonomous HEIs are expected to be flexible in
managing and governing their respective institution and interact with the
different ministries deploying its autonomy.
One example is on the recognition of public servant status and university
governance organisational structure by other ministries. Three autonomous
universities proposed for equal treatment of the university employees as the
other employees who are civil servants. They also want to post these university
employees in the structural positions which are newly created for their autono-
mous institutions and which are different from the regular HEIs’ organisational
structure. Certainly, the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Human Resources
could not recognise the newly created organisational structure of the three
autonomous HEIs and the need for human resources to fill these positions.
This is because these three autonomous HEIs have not equipped themselves
with the legal status of the organisational structure, that is, their own regu-
lation regarding the structure, position, and requirement for such positions.
Furthermore, they have not made any request for approval from the Ministry
of Human Resources, whose endorsement will allow the Ministry of Finance to
give permission for the autonomous HEIs to spend their own budget on the
salary and wage for those personnel in the newly created positions.
4 The autonomous HEIs also reported challenges regarding finance and human
resources. Up to the present, they still follow the government’s regulations;
thus, they cannot afford to have flexible ventures on the basis of their unique
situation. Many have proven that they actually are able to fund their own opera-
tion and they have reasonably high income from various ventures, research,
education programmes, and so forth. Nevertheless, challenges come with con-
siderably unfair treatment between academics and supporting staff, lack of pri-
ority in budget allocation, and lack of internal regulations. This has raised an
issue that “autonomy” of the HEIs has been beneficial only to academic staff
members while becoming disadvantageous to the non-academic staff members
who were treated unfairly (in terms of income from HEI and opportunities for
promotion), as reported by a number of non-academic staff members.
There are several other challenges faced by the autonomous universities
relating to recruitment of faculty members and staffs, career development
for faculty members on tenure track, and professional development of other
staff. It is becoming more difficult to hire more faculty members and sup-
port staff when the university has to generate their own funding to pay for
their salaries, according to some leaders in the autonomous HEIs. This issue
has become a hot topic raised by the employees – academic as well as non-
academic members of the autonomous HEIs.
The public at large is also sceptical regarding the autonomous status of
HEIs, especially concerning finance, since they perceived that the autono-
mous HEIs will increase the tuition fee for students so as to earn money
for their operation. Nevertheless, the government policy on the allowable
ceiling for tuition fees, which also applies to the autonomous HEIs, is con-
sidered helpful to the public. As such, there are boundaries (range) of tuition
fees that can be employed by HEIs, and HEIs cannot go beyond the ceiling
in stipulating the tuition fees for various students. This regulation is helpful
for the disadvantaged students, but not popular among the autonomous
HEIs which consider this regulation as too binding.
5 Autonomous universities were authorised to establish business units. This
authority was given to meet the objective for generating income needed
by university to conduct its programmes and activities without depending
heavily on the government funding and student tuition fees. It is expected
that when its income is better, the university could offer better academic pro-
grammes and thus fulfil its vision and mission. In reality, half of the autono-
mous universities studied did not own any business corporations because
they do not own enough capital to start any business activity. They also face
difficulty in identifying any kind of appropriate business that is beneficial to
the university. For those universities that have established a business corpora-
tion, the income is not sufficient to support university’s needs. The effort to
establish their own endowment funds is still very limited, and the tradition
of participation by the private sector, philanthropists, and the policies of tax
deductibility and corporate social responsibilities do not exist yet.
Such challenges could be minimised if there is enough time in the transition

period for HEIs to embark on their journey towards autonomy. HEIs are sup-
posed to be nurtured and guided to implement the transformation. The nurtur-
ing and guidance are mostly carried out during the transition period. In most
cases, the transition period was too short, thus not allowing for quality nurtur-
ance or guidance. Therefore, many autonomous HEIs are struggling to find their
ways in taking up the challenges of being autonomous.
In general, results of the study indicate that the most notable challenges have
been the understanding of the meaning of being an autonomous HEI – which
is varied from one HEI to another. Regulation comes second in the list of chal-
lenges. Then, there is a challenge that other ministries and government bodies
have not understood the term and organisation of “autonomous public HEI”;
thus, most were still requiring the autonomous HEI to operate under the exist-
ing public HEI regulations. This practice has been a constraint to a more flexible
university management system based on the principles of good university gov-
ernance. There is also a challenge in managing staff, especially on the issue of
whether they should be civil servants or not, the latter of which requires autono-
mous HEIs to have their own regulations and carry the responsibility for allocat-
ing funds to manage their own human resources.
Potential and way forward
Achieving higher academic reputation internationally

Despite the aforementioned challenges, four out of the seven autonomous HEIs
that were assessed are moving forward in the international university ranking, as
follows:
Table 5.2 indicates the rank of five autonomous Indonesian universities in
QS world university ranking in 2017 (www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings/
world-university-rankings). Universitas Indonesia has achieved the highest rank
in general, followed by Institut Teknologi Bandung, Universitas Gadjah Mada,
Universitas Airlangga, and Institut Pertanian Bogor. International rank is one of
the indicators of the successful implementation of the autonomous HEIs.
Thus, the autonomy provided and support from the government have allowed
the autonomous HEIs to perform better, academically as well as administratively.
The leaders from autonomous HEIs reported that such an achievement is neither
due to the big amount of funding available for HEIs nor because of the big stu-
dents’ population. There are other HEIs that have larger number of students and
more funding than the five autonomous HEIs. However, the flexibility for the
autonomous HEIs to set priorities and allocate resources has been the success
factor behind such an achievement.
Some autonomous HEIs reported that their strategies were gradual transfor-
mation, so as to blend the non-autonomous university setting with the autono-
mous setting slowly and gradually. As such, the change is not revolutionary but
rather evolutionary. This approach is more acceptable to the academics, students,
and supporting staff. This evolutionary approach has worked out remarkably well
in maintaining the support staff in their existing positions while changing into a
new structure whereby the existing positions may be abolished.
Table 5.2 Indonesian HEIs in the world university ranking 2017
WUR 2017 Higher Education Institution

277 Universitas Indonesia
331 Institut Teknologi Bandung
401–410 Universitas Gadjah Mada
701–750 Universitas Airlangga
751–800 Institut Pertanian Bogor
Source: www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings/world-university-rankings
With some constraints faced by the universities, the process of changing should
be managed appropriately by a strong and good leadership. Furthermore, there
are still challenges in implementing better academic programmes at the university
so as to attain internationally recognised ranking and status, such as the lack of
focus and funding for cutting-edge research activities. One of the difficulties is to
increase the number of faculties that can achieve high rates of citation in scientific
publications as well as in developing and offering of new programmes of studies
so as to increase their competitiveness.
Achievements of these universities are associated with their autonomous sta-
tus supported by the critical mass of highly qualified faculty members, adequate
research facilities, and excellent students that already existed in their universities
which have the tradition of excellent academic culture prior to the autonomy
status. One autonomous HEI leader mentioned that his university will not be
able to achieve the international rank if not for the autonomous status which has
provided the university with flexibility in managing the institution and making
priorities in terms of their programmes and resource allocation. Therefore, they
must capitalise on the given autonomy to accelerate and excel towards academic
advancement in the future. Funding may not necessarily be the key for the suc-
cess, because many other autonomous universities with the greater funding could
not perform as well when compared with these five universities. A similar obser-
vation also applies to the student body, because a larger student body does not
necessarily lead to better academic achievement of the universities.
Research and its contribution to the economic development

It is expected that by having the autonomous status, a university can capitalise on
and maximise its opportunities to increase and strengthen its research capacity that
contributes not only to the advancement of science but also the economy of the
country. Thus far, the number of international publication of Indonesia has been
increasing. In ASEAN, Indonesia is already in second place as of May 2018, with
8,269 publications, in between Malaysia with 8,712 publications and Singapore
with 6,825 publications. Although internationally, Indonesia is still ranked 52 in Sci-
magojr (www.scimagojr.com/countryrank.php). A large share of this achievement
has been the effort of some autonomous HEIs as depicted in the following figures.
Figure 5.4 indicates that autonomous HEIs have contributed significantly to
the increase in number of international publications in Indonesia. Figure 5.5,
however, indicates that although the number of international publications is
increasing, they are not cited very much by other writers. Figure 5.6 indicates
that although the number of international publications is increasing, the intel-
lectual property rights of autonomous HEIs is still relatively low, and only four
autonomous HEIs are contributing. In this situation, autonomous HEIs still have
a long way to contribute to the nation’s economic development, which depends
highly on the intellectual property rights and innovation, which is streamlined to
the industry. Low intellectual property rights indicates that domestic production
still has high costs since the country has to pay for the foreign patents being used
10000
9000
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
B
IP
u
U
us
IT
IP
IT
PA
G
U
U
N
U
U
Figure 5.4 HEI contributors of international articles in Scopus – eight out of the
highest contributors are the autonomous HEIs ().
Source: http://sinta2.ristekdikti. go.id/
300
250
200
150
100
50
X X X X X X X X
0
M
AS
IP
PI
PI
D
U
IT
IP
UA
PA
G
LI
U
H
U
N
N
U
U
Figure 5.5 HEI contributors of international articles citation – eight out of the
highest contributors are the autonomous HEIs (X)
300
200
100
X X X X
0
N
er
IP
A
U
ID
IP
IT
E
IT
N
nm
S
A
N
N
U
U
U
Figure 5.6 HEI contributors of intellectual property rights – four out of the highest
contributors are the autonomous HEIs (X)
in the production. As such, the nation’s competitiveness is relatively low. With

concerted efforts, there is potential capacity of the autonomous HEIs to contrib-
ute significantly to the nation’s economic development in the future.
Conclusion
In the years to come, there will be many more HEIs in Indonesia which will
transform into autonomous HEIs. As such, the experiences and strategies imple-
mented by the 11 autonomous HEIs will become a valuable reference for best
practices. Some success factors are worth noting, such as the strategy of combin-
ing the old organisation structure and the new versus revolutionising the struc-
ture completely. At the same, the various constraints that have emerged can be
anticipated in the future. However, each autonomous HEI brings about a unique
approach and strategy to implement its autonomy, which other HEIs embarking
on the same journey may not be able to model themselves on.
Going forward, there is a need for the existing autonomous HEIs to define
their autonomous areas and perhaps also establish their own scorecards based on
the definition – as detailed as possible as illustrated by the European Higher Edu-
cation Autonomy Scorecard. The details are important so as to allow uniqueness
of each HEI while maintaining the standard of being autonomous HEIs.
Furthermore, there is also a need for autonomous HEIs to work closely with
the government in aligning the policy and regulations at the national level and
the policy and regulation at the institutional level. As such, autonomous HEIs
will be able to enjoy legal status which is accepted by various stakeholders or
other ministries to support its flexibility and unique operation in terms of finance,
resources, and governance and decision-making.
Internal consolidation within the transformative change is necessary as to
increase the impact of change to being an autonomous HEI. Therefore, various
strategies are to be applied to maintain the synergy and institutional environment
by various stakeholders, that is, students, support staff, lecturers, and leaders. A
series of socialisation activities regarding the transformation, or open dialogue
and discussion for those who are questioning the change, for example, will pro-
vide enlightenment to the institutional community. An evolutionary approach is
highly recommended in managing the transformation. It gives the time needed
for people to understand the transformation and to position themselves in the
transformation process.
“Autonomy should necessarily lead to excellence in academics, governance and
financial management of the institutions. If it does not lead to this, it can be safely
concluded that autonomy has been misused” (Department of Secondary and Higher
Education, 2005). Managed and used properly, the flexibility that autonomous
HEIs gain in managing their operation as higher education institution can result
in higher achievement of the HEIs such as quality higher education indicated in
WUR, Scopus Index, or other measures. In the future, this aspect needs to be
driven forward by the government as well as each HEI.
References and further reading

Brodjonegoro. (2012). Landasan Implementasi Perguruan Tinggi Sebagai Badan
Hukum Milik Negara. Retrieved from http://hukum.unsrat.ac.id/men/dirjendikti_
3912_2001.htm.
Department of Secondary and Higher Education. (2005). Report of the Central Advi-
sory Board of Education (CABE) committee on autonomy of higher education institu-
tions. New Delhi: Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India.
Direktorat Jenderal Pendidikan Tinggi Kementerian Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan.
(2012). Otonomi dan PTNBH Konstitusional: Uji Materi UU 12/2012. Unpub-
lished working paper.
Dhyrahma. (2014). PTN Badan Hukum. Retrieved from https://thietisdyrahma.
wordpress.com/2014/12/01/ptn-badan-hukum.html
Fasich. (2013). Analisis Peningkatan Kinerja Universitas Airlangga Tahun 2009–
2012: Tinjauan terhadap PTBHMN dan PTN. Unpublished working paper for the
Constitutional Court of Republic of Indonesia.
Gunawan, J. (2009). Prospek Badan Hukum Pendidikan (BHP) Sebagai Penyeleng-
gara Pendidikan Dalam Sistem Pendidikan Nasional: Kajian Politik Sistem Pen-
didikan Nasional, Sosial dan Budaya. Unpublished working paper for Ministry of
National Education, Republic of Indonesia.
Kementerian Riset, Teknologi, dan Pendidikan Tinggi. (2015). Peraturan Menteri
Riset, Teknologi Dan Pendidikan Tinggi, Republik Indonesia Nomor 13 Tahun 2015
Tentang Rencana Strategis Tahun 2015–2019. Jakarta: Kementerian Riset, Teknologi
dan Pendidikan Tinggi.
Menristekdikti. 2014. Perguruan Tinggi Negeri Badan Hukum Mirip BUMN. Retrieved
from http://ristekdikti.go.id.
Ministry of Education and Culture, Government Regulation of Managing and Gov-
erning HEIs No. 4/2014.
Ministry of Education and Culture, Law of Higher Education No. 12/2012.
Ministry of Education and Culture, Ministerial Decree on National HE Standards
No. 44/2015.
Ministry of Education and Culture, Ministerial Decree on the Transformation of Public
University to be Autonomous Public University No. 88/2014.
Ministry of Finance, Government Regulation on Funding for Autonomous HEIs No.
58/2013, renewed by the Government Regulation on Funding for Autonomous
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Pendidikan. Jurnal Administrasi Pendidikan, IX(1), 34–50.
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yahoo/answer.html.
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card 2017. Brussels: European University Association.
Surachman. (2016). UU PT, UKT, dan PTN-BH. Retrieved from http://koridorhi
tam.blogspot.co.id/2014/04/sekilas-uu-pt-ukt-dan-ptn-bh.html.
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Negeri Menjadi Badan Hukum Pendidikan Pemerintah Menurut Undang-Undang
Nomor 9 Tahun 2009 Tentang Badan Hukum Pendidikan. Unpublished Master
thesis, Semarang, Universitas Diponegoro.
6 National university reforms
introduced by the Japanese
government
University autonomy under fire?
Akiyoshi Yonezawa
Introduction
Autonomy is regarded as a core value of Japanese universities, owing to the regret-
table past collaboration of universities with the military-led totalitarian regime
during World War II (Yonezawa, 2014). While the first president of the oldest
university, the University of Tokyo, which was established in 1877, was appointed
by the government (Tachibana, 2012), universities gradually acquired the power
to autonomously select their faculties, deans, and presidents even before World
War II (Terasaki, 2000). Yet the structure of the heterogeneous, diversified uni-
versity sector has made dialogue concerning university autonomy very complex.
As of 2018, Japan has 782 (86 national, 93 local public, and 603 private) uni-
versities. Some national and private universities are comprehensive and research
intensive, whereas others are very small. Further, some are highly selective with
respect to student admissions, whereas many, especially private universities, have
de facto open entry.
Specifically, national universities that have received public funding for education
and research are expected to make more direct contributions to socio-economic
development through human resources development, research, technology, and
innovation. Over the last two or three decades, the national government has
introduced a series of national university reforms focusing on the governance
and management of Japan’s national universities, partly in line with the country’s
general policy direction of neoliberalism and New Public Management (Wata-
nabe & Sato, 2017).
These reforms were aimed at strengthening the institutional capacity for auton-
omous management which were various forms of direct and indirect governmen-
tal intervention in university affairs for boosting performance. The increasing
national competition with neighbouring countries (where university autonomy is
not as well-established as it is in Japan) as well as with Europe and North America
seems to be changing the nuances of university autonomy in the policy dialogue.
Japan’s postwar constitution assures academic freedom in the universities.
National, local public, and private universities have maintained de facto auton-
omy in the appointment of faculties, deans, and presidents. Traditionally, how-
ever, the central power had rested more with the faculty or the school rather than
82 Akiyoshi Yonezawa
with the president, at least in the comprehensive national universities. Members
of the administrative staff of national and local public universities were accorded
the status of civil servants, and these universities were administered as govern-
ment entities until the beginning of the 21st century.
The nation-wide reform movement in university governance and manage-
ment over the last two or three decades, however, has significantly changed this
situation. The corporatisation of public universities was initiated in 2004. The
objective was to improve institutional autonomy and university management and
governance capacity, and the process itself was led by governmental initiatives.
This corporatisation initiative can be viewed as a pattern of policy borrowings
frequently seen in Asia, influenced by neoliberal policies and New Public Man-
agement practices that have originated from Europe and North America. The
corporatisation of public universities has been undertaken widely throughout
East Asia and Southeast Asia (Lee, 2016), and Japan’s case can be understood as
one variation of this phenomenon in the region. Since implementing corporati-
sation, the government has continuously required national universities to adopt
further reforms, such as strengthening the leadership capacity of the president
and other senior managers, introducing key performance indicators, and tailoring
education programmes to fit social needs.
The main question that this chapter addresses concerns how the notion and
practices of university autonomy have changed in Japan, and under what internal
and external conditions have they changed. How can we understand the impact
of the corporatisation and a series of reforms of university governance, man-
agement, and autonomy at both national and institutional levels in this country
which has an established culture of academic freedom and autonomy?
More than a dozen years have passed since the implementation of the 2004 cor-
poratisation policy, and Japanese public universities have accumulated experience
in how to govern and manage themselves as university corporations. Through an
analysis of the current situation and of the ongoing university reforms, the author
discusses the characteristics of Japan’s university governance reforms in relation
to the international trends of university governance and management changes,
especially focusing on the concept and the reality of university autonomy. This
chapter mainly examines national universities in order to maintain consistency in
the discussion, and as this enables direct comparisons with similar cases in Europe
and in neighbouring Asian countries. Combining policy analysis with case stud-
ies, the author examines both the system-level and the institutional-level gover-
nance in national universities, because the transformations at these two levels are
closely linked.
Diversified stakeholders
The stakeholders in higher education are multiple and heterogeneous. Clark
(1983) identified the governance structures as the coordination of universities by
academics, the government, and the market (or society). However, it is clear, for
example, that the actual structure of higher education governance has developed
National university reforms 83
into much more complex patterns because of the different types of universities
and higher education institutions (Altbach, Reisberg, & de Wit, 2017).
Furthermore, the government has its own complex internal dynamics. In Japan,
the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT)
is the main ministry that supervises and supports universities, through both its
higher education policies and its science and technology policy. The Ministry of
Finance (MOF) is in charge of allocating the national budget, which it sets on the
basis of negotiations with other ministries, including MEXT. Under budgetary
constraints, owing to both the huge governmental debt and the ageing society,
the public financing of higher education has been a hot topic for decades. More-
over, the Cabinet Office has paid much attention on the governance of public
universities in recent years. Under the Cabinet Office, the Council for Science,
Technology and Innovation (CSTI) is a key national policy council to which
the Prime Minister attends. The universities have been recognised as crucial to
the development of science, technology, and innovation in the country. There-
fore, the Cabinet Office and CSTI have made statements and recommenda-
tions regarding university governance under the assumption that the universities
should strengthen their linkages with both the society and industry. Especially
under the current cabinet led by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, universities have
been directly linked to economic policies and the pursuit of national development
through innovation.
The national government also provides indirect financial support to local pub-
lic and private universities. The local (prefecture or city) government establishes
and supports local public universities, whereas the national government provides
local allocation tax grants to local governments with local public universities. For
private universities, a public organisation, Promotion and Mutual Aid Corpora-
tion for Private Schools of Japan, allocates national government subsidies to sup-
port a portion of their operational costs.
The society representing the “market” should be understood as the third influ-
ential actor, although deciphering what the “market” and “society” mean and
how they influence university governance is not so straightforward. Adding to
the traditional relationship between universities and industry based on the devel-
opment and employment of highly skilled workers, the university-industry link-
age has been strengthened and deepened, including staff exchanges. Today, it is
quite common to find university professors and senior university managers who
had previously built their careers in the industrial world or the government. In
addition, the governing board chairs and members in both the public (national
and local public) and private universities are often from outside of academia.
Thus, representatives from the business and industrial world now play an active
part in the governance of universities in Japan.
Corporatisation of national universities

Today, almost all of the universities in Japan operate as some form of “corpo-
ration”, although what this means is markedly different in the public versus
private sector. In Japan, the private university sector has the longest history of
the corporation-based operation and management, which can be traced back to
1918, when the national government’s official authorisation of private universi-
ties commenced. After the introduction of education reforms at the end of the
1940s, private universities began operating as non-profit “school corporations”.
Since 2003, in designated special districts such as Tokyo and Osaka, stock cor-
porations were allowed to operate private for-profit universities, although the
number of successful cases remains very limited.
National universities have been operating as “national university corporations”
since 2004, and the majority of local public universities were also designated as
“local public university corporations”. While the corporatisation of public uni-
versities has been widely seen as a general trend in East and Southeast Asia (Lee,
2016), Japan can be understood as a case of the most drastic transformation,
because all the national universities operating under the national government and
most of the local public universities operating under municipal governments were
incorporated almost at the same time in 2004.
This corporatisation was implemented as part of general administrative reforms
in the delivery of public services. Under the dominance of neoliberal policies
requiring the downsizing of the government bureaucracy, the separation of
national universities from the government as incorporated bodies was proposed
so as to reduce significantly the number of national civil servants (Yamamoto,
2004). At the same time, the national government was also cutting the bud-
gets to these incorporated national universities. A similar trend can be observed
among the local public universities. When faced with financial stringency, the
local municipality would cut financial support to its local public universities.
As mentioned earlier, the corporatisation scheme was applied to all national
universities and to most of the local public universities more or less at the same
time. The final decision to corporatise national universities was declared by Akito
Arima, then the Minister of Education, in 1999, at a meeting with the presidents
of all the national universities and research institutions. Arima served as president
of both the University of Tokyo and the Japan Association of National Universi-
ties (JANU) and was elected as a member of the House of Councillors. Thus, his
declaration was considered to be a decision based on wide consensus between the
government, politicians, and the national universities themselves, and through
a wide range of official and unofficial negotiations among these stakeholders
(Osaki, 2011).
Arima’s idea was to incorporate simultaneously all the existing national univer-
sities by setting up a new national university corporation scheme that would suit
the characteristics of the universities. He maintained that this scheme would be
an opportunity to increase university autonomy by fostering their independence
from the government. The decision to apply the corporatisation scheme to all
national universities was based on the widely shared consensus at that time that
all national universities should be treated equally, regardless of their diverse back-
grounds in terms of their historical origin, size, and fields of study. Some small
national universities were merged with others so that all national universities
would be large enough to sustain themselves as corporate bodies. Consequently,
the number of national universities decreased from 100 in 2003 to 87 in 2004.
The government also established a scheme to enable the corporatisation of local
public universities, and most of these universities were also incorporated accord-
ing to autonomous decisions of the municipal governments.
A taskforce composed of university leaders from JANU and the government
was set up to design a system for the implementation of the corporatisation
scheme. The taskforce issued a report entitled The Image of National University
Corporation in 2002. Osaki (2011) summarised the five key components of the
system design as follows:
1 Each national university is accorded a prospective corporation status; that is,

one national university corporation operates only one national university.
2 A national university corporation does not have an organisation separate
from its operating national university.
3 The founder of a national university is the national government, under the
School Education Act.
4 The president serves as the chief of the national university corporation.
5 The president and (typically) the vice president serve as board members.
The previous points imply that the national university corporation and the national
university are the same organisation, and the president has absolute authority as
leader of the organisation. According to Osaki (2011), this legal structure fol-
lows the models of continental Europe. In the United States, on the contrary,
the governing board possesses a corporation status as an organisation separate
from the university itself; this is the model applied to Japan’s private universities.
Here, the national universities gained autonomy through the system design of
the leadership team. The most crucial option for the composition of the leader-
ship team was its relationship with MEXT. Before corporatisation was initiated,
national universities had a co-governance structure between the university facul-
ties, represented by the senates and presidents, and the administrative bureau
of the university, as part of the personnel system of MEXT, represented by the
head of the administrative bureau. Prior to corporatisation, the administrative
bureau of the national universities was legally treated as a governmental branch
of MEXT. The university budget was also part of the national governmental bud-
get, separated as a special budget for national schools. Just before corporatisation
commenced, the government transformed the national university budgeting to a
lump-sum budget (Yonezawa, 2003).
Before the national universities were corporatised, only a limited number of
national civil servants have been directly recruited to MEXT. These individuals,
usually termed “career” staff, basically develop their career in MEXT, although
they have the opportunity to work at “sites of education practice” including
national universities. After retiring, MEXT officers frequently have the oppor-
tunities to work in the top or senior positions of the administrative bureau of
national universities.
Before corporatisation, the administrative staff of the national universities was
composed of national civil servants recruited through a national-level examina-
tion. They were first assigned to the officer positions in a specific national uni-
versity and were then promoted basically at the nearby university or national
education institution on a rotational basis. Staff with a good performance record
could be sent to MEXT or back to a national university to fill a senior position
according to the national-level rotation, and some did reach the top position of
head of the administrative bureau. These individuals were called “non-career”
staff.
In the Japanese higher education system, it was not the university president
but MEXT that selected the head of the administrative bureau of a national
university, and appointments were made through the rotation of senior offi-
cials directly linked to MEXT. This practice enabled the provision of a stan-
dardised public administration in all national universities. As for the academic
side, represented by the senate, their autonomy at the institutional administra-
tive level was extremely limited. Instead, school-level autonomy through deci-
sions made at faculty meetings had very strong power in matters relating to
the recruitment and promotion of academic staff, all aspects of academic mat-
ters, and even financial allocation. In almost all the national universities, the
president, the deans of schools, and the members of the senate were elected
by faculty members, and in some cases, non-academic staff also participated
in the voting.
The most important feature in the corporatisation of national universities was
to make the university president both the chief executive officer of the univer-
sity and the chair of the university governing board. Thus, the power of the
national university president is very strong, because he or she represents both
the university and the national university corporation (governing board). The
national university president also has the legal authority to appoint the mem-
bers of the university board and vice presidents based on the National University
Corporation Act. The status of all academic and non-academic staff of national
universities was de-linked from the civil service and they became employees of the
national university corporations. Thus, at least technically, the president has abso-
lute power in the hiring and firing of senior managers in the university. As for the
selection of national university presidents, the National University Corporation
Act requires the University President Selection Council to make a recommenda-
tion at the respective national university before the official appointment is made
by the Minister of Education. The members of the University President Selec-
tion Council are selected from the Management Committee (advisory board for
university management that includes external members) and the Education and
Research Council (senate). Most national universities maintain some form of vot-
ing system that takes into account the voices of academic and non-academic staff
in the selection of university president candidates. However, it is interesting to
note that the candidates who were not short-listed by the selection committee
have occasionally been nominated and appointed as national university presidents
ever since corporatisation.
Transition from the pre-corporatisation scheme
As the corporatisation process was rather drastic, the transition from the pre-
corporatisation scheme became crucial.
Mid-term goals and plans

The National University Corporation Act (NUCA),1 enacted in 2003, defines
the legal status and operation of national universities. The NUCA stipulates that:
Article 30. The Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Tech-
nology shall set mid-term goals to be achieved within six years regarding
the operation of a national university corporation, indicate these goals to
the said national university corporation etc., and publish them. The same
shall apply when these goals are changed.
Article 31. When mid-term goals are indicated based on the provision of
paragraph 1 of the preceding Article, a national university corporation etc.
shall formulate a plan to achieve the mid-term goals as a mid-term plan in
pursuit of these mid-term goals as specified by an Ordinance of MEXT,
and must obtain the approval from the Minister of Education, Culture,
Sports, Science and Technology. The same shall apply when this plan is
changed.
Under this Act, the main responsibility of corporatising the national universities
lies not with the national university presidents but with the Minister of Educa-
tion of the national government. However, in reality, it has been the national
universities that set the mid-term goals and drafted the plans. Meanwhile, MEXT
could, and did, intervene in the drafting process before granting approval for
the plans. The performance (the degree of achievement) was evaluated by the
National University Corporation Evaluation Committee, set up by MEXT, com-
prising members drawn mostly from private universities, industries, and consul-
tancy firms.
Overall, the application of these mid-term goals and plans resulted in a highly
standardised approach to goal- and plan-setting among the national universities.
However, the need for approval from the Minister of Education could be per-
ceived as a limitation on institutional autonomy in the governance and manage-
ment of national universities.
Senior administrative staff

After the national universities were corporatised, the first challenge was to deter-
mine the structural compositions of senior management (board members, vice
presidents, etc.) and the university administrative bureau (central administration
of the university). Through the corporatisation process, much was technically
placed in the hands of the university president. In other words, how to deal with
the transition from the previous national university administration system led
by the head of the administrative bureau within the personnel rotation scheme
of MEXT towards the corporatised university management led by the president
and the senior management staff nominated by the president became the first
challenge.
The practice of sending senior officials from MEXT continued, not as an official
rotation controlled by MEXT but as a personnel exchange between national uni-
versities and MEXT (and other ministries occasionally). In addition, the national
universities recruited retired senior officials from MEXT to senior management
positions, and they can act autonomously and not as official representatives of
MEXT. These personnel exchanges and recruitments have enabled strong net-
working between MEXT and national universities. At the same time, corporati-
sation has enabled an increase in institutional autonomy by limiting the control
of MEXT officials. While some universities, such as Fukui University and Shiga
University of Medical Science, once employed the top senior managers trained
as business professionals in MBA programmes and at private consultancy firms,
the national universities, in general, have continued to accept senior officials cur-
rently or previously affiliated with MEXT.
A practical strategy to increase the autonomous power of national university
presidents was to abolish the position of head of the administrative bureau. Osaki
(2011) pointed out that 22 universities, including the University of Tokyo and
Kyoto University, had abolished this position. In these corporatised universities,
the respective board members put the administrative bureau under their direct
control. Thirty-three universities continued to appoint a head of the administra-
tive bureau, and in nearly all these universities, the head of the administrative
bureau is a board member. At the same time, the responsibilities of these heads
were reduced to a few assigned areas such as general and personnel affairs.
Funding
The financing of national universities has also been changed drastically. Before
corporatisation, the campus, facilities, and equipment of a national university were
technically national property but could be used by the university upon request.
However, after corporatisation, the campus, facilities, and equipment were handed
to the respective national university corporations. MEXT and the MOF have set
up the Center for National University Finance and Management to support and
develop the capacity for financing and managing national universities in 2004, and
later this centre was merged into the National Institution for Academic Degrees
and Quality Enhancement of Higher Education (NIAD-QE) in 2016.
The basic public funding of national universities was from the “special budget for
national schools”, a budget separate from the general budget of the national govern-
ment for securing the stability towards the funding to the national universities and
schools. Since the implementation of corporatisation, the operational budget for the
national universities has been allocated yearly on the basis of the university’s perfor-
mance against the mid-term (six-year) plans and goals. Under MEXT, the National
University Corporation Evaluation Committee was established, and this committee
assesses the performance of the universities yearly, mostly with regard to adminis-
trative matters. Every six years, the performance of all undergraduate and gradu-
ate schools and colleges in education and research is also assessed by expert panels
formed by the NIAD-QE. In the first round of assessment, the linkages between the
assessment results and financial allocations were nominal. But gradually the linkages
were strengthened and became vitally important for the universities. In addition,
the whole annual budget for national university operations has been reduced
by 1 percent almost every year. As a result, the operational budget income of the
national universities, including the top universities, has been decreasing gradually.
Functional differentiation
In response to continuous budgetary pressures, the government is accelerating
the differentiation of budgetary allocations both through the characteristics of
the university mission and on the basis of performance assessments. For instance,
in the third cycle of the mid-term goals and plans from 2016, the government
requested all national universities to select and apply for one of the three catego-
ries of their key functions:
1 Category 1: to contribute mainly to the local community and to contribute

nationally and globally in specific fields;
2 Category 2: to contribute nationally and globally in specific fields; and
3 Category 3: to make educational, research, and social contributions that
enhance the global competitiveness of the university as a whole.
Of the 86 national universities, 55 universities, most of which are located in cit-

ies, selected Category 1; 15 universities with specialised fields, such as engineer-
ing, selected Category 2; and 16 comprehensive universities with strong research
functions selected Category 3. The respective national universities are assessed in
comparison with peer universities within these categories, and in accordance to
the categories they have chosen that indicate their different functions. It must be
noted that the different functions do not imply different standards, although the
categorisation obviously indicates that Category 3 is for universities that aim to
be world-class.
The differentiation of financial allocations on the basis of performance assess-
ment results has been strengthened since corporatisation. In fiscal year 2017,
redistribution based on the performance assessments in these different categories
ranged from 78.3 percent to 113.0 percent.2 At the same time, the government
has set guidelines to encourage the various national universities to develop clear
institutional strategic plans and implement key performance indicators.
Designated national university corporations

As part of this category-based funding scheme, the national government added
a distinguished category: “designated national university corporation”. This
scheme applies to a very limited number of universities that are expected to be
globally competitive in research, education, and innovation. In 2017, only three
universities – Tohoku University, the University of Tokyo, and Kyoto University –
were selected, and in 2018, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Nagoya University
and Osaka University were included. These designated national universities were
requested to develop a strategic plan to become global competitive universities,
benchmarking with overseas world-class universities. The selection and moni-
toring committee includes overseas and industrial members so as to make their
operations more visible to the wider society and internationally. As for the gover-
nance reform, all the designated national universities claim to have strengthened
their leadership team for efficient institutional management. Kyoto University,
Tohoku University, and Tokyo Institute of Technology have introduced a “pro-
vost” or “senior vice president” position to support the president as the number
two chief academic officer. Tohoku University, which had abolished the posi-
tion of the head of the administrative bureau after corporatisation, is planning
to re-establish this position, while Tokyo Institute of Technology and Nagoya
University have maintained the position of head of the administrative bureau.
All these universities have continuously invited senior officials from MEXT to
participate in the personnel exchange since corporatisation, and they have no
plan to change this.
The actual action schemes of the designated national universities are continu-
ously operated under the revised mid-term goals and plans set through negotia-
tions with MEXT and monitored and assessed by the special sub-committee for
the evaluation of designated national universities under the National University
Corporation Evaluation Committee.
Conclusion
This chapter examined the background and the current reality of the governance
and management reforms of universities in Japan, with a focus on the impact of
national policy settings. Japanese universities have enjoyed considerable academic
autonomy and freedom for a long time, particularly at the level of individual pro-
fessors. In the last two or three decades, however, interventions in universities by
the government and society have increased, owing to governance and management
reform requirements. While such government reforms have strengthened the insti-
tutional management capacities of Japanese universities to some degree, it is doubt-
ful that the institutional autonomy of Japanese universities has actually increased.
The analysis showed that there is decoupling between policies and practices
with regard to university autonomy in the various university governance and
management reforms. Reflecting the diversified and heterogeneous structure of
higher education, the notions of university autonomy, governance, and man-
agement have different interpretations among different stakeholders and interest
groups. While the corporatisation of national universities was carried out with
the agreement of the universities themselves, which aimed to increase their insti-
tutional autonomy, the underlying motive on the part of the government was to
introduce New Public Management practices and performance-based funding
schemes for the universities. At the governmental level, university reform is not
only discussed as a tool for the ministry in charge (i.e., MEXT) to carry out
supervision and exercise control; but also the Cabinet Office views it as a key
driver of economic development based on science, technology, and innovation.
On the other hand, the interests of respective national universities differ accord-
ing to the characteristics of the institution and positioning within the higher
education system. In addition to JANU that includes all the national universities
as members, leading research universities have set up their own group called
Research University 11 (RU11) with the two top private universities, and they
compete with each other for the distinguished government status of “designated
national university corporation”. Within the universities, university presidents
and senior managers – who are non-academics but are professional managers –
appointed by these presidents are in favour of top-down management, whereas
the faculties and schools are more resistant to many of the governance reforms.
The recruitment and rotation-based career mobility of administrative staff as
national civil servants before corporatisation have gradually shifted to a coordi-
nation by the universities themselves through the negotiation with the national
government.
The corporatisation of national universities in 2004 and the series of univer-
sity reforms that followed have certainly improved the management capacity and
the general institutional autonomy of national universities at the institutional
level, but with a number of caveats. First and foremost, faculty- and school-
level autonomy is vulnerable to both strengthened institutional-level leadership
within the universities and strengthened external quality assurance mechanisms.
Increasingly, the policy initiatives of the Cabinet Office in relation to fostering
a knowledge society (i.e., science, technology, innovation, and human resources
development) require national universities to accept a more direct commitment
to the wider society, for examples, by accepting senior officials from the govern-
ment and senior managers from the industries. The pressure of increased compe-
tition with neighbouring countries, both in terms of economic performance and
academic performance, does not seem to have any space for traditional academic
autonomy in the universities.
The international debates regarding desirable models of research universities,
such as “world-class universities” (Salmi, 2009) and “flagship universities” (Dou-
glass, 2016), indicate that university autonomy and academic freedom are indis-
pensable part and parcel of these universities. Marginson’s (2018) comprehensive
arguments on the global trends in the geopolitics, vision, and idea of universities
caution about the challenge to the established values regarding academic auton-
omy and freedom, and not to neglect the value of universities as global public
and common goods. In Marginson’s argument, Japan’s case is referred to as the
exceptional case that is facing stagnation in academic (mostly research) perfor-
mance mainly through public and private underinvestment in the higher educa-
tion sector. However, within the policy debate in Japan, there is a very strong
voice demanding for more “efficient” governance and management of Japanese
(especially national) universities to improve their performance.
There do not appear to be any forceful arguments for limiting academic free-
dom and autonomy in Japan, at least not currently. However, the idea and reality
of university autonomy in a mature and established higher education environ-
ment such as Japan’s is facing a critical challenge, maybe as an unintended conse-
quence of competition and performance, because Japan is struggling for survival
under the regional and global economic pressures. Policy borrowings, such as
the idea of institutional autonomy, are inserted into practices deeply linked with
the inherent national context and the complex dynamics of various stakeholders.
While university autonomy itself is highly valued, a detailed and careful examina-
tion is necessary to determine what is actually happening in practice.
Notes
1 The original text of the National University Corporation Act in Japanese lan-
guage is accessible through the following site: http://elaws.e-gov.go.jp/search/
elawsSearch/elaws_search/lsg0500/detail?lawId=415AC0000000112&openerC
ode=1
2 www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/houdou/29/01/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2017/01/12/
1381033_6.pdf
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7 Governance and management of
public universities in Malaysia
A tale of two universities
Chang Da Wan, Morshidi Sirat, and
Benedict Weerasena
Over the last two decades or so, there have been several major initiatives which
have changed the governance and management of public universities in Malaysia.
The establishment of the Universities and University Colleges Act (UUCA,1971)
(Act 30) is a defining moment to the governance of public universities in this
country, and it continues to be the main legislative that defines the ways in
which public universities are governed and the relationship these institutions
have with the state. Since this piece of legislation was introduced and the sub-
sequent amendments over the last five decades, other significant initiatives that
had redefined the governance and management of public universities include the
corporatisation exercise in 1998, the research university status awarded to five
oldest public universities in 2007, the launch of the National Higher Education
Strategic Plan 2007–2020 (NHESP), and Malaysia Education Blueprint (Higher
Education) 2015–2025 (MEBHE) as well as the granting of autonomy status
to public universities beginning in 2012. To date, 17 of the 20 public universi-
ties have received the autonomy status from the Ministry of Higher Education.1
In addition, institution-specific initiatives with the intention to transform uni-
versities to become world-class institutions, such as the High Impact Research
Programme (HIRP) in Universiti Malaya and the Accelerated Programme for
Excellence (APEX) in Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM), have also been pivotal
in changing the governance and management of these universities. The HIRP
focuses on fundamental research projects that will result in publication of manu-
scripts in Tier 1 ISI/Web of Science journals as well as the setting up of laborato-
ries and reshaping the research landscape, whereas APEX aims to transform USM
in becoming a world leading university in sustainable development particularly in
addressing the needs of society and the “bottom billions”.
However, while there have been many initiatives undertaken at the national
policy level that had brought significant changes in Malaysian public universities,
there remains a lack of understanding of the ways and extent to which governance
and management within these public institutions have changed and evolved. This
chapter attempts to fill this gap by examining the changes that have taken place
in public universities at the institutional, faculty, and process levels through two
case studies of public universities. The first section of this chapter will exam-
ine the overall higher education landscape in Malaysia, followed by a discussion
Malaysian universities’ governance 95
about how the case studies are selected and empirical evidences are collected and
analysed. The third section explores the case studies in a thematic manner to help
us understand the changes and evolvement of governance and management of
public universities in Malaysia.
Higher education in Malaysia

The establishment of Universiti Malaya following the Carr-Saunders Commis-
sion on University Education Report in 1948 marked the beginning of higher
education in Malaysia. Universiti Malaya was established through a merger of two
colleges in Singapore, and by 1959, an autonomous campus was set up in Kuala
Lumpur. In 1961, the two campuses became the University of Singapore in Sin-
gapore and Universiti Malaya in Kuala Lumpur. For almost a decade, Universiti
Malaya was the only university in Malaysia until four other public universities
were established between 1969 and 1975 following the recommendation of the
Higher Education Planning Committee for Malaysia. These universities are Uni-
versiti Sains Malaysia, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Universiti Putra Malaysia,
and Universiti Teknologi Malaysia. Importantly, the UUCA (Act 30) was formu-
lated in 1971, and significantly amended in 1975, to enable the government in
controlling the universities. The control includes shifting the power of appoint-
ing leaders from the university council to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong with the
advice of the minister as well as curbing the rights of students and academics to
participate in politics and activities related to ideology-based social movements.
In the 1980s, two other public universities were established, and another two
were added in the early 1990s. To date, there are 20 public universities, where
five are categorised as research universities, four as comprehensive universities,
and the remaining 11 as focused universities. Four of the focused universities
eventually became technical universities.
Public universities are institutions that received financial support from the state
through the Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE). The status of these insti-
tutions are federal statutory bodies (FSBs), which means that they are public
entities with partial autonomy in decision-making except in matters of public
budget and expenditure. Public universities are under the control of MoHE, and
the minister has authority and responsibility to monitor these FSBs and appoints
the members of the board of directors and top management – vice chancellors
and deputy vice chancellors. As a public institution, public universities have to
subscribe to the circulars, directives, rules, and regulations of the Public Service
Department in terms of human resources. Academic and support staffs of public
universities follow the remuneration scheme of the civil service and are entitled to
public pension. In addition, public universities are answerable to the Ministry of
Finance, Treasury and Economic Planning Unit in the Prime Minister’s Depart-
ment for matters of finance and budget allocation as well as subject to audit by
the National Audit Department. Besides that, academic programmes of public
universities have to adhere to the accreditation framework of the Malaysian Qual-
ifications Agency (MQA), and this arrangement also suggests that the National
96 Chang Da Wan et al.
Higher Education Fund Corporation has an indirect say on public universities
through the recognition and eligibility for students in the academic programmes
to qualify for student loans.
Apart from the 20 public universities, the Malaysian higher education system
also comprises 33 polytechnics and 91 community colleges, which are public
institutions supported by the state, as well as private institutions that do not
receive public funding. According to Ministry of Education (2015), there are
currently 70 universities and international branch campuses, 34 university col-
leges, and 410 colleges that are private higher education institutions. These
private institutions are governed concurrently by the Private Higher Education
Institutions Act (1996) (Act 555) and the Companies Act (1965).
At the national level, the UUCA has affected the governance and manage-
ment of public universities in which universities were required to be governed
directly by the Ministry of Education. This includes exercising responsibility for
the appointment of leadership in the universities. Thus, public universities were
firmly steered by the government with a specific importance placed on nation-
building and compensation for national socio-economic imbalances up until
the mid-1990s. Moreover, institutional autonomy and academic freedom was
severely affected during this period (Wan & Morshidi, 2018).
After this period, there was a shift in the nature of the university-state rela-
tionship. Five public universities were corporatised in 1998 in the context of
a public policy commitment to privatising public utilities and national indus-
tries. This was carried out to enable the universities to engage in market-related
activities which include the establishment of companies able to acquire and hold
investments. Significantly, the university court was abolished, university councils
were replaced with boards of directors and academic senates were reduced in
size which changed the internal governance culture (Lee, 2004). As a whole,
the changing governance structure of public universities to become leaner where
authority and decision-making are more concentrated at the university central
administration so as to enable public universities to be more efficient and pro-
ductive. However, university governance and leadership still remained heavily
dependent on the Ministry of Education and has not shifted to the governing
body of the university.
In 2007, the NHESP was launched, which is the first comprehensive strategic
plan for Malaysia’s higher education system. Seven areas of strategic priority were
identified, namely, widening access and increasing equity, improving the quality
of teaching and learning, enhancing research and innovation, strengthening uni-
versities, intensifying internationalisation, creating a culture of lifelong learning,
and reinforcing the delivery systems of the Ministry of Higher Education. One of
the major objectives of strengthening universities is to ensure that the governance
of universities is efficient, effective, and transparent towards attaining autonomy
and to enable universities to generate income through competitive bidding from
various sources of funding. In terms of governance, the NHESP focuses on pro-
viding a clearer definition of the responsibilities of the board of directors, top
management, and the senate of public universities on enhancing accountability of
the board of directors as well as on increasing self-governance of public universi-
ties through the boards’ supervision of leadership, performance, and funding.
Then, 12 public universities were granted autonomous status from 2012 to
2014, which implied that these universities would no longer be burdened by
bureaucratic rules and processes. Furthermore, the supervisory role of the minis-
try for these universities would be handed back to the board of directors of each
of the institutions concerned (Priya, 2012). Thus, this was a positive step towards
transforming the role of the ministry from being a tight controller to being a
regulator and policymaker. The rationale for granting institutional autonomy
is to enable public universities to compete with the best universities globally,
according to the prime minister’s presentation of the Tenth Malaysia Plan, as
the status should be a catalyst for the universities to be more innovative and
competitive in becoming institutes of excellence, as they will not be tied down
by government rules or processes. Also, there was a strong economic imperative
for autonomy due to the economic recession in which financial support from
the state is expected to reduce, which will then pave a way for universities to be
more effective and efficient in raising funds as a corporate entity similar to the
corporatisation exercise back in 1998. However, experts comment that the grant-
ing of autonomous status to public universities may not change much unless it
is accompanied by significant change in the structure and status of these institu-
tions, such as legislation amendments to provide the legal basis for autonomy (see
Fauziah & Ng, 2015; Soaib & Sufean, 2012; Wan, 2017; Wan & Abdul Razak,
2015).
Meanwhile, MEBHE was issued in 2015, which identified ten areas of shift:
holistic, entrepreneurial and balanced graduates; talent excellence; nation of life-
long learners; quality TVET graduates; financial sustainability; empowered gov-
ernance; innovation ecosystem; global prominence; globalised online learning;
and transformed higher education delivery. Also introduced was the notion of
“empowered governance”, which seeks to redefine the roles of various stakehold-
ers as well as the role of the MOHE in relation to all public universities. Moreover,
balancing institutional autonomy and accountability is a strategy under “empow-
ered governance” (MOE, 2015). However, it remains too early to observe the
impact of these strategies and the associated initiatives of the MEBHE.
Methodology
Guided by the aim to understand the governance and management of public uni-
versities in Malaysia, specifically from the institutional, faculty, and process levels,
this research adopts a multiple case study design. Two public universities which
have received the autonomy status were selected as case studies, in addition to the
criteria of one being more established and another a fairly new institution. The
primary data collection method was semi-structured interviews with key actors in
each university, predominantly those in the top and mid-management. In addi-
tion to interviews conducted by this research team, a series of interviews with
academic staffs in these two universities that was conducted by another research
team (which one of the authors was a member of the other team) was used with
permission. A similar ethical process was put in place to ensure anonymity and
confidentiality of the participants and their institutions, and all the participants
were informed that their participation was voluntary, and they had the right to
withdraw without any obligations. Informed consent was also obtained in writing
before the interviews were conducted.
Before we proceed to the findings, we intend to provide a brief description of
the case studies. As to ensure the anonymity, certain parts of the description, sig-
nificant dates, and facts were deliberately left out or describe in a general manner:
Case Study A. Wu Lien Teh University (WLTU) is one of the five oldest
public universities in Malaysia. As with the other four universities, WLTU
experienced the corporatisation exercise in 1998, received the research
university status in 2007, and received the autonomy status in 2012. In
addition to these major initiatives, WLTU also has an in-house world-class
university programme, which has collectively or separately exerted some
influences in changing the governance and management in the university.
Case Study B. Rosli Dhobi University (RDU) is a fairly new public univer-
sity. As an institution, RDU did not go through the corporatisation exer-
cise and remained as a comprehensive/focused university. Recently, the
university has received the autonomous status, and therefore this status is
the only major development in RDU. This case study provided us with a
“control case” to illustrate the changes in governance and management
solely due to the autonomous status.
Across the two case studies, a total of 17 academics in administrative positions

were interviewed. These interviews are coupled with another 27 interviews con-
ducted with academics across the same two public universities in another research
study that examined the changing academic workplace. The interviews, and por-
tions of interviews from the other study that are relevant to governance and
management, were transcribed and reviewed by two research team members.
Thematic content analysis was used to identify themes that emerged from the
interviews: governance and management structure, autonomy and leadership,
key performance indicators, decision-making and appointment, finance and
funding, human resources, and academic matters.
Governance and management structure

The governance structure has been predetermined by the UUCA. The major
change took place in 1998 following the corporatisation exercise (Lee, 2004;
Soaib & Sufean, 2012). As Lee (2004) pointed out, the corporatisation that
took place in 1998 with public universities was merely corporatisation by gov-
ernance. The previous governing structure in public universities emulated the
British model of having the court, the university council, the senate, faculties, and
various academic boards (Khoo, 2005; Lee, 2004). Following the corporatisation
exercise, the university court was abolished, the university council replaced with
a much smaller board of directors, and the size of the senate reduced to about
40 members (Lee, 2004). Interestingly, according to Soaib and Sufean (2012),
Universiti Malaya was the only public university in Malaysia which had a func-
tioning court prior to its abolishment, where the main function was to accept
officially amended statutes of the university. 2 July 1996 was the last session of
the court, and subsequently, it was abolished. Today, the governing structure of
public universities, including RDU and WLTU, has a similar governing structure
comprising a board of directors, senate, and the faculties/centres. The chairman
of the board and its members are appointed by the minister, where the number
of members may vary across universities but mainly comprises the vice chancellor
and representatives from the government, local community, and private sector.
The board is the highest governing body overseeing all matters of the university
including finance, staffing, and development, except for academic matters that
are under the purview of senate.
While the corporatisation exercise in 1998 has restructured the governing
structure of public universities into a corporate entity, the financial aspect of cor-
poratisation did not materialise. The initial plan was for public universities to raise
a portion of its operating costs gradually to 40 percent. The salaries of staffs in
the universities were also supposed to be raised by 17.5 percent, but the incre-
ment was shelved, as the corporatisation exercise was carried out in the midst of
the worst economic crisis in Malaysia (see Lee, 2004; Wan & Morshidi, 2018).
However, although the corporatisation was only on the governing structure, in
retrospect, this change can be seen as a prerequisite initiative to drive universi-
ties to be more efficient and productive, with a much leaner and concentrated
governing structure for decision-making, by reducing the size of the governing
bodies and eliminating one level of hierarchy (Wan & Morshidi, 2018). In other
words, influenced by corporate managerialism, the governing structure of pub-
lic universities changed from the academia and collegial-based structure to be
more corporate-like, where academic representation in the board of directors was
stripped away and academic participation in the senate was reduced to only 20
professors appointed by the vice chancellor (see Wan, 2017).
Despite the fact that universities have to adopt a similar governing structure,
there have been variations across institutions in terms of the processes and set-
up within the structure. For example, following the autonomy status given to
universities, institutions can determine the size and composition of their senates.
The size and composition of the senate, being the highest body on academic
matters in a university, is important to represent the views of academics. In the
case of WLTU, the decision was to have a senate that reflects a balance between
professors and members who hold administrative positions such as deans and
directors. Hence, the current size of the senate in WLTU is 105, comprising top
management, 46 deans and directors, 46 professors elected by their peers, four
representatives appointed by the vice chancellor and other ex-officio; so much
bigger than another research university (not sampled in this study) that limits the
size of its senate to not more than 20 elected professors. Furthermore, the senate
representation in the board of directors across these two universities also differs
where WLTU has two senate representatives, and the other research university
has only one. In other words, the set-up of the senate in WLTU, as compared
with other public universities including RDU, attempts to ensure equal represen-
tation of academics in the senate elected among their peers with those appointed
by the top management to hold administrative positions.
However, although the governing structure is similar across public universities,
the management structure differs across universities. The management structure
refers to the internal arrangements in which the university is managed and admin-
istered. Apart from the main set-up of faculties to delineate disciplinarity and aca-
demic programmes, universities may establish various centres and units according
to their institutional needs. For instance, RDU established a quality department
initially to audit the various processes in the university as well as to evaluate the
institution’s readiness towards obtaining the autonomous status and develop a
strategic plan for the university after successfully gaining the status. Upon receiv-
ing the autonomous status, RDU renamed the quality department and mandated
it to implement the strategic plan, and importantly, is now the monitor of the
university’s key performance indicators. In addition, the university also set up a
risk management department to evaluate the risk of the university.
Furthermore, going back two decades, the corporatisation exercise also moti-
vated WLTU to partly reorganise its management structure. For instance, a
Corporate Development Department was established to help the university in
charting its long-term strategies following the corporatisation. In addition, the
department also intensified data collection across the university and developed
guidelines for investment. Importantly, this department also initiated the idea for
every academic unit in the university to have an enterprise account for income
generation activities that is separate from the operating account supported by the
state.
Importantly, underlying the governance and management structure of uni-
versities is the respective constitution of the university. The concept of having a
constitution for university was inherited from the British tradition and initiated in
1949 during the establishment and incorporation of Universiti Malaya (Soaib &
Sufean, 2012). However, with the introduction of UUCA in 1971, university
constitutions, although having remained as the legal authority governing the
existence of the university, have become a schedule subsumed under the UUCA.
University constitutions are typical across the public universities in Malaysia, with
an average of 73 sections. Yet individual universities, for instance, WLTU, has addi-
tional sections of more than 90 sections when the university constitution was
amended in the late 1990s and early 2010s (accurate dates cannot be provided
as may compromise anonymity of institution). According to the legal advisor of
WLTU, the university is currently in the midst of preparing another amendment
to the university constitution to provide more leverage and to allow the univer-
sity to be engaged in income generation activities more effectively. Nevertheless,
all amendments to the constitution of the university must either be carried out
within the framework of UUCA as additional sections beyond those prescribed in
the Schedule of UUCA, or exemption has to be approved by the Yang di-Pertuan
Agong as provided by Section 26 of UUCA.
Autonomy and leadership

With regard to autonomy and leadership, participants in both case studies almost
unanimously pointed out that there is no autonomy, and there are several jus-
tifications to such an assertive and strong statement. First, as public universities
continue to rely on funding from the state, there can be no autonomy because
the state/government holds the purse strings and universities are accountable
for the public monies allocated to them. Second, many participants also pointed
out that the autonomy at the moment is “guided” or “restricted”, as public univer-
sities still require approval from various parties, especially the Ministry of Higher
Education, as well as adhering to the many public service and treasury circulars.
The “restricted autonomy” has been described by a participant using the analogy
of freedom is given but with the hands remained cuffed at the back. The first and
second points raised will be discussed in the later sections.
Third, while the MEBHE has outlined autonomy as a transfer of more powers
from the ministry to the board of directors of universities, there are academics and
institutional leaders who argued that autonomy cannot be fully realised until and
unless public universities have the authority to decide their own appointments for
top management positions. Even with the autonomous status, the appointments
of the chairman of the board of directors, its members, the vice chancellors, and
deputies vice chancellors remain as the prerogative of the Minister of Higher
Education. Hence, many considered the current arrangement as universities not
having the autonomy to appoint its own leaders.
Closely related to the point about autonomy and leadership is that while uni-
versities with autonomous status have been perceived not to be autonomous,
leadership has emerged as a critical factor that contributed to the interpretation
of autonomy with the universities. A point to note that even before the autono-
mous status was awarded to public universities, the nature of these institutions as
FSBs suggest that legally, universities have partial autonomy. Hence, the auton-
omy, more precisely, what the university wants to do and how to do it, is highly
dependable on the leadership. As a consequence, participants through their inter-
views have often demarcated phases of development in their universities with the
tenure of the vice chancellors.
Leadership is critical to the governance and management of public universi-
ties, as vice chancellors have different visions and styles. One of the major influ-
ences of a vice chancellor is the identity of the university. When a vice chancellor
is replaced, the new person may embark on a rebranding exercise. For example,
RDU under the leadership of its current vice chancellor has decided that it will
not aspire to become a research university but instead will emphasise equally on
teaching, research, and service. One of his predecessors, on the other hand, felt
that the job title for administrators in the university should be changed from assis-
tant registrar to manager, to reflect a change from administration to management.
Both vice chancellors of WLTU and RDU that are in office at the time of the
study have also introduced an additional committee when they began their ten-
ures. The most explicit example is the set-up of an executive committee, chaired
by the vice chancellor and included all the deputies, registrar, and bursar. In
RDU, the concept of executive committee was further cascaded to the faculties,
where each faculty is required to have its own executive committee. The idea of
an executive committee is to allow frequent meetings, usually on a weekly basis,
to discuss ongoing issues such as implementation of the strategic plan and peri-
odical performance of the university. Interestingly, this initiative across the two
universities has been seen as part of the individual leadership management style
of the vice chancellor.
Fundamentally, the ability of a university to be autonomous to the extent
of self-governing is highly dependable on the leadership. As a senior leader in
WLTU shared, self-governance is very much possible. He further elaborated that
when the university receives an instruction or circular from central agencies such
as MoHE, the university has three choices: to adopt the circular in its entirety, to
adopt with amendments, and to not adopt. All three choices are within the legal
rights of the university as a FSB. However, an important point to consider is that
the leaders in the university are appointed by the Minister of Higher Education,
and therefore, we do not need to second guess what will happen to a vice chan-
cellor who exercises the third choice more often than the other two.
Furthermore, with the autonomy status, universities are required to have their
own strategic plan in charting the way forward. However, many academics shared
their opinions that strategic plans are leader-centric, whereby when a new vice
chancellor comes into office, the strategic plan of the university will change. The
changes at times can be drastic. Importantly, the strategic plan of the universities,
to some extent, must also be synchronised with the existing national strategic
documents and policies. If this synchronisation was done after a new national
strategic document was launched, the synchronisation has been seen as a form
of conformity by the university and hence the question about its autonomy was
raised. Interestingly, across the two case studies, two different responses took
place. On the one hand, RDU amended its strategic plan to accommodate the
MEBHE when the latter was launched in 2015, but on the other hand, WLTU
continued with its own existing strategic plan.
Key performance indicators

The corporatisation exercise can be seen as the beginning of corporate mana-
gerialism in Malaysian higher education. The restructuring of governance and
management structure in 1998 in WLTU and the setting up of a corporate depart-
ment underlined the shift towards corporate managerialism. Yet, conceptually,
the ideology behind corporate managerialism of public universities is identifiable
to the new public management which is a strand of neoliberalism. Nationally, the
introduction of the National Higher Education Strategic Plan 2007–2020 was
another clear indication of neoliberalism influencing the development of higher
education in this country, and this influence led to concepts of efficiency and
accountability and further operationalised into key performance indicators that
are measurable and easily quantifiable.
Currently, key performance indicators are a major element in the governance
and management of public universities. These indicators extended from the
top with the vice chancellors and down to the academics and students. Indi-
cators ranged from academic and research performance to income-generating
activities and, collectively, being used to inform and shape the governance and
management.
Importantly, key performance indicators have also been considered as an
instrument for the state/government to “control” and dictate public universi-
ties. For example, as shared by the person who is responsible for monitoring the
key performance indicators in RDU, MoHE prescribes a number of indicators to
the university and its top management. These indicators, such as percentage of
self-generated income from the overall expenditure and performance in rankings,
are then divided and cascaded to the faculties and departments. Within a faculty,
the faculty indicator may be further divided into individual indicators.
Key performance indicators have also been translated into other management
processes in a university. Three years ago, as an incentive to encourage academ-
ics to publish in journals to fulfil the key performance indicators of RDU, each
publication was rewarded with RM1,000. However, this financial incentive has
been discontinued, and instead, these indicators have been translated into more
stringent promotion criteria. Besides indicators on research grants and publi-
cation in high-impact journals, the performance indicators for promotion also
include a set number of courses to lecture. Yet, as an academic shared, there
are currently too many academics in her faculty and insufficient courses to be
distributed to everyone that ensured the individual key performance indicators
can be met. Hence, the faculty has to resort to splitting the courses to ensure
all academics have sufficient courses to teach, but this practice may not neces-
sarily be effective, and it was carried out purely to help academics meet the key
performance indicators.
From the perspectives of academics, key performance indicators have been
identified as a source of frustration. From the studies undertaken by Wan and
colleagues (2015) that included WLTU and RDU, the over-emphasis on measur-
able indicators, such as number of publications in indexed journals and number
of courses, over other intangible aspects of teaching, research, and service, have
altered the behaviours of academics to comply with the culture of managerialism.
The compliance with such a culture may have been at the expense other academic
cultures of collegiality and having the quest for knowledge and truth.
Decision-making and appointment

One of the major changes that took place about governance and management
is the speed of decision-making within the university. Following the autonomy
status being awarded to both universities, the board of directors has more tasks
at hand to address. Thus, the board of directors of RDU had met more often,
from four times a year before the autonomy was given, to six times in the first
six months of the year. The more frequent meeting of the board of directors has
expedited the decision-making processes in the university. In addition to that, the
use of an executive committee at the university and faculty levels is also believed
to expedite the decision-making processes among university leaders and mid-
level managers.
Another major change that has taken place is the appointments. Prior to the
corporatisation exercise, the two representatives of the senate were elected to sit
in the university council. However, from the restructuring of the council to the
board of directors, there was no senate representation in the board until universi-
ties were given autonomy, and the representation of senate in the board of direc-
tors has now been guaranteed as specified in the constitution of the university to
ensure academics are represented in the highest governing body.
The representation of the senate has also changed across time. Prior to the
restructuring, the senate comprised all professors and elected representation
from each faculty. The elected element was abolished during the corporatisation
restructuring and revived with some modification recently following the provi-
sion of autonomy status. Currently, autonomous universities can have their own
arrangements as discussed earlier in the section.
Apart from the board and the senate, there has also been a change in the ways
in which mid-level leaders such as the deans and deputy deans are appointed.
While these appointments have remained under the prerogative of the vice chan-
cellor, universities have different ways of nominating and electing these mid-
level leaders. On the one hand, WLTU conducts elections across the faculties,
whereby the candidates with a significant number of votes will be considered
by the vice chancellor for appointment. The votes are not made public and
only the vice chancellor is privy to the votes. However, the decision of who to
be appointed still lies entirely with the vice chancellor. On the other hand, the
appointment process in RDU is slightly different. The Management Committee
of the Faculty will nominate and elect two persons for each position of the dean
and deputy dean, and the vice chancellor will appoint one of the two candidates
elected by the faculty. The two different processes demonstrated additional pro-
cesses of involving academics in the faculty in the appointment of mid-level
leaders, but at the same time, the decision of appointment remains in the hands
of the vice chancellor.
Finance and funding

Finance and funding in public universities have been among the most crucial
aspect in the deliberation about autonomy. The lack of ability by public universi-
ties to generate their own income to fund the operations of the universities has
been considered as the major stumbling block for universities to exercise their
autonomy. However, the issue of income generation was not a new topic that
emerged in the discussion of autonomy. In fact, income generation has been
part of the corporatisation exercise in 1998 but did not materialise due to the
economic situation.
Two major legacies of the corporatisation exercise on the governance and
management of public universities are the establishment of holding companies
and enterprise account in the financial management system within universities.
Both WLTU and RDU have set up their respective holding companies; known
as Wu Lien Teh Holdings and Rosli Dhobi Holdings, respectively. Wu Lien Teh
Holdings was established almost immediately after the corporatisation took place
and Rosli Dhobi Holdings about a decade after the university was established.
As public universities are FSBs, they are constrained by various financial regula-
tions of the Treasury and Ministry of Finance, for instance, on procurement and
involvement in investment and business activities. Yet, with the holding com-
panies, universities can do procurement more effectively and quickly. In addi-
tion, universities through the holding company can conduct training and other
income-generating activities that contribute to the enterprise account. The enter-
prise account is an additional account within the financial management system
of the universities that typically comprises only the operating and development
accounts (where the source of income is allocated from the state). In addition,
monies in the enterprise account are not subjected to the rigid vote arrangement
that is common in operating and development accounts, for example, vote 21000
has to be used for travelling and vote 24000 for rental. Hence, in the case of Rosli
Dhobi, the enterprise account of the faculties is parked in its holding company
and therefore not subjected to the typical financial regulations and procedures of
FSBs. For example, Rosli Dhobi Holdings provided certified laboratory services
in collaboration with the university and the profit will proceed into the enterprise
account of the Faculty of Engineering of RDU but is housed in the holding
company. Importantly, the establishment of a holding company is also an “arm-
length” defence of the university in event of lawsuits that may emerge from com-
mercial activities undertaken.
Since obtaining the autonomous status, public universities are expected to
exercise independence in using the monies that were self-generated. The needs
to use self-generated income or savings were particularly crucial this year, as allo-
cation from the state for higher education as announced in October 2015 was
slashed by 15 percent on average and further recalibrated with reduction at the
beginning of 2016 (Astro Awani, 2016; Sharma, 2015). Yet, even before 2016,
the state’s allocation to tertiary education has been decreasing, from 37 percent
of total government expenditure on education in 2011 to 34 percent in 2013,
and this has put pressure on public universities to be creative with generating
income for its operation and development, such as taking a cut from research and
consultancy grants of academics, commercialising the facilities in the university,
or setting up companies and businesses within the university under the holding
company instead of outsourcing.
In RDU, one of the creative initiatives undertaken to generate income is to pri-
vatise some of the students’ hostel to the holding company. The project was still
at an experimental stage where several blocks of students’ hostels were allocated
to the holding company at a similar rate as renting them to the students. Then,
Rosli Dhobi Holdings renovated the hostel and equipped the rooms with air-
conditioning and hot water shower and rented out these upgraded hostels at
a higher rate that is almost equivalent to the rental rate for rooms outside the
campus. This initiative was well-accepted by students, as some can afford to pay
the higher rate and would want some forms of luxury as well as having the conve-
nience of staying in campus. The initiative of upgraded hostels has been a form of
income generated to the university, and at the same time, reducing the expendi-
ture of the university as the cost of maintenance has been covered by the holding
company.
Further to reduce the cost of maintaining a fleet of cars for the university,
RDU has gotten rid of these vehicles. Because apart from owing the car and hav-
ing to cover the maintenance, the university also has to bear the cost for petrol
and other forms of disposables of the car. Instead, the university provides cash
allowance for academics who qualify to have a car, such as the top and mid-level
managements, with the rationale that these allowances are just subsidisation for
the usage of own vehicle. According to the registrar of the university, this initia-
tive came about after receiving the autonomy and giving university the leverage
to make changes according to their needs. Importantly, these two initiatives,
alongside several others to be discussed later, demonstrated the changes that have
been mooted by the provision of autonomous status on public universities.
However, even though a public university may have already obtained the status
as autonomous, there remains confusion in regard to the position of the financial
controller. As highlighted by the vice chancellor of RDU, until recently, it has
always been assumed that the vice chancellor is the financial controller of the
university. Yet MoHE has clarified that the financial controller for all public uni-
versities is the chief secretary of the ministry, regardless of whether it has or does
not have the autonomous status. The decision, to a large extent, has undermined
the autonomy of public universities, and particularly in the area of finance and
funding.
Human resources
The corporatisation exercise in 1998 was intended to raise the salary of academics
by 17.5 percent, but this change did not materialise due to the financial situa-
tion. As a result, the salary of university staff – both academic and administrative/
support – continue to be tied to the salary scheme of the Public Service Depart-
ment. Despite the fact that public universities are FSBs, the emolument of perma-
nent staffs of the universities are guaranteed by the government, and these staffs are
eligible for pension like civil servants. Currently, when public universities became
autonomous, one aspect of the autonomy is human resources management.
However, as clearly articulated by the legal advisor of WLTU, public universi-
ties do not have the absolute power to hire and fire due to job performances if the
staffs are in permanent positions. Although the university can decide whom to
hire, the hiring has to be based on an approved position in the form of a warrant
issued by the Public Service Department. Likewise, the firing process can take
place only after all disciplinary processes have been exhausted but may not be
able to do so due to poor performances. Hence, only in 2014 did the civil service
propose an exit policy for non-performing civil servants, and WLTU is currently
in the process of developing an exit policy for staff members who do not meet a
certain level of performance in their annual appraisal.
Yet if the university wishes to exercise its own discretion on human resource
matters, it can do so only using internal funds generated or saved. For instance,
due to the lower hierarchical structure prescribed for a non-research university
by the Public Service Department, RDU has decided for all its top management
staff to be paid comparably with their peers in a research university. For this to be
possible, the pay differences are borne by the university through money gener-
ated internally.
As university employees are tied to the civil service, the mandatory retirement
age for academics has been capped at 60 years old. Yet unlike other sectors of
the civil service that may be more labour intensive, academics at the age of 60
may still be productive and able to contribute to academia. The practice in pub-
lic universities, traditionally, has been to rehire academic staffs at their last pay
grade on a biannual or triannual contract. However, on this matter, the two case
studies have adopted different ways to retain their retired academic staffs. RDU,
instead of giving a contract with salary and benefits equal to the retired staff’s last
drawn salary, has developed its own salary scheme for retired academics with a
lump-sum payment and specific tasks. For a retired professor, the package is RM
10,000 (USD 2,500) and he or she is required to teach two courses and super-
vise one doctoral student. For a retired associate professor, the package is RM
8,000 (USD 2,000) with the same task. Conversely, WLTU has been offering
full salary contract arrangements (including pension) for retired academic staff
until this year, where a retired professor can continue to receive the salary and
allowances of his or her last pay grade (minimum of RM 17,000 (USD 4,250) a
month). Due to the budget constraint, WLTU has instead offered a position of
honorary professor without stipendiary. The recipient of the position can main-
tain the affiliation to the university and access to its facilities, but without salary
and allowance.
In terms of attracting and retaining talent, RDU has again exercised its auton-
omy to make it more attractive for talent to join the university. Specifically target-
ing professionals in critical disciplines like engineering and clinicians in medicine,
the university has given an internal promotion but non-pensionable position,
where the pay difference is borne by the university with monies generated inter-
nally. For example, an academic is holding the position of associate professor,
which is a pensionable position. However, in order to compensate the person
for his or her professional expertise, the university offers the salary of a professor.
When this person retires, the pension will be given on the basis of his or her posi-
tion as an associate professor.
The registrar of RDU also claimed that the university may be one of the
pioneering institutions in Malaysia to have developed multi-track systems for
academics. Under the Public Service Department, academic staffs are categorised
under the University Lecturers Scheme. While the over-arching scheme dictates
the remuneration package and general job description of academics, RDU has
allowed its academics to specialise in a teaching, research, or service track. In
other words, academics in RDU in a faculty or research institute or holding an
administrative position may have differentiated job descriptions and performance
indicators for their annual appraisal as well as promotion. Conversely, WLTU has
maintained a one-size-fits-all system, where all academics, regardless of where
they are based, have the similar five areas of responsibilities (teaching, research,
supervision, service, and publication) to fulfil. At the point of the interview, the
registrar shared that WLTU is currently looking into having a much more flexible
system for career development of its academic staff as well as the possibility of
administrative staff to cross over into holding adjunct academic positions.
RDU, being a much newer university and not as established as WLTU, has
to also be creative in thinking of the career development of its academics. While
MoHE provides an Academic Staff Training Scheme for all public universities
to fund their current and future academic staffs for doctoral training locally or
abroad, this central provision has an age limit that the candidate cannot exceed
the age of 40. However, as there are pockets of academics in RDU who have
exceeded the age limit but are still without a doctorate, the university has devel-
oped its own funding for these over-age staff members to pursue their doctorate
locally.
The human resources system in the two case studies differs considerably.
Because RDU may not be as attractive as WLTU, in part as a result of geographi-
cal distance, being less prestigious and not having the status as a research univer-
sity, RDU has to exercise its creativity and autonomy in using internal finance to
attract, retain, and develop its academic talents. WLTU, being a more established
university, has been “toeing the line” by taking the option to “obey and fol-
low” the arrangements of the Public Service Department in the management of
human resources.
Academic matters
In theory, the senate is the highest governing body on academic matters in a uni-
versity. This arrangement also holds true in the context of Malaysia. However,
the authority of the senate of universities, particularly public universities with
autonomy, has been questioned by academics and institutional leaders across
both WLTU and RDU. The contradiction of the role of the senate lies with
three major arrangements. First, academic programmes in universities, even
with the approval of the senate, are largely subjected to the accreditation of the
Malaysian Qualifications Agency as well as professional bodies in selected disci-
plines. The accreditation process, at times, can be prescriptive in requiring the
academic programme to be structured with outcomes, activities, or assessments
in a particular manner. Second, approval from MoHE is needed for a change
of curriculum of more than 30 percent. However, this requirement for public
universities with autonomy status has been more relaxed, where MoHE has to
be informed only. Third, although academic matters rest with the senate, the
offering of academic programmes does have financial implications to the uni-
versity. Hence, the board of directors has an interest and may even overrule the
decision of the senate, to ensure the marketability and financial sustainability of
academic programmes.
While the control from external bodies on academic programmes such as
MQA and professional bodies has been a matter of the last two decades or so, the
control from MoHE has a much longer history. According to a senior academic,
the control from the government on the curriculum in public universities began
as early as the mid-1970s when the UUCA (1971) was amended in 1975 to curb
student activism. Due to that, the government exerted strong control on every
aspect of universities, more so on academic matters of what should be taught.
Although the control on academic programmes has not been as strong as in
the past to curb political and social activism, the control has shifted towards the
economic factor such as avoiding the duplication of resources to run overlapped
programmes. The economic-driven consideration that motivated the control also
relates to the issue of graduate employability and the popularity of certain pro-
grammes leading to income generation. Particularly in some disciplines like busi-
ness and architecture, more professional and commercial-driven programmes are
being developed in both public universities. Nevertheless, the idea of control on
students remains significant whereby a deputy vice chancellor for student affairs
opined that 60 to 70 percent of student matters continue to be directed centrally
by MoHE.
Although both universities in this study have received autonomy, at the point
of writing, WLTU is the one which exercised the autonomy to directly select its
own students. Yet this autonomy does not extend to the ability of these universi-
ties to decide the types of pre-university qualifications to be recognised, as rec-
ognition of qualifications are still subject to the guidelines of the Public Service
Department. Hence, neither WLTU nor RDU can admit students with qualifica-
tions such as the United Examination Certificate, International Baccalaureate,
or International General Certificate of Secondary Education. The autonomy for
these two universities involved only setting additional requirements and pro-
cesses, such as having interviews, to determine which students to be admitted
into which academic programmes.
Conclusion
Governance and management of public universities have undergone significant
and subtle changes over the last six decades. The significant changes on governance
and management have been initiated by, first, the establishment of UUCA in
1971, which altered the legal framework for self-governance within these public
institutions. Second, the corporatisation, which effectively was a corporatisation-
in-governance, has also played a big part in revising the governance structure of
public universities from a more collegial institution into a more corporate entity.
While the provision of the autonomy status to public universities beginning
from 2012 may be expected to initiate another significant change to the gover-
nance and management of universities, examining the changes in the two case
studies highlighted the change may not be as significant as envisioned. Instead,
the autonomy status has influenced more changes to the internal management
structure and process within the university, but only subtle modifications have
taken place on the governance structure of these public institutions. The notable
changes in this respect include a more active board of directors and the possibility
of universities having a much bigger (and expectedly more vibrant) senate. Other
subtle changes were mainly management processes related to having innovative
ways to manage the financial and human resources within the university.
Importantly, while sophisticated concepts like corporatisation and autonomy
have been introduced in Malaysian higher education and are expected to trigger
changes, the examination of these two public institutions suggest that leaders and
academics in these institutions are still grappling with the way in which to intro-
duce and exercise these changes accordingly in their institution. For example, the
fact that a university can now decide on the number of its senate members, have
additional sections and provisions in its constitution, and have the freedom to
utilise self-generated income, these differences across the two universities as well
as other public universities have demonstrated the possibility for change within
the governance and management of public universities. These differences also
serve as good practices or examples for others to emulate and explore. Crucially,
public universities need to take initiative and strategise changes to their gover-
nance and management quickly according to their own needs and context so as
to enable the university as an institution to leverage on the changing dynamics at
the systemic and national policymaking level.
Note
1 Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE) existed between 2003 and 2013 as well as
2015 and 2018. While MoHE existed in the line-up of ministries, universities were
put under its charge. In the absence of MoHE, universities and higher education is
under the purview of the Ministry of Education.
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8 University governance and
management in Singapore
The case of the Singapore Institute
of Management University
(UNISIM)
Jason Tan
Background
University governance and management in Singapore began coming under firm
government control in the 1960s. Prior to that, the then Raffles College and King
Edward VII College of Medicine, precursors to the University of Malaya and the
University of Singapore, enjoyed considerable operating autonomy. In addition,
the Chinese-medium Nanyang University, which began operations in 1955, was
fully privately funded. The situation began changing when the People’s Action
Party (PAP) was elected in 1959. A series of confrontations with university staff
and students at both the University of Singapore and Nanyang University led
the PAP to begin clamping down on academic freedom and imposing draconian
legislation governing student activities. In addition, the state began progressively
playing a dominant role in such matters as the appointment of top university offi-
cials as well as funding, admission, and strategic planning. The election of deans
and department heads was also abolished.
Another prominent display of governing fiat came when the then Prime Minis-
ter Lee Kuan Yew intervened personally regarding the future survival of Nanyang
University. This intervention resulted in the merger of the two universities to form
the National University of Singapore in 1980. The Nanyang Technological Uni-
versity was established in 1991, once again as a result of the government’s deci-
sions to provide a second public university. This was followed by the opening of
the privately run but publicly funded Singapore Management University in 2000.
Moves in the direction of greater operating autonomy began in 1999 when
the then deputy prime minister commissioned a committee to explore this pros-
pect. Citing the need for change amid the challenges of the knowledge econ-
omy and international competition, the committee released its report in 2000.
Among its key recommendations were (i) greater operational autonomy within
key government-determined policy parameters in three main areas: overall
development of the university sector, funding and subsidy, and manpower plan-
ning; (ii) more authority devolution to deans or heads for greater flexibility in
responding to challenges; (iii) funding through block grants, with the emphasis
on outcome-based accountability; (iv) devolving operational finance decisions
Singapore universities’ governance 113
towards the lowest operational level feasible; (v) diversification of funding sources;
and (vi) broadening staff appraisal systems to make them market driven, perfor-
mance based and moving away from close linkages to the civil service pay struc-
tures (Ministry of Education, 2000).
Five years later, another committee that had been commissioned by the then
deputy prime minister released its report on recommending an appropriate model
of autonomy for Singapore’s publicly funded universities. This report recom-
mended all three publicly funded universities be turned into autonomous univer-
sities by being corporatised as not-for-profit companies, similar to the prevailing
set-up in the Singapore Management University. The report also claimed that
the National University of Singapore and the Nanyang Technological Univer-
sity would no longer be constrained by the operational regulations imposed on
statutory boards, thus enjoying more administrative and financial autonomy to
explore different ways of building their teaching and research performance and
competing within the international arena. Corporatisation would send a strong
signal that the universities belonged not to the government, but to the vari-
ous other stakeholders instead. The universities would be granted autonomy to
increase the percentage of students admitted under non-academic criteria.
As in the previous report, the committee talked of empowering deans and
heads to be more actively involved in decision-making in areas such as curricular
matters and academic quality. As far as accountability was concerned, the report
recommended that the universities each sign a policy agreement with the Edu-
cation Ministry. This agreement would enable the ministry to outline strategic
directions for the entire university sector and set key parameters for autonomy.
In addition, each university had to formulate its own performance agreement
with the ministry, outlining its key performance targets in teaching, research, ser-
vice and organisational development over a five-year period. Third, the ministry
would set up a quality assurance framework for universities (QAFU). Under this
framework, the universities needed to submit annual progress reports as well as
undergoing five yearly on-site external validation by a ministry-commissioned
external review panel (Ministry of Education, 2005).
In both cases, the respective committees drew lessons from overseas institu-
tions. The 2000 report committee visited the United States, the United Kingdom,
Canada, and Hong Kong. In the second case, the team visited the Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology, the University of Virginia, and the University of
Michigan at Ann Arbor. This practice of policy borrowing is well-established in
Singapore and has been used for reforms at the primary and secondary levels of
schooling as well.
Since the publication of these two reports, and their acceptance by the Minis-
try of Education, two more autonomous universities – the Singapore University
of Technology and Design, and the Singapore Institute of Technology – have
been established. There is now a total of five such universities. At the same time,
there are a few foreign university branch campuses such as those of James Cook
University that are completely privately run and funded, along with numerous
degree programmes offered by overseas universities in collaboration with local
114 Jason Tan
education partners. There is currently only one local privately run university, the
Singapore Institute of Management University (UNISIM), which will be the
focus of the rest of this chapter. As there is hardly any published information
available on the issue of university autonomy in Singapore, the report draws heav-
ily on an interview I conducted with Professor Cheong Hee Kiat, the President
of UNISIM, on 27 September 2016. The interview was tape recorded, and the
transcript was analysed for key ideas relating to the operational set-up of Singa-
pore’s sole local private university. This unique case will highlight in more detail
the practical meaning of the term “private” and explore how different the term
“private” is from the term “autonomous”.
The Singapore Institute of Management

University (UNISIM)
The UNISIM has its origins in the Singapore Institute of Management (SIM),
a totally private not-for-profit institute that was established in 1964 with a grant
from the Economic Development Board in order to provide professional leaders
and managers to aid Singapore’s economic development. It started offering crash
courses in management before offering diploma and degree programmes (the lat-
ter in collaboration with foreign partners such as the University of London and
the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology) in the 1970s.
In 1992, the Ministry of Education invited the SIM to start an Open Univer-
sity programme in partnership with the Open University of the United Kingdom.
This Open University, which ran courses over a period of 12 years, largely served
the needs of non-degree school teachers who wanted to improve their educa-
tional qualifications at a time when most school teachers did not possess a univer-
sity degree. In 2003, the Education Ministry approached the SIM for assistance
in catering to a proposed expansion of university undergraduate enrolments. The
SIM management decided, with ministry approval, to use the Open University
as the basis for the formation of an entirely new university, while the SIM would
form a new unit called SIM Global, dedicated to nurturing partnerships with
overseas universities in offering degree programmes. The two units would have
clearly demarcated target audiences. The UNISIM would exclusively (and be the
sole local institution to) target local Singaporean working adults without a uni-
versity degree, whereas SIM Global would target fresh school leavers and foreign
students. SIM Global helped provide a limited amount of funding for about eight
or nine years to help the UNISIM find its feet.
UNISIM was set up as a private limited company in 2005 and received a
degree-granting licence from the Ministry of Education. In the first few years of
its operation, it was “private” in the sense of being totally self-financing and self-
governing, with total autonomy to decide on such matters as staffing, running
of programmes, and quality assurance. After a few years of operation, negotia-
tions took place between the ministry and the UNISIM to provide government
financial subsidies for part-time undergraduate students in order to encourage
more working adults to acquire degree qualifications. The undergraduate fee
subsidies began initially at 40 percent and stood at 55 percent in 2016. With the
start of government financial subsidies came, quite naturally, an increase in gov-
ernment intervention and oversight of the UNISIM’s programmes.
Governance and management

The UNISIM is part of the SIM Group, a not-for-profit organisation established
under the Charities Act. The SIM Group is under overall governance of a gov-
erning council. Consisting of independently elected members, the council is
responsible for the SIM Group’s strategy; exercises overall control on all financial,
remuneration, and audit matters; and closely monitors compliance with quality
assurance measures. The UNISIM has a governing board of trustees, similar to
the practice in the five autonomous universities. The 15 trustees are categorised as
follows: the chairman (a prominent businessman); six eminent academics or busi-
ness leaders; three SIM Governing Council nominees (two prominent business-
men and a National University of Singapore professor); one SIM representative
(the SIM Executive Director); the Education Ministry Deputy Secretary (Policy);
the Chief Executive of the Singapore Workforce Development Agency; the UNI-
SIM President; the UNISIM Registrar. The board is appointed by the SIM Gov-
erning Council in consultation with the Education Ministry and is tasked with
broad oversight of the university’s strategic direction, governance, and quality.
There is clear government representation on the board as is the case in the autono-
mous universities. The president pointed out to me that this accountability to the
government is part of the privilege of being granted a degree-granting licence.
The UNISIM is autonomous from the SIM, except for SIM Governing Coun-
cil representation on its board of trustees. The university president is directly
accountable to the board and is appointed by the board in consultation with the
SIM Governing Council for a renewable five-year term. The board also has an
Establishment Committee that has broad oversight over the appointment of top
management staff such as deans, directors, department heads, and senior non-
academic administrative posts. The president makes nominations for these posi-
tions, which must then be approved by the Establishment Committee.
Finance
Almost 100 percent of the UNISIM income is from student tuition fees. What-
ever savings it has are used in part to fund research initiatives, although individual
staff members are encouraged to look for external sources of research funding. In
addition to government financial subsidies in terms of block grants for part-time
undergraduate students, the UNISIM is allowed to solicit individual donations
or limited-term funds or awards. It also sets aside funds for scholarships based on
academic performance and renewable on an annual basis. There are also study
awards for students who need financial assistance, although the president admitted
there are still insufficient funds for these study awards. Approximately two to three
percent of part-time degree students receive either scholarships or study awards.
116 Jason Tan
Full-time students, similar to their counterparts in autonomous universities,
may apply for various forms of financial assistance, such as bank loans, Central
Provident Fund money (something that part-time students cannot use), or gov-
ernment loans. There are approximately 700 full-time students compared with
about 13,000 part-time students. Tuition fees for both full-time and part-time
programmes are based on market forces. The UNISIM uses the autonomous uni-
versity fees as a benchmark to determine what might be affordable for students
and does market surveys to determine what fee levels students are comfortable
paying. The president pointed out that the UNISIM was a not-for-profit insti-
tution and that whereas some programmes were making money, others were
operating at a loss. It was not necessary, he claimed, for every programme to
make money, as the more important priority was serving the needs of the country
and working adults. Being a private institution meant having to make its own
calculations about financial viability without any guarantees on either student
enrolments or ministry financing.
Staff recruitment
There are four academic ranks for faculty: lecturer, senior lecturer, associate pro-
fessor, and professor. New faculty are normally awarded two consecutive three-
year contracts, after which they receive a permanent employment contract, rather
than academic tenure. Promotions and appointments are approved by the Board of
Trustees. UNISIM staff are recruited primarily to perform teaching duties. Research
is not mandatory, although some staff undertake research with an industry or busi-
ness focus rather than of an empirical or esoteric nature. Individual staff members
can decide within a specified range on the relative weightages to be accorded for
the various staff appraisal components of teaching, research, and service. The UNI-
SIM President pointed out that the UNISIM, unlike the NUS or the NTU, was
not focused on pursuing ranking positions in the various international university
league tables, and therefore was not keen on hiring faculty who were looking to
establish their reputations as internationally renowned researchers. He also pointed
out that UNISIM faculty faced a less onerous path than its counterparts in autono-
mous universities, who had to satisfy stringent requirements in terms of academic
writing and research. During the period when the UNISIM accepted only part-
time degree students, there were approximately 50 full-time and 500 part-time
staff, referred to as associate staff. Currently, there are approximately 130 full-time
and 800 associate staff. Associate staff who have relevant industry experience are
appointed on a flexible basis, that is, for a semester, two semesters, or even up to
three years, depending on course demand. There is a deliberate flexibility in staffing
in order to meet market needs. This large percentage of associate staff is one differ-
ence between the UNISIM and the autonomous universities.
Academic studies
There are two part-time student intakes and one full-time student intake annu-
ally. The UNISIM President mentioned that there were no predetermined upper
limits on student enrolments in various programmes and courses. The UNISIM
held discussions with industry representatives to determine market demand for
programmes as well as specific course content. In addition, it surveyed existing
provision of programmes in Singapore in order to ascertain the financial viability
of programmes. The use of large numbers of associate staff meant greater flexibil-
ity in expanding student enrolments rapidly. All courses and programmes under-
went several stages in a programme development process: a new programme
would be triggered by industry need or market demand, in consultation with
industry partners. Market research and consultation with industry partners would
then take place before curriculum development by a curriculum team headed
by a programme head. A Programme Definitive Document would then be pro-
duced that would contain information such as market demand and sustainability,
programme structure and curriculum, programme outcomes and course learn-
ing outcomes, modes of delivery and assessment, resources needed and financial
break-even analysis; external assessor review of the proposed programme, and
approval by the Curriculum Planning Committee, before final approval by the
academic board and board of trustees. The president pointed out that in the
autonomous universities, which catered largely to fresh school leavers, there was
considerable consultation with the government about national economic needs
before deciding on new programmes and courses as well as enrolment levels. In
addition, there was much greater competition for places, as these universities did
not enjoy the kind of hiring flexibility as the UNISIM.
Unlike the autonomous universities, where applicants could list six choices for
admission, part-time UNISIM applicants listed only one enrolment choice in the
certainty that they would gain admission provided they met admission require-
ments. There was also a greater percentage of online instruction due to the busy
lives of working adults. Full-time UNISIM applicants took part in the same joint
admission exercise as their counterparts in autonomous universities.
Quality assurance
The UNISIM President mentioned that the UNISIM exercised quality assurance
in terms of course development, use of textbooks and course guides, and assess-
ment practices in order to minimise individual instructor variation in course deliv-
ery and the setting of examination questions. He referred to this as “McDonald’s
standardisation”.
The quality assurance strategy is multifaceted, with the UNISIM Provost
broadly overseeing all quality assurance processes. There is an Academic Qual-
ity Assurance Unit that works with various departments and centres. The UNI-
SIM also subscribes to the SIM Quality Framework. In this regard, the UNISIM
Quality Assurance Unit holds a few annual meetings with its SIM Global coun-
terpart. The third form of quality assurance is in the form of the Ministry of
Education’s QAFU. Every five years a ministry-commissioned team conducts
an external site-based inspection of various aspects of university governance and
course delivery. This is one respect in which the UNISIM is identical to the
autonomous universities. Fourth, the UNISIM as a private institution has submit
118 Jason Tan
annual routine reports to the Ministry of Education’s Council for Private Edu-
cation (CPE), which was established in 2009 to monitor quality in the private
education sector. The UNISIM has a mutual understanding with the ministry
that its degree-granting licence will normally be granted for consecutive four-year
terms. The CPE audits are more detailed than the QAFU audits, involving more
detailed inspection of course materials and instructor qualifications, for instance.
Fifth, the UNISIM, like all the autonomous universities, needs to submit
annual routine reports to the Ministry of Education’s Higher Education Divi-
sion. It also needs to undergo annual SIM financial audits. However, the UNI-
SIM is not required to undergo EduTrust inspections by the CPE, since it does
not enrol any non-Singaporean students. The EduTrust inspections ensure that
the needs of foreign students are adequately addressed.
Conclusion
The case of the UNISIM shows that the term “private” needs to be considered
carefully. Although the UNISIM differs from autonomous universities in some
respects, in many other ways, the Ministry of Education’s intervention is clear.
For one, there is Ministry of Education influence on the composition of the
board of trustees. There is now growing influence along with the provision of
financial subsidies to part-time degree students. The fact that the UNISIM is
serving the needs of adult learners means intervention as well from the Work-
force Development Agency. Most important, the imposition of quality assurance
requirements ensures effective ministry steering from a distance.
On 12 October 2016, the acting education minister (Higher Education and
Skills) publicly announced ministry plans to incorporate the UNISIM into the fold
of autonomous universities and rename it the Singapore University of Social Sci-
ences (Davie, 2016). These plans were in line with ministry ambitions to lend
greater support to its SkillsFuture initiative, which is designed at encouraging life-
long learning among the entire population. If this proposal is accepted by the UNI-
SIM and the SIM Governing Council, as is likely the case, this will mean that the
differences between “private” and “autonomous” will effectively cease to exist. It
remains to be seen whether such aspects of greater relative autonomy, such as the
hiring of large numbers of associate staff, will be preserved.
References
Davie, S. (2016, October 13). UNISIM set to be sixth autonomous university. The
Straits Times, p. A1.
Ministry of Education. (2000). Fostering autonomy and accountability in universities.
Singapore: Author.
Ministry of Education. (2005). Autonomous universities: Towards peaks of excellence.
Singapore: Author.
9 Governance and management
under transformation in
Korean higher education
Perception gaps between senior
managers and academics
Jung Cheol Shin and Yangson Kim
Introduction
Governance is understood in terms of the two core components of “structure”
and “process” in decision-making in higher education (Shin, 2018). In addi-
tion, governance of higher education is approached differently at different lev-
els of decision-making (Shin, 2013). At the macro level, governance focuses on
the relationships between government and higher education institutions, and
recent discourses of these relationships often centred on institutional autonomy
and deregulation. At the institutional level, governance focuses on the relation-
ships between institutional managers and academics. Recent policy initiatives
emphasise the trend towards moving decision-making power from academics
to institutional managers through managerial reforms (e.g., Shattock, 2014).
These managerial reforms include both structural changes and the changes of
decision-making processes in higher education institutions. Furthermore, one
may add other levels of analysis such as supra-national governance as seen in EU
and micro-level governance or even the relationships between senior academics
and junior academics (Harley, Muller-Camen, & Collin, 2004; Shattock, 1999).
Until now, studies on governance of higher education have focused on whether
institutional managers have been empowered since the neoliberal reforms.
Governance reforms tend to focus on structural reforms as seen in the adop-
tion of the new public management in East Asia countries (Shin, 2018). Formal
structure of governance is relatively easy to change from the policymakers’ points
of view. However, formal structural changes may or may not be accompanied by
changes in actual “practices” in the institutions. For example, the incorporation
of a national university has been a policy agendum across Northeast Asia such as
in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan (Mok & Oba, 2007). Both Japan and Korea have
transformed its universities from national organisations to independent organ-
isations through the incorporation policy (Oba, 2007; Shin, 2018). However,
such structural changes do not necessarily mean that there is a change in the
governance practices in the institutions. Instead, many universities maintain their
academic tradition and customs after the governance reforms in Japan, although
there are some signs of changing practices. Similarly, changes of the governance
120 Jung Cheol Shin and Yangson Kim
structure did not bring much change among the incorporated national universi-
ties in Korea.
Studying university governance from a structural perspective helps us to under-
stand policy initiatives, but some governance practices are rooted in a much
longer history and traditions of individual universities (Maassen, 2017). Each
university has its own academic tradition and customs that are not easily changed
through policy initiatives. These different views – formal structural and internal
historical – are represented by two theoretical perspectives of organisation and
institution perspectives, which will be discussed in the following section. Poli-
cymakers tend to favour the organisational view, whereas the institutional view
better explains the reality of governance. Similarly, we often find different views
on governance within a university. Senior managers tend to have a strong organ-
isational perspective, whereas academics hold an institutional view on governance
practices in each university. The new public management is based on the organ-
isational views, whereas academics tend to hold institutional views.
Research on academic governance tends to focus on whether decision-making
power moved from academics to senior managers after the neoliberal reforms
(Dobbins & Knill, 2014). However, researchers have not paid much attention
to the complexity of institutional governance where senior managers have dif-
ferent views on governance practices from those of academics. Considering that
governance is more than decision-making structure, it is critical to approach gov-
ernance practice from the perspective of different actors in the university. This
study is designed to explore the differences between the views of senior managers
and academics on governance practices in Korean higher education.
Background
This section provides the theoretical background on the governance practices
and governance reforms initiated by the Korean government and is followed by a
description of common leadership practices in some of the four-year universities.
Two competing perspectives on governance: organisation

vs. institution
Social science research on governance uses the two theoretical lenses to under-
stand university governance, namely, the organisational perspective and the insti-
tutional perspective. The organisational perspective emphasises the intention of
the university to change because of the impact of environmental changes on the
organisation (e.g., Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). A lot of university reforms which
are initiated by policymakers at the national level rely heavily on the organisa-
tional perspective. On the other hand, the university has its own history, mis-
sion, culture, value, and norms because it is a social institution. The institutional
characteristics may not be easily changed as in other social organisations. Euro-
peans tend to view their universities as institutions, whereas Americans view their
universities as organisations (Krucken & Meier, 2006). These different views can
Korean higher education governance 121
lead to a very different understanding of the societal roles of the university. In
many European societies, the university is a social institution for cultural preser-
vation and development, whereas in the United States, it is a social service organ-
isation that supports industrial development (Braun & Merrien, 1999).
It is not easy to generalise the Asian model because the influence of higher
education model of European countries and the American model has been com-
plex and varied during last several decades (Altbach, 1989; Neubauer, Shin, &
Hawkins, 2013). In that sense, the modern university in Korean higher educa-
tion has two roots: (i) on the German tradition which took root during the
Japanese colonialisation period, and (ii) the American tradition after indepen-
dence in 1945. The two traditions work quite differently depending on sectors,
formal structure, and internal culture. For example, national universities have a
relatively strong European tradition which views the university as a social institu-
tion, whereas private universities tend to have an organisational view. There is
also variation even within a national university. On the one hand, the academic
culture is of European heritage, whereas its “formal structure” is more similar to
American universities (Shin, 2012). Similarly, the views also differ between pure
and applied disciplines (e.g., Kekäle, 1999). Academics in pure disciplines have
a stronger orientation towards the institutional view, whereas their colleagues in
applied disciplines tend to favour organisational views. In addition, senior man-
agers have much stronger organisational views, whereas academics tend to have
institutional views because academics, especially in humanities and social sciences
tend positively view their historical tradition and culture.
This study is interested in finding out the different views among senior manag-
ers and academics on changes in the governance of the university. Many senior
managers do believe that the university could be changed by efficient and effec-
tive management strategies such as strategic planning and good leadership. On the
other hand, many academics maintain that the university could not be changed in
a short period of time by either policy initiatives or managerial leadership. How-
ever, such perceptions may vary across different administrative affairs, namely
general administration, finance, human resources management, or academic affairs
because the managerial power is stronger in some administrative departments
than others (e.g., Kogan & Hanney, 2000). Senior managers tend to have a stron-
ger control over general administration and finance, whereas academics have
more power over academic affairs.
Generally, senior managers prefer managerial governance, whereas academics
prefer academic oligarchy. Institutional managers tend to believe that manage-
rial leadership is critical for university development, whereas academics believe
scholarly leadership is critical. These perceptional differences are represented in
Table 9.1.
Changing patterns of governance under neoliberalism in Korea

The Korean Ministry of Education (hereafter, MOE) adopted a neoliberal pol-
icy which was the comprehensive education reform entitled the 5.31 Education
Table 9.1 Perceptional differences between senior managers and academics
Senior Managers Academics

Perception on university Organisation Institution
Perception on managerial Positive Negative
reforms
Administrative areas on General administration, Finance Academic areas
influence
Preferred types of Managerial governance Academic oligarchy
governance
Perception on institutional Managerial leadership Academic leadership
leadership
Reform. The core component of the neoliberal policy at that time was to provide
funding to public and private universities according to proposal-based contract
funding (Shin & Kim, 2017). Before the 5.31 Education Reform, public univer-
sities received an operational budget mainly based on the number of students,
and the private universities rarely received any public funding. Government fund-
ing for research was available from the National Science Foundation and National
Research Foundation through “individual-based competition”. However, public
funding to universities was dramatically changed under the neoliberal reforms
which saw the launch of Brain Korea 21 Project in 1995. Under this project,
both public and private universities were eligible to receive special governmental
funding for their graduate programmes. The aim of the project was to build
world-class universities. After the Brain Korea 21 Project, competition-based
funding schemes became a normal practice in Korean higher education (Shin &
Jang, 2013).
This kind of funding scheme is similar to those found in the United Kingdom
since 1992 and in Australia since 1988. In both countries, the formal differentia-
tion between university and other sectors (e.g., polytechnic, college) was abol-
ished after undergoing neoliberal reforms. However, the Korean funding scheme
is slightly different from those in the United Kingdom and Australia. The Korean
funding scheme provides funding to public as well as private universities because
the private sector is relatively large as represented in Table 9.2, and the private
universities are very competitive in Korea. In fact, the public universities, which
are mostly national universities, are relatively inefficient because of their bottom-
heavy decision-making structure. In other words, academics have a strong influ-
ence on the decision-making process in most of the national universities in Korea.
This Korean funding scheme is also different from one in the United States in
that although private universities are eligible to receive research grants from pub-
lic foundations and state governments, they rarely receive any operational budget
from the federal or state governments.
Very often, national universities in Korea were criticised by the public because
of their low-ranking status in global rankings. In the socio-political environment,
governance reforms were proposed to drive efficient decision-making and improve
Table 9.2 Comparison between public and private university sectors
Public Private Total

Number of universities 35 154 189
Number of faculty members 16,239 50,556 66,795
Number of student enrolment 474,727 1,575,892 2,050,619
Source: Ministry of Education & Korean Education Development Institute (2017)
institutional management in the hope of receiving a better ranking. In 2004,

Japanese national universities were incorporated. Because of these environmental
changes, the Korean MOE proposed the incorporation of national universities. The
essence of this reform was to empower university presidents and reduce influence of
academics in the decision-making process. Korean MOE set out to abolish the elec-
tion of university presidents by faculty members and, at the same time, gave insti-
tutional autonomy to universities on matters relating to general administration and
finance. Through the incorporation of universities, the university presidents gain
much power in the management of its human resources. However, the academics
were strongly against this policy, for they were worried that incorporation would
result in the financial volatility due to the privatisation of national universities.
Under such circumstances, the Korean MOE decided to incorporate the national
university on a voluntary basis. As a result, Seoul National University, one of the
leading universities, was incorporated in 2012. However, the other national uni-
versities did not follow suit. Nevertheless, the Korean MOE did not give its push
for managerial reforms in its governance of the Korean universities. The Korean
MOE uses its funding mechanisms to drive reforms in university governance.
These new reforms do not involve any structural changes such as incorporation.
Instead, the MOE uses funding to get individual universities to change accord-
ingly. For example, the MOE began to use the appointment of university president
as one the indicators for getting governmental funding. However, this practice was
dropped in the face of strong resistance from professors in 2017. Despite such a
move, many of the governance policy initiatives which are aimed at managerial effi-
ciency are based on assessment and funding schemes. Funding incentives became
the core of the MOE’s policy tool for university reforms (Shin and Kim, 2017).
Leadership practices of senior mangers

Leadership in university management has been critical for institutional devel-
opment. However, there are different expectations with respect to managerial
leadership when compared with academic leadership. Academic leadership used
to be considered as the “first among equal” in traditional European universities,
whereas managerial leadership is commonly found in many American universities.
Managerialism is based on the belief that leadership is effective for institutional
development. On the other hand, academics believe that institutional managers
are supposed to understand and support the work of academics which is the core
of university activities. Because of these different preferences between managerial
leaders and academic leaders, often it is difficult to decide what should be the
ideal leadership style for universities. An ideal situation would be to appoint a
scholar with strong managerial skills to be the president of a university. However,
often it is not easy to find such a person.
More often than not, academics who are engaged in scholarly research and
teaching may not be strong university leaders. Leadership skills are to be devel-
oped through being in a leadership position. However, there is less time and
energy for teaching and research when academics assume a leadership role. Some
managerial practices tend to focus on appointing senior managers with leader-
ship experience rather than on the basis of scholarly reputation. American uni-
versities tend to appoint their presidents from outside the university in order
to enhance managerial efficiency. Oxford University appointed a vice chancellor
from an American university in an effort to enhance managerial efficiency and
strong leadership. German universities undergoing governance reforms are also
experimenting with new forms of leadership (Dobbins & Knill, 2014). Some
universities appoint faculty into leadership positions because they have strong
managerial skills even though their reputation as a scholar is not high. Manage-
rial leadership may be successful in a small-scale, teaching-focused university but
would not be successful in a large-scale, research-focused university.
In Korean public universities, the university president and dean of colleges used
to be elected by faculty members. The elected president and/or dean are neces-
sarily neither good scholars nor good managers. They were much more likely to
be political leaders. Their key role after being elected was to represent the interest
of the faculty members who voted for them and they did not care much about the
long-term development of the university. Besides, corruption in the election pro-
cess was not uncommon. In light of this, the Korean MOE decided to change the
leadership appointment systems from faculty voting to appointment by a search
committee that would lead the selection process (MOE, 2012). Currently, the
dean is no longer elected by faculty members, but instead he or she is appointed
by the university president in most public universities. However, in many Korean
universities the presidents were still elected by faculty members.
There are occasions where senior managers (vice president, associate vice presi-
dent, deans) who are appointed by the university president may not have sufficient
leadership experience. For example, the university president has a four-year term,
but other senior managers are appointed for two years only. The university presi-
dent and his or her senior managers may have spent most of their time in sharp-
ening their managerial and administrative skills, and by the time they are familiar
with the work, he or she is close to the end of the term. Most university presidents
and their senior managers have few opportunities to develop their leadership and
management skills, which is detrimental for developing strategic relationships with
foreign universities because this requires a longer period of time.
In most private universities, other than some large research-focused universi-
ties, faculty voting is not a popular method for appointing the university president.
Some large research universities (e.g., Yonsei University and Korea University)
have developed their own method for appointing the university president. The
board of trustees has the authority to appoint the president, but they have devel-
oped a process to take faculty input into account in the appointment process. In
the case of Korea University, the President Nomination Committee, consisting
of 30 representatives from the board of trustees (four members), faculty (15
members, or 50 percent of the representatives), alumni association (five mem-
bers), university staff (three members), and students (three members), recom-
mend three candidates and the board of trustees appoints the president from
among the three candidates. Other than these universities, the board of trustees
has the power to appoint the university president in most private universities. As
a result, the university president is likely to have strong managerial skills as well
as close connections with the board of trustees compared with the presidents in
public universities. In reality, the Korean MOE believes the presidents at private
universities have better managerial skills than those in public universities.
In addition, senior managers in private universities tend to stay in their posi-
tions longer than their peers in public universities, thus providing them with
more opportunities to develop their leadership skills. This is possible in private
universities because the university president appoints his or her own senior man-
agers even though he or she consults with the board of trustees. Senior managers
in private universities tend to develop good connections with the MOE as well
with senior managers in other universities. The senior managers, among other
things, also develop long-term strategic planning, vision, and external relation-
ships. This explains why the MOE tries to reform public university governance
and management similar to those practices in the private universities.
Method
The data for this study are from two major data sources. Our first data set on
governance and management is from the Changing Academic Profession (CAP)
survey which was conducted in 2007–2008 by an international comparative
research team (Teichler et al., 2013). The survey data include academics’ percep-
tion on governance and management as well as general activities related to teach-
ing, research, and service and administration. The comparative research team
includes 19 higher education systems across the world. This study uses the data
collected from Korean higher education settings. The Korean CAP data were
collected from regular and tenure track academics in four-year universities, and
the data have 900 observations in the final data set. The survey was conducted
online, and the return rate was 13.2 percent.
Our second data set is from the Senior Managers’ Survey, which was devel-
oped by a Japanese research team to analyse senior managers’ perceptions about
university governance and management. This survey was derived from the gov-
ernance and management questions pertaining to senior managers found in the
CAP survey. The Korean research team collected data from 123 senior managers
in a population of 4,203 from May to June 2015. In the first stage, the survey
was administrated to 874 senior managers as an online survey, but the return of
62 is relatively low (7 percent). Therefore, we did a follow-up paper survey to
increase the return rate and received an additional 61 responses. The paper survey
was conducted in a workshop at the Association for Deans of Planning of a four-
year university. However, the paper survey did not provide affiliation information
about whether respondents were at a national or private university. Given this data
limitation, this study uses all 123 observations of the Senior Managers’ Survey
for general comparison between senior managers and academics. However, we
use only 61 observations for the comparisons between private and public sectors
because the data collected through the paper survey does not have the respon-
dents’ institutional affiliations. The population and sample are shown in Table 9.3.
In addition, the scales for the Senior Managers’ Survey are slightly different
from that of the CAP. For example, the Senior Managers’ Survey has 12 levels of
managerial positions, whereas the CAP has five (government or external stake-
holders, institutional managers, academic unit managers, faculty committees/
board, and individual faculty). We matched the 12 levels in the Senior Managers’
Survey to the five levels in the CAP survey. We believe that the matching reflects
the governance and management reality of Korean higher education. After the
matching, we coded these levels using a Likert scale for the descriptive analysis.
The matching and coding scheme is reported in Table 9.4.
Table 9.3 Population and sample
Senior Managers’ Survey CAP
Population 4,203 52,763

Sample 874 6,827
Response 123 900
Return rate (%) 14.07 13.18
Source: Senior Managers’ Survey of 2015; the Changing Academic Profession survey of
2007–2008
Table 9.4 Coding for the Senior Managers’ Survey and CAP Survey
Senior Managers’ Survey CAP Scale of This

Study
State government/authority Government External

Chair of university board or external stakeholders
External board member/auditor/ stakeholders
advisor
University board
University president Institutional Senior
Vice president in charge of this area managers managers
Dean/head of college Academic unit
Head of department/school managers
Senate, university-wide committee Faculty Academics
Faculty committees committees/
Professoriate board
Individual faculty/teaching staff Individual faculty
Table 9.5 Comparison of survey items
Senior Managers’ Survey CAP
Finance University budget: expenditure Determining budget priorities

on staffing
Personnel Personnel decisions of senior Selecting key administrators
managers
Academic Personnel policies for Choosing new faculty
personnel recruitment
Faculty promotion and tenure Making faculty promotion and
tenure decisions
Substantive Approval of new academic Approving new academic
programmes programme
Setting internal research priorities Setting internal research priorities
Evaluating research activities Evaluating research
The analytical focus of this study is on how senior managers and academics per-
ceive decision-making powers in the core areas of the university such as finance,
appointing key personnel (appointing senior managers), academic personnel (hir-
ing and promotion of academic staff ), and substantive issues (e.g., approving new
academic programmes, setting internal research priorities, and evaluating research
activities). The Senior Managers’ Survey slightly rephrased the CAP survey ques-
tions as shown in Table 9.5. In addition, this study will compare the perceptional
differences between public and private universities across the three core actors.
It is possible that the perceptional differences come from positional differences
between senior managers and academics in general. Alternatively, the differences
may be related to changes in the decision-making power between senior manag-
ers and academics. For this analysis, we set criteria when the perceptional differ-
ence is more than 30 percentage points, then it is coded “very high”, between
16 and 30 percent is “high”, between 5 to 15 percent it is “mid”, and less than
5 percent is “low”.
Findings and discussions

This section summarises the major findings from the analysis of the seven areas of
administrative affairs mentioned in the method section and concludes with a dis-
cussion of the perceptional gaps between senior managers and academics about
managerial power in decision-making.
Financial decisions
Senior managers believe they have relatively little power over financial decisions
and that the faculty and the state have a moderate level of influence. Academ-
ics believe that financial decisions are mostly made by senior managers (88.7
percent) as shown in Table 9.6. This perceptional difference between the two
Table 9.6 Perception on decision-making power across three stakeholders
External Stakeholders Senior Managers Academics

Managers Academics Managers Academics Managers Academics
Finance 20.9 1.9 46.2 88.7 33.0 9.4

Key personnel 19.8 0.7 74.3 90.6 5.9 8.7
Faculty hiring 12.2 0.2 59.2 50.7 28.6 49.1
Faculty 20.4 0.2 32.3 55.7 47.3 44.0
promotion
and tenure
Approval 8.6 2.2 47.3 63.8 44.1 33.9
of new
academic
programme
Setting 1.1 0.9 24.2 61.8 74.7 37.3
research
priority
Evaluating 3.2 1.4 19.1 34.1 77.7 64.6
research
activity
Notes: The numbers are the percentage of respondents who chose one of the stakeholders, and
stakeholders are coded according to the coding scheme in Table 9.4.
actors suggests that academics are likely to blame senior managers when finan-
cial decisions do not meet their expectations. On the other hand, senior manag-
ers consider that they have only a limited range of decision-making power (46.2
percent) because most financial decisions depend on external stakeholders and
faculty members. This finding reflects the governance practices in most Korean
universities. Academics believe that the major responsibility of senior managers
is to attract external resources and allocate these resources according to rational
criteria. However, senior managers often cannot make rational decisions because
they cannot change their historical and institutional customs and tradition that
govern resource allocation. For example, the tradition reflects number of faculty
members and students, but it also depends on their hidden rules that might not
be formally known.
Senior managers also show similar perceptual patterns about their influence on
financial decision-making when comparing public and private universities. Only
50.0 percent of senior managers in public and 55.3 percent in private universi-
ties agree that institutional managers can influence financial decision-making as
shown in Table 9.7. As we can predict, senior managers give more consideration
to the voices of the faculty in financial decisions in the public sector than do their
colleagues in the private sector. However, the difference is marginal. This finding
is interesting because senior managers perceive themselves to have much greater
influence in the appointment of key personnel (86.7 percent in public sector
and 68.0 percent in private sector) while relatively little in financial decisions
(50.0 percent in public sector and 55.3 percent in private sector), suggesting that
Table 9.7 Senior managers’ perceptional differences between public and private
universities
Administrative External Senior Managers Academics

Areas Stakeholders
Public Private Public Private Public Private
Finance 16.7 17.0 50.0 55.3 33.3 27.7

Key personnel 0.0 26.0 86.7 68.0 13.3 6.0
Faculty hiring 7.1 16.3 64.3 53.1 28.6 30.6
Faculty 7.7 25.0 15.4 33.3 76.9 41.7
promotion
and tenure
Approval 0.0 8.2 46.2 53.1 53.8 38.8
of new
academic
programme
Setting research 7.7 0.0 15.4 22.9 76.9 77.1
priority
Evaluating 7.7 0.0 23.1 22.9 69.2 77.1
research
activity
Notes: The numbers are the percentage of respondents who chose one of the stakeholders, and
stakeholders are coded according to the coding scheme in Table 9.4.
financial decision-making is not very flexible in both public and private universi-
ties. This is because a large share of the budget consists of salaries and benefits as
well as resource allocation to academic units (college, school, and department),
which largely depend on the number of students and faculty members, leaving
little room for senior managers to decide.
Decisions on key personnel

Most senior managers (74.3 percent) and academics (90.6 percent) agree that
key personnel decisions are made by senior managers. One interesting finding
in the Senior Managers’ Survey is that 19.8 percent of senior managers per-
ceived that external stakeholders did have some influence over the appointment
of senior managers. This is obvious when comparing public and private universi-
ties because 26.0 percent of senior managers in private universities agreed that
external stakeholders such as the board of trustees did influence the appointment
of key senior managers. However, in general, senior managers see themselves as
the ones making key personnel decisions.
Decisions on academic personnel

Both surveys found that academic personnel decision-making seems to be
equally distributed between senior managers and academics. Interestingly, senior
managers perceive that they have greater hiring power with respect to new fac-
ulty than do the academics who think that both groups have similar influence
in faculty hiring. As for faculty promotion and tenure decisions, senior manag-
ers believe their power is very limited (32.3 percent), whereas faculty members
have considerable influence (47.3 percent). However, the perception of faculty
members seems to be exactly the opposite because 55.7 percent believed that
senior managers have a higher degree of influence than they do (44.0 percent).
The different perceptions with regard to faculty promotion and tenure deci-
sion imply that faculty members consider their decisions about promotion and
tenure are not usually accepted by senior managers. On the other hand, senior
managers feel they have little room to change a decision once faculty members
have decided.
There is little difference between public and private universities in their percep-
tions on faculty hiring. Senior managers are seen to hold relatively stronger power
over faculty hiring decisions but less in relation to faculty promotion and tenure.
Senior managers have the freedom to decide whether they would hire new faculty
members, so that there is much room where senior managers can be involved.
However, faculty promotion and tenure decisions rely on faculty members’ own
decisions. Although senior managers can theoretically “reject” the promotion
and tenure proposal by an individual department, they can rarely do it in practice
if such faculty members have published a predetermined number of publications.
This is the general rule in most Korean universities. It is, therefore, understand-
able that senior managers exercise relatively strong influence over faculty hiring,
but not much in respect of faculty promotion and tenure. This tendency is much
clearer in public universities compared with private universities because the for-
mer are regulated by the Education Civil Servant Act, which provides criteria for
promotion and tenure.
Decisions on substantive areas
Approval of new academic programme

Senior managers believe that the approval of new programmes depends on both
senior managers (47.3 percent) and academics (44.1 percent), whereas academ-
ics view the decision-making as dependent primarily on senior managers (63.8
percent). Establishing a new programme is very difficult in a university because
of potential conflicts of interest with current programmes. In such a situation,
senior managers are concerned about the views of other academics, whereas the
academics establishing the new programme seek the approval of senior managers.
The approval of the programme usually depends on both the senior managers
and academics. But the senior managers seem to have more influence in private
universities. This finding suggests that opening new programmes is quite difficult
involving negotiation between senior managers and academics as well as between
academics from different academic units (department or college).
Setting research priority
Over 70 percent of senior managers perceive that setting research priorities
depends on faculty members, whereas over 60 percent of academics think it
is set by senior managers. Where does this major perceptual gap come from?
In principle, senior managers believe that they cannot be involved in setting
the research priorities of their academics because of academic freedom. How-
ever, faculty members believe that the setting of research priorities is very
much determined by the senior managers. This perceptual difference might be
understood in terms of current academic practices where pure basic research is
not particularly encouraged and applied research is prioritised by senior man-
agers in order to attract external research funding. In both the public and
private universities, senior managers perceive that faculty members determine
their own research priorities and that managers have limited influence over
such decisions.
In general, senior managers perceive that research priority is part and parcel
of academic freedom, whereas academics often see their academic freedom
being usurped by policymakers in the universities. Although senior manag-
ers may not see themselves as pressuring the academics to do “research for
resource generation”, in reality, the academics often feel pressured. For exam-
ple, academics might be pressured when their university considers “external
resource acquisition” as a significant criterion for their faculty tenure and
promotion decisions. Although senior managers are not directly involved in
research priority setting, they have considerable influence on the research pri-
ority setting through faculty evaluation practices. This trend might become
more significant in the future because operational budgets from the public
funding will continue to decline and competition-based funding will continue
to increase. If this trend continues, academics will lose their say on the set-
ting of research priorities, which seems to be in line with the concerns they
expressed in the CAP survey.
Evaluating research activities

Most senior managers and academics agree that research evaluation depends very
much on the peer reviews. This finding supports the view that senior managers
are not involved at all in research evaluation because it is very specialised and
technical, meaning that only academics in the specific areas have the authority to
assess the research performance of their peers. Although both senior managers
and academics agree that research evaluation is an area where academics should
make the decisions, some academics (34.1 percent) feel that senior managers also
have influence on research evaluation. This could be because research assessment
is now becoming more standardized so much so that senior managers could be
involved. In addition, there is little difference in the senior managers’ perception
on research assessment between public and private universities.
Research assessment practices have been changing in many countries (e.g.,
United Kingdom, Australia, Hong Kong). Musselin (2013) found that in France,
deans are empowered to carry out research assessment exercises. Although senior
managers are not directly involved in research assessment, their influence is
expected to increase. One way to be involved is setting the indicators in the
research assessment process. Another way is being involved in the final decision-
making process where senior managers make decisions on promotion and tenure,
salary setting, or research awardees.
Perception gaps and leadership of senior managers

This study found that perception gaps between senior managers and academics
are much bigger in some areas than others. Why do these gaps exist? One theory
suggests that perceptional gaps are natural because of positional gaps between
managers and employees be they in private companies or public organisations.
Such perception gaps are observed in work environments and in organisational
reality (Liao & Toya, 2009; Sánchez-Vidal, Cegarra-Leiva, & Cegarra-Navarro,
2012). Another explanation is from the change process perspective, which sug-
gests that perception gaps usually emerge when there are transformative changes
within an organisation. Perception gaps happen because some actors can quickly
grasp the organisational changes, whereas other actors are much slower. We
believe that both these perspectives are applicable to the perception gaps between
senior managers and academics in this study.
The first explanation focuses on the positional differences between the two
actors. Senior managers have an organisational perspective, which emphasises
changes that need to be made in an organisation due to changes in the envi-
ronment. Policymakers in the university tend to have this organisational per-
spective. However, academics tend to view the university as a social institution,
which emphasises the historical social function of the university. Senior managers
believe that they do not have much power to change their universities. On the
other hand, academics perceive that the power of their managers is too exten-
sive, and they are losing their influence on major decisions. These hypotheses
were supported by the findings of this study with the exception in faculty hiring.
Senior managers see themselves as having more power for new faculty employ-
ment (59.2 percent of senior managers agreed), whereas academics tend to be
less in agreement with that view (50.7 percent of academics agreed).
We can also interpret the findings from the changing power relationships between
senior managers and academics with reference to neoliberal higher education
reforms. Senior managers seek stronger decision-making power so that they can
address new challenges rapidly and efficiently. However, to the academics, senior
managers already have considerable power. The perception gaps between senior
managers and academics show that there are power shifts occurring between these
two actors. This is an important consideration under the new public management
that emphasises effectiveness and institutional performance. Individual academ-
ics are experiencing reduced power because they could not make any decision
without senior managers’ agreement. Under such circumstances, senior manag-
ers are required to practice effective leadership roles to demonstrate proactive
decision-making. If not, they need only to “agree” (responsive) to individual
academics and/or an academic unit’s decision if they do not know how to lead
effectively. The gaps between senior managers and academics indicate the admin-
istrative areas where the senior managers are expected to be proactive.
This study found that there are “very high” gaps in their relative power in
financial decisions and setting research priorities, and “high” gaps in decisions
related to key personnel, faculty promotion and tenure decisions, approval of new
academic programmes, and evaluating research activity as shown in Table 9.8.
Senior managers can have a strong say on making decisions on financial mat-
ters and research priorities if they are effective leaders. Furthermore, these issues
are critical to the development of the academics’ careers in their own university.
Small changes in financial decisions can have a huge impact on the operation of
their academic units (department or faculty), and small changes in research prior-
ity can also have a huge impact on academics’ research agenda. We may, there-
fore, conclude that in the minds of the academics, the senior managers hold a
great deal of power over these issues even though the senior managers themselves
would dispute this perception.
Moreover, senior managers may wish to change the university’s policies in
these two areas as well as in those three other areas which show “high” gaps, but
they hesitate to use their power because they are very likely to meet objections
from faculty members. In many Korean universities, senior managers require
patience and persuasion in order to minimise faculty resistance. In Korean soci-
ety, academics are highly regarded and policymakers and institutional leaders are
unlikely to succeed in achieving their reform goals if faculty members resist their
reform initiatives. If senior managers think they lack power (even though faculty
members perceive them as holding power), they would not lead as an academic
leader. Unfortunately, many senior managers lack the experience to develop their
leadership roles, especially in public universities where most are elected by faculty
Table 9.8 Perception Gaps on Managerial Power
Administrative Areas Senior Managers Public vs. Private

vs. Academics (Senior Managers)
Finance Very high Mid (public is lower)

Key personnel High High (public is higher)
Faculty hiring Mid Mid (public is higher)
Faculty promotion and High High (public is lower)
tenure
Approval of new High Mid (public is lower)
academic programme
Setting research priority Very high Mid (public is lower)
Evaluating research High Low (similar)
activity
members. From this perspective, the perceptional gaps might be due to a lack of
leadership on the part of the senior managers.
Leadership development is crucial in university governance and management
practices. Policymakers tend to believe that structural reforms such as the “incor-
poration” of national university would bring changes in the governance prac-
tices. However, changes in governance are not possible without changes in the
leadership of senior managers. It is normal to stay for only two years in a senior
manager position in many public Korean universities, and this is based on the
view that weak leadership can lead to better performance in a university as a social
institution. Yet it is not possible to develop a university without leadership devel-
opment in a rapidly changing and competitive environment. One option is to
appoint senior managers for longer terms – more than two years. We can observe
this practice in incorporated Japanese universities where a university president’s
term is six years and senior managers serve (vice president, deans/associate deans
of president’s office) for longer terms accordingly, but this may not be easy to
implement in Korean universities where university presidents are elected.
Conclusion
This study found that senior managers tend to underestimate their power, whereas
academics perceive senior managers to have a relatively stronger level of influence
on decisions relating to finance, key personnel, academic personnel (hiring and
promotion/tenure), and academic areas (approval of new academic programme
and setting research priority). We believe that senior managers want to have more
decision-making powers, whereas academics think that senior managers already
have considerable power. These findings can be interpreted as the different views
on governance – senior managers want to change their university according to
environmental changes, whereas academics are more concerned about maintain-
ing the university culture and tradition. These two views – the organisational view
of senior managers and the institutional view of academics – are competing in
contemporary research on higher education governance (Maassen, 2017).
Although both views explain the governance practices found in Korean uni-
versities, university governance is shifting towards organisational view brought
about by the managerial reforms since the 1990s. Such a shift is found in various
countries as reflected in the findings of many comparative studies (Braun & Mer-
rien, 1999; Shattock, 2014; Shin, 2018). One critical question is whether the
new governance practices have a positive impact on the two major functions of
university (teaching and research) and its entrepreneur activities. There is no clear
evidence that the managerial reforms bring substantial changes in institutional
performance as shown by Lokuwaduge and Armstrong (2015). The managerial
reforms may not improve the quality of research because quality depends on the
academic freedom and the research interest of the academics and not on manage-
rial efforts of the university. However, the university reforms may affect teaching
and entrepreneur activities. Academics have to pay more attention to their under-
graduate teaching when their managers start managerial practices such as class-
room assessment, faculty career development, and student satisfaction surveys.
At the same time, managerial reforms enabled universities to bring in extra
resources through active participation in applied research and other types of
market-related activities. The close relationship between the university and indus-
try would enable college graduates to have better employment opportunities
after graduation. The active participation in social and industrial development
enabled the university to position itself as a core engine of social and industrial
development. Such new initiatives are mainly driven by senior managers who are
responsible and responsive to external stakeholders. Senior managers are now no
longer “the first among the equals”. They are mediators between society and the
academics, and in many countries, they represent external stakeholders through
the governance reforms. It seems that once managerial reforms are launched, it
would not be easy to stop the policy trend. However, the university has always
evolved on the basis of the thoughts and efforts of academics over the last thou-
sand years, rather than through managerial power. The study highlights the out-
standing issue of how to balance the power of senior managers with the influence
of academics in university governance practices.
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10 Governance and management
of universities in Thailand
Rattana Lao
Introduction
Thai universities, since their inception, were founded as parts of the Thai state
apparatus, funded by government budget and regulated by bureaucratic rules.
Academics are civil servants and their norms have governed every facet of Thai
higher education. For the past five decades, these factors have been seen as detri-
mental to the development of Thai higher education in general and its quality in
particular. Policy papers and seminars reiterated the need to revamp the system
and reform the structure. It was not until the last two decades that the engine
for change has been fastened forward, and currently 22 public universities have
been transformed from their civil servant status to that of being autonomous. It
has been presented as if there is no other alternative and being autonomous is no
longer an option.
According to the then Ministry of University Affairs, which later became the
Office of Higher Education Commission (OHEC), university autonomy has
been defined as:
An innovative way of university administration has been introduced to pro-

mote flexibility of university operation. Such universities have their own
administrative structure and budgeting system for self-governance and full
autonomy, allowing decisions making on administrative and management
matters of the university to be handled by the university itself.
(CHE, 2007 cited in Rungfamai, 2008)
On the basis of this definition, different features of university management have

emerged: innovation, flexibility, self-governance, and full autonomy. Thai state
promises that autonomous universities will be free to manage their own admin-
istration. By granting this authority to universities, the state signifies its chang-
ing role and relationship with Thai higher education. Interviews with executives
and administrative personnel across the universities provide divergent perception
on these changing roles of the Thai state and their implications to Thai higher
education. Instead of viewing the state as becoming “passive”, these three func-
tions, administrative structure, budgeting, and self-governance, allowed the state
138 Rattana Lao
to maintain its grip and control the direction of the institution. Perhaps the Thai
state does not have as much power as it used to when it comes to day-to-day
operation of Thai higher education institutions, but these three functions and
mandates continued to compel the state to intrude and influence the manage-
ment of university affairs.
There are five main guidelines that universities have to follow to transform
themselves. First, lecturers and administrative staff who were civil servants before
must now become employees of universities. Although there was a slight change
at the implementation level, existing lecturers can choose whether they want to
maintain their status as civil servants or become university employees. Second,
the university council will hold the highest authority in terms of budget, human
resources, and management. Instead of reporting to the centralised public offices,
every unit of university will report to their respective university council. Third,
each university will formulate its own compensations and benefits and develop
its own payment structure. Fourth, the university council must ensure that the
implementation of autonomous university is fair and transparent. Fifth, the salary
structure provided to employees must reflect their qualifications.
This chapter presents the stories of two public universities in Thailand which
have become autonomous institutions in recent years. University A is a regional
comprehensive university which became autonomous only recently, and Univer-
sity B is a university based in Bangkok. Although differing in terms of the tim-
ing, processes, and outcomes, these two comprehensive universities offer a good
insight into the significant changes in Thai higher education at large. In this
chapter, perception and experiences of executives and academics with regard to
the changing status of becoming an autonomous university will provide a better
understanding of the changing governance and management structure of Thai
higher education. The experiences of these two universities will offer an insight
into the plausible benefits, disadvantages, and challenges of higher education
transformation.
Methodologically, this research deployed a qualitative case study in two com-
prehensive universities in Thailand. Two methods of inquiry were carried out:
semi-structured interviews and document analysis. Nineteen interviews were
conducted, audio-recorded, and transcribed verbatim. The interviews, on aver-
age, lasted between 30 minutes and one hour, depending on the role and experi-
ence of the interviewee. Each interviewee was selected to include a wide range
of voices and experiences in the university, ranging from the university president
or former university president, top executives and academics. While some inter-
views were purposively chosen, others’ access were secured through a snowball-
ing technique. The transcripts were thematically analysed.
Background on autonomous university in Thailand

The last 20 years have witnessed a proliferation of autonomous universities in
Thailand. There are two types of autonomous universities. First, there are those
which were established as autonomous from the beginning. There are three:
Thai universities’ governance 139
Suranaree University of Technology, Mae Fah Luang University, and Walailuck
University. These were created in the 1990s as part of the First Long Range Plan
of Higher Education, and they did not have to undergo the transformation to
become autonomous. They were created from scratch with the idea of an autono-
mous university; therefore, a study on their organisational structure and legacy
differs substantially compared with other public universities that went through
the transformation. In 1991, there was a policy attempt to overhaul all 15 public
universities to become autonomous; however, the policy failed. According to
Kirtikara (2002), “The university people and the public were ignorant of the
nature and benefits of autonomous universities. No more attempt has been made”
(p. 4). Yet King Mongkut’s University of Technology Thonburi (KMUTT) was
the exception which persisted to become autonomous earlier than other institu-
tions. After 20 years, KMUTT has often been studied as the poster child for
the best practice of having a successful transformation to become autonomous
(Suwantragul, 2009). The success is due particularly to the unique leadership
in the institution. Second, there are those public universities which were trans-
formed from the state control to autonomous status. It has indeed become the
reality of Thai higher education, a powerful force that cannot be stopped. As of
2017, there are 22 institutions that have become autonomous. Table 10.1 pro-
vides a list of current autonomous universities in Thailand.
Table 10.1 Transformation of autonomous university in Thailand (1990–2017)
Year Institution
1990 Suranaree University of Technology

1992 Walailuck University
1997 Maha Chulalongkorn Rajavidyalaya University
King Mongkut’s University of Technology Thonburi
2007 Mahidol University
King Mongkut’s University of Technology North Bangkok
2008 Burapa University
Thaksin University
Chulalongkorn University
Chiang Mai University
King Mongkut’s University of Technology Ladkabang
2010 Pa-Yao University
2012 Prince Galayani Vadhana Institute of Music
2015 Kasetsart University
Khon Kaen University
Suan Dusit University
Thammasat University
2016 Silapakorn University
Prince Songkla University
Srinakharinwirot University
2017 Maejo University
Srisavarindhira Thai Red Cross Institute of Nursing
Source: www.mua.go.th/university.html
140 Rattana Lao
The policy of autonomous university has been a subject of public debate
for more than five decades. Such intense policy debate has undergone various
phases and resulted in public negotiation of what constitutes the meaning of
autonomous university. A detailed account of the policy process is documented
elsewhere (Lao, 2015b). The trajectory of the autonomous university policy in
Thailand can be differentiated into three periods: (i) conceptual formulation:
1964 to 1990, (ii) policy text to policy implementation: 1990 to 1999, (iii) from
crisis to opportunity: 1999 to present.
The promises of being an autonomous university

This section highlights three issues: administrative structure, human resources,
and financial management. The first promise highlights greater autonomy on aca-
demic matters. Traditionally speaking, every programme needs to be approved by
OHEC before it can be offered to students. Universities which become auton-
omous can grant their own degrees and approve their own programmes. The
university council becomes the most important decision-making body for each
university. Instead of going through a lengthy approval and centralised process
of decision-making, each university can approve their programmes as they deem
appropriate through the university council.
The second policy promise is related to human resources. Once becoming
autonomous, the university will be unlocked from the limitation of civil service
regulation. Therefore, salaries will be higher, and the university will be able to
source more capable individuals to fill the lectureship positions. University lectur-
ers traditionally were considered to be part of civil service. Previously, salary scale
for university lecturers was set by the Office of Civil Service Commission, simi-
larly to other official bureaucrats. These bureaucratic bottlenecks such as itemised
budgets, procurement regulations, and limitations in salary policy were perceived
as major challenges to the development of modern universities.
The third promise is greater flexibility and freedom in the financial management.
Atagi (1998, p. 10) describes the rigidity of the budgetary process. Each year, the
university has to estimate its expected annual expenditures and submit its annual
budget to OHEC. Subsequently, OHEC will propose the budget to the Budget
Bureau, which is responsible for the national budget of all state departments and
ministries. The final stage is to submit the annual budget to the Cabinet. While the
remaining budget not used for any year must be returned to the Budget Bureau,
each budget has been itemised to specific details and cannot be used in the unas-
signed areas. In this scenario, universities do not have the flexibility or freedom to
manage their income in order to improve the university or its efficiency.
Besides the autonomous university policy, there are other policies that aim to
increase flexibility and freedom of higher education. Since 1999, the government
has mandated that 20 public universities will no longer recruit civil servants into
their institutions. All new recruits will come under new contract as university
employees to minimise the overall number of civil servants in the system and
also aid the transition (B7). Second, the government has issued a plethora of
quality-related policies with which every university must comply. These include
Internal Quality Assurance, External Quality Assessment, and Thailand Qualifi-
cation Framework. These quality-related policies require universities to produce
key performance indicators (KPI) (Lao, 2015a). Therefore, the new governance
system through KPI and output/outcome has been in place regardless of auton-
omy status. These issues such as international ranking, Quality Assessment, and
Thailand Qualification Framework happen regardless of autonomous university
policy. However, one could point out that the policy of university autonomy
intensifies the impact of these tools in institutional management. This point will
be further elaborated.
Comparative analysis of University A and

University B in Thailand
This section provides detailed analysis of University A and University B and dis-
cusses their transformation from being public universities to becoming autono-
mous universities in Thailand. The comparative analysis of these two institutions
sheds lights into the changes that had happened at different levels of the university,
diverse interpretation and voices from executives, administrators, and academics.
The titles in this section emanated from the thematic analyses from the data.
Institutional process of becoming autonomous

There is an attempt in Thailand to ensure that the process of university transfor-
mation is democratic and accountable. The government requires each institution
to undergo a public referendum as a prerequisite to become autonomous, and
there is an integral relationship between institutional and national politics. As it
will be illustrated, university proposals to become autonomous had been dropped
and delayed due to unstable changes at the national level – such as the dissolve of
the parliament and changing minsters of education.
University A is a comprehensive university situated in the regional hub of Thai-
land. The university is considered one of the nine universities involved in the
National Research University (NRU) and stands as the centre of higher edu-
cation development in the region. Document analysis dated the aspiration of
University A to become autonomous back into 1990s. A taskforce on university
transformation was formed to conduct comparative study with other universities
in how they aspired to become autonomous. Subsequently, a detailed strategy
was played out that planned a four-year process to transform the university. The
trajectory of the policy process began as follows: The university council initiated a
taskforce to study the experiences from other institutions who have and have not
become autonomous. Within two years, there would be a referendum within the
university to ask overall opinion. There was an internal preparation to propose
the act to the Ministry of University Affairs and subsequently table it to the par-
liament. University A organised a plethora of seminars by respectable educators
to provide information to the university. The document was written in 1998, and
142 Rattana Lao
it was evident that the university did not become autonomous by then. There has
been a long-standing aspiration to transform its institution.
Meanwhile, University B was one of the earliest universities founded in Thai-
land and situated in the heart of Bangkok. This university has a close connection
with the state as each of its faculty was directly linked to the bureaucratic appara-
tus during its inception. It successfully became autonomous in the late 2000s. In
the beginning, the rationale to become autonomous for University B was to get
away from close surveillance of military control. However, the rationale changed
when they transformed the university back in 1992. Becoming a corporatised
university became the rationale. The issue was dropped when parliament was dis-
solved. When Asian Development Bank initiated the policy to transform higher
education during the Asian economic crisis of 1997, there was a lot of excitement
within the university: public hearings, referendums, and seminars were hosted to
hear what people inside the university thought about the move. Similar to Uni-
versity A, a taskforce was created to handle public discussion on the transforma-
tion and disseminating information about the new act. They hosted 15 meetings
to generate public debate and discussion on the new draft and invited external
guests to oversee the process. These guests were respectable individuals in Thai
society. The draft was proposed, but it was dropped again due to the dissolve of
the government. A new draft was proposed in 2006 to the new government but
was met with strong public resistance against the bill. The resistance was based
on three grounds: higher tuition fee, privatisation of public university, and misuse
of the university property.
Governance and management

Governance refers to the relationship between the university and the external
body – the state, whereas management refers to managerial mechanism within the
university. The autonomy given to the universities is aimed to change the struc-
ture and systematic outlook of governance and management. On the one hand,
autonomy will lessen the control of the state and empower university executives
to have greater say on their institutional internal matters. On the other hand,
autonomy will increase the centralisation of management within the institution,
which then takes away the authority and autonomy of each faculty. Hence, there
are various issues pertaining to the changes in governance and management as a
result of the autonomy.
The governance issue highlights the changing role of the state in relations
to the university. This is the most evident change in the Thai system. Given
that Thai universities were founded as an integral part of bureaucratic structure,
each university is considered an equivalent of a department within state appara-
tus. Therefore, they are subjected to strict rules and regulations in all areas. By
becoming autonomous, there is a promise that such university will be more inde-
pendent from the state in terms of its operation and function.
The role of the university council is supreme in this discussion. The university
council is responsible for governance and management of higher education. It is
the middleman between state and university and also acts as the most authorita-
tive body in terms of finance, human resources, and academic affairs. The role
of the university council differs significantly depending on the strength of the
institution. Traditionally, the university council has a symbolic role within the
university and comprises a diverse group of individuals from all walks of lives
to provide a representation of the society or community where the university is
situated. In the case of University A, which is located in the regional part of Thai-
land, it is said that the university council is a representative of local politics and
members of the immediate communities. Meanwhile, in University B, which is a
renowned university in Bangkok, its university council brings together respect-
able individuals from different professions and occupations within the rigid rubric
of quota and representativeness.
Being autonomous promises effective decision-making process and shifts the
final say from central government to the university council of each institution. This
shift also gives greater decision-making authority to university executives rectors
and vice rectors. Interviews across cases express a similar concern that there is a
new form of centralisation occurring in the university, which is the centralisation
from within. Instead of being controlled by the central government and its rules
and regulations, every decision in the university is made by the central executive and
leaves little or no room for individual faculty and staff to have the flexibility and
freedom to exercise. One academic vividly elaborated the situation as follows:
Every decision is politics. Since we become autonomous, I don’t see that the
people have more autonomy. In the beginning, I thought this topic was a far
off topic and distant from me. However, when it actually happens, it’s part
of everyday life. Everything is centralized at the executive and the University
Council. The centre directs all the policy and it’s heavily centralized. It’s like
power-centric and totalitarian from the centre. The centre consists of the
executives. Before we had the state system as overarching system to play a
balance of power. However, the state has now given all the authority to the
executives – they can announce all the new rules and regulations to control
all the employees – from civil servants, students, and everybody. In fact, it’s
been happening for quite some time.
(Academic, University A, A4)
University B academics believe in the new governance structure and its account-
ability. However, University A raised a precaution on issues of governance and
accountability that the members of the university council might have. This is
related to the issue of conflict of interest and results in different views on how to
operate a university. The increasing centralisation of internal management is also
a dominant concern. Given that prominent members of the university council
come from the private sector, members of the academic staff exhibit fear that
such a view will tamper with educational benefits.
People fear that autonomy will create a new hegemony within university. Inter-
estingly, the state was viewed in a positive light here as the “devil we know”. As
144 Rattana Lao
the aforementioned interview quotation suggests, some academics viewed the
state’s role as providing checks and balances with university executives.
Contrary to the general belief that the new system would empower executives
to have absolute say in university affairs, many pointed out to existing mechanisms
that enable checks and balances and mitigate the abuse of power. For example,
the board of deans, which is composed of all deans from every faculty as well as the
university council. The rector and team of executives need to be accountable to
these other stakeholders and therefore limited their ability to exercise control.
The underlying concern is the issue of “good governance”. In fact, there is a
strong concern at the national and institutional level that increasing the power of
the university council would lead to the abuse of power within institutions. Kirti-
kara (2001), long-standing advocate of university autonomy and former leading
policymaker, reiterated the significance of good governance in the new policy
climate of university autonomy.
Finances and budgeting: line item and block grants

There are two significant changes in terms of finance. On the one hand, there
is a change from the line item budgeting to the system of block grants. Tradi-
tionally speaking, all university rules and regulations, particularly on purchasing
and budgeting, were following the guidelines of the Budget Bureau, Ministry of
Finance. The university had to follow a strict budgeting procedure known as line
item budget for each and every item to be purchased. In an interview with the
head of the department, Faculty of Medicine in the University A, this issue is spelt
out clearly. He explained the relationship between the inefficiency of line item
budgeting and on the purchase of low quality products:
Sometimes we have to set the budget request and it takes 3 to 4 years for it
to be approved. The budget item is so strict that it has to be purchased on
that particular model. But 3 to 4 years have passed, there are new models,
new companies. We cannot buy the new model. We have to buy the model
that we had requested the budget for. Things bought from the state funds
are always of poor quality and sometimes too expensive. If it’s not bad nor
expensive, it’s not from the state funding. For example, if we set the budget
for 1,750 USD, then we have to buy a spec or model that suits that price.
We cannot buy any other one even though it is cheaper and of better quality.
Could not we have a better budgeting system?
(academic, University A, A2)
On the other hand, there is the issue of income. For public universities, the Bud-
get Bureau used to provide 100% contribution of the budget of the university.
Budget Bureau received 17% of annual educational budget, 65% of which goes to
subsidise the cost of public universities (CHE, 2008 cited in Kantabutra & Tang,
2010). Under the university autonomy, the Budget Bureau still provides financial
support, but partially.
On average, the university receives 30 percent of its operation budget from
the state and needs to earn the other 70 percent on its own. Therefore, the
autonomous universities are required to generate additional income through
various means such as research grants from national and international agencies,
tuition fees, and other forms of academic services. The university has the leeway
to decide on how it spends the revenue that it had generated. However, this does
not mean the Budget Bureau does not have any more power. Given that the state
continues to support a portion of the financial arrangement of the university such
as the salary of the staff, Budget Bureau continue to require the university to fol-
low detailed guidelines on the certain matters and to oversee the spending of this
partial amount of the funding.
These two changes have significant repercussions at the institutional level. First,
the change from line itemised to block grants offers the flexibility and freedom
to the university to manage its budget in a more appropriate manner. According to
the senior administrator in terms of budget at the University A, he maintained:
Previously university budgeting was controlled by the Budget Bureau and

every rule was directed by the government. When we became autonomous,
the power is delegated and shifted to the University Council. The issues of
asset, financial planning, budgeting and purchasing became the responsibil-
ity of the University Council. Is it good? It’s good. It makes us more effec-
tive and efficient. Think about it, the government regulation applies to every
university and every department all the same. Now that we can control our
own budget line, we can do things in a more appropriate manner, that is,
more flexible. It’s like cutting a tailor-made shirt, we know what we need
and what size fits well. I think it’s a good system. However, there are of
course concerns about the abuse of power.
(senior administrator, University A, A6)
Line budgeting created burdens on the efficiency and effectiveness of the overall
management, which resulted in the slow process of purchasing and reimbursing
for the university as a whole. Some also argued that given the slowness of budget
process, the university often gets to purchase more expensive and less quality
products. While university autonomy promised to address the inefficient process,
interviews from University A and B raise concerns that it has not delivered what
it promises.
Second, there is the issue of income generating. There is vast contrast between
the two institutions in this respect. While University A continued to face diffi-
culty in terms of generating income– for they relied on the traditional means such
as opening courses and conducting researches, University B is much better off
due to their land assets. University B is fortunate to have abundant land assets to
generate huge amounts of revenue:
We are lucky to have endowed 1,309 Rai of land. It was given to us by Rama
the Sixth. We decided to do zoning. 51 percent of the total amount goes to
146 Rattana Lao
educational purpose. 30 percent we rent out to offices and 10 percent we use
for commercial purposes.
(former rector of University B, B8)
The ways in which a university generates its own income influences significantly
how the university can move forward as an institution. The amount of revenue
generated would determine whether a university is heading towards the com-
mercialisation of higher education or not. Interviewees from both universities
showed great concern over the commercialisation of higher education. Academ-
ics pointed that they experienced greater pressure to generate revenue for their
own faculties. Every faculty needs to find a budget to pay for extra staff, students’
activities, and even new buildings and infrastructure (B2, B4). The university
may give the permission to erect a new building, but it does not cover the cost of
its construction and furnishing. The most convenient way for faculties to gener-
ate revenue would be to offer new courses, international programmes, or short
courses to the public. The head of the Faculty of Arts from University B shared
his observation on the proliferation of new programmes as sources of income and
its implications:
Now educational services function in the economic of scale not academic

excellence. The more students, the better. When university becomes autono-
mous, it needs more income to operate and the biggest source of income is
the opening up of international programs. Think about it, the Faculty does
not have to invest in the infrastructure and if it admits 100 students a year
and 60,000 baht per person, that’s a lot of money.
(academic from the Arts and Humanities, University B, B2)
The pressure is also exercised differently depending on a university’s capacity to

generate income. Some departments within the same faculty are less able than
others, depending on the size of the programmes and the market attraction. A
faculty member at the Faculty of Science expressed concern over the pressure to
generate income in the university:
It’s all about survival. . . . The University B tries to downsize the programs
and we are anxious about it. Good thing we have international programs to
support us. We don’t have short courses as our subjects are not that attrac-
tive to the general public but the Faculty tries to develop international pro-
grams which are outside the normal educational programs.
(B6)
Another source of income comes from the overhead of conducting research and
academic services. All the interviewees expressed that they have to pay 5 to 20
percent as overhead expenses for the university. The percentage varies depending
on the type of research and the size of the grant. It must be noted that the faculty
does not have to return the earnings from these extra courses to the university.
They can keep the revenue generated for the operation within the faculty.
Academic matters: course approval and human resources

From the views of the executives, there is a clear sign that autonomous university
has brought about more flexibility in terms of academic matters related to course
approval as well as human resources. The most evident sign of increased flexibility
is that the decision-making process no longer depends on various external bod-
ies. Rather, it depends on the university council to make the final decision. Prior
to university autonomy, new courses needed to be approved by OHEC. The
decision-making process changes with university autonomy. As the former rector
of University B indicates such a change is significant for greater institutional flex-
ibility and management:
Academic changes are moving quickly and we have to keep up with it. Now
that we don’t have to request permission from the outside, we can do things
in our own ways which are quicker, more flexible and more efficient. The
ability to approve our own programs is the most significant change. We can
be more up-to-date and keep up with trends. Like now we have a course
called Modern Agriculture. It is not a conventional program. It includes
how to do better in production, packaging and logistics. We integrated all
the key elements together and because we can approve our own program,
this is possible.
Unlike other interviewees, B8 is optimistic about the changes brought about

by autonomous university. Others have questioned the so-called autonomy
and flexibility when the university continues to rely on the forms and require-
ments of OHEC for course approval. OHEC has initiated what became known
as Thailand Qualification Framework (TQF), which is a detailed guideline that
each academic programme needs to meet to be approved. It is also linked with
the Internal Quality Assessment that each academic programme needs to be
approved and renewed every year. There are six areas that each programme needs
to be approved before it can continue operating. In terms of the “student”,
the requirements look at the admissions process, the retainment, and students’
satisfaction to continue with the programme. In terms of the “academics”, it
is required that there must be at least five full-time academics with publication
records in the board of the academic programme. In terms of the “curriculum”,
the guideline required that the programme submitted a detailed, lengthy, and
long-term syllabus and plans.
An academic from the Political Science Faculty of University B reflected on the
paradoxical relationship between these rigid requirements and university auton-
omy: “how is it autonomous if the outsider dictates how we do things through
148 Rattana Lao
forms?” (B7). Additional to the ability to approve one’s own programme, execu-
tives argue that autonomous university has been given greater flexibility in term
of human resources. As budget is provided in a block grant, each faculty can
revise its salary scale as it deemed appropriate in order to attract high-calibre aca-
demics. This is the case for hiring foreign academics in international programmes:
Before everything was capped. But now we have more flexibility in human
resources. If the University gives us 3 quota for PhD but the Faculty only
wants 2, we can hire at a more competitive price. Or if the Faculty has more
income, they can also top up the salary as they see fit. It depends on three
factors: (i) how hard or easy that job is, (ii) the experience of the candidate,
and (iii) working experiences. As long as the Council approves, it’s OK.
(professor, University B, B10)
The role of teaching and research

The interviews shed light on increasing tension in both the universities in terms
of the role of research and how it has gained paramount importance in the uni-
versity setting. It must be pointed out that Thai universities are not known for
their research strength. Traditionally, Thai universities are teaching-intensive uni-
versities with emphasis on teaching rather than on conducting research. Accord-
ing to former rector and chair of university council, Charas Suwanwela (1988,
pp. 8–11), this issue is directly related to the fact that Thai higher education has
relied heavily on Western knowledge:
For the advancement of knowledge, the university served only to import

knowledge from Western sources . . . [with] an emphasis on immediate
utility at the expense of basic knowledge . . . many administrators and
teachers alike continue to be contented just to emulate the development
and progress experienced in other parts of the world, and thus maintain
the status quo.
Therefore, the institutional legacy of being a teaching-intensive university has

long been ingrained in the university structure, particularly among the academ-
ics. Academics are not used to conducting research on a regular basis, and at the
same time, institutional structure favours teaching. Academics’ teaching loads are
extremely heavy, leaving little time and energy to do research.
Recent institutional changes can be attributed to four factors and are inter-
related but significant enough to be discussed separately. First, the international
ranking of universities is considered the most forceful factor that drives the uni-
versity to pay more attention to research. It is an issue of reputation and com-
petition. Second, there is also a national agenda to construct National Research
Universities (NRUs). Nine universities were selected nation-wide to receive
greater funding from the government so that they become leading institutes in
research of certain areas. In fact, the requirement for becoming a member of the
NRU group also depends on each university’s ranking in various international
league tables. Third, the transformation to become autonomous in and of itself
heightens the importance of research within the university’s programmes. Auton-
omous university pays special attention to and increasing focus on the capacity
of each academic in both teaching and research. Their contracts are based on
their performance in these two areas. In most, if not all, cases, performances in
research and publication in international journals are considered the essence of
academic work. The implications of such a system will be discussed in the subse-
quent section on quality assessment. Suffice to say, these factors create an impetus
for more research and publication.
The increasing attention to transform Thai universities to become research
focused has long been a policy aspiration at the national level. Both universities
in this research are members of the NRU group and receive greater attention in
terms of budget and policy emphasis. However, they differ in terms of direction
and strategy: University A focuses on more practical and local research problems,
whereas University B gives more attention to international publications using
respectable databases.
Instead of focusing on publication, the executive in University A argued that
the university focused its research attention on the local problems. The main
focus of the university is not on producing publications, although that is often
viewed as the end product. Rather, the university’s goal is to reduce poverty and
sustain development of its region. According to one interviewee:
I do not believe in participating in the university ranking. I do not think

it can help to move the university forward. It is more important for us to
decide what we need to do. It is important to look at the fundamental under-
lying philosophy of the university and develop our programs of the local
communities and allocate our resources accordingly. If we have a hundred
baht, we’ll put 70 baht in the local research areas, 20 baht on basic research
and 10 baht on other topics. This strategy worked. It has helped us to secure
a place among the nine Research Universities and we also used this strategy
to gain support from other agencies.
(rector, University A, A1)
University B is an NRU and all the interviewees acknowledged the importance

of university ranking in their daily operations. As to the degree of importance,
there are divergent opinions. On the one hand, an academic from the Arts and
Humanities from University B views the overt and excessive use of ranking with
disgust:
They are just so crazy about university ranking. Anything that can heighten
the ranking, they will do it at any cost and price.
(academic from the Arts and Humanities, University B, B2)
150 Rattana Lao
Although it is debatable to what degree the university pays attention to ranking,
it is undeniable that the university gives enormous attention to research and pub-
lication. A former rector stated:
Ranking is very important but we do not select all of the related indicators.
The one we really cared about is research and publication.
Although the university executive did not admit that the university favours
research and publication, the academics themselves did feel compelled and pres-
sured to do more research work. This pressure has an enormous ramification on the
teaching staff. Academics from the Sciences, Social Sciences, and Humanities facul-
ties pointed out that the pressure to publish has diverted their attention from teach-
ing. One academic elaborated on his unequal attention, which favours teaching:
The university still does not see clearly. We are Faculty of Medicine. It is a
professional school. If we focus on research and do not give equal attention
to teaching, we will lose out. Students will ask why their teachers are biased.
The Faculty has a teaching hospital and there are more to do than research,
we need to provide health and medical services. We each have to take care of
300 to 400 patients a day, does this not count? We are not like the Faculty
of Sciences which can focus on research. Ours is a professional school. The
university needs to have a broader perspective.
(academic, University A, A2)
Contract and performance indicators

The most pertinent issue across the interviews is the increasing role of the contract
and assessment mechanism, which has played a role in incentivising or forcing
employees of the university to conduct research. In the old system, there was
no mechanism to enforce research. “If you do not do research, the university
did not implement any penalty” (B1). In the new system, international ranking
and national quality assessment system have put enormous emphasis on research
and publication, and such pressure has been translated into greater workload and
requirement for academics at the institutional level. The pressure is embedded
within different forms of assessment on the performances of the academics. For
example, academics are required to fill in various rubrics and assessment forms in
order for the university to use these inputs in its submission to international league
table. Furthermore, the academics are required to publish papers and present in
international conferences (A4). These pressures are tied up with the university
contract – it is neither a choice nor an option, but a requirement to follow.
The contract systems in University A and University B differs, but both fol-
low the same logic intended to achieve similar results. In University A, academ-
ics need to become assistant professor within five years of signing the hiring
contract; otherwise, the contract will be automatically terminated. Furthermore,
if they are hired for more than nine years, they have to become associate pro-
fessor; otherwise, the contract will also end. Although the university said it is
not concerned about ranking, these embedded assessments tell a different story.
Through the ranking and quality assurance procedure, the number of professors
is highly valued. Hence, these measures illustrate that ranking played an impor-
tant role in the management of the university and affected individual lives. In
University B, every employee of the university has to go through a 1 + 3 + 2 + 2
contract system, meaning faculty members will have one year of probation, three
years to become assistant professor, and if they fail, they can extend the contract
for two years twice before they are terminated by the university. Thus, academics
are automatically forced to “publish or perish”.
In addition to the contract, each faculty member has to fulfil certain KPI. “KPI
helps to give direction, guidance and accountability” (B8). The most often used
KPI is research. For example, each faculty member needs to publish .25 paper a
year. If the Faculty has 60 academic staff, that means the overall Faculty has to
publish 15 papers that year.
This KPI is significant as it travels down the hierarchical structure. The Uni-
versity Council sets the overall KPIs for the Rector to meet, the Rector sets
the KPIs for the Deans and the Deans therefore set the KPIs for the overall
Faculty.
(B8)
Additional to the KPI for research, the university also subjects itself to external
quality assessment by the Office of National Education Standards and Quality
Assessment (ONESQA). This has an enormous ramification for the university as a
whole, as the new governing system is decided on the basis of number of output/
outcome. It changes the perception of what is counted as work and what is not.
The increasing focus given to research and publication does not apply to all fac-
ulties equally. The increasing focus on research and publication created uncom-
fortable sentiments at all fronts. For the professional schools, such as Faculty
of Medicine and Faculty of Dentistry, the new focus on research has a negative
impact on the morale of the professional staff who spend enormous amount of
time on hands-on experience and prefer to provide clinical leadership rather than
publication. From Faculty of Veterinarian and Faculty of Science, time limitation
is problematic. Some research takes longer time to complete. Therefore, the pres-
sure to publish within a year is problematic. It makes the research outputs less
comprehensive, focusing on quantity rather than quality.
While the majority of academics believe that such an evaluative system has put
an enormous burden and pressure on the academics, a number of individuals
believe this system is fair and conducive to the development of the university:
They give you first 8 years to publish in order to be promoted to assis-

tant professor, I think it’s fair. They give you 19 years to become an associ-
ate professor, I think it’s long enough. For the development of the overall
152 Rattana Lao
university, I think this system is a good thing. Otherwise, there is no guaran-
tee that people will work.
(B5)
The fact that contracts need to be renewed may motivate people to work hard for
fear of being terminated. In contrast, the old system breeds inertia and inaction
within the university:
This [new system] makes academics constantly active. They can no longer
float around without productivity. When I was civil servant, nobody pushed
me. There was no pressure but we wanted to do it ourselves.
(academic, University B, B1)
This quotation illustrates that the old system relies on internal motivation to
move academics to get their professorship. However, the new system does not
leave it up to chance. Every academic has to actively do research and publish in
order to survive. While the new system might be productive for the university,
this requirement has created enormous pressure for academics across disciplines
to comply. The system also required each individual to obtain the minimum stan-
dard of publication per year in order to maintain his or her status. This is to
keep the system actively working. Although the general perception points to the
increasing activeness for research and publication, some academics believe that
the current assessment and contract system is not sufficient to motivate academic
excellence. It depends again on the role of the faculty as an enforcer of the policy.
Job security: monetary and non-monetary factors

Autonomous university policy in Thailand created a whirlwind of change for
academics. Traditionally, academics in Thai public universities are civil servants.
They are the servants to the society, receiving royal accolades and a multitude of
health benefits. With the move to autonomous university, academics were given
the choice to remain as civil servants or to become employees of the university.
The decision to change or not to change their civil servant status, therefore, boils
down to their perception of how such changes affect their job security. There are
two aspects to consider. On the one hand, there is a monetary gain. Those who
have changed their status from civil servants to become employees of the univer-
sity value the monetary gain that comes with the status change. In University A,
the increase in academics’ salary is approximately 1.6 times of their basic salary,
whereas the University B pay scale is 1.4 times.
On the other hand, there are non-monetary factors to be considered. These
factors include health benefits and a sense of pride and security. First, as employ-
ees of the university, their health benefits are mitigated when compared with
those benefits enjoyed by civil servants. The university usually buys standard
health insurance to cover only the employee, but it does not provide coverage for
three generations of parents, themselves/spouse, and children:
I was uncertain whether to be civil servant or employee of the university.
Until the last phase, I had health problem and needed the health coverage,
that’s why I decided not to change. There were also issues of holidays. Civil
servants have more leave than university employees and I needed the leave
for my surgery. If I were not ill during that period, I may have not realized
the importance of health benefits.
(academics, University B, B6)
The issue of health is a major dissatisfaction for those who became employees
of the university. The health service is also abysmal. Unlike being a civil servant,
whereby health service was provided by the public hospital run by the university,
the university employee gets health coverage through social security: “I knew it
is bad service. I never want to use it” (B2). This was the view of many of the 61
university employees who were being surveyed – that the quality of health service
was better under civil servants (Suwan et al., 2008).
Second, many university personnel like the idea of being in the civil service
because it gives them a sense of “serving the society”. The university tried to
incentivise its staff to become employees by offering them a pension scheme.
After having served the university for ten years, the employees can get a pay raise
and are entitled to join the pension scheme. However, all those who remain in
the civil service maintained that monetary incentive was not enough to forego
personal satisfaction, health benefits, job security, and long-term pension. As one
of the staff puts it:
The work is the same, regardless of the status. But the real difference is pride.
I am proud to be civil servant and it is my intention to pursue this career
since I join the service. If I changed my status, my salary would increase
by 1.7 times but I am not sure if all my other benefits for my family will be
the same . . . people asked me why I did not change my status, I told them
money was not the issue. But then, there is my pension. If I changed my
status, I would get my “pension” as my monthly income almost immediately
which means that I would lose my future income. Since I don’t need the
money now, I better wait until I retire.
(academic, University B, B1)
There is also the issue of job security, which plays a pertinent role in making their
decision. As mentioned before, the benefit of being a civil servant is job security,
which is unlike short-term contracts that come with repetitive assessment. That
is why university personnel are reluctant to be de-linked from the civil service.
There was a fear that the assessment would threaten job security and such change
would be fatal. While continual assessment is generally viewed as necessary for the
progress of the university, individual academics tend to shy away from it.
Many of those academic staff who have changed their status to become
employees of the university do feel anxious because they fear that the new system
would not treat them well as a respectable member of the university. From the
154 Rattana Lao
interviews, we gather that many academics prefer to remain in the civil service
because of job security and health benefits. For those who opted to de-link from
the civil service, they were attracted by the immediate monetary gains.
Conclusion
Autonomous university has been a long-term policy aspiration for Thai policy-
makers and leading academics in the higher education system. With increased
institutional autonomy, it is hoped that Thai public universities would become
more flexible, efficient, and effective as well as improving its quality in terms of
academic programmes, finance, and human resources management. After five
decades of public discourse, this policy was at long last implemented in several
public universities. In-depth comparative case studies of University A and Uni-
versity B offered some insights into the transformation process. The purpose
of the research is to examine to what extent the objectives of the policy have
been achieved. Interviews with key personnel from both universities shed some
light on the varied views and perceptions of how each of these two universi-
ties had been and what each would become in the future. The research findings
show that the historical background of the university legacy, which is historical
background, its organisational structure, and the academics’ perception, play a
crucial role shaping each of the autonomous universities. Particularly, the uneven
distribution of assets and resources between the two universities have led to dif-
ferent strategies in generating revenue for the respective university. One of the
universities, which does not have many assets, had to develop more new courses,
offer more international programmes, conduct consultancies, and commission
research in order to generate more revenue. Meanwhile, there is a great pressure
on the academics in both the universities to conduct research and publish. As
employees of the autonomous universities, they are subjected to employment by
contracts, continual assessments using various performance. Even though there
is immediate monetary gain on becoming an employee of the university, the
research shows that many academics chose to remain in the civil service because
of the non-monetary benefits such as job security, health care, and a sense of
pride of being a civil servant.
References and further reading

Asian Development Bank. (2002). Program completion report on the social sector pro-
gram in Thailand. Manila: ADB.
Atagi, R. (1998). Economic crisis accelerates the reform of higher education in Thai-
land. International Higher Education, 11, 9–10.
Braun, V., & Clark, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative
Research in Psychology, 3(2), 77–101.
Commission on Higher Education (CHE). (2007). Seminar & exhibition on Thai
education 2007. Bangkok: Commission on Higher Education
Kantabutra, S., & Tang, J. C. S. (2010). Efficiency analysis of public universities in
Thailand. Tertiary Education and Management, 16(1), 15–33.
Kiranand, S. (2008). The executive path of Chulalongkorn University by Kun-Ying
Suchada Kiranand. Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Press.
Kirtikara, K. (2001, January). Higher education in Thailand and the National Reform
Roadmap. Symposium conducted at the Thai–US Education Roundtable, Bang-
kok, Thailand.
Kirtikara, K. (2002). Thai public university system in transition: Some issues on manage-
ment and Financing. Symposium conducted at the Thai–UK University Presidents
Forum, Bangkok, Thailand on 17 January 2002.
Kirtikara, K. (2004). Transition from a university under the bureaucratic system to an
autonomous university: Reflections on concepts and experience of the King Mongkut’s
University of Technology Thonburi. Bangkok: Office of the Education Council.
Lao, R. (2015a). A critical study of Thailand’s higher education reform: The culture of
borrowing. New York, NY: Routledge.
Lao, R. (2015b). The limitations of autonomous university status in Thailand: Lead-
ership, resources and ranking. Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia, 30(2),
550–559.
Rungfamai, K. (2008). Higher education and institutional-autonomy policy in Thai-
land: The perspective of agency theory. Master’s Degree thesis in European Master in
Higher Education (HEEM), University of Tempere.
Suwan, S. et al. (2008). Research salary and welfare to prepare for university autonomy:
Reflection from employees. Bangkok, Thailand: Kasertsart University.
Suwantragul, B. (2009). King Mongkut’s University of technology Thonburi, Thai-
land. In N. V. Varghese (Ed.), Institutional restructuring in higher education in
Asia: Trends and patterns (pp. 133–160). Bangkok: UNESCO.
Suwanwela, C. (1988). Southeast Asian universities and the challenges of the twenty-
first century. Presented at ASAIHL Lecture at the Association of Southeast Asian
Institutions of Higher Learning General Conference and Seminar on the Role of
ASAIHL Universities in the Transfer of Technology, Jakarta.
Varghese, N. V. (2001). Impact of the economic crisis on higher education in East Asia:
County experiences (No. 12). International Institute for Educational Planning,
UNESCO.
11 Conclusion
Reforms of university governance
and management in Asia
Molly N.N. Lee, Chang Da Wan,
and Hoe Yeong Loke
This concluding chapter gives an overview of the reforms of university governance

and management in the nine Asian countries, drawing on their similarities and
differences. The reforms have occurred at various levels in the higher education
systems. At the systemic level, some countries such as Malaysia, Japan, Singapore
and South Korea have corporatised their public national universities, whereas
others such as Indonesia and Thailand have established autonomous universities.
All these reforms are aimed at seeking alternative sources of funding other than
governmental funding for the universities and, more importantly, to improve the
efficiency, quality, and productivity of the universities. Several of the countries
in the sample such as China, Japan, and South Korea have explicit policies to
target a number of their top national universities to be world-class universities.
At the institutional level where the national policies are being implemented, the
university governance and organisational structures have changed and the univer-
sities are given different kinds of institutional autonomy over various areas such
as finance, human resources, and academic matters. At the process level, various
management strategies, techniques, and practices have been institutionalised in
the universities, including both internal and external quality assurance mecha-
nisms as well as performance indicators to assess individual and institutional per-
formances. The following sections of the chapter are organised along a number
of themes that have emerged from the case studies: (i) governance and structure,
(ii) appointive power, (iii) finance and funding, (iv) corporate managerialism,
(v) academic matters, and (vi) tensions and conflicts.
Governance and structure

The concept of governance in higher education can be briefly described as the
structure and process of decision-making in higher education. At the systemic
level, governance is about the relationship between the government and the
higher education institutions. At the institutional level, it is about the relation-
ship between the institutional managers and the academic staff. Recent reforms
in university governance have revolved around the central issues of institutional
autonomy and public accountability. Influenced by neoliberalism, many govern-
ments in the Asian region have reduced their roles in funding and in directly
Conclusion 157
governing the universities by granting the universities with more autonomy. At
the same time, universities are required to be more accountable to various stake-
holders, in particular, the governments, students, communities, employers, and
industries.
The “retreat of the state” and the granting of institutional autonomy have been
operationalised in various forms in different countries. On the one hand, several
countries, such as Thailand, Indonesia, and Japan, have operationalised institu-
tional autonomy through legislations. On the other hand, Malaysia, Singapore,
and Cambodia are examples where the granting of institutional autonomy has
been only a policy initiative. It is interesting to note that in Indonesia, the special
law on higher education institutional autonomy was revoked in 2006 after six
years of implementation. The issue of institutional readiness to receive institu-
tional autonomy from the state has been given much attention. The chapters on
Indonesia and Cambodia describe how institutional autonomy can be abused if
and when the institutional leadership is not well-prepared for such a responsible
role. India has a system of graded autonomy where a small number of universities
enjoy a high degree of autonomy on the basis of their academic performances,
and a large proportion of the universities are still under close supervision by the
government. In the case of China, the Communist Party set boundaries to both
institutional autonomy and academic freedom so as to maintain political stability
and social harmony in the country.
The issue of who owns the university also emerges in the various case stud-
ies. The establishment of autonomous universities and corporatisation of public
universities can be described as a form of change in ownership of universities
from belonging to the government to belonging to various stakeholders. This
structural change is manifested in the establishment of a university council (in
Thailand), a board of directors (in Malaysia and Cambodia), and a board of
trustees (in Singapore and South Korea) as the top decision-making body in the
respective university. Sometimes, this form of governance is referred to as “shared
governance” because various stakeholders are involved through representations
in the top decision-making bodies. However, the decision-making power of these
governing bodies does vary across the different countries in terms of appointive
power, human resources, and financial management. While the university coun-
cil in Thailand holds the ultimate power in running the university, the board of
directors in Malaysia and Cambodia are relatively weak when compared with their
respective ministry of education.
Whereas the granting of institutional autonomy from the government to indi-
vidual universities is a form of decentralisation of decision-making, at the insti-
tutional level, from the perspective of the academics, the autonomy may simply
be a shift of centralised governance from the government to the institution. In
other words, the authority of the central administration of the university has
been strengthened. This is particularly the case in South Korea and Malaysia
where the presidents or vice chancellors of the corporatised universities are often
referred to as the chief executive officers (CEOs). However, in China and Sin-
gapore, there are serious attempts within the universities to devolve operational
financial decision towards the lowest feasible level. In the Japanese and South
Korean universities, there is strong autonomy at the school level in the recruit-
ment and promotion of academic staff. There is also clear evidence that there is a
significant relationship between university leadership and institutional autonomy.
As shown in the Malaysian case, strong university leaders tend to increase institu-
tional autonomy by ignoring circulars issued by the ministry, but they can also be
held accountable by their actions. In the final analysis, leadership development is
crucial in university governance, and management as clearly shown in the Indo-
nesian and Cambodian case.
Appointive power
To a large extent, how the university is governed and managed depends on the
university leaders and their top management teams, so the crucial issue is how
these leaders are being appointed. Although there is an increase in institutional
autonomy among the universities in the selected Asian countries, not many of
the universities have the power to appoint their own presidents and top manage-
ment team. The university councils in Thai universities have the power to appoint
the university presidents, and the presidents themselves appoint their own top
management teams. In the case of Singapore, the board of trustees of the pri-
vately owned university appoints the university presidents in consultation with
the governing council and the Ministry of Education. As for Malaysia, Indonesia,
and Cambodia, the university leaders and the top management teams are still
being appointed by the ministries of education despite the university reforms.
In the cases of Japan and South Korea, both countries have a long tradition of
strong academic autonomy where the presidents, deans, and members of the sen-
ate were elected by faculty members of the universities. Since the corporatisation
of public universities in these two countries, there is strong pressure to do away
with the election of university leaders by academic staff. In fact, the ministries are
using funding incentives to get individual universities to change the way in which
university presidents are appointed. In both cases, the appointed university presi-
dents have strong appointive power, for they appoint their senior management
team in their respective university.
Finance and funding

A key feature of the university reforms on university governance and manage-
ment is that public universities are allowed to engage in market-related activi-
ties to generate their own revenue so as to make up for the shortfall of reduced
government funding. For example, on average, Thai autonomous universities
receive only 30 percent of their operational budgets from the government and
have to raise the other 70 percent on their own. With the exception of Singapore
and Japan, where even a private university enjoys government subsidies, many
of the other autonomous universities have to generate an increasing proportion
of their own funding. This pressure has, therefore, pushed universities towards
Conclusion 159
the commercialisation of their educational programmes and research outputs.
In countries such as China and Cambodia, where there used to be free tertiary
education, universities have started charging students tuition fees. Academics
are under constant pressure to do consultancies and apply for external research
grants. Autonomous universities have to use innovative ways to generate rev-
enues such as renting out physical facilities, initiating various university-industry
linkages, franchising educational programmes to private colleges, setting up affili-
ated colleges, and others. It is interesting to note that autonomous universities
in Thailand and Malaysia have set up holding companies to conduct business and
investment activities.
However, in most cases, the governments continue to fund the autonomous or
corporatised universities, though the methods of funding have changed. In most
cases, the universities are given block grants instead of line item financing, for
this would allow the universities the financial autonomy and flexibility on how to
use the funds. In addition to the decrease in public funding, the universities have
to compete for external revenues. For instance, the Chinese government allo-
cates funds on the basis of productivity and performances of the universities. In
other cases, government allocation to universities is according to category-based
funding. For example, in Japan, South Korea, and China, many more resources
are channelled to their flagship universities which are targeted to become world-
class universities. In some countries such as Malaysia, there are different catego-
ries of universities, namely, research universities, comprehensive universities, and
focused universities, and each category is given different amount of funding for
each university.
Corporate managerialism
Many of the corporatised and autonomous universities in the Asian region have
institutionalised new management practices and administrative processes that are
commonly known as New Public Management (NPM). NPM refers to the adop-
tion by public sector organisations of organisational forms, technologies, manage-
ment practices, and values more commonly found in the private sector (Deem,
1998). The managerial approaches in university administration place great empha-
sis on efficiency, effectiveness, and market behaviour. For example, Malaysian cor-
poratised universities have adopted managerial practices such as strategic planning,
total quality management, ISO certification, and benchmarking to enhance their
performances. In China, market mechanisms such as outcome-based performance
management, monetary incentive practices, and cost-benefit analysis have been
introduced in the internal governance and management of universities.
A central feature of the NPM is “performativity” in the management of aca-
demic labour in universities (Cowen, 1996). Academics are subjected to close
surveillance. Performance indicators on core activities such as research, quality
of teaching, and student learning outcomes are increasingly moving to the fore-
front in the universities. Performance indicators are used at the institute, faculty,
departmental, and individual levels, and a cascading model is used to assess the
performance of a particular university. Performance agreements between ministry
and universities, and performance contracts between deans and faculty members
are common practices among the universities in the Asian region.
To ensure public accountability, the universities are subjected to both inter-
nal and external quality assurance. Nearly all the countries featured in this book
have an external quality assurance mechanism set up by the respective govern-
ment to monitor and evaluate the universities, such as the Malaysian Qualifica-
tions Agency (MQA) in Malaysia, the Office of the National Education Standards
and Quality Assessment (ONESQA) in Thailand, and the National Assessment
and Accreditation Council (NAAC) in India. In some countries, assessment and
evaluation of universities is voluntary, whereas it is compulsory in others. Some
agencies carry out programme accreditation, whereas others carry out institu-
tional audits.
As for human resources management, in some cases when the public universi-
ties became corporatised or autonomous, the academic staff is de-linked from
the civil service. This change of status happened in Indonesia, Japan, and South
Korea. In the case of Thailand, while the new academic staff have no choice, the
existing staff of an autonomous university could choose to remain in the civil
service or be a university employee who would receive a higher pay. But many
of the existing staff opted to remain in the civil service because of its high status
and good medical benefits. In India, academics in the national universities are not
civil servants, but those who work in the state universities are. Chinese universi-
ties practise a merit-based hiring and remuneration system. In Malaysia, although
the academics are hired on the civil service scheme, some of the less established
universities hire and pay their academics at a higher rate using their own gener-
ated revenue so as to attract talent.
Academic matters
In theory, substantive autonomy (Berdahl, 1990), which is the power of the
university to determine its own goals and programmes, should be in the hands
of the academics. However, in practice, this may not seem to be the case in
many instances. In Malaysia, academic programmes, although approved by the
university senate, are subjected to accreditation by the MQA and by professional
bodies in certain disciplines. In the case of South Korea, the establishment of new
programmes depends on the negotiation between the academics and senior man-
agers as well as between academics from different units because of the financial
implications and potential conflict of interest with existing programmes. Further-
more, the setting of research priorities in South Korean universities is determined
by the senior managers because of their preference for applied research, which
would attract more external funding from the private sector. In the case of Thai-
land, although the final approval of new academic programmes lies in the hands
of the university council, the applications for new programmes have to meet the
requirements of Thai Qualifications Framework set by the Office of Higher Edu-
cation Commission.
Conclusion 161
In most of the countries, the public universities can admit their own students
without any external intervention. However, this is not the case in Singapore and
Malaysia, where the admission of students has become centralised under the juris-
diction of the government. As for hiring academic staff, in most cases, it is done
by the senior management of the universities, with the exception of Japanese
universities, where the academics at the school level have strong autonomy in the
recruitment and promotion of academic staff. Similarly, in South Korea, whereas
the senior managers have greater hiring power with respects to new faculty, the
academics have more power in promotion and tenure decisions.
Tensions and conflicts

The implementation of the reforms on university governance and management
has caused various tensions and conflicts of interests, particularly at the institu-
tional level. Much of the tension is between senior managers and the academics
as described in the chapter on South Korea. The chapter analyses the perception
gap between senior managers and academics on their decision-making powers.
The analysis shows that academics perceived senior managers have a strong say in
various areas such as finance, key personnel, and even on academic matters. The
erosion of the influence of the academics is also reflected in the reduced number
of members in the senate, and the token representation of senate members in the
board of directors in the corporatised public universities in Malaysia. Similarly,
in the Japanese corporatised universities, the senate has limited decision-making
power on administrative matters which lies in the hands of the senior manage-
ment. Nearly in all autonomous and corporatised university, the power of the
university president and his or her management team has been strengthened.
Many of the academics in Thai universities raise the issue of tension between
their roles in teaching and research, whereas those in Malaysian universities com-
plained about the strong pressure from top management to publish in high-
impact journals so as to improve their university rankings. In the case of the
autonomous universities in Indonesia, it seems that the change of university sta-
tus is more beneficial to academic staff than the non-academic staff who are not
quite sure of their own status.
Conclusion
The governance and management of universities in Asia has undergone signifi-
cant changes, predominantly driven by the global trend of granting institutional
autonomy or corporatising public universities, under the influence of neoliberal
ideology. In examining these reforms, it is possible to observe a convergence
in policies at the systemic level, but also significant variations when it comes to
implementation at the institutional level because of the decoupling of policies
from practices. Although all the higher education policies are aimed at improv-
ing the efficiency and productivity of the universities, the change in governance
and management of universities varies not only across countries but also among
universities within the country. The change in governance and management also
brought about unintended and unforeseen outcomes. This is because universi-
ties are not mere corporate organisations but unique institutions with traditional
academic cultures and values. Moreover, public universities across Asia have to
contend with their local context and environment both within their country and
across the region.
References
Berdahl, R. O. (1990). Academic freedom, autonomy and accountability. Studies in
Higher Education, 15(2), 169–180.
Cowen, R. (1996). Performativity, post-modernity and the university. Comparative
Education, 32, 245–258.
Deem, R. (1998). “New managerialism” and higher education: The management of
performances and cultures in universities in the United Kingdom. International
Studies in Sociology of Education, 8(1), 47–70.
Index
academic 56, 60–64, 66, 68–76, 79, collaboration 59, 60–61, 63

119–135; board 16, 17; capitalism collegiality 13
25; freedom 10, 16, 45, 81–82, collegial model 45
91–92; management 6, 8, 10, 12, commercialization 146
14–16; services 146–147 comprehensive universities 138, 141
accountability 2, 4, 6, 8, 26, 36, 53, concurrent list 47
59, 60–62, 64–65, 67, 70–71, contract 149–152
143, 151 corporate managerialism 99, 102
accreditation 58–60, 70 cost recovery measures 44, 51
administrative structures 137 cost saving measures 44, 46, 51
affiliated colleges 49 Council for Private Education 118
appointive power 11 Council for Science, Technology, and
assets 56, 59, 61–62, 67, 70–71, 73, 80 Innovation (CSTI) 83
authoritarianism and liberalism 37 course approval 147
autonomous 137; college 49; curriculum 140
universities 2–3
autonomy 6, 8–11, 18, 26, 36; decision 56, 61–62, 67, 70–71, 79
academic 90–92; complete autonomy decision making (decision-making)
6, 10, 18; institutional 6, 9, 44, 119–123, 127–130, 132–134,
50, 52, 55; institutional financial 8; 140, 143
graded 52; substantive 11, 50 deemed universities 47
democratic process 141
benefits of change 62 devolution 23, 31, 33–34, 36
block grants 140, 144 disadvantage students 59
board of directors 7, 96–97, 99–101, Double First-Class initiative 26, 28, 30
103–104 dual concerns of the Chinese state 21;
boundaries 62, 64, 70–72, 74 see also state’s twin expectations, the
bureaucratic bottlenecks 140
business model 56, 60, 65 economic development 56, 59, 61,
business unit 60, 67, 70, 74 76, 78
educational services 144
centralization 143 effectiveness 143
Changing Academic Profession (CAP) efficiency 140, 144–145
125–127, 131 endowment fund 60–62, 67, 70, 72, 74
changing role of the state 142 enterprise account 100, 105
check and balance 143–144 entrepreneurship/entrepreneurial 15
China Discipline Ranking (CDR) 29–30 European Higher Education Autonomy
choice based credit system 51 Scorecard 70–71, 78
civil servants 137, 140 evaluative state 44, 55
164 Index
facilities and infrastructure 62, 63 leadership 120–125, 132–134, 139
Federal Statutory Bodies (FSBs) 95, Lee Kuan Yew 112
101, 105 legal entity 57, 71
fee-paying 8, 11 legal framework 62, 64
financial feasibility 59, 60 liberal-oriented reforms 21, 23, 35, 37
financial formula 62, 65 line item 140, 144, 145
financial management 140
flexibility 56–57, 65, 75–76, 79, 140, Magna Charta 56
147, 148 Malaysia Education Blueprint (Higher
free-seat 10 Education) 2015–2025 (MEBHE)
94, 97, 101
globalisation 22, 25 manage funds 61, 67, 70, 65
global league tables 22–24 managerial power 121, 127, 133, 135
government regulation 21, 25–27 marketisation 2, 23–25, 31, 32, 33, 36
government-supervision mode 36 market mechanisms 21, 23, 31–32, 37
graduates 65 massification 43, 55
gross enrolment ratio 43 MEF 6, 7, 9, 14, 18
minban HEIs 32
health benefits 153 MoEYS 12, 14, 15
holding company 105–106 monitoring and evaluation 62–63, 65
household investment 43 MORTHE 57, 58, 61, 65
human resources 62–63, 66, 73, 75, 80,
140, 143, 148 Nanyang Technological University
112–113
income generating 144–146 National Higher Education Strategic
indicator 56, 60, 63, 75 Plan 2007–2020 (NHESP) 94,
innovation 56, 61, 63, 66, 68, 76; 96, 102
management 12 National University Corporation Act 86
institution (institutional) 119–123, 126, National University of Singapore
128, 132–134; accountability 6, 8; 112–113
administrator 8, 13, 14; process 141 neoliberalisation 22–25
Institut Pertanian Bogor 56, 58, 65–66, neoliberalism 1–2, 102, 121
69, 75 New Public Management 24, 81–82,
Institut Teknologi Bandung 56, 65–66, 90, 102
69, 75, 80 non-monetary factors 152
Institut Teknologi Sepuluh November norms 61–63
Surabaya 57, 58, 66, 69
intellectual property rights 59, 76, 78 on-contract staff 8, 10, 11
internal quality assurance cells 52 operational policy 62–63
international program 146 organization (organisation) 119–122,
international publication 59, 76 132, 134
international university ranking 75, 76 organizational structures 63
investment 63, 72
PAI 5–7, 11, 15
Japan Association of National paradoxical relationship 147
Universities (JANU) 84–85 party intervention 21, 34
jobs security 152, 153 perceptional gaps 127, 132, 134
performance: contract 57, 65, 69, 70;
key performance Indicators 102–103 evaluation 58, 65; indicators 141,
King Edward VII College of 149, 150
Medicine 112 performativity 2, 159
knowledge-based economy 22, 23, 25 political stability maintenance 36–37
politics 143
Law of Higher Education 57, 62, 69, pride and security 153
70, 72, 80 priorities 75–76
Index 165
privatisation of public institutions 44, 46 Singapore University of Technology and
procedural autonomy 11, 50 Design 113
Project 211 26–28, 30 social: inequalities 43; responsibility
Project 985 26–28, 30 59, 60
public audit 65, 71 state control 21, 25, 33
public debate 140 state’s twin expectations, the 21
Public Service Department 95, 107–109 statute 57–58, 61
public university 57, 58, 61, 73, 80 statutory body 47
steering from distance 43–44
qualities 141 strategic plan 61
quality 58–59, 61–64, 71–72, 74, 79; structural adjustment 44
assessment 141, 150, 151; assurance structural reform (change) 119, 123–134
10, 12 study programs 59–63, 67, 70
Quality Evaluation of Undergraduate success factors 75, 78
Education (QEUE) 29
talent: attracting 107–108;
Raffles College 112 development 108; retaining 107–108;
readiness 62, 66 programmes 28
rectorate team 16 tax obligation 71
red and expert 21, 26 teaching intensive university 148
regulation 56–60, 64, 66, 68–70, Thai state 138
72–75, 78, 80, 143 transparency 59–62, 65, 67, 70, 72
regulatory bodies 45, 47, 50 Tridharma Perguruan Tinggi 57, 62
research universities 22–23, 26–30, 37, tuition 62, 74
141, 148
restricted autonomy 101 Universitas Dipenogoro 57–58, 66,
69, 80
scope 61, 69–70 Universitas Gadjah Mada 56, 58, 65–66,
scorecard 62, 63, 70–71, 78, 80 69, 75
self-financing courses 44, 46 Universitas Hasanuddin 57–58, 66–67, 69
self-generated income 105 Universitas Indonesia 56, 58, 66–67,
semi-autonomous 6 69, 75, 80
senate 99–100, 104, 108–109 Universitas Padjadjaran 57, 66–67,
senior managers 119–122, 124–135 69, 80
Senior Managers’ Survey 125–127, 129 Universitas Pendidikan Indonesia 56,
Singapore: university autonomy 58, 66–67, 69
in 112–114, 118; university Universitas Sumatera Utara 56, 58,
corporatization 113 66–67, 69
Singapore Institute of Management: Universities and University Colleges Act
academic studies 116–117; (UUCA) 1971 94–96, 100
finance 115–116; governance and university council 96, 104, 142
management 115; origins 114; quality University of Malaya 112
assurance 117–118 University of Singapore 112
Singapore Institute of Technology 113 university ranking 23, 149
Singapore Management University 113
Singapore University of Social world-class university 21–27, 29, 35,
Sciences 118 36, 37

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The Governance and

Hoe Yeong Loke is Adjunct Research Manager at The HEAD Foundation,

The Sustainability of Higher Education in an Era of Post-Massification

Emigration, Employability and Higher Education in the Philippines

Literature Education in the Asia-Pacific

English Tertiary Education in Vietnam

English Language Teacher Preparation in Asia

Lesson Study and Schools as Learning Communities

The Asian EFL Classroom

Teacher Education for English as a Lingua Franca

The Governance and Management of Universities in Asia

For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/

Edited by Chang Da Wan,

2 Governance in “public administrative institution”

3 World-class university construction and higher education

4 Institutional autonomy and governance of higher education

5 Autonomous higher education institutions in Indonesia:

6 National university reforms introduced by the Japanese

7 Governance and management of public universities in

9 Governance and management under transformation in

10 Governance and management of universities in Thailand 137

11 Conclusion: reforms of university governance and

Paulina Pannen, MLS, is an expert in higher education, e-learning, distance

Hadi Subhan is a Lecturer in law at Airlangga University and has a Doctor of

Neoliberalism and higher education

In neoliberalism the patterning of power is established on contract, which in

The role of the state in higher education is to create an appropriate market by

Institutional level governance

Process level within the institution

Outcomes and impacts

Towards establishing an autonomous public university in

Higher education governance reforms in China

Chinese WCU construction agenda: new project, old contradiction

Government regulation: financial support and

Government financial support

Double First-Class initiative

National evaluation schemes and research

Provincial and institutional responses: intensified

Market mechanisms: state-led marketisation, devolution,

Marketisation: diversification of higher education provision and the

Devolution: more autonomy in exchange for more accountability

Corporatisation: emerging self-regulation and introduction

Party intervention: from entire control to stability

Organisational and institutional apparatuses of

Stability maintenance: new strategy for political control

From direct state control to steering from distance

Changing context of higher education governance in India

Regulatory bodies in higher education

Governance structures at the institutional level

Requirement to be an autonomous HEI

Education Institution Government Regulation

1 Institut Teknologi Bandung No. 65/2013 on the Statute of Institut

to public universities by the government on the basis of a performance evaluation

Figure 5.1 Requirement to be an autonomous HEI

The preparation for autonomous status is an initiative to be taken by each

Approach in implementation of autonomy

1 to manage the government’s owned assets for operational purposes, except

Figure 5.2 The scorecard of HEI’s autonomy in Indonesia

Assessment of the seven autonomous universities

Framework of the study

ita lang Ind

Constraint and Problems

Figure 5.3 Research framework