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LNG OPERATIONS IN PORT AREAS

Recommendations for the Management of Operational Risk
Attaching to Liquefied Gas Tanker and Terminal Operations
in Port Areas

First Edition
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First Edition 2003 ofo
@ The Society of lnternational Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators Ltd
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tsBN 1 85609 256 I ope
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Published by ins
Witherby & Company Limited mal
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Tel No. 0207251 5341 Fax No. 0207251 1296 gas
lnternational Tel No. +44 20 7251 5341 Fax No. +44 20 7251 1296
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, for
SIGTTO The Society of lnternat¡onal Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators is a non-profit making organisation dedicated to
, lnfc
protect and promote the mutual interests of its members in matters related to the safe and reliable
operation of gas tankers and terminals within a sound environment. The Society was founded ln 1979 and was granted consultative status Ì Pto
at IMO in November 1983. The Society has over 100 companies in membership who own or operate over g5% of the world's LNG tankers ithe
and terminals and over 55% of the world's LPG tankers and terminals

cî; OW
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data op(
SIGTTO
miti
LNG Operations in Port Areas loc
1. Title an(
tsBN 1 85609 256 I ofl
ass
tol
Notice of Terms of Use risl"
While the advice given in this document ("document") has been developed using the best information currently available, prc
it is intended purely as guidance to be used at the user's own risk. No responsibility is accepted by the Society of
lnternational Gas Tanker &Terminal Operators Ltd. (SIGTTO), the membership of SIGTTO, or by any person, firm,
corporation or organisation [who or which has been in any way concerned with the furnishing of information or data, the Thr
compilation or any translation, publishing, supply or sale of the documentl for the accuracy of any information or advice als
given in the document or any omission from the document or for any consequence whatsoever resulting direcily or
indirectly from compliance with or adoption of guidance contained in the document even if caused by a failure to enl
exercise reasonable care.
LflX:
 INTRODUCTION

'fuas tanker and terminal operations carry a range
öf operational risks arising from transport, storage
and transfer of liquefied natural gas and petroleum
gases. These risks are unique to liquefied gas
operations and require specific measures to
manage them within tolerable limits.
Many gas terminals are situated within the
environs of established ports. Hence their
operations and those of the gas tankers serving
them, necessarily share a common operational
environment with other port users, Such situations
have existed for many years, Consequently
industry members have acquired valuable
experience in conducting gas operations in port
environments that also host numerous other poft
if,sers and other industrial activities.
This document draws on this collective experience
in setting out guidance to best practice for
managing gas shipping operations within ports,
It also illuminates the profile of risks attaching to
gas operations, for the information of those who
administer ports and provide essential services in
port areas.
together with concomitant adjustments to the
operational procedures devised to suppress them
Operators therefore have a need for both a
systematic assessment of operating risk and a
range of risk reduction measures that can be
tailored to be effective in specific situations. The
guidance offered in this document aims to satisfy
both needs.
Neveftheless change in operational risk profiles
may not always be manageable solely by gas
businesses adjusting their operating procedures.
ln many situations the co-operation of porl
administrations and seryice providers will be
required to achieve the required degree of safety.
This will be especially true of risks arising from the
movement of gas tankers in port areas and from
other activities conducted in the vicinity of gas
tankers and terminals, including the movement of
other ships. This document therefore addresses
also the issue of relations with the providers of
port services, other pod users and the wider
social community of the port,

The document draws heavily on SIGTTO's

lnformation Paper 14 (Site Selection and Design
for LNG Ports and Jetties), first published in 1997.
lnformation Paper 14 expounds a doctrine of
protective location for gas terminals, arguing for
the elimination of major risk elements by locating
å
fl* ":gi?:"tr
ïfJ3lË;,i i:iå'i:LÏliå"J iT.,,
own operating environments. Under this doctrine
operational risks are removed from the operational
milieu of gas shipping (by informed selection of
locations), Such risks as then remain are assessed
and afterwards addressed by the implementation
of procedures derived specifically from the risk
assessment. Hence gas shipping operations are
to be managed within tolerable limits - i.e. residual
risk exposures are reduced to manageable
proporlions,

The guidance offered in this document recognises

also the dynamic nature of operating
environmenfs and the fact that risk profiles change
*pver time, Hence residual risk exposures may also
iÐhange and therefore require re-assessment,
7

t
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{
 CONTENTS

Page

ODUCTION iii

l. Hazards of LNG OPerations

1.1 Safety Critical Properties of LNG 1

1.2 Containment SYstems for LNG 1

1 .3 Resistance of Gas Tankers to Collision and Grounding

2
i.4 Characteristics of Gas Releases to the Atmosphere ... 2
e
1.5 Consequences of lngress from the Sea '.
BibliograPhY .'.'.. 4

2. Risk Assessment
2.1 QRA MethodologY 5
2.2 Special Areas for Performing a QRA of LNG Port Operations C)

2.3 Summary of General Considerations .. Õ

u
Bibliography ......

Ð Managing Tanker Transits

3.1 Anchorages....... 11
3.2 Approach Channels ..... 12
3.3 Turning Basins. 12
3.4 Operational Management of Tanker Transits 13
3.5 Special Defensive Procedures 15
Bibliography ...... 16

4. Terminal Site Selection

4.1 Elementary Criteria 17
4.2 ferminal Operations (Basis of Design) 17
4.3 Port Operations (Manoeuvres) 1B
4.4 External Threats (Protective Location) 19
4.5 Port Development 22
Bibliography...... 22

5. Managing Gas Transfer Operations

5.1 The Elements of lnterface Security 23
Ð 5.2 Effective Mooring 24
5.3 Cargo Transfer Systems (Emergency Shut Down - ESD) 24
5.4 Jetty Operations and Control ....... 25
5,5 Protection from External Threats 28
Bibliography ...... 29

6. Managing Relations w¡th Poft Authorities and Other Stakeholders

6.1 Contingency Planning 31
6.2 Local Partnerships Õz
6.3 APELL ')\)
6.4 Managing the LNG Risk - "Successful" to "Significant" 34
Bibliography ...... 34

Ð
 A more detailed exposition of the propefties of LNG and
.1 Safety Critical Properties of LNG other liquefied gasses is provided in "Liquefied Gas Handling
Principles on Shþs and in Terminals" 3rd Edition, 2000 -
iquefied Natural Gas comprises near pure Methane (CHd.
SIGTTO. see bibliography.
his is carried in specialist tankers at or very near its boiling
oint of -16OoC at atmospheric pressure. Natural gas,
therwise known as methane, firedamp or marsh gas, is
on-toxic, lighter than air but flammable under certain
1.2 Containment Systems for LNG
onditions.
All containment systems for LNG must pedorm two critical
functions: insulation, to inhibit the boil off of the gas and
r its liquid state natural gas is 1/600th of the volume of its
segregation of the liquefied gas from mild steel structures,
fl.livalent gaseous state, at atmospheric pressure and
protecting the latter from exposure to cryogenic
ilrOient temPerature.
temperatures.
lence the hazards arising from this material, should it
scape to atmosPhere are: Hence the cargo tanks of LNG tankers are constructed as
insulated cryogenic holds within the steel structure of the
the eventual prospect of a gas cloud, many times the ship's hull. Most of the longitudinal and transverse strength
volume of associated LNG, with an accompanying risk members of the structure are arranged between the inner
of fire or explosion. hull, holding the insulated cryogenic tanks, and the outer
skin. ln practice this produces a highly robust double-hull
severe brittle fracture damage to carbon and low alloy
configuration.
steel structures coming into contact with material at
cryogenic temperatures.
There are three major designs for ships' LNG tanks: the self
severe injury to personnel arisin$ from contact with supporting Prismatic Tank, or SPB system; the Membrane
cryogenic material. systems, and the Moss system, that features spherical
aluminium tanks. Viftually all LNG tankers in the wodd are
latural gas is flammable between 5.3% and 14% by volume constructed with one or other of these systems.
t air. Outside these limits the gas/air mixture is either too
ran or too rich to supporl combustion.

t required for ignition of a flammable mixture of air E cargo

nd "n"rgy
all hydrocarbon vapours is typically less than one milli
¡ule - an energy level easily exceeded by any visible flame,
I ballast

y most electrical circuit sparks, even from low voltage I insulation

curces, and by any electrostatic discharge detectable by
uman contact.

ielease of LNG into the atmosphere of any area having

tithin it low energy ignition agents carries with it a risk of fire
conditions
ts are not Rep of Self Supporting
pecifically of Prismatic Construction
Fig.1.1

eleases of LNG at cryogenic temperatures therefore pose
r tmmediate danger to personnel exposed at the point of
le release and to the integrity of steel structures in the
rmediate vicinity, However subsequent dilution of the gas
may lead to the formation of a flammable gas cloud,
ft¡frrthat could, under eminently feasible conditions, carry
lmmable vapours into areas where ignition sources are
resent.
All LNG tankers are now constructed in accordance with the
provisions of the "lnternational Code for the Construction
and Equipment of Ships Carrying Liquefied Gasses in Bulk"
- more commonly called the IGC Code.
Aparl from stipulating standards for containment systems
the IGC Code requires all tanks and handling systems to be
completely separated from a tanker's accommodation and
 sEcTtoN 1

machinery spaces with gas tight segregation. The Code also
prohibits cargo pump rooms being located below the upper
deck and stipulates that no cargo pipelines be run under
deck, Hence each tank is served by at least one individual
submerged pump, discharging to an above deck manifold,
with an alternative means of discharging - usually there are
two main pumps and a spray pump . and collision impacts have of necessity to be based
Compressor rooms on LNG tankers are required by the IGC
Code to be located in the cargo area and above the weather
deck. The Code also contains detailed specifications for the
construction and location of accommodation, service and
machinery spaces and control stations.
n cargo
I battast
I insulation
high energy grounding incidents and only one collision
incident in the industry since its inception. Neither the ).4
grounding incidents nor the collision caused a penetratio¡
the ships' inner hull and gas containment system.
)inct
Estimates of the resistance of LNG tankers to grounding ankr
on
lata
maihematical modelling of such incidents. lr/odern analyticelea
methods, i.e. finite element analysis, now lend greater low
credence to such estimates, Predictions of hull penetrationtudi
for given impact scenarios, can be obtained within ;ontr
tolerances that confer on them a practical utility for use in elea
risk management exercises. natl'
rter¡
The following table gives indicative speeds for collision
impacts, on a stationarrT LNG carrier of 13b,OOO m3., that \fter
are estimated to penelrate the tanker's outer hull but fall rave
shorl of penetrating the inner hull and the contajnms¡{ {s¡previ
located within. )om

Hull Resistance for a 135,000m3 LNG Tanker Ð;J

nuc
nixtt
Displacement of lmpacting Critical lmpact Speed - KtsiNG
Ship in tonnes
t
Representative Cross Section of Membrane Construction 93,000 3.2
Fig.l.2 61,000 4.2 i€mI
20,000 7.3

n cargo
I baìlast
I insulation

Representative Cross Section of

Spherical Tank Construction
Fig.1.3

Shipboard containment of LNG is thus rendered highly

secure by tank arrangements that are physically robust, and
by comprehensive control and monitoring systems.

For more detailed descriptions of gas containment and

handling syslems see references for this Secfion.
1.3 Resistance of Gas Tankers to
Collision and Grounding lmpacts
ln some thirly years of operations there have been few
incidents of serious damage to LNG tankers anywhere in the
world. There is scant historical data upon which to base
predictions, of damage to LNG tankers as a result of
collisions and grounding. lndeed, there have been only two
No grounding incident has yet made penetration of the innffi
hull of an LNG tanker. Yet while such ships are, ignit
demonstrably, able to sustain severe damage to their
bottom structures without suffering inner hull penetration, Whr
such penetration is entirely credible if grounding is gas
associated with impact on hard point obstructions - e.g. i. Oi
rock pinnacles and concrete piles. Such incidents are flarr
entirely possible within the environs of some ports.
éIl
¡SUCi
For more extensive treatments of this topÌc refer to
references for this Section.
 SEGTION

l.¿ Gharacteristics of Gas Releases to

rllision
:r the
enetration the Atmosphere
W¡nd direction
n a catastrophic failure of an LNG D (Too lean)
ent system there are no incident
ruct scenarios following the
of LNG into the atmosPhere.
B (Over-rich)
f released LNG has been carefullY
ain important experiments involving
e the consequences of such a (Spill)
d and are Predictable, through
ithin tolerances that admit reliable Fig.1.4

interpretation in specific circumstances'

The methodology for gas cloud predictions is well
gas a cloud will develoP and established and comprises two phases of analysis. First
e spill point under the influence of there must be established a realistic estimate of the
d will contain the gaseous maximum credible release, or spill. Second, the released
condensed water vapour (giving it gas cloud is modelled using realistic values for air
temperature, wind forces and atmospheric stability at the
Èp characteristic white cloud appearance) and air' Mixing
t¡n a¡ the cloud will develop flammable properties though location in question. From such analysis it is possible to
rnker predict with credible accuracy, the likely scenario following
much of its volume. Flammable volumes of gas and air
mixture will continue to be generated until the release of a worst probable gas release into the atmosphere.
is stopped
reed -
it travels away from the spill point the cloud will warm, 1.5 Consequences of lngress from
ing progressively less dense. As it warms to ambient
it will become buoyant in air and disperse
the Sea
ly. Pure methane is lighter than air at -107'C, but it is
Since there has never been a catastrophic penetration of a
temperature of the entire cloud, not just its gaseous
tanker's LNG tanks and such an incident has not been
component than determines its behaviour. Other
)d replicated by practical experiment, the consequences of a
components too must warm to higher temperatures before
ses of massive and sudden confluence of LNG and sea water are
vertical dispersal ensues. Meanwhile the cloud will continue
-
rters tven. not well understood.
disperse in a generally horìzontal direction, developing a
anker '"n- ;;J?
shape similar to an elong ated plume.
rull at Neverlheless it is indisputable that such an incident would
generate a gas cloud in the atmosphere having
characteristics similar to those described in section 1.4.
It is also widely accepted that a rapid mixing of LNG at
cryogenic temperatures with much warmer sea water will
induce the phenomenon of "rapid phase transition", or RPT

The term RPT describes a process in which the LNG

translates from a liquid to gaseous state at a greatly
accelerated rate - i.e. a forced rate of phase transition,
much more rapid than would othen¡uise result from a releast
into the atmosphere, unattended by mixture with water.
While there have never been practical experiments on a
scale representative of the ingress of the sea to a ship's tan
though they might also hasten the progress of the of LNG, tests with small volumes of LNG provide compellinl
^¡ ¡L^
.ì oÏ tne ,^^pas,
lnnfflammable parts evidence that RPT will indeed occur. These same
of tñe gas cloud into areas-carrying risks of
ignition. experiments suggest RPT will be accompanied by a rapid
their release of energy in the form of violent non-flammable
netration, shocks. Such experimentally derived data as does exist
is suggests such shocks could be energetic enough to
ns - e.g. threaten the integrity of adjacent structures.
ts are
ts. ln the absence of historical incident or representative
experimental data, determining post-incident scenarios
to following the ingress of the sea to an LNG tank is
necessarily speculative. Nevertheless it would be prudent fc
planners to recognise the prospective hazards of RPT.
SECTION 1

The hazard profile presented by LNG tankers in port areas is
narrow. The ships are robustly constructed and well
equipped with critical safety systems, Methane is not toxic
and presents no pollution risks to the port environment.
Hence, provided they are competently managed and
maintained, such ships present low exposures across a
wide spectrum of operational risk.
There has never been an incldent involving the penetrat
or catastrophic failure of an LNG tanker's containment
system - indeed, the safety record for this class of ship is
exemplary. Neveftheless, this safety record
the risk profile of LNG tankers presents a very serious
residual hazard in port areas if the vital structure of the
tanker is penetrated.

Major incidents, involving serious structural damage to LNG

tankers, are extremely rare. Thus the paramount objective in managi
LNG shipping operat¡ons in port area
There are a number of recorded incidents of LNG escaping is the elimination of any credible risk
during cargo transfer at loading and receiving terminals.
ln these cases the volumes were relatively small and the
a tanker's conta¡nment system bein
breached.
effects of the releases were confined to the immediate
environs of the terminals concerned.
The following sections outline procedures that may be
to analyse operational risks in specific locations and the
measures available for suppressing them,

Bibliography for Section 1

1. Liquefied Gas Handling Principles on Shþs and in Terminals 3rd Ed, 2000 - S/GZO
2. General Characteristics of Natural Gas (EN 1160) - CEN 1997
3. Safety Aspects of the Marine Transporlation and Storage of Refrigerated fuelGases - A Review of Current Practice
- S\GTTO 1995.
4. lnternational Code for the Construction and Equípment of Shþs carrying Liquefied Gases in Bulk (GC) - tMO 1
as amended.
1
5. Recommendations on the Safe Transport of Dangerous Cargoes and Retated Activities in Port Areas - tMO l gg;
6. Control of Maior Accident Hazards involving Dangerous Subsfances (EU Directive 96/82/EC - the Sevenso 11
Directive 1996).
It
ìip is

(a) System Definitions (define what objects and type of

operations to be analysed)
(b) Establish Risk Acceptance Criteria (what is acceptable
risk w.r.t. personnel, assets and environment?)

, different frequencies of hazardous events and (c)
varying quality of data for the frequency of such events.
(d)
lþnce actual QRA techniques often will vary from one
Secific situation to another. ln this case (LNG tanker
operations in ports) the essential QRA approach will be (e)
adapted to the specific risk profile of these operations.
ldentification of Hazards (what can go wrong?)
Assess the Probability of each Hazardous Event
(how often?)
Assess the consequences (what is likely to be
the result?)

Ïhere are many factors influencing the outcome of a QRA These elementary processes define the parameters of the
which have to be taken into account, such as layout of risk arising in any parlicular theatre of operations.

[e Oort, nearby buildings, population density, traffic etc. From this position it is possible to fufther refine the process
ònlpowners have little or no control over these imporlant to:
factors.
(d) Assess the potential for consequence escalation
Quantitative risk assessments cover a probability model of (How bad can this get?)
the activ¡ty with a
wide range of consequence models for
determiniñg the
risk picture.
(e) Assess the capability for effective response covering
design measures and contingency planning (What
In this context can be done to limit the consequences?)
Risk is defíned as the product of the
Frequency The final steps in the process are:
of an event and the Consequences arising
Itorn it _ i.e.
R= FxC (Ð Ranking of the ldentified Risks in terms of likely
severity.
)riaiions in application not withstanding, the methodology
'"r all QRAs entails the same fundamental elements: (g) Specification of Risk reduction and Risk suppression
measures.
 SECTION 2
There exists today a vast amount of literature on how to
pefform QRA, this chapter wjll therefore not go into furlher
detail of the technique as such, but will highlight special
areas related to LNG port operations.
(Refer SIGTTO "Guidelines for Hazard Analysis: Aiclto
Management of Safe Operations in por-t", Feb. 1gg2.)
2.2 Special Areas for Performing a
QRA of LNG Port Operations
Each porl environment will present a unique set of risk
exposures for prospective LNG operations and, thus, each
will require a specific, detailed study of the operating
environment in every case.
Nevedheless, whatever the particular circumstances of
specifìc localities every analysis will encompass two
broad areas of risk exposure:-
1. The transit to and from the marine terminal;
2. Operations at and alongside the tanker ber1h.
ln succeedlng parls of this section a generalised exposition
of how a QRA might be applied is offered, to illustrate use
of the technique in the context of LNG operations in port
areas.
2.2.1 Port Transits
Analysis of the risks inherent in the transit of a tanker to and
from its berlh must entail an examination of all relevant
factors that might lead to the tanker suffering a collision with
another ship or a fixed object, or running aground,
ln assessing the likelihood of such events the assessor
should at least take into account:
(a) The recorded incident rate for the transit passages
concerned. This should cover all vessels, especially
since there is unlikely to be any previous recorded
incidents involving LNG tankers. ln interpreting past
incidents in a port, planners should identity the
contributing factors (e.9. vlsibility, passing distances
etc.) and consider how these might also affect
LNG tankers.
(b) Traffic density, the extent of navigable water and the
incidence of poor visibility. These factors are usually
major contributors to the frequency of accidents to
ships in confined waters, irrespective
of the pafticular features of specific areas.
(c) The specific features of the transit passage in
question that mlght contribute to the operational risks
entailed. These will include all factors that could
conceivably compromise track keeping - i.e. bends
in the approach channel, tidal flows that run in
directions other than that of the track, obstructions
and isolated dangers ihat require precise and p)
controlled track alterations.
(d) Likely encounters with other ships. The geometry q1
such encounters should be analysed to assess the
chances of their precipitating a collision as a d)
consequence of mechanical failure or operational
misjudgement, on any of the ships involved at critic¡
points during the encounter.
The accuracy of any formal risk assessment will oup"no o,fidi'
the availability of past incident data, The value of such datúve
will vary from poft to porl and in some cases a well defineqs¿s
assessment may not be possible.
3cut
Whether or not the resulting assessed risk is acceptable 3:i
depends on an appreciation of the likely consequences. TtU lin
analysis must therefore be accompanied by an assessmenVoic
of the possible consequences arising from the identified ¡itir
hazards (of collision and grounding). he r
hou
Section 1 describes the resistance of a typical LNG tanker'
to the impacts of grounding and collision. Both theoretical
analysis and the experience of past casualties indicate a 1.2.,
robust level of resistance. The tanker,s double-hull
construction enables it to absorb considerable impact
energy before the inner hull and containment of the LNG ros,
ïe ,
cargo is breached, rerll
rpì
While this remains the paramount objective, any damage to,uid
the tanker will have serious consequences - both
commercially and in terms of confidence among the len,
community of porl stakeholders in the security of the transílrrar
operation.
f:i:
Hence the results of the QRA process should yield as ¿ i!st,
minimum: ìssr
(a) A high confidence in there being a low rjsk of the lou
tanker failing to maintatn track during the transit thj$s a
-
might be considered a probability of the order 1O-¿,
i:
(b) A high confidence of the tanker not encounterino
other vessels in situations that present risks of lÜe
collision -- again high confidence might be ascribed âele
value of I0-+.
 SECTION 2

also be reviewed from time to time over the life of a

terminal's operation, since conditions in the port mìght
change and with them the pattern of external threat to the
terminal and its berthed tankers.
Itry of
s the tanker
(d)
2.2.3 QRA of lntrusive Risk Exposure
na ct
criticq g There are two categories of lntrusive risk; that arising from
tanker's inner hull' intrusions threatening the physical integrity of the terminal
and berthed tankers (e.9. heavy displacement ships), and
risks cri
hese as general guida that arising from the introduction of uncontrolled ignition
of riãfit Oe n establishing an I
sources. This latter category will include every type of
;y of 17ist ex tanker transits. T unauthorised craft, irrespective of its polential for inflicting
an e taken endations. What physical damage at the terminal.
ny given set of circumstances rests ultimately on local
an rdgéments of the consequences of a particular event and (a) lntrusions by Heavy Displacement Vessels.
n áppreciation of the operational circumstances of The process of site selection (for the terminal) should
arlicular Port areas' address a site's exposure to intrusion from other craft
using the port - see Section 4.
,'i3"ÌHr"nneless other sections of this guide illustrate the
Jefined¡s¿sLr¡es that may be iaken to achieve desired standards of A QRA analysis should encompass the likelihood of
ecurity during tanker transits' These might include: traffic other ships in the vicinity (in transit or berthed at
ontrol; exclusìon zones around transtting tankers; tug adjacent facilities) presenting a threat of intrusion to
tble scorts (NB: these will be most useful when it is necessary the LNG terminal as a result of operational
;es. Tht limit the tanker's speed, so as to maintain control, while misjudgement or mechanical failure.
;smenivoiding the risk of high energy grounding) and specified
fied niting operating conditions of wind speed and visíbility. The analysis should entail an assessment of what is
he effect of introducing such risk mitigation factors the worst feasible case, based on the displacement,
hould be used in the QRA. speed and striking angle of an intruding ship. This
:anker should be established, in the first instance, before the
'etical initial site selection is made and appropriate defensive
te a t.2.2Terminal Operat¡ons actions taken if required.

;t he safety of berlhed tankers rests on two sets of defences:
-NG rose provided to ensure the integrity of LNG transfer at the
erth and those aimed at preserving the security of the
çfth and any ship that might be lying alongside. These are
dentifytbcribed and illustrated in other sections of this Guide.
ting
night here already exists extensive guidance for ensuring the
ttegrity of the ship/shore intedace and a QRA of this feature
'f port operations is implicit in the application of such
rage t0uidance to the design process for the marine terminal.
Thereafter there should be regular reviews of this
category of risk exposure to ensure that port
developments in the meantime have not introduced
intrusion risks that were not prevalent at the time of
the ierminal's commissioning.
Through this process the probability of a high energy
impaci, threatening the integrity of the terminal
structure and containment systems of befthed tankers
should be derived.

lence the process of site selection, design of the mooring
I transitrrangements, specification of the array of transfer arms and
pecification of maximum operating limits will, effectively,
letermine what the risks to the integrity of the transfer
s a ystem are and will specify those measures required to
ssure its integrity.
the lowever the terminal may remain exposed to risks arising
iit - thi't a consequence of intrusions, accidental or otherwise,
lO-4, lto the environs of the berth by other vessels operating in
le por1.
lnn )ese risks must first be assessed at the design and site
cribed election stages of a terminal,s development. They should
The acceptability of such residual exposure is a
matter of localludgement, but for general guidance
and in recognrtion of the possibly serious
consequences of a high energy impact, such events
should be more remote than 10-6, A lower risk
threshold might be accepted for intrusions that
threaten less severe damage.
(b) lntrusion of lgnition Risk.
The integrity of all defences at the termìnal rests on
the exclusion of all uncontrolled ignition sources.
"Uncontrolled" in this context means any potential
source, whether shore or sea based, not under the
direct control of the terminal management. Thus tugs,
 SECTION 2

supply boats and bunker barges are deemed to be

2.3.1 For Frequency Estimates:
controlled ignition sources if their entry to the terminal
3.3
control r description of port layout and jetty arrangement
-t.e. ,ers
tody o the emergency shutdown system. Shut down respOnSe+he
time.
Hence, any water craft entering the environs of the
. separation distances. lam
terminal presents an ignition risk. This is most potent
when transfer operations are under way and there is a )nvll
o active and passive fire protection.
heightened risk of an escape of gas at the ship/shore
interface.
. ignition probabilities
Assessment of such risk rests on a detailed understanding ¡¡t
¡ weather data
of traffic flows in the area of the terminal from which the
likelihood of an intrusion, by accident or design, might
be . traffic data
assessed. Factors to be considered should include:
o other incidents in the port area
- The proportion of port traffic in the area not under the
control of a licensed pilot.
¡ vessel integrity data, collision energy required
for
penetration
- The typical trajectories of passing traffic.
¡ collision and grounding probabilities
- The presence of pleasure craft, parlicularly those
under sail.
. safety design of a facifity e.g. fail safe systems
-
- The presence of fishing vessels.
o maintenance of a facility

The presence of barge traffic, its density, typical

displacement and factors likely to affect its control
and predictable tra.¡ectories _ e.g. currents. 2.3.2 For Consequence Estimates (coveri ng
both consequence to terminal, LNG
Such assessment should reveal the probability of an vessel and surrounding env¡rons):
intrusion. The management of such exposure, within
acceptable limits, should be addressed primarily in the site o distance to public areas and public densities (population).
selection process with residual risks being reduced to
remote contingencies managed by operational procedures _ . gas dispersion, including cloud dispersion
e.g. warnings and the vigilance of security watches. models, size l'
estimates etc.
Acceptance of residual risk is a matter for specific
determination in particular circumstances, but as a general e gas release models fiet rerease and dispersion carcurution!
guide operators shourd be satisfied that the probabirity
of an
uncontrolled ignition source gaining access to the terminar . personnel distribution
area during LNG transfer is no greater than 1O s.
. fire and explosion calculations

2.3 Sum mary of General Considerations . personnel exposure estimates and fatality calculations

Previous sections have addressed the specific operations

of
porl transits and terminal operations. But for all exercises
aimed ai establishing a eRA for a particular operation the
following elements ought always to be addressed and taken
into consideration.

È-
 SECTION 2

lg,s n¡tr Calculations

employees and public)
personnel at risk (crew, terminal

iPonseother vessels in the vicinity

.damage to material assets

environmental imPact

ibliograPhY for Section 2

Safety in Liquefied Gas Marine Transportation and Terminal Operations - A Guide for Se/f Assessment. SIGTTO,
2000.

Guidelines for Hazard Analysis as an Aid to Management of Safe Operations in Port - SIGTTO 1st Ed 1992'

Design of Onshore tnstaltations -8N1473 CEN 1997'

Site Selection and Design for LNG Pofts and Jettles - S/GffO lst Ed 1997'
Ship to Shore lnteñace - EN 1532 CEN 1997' SIGTTO
Design and Testing of LoadinglUnloading Arms - EN 1474 CEN 1997.

Canvey - An tnvestigation of Potentiat Hazards for Operations in the Canvey lslandlThurrock Area - HMSO HSE
1978.

Canvey - A Second Repoft. A Review of Potentiat Hazards for Operations in the Canvey lslandlThurrock Area,
-
Three Years After Pubtication of the Canvey Repott HMSO HSE 1981.

{G

rulation)

;, size

)
lculatior

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 SECTION 3
3.2 Approach Channels
The configuration of an approach channel designated for
use by LNG tankers should be determined by the same
elementary factors that inform the use of restricted channels
by any other class of ship. ln broad terms these address the
depth of water required, the manoeuvring characteristics of
the contemplated ships, within expected operating
conditions, while maintaining effective control of the
transiting ship. Thus:
. the ship's draught, including any increase in draught
caused by the decrease in water density.
. defined using beacons or buoys.
squat, which is related to the speed of the ship, water
depth and channel profile.
¡ reduction of under keel clearance as a result of pitching
or rolling.
o the interaction between the sea bed and the ship's
bottom as a consequence of the trim of the ship.
The width of the channel too, should be examined
throughout its length to confirm that it provides adequate
navigable water in all credible operational contingencies,
The principal determinants of channel width are the
manoeuvring characteristics of the contemplated ships
under the most severe permissible operating conditions,
together with the speed needed to sustain directional
stability and achieve the required turning momentum on
bends in the channel. Thus channel widths might vary
depending upon the expected speed of the vessel in that
part of the channel and around bends. lf a channel is
straight at its sea approach then bends before entering a
straight section, prior to approaching the ber1h, the bend
and latter sections might have to be wider than the first
section. The speed of the ship in the first section would be
expected to be greater than in the final straight section,
when the ship would not be so directionally stable.
Similady the width of bends should be determined by the
expected speed of the vessel as it negotiates such sections.
lf, for example, the bend radius is less than optimal,
because of surrounding limitations, the width should
increase to allow for the extra space needed for negotiating
the bend.
Any channel between the sea approach and the LNG
terminal should be clearly defined by navigation marks,
pafticularly the extremities of the channel. ln those areas
where it is difficult to ascertain the seaward end of the
channel, a fairuuay buoy should be considered, preferably
with a Racon fitted. The navigation marks can be in the form
of fixed beacons (preferable in locations with strong
currents) or buoys of an appropriate size, shape and colour
for ease of recognition even in poor visibility. They should
have clear markings and distinguishable lights if there are to
be shipping movements during darkness.
Leading marks (with lights for night or poor visibility
navigation) are very useful in defining the required safe trqh¡g
(usually the centreline) along a channel, especially in areai,r^.
where high currents or traffic density may periodically resq-"'
in buoys becoming displaced. Fixed on land they are ìpp
inherently more reliable than anchored in water. Nevertheflanl
their utility depends upon the distance between the front,oS
and the d emF
marks are
terminal, e nHer
e required ti/itl
monitored when navigating from one set of leads to anot6ho
meanwhile the maximum extent of navigable water can b69g
Cha
ln designing the final approach to the berth ¡t is essential imt
that there is adequate scope to reduce speed, whjle still foC
retaining directional control over the incoming tanker. Dos
It is also essential that the final approach can be made :_
without requiring rncoming tankers to be steered direcilv at
the berlh while still having to maintain significant headwaylr ftr
stab
/s st
3.3 Turning Basins
lf LNG tankers are required to be turned around, either pfii4
to bedhing at a terminal, or after depafture, the size and
shape of the turning basin should be consistent with
manoeuvring the ship under the maximum specified n
operating limits for conducting berthing operations.
Generally benign weather conditions might predicate a
smaller turning basin than would be required if strong wi the
and significant current effects are anticipated. ln general
stronger the weather and current forces the larger the I
should be.
Shallow water in the basin will adversely affect ships,
characteristics and, if bottom sediments are easily
during manoeuvring (by tugs as well as the ship), mud and
might enter the ship's condenser and cooling intakes,
resulting in loss of power or engine failure. otw
nan¿
The utility of a turning basin should also be considered 1e/elibr
an emergency anchorage in the event of an approaching isks
tanker suffering some failure or mishap that impedes its
safe progress to the berth. Similady, if the ship has to
vacate its berlh in an emergency it may be prudent for 1.4.
it to anchor in the turning basin while awaiting assistance
before proceeding furlhet especially if it has to negotiate \ll o¡
a channel passase.
l:ä
The turning basin should be clearly marked by the ,rs 61 liscc
beacon or buoys to enable the ship handlers to be very he l^
clear as to the size of the basin and itsextremities. ailun
truali
ffir
¡o11
ìea.
 SECTION 3

3.4.2 Ship lnspections Prior to Arrival in Port

afe paramou nt concern' in determining
shall be a n accePtable geometry of
an Pre-arrival inspections are a common feature of bulk oil
llv
h cha nnel for a transiting LNG trading, but not at all common in LNG shipping, where
tankers generally have been dedicated to regular trading
nker' must alwaYs be to eliminate
re the
between a small number of ports. Consequently poits are
¡b¡l¡tY of its suffering a
,front high-energY familiar with the ships and, perhaps more importantly, the
rm
mpact at any point during the transit. ships' crews are familiar with the por1s.
nce the chances of its sustaining contact
ong
However, increasingly LNG tankers are being assigned to
the bottom or sides of the channel
shi
less structured trade patterns and crew familiarity with ports
be suppressed by the application of and ports' familiarity with ships is set to dilute. Crews used
can und design, coherent with the ships' to working in a particular way in one project might overlook
aracter¡stics and control features' More specific requirements of anothe¡ and different established
customs too, may give rise to misunderstandings. Hence
ential mportant is elimination of threats Posed bY transferring a tanker from a dedicated trade pattern to an
e still irock outcrops and other obstructions that unfamiliar port might compromise the effectiveness of
)r. a r¡sk of penetration of a tankers' hull. established safety procedures at that port.
ade
rectly Pre-arrival inspections should form part of a process by
fur-ther, more detailed expositions of the criteria for which terminal managers and port authonties assure
safe approach channels see fhe bibliography for themselves that a tanke¡ new to the port, is familiar with the
tis section. critical risk management procedures established for its
operations, and that its crew are cognisant of their
responsibilities and competent to discharge them.
trrer prl'4 Operational Management of
) Tanker Transits Note: Proliferation of vetting rnspecfions in the oil trades has
h
given rise fo excesslve demands on shþs staff in poft. The
j ilaving established an inherently non-threatening operating industry seeks 1o minimise this burden by sharing inspection
data through the OCIMF's S/BE system. Shipowners and all
rnvironment for LNG tankers it is also necessary to establish
parties involved in LNG carrier inspections are urged to take
'.e a : framework of procedures, derived precisely for application
rg wincr the specific circumstances of a pafticular port. advantage of having reporis posted on this sys/em to help
prevent a proliferation of repetitive inspections.
neraltl^
,he baghe following sections illustrate a number of possible
'lements in such a framework. Some will not be
:ppropriate, or necessary, in the actual circumstances of 3.4.3 Passage Planning
s' turnitpme por1s, while others will be applicable to all classes of
Jisturbfiips irrespective of their cargoes. ln well managed ships, irrespective of type, it is accepted
ro and I best practice to actively plan sea passages berth to befth.
)s, lowever, established practice and procedures Active planning of port transits serves to highlight special
otwithstanding, a distinct framework of operational dangers, such as shallows and obstructions, and critical
ranagement for LNG ships must be expressly and control parameters such as approach speeds and critical
'r"6 16/eliberately constructed to address the assessed (residual) manoeuvres. The process thus provides for the ship's bridge
rching Sks in specific port environments. team a clear picture of what lies ahead of them, how the
ls its port transit is to be accomplished and what is requìred of
to each of them, in ensuring the plan is executed in a
for 1.4.1 Quality Verification processes controlled manner.
;tance
Active planning is calculated to provide continuous
monitoring of a ship's track, early warning of deviation from
plan, rapid and effective response to deviations from track
and the approach of dangers - e.g. collision risk. Expected
speeds also should be marked for each part of the transit.
No tanker should be committed to successive stages of the
transit unless speed and position in the channel conform to
plan and, if meeting tugs, their number and readiness has
been confirmed.
þerational
lualitV assu
must include
ers and the
'ort service s to and from
ea.
SECTION 3
3.4.4 Abort Procedures
Formal planning of port transits should include
contingency plans for aborting the transit and securing the
safety of the tanker - e.g. by placing it in a temporary
anchorage or returning to sea.
It is essential that the port transits of LNG
tankers be actively planned in the manner
outlined above. Without this process there
can be no assurance that the transit will be
conducted under adequate control, nor can
there be any assurance of the ship being
able to respond effectively to unforeseen
cont¡ngenc¡es. Without a well prepared
plan, a tanker's safety will rest entirely with
the one person directing helm and engine
movements. A single error on his part may
then go undetected and thus place a tanker
in needless jeopardy.
3.4.5 Management of the Port Transit
(Bridge Team Management)
Having a plan is essential but it will be ineffective unless
progress of the vessel is continuously monitored against the
plan. This is the function of the bridge team who should
ensure that the guidance given by the pilot is appropriate to
the position and intended movements of the vessel, taking
into account any dangers to navigation in the vicinity of the
vessel and along its intended track.
The aim of bridge team management is to create a proactive
culture for managing the navigation, one in which the master
and pilot are fed the information they require in advance of
an intended manoeuvre and given adequate warning of
developing situations that might undermine the integrity of
the plan for the passage, Thus all officers on the bridge play
active contributory roles in piloting the vessel, with the
master in a supervisory or managerial role.
A regime of disciplined bridge management is especially
important when a pilot is on board. lt ensures that his
actions are effectively monitored and challenged where they
appear to deviate from the passage plan or the expectations
of the bridge team.
Note: The principles of bridge team management training
are set out in a number of industry publications, two of the
most comprehensive being the ICS publication "Bridge
Procedures Guide" and the Nautical lnstitute's "Bridge Team
Management". Bridge team training is available in a number
of establishments throughout the world, drawing on the
experience of the aviation industry in fostering a team
approach to bridge operatÌons in port.
Professional standards and experience profiles among
vary considerably from port to por.t, yet it is essential S
be familiar with handl ing characteristics of the ships they
serve. LNG tankers are rare in the world's merchant fl ado¡
and it is unlikely, when operations are first introduced in
port, that its pilots will have had experience of them. pr(
This is especially important in the case of LNG tankers
nearly all are still steam turbine driven while the bulk of
world's merchant fleet is powered by diesel engines.
turbine propulsion has markedly slower response times
itior
those of the diesel engines common in all other classes
ship. Before committing their ships to the port transit
face
masters must brief pilots on the handling characteristics
their ships, discuss the proposed passage plan from the
station to the befth and assure themselves that the plan
coherent with their ships' capabilities.
1
Before LNG operations begin at a port
no prev¡ous history of the trade, it
prudent for simulator training to
provided for pilots and, perhaps, a
masters. Such training would a¡m
ensure all involved parties are thoro
au fait with the proposed operat¡on and a
pract¡sed in handling emergency
and deviations from the plan. tra
It may be preferable to designate a specialist team of
ra
for LNG operations but even then, periodic refresher
recommended to assure their continued competence.
3.4.7 Limiting Gonditions for Operations
Viftually all porls in the world establish limiting criteria for
operations when they experience severe weather or bad
visibility. The limits applied to LNG operations should also
contemplate the high wind areas associated with such
and the characteristics of their propulsion plant.
should also recognise the wind speed limits applied to
operation of loading and discharging arms. These will
generally be set lower than wind speed thresholds
applied to restrict vessel movements in a port - hence it WS
may sometimes be prudent to delay porl operation until
wind speeds are reduced to levels that admit cargo
As a general principle there should be no impediment to C(
conducting LNG operations at night - though the unique
circumstances of particular ports may sometimes
 SECTION 3

'bommend
such restrictions' Often there
is less traffic 3.5.3 "Moving" Safety Zone
this courd present a transitins tanker
r"äm;i;iÃignt uno
y everyir.-fi lo*", probability for encountering other ships' It is sound practice to establish a cordon sanitaire or
ã
ificate. exclusion zone around a transiting gas tanker. ln this way
an area of sea space is established around the tanker into
which no other traffic is permitted to enter. Hence the
Defensive Procedures
i?r:iT'5 special tanker's progress will never be immediately hindered by
encounters with other traffic, nor will it encounter traffic
utlined in 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 the
having the potential to penetrate its hull.
leared of Potentialthreats and,
assure the qualitY of oPerating
LNG tanker transits will be
The dimensions and shape of an exclusion zone should be
determined in the context of the specific conditions of a port.

etermination, in the context of
measures are required. Such
comprise of direct intervention
orities exert control over some or
progress through the Port.
rthe pif
plan isi.s.1 Vessel Tratlic Systems/Vessel Traff¡c
ln a port with a narrow access channel it is sound practice
to prevent traffic entering the channel in the opposite
direction while a gas carrier is in transit i.e. preventing an
'end on' encounter. ln exceptionally long access channels it
may be acceptable for traffic proceeding in the opposìte
direction to proceed so far and then stop in a 'passing
place' but in all cases the transiting gas carrier must have
priority.

lnformation Schemes Where traffic is proceeding in the same direction as the

t withhese schemes monitor traffic flows within a port and issue
it i$vice to transiting ships on the movements of other traffic
O 6rt the area.
, tugh"u are shore based with VesselTraffic System (VTS)
m tOperators observing traffic on radar and advising other
)ughlyaffic, by radio, of movements within the area. Recently
1d ¿¡6eveloped Automatic lnformation Systems (AlS) may have a
rçlg¡ggrowing role in the future - providing the same service.
tanker the zone may extend some 1 to 2 miles ahead of the
gas carrier, a distance determined by the distance required
to bring the following gas carrier safely to a stop. Traffic
following the gas carrier should be excluded for a similar
distance, allowing scope for the gas carrier to slow down to
manoeuvre without it being impeded by the approach of
following ships. ln general no gas tanker should be
overtaken in a channel, regardless of the width of the
channel. ln general, traffic should not cross closer than
1.5 miles ahead or 0.5 miles astern of a gas carrier.

_or transiting gas tankers, who must avoid threatening ln some circumstances it may be prudent to deploy a patrol
ncounters with other traffic, the advice flowing from such a craft to escort a transiting gas tanker. This may be either a
f oilots ervice can be critical to their security in porls having dense small craft that can patrol well ahead of the gas carrier
rainino pd random traffic patterns. advising other traffic to keep clear, or a tug that can enforce
)e. "l the zone by deliberately putting itself between an
approaching vessel and the gas carrier. ln some ports a tug,
i.5.2. Traffic Separation Schemes of sufficient power to assist a gas carrier lo turn in the case
s of emergency, is preferred. A tug need not necessarily be an
iaffic separation schemes 'escort tug', capable of assistìng the gas carrier at fulltransit
ftSS) are often very effective in
speed, but one of sufficient power enabltng it to alter it's
trajectory at low speeds.
SECTION 3

Bibliography for Section O

1. Port Marine Safety Code - IJ.K. Dept. of Transport. 2OOO

2. Maritime Structures Pa¡fs 1,2 and 4, 856A49 - BSI, lgg4.
3. Aids to Navigation Guide - |ALA, 1995.
4. Approach Channels - A Guide for Design - ptANC, 1997.

5' Optimal Lay-out and Dimensions for the Adiustment to Large Shíps for Maritime Fainuays in
Sha¡ow Seas, Sea
Sfrarts and Waterways. ptANC, tggo.
-
6. underkeel clearance in Maritime Fairways with Hard Bottoms.
- plANC, lggs.
7. Bridge Procedures Guide - lCS, Srd Ed 199g.
8. Guidelines for vesselrraffrc services. - lMo Resolution A.578(14), l986.

1l
S

ll bt

fhes
It thr
orm
;truc
.leyo

cfa
 SECTION 4

A ferminal Site Selection

attached to LNG operations in poft areas is
|- the location of the tanker berth(s), The
sequent profile of risk for tanker operations;
un-befthing manoeuvres; proximity to other
port traffic and external ignition sources.

port areas, the site

lnvariably, and especially for receiving terminals located in developed
selection process is formed by many considerations other than the risk implications for
Ianker operations. Availability of suitable land for the installation and the effects of
associated local planning laws, constraints arising from the infrastructure of gas
distribution and usage from the terminal and many other factors will weigh heavily in the
selection process - not least constraints of acceptable cost.

Therefore, compromising some or all of the principle criteria for site selection is often
unavoidable'

Nevertheless, the reality of compromise notwithstanding, no site should be selected for an

LNG terminal that produces unavoidable potential threats to the security of its associated
tanker operations thereafter, for as long as the terminal will operate, Such risks, accepted
as routine at the inception of a terminal, even if they appear remote in the first instance,
will inevitably come closer to realisation as the installation operates over its intended life
span.

1.1 Elementary Griteria
he specification process for constructing an LNG marine
êrminal is a well established discipline of civil engineering,
timilar in many respects to that used for developing marine
¡edhs for other classes of ships and oiher shipping
¡usinesses. Essential specification of the layout of the shore
frminal - its LNG storage tanks, gas processing plant etc. - the terminal.
Vill be determined by national and local planning
will set the parameters, among other
aration of the shore installation from
sites and populated areas in the public
The safety and security criteria forming the site selection
process therefore fall into two categories; those that address
operations at the terminal when a tanker is transferring LNG,
and those that have a bearing on safety in the wider pod
environment. This latter category addresses hazards that
might arise for LNG tankers transiting the port, threats to
them while bedhed and hazards that might arise for other
poft users as a consequence of LNG transfer operations at
4.2 Terminal Operat¡ons
(Basis of Design)
Fundamental criteria that effectively set the risk profile for a
marine terminal are established in the "basis of design".
These are the operating limits for the terminal and the range
of ship types for which berths are to be provided.

4.2.1 Envi ron mental Cond itions

Established civil engineering practice will address the

sustainability of the marine terminal structure in the local
climate - usually by reference to the severest expected
weather (100 year recurring storm).

à
tu
 SECTION 4

Howeve¡ managing tanker operations requires detailed The functions of the breasting dolphins are:
studies of more common weather conditions, to determine ': Ma'
what is the likely frequency of 'down time, - that is the . to absorb the berthing energy of the ship. ),00(
frequency of weather conditions that do not permit tankers o to suppotl the ship alongside a berth. uind
to berth or operate while alongside. Jetty mounted transfer illa h¿
arms and ships' mooring outfits are both designed to
operate within prescribed maximum wind forces. lt is
necessary to establish beforehand that these limits will not
normally be exceeded.

Sea conditions too have an immense impact on the long-

term risk profile of a terminal. Cerlain dynamic forces
induced in a tanker's mooring system can undermine its
effectiveness and wave induced movement in a berlhed
tanker can create excursions in the ship/shore connections
of the transfer arms.

Extensive data on climatic and wave conditions are therefore

essential for ensuring that tankers can safely berth and
remain alongside the terminal without compromising the
effectiveness of mooring systems, the design limits of the
transfer arms and the maximum designed excursion of the
manifold connection of the transfer arms.

The basis of design must therefore be formed by detailed

studies, preferably confirmed by simulated testing, that can
confidently predict the operability of the planned terminal in
the prevailing wind and sea conditions.
4.3 Port Operations (Manoeuvres) ù

For furfher, more detailed, expositions of the criteria for

establishing safe approach channels see the bibliography for
this section.
4.2.2 Functionality and Design
Safe tanker operations at a terminal depend crucially on
secure moorings for the ships (see section 5). lt is therefore
critical to the long-term security of operations that, in
selecting a site for the terminal, there is sufficient flexibility to
accommodate the full range of ships likely to use the facility.
The number and arrangement of mooring dolphins and the
array of transfer arms must in fact be suitable for all likely
sizes of ship. There should never be a need for a ship to
have sub-optimal mooring restraint because it is not
possible to achieve effective leads for its mooring lines, or
provide evenly distributed and adequate load bearing
restraint for its flat side.
Forces transmitted to the jetty structure during berlhing
manoeuvres should also be discounted in the design.
Calculation of the berthing energy should normally conform
to established methods (e.9. BSRA or ptANC). The
designed absorption capacity of the fender aI SO% fender
compression (and 0o berthing angle) should be greater than
the envisaged berlhing energy. Hence it is recommended
that no fenders are direcfly supported by the structure of the
loadi
in ca
high.
spee
The process informing the basis of design, described
is essentially concerned with providing a safe berth for
tankers. A bedh that can be safely approached and ture
tankers can be securely moored without compromising
integrity of the ship/shore intedace, within the specified mat
operating limits of the terminal.
Such factors inevitably will influence the selection of the
terminal site, but othe¡ equally compelling, determinants
must also form the selection.
4.3.1 Berthing Manoeuvres
Given the designed load bearing llmits of the berth the
practicality of conducting safe berthing operations must bf
established beyond any reasonable doubt. The orientatiofl
a befth in respect of a tanker's approach track must be
considered in relation to the approach speed and the
concomitant ability to maintain control over the manoeuvr¿
at all stages, up to final contact with the dolphins.
ln viftually all credible operating conditions the fjnal
approach speed of the tanker will be insufficient to maintait
effective directional control - hence tug assistance will be
essential. This should be specified in terms of the power
required to maintain control over the tanker under maximrJl, B
tri
permissible operating conditions, assuming loss of the
rm , il'
tankers' own main propulsion

1-
 sEcTroN 4

feasibility of conducting routine operations within acceptable

operating limits. Dynamic realtime simulations are strongly
recommended, particularly to validate contemplated tanker
manoeuvres and the effectiveness of the mooring system.

4.3.2 Departure Manoeuvres

Departure manoeuvres, though generally less problematical

than berthing because they do not involve managing
contact with the bedh, should nevertheless be planned with
the same care. lt is still essentialto maintain complete
control over the tanker at all stages of the operation and to
have assurance that control will not be compromised by
loss of a tanker's main propulsion.

4.3.3 Emergency Evacuation - Use of Tugs

re boulsion fitted in the tugs. ln sheltered harbours a number It is common practice for terminals to contemplate
;alculatifi smaller tugs may be more appropriate, while exposed
emergency depadure manoeuvres for tankers - often
)ads giucations are better served by a smaller number of larger
associated with scenarios involving fire in the terminal.
shiP tore powerful tugs. Typically such a contingency will be anticipated by requiring
;d by
the tanker to be berthed with its bows headed seaward.
lote; The long term practicalities and costs of dredging
However, such a procedure, in itself, may not be sufficient to
hould be taken into consideration at the outsel. Silting
safely evacuate a berth in an emergency. ln cases where
rogressively reduces water depth and shíp manoeuvrability'
tankers are not equipped with transverse thrusters and
S)
'
tVG shþs are generally powered by steam turbines.
where tugs are not readily available, an emergency
xcessive sediment sucked into the main condenser can
departure may be difficult or impossible to achieve. lndeed,
where wind and current forces are tending to press a tanker
to a berth, or where the transverse thrust of its propeller
tends to turn it towards the berth, escape without tug
assistance is not a feasible option.

4.4 External Threats

(Protective Location)
The operational integrity of a marine terminal
notwithstanding, the security of LNG operations can be
exposed to external threats, arìsing from the activities of
other port traffic and adjacent industrial sites. Such potential
the threats must be evaluated in the site selection process for a
must b gas terminal.
3ntatioí
--------¡-
st be
:he a.a.l@l Passing Ships
noeuv(
ldeally LNG marine terminals should be sited away from port
fairways used by other ships. The most effective form of
protective location is one where there is no possibility of
mainrol other ships approaching and threatening the security of
will be moored LNG tankers. Such security will be obtained by
)ower locating the terminal in a remote area of a poft devoid of
Driving engines other developments, or in an exclusive dock area, not
lìî'''') ahead pushes bow
on to berth
frequented by other port users. Even when protected from
the threat of approaching ships, the berth ought also to be
free from wave effects generated by passing traffic.
Fig.4.1
 sEcTroN 4

ln reality it may be impractical or impossible to achieve this

level of security in siting a terminal. Circumstances may OC dete
dictate that some degree of exposure to other porl traffic is erati
unavoidable. ln such circumstances the risks attaching to
such exposure must be actively managed within tolerable
Qolve
ìerer
levels - i.e. levels that exclude the possibility of a high-
_\ sets'
energy impact on the berth, sufficient to threaten the
I -
containment of a berlhed tanker or the topsides of a jetty. ;SESS
This principle should be rigorously applied. :COUf
ty
ano€
4.4.1(b) Speed Restrictions for Passing Ships rndu,
rmln¡
trren
A large vessel in transit displaces a large volul¡e of water.
The resulting surge is proporlional to the size and speed of
p(
the vessel and the width of the channel. The surge will Fig. 4.3
lure
generate a dynamic loading on moored ships in the vicinity,
ld fa
a loading that could cause their mooring array to fail. Total
break outs from berths, with accompanying serious
consequences have occurred as a result of this
a.a.1þl lgnition Risk rch ¡

phenomenon.
The effect of passing ships can be especially pronounced at
befths recessed into the shoreline as a cutaway - the
dynamics of the pressure wave of a passing ship are
magnified when directed into a confined area.
Whatever the circumstances, no terminal should be sited on
a bend in a shipping channel such that, inevitably, the
trajectories of transiting ships pass through the terminal as
they negotiate the bend. (See fig. 4.2).
ptrre
All poit traffic, irrespective of its potential to inflict damagg'bntir
on gas assets, presents an ignition risk. mjl¿
Snsls
Hence, the issue of physical protection notwithstanding, ydro,
porl traffic must be excluded from the envjrons of an LNG'mo,
marine terminal. The extent of the exclusion zone '!,tp n
established around a terminal is a matter for local llc t
determination, in the context of the prevailing conditions. lghet
Howeve¡ an assessment must be made of the size of thr-
maximum credible spill of LNG during transfer operations
and the likely pattern of dispersal for the resulting gas clori
The geometry of the projected cloud, together with a :
prudent additional margin, should inform the determinatid,
of the exclusion zone. ".

RISK
TRAJECTORIES
--> Prudent siting of the terminal will facilitate the effectivenest,
/ INWARDTRACK of an exclusion zone. Locations that already attract other.
.à
craft, including pleasure craft and fishing vessels, are t
inherently unsuitable for LNG terminals. ln such I
circumstances enforcement (of the exclusion zone) is highl
oureou¡ro / problematical and, even with strenuous enforcement effor4t-
/ may ultimately fail.

4.4.2 Adjacent Berths and Operat¡ons

Fig.4.2
Similarly, whatever the prevailing circumstances, no terminal
should be sited in a position that admits the possibility of its
being approached by heavy displacement ships, having an
inherent capability for penetrating the hull of an LNG tanker.
Where such encounters are possible a protective barrier
should be erected to shield the LNG terminal. (See fig. a.3)
lf this is not feasible then heavy displacement ships shouid
be conducted through the area with a tug escort sufficient
to prevent collision with the terminal, in the event that
steering or propulsion is lost on the transiting ship.
Exposures to other traffic and intrusive ignition sources aro
inherent in a terminal's proximity to other industrial sites afl
their associated marine terminals.
Hence injudicious siting of an LNG termlnal, in proximity t0
an adjacent industrial site, will invite inflated risks of ship
encounters and (uncontrolled) ignition sources.
ln developed port areas it will often be impossible to
eliminate the risks of encounters with shipping serving ¡
adjacent industrial sites. The site selection process must 7
therefore examine the patterns of these adjacent operatiof
 SECTION 4

---------\ldetermine precisely what risk will be posed for LNG
ierations. Of paramount importance is the type of shipping
-- <íèúolved and the critical question of whether it has an
capability of inflicting catastrophic damage on gas
-\erent
_\ jsets.
ssessment of the shipping risk must therefore take into
;count the displacement of ships manoeuvring in the
----------cinity of the LNG terminal, the pattern of those
ranoeuvres and the conditions under which they are
tnducted. Heavy displacement ships moored at adjacent
rmjnals that are themselves affected by high winds and
trrent effects carry a risk of breakout and uncontrolled drift.
potentialfor: damage to the terminal or berthed tanker;
rilure of control during bedhing or un-berthing manoeuvres;
rd failures at adjacent berths, must be formally assessed.
-îe
uch assessments should be formed by an understanding
practices of adjacent terminals and ships. lt
f the operating
:damagg entirely possible that operations involving non-toxic and
on-flammable materials will be conducted in a manner
onsistent with a lower risk threshold than LNG or other
anding, ¿ydrocarbon based operations. Hence their overall security,
f an LNGì mooring systems, ship/shore cargo handling systems and
hip manoeuvring, may be less than those applied to the
I NG terminal itself. Thus they could present a generally
¡ditions. :igher inherent rísk than adjacent hydro-carbon facilities.
ze of
erations
gas clot
:ha
rminatior
Special consideration should be given to potential ignition
risk from adjacent operations. Certainly where non-
flammable materials are being handled, a high level of
ignition risk should be assumed.
The proximity of adjacent operations is therefore of critical
importance to the security of LNG terminals and tankers _
but is, of itself, not the only or even principal determinant for
selection of a safe site.
Close proximity to a site handling toxic or flammable
materials, on which all ignition sources are rigorously
suppressed, may pose a more acceptable risk exposure for
the LNG terminal than a site with high ignition risks, located
at a more remote distance.
Similarly, ships that are moored with a high degree of
security in close proximity may pose a lesser hazard than
those insecurely moored at a greater distance.
lndeed, the security of moorings on adjacent ber.ths
notwithstanding, their near proximity may be less relevant
than the actual trajectory followed by a drifting ship. lt is
entirely possible, given the particular circumstances of two
berths' relative configuration, for a ship breaking out at a
more remote distance to pose a greater threat to the LNG
terminalthan one breaking out close by.
Wind effect brings tankei s
head onto wind

;tivenes Current effect

;t other between tanker and berth
are I
) is highl Oil Tanker Breaking Out in Close Proximity
rnt

Fig.4.4

Wind force initially

rces arê pushes ship across
sites atr the current
Wind force on high
sided ship, induces "SAlL" +
effect - increasing forward
:imity to mo
ship

l Current
ng
must J
leralioî
Container Ship Breaks Out Bemote from LNG Berth

Fig. 4.5
 SECTION 4

It is therefore not possible to specify general criteria for the
separation of LNG operations from adjacent berths and
sites. Determination of what is acceptable in specific
circumstances must follow from an assessment of the actual
risks posed by the operations of adjacent sites, in the
particular circumstances of individual por1s.
4.5 Port Development
Ports have dynamic environments; the pattern of their
operations changes over time and with that the profile of
their operational risks also change. Hence a site selection
process, conducted with a careful consideration of the risks
posed for LNG operations, can later be confounded by
subsequent developments, long after the LNG operatión is
established.
ldeal solutions may not, however, appertain. The
process must therefore consider prospective
and the possible future consequences for LNG o
dsk. Where there is undeveloped land in the vicinity of
prospective terminal , or where access to a terminal
is
way of common user shipping channels there must be
possibility for fut ure poft developments that could
undermine the security of LNG operations.
Such considerations should weigh in the site selectjon
process, as well as consideration of imm ediately
risks. ln contemplating possible future changes to risk
profiles, planners should also consider the range of risk
management options available to them. lt may, for
be entirely possible to manage the risks attaching to
appearance of heavy displacement shi ps in the vicinity,
using the available traffic control mech anisms

There is a general tendency for ships in all trades to be
made bigger. Por1s, being competitive commercial
undertakings, are committed to attracting users and
retaining their businesses. They will therefore be keen to
accommodate more traffic and larger ships, if users so
desire, and to make the maximum commercial use of
available land. Hence the operating environment in which an
LNG terminal is constructed may change over time and with
it the risks posed for LNG operations may also change.
The site selection process must be conducted with an
appreciation of this reality. ldeally the site selected will be
one whose operations remain indifferent to subsequent
developments within a por1. For example, where the terminal
site is one that excludes any possibility of unwelcome
adjacent developments, or where the marine terminal is
located in a position that rules out threats from other
shipping, irrespective of size or type. The proximity of
passenger ship terminals, for example, would increase social
risks by inserting a much higher human risk factor into the
port area.
On the other hand it would not be prudent to dlscount
prospects for later developments that promise im
prosperity for a port, or that are demanded by other
Such developments will be very hard to resist and
therefore be anticipated at the outset. Hence, the
for a changing risk profile must be part of the site
process and entail an assessment of future capabilities
managing those exposures.
Benefits of a rigorous site selection process
the issue of the long-term management of an LNG port
operation will remain. The vital needs of security for the
operation and the integrity of the procedures developed
manage it must find expression in contingency plan nrng
docum ents and, above all, be expressed in relati onships
with port authorities and service provi ders. This latter
is more fully developed in Section 6.
F-

Bibliography for Section 4

The lnternational safety Guide for oitrankers & Terminals (tscoTl) - tcs, octME lApH, 4th Ed, 1996
2. Safety Guide for Terminats Handting Ships carrying Liquefied Gases in Butk
- oCtMF 2nd Ed lggs
.). lnformation paper no. 14 "site setection and Design for LNG Po¡7s and Jetties".
- s/Gro 1st Ed 1gg7.
4. lnformation paper no. 1! "A Listing of Design Standards for Liquefied Gas Terminals
(referencing porfs and
Jetties)" - SIGTTO 1st Ed 1997.
5. Safety in Liquefled Gas Marine Transpoftation and Terminal Operations
- A Guide for Se/f-Assessrnen¿.- STGTTO
1999.

6. Siting of Terminals (Case Study) - Beftrand LANQUETiN, LNG TECH tt Asia 200o, Kuata Lumpur,
7. Bontang Future Sr1LNG/LPG Dock: a Design which Achieves Very High Levels
of Flexibility, Safety and
Bertrand ?'NQUETIN, LNG 12 Conference, pe¡ih l9gB.
 SECTION 5

Gas Transfer Operations

S túlanaging
ave received more detailed attention in
any other aspect of LNG shipping operations.
ity of a
ral is hip/shore intedace is secured to a degree that
rst be fer operations a non-credible event - provided
I pplied,

,ction
liquefied gas transfer operations are well
d e bibliography for this Section). The elements
> risk to provide for those having responsibitity for
of risk secure transfer operations are achieved, and
r originating in the wider environs of ports.
t to the
cinity,
This awareness is crucial for effective management of LNG terminal operations since,
catastrophic penetration of a tanker's hull excepted, failure of the LNG transfer system
- ;ount
presents the biggest single risk of LNG escaping into the atmosphere of a port. lt is essential
croved
ler
that all terminals designated for the transfer of LNG fully comply with recommended criteria.
To do othen¡uise needlessly increases the risks of interface failure and consequential release
of LNG,

rilities

;t ttre Elements of lnterface

thstand[,
Security Supporting these defences should be ancillary and
complementary measures; setting maximum operating limits
ì of the risks of LNG escaping at the ship/shore
for LNG transfer and tanker berthing; ship/shore operational
99d
tn".
,opr"ssion
controls; personnel training and emergency response
ìt .t"rfu"e is achieved by a series of defences for the transfer
rloped tÇ-". procedures.
These defences are: secure mooring for the tanker,
nnlng constrained within pre-
nshiPs ut-down and quick release
Finally, the marine terminal and any bedhed tankers must be
:ter toPi protected from threats to their defences intruding into their
s, and Powered Emergency
immediate environs from without. The most common potential
elease Coupters (PERCS).
threat being posed by the intrusion of other port traffic.

STARBOARD SIDE MOORING

I 6à
VV
s25ool¿umol¿em
6;)
1 6000 50500 48000
@
I @
T 3smo

o
z a
c
I

Fig. 5.1
 sEcTtoN 5

Succeeding parls of this section describe each of these

elements in more detail.

5.2 Effective Mooring

The foundation of safe LNG transfer is secure mooring of
the berlhed tanker. without this the security of the transfer
arms is compromised, rendering all LNG transfers exposed
to an inherent risk of LNG escape through rupture _ with the
defences of emergency shut down and ÞfnCS remaining to
mitigate the consequences. It is essential that proposed mooring arrangements
for 11
tankers be tested and confi med by analysis using
An understanding of the dynamics of ships, mooring established computer based programmes developed
for
systems has come late to the shipping industry beiñg purpose. Such analysis is critical to confirm
ttre operabit
investigated first as a necessary accompaniment to the the berlh envisaged in the basis of design.
introduction of very large oil tankers in the late .1960s.
The
high volume cargo transfer rates associated with these
ships
required hard and relatively inflexible arrays of transfer arms, 5.3 Gargo Transfer Systems
which in turn required the movement of berlhed tankers to
be constrained within very limited tolerances. (Emergency Shut Down - ESD)
The then unprecedented size of VLCCs also presented
previously unknown forces acting on their
moorings as a
consequence of tide and wind action on their hulls.
The principles of sound mooring practice are now well
understood within the oil tanker sector and these have been
readily applied to LNG tankers whose needs for secure
moorings are identical.
Secondary defence should be provided by two separate
supplementary systems of emergency shut-down. One E

automatically shut-down the transfer of LNG if the

Fig. 5.1 shows the essential components of an effective
moves outside a predetermined envelope (ESD), and
another that will automatically disconnect the arms
from
tanker, after the flow of LNG has ceased, if the tanker
continues its movement from its permitted envelope.
Th U
systems may be operated manually, but are designed to
operate automatically, on prompts that i ndicate a tanker
being disturbed from its berlh

Fig. 5.2 illustrates the principles of ESD operation.

A
feature of such systems is the ship/shore link
shut-down requires pumps to be sto pped and valves
on both ship and shore in a prescri bed safe sequence.
system. procedure cannot be executed automatically
unless ship rcn
and shore systems are linked
N(
Contrary to widely held popular opinion head and stern lines
contribute very litfle to the restraint of berlhed ships. That An effective ESD system, bac ff;
head and stern lines still have wide application in por.ts is array, reduces the risk of a lar
o
due more to the practice of mooring ships to flush dock negligible proporlions. Hence ler
walls, than to their effective contribution to mooring restraint. guard for LNG transfers. No such transfers should
routinelÞys1
be conducted in the absence of a fuily effective, rinked
Eshigr
Effective mooring is achieved by arrays of breast lines red
to
system. har
secure points lying within the length of the ship, at angles no
more than 15 degrees from the perpendicular to a shiþ,s
centre line.

The geometry of the mooring array is not the sole

tanker's manifold. Such devices represent a secondary
determinant of effectiveness. Both theoreticar anarysis and ESú il
system - Emergency Retease System (ERS).
I
t

I
 SECTION 5

)f
SHORE SHIP
-.s of si Detectíon system Quick acting double
for ship movement valves and PERC
herently
h
later¡als Shore Ship
ESD ESD
System System

Cargo
ESD valve arm ESD valve pump

LNG tank Shore Ship

I
side side
rnts for L[
f bre
ng Telephone c c
oped forl î õ .Ø
.o
_o
Cable reel Optical plug õ
.o
Ø
.o .2
operabili\ o ØE cf o EØ
o c
6
o c
s
D D
Hot line Hot line
telephone telephone
Modem
Modem

ìD) I
Wind direction/velocity
--- Wave height lide level
, set in ar Mooring tension
mon¡toring system Strain
eturn line Mooring tension
Mooring line display
)rimarily t
ter
Mooring hook

Fig.5.2

5.4 Jetty Operations and Control

With the ship/shore intedace secured to the maximum
possible extent and the risks of all but a minimal spill of LNG
thereby excluded, the security package for LNG terminals is
completed by a system of monitoring and control. There are
no general criteria for specifying precisely what form any
such system should take but certain salient features are
common to all well managed installations.

Principal features of an effective system are: a human

mon¡toring and intervention capability, located in a secure,
protected, location; an effective fire-fighting system;
monitor¡ng of the critical elements of interface protection and
escape procedures.

5.4.1 Control Building

A jetty control building must be provided, located at some
distance from the loading platform (where the probabilities
for spillage and subsequent fire are greatest). lts location
should nevertheless allow swift and easy intervention by
personnel to the jetty by operations personnel at any time.

)) - ldeally control buildings should be placed outside the blast

to zone. lf not then they should be constructed to blast proof
a standards. The control building should incorporate
ary accommodation for mooring teams and have a ready supply
of protective clothing and equipment.
 SECTION 5

Recommendations on the values to be used can be found

sfer of LNG - line pressures,
in regulations for buildings design (for example the
of valves in the transfer syste¡, V
recommendation "Process plant Hazard and Control f;
Building Design" from the chemicar rndustries Association).
ures. /15
) Je,
However the effectiveness of the principal security systeìaf(
should be monitored by specific monitoring svstems, '"""
5.4.2 Control Systems
Monitoring and control systems for operations on jetties
whose deslgn is based on the ,,unmanned concept,, (i.e.
operators presence not necessary on the jetty head) are
critical for the safety of transfer operations. The principal
objective of control systems should be the enhanced safety
of operations and personnel - not a reductron in jetty
manning.

The overall contror of the instailation is through a Distributed

Control System (DCS).

A schematic representation of a DCS is given in fig. S.3.

Such a system is devoted to the continuóus moniioring of

MAIN YEWMAC SHIPBOARD

JEITY POFTABLE IVONIfOR
DOCKING
DISPLÁY BOARD
DISPLAY + DISPLAY
ldr
HANDY DISPLAY
MD-5 ¡fet
DOCKING BEI\4OTE
INDJCAÎOH AT
LOADING PLAIFOBM
ina
UHFTELEI!¡ETRY L¡NK Quìt
VESSEL CONNECTION IO HANDY DISPLqY
¡fler
FIBREOPTIC LINKTO ohe
LASEH DOCKING SENSOF YEWMAC
No I BDS UHFTELEIIEIRY LINK
TO PORTABLE DISPúY

YEWI\4AC MODEIV
M[,lS INSTRUI\¡ENTAIION RACK

a
C
HANDY
LOAD CELLS CAFRY {N
DOUBLE HOOKS IX FX 1X
BDl, AD2, BD3, BD4, MD4
SYSTEIú
INTÊRFACE

LOAD CELL
INTEFFACE

LOAD CELLS MODEM

OUAD HOOKS
MD1, [¡D2, t\¡D3, [¡DS, MD6

AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT ROOM

WIND SENSOR ETHERNETTO WORKSIATION
ì
lo
al
FEPORT

LASER DOCKING SENSOH

PBINIER TELEPHONE
NEMOFK e)
No 2 BD2
a{
o'

CURRENT SENSOR
JETTY
WOFKSTATION
_ BERTHING AID
. LOÁD I4ONITOBING
WIND AND CURRENÎ
It¡ON¡TORING
PRINIER
l
MD_I HAZARDOUS AREA MOORING TEAM ROOM

Fig. 5.3

l*
 SECTION 5

UTES,
Other elements for fire defence, likely to commend
system,
themselves in a number of diflerent situations are: early
detection and swift extinguishing of small pool fires and jet
fires, and protection of gas bearing systems by minimum
ritY syslqricafions)'
separation distances set by reference to radiated heat
tems; properties.
' CCTV system: Typically three remote controlled cameras
rn three large colour monitors are
ide of the loading arms to Typical features of a fire defence inventory will be water
hips manifold, and one on an curtains to suppress heat radiation to vulnerable
nently watch the gangway). Other containment elements and facilitate human evacuation; rapid
s (dock entrance and each deck detection (CCTV and alarm systems) and early response
aybe provided with, for equipment, able to extinguish small fire outbreaks of
lstem to example, scanned pictures displayed on two other colour manageable proportions. Hence some or all of the following
stance rìf mon¡tors (the scanning is in order to reduce the number equipment might find application in applying a properly
rditionsl of monitors in the control room)' devised fire defence system.
pis
rg lines; ¡
. a fixed water curtain on the seaward front of the transfer
tions. r¡x.+.3 Fire Protection arms platform to protect arms from excessive heat
ona radiation.
', with fr"r" ur" no generally applicable criteria for specifying fire . under deck fixed water curtains on the seaward front to
,rotect¡on equipment at LNG terminals (but see bibliography protect deck platforms below the loading arms platform.
tr this Section). lnvariably terminals will be subject to
ìdependent audit by local authonties, their fire departments o two tower elevated oscillating fire water monitors,
nd such other agencies having accountability for industrial controlled from a remote fire station to cool-down of the
afety in the localitY. surfaces exposed to heat radiation.

Vhatever local regulatory criteria may be applied, the

o a water curlain to protect the gangway tower and its
telescopic part from radiated heat.
¡ErRyL¡NK rquipment outfit specified for a marine terminal should
DTSPLAY
-.flect a clear policy objective, and an accompanying o two pre-aimed tower elevated dry chemical monitors
:oherent strategy, for managing fire defences.
located on the loading platform in order to help
)olicy definition must proceed extinguishing a possible fire on a ship manjfold or on
from what is deemed either loading arms.
or practical in the given circumstances of a
's situation o fixed dry chemical fire fighting system with hose reels and
flooding system for the protection of the curbed areas on
all situations the policy should have the safety of main deck platforms.
human
as a paramount objective. The risks to human life
HANDY
D¡SPLAY
TX
must
be assessed in relation to credible scenarios of fire
. hydrants with hoses together with portable and wheeled
and feasible response strategies. Such fire extinguishers provided at different places.
may reveal different imperatives in remote, o an internationalfire connection with hose reel on the
locations than in more confined situations with loading arms platform.
proximity to adjacent
manned sites. Similarly, realistic
for fire response will be determined by a site,s . CCW, automatic flame, smoke, gas, and spill detection
lity to fire{ighting services and the capabilities with alarms system.
of
services
. foam monitors to blanket spill collection areas.
. passive fíre protection measures - e.g. site design and
materials selection.
lo
ELEPHONE
!ETWORK
Controls to operate fire defences should be established at a
terminal's main control room, as well as the jetty operation
room, to provide full redundancy for the defence system.

J
 SECTION 5
5.4.4 Emergency Removal
remotely.
Emergency escape routes for personnel are best provided in
the first instance by placing routine access points outside
the fire risk area of the cargo handling platform. Thus a
gangway tower should be located on a dedicated
dolphin,
remote from the closest loading arm. Similarly a tanker,s
gangway too, should be located some distance from
the
manifold area. Hence routine access facilities can be used
as an emergency escape between ship and shore, without
having to cross the loading platform.
Escape routes are needed too, for personnel trapped on
dolphins, to reach a safe area without passing over the
loading platform. lt is also recommended that two ladders
be provided on each outer dolphin for access to the water.
This would conform to OCIMF recommendations, requiring
two separate and remote escape routes from all working "
and occupied areas.
Emergency removal of the tanker from the berlh is an
element of emergency response plans for many terminals.
The procedures for managing such an operation, if
contemplated, must be worked out in detail for each
installation. First, its feasibílity as an operation must be
established. ls it feasible under all conditions of wind and
tide? Are tugs required? These are merely examples of
several issues that have first to be determined before
operational procedures can be established.
lf an operation is deemed feasible it may require the tanker,s
engines to be maintained in a prescribed state of readiness,
that tugs are retained in the vicinity during transfer
operations and that a minimum number of crew are retained
on board.
A critical element of a removar pran wiil be the operation
of
the quick release mechanisms for the tanker,s moorings.
Such devices may be fitted irrespective of whether or not
emergency evacuation is contemplated. Control of their
operation e consequences of
inadverien is a capability for
releasing t as pad of a
procedure
F
5.5 Protection from External Threatqo
)t
n
n
g
moorings of berlhed LNG tankers (Refer Section 4) p
3(
e
5.5.1 lgnition Risk
Ships manoeuvring to and from adjacent berths,
accompanied by tugs must be prohibited from straying
a prescribed exclusion zone around a berthed LNG
lndeed all craft not u nder the control of the terminal
excluded from this zone during transfer operations,
the possibility for spillage is most likely.
The dimensions of the exclusion zone should be
by an analysis of the likely spread of a gas cloud
by the maximum credible spill- it shoulO also be
formed
an assessment of the damage threat posed by
other
approaching to within close quarters of the terminal,
Procedures must be established to shut_down transfer
operations in the event that the security of the terminal
compromised by the intrusion of craft, not under the
di
control of the LNG terminal, into the exclusion zone.
The risks posed by adjacent land sites must be
in the site selection process. lt would be u nusual
and
serious if the pattern of these risks were to subsequenfly
change - e.g. by a fundamental change of use, that
introdu ced previously unforeseen hazards.
Nevertheless poft environments are dynamic and changi
LNG terminals should be alerl to ch anges in use of
sites that might pose an increased risk of ignition and
thereafter render ineffective such p rotections e.g
-
separation distances - that were previously deemed
adeq uate. Under such circumstances resort to local
planning enforcement procedures may commend
itself
II
L
 SECTION 5

area. Visitors and contractors are potential sources of illicit

smoking materials, portable electronic devices - particularly
mobile telephones - and tools or other materials capable of
generating incendiary sparks. Strict controls over access to
the terminal area by all personnel, whether approaching
from the land or the sea, is therefore critical to the
suppression of ignition rìsk.

Such controls should also contemplate

defences aga¡nst incursions by terrorist or
criminal groups and thus be appropriately
supported by rigorous identity vetting and
search procedures.

Safety and security procedures should also guard against

ln this context attention is drawn to the unauthorised approaches into the environs of the terminal
dangers of ship/shore bonding by waier craft of all types. Control and surveillance
nd the recommended industrY measures should be adequate for detecting such incursions,
'lG ce for discontinuing their use. while LNG is being transferred, and ìnclude procedures for
ral challenging incursions and shutting down transfer
ls, when operations if they persist.
enerally the focus of ignition risk suppression should be on
re introduction of sources from without, into the terminal
determir

formed
ther for Section 5
nal.
ansfer
rm na e
Design and Construction Specification for Marine Loading Arms - OCIME (Srd Ed 1999).

the Accident Prevention: The Use of Hoses & Hard Arms at Marine Terminals Handling Liquefied Gases - SIGTTO,
)ne. 2nd Ed 1996 (for SIGTTO Members only).
LNG/LPG Arms Protection against tvcessive Ship Movement: A New Approach For Alarms Setting and ESD/ERS
Activation - Ber-trand LANQUETIN Gastech 2000, Houston (see on SIGTTO web Members Bulletin Board).
and
lquentlY A Risk Based Approach for the Evaluation of Fire Fighting Equipment on Liquefied Gas Jetfies - SIGTTO 1st Ed 1999.
hat
Liquefied Gas Fire Hazard Managemenl - S/GrO b be pubtished 2003.

tnternational Safety Guide for OilTankers and Terminats (tSGOTl)- tCS, OCIMF (4th Ed. 1996}

of Mooríng Equipment Guidelines - OCIMF (4th Ed 1gg7).

r and
Sfandards for the Production, Storage ancl Handling of Liquefied NaturalGas (LNG) -NFPA 5gA NFPA 1996.
g.
ned The Ship/Shore lnterface - The Communication /Vecessa4¡ for Matching Ship to Be¡fh. STGTTO 2nd Ed 1997.
rcal on Shrps
i itself
0. Liquefied Gas Handting Pinciples ancl in Terminats - StGTTo Srd Ed, 2OOO.
SECTION 5

"l
d
rt
p
a

c
(

Itn

sYs
 t

li. , i,;iiì ì._¡irllrì(ìj¡ ,.1 ;,1;;l tt,lLr l;:; Critical proceriures ktr mobilising ernergency services,
triç¡gerirrg rnulual aid arrangements, personrtr_.i evacuation,
casualty hanrjling ¿lnd exiernal announcements; mulst be sel
out in the plan lt should also specify the critical actions to
be [al<en to nlinirnise the irnpact of an incJuslrial accicjent in
its immediate aflermath, lo secure the al'fected area and lo
CIy li)[a¡ns; rmn.lsi: ftie oa¡aaftr{e+ e¡f" render the environs of the accident as safe as possible.
üt&¡ 'il&re ilarr'g1es{, ürrloncierrrt t&l¿¡t c;a¡.¡ The severity of an emergency rnay range from an accident
which can be deal1, with by ship's or site personnel only, to
['Oclr',¡ltrl¿llrJil]/ ltle f'C¡ri'C.seerll, [oUrt a;üe+t¿¡ñflr:cij
one for which effective response and containrnent requires
lt)ilal, r n fr l lç¡
s;ü l o u fl ol oc¡ ¡ lcetr n.ü,r'¿¡'tr: e¡n cxle¡'¡ ss [:[ilat,il
fr
assislance from lhe community's emergency seryices, l-he
êì[6r r,¡,¡,,,t ii
¡lt.r-olil¿fr1[<1,' plan must therefore give clear directior-rs for ltte rnobilisation
of emergency services support, with conconritant guiclancc
lor the operation of comnlurrical.ions and l.he appoirionmenl
of responsibililies among the pafties in lhe chain of
command and in the cc¡mmunications system,

Yel no plan can give detailed instruclir¡ns for every

conceivable contingency. Rather it shourld provide clear
guidance as to how, when and whal to comrnunicate and Lo
which responsible pady, so that the immediate ancj

I
SECTION 6
subsequent decision making processes are effective and
apposite to the severity of the emergency being managed.
Detailed guidance for the preparation of contingency plans is
readily available elsewhere (see bibliography for this Section).
6.1.1 Roles of Port Administrations and
Service Providers
A porl may contain one or more terminals whose activities
require them to have a contingency plan. lt then becomes
essential for each of these to be integrated into the overall
plan for the port area and that their respective effectiveness
be tested through regular exercises.
For most ports the poft authority will be the most
appropriate body to co-ordinate the development of
contingency planning within the poft; ensuring that individual
plans are properly prepared, are practical within the context
of a particular port and coherent with the available
emergency response servlces.
Plans will be the most effective if developed in close
consultation with porl users, ship's agencies, adjacent
industries, municipal authorities, police, fire and medìcal
services. The Plan, having been developed, must be
communicated to all parties that may be involved in
responding to an emergency and be understood by them all.
6.1.2 LNG Tankers
A unique feature of contingency planning for marine
terminals is the inclusion of berlhed ships within the
planning and response framework.
All ships must have emergency response plans of their own
to address emergencies that might arise on board. Visiting
ships must also be familiarised with those elements of the
Terminal Contingency Plan that directly, or indirectly, address
the situation of a berthed ship durlng a terminal emergency
and the actions expected of it.
6.1.3 Public Relations
ln the event of an emergency it is essential that the news
media be provided with fast, accurate and focused
information and, in particula¡ reassurance over the risks to
affected centres of population.
Modern news reporting allows live pictures of a developing
situation to be broadcast very soon after an accident and to
continue transmission throughout the duration of the
emergency. Porl operators will have no direct control over
what is shown nor the commentaries that accompany it.
culiur
It is strongly recommended that LNq unde
ur
terminal staff, identified as prospectivq be
commun¡cators to the news media, bê Rese
g¡ven expert training by media consultants prr",
to prepare them for their role. Effective PR
is critical for the effective management o(
of an emergency. lt is the principal .I
commun¡cations route to the public and' as .l
such, will be critical for maintaining the
credibility of the operator in public a
percept¡ons.
Avoidance of hostile (public) percept¡onsì corr
is vital for maintaining an operator's ability and
to manage an acc¡dent, free from cari¡
and
politically inspired interference. Positive
percept¡ons will also be critical to ln1
re-establ¡shing normal operat¡ons after the SEV
emergency is past. saving a s¡te from rerT
acc¡dental destruction will ava¡l little if it is The
subsequently denied permission to re-start o
operat¡ons.
a
a
6.2 Local Partnersh¡ps a
lndeed the management of public perceptions and those
port authorities, other pod users and service providers
ought to be the subject of routine operational management, a
not merely an issue to be addressed in the aftermath of an
incident. People who are likely to be affected by an accident ln
should be given information about the port and the Aç
operations it conducts, including potential hazards and the di1
safety measures that are in place. Port and terminal ar
operators should be pro-active in providing this information, th
or "risk communication" and not wait until local authorities 0l
community leaders ask for it.
6
Effective risk communication goes beyond the technical
to
ability to use the best science to assess the risk and ll
to
make calculations of the assessed risk, or the ability L
demonstrate the effectiveness of state-of-the-ar1 tl
technologies and risk management measures. These things E
may be viewed as the "Brain" of the "Risk Assessment, Risl{ ir
Communication, Risk Management" triangle. Risk
Communication is the "Heart" of the "Risk" triangle.
Ç
sEcTroN 6
Full details of this process are given in "APELL for Poft
Areas 1996" published by the lnternational Maritime
Organization,
6.4 Manag¡ng the LNG Risk -
to o'Significant"
"Successful"
LNG operations have, historically, an enviable safety record.
It is a record that owes much to investment in technical
defences and to high quality management that has
recognised the crucial impodance of preserving a reputation
for responsible and safe operation.
It is, therefore, a "Successful" industry - one that has
demonstrated an innate ability to confront the challenge of
its risks and successfully manage them within acceptable
bounds.
Yet historically LNG trading has also been a specialised
niche industry with a restricted international market and
relatively few major players. lts reputation for responsible
operation, though real enough, will increasingly be tested in
the global environment; one in which LNG operations
become established in ports with no previous experience or
understanding of liquefied gas and where many new
industry players are parlicipating.
Managers of LNG operations will therefore have a greater
need to reach out to port communities - port authorities,
other users and service providers - to communicate the
risks of their operations and explaln the actions being taken
to manage these risks, the defences provided and the
protections required of others. Through the process of
reaching out, the LNG (terminal) operator moves from the
position of being "Successful", within his own industry, to
being "Slgnificant" among the wider port community. ln a
position of significance, the LNG operation is widely
understood, others are aware of its particular characteristics
and requirements, the actions of its management are
appreciated and respected, and it enjoys prestige as a
consequence of others understanding the quality, technical
excellence and professionalism assoclated with the LNG
operation.
Communication is pivotalto the entire risk management
process for the LNG terminal.
Bibliography for Section 6
1. "A Guide to Contingency Planning for Marine Terminals Handling Liquefied Gases in Bulk"
2. " Guide to Contingency Planning for the Gas Carrier Alongside and Within Porf Limits" ICS OCIMF SIGTTO 2nd
Ed 1999
3.
4.
APELL for Porf Areas 1996" lnternational Maritime Organization.
"Emergency Planning for Major Accidents" HSG 191 HSE Books /SB/V 0 7176 1695
. individual perceptions cannot change without kn owteog)
and trust.
o entrenched sectional interests will not change without
knowledge of alternatives and consequences, and the
motivation, skills, and support systems to do so.
¡ entrenched working practices and porl management
systems will not easily change unless a broad consens¡,
for change is first constructed.
r public fear and resistance will not be easily allayed - ev¡
by the most stringent laws and regulations - unless ther
is trust built on knowledge and understanding.
o regulations and prescribed procedures (for port
operations) will not function effectively without a
consensus of understanding and acceptance among
those affected.
["ftä HSi :fl :i i;:?:i'#""å',i ïil îi:x'ii,tff*r
problem, the more skilful that communication must be to
achieve consensus on the solutions.
When risk management fails it is often because of a lack ol
public and political acceptability.
Risk assessment and technical uncertainties might
sometimes be cited as the reason for failure. Yet if the
communication problem is misunderstood, the approach is
unlikely to be effective. This error usually results from lack o.
attention to the formative research necessary to understanc
the targeted audiences and the leverage points that will be
effective with those audiences - both social and
professional.
Being "Successful" does not automatically mean an
operator is accepted as "Significant," yet being "significant',
is critical for the long-term security of LNG operations in pÐ
areas. Only when there is a broad based understanding oft--
the risk profile of these operations among pori communities.
can there be assurance of the required regulatory and
procedural framework for safe operations. Similarly, only
when there is a favourable public consensus for the
continued operation of LNG facilities, based on trust, can
operators be confident of obtainlng sympathetic support
from authorities and governmental agencies.
S/GffO 2nd Ed 2001
I
o