Naval Postgraduate School: Systems Engineering Capstone Report

NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
CAPSTONE REPORT
DISTRIBUTED MARITIME OPERATIONS AND

UNMANNED SYSTEMS TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT
by
Christopher H. Popa, Sydney P. Stone, Ee Hong Aw, Choon Pei

Jeremy Teo, Licun Edwin Cai, Wai Hoe Chong, Rachel Cline,
Jiesheng Jackson Hong, Chong Khai Roger Koh, Wee
Leong Lee, Jun Jie Lim, Xinhong Lin, Shay Paz Liraz, Kai Boon
Eugene Mok, Alex W. Ryan, Boon Hong Aaron Teow,
Andrew R. Whitmer, Peter J. Winstead, and Yong Jie Chia
June 2018
Project Advisors: Paul T. Beery

Michael P. Atkinson
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(Leave blank) June 2018 Systems Engineering Capstone Report
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS
DISTRIBUTED MARITIME OPERATIONS AND UNMANNED SYSTEMS
TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT
6. AUTHOR(S) Christopher H. Popa, Sydney P. Stone, Ee Hong Aw, Choon Pei
Jeremy Teo, Licun Edwin Cai, Wai Hoe Chong, Rachel Cline, Jiesheng
Jackson Hong, Chong Khai Roger Koh, Wee Leong Lee, Jun Jie Lim,
Xinhong Lin, Shay Paz Liraz, Kai Boon Eugene Mok, Alex W. Ryan, Boon Hong
Aaron Teow, Andrew R. Whitmer, Peter J. Winstead, and Yong Jie Chia
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING

Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION REPORT
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 NUMBER
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official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
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13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
The concept of Distributed Maritime Operations intends to enable a force that is capable of winning a fleet-on-fleet
engagement through the integration of manned and unmanned systems, execution of deceptive tactics, and emboldening of
units to conduct offensive strikes. This report contributes to the concept of DMO in the 2030-2035 timeframe through the
development of an operational simulation that examines the ability for various compositions of multi-domain fleet assets to
perform tactical operations in a naval combat environment. This project studies the impact of the friendly force employment of
deception and tactics against an enemy force, and the resulting impact on the adversary’s ability to progress through the various
stages of a kill chain. Through the development and analysis of a discrete event simulation, this research investigates the ability
for naval forces in the air, surface, and electromagnetic warfare domains to contribute to DMO through the performance of
tactical offensive operations and employment of deceptive tactics. The analysis resulted in two major findings. In terms of force
composition, an increased number of missile carrying assets had the largest impact on operational effectiveness and
survivability. Tactically, the utilization of electronic jamming, coupled with the utilization of unmanned deceptive swarms,
provided a significant improvement in the survivability of friendly force assets as well as the attrition of enemy forces.
14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF

Distributed Maritime Operations, DMO, Tactical Employment of Unmanned Systems PAGES
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Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
DISTRIBUTED MARITIME OPERATIONS AND UNMANNED SYSTEMS

TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT
LT Christopher H. Popa (USN), LT Sydney P. Stone (USN), Ee Hong Aw,

Choon Pei Jeremy Teo, Licun Edwin Cai, Wai Hoe Chong,
Capt Rachel Cline (USMC), Jiesheng Jackson Hong, Chong Khai Roger Koh,
Wee Leong Lee, Jun Jie Lim, Xinhong Lin,
Shay Paz Liraz, Kai Boon Eugene Mok, Capt Alex W. Ryan (USMC),
Boon Hong Aaron Teow, LT Andrew R. Whitmer (USN), LT Peter J. Winstead (USN),
and Yong Jie Chia
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degrees of
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN COMPUTER SCIENCE
and
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
from the
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

June 2018
Lead editor: Christopher H. Popa
Reviewed by:
Paul T. Beery Michael P. Atkinson
Project Advisor Project Advisor
Accepted by:
Peter J. Denning
Chair, Department of Computer Science
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ABSTRACT
The concept of Distributed Maritime Operations intends to enable a force that is

capable of winning a fleet-on-fleet engagement through the integration of manned and
unmanned systems, execution of deceptive tactics, and emboldening of units to conduct
offensive strikes. This report contributes to the concept of DMO in the 2030–2035
timeframe through the development of an operational simulation that examines the ability
for various compositions of multi-domain fleet assets to perform tactical operations in a
naval combat environment. This project studies the impact of the friendly force
employment of deception and tactics against an enemy force, and the resulting impact on
the adversary’s ability to progress through the various stages of a kill chain. Through the
development and analysis of a discrete event simulation, this research investigates the
ability for naval forces in the air, surface, and electromagnetic warfare domains to
contribute to DMO through the performance of tactical offensive operations and
employment of deceptive tactics. The analysis resulted in two major findings. In terms of
force composition, an increased number of missile carrying assets had the largest impact
on operational effectiveness and survivability. Tactically, the utilization of electronic
jamming, coupled with the utilization of unmanned deceptive swarms, provided a
significant improvement in the survivability of friendly force assets as well as the
attrition of enemy forces.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1
A. BACKGROUND ........................................................................................1
B. TASKING STATEMENT .........................................................................2
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT .......................................................................3
D. OBJECTIVE ..............................................................................................4
E. OUTLINE ...................................................................................................4
II. DISTRIBUTED MARITIME OPERATIONS ....................................................7

A. DEFINING DISTRIBUTED MARITIME OPERATIONS ...................7
B. SCOPING THE DMO CONCEPT TO THE PROJECT .......................9
1. Domains and Focus Areas .............................................................9
2. Platforms.......................................................................................10
3. Technologies .................................................................................10
4. Tactics ...........................................................................................11
C. BOUNDING DISTRIBUTED MARITIME OPERATIONS ...............11
III. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS ..........................................................................15

A. SCENARIO ..............................................................................................15
B. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND TASKING .........................16
C. AREA OF OPERATIONS ......................................................................16
1. Environmental Considerations ...................................................17
2. Regional Considerations..............................................................18
D. ORDER OF BATTLE .............................................................................18
1. Friendly Order of Battle..............................................................18
2. Enemy Order of Battle ................................................................24
IV. KILL CHAIN AND TACTICS ...........................................................................31

A. TRADITIONAL ENGAGEMENT PROCESS .....................................31
B. KILL CHAIN WITH IMPROVEMENTS IN WEAPONS
SYSTEM TECHNOLOGY .....................................................................32
C. TACTICS AND COUNTER-MEASURES............................................34
1. Swarm ...........................................................................................34
2. Mechanical and Physical Counter-measures.............................36
3. Electronic Jamming .....................................................................39
4. Emissions Control ........................................................................43
V. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS AND PERFORMANCE.......................47

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A. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS .....................................................47
1. MOE 1: Surviving Blue Forces ...................................................47
2. MOE 2: Remaining Red Threats ................................................48
3. MOE 3: Red Threats that Successfully Complete the Find
Sequence of the Kill Chain ..........................................................48
4. MOE 4: Red Threats that Successfully Execute the
Target and Engage Sequences of the Kill Chain .......................49
B. MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE ......................................................50
1. Area of Uncertainty .....................................................................50
2. Counter-engagement of Enemy Missiles....................................51
3. Threat Time in Find Sequence....................................................52
4. Threat Time in Target Sequence ................................................52
VI. DMO MODEL AND SIMULATION .................................................................55

A. MODELING DISTRIBUTED MARITIME OPERATIONS ..............55
1. Model Structure ...........................................................................56
2. Model Assumptions and Limitations .........................................77
B. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS ...............................................................78
VII. MODEL ANALYSIS ...........................................................................................85

A. BASELINE FIXED FORCE STRUCTURE .........................................88
1. Analysis of MOE #1: Survivability of Friendly Forces ............88
2. Analysis of MOE #2: Survivability of Enemy Forces ...............94
3. Analysis of MOE #3: Enemy Force Effectiveness in Find
Sequence of Kill Chain ................................................................97
4. Analysis of MOE #4: Enemy Force Effectiveness in
Target Sequence of the Kill Chain ...........................................100
5. Analysis of Measures of Performance ......................................102
B. DMO VARIABLE FORCE STRUCTURE .........................................103
1. Analysis of MOE #1: Survivability of Friendly Forces ..........104
2. Analysis of MOE #2: Survivability of Enemy Forces .............106
3. Analysis of MOE #3: Enemy Force Effectiveness in the
Find Sequence of the Kill Chain ...............................................107
4. Analysis of MOE #4: Enemy Force Effectiveness in the
Target Sequence of the Kill Chain ...........................................108
5. Analysis of MOPs for the DMO Variable Force Structure....110
C. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS ................................................................114
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...........................................117

A. CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................118
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS .......................................................................119
C. AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH..................................................121
APPENDIX A. MARITIME WAR OF 2030 SCENARIO ........................................123
APPENDIX B. ICOM AND CONTEXT DIAGRAMS .............................................127

A. ICOM DIAGRAM .................................................................................127
B. CONTEXT DIAGRAM .........................................................................128
APPENDIX C. ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS ...............................................129

A. WEATHER CONDITIONS ..................................................................129
B. CLUTTER CONDITIONS ...................................................................129
APPENDIX D. DETAILED ORDERS OF BATTLE ................................................131

A. FRIENDLY FORCES ...........................................................................131
1. Platforms and Quantities (Variable Force Structure)............131
2. Missile Loadouts.........................................................................132
3. Missile Ranges ............................................................................133
4. Platform and Missile Speeds .....................................................133
B. ENEMY FORCES .................................................................................134
1. Platforms and Quantities ..........................................................134
2. Sensor Ranges.............................................................................134
3. Missile Loadouts.........................................................................135
4. Missile Ranges ............................................................................136
5. Platform and Missile Speeds .....................................................137
APPENDIX E. METRICS EQUATIONS...................................................................139

A. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS ...................................................139
B. MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE ....................................................139
APPENDIX F. MISSION ASSIGNMENT CRITERIA AND SCORING ...............141

A. SCORING CRITERIA DEFINITION.................................................141
B. SCORING OF FRIENDLY PLATFORMS ........................................142
APPENDIX G. DEGRADATION FACTORS ...........................................................143
APPENDIX H. ANNOTATED EXTENDSIM MODEL DESCRIPTION ..............145
APPENDIX I. SAMPLE MODEL INPUT DATA DMO FORCE

STRUCTURE— DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS............................................147
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APPENDIX J. SAMPLE DATA EXTRACTED FROM MODEL ..........................149
APPENDIX K. MODEL ANALYSIS OUTPUTS......................................................151

A. FIXED FORCE STRUCTURE ............................................................152
B. DMO VARIABLE FORCE STRUCTURE .........................................157
LIST OF REFERENCES ..............................................................................................167
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .................................................................................171
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. DMO Top Level Functional Architecture..................................................12
Figure 2. DMO Tactics Functional Architecture.......................................................12
Figure 3. Projected Operating Area. Adapted from Google Maps (2018). ...............17
Figure 4. F2T2EA Kill Chain. Source: Joint Publication 3-60 (2013)......................32
Figure 5. Simplification of F2T2EA Kill Chain to FTE Process. Adapted from

Joint Publication 3-60 (2013).....................................................................33
Figure 6. Starting Ranges of Enemy Platforms and Land-Based Missiles.

Adapted from Google Maps (2018). ..........................................................57
Figure 7. Primary Functions of the DMO Model ......................................................63
Figure 8. DMO Structure Input Variable Scatterplot Matrix—First 10 Input

Variables ....................................................................................................83
Figure 9. MOE #1: Friendly Force Overall Survivability Regression Model ...........89
Figure 10. MOE #1: Statistically Significant Factors—Fixed Friendly Force

Overall Survivability..................................................................................91
Figure 11. MOE #1: Operational Impact of Statistically Significant Factors—

Fixed Friendly Force Overall Survivability ...............................................91
Figure 12. MOE #1: Statistically Significant Factors—Survivability of Friendly

Force Missile Carriers ................................................................................92

Fixed Friendly Missile Carrier Survivability .............................................93
Figure 14. MOE #2: Enemy Force Survivability Regression Model ..........................94
Figure 15. MOE #2: Statistically Significant Factors—Enemy Force

Survivability...............................................................................................95

Fixed Force Structure Enemy Survivability ..............................................96
Figure 17. MOE #2: Statistically Significant Factors—Enemy Missile Ability to

Find the Assigned Friendly Force Asset ....................................................98
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Enemy Missile Ability to Find the Assigned Friendly Force Asset ..........99

Enemy Aircraft Ability to Target an Assigned Friendly Force Asset .....101
Figure 20. Correlation Analysis—Baseline Force Structure MOEs and MOPs—

Enemy Force Ability to Target ................................................................103
Figure 21. MOE #2: Statistically Significant Factors—DMO Structure Enemy

Force Survivability...................................................................................107
Figure 22. MOE #4: Statistically Significant Factors—DMO Structure Enemy

Surface Vessels Targeting Effectiveness .................................................109

Enemy Aircraft Ability to Target an Assigned Friendly Asset................110
Figure 24. MOP: Operational Impact of Statistically Significant Factors—

Enemy Aircraft Time to Find...................................................................113
Figure 25. MOP: Operational Impact of Statistically Significant Factors—

Enemy Aircraft Time to Target................................................................114
Figure 26. AIS Tracks in the Prescribed Area of Operations. Source: Marine
Vessel Traffic (2018). ..............................................................................129
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LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. Friendly Order of Battle—Surface Vessels ...............................................20
Table 2. Friendly Order of Battle—Aircraft ............................................................21
Table 3. Friendly Order of Battle—Sensors ............................................................22
Table 4. Friendly Order of Battle—Missiles ...........................................................23
Table 5. Enemy Order of Battle—Surface Vessels..................................................25
Table 6. Enemy Order of Battle—Aircraft ..............................................................26
Table 7. Enemy Order of Battle—Sensors...............................................................27
Table 8. Enemy Order of Battle—Missiles..............................................................28
Table 9. Mission Assignment Sample Probabilities—No Swarm ...........................73
Table 10. Mission Assignment Sample Probabilities—Effective Swarm .................73
Table 11. Mission Assignment Sample Probabilities—Partially Effective

Swarm ........................................................................................................73
Table 12. Baseline Fixed Force Structure ..................................................................79
Table 13. Baseline Force Structure Input Variables ..................................................80
Table 14. Variable Force Structure Input Variables ..................................................81
Table 15. Metrics Captured by the ExtendSim Model...............................................86
Table 16. Analysis Summary of Baseline Structure—MOE #1: Friendly Force

Survivability...............................................................................................90
Table 17. Analysis Summary of Baseline Structure—Enemy Find

Effectiveness ..............................................................................................97
Table 18. Analysis Summary of Baseline Structure—Enemy Target

Effectiveness ............................................................................................100
Table 19. Analysis Summary of DMO Structure—Friendly Force Survivability ...105
Table 20. Analysis Summary of DMO Structure—Enemy Force Survivability .....106
Table 21. Analysis Summary of DMO Structure—Enemy Find Effectiveness ......108

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Table 22. Analysis Summary of DMO Structure—Enemy Target Effectiveness ...109
Table 23. Analysis Summary of DMO Structure—Enemy Time to Find ...............111
Table 24. Analysis Summary of DMO Structure—Enemy Time to Target ............112
Table 25. Ranking of the Significant Factors for Fixed and Variable Force
Structures .................................................................................................115
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ACE Aviation Combat Element

AESA Active Electronically Scanned Array
AIS Automatic Identification System
AMRAAM Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile
AOR Area of Responsibility
AOU Area of Uncertainty
ARG Amphibious Readiness Group
ARM Anti-Radiation Missile
ASBM Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile
ASCM Anti-Ship Cruise Missile
BIC Bayesian Information Criterion
CG Guided Missile Cruiser
CONUS Continental United States
CRUSER Consortium for Robotics and Unmanned Systems Education and
Research
CSG Carrier Strike Group
CVN Nuclear Powered Aircraft Carrier
CVW Carrier Air Wing
DDG Guided Missile Destroyer
DES Discrete Event Simulation
DL Distributed Lethality
DMO Distributed Maritime Operations
DoD Department of Defense
DOE Design of Experiments
DRFM Digital Radio Frequency Memory
DTE Detect to Engage
EMW Electromagnetic Warfare
EPF Expeditionary Fast Transport
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EMCON Emissions Control
ESG Expeditionary Strike Group
ESM Electronic Support Measures
ESSM Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile
EW Electronic Warfare
F2T2EA Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, Assess
FTE Find, Target, Engage
GPS Global Positioning System
HARM High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile
ICOM Inputs, Control, Outputs, Mechanisms
IR Infrared
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
JCA Joint Campaign Analysis
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LHA/LHD Amphibious Assault Ship
LPD Landing Platform Dock
LRASM Long Range Anti-Ship Missile
MANPAD Man Portable Air Defense
MDUSV Medium Displacement Unmanned Surface Vessel
MOE Measure of Effectiveness
MOP Measure of Performance
MST Maritime Strike Tomahawk
NMI Nautical Miles
NOB Nearly Orthogonal Balanced
NPS Naval Postgraduate School
NWDC Naval Warfare Development Command
OOB Order of Battle
OPNAV Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
PACOM Pacific Command
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PLAAF People’s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy
PRC People’s Republic of China
SCS South China Sea
SAG Surface Action Group
SAM Surface to Air Missile
SEA Systems Engineering Analysis
SM Standard Missile
TERN Tactical Exploited Reconnaissance Node
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
VLRAAM Very Long Range Air to Air Missile
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In a dynamic and uncertain global environment with regular challenges between

major military forces, the expectation of a sea domain predominantly controlled by the
maritime forces of the United States cannot be assumed. The contested environments in
the maritime sphere of influence demand continued innovation with respect to current and
projected future weapons systems and network capabilities. The challenges in the sea, air,
subsurface, electromagnetic and cyber domains serve as the impetus for the United States
to continue developing innovative employment concepts and doctrine in an effort to remain
at the forefront as the world’s prominent naval power. The Distributed Maritime
Operations (DMO) concept is proposed to enhance the U.S. naval force offensive
capabilities by creating a distributed network of collaborative, integrated platforms across
all operational domains.
The objective of the Systems Engineering Analysis Cohort 27 Capstone group, as

provided by the OPNAV project sponsor, is to develop a system of systems, comprised of
both manned and unmanned systems, for employment within the Distributed Maritime
Operations construct in the 2030-2035 timeframe. The team will analyze and evaluate the
ability for various compositions of dissimilar platforms to perform tactical offensive
operations in contested environments. The team’s effort will not be focused towards the
design and acquisition of new platforms, but will instead focus on the execution of
deceptive tactics, integration of manned and unmanned assets, and the application of
tactical offensive capabilities against a capable adversary force in an effort to develop a
more lethal and survivable naval force.
A. DISTRIBUTED MARITIME OPERATIONS
In order for the team to develop a system of systems that contributes to the ability
to perform Distributed Maritime Operations, the construct for DMO requires bounding and
defining in further detail. For the scope of this Capstone project, DMO is considered as an
employment concept in which multi-domain platforms and technologies are integrated and
leveraged with the objective of increasing overall lethality, while also decreasing
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susceptibility to attack from an adversary. A system of systems that performs DMO is
capable of projecting offensive firepower and executing collective defense over a large
geographical area from a unified set of naval forces across all operating domains. The
primary principle that separates DMO as an innovative concept from current naval force
operations is the empowering of operators and commanders to exploit available
technologies and take offensive action in an engagement when capable, to strike first in an
effort to win in combat against a capable adversary.
The DMO concept considers not only offensive strikes as the primary tactic for
winning in battle, but also identifies the ability to deceive and confuse the enemy as a
critical task to achieve success in a contested environment. For this study, the employment
of DMO is decomposed into three primary functions; counter-measures, counter-targeting,
and counter-engagements. Each serves a different purpose with respect to an engagement
between opposing forces, and results in different intended outcomes. Counter-measures are
defensive in nature, as the aim is to divert enemy resources once a weapons engagement
from an enemy threat has occurred. The objective in employing counter-measures is to
distract or impair the enemy systems in an effort to protect against an enemy action that
has already occurred. Conversely, counter-targeting assumes a more offensive stance
within the confines of an engagement between adversary forces. Counter-targeting is
considered as actions that are taken pre-emptively by friendly forces in an effort to prevent
an enemy weapon’s launch from being directed towards an actual blue force asset. This
counter-targeting objective can be achieved through the employment of deceptive tactics
and operational maneuvers that divert or prevent an enemy from targeting an independent
unit or group of friendly forces. The study’s final element of DMO is counter-engaging,
which describes actions taken by friendly forces to neutralize a threat to preclude any
potential weapons launch from an enemy platform. Each of the aforementioned principles
of DMO are considered in the project as a requisite function in order to contribute to the
ability to conduct distributed operations in a challenged maritime environment.
As described with the counter-engagements, counter-targeting, and counter-

measure components of the DMO concept, the primary focus for the Capstone project
is the employment of various deception methods and tactics in an effort to influence
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the success of friendly forces in combat. The SEA-27 team categorizes these deceptive
tactics into four major groupings; swarms of unmanned assets, mechanical and physical
counter-measures, electronic jamming, and the limiting of electromagnetic radiation, or
emissions control (EMCON). Each of these tactics are examined to determine the
operational impact of these counter-targeting actions and defensive counter-measures on
the ability for friendly forces to remain operational and combat capable throughout the
duration of an engagement.
B. DMO MODEL AND SIMULATION
In order to analyze and evaluate the utility of various force architectures comprised
of multi-domain platforms, the team constructed an event-based model using a discrete
event simulation program called ExtendSim, to represent a fleet-on-fleet engagement
against a near peer adversary. The ExtendSim engagement simulation developed by the
SEA-27 team considers both friendly and enemy orders of battle in terms of the major
platforms, sensors, and weapons systems projected to be operational in the prescribed
2030-2035 timeframe. Additionally, the employment of the previously described tactics
are modeled in an effort to gain insights into the potential value of employing the deceptive
measures with respect to various survivability and lethality performance metrics.
In order to conduct a detailed analysis of the effectiveness of friendly counter-

measure, counter-targeting, and counter-engagement tactics, the Capstone team built a
simulation model focused on execution of an enemy kill chain. The model represents an
enemy threat in the surface, air, and missile domains as it proceeds through the various
stages of a kill chain, with an objective of prosecuting an assigned blue force platform. The
kill chain sequence incorporates the major functions that an enemy threat must perform
including finding, targeting, and ultimately engaging an assigned friendly force asset, as
depicted in Figure 1. The relative performance parameters of both the enemy threat and the
friendly force asset are considered when determining the outcome of a particular
engagement, to include the potential employment of various tactics and counter-measures
at the various stages of the kill chain for friendly forces. This implementation of the
deception and diversion methods at the various stages of an enemy threat progressing
through the kill chain allows the friendly force to degrade or disrupt the enemy’s ability to
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conduct the finding, targeting, and engagement functions. The application of various logic
statements and settings within the simulation facilitate the ability to examine the impact of
a DMO-centric, forward-leaning friendly force on the overall measures of success.
Figure 1. Functionality of the DMO Event-Based Model
The ExtendSim model data outputs and the application of multiple regression
analyses allows for the evaluation of both a baseline fixed force and variable force
structure. The baseline force structure consists of a fixed set of friendly force ships and
aircraft arranged into traditional action groups including a Carrier Strike Group,
Expeditionary Strike Group, Surface Action Group, and various independent deployable
units. The independent variables examined for the fixed force structure include the various
tactics such as the employment of jamming, quantities of available physical counter-
measures, EMCON assignments, and deployment of swarm assets. The variable DMO
force structure is comprised of any potential combination of surface, air, and unmanned
assets and the associated employable tactics and counter-measures. The input variables
considered for analysis of the variable force structure include both the tactics previously
described, as well as the variable quantities of platforms in the surface and air domains.
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From the analysis of these 2 major categories of force structures, the team determines the
statistically significant factors or tactics and platforms that contribute to friendly force
mission success, as well as the operational impact of employing the various groupings of
platforms and the associated tactics and deceptive measures.
C. CONCLUSIONS
From the analysis of the fixed and variable force structures, several factors are
deemed statistically and operationally significant with respect to the ability for various
force compositions to perform DMO. With respect to friendly force survivability, the
employment of jamming and deceptive swarms demonstrate a larger impact on operational
effectiveness than any of the mechanical or physical counter-measures or any of the
EMCON techniques analyzed. The application of jamming against enemy threats serves to
disrupt the finding and targeting phases of the kill chain, resulting in a delay to find and/or
engage the assigned blue force asset. The time delay for the enemy threat in the targeting
phase results in an increased number of opportunities for the friendly forces to conduct
counter-engagements to neutralize or destroy the threat prior to a missile or weapons
engagement. Additionally, the presence of a swarm creates additional contacts and clutter
that require the enemy to dedicate additional time and resources in order to identify and
classify each of the swarm vehicles as hostile or friendly. Again, this delay imposed upon
the threat is advantageous to friendly forces in terms of conducting offensive strikes and
employing layered defense against an inbound threat.
The primary missile carrying surface platforms, specifically the cruisers and
destroyers, have the greatest statistical and operational impact when empowered to take an
offensive stance in an engagement scenario. The success of friendly forces with respect to
survivability and lethality is influenced by the significant contributions of the missile
carriers in terms of both offensive and defensive weapons, as well as the capability to
contribute to a common operating and fire control network. The missile carriers provide
long-range offensive strike capability and serve as the primary foundation for the collective
defense of the force across a large geographical area. Additionally, with respect to the
integration of unmanned assets, the missile carriers can serve as a parent platform for the
deployment and control of unmanned assets.
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The SEA-27 team provides these recommendations based on the analysis of the
statistical and operational significance of the factors that contribute to the ability to perform
DMO against a capable adversary. With respect to jamming, it is critical to not only
examine the methods of employing the application of electromagnetic radiation against an
adversary, but to also consider the ability to defend against a similar attack. With the heavy
reliance on networks to communicate and share a common operational picture, the
susceptibility to jamming must be mitigated to prevent being incapacitated due to the
inability to freely use the electromagnetic spectrum. Unmanned assets and technologies,
while modeled primarily as clutter in the engagement simulation, can serve as a significant
factor for the combat capabilities of friendly forces in terms of ISR capability as well as
increased lethality. The presence of armed unmanned assets changes the dynamics of a
battlespace, with the advantage given to the operators that are able to effectively employ
the multi-domain unmanned vehicles. Lastly, if the unmanned assets are able to
successfully emulate another vessel in the order of battle that is frequently targeted by
enemy threats, the aircraft carrier for example, all other friendly force platforms reap the
benefits of a reduction in being targeted and engaged by enemy threats.
xxiv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The SEA-27 team sincerely thanks our advisors, Dr. Paul Beery and Dr. Michael
Atkinson, for their guidance and direction throughout the duration of the project. To say
that we couldn’t have completed the project without the dedication of their time and
support is truly an understatement. We also thank Captain Jeff Kline for his mentorship
and sage advice throughout our time at NPS: thank you for providing us the opportunity to
shine on camera and promote the Systems Engineering Analysis Curriculum in the SEA
promotional video!
The SEA 27 team also credits the faculty and professors of the Systems Engineering
and Operations Research departments with providing the requisite knowledge and
instruction needed to complete the capstone project. The ability for the lecturers to present
the necessary material from both the academic fields of study as well as from an operational
standpoint proved to be vital in our research and analysis. Thank you all for always being
available and keeping your doors open for questions and guidance.
xxv
xxvi
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Navy has conducted integrated maritime operations since its days
of inception nearly 250 years ago, thus the idea of ships and their associated aircraft
operating as unified groups is hardly a new concept. Force packages of surface combatants
and aircraft organized into Carrier Strike Groups, Amphibious Readiness Groups, and
Surface Action Groups have traditionally operated collectively to project power, maintain
freedom of the seas, and further U.S. interests in military and foreign policy. Tactics and
doctrine have been established and practiced over time with respect to the construct of
distributed forces that function as a cohesive fighting force, but continuous improvement
in emerging adversary technologies and platforms challenge this ability to conduct
operations in littoral environments.
A. BACKGROUND
As described in the National Defense Strategy, the U.S. has become accustomed
to “dominant superiority in every operating domain. We could generally deploy our
forces when we wanted, assemble them where we wanted, and operate how we wanted.
Today, every domain is contested-air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace” (Mattis 2018, 3).
In the current strategic environment, the assumption that the attainment of sea control is
easily achievable by the world’s most powerful Navy is now regularly questioned by
capable adversaries. Sea control in this sense is defined as “winning fleet battles in blue
water against a first class-opponent” (Hughes 1999, 10). The U.S. has not engaged in major
naval fleet combat since World War II; therefore, it is difficult to discern if the current and
future U.S. Navy is capable of achieving this description of control of the sea in any specific
region.
A report produced by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Studies titled
Maritime Competition in a Mature Precision-Strike Regime supports this idea, which
concludes that since the last major naval engagement for the U.S. “advances in maritime
capabilities have been dramatic. Yet the data on the relative value of these new capabilities
are meager, culled from minor conflicts that may stimulate as many false conclusions as
1
useful insights” (Krepinevich 2014, 3). Without tangible data from modern engagements
between present-day and projected future naval powers, the research and modeling of these
capabilities becomes exceedingly valuable in forecasting the potential outcomes of battles
against increasingly capable opponents.
With respect to gaining sea control, challenges from competitors are prevalent and
widespread, especially when attempting to access specific global regions via the maritime
domain. U.S. forces conducting operations in open seas are regularly tested by major
regional powers such as the Chinese forces in the Western Pacific, Iranian presence in the
Middle East region, and Russian forces in the Baltic and Mediterranean. Additionally, the
proliferation of progressive combat technologies exacerbates the threat faced by U.S.
operational forces. Potential state and non-state adversaries now have access to
increasingly precise and lethal munitions, and modern surveillance technology enables
enemy assets to locate and engage targets more proficiently and effectively.
Maritime operations, particularly in the littorals, will continue to be contested and

dangerous, compelling U.S. forces to operate in an increasingly dispersed and forward
leaning manner. Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) aims to address these concerns
of conducting operations that support national and strategic objectives in contested
environments. U.S. forces employing DMO intend to project greater offensive combat
capability from a unified, yet independent system of naval platforms that provide robust
capabilities across all maritime domains: sea, air, land, subsurface, and cyber in order to
gain control of the sea, especially when faced with the challenge of opposition by a near-
peer adversary.
B. TASKING STATEMENT
The Chair of the Systems Engineering Analysis (SEA) curriculum details the
project assignment for the SEA Cohort 27 Capstone via a tasking letter. The memorandum
describing the tasking of the integrated project was provided to the SEA-27 team under the
guidance of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Director of Warfare Integration,
OPNAV N9I.
2
Design a cost effective and resilient unmanned and manned system of
systems capable of contributing to Distributed Maritime Operations concept
in the 2030-2035 timeframe. Focus your design’s contributions on counter-
targeting, decoys, deception, electromagnetic warfare and the manned-
unmanned tactics associated with them to achieve desired effects in
supporting tactical offensive operations in the air, surface, undersea and
cyber domains. Consider employment requirements, power requirements,
operating areas, bandwidth and connectivity, interoperability, sensor data
processing, transfer and accessibility, logistics, forward arming and
refueling (FARPS) basing support in forward areas from CONUS bases.
Where possible, include joint contributions in the systems of systems.
Generate system requirements for platforms, sensors, active decoy
packages, manning, communication and network connectivity, and their
operational employment concepts. Address the costs and effectiveness of
your alternatives in mission areas like at-sea strike and electromagnetic
warfare. (Kline 2017, Tab A)
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Further direction on research topic areas is provided via the supplementary problem
statement, derived from the SEA-26 and SEA-27 teams’ involvement in the 2017
Consortium for Robotics and Unmanned Systems Education and Research (CRUSER)
Warfare Innovation Continuum Workshop. Members of the SEA teams contributed to the
DMO concept research with respect to combined, joint, and coalition warfare at-sea by
leveraging operational military experience and current scientific advancements from
civilian engineers across the defense and technology industries. The CRUSER Warfare
Innovation Continuum Workshop was motivated by the following problem statement:
Emerging technologies in unmanned systems; autonomy; missile systems;

undersea systems; long-range, netted and multi-domain sensors; and
networks create a new environment for operations in the littorals, on and
over the sea. This changing technology environment both challenges
traditional fleet operations and provides opportunities for innovative tactics,
techniques, and procedures to achieve maritime domain objectives in sea
control, power projection and distributed maritime operations. The Warfare
Innovation Continuum (WIC) is a series of independent, but coordinated
cross-campus educational and research activities to provide insight into the
opportunities for warfighting in the complex and electromagnetically
contested environment at sea and littorals. Unmanned systems technologies;
joint, combined and coalition forces contributions; and multi-domain C2
provide opportunities to support integrated fires and tactically offensive
operations, and further develop the concept of distributed maritime
3
operations. The larger research question is: “How might emerging
technologies; concepts; joint, combined and coalition forces contribute to
distributed maritime and cross-domain operations?” (Kline 2017, Tab B)
D. OBJECTIVE
This report details the efforts to apply DMO with the goal of improving the ability
of naval forces to function in an integrated manner when conducting operations in a
challenged, littoral environment. The Capstone team focuses efforts not on designing new
platforms or force compositions, but instead, on the employment of manned and unmanned
systems to increase combat power, specifically the use of deceptive strategies and tactics
for improved counter-targeting and tactical offensive operations. A significant area of
focus for current and future naval forces is the ability to promptly strike effectively, which
is critical to overall mission success. The ability to counter-target, or take action prior to
an adversary missile launch to prevent friendly forces from being targeted or engaged, is
also required for mission success, but is largely an evolving practice with current, advanced
technologies and demands further study. The SEA-27 group leverages academic
backgrounds and operational experience to examine the technologies and resources that
will improve the Navy’s ability to conduct integrated engagements and counter-targeting
through the employment of tactics and counter-measures. The objective of the SEA-27
team is to perform an evaluation and provide actionable recommendations regarding the
ability to perform DMO in a contested maritime setting, in support of the development of
a more lethal and survivable naval force.
E. OUTLINE
This report details the SEA-27 Capstone team’s research, modeling, and evaluation
of various systems and their respective contributions to the performance of DMO. The
organization of the report follows the sequence of events and activities the group performed
to define the tasking, identify the problem and solution spaces, develop a representative
model, and analyze the alternative force compositions in terms of the ability to perform the
fundamental principles of DMO.
The first major section of the report consists of Chapters II through V, and details
the foundational theories related to DMO. Chapter II defines DMO and the supporting
4
concepts and terminology, as well as the structure for the problem in terms of boundaries
and areas of focus. Chapter III details the context for the project with a description of the
operational scenario, environment, and order of battle for the friendly and enemy forces
engaged in a fleet-on-fleet battle. Chapter IV specifies the kill chain sequence that provides
the foundation for an operational simulation, as well as the tactics and counter-measures
considered for inclusion in the DMO construct. Chapter V details the measures and metrics
applied to the model to evaluate of the alternative force compositions and their respective
impact to DMO.
The latter half of the report describes the development and implementation of an
operational simulation to facilitate a structured analysis of varying combinations of friendly
force assets and tactics. Chapter VI describes the functionality and limitations of the
simulation, as well as the intended outputs as a function of the input variables and
associated experimental design. The discussion in Chapter VII provides the results and
analysis of the DMO force structures in terms of the previously identified measures of
effectiveness and performance. The analysis is summarized and applied in Chapter VIII,
which provides the team’s conclusions and recommendations based on the analysis of the
integrated forces’ ability to perform DMO in a contested environment.
5
6
II. DISTRIBUTED MARITIME OPERATIONS
Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) is an emerging idea in modern naval

warfare, in which publications and doctrines are still in the process of being established.
The U.S. Naval Warfare Development Command (NWDC) is developing the DMO
concept to put into effect a more offensively inclined Navy across all domains, as well as
identify and mitigate the risks of combat power capability gaps. NWDC’s current efforts
are focused on integration of existing platforms and systems with the DMO concept to
achieve maritime strategic and operational objectives. NWDC defines DMO as the
“warfighting capabilities necessary to gain and maintain sea-control through the
employment of combat power that may be distributed over vast distances, multiple
domains, and a wide array of platforms” (Coffman 2017). The primary doctrinal emergence
with the employment of DMO is the emboldening of units and action groups to conduct
offensive targeting when capable, and reduce susceptibility to attack from adversary forces.
A. DEFINING DISTRIBUTED MARITIME OPERATIONS
The development of DMO as a concept for the operational employment of maritime

assets stems from the Distributed Lethality (DL) model of achieving sea control,
specifically in the surface domain. The DL concept is comprised of three pillars: the ability
to increase the offensive power of individual warships through networked firing capability;
distribution of the offensive capability over a wide geographic area; and the allocation of
sufficient resources to the surface platforms in order to enable the enhanced combat
capability (Rowden 2017). DL not only emphasizes expanding the offensive firepower of
surface ships, but also stresses the need for more resilient and sustainable surface platforms
that are resistant to adversary targeting and able to withstand damage in the event of an
attack. The concept of DMO adopts an extended viewpoint of DL, with similar key tenets,
but expands upon these surface warfare principles to consider all domains including air,
subsurface, and cyber warfare.
NWDC describes the desired end state of employing DMO as “fleet-centric fighting
power, enabled by integration, distribution and maneuver that allows simultaneous
7
employment of synchronized kinetic/non-kinetic mission execution across multiple
domains in order to fight, and win in complex contested environments” (Canfield 2017).
This view of DMO ensures the consideration of not only traditional tactics such as
integrated air and missile defense and at-sea strike, but also the incorporation of non-kinetic
tactics such as ISR, deception, and the use of unmanned systems particularly for enhanced
capabilities in offensive tactical operations.
A primary goal of employing DMO is to allow operational commanders the ability

to distribute their fleet assets of varying capabilities as a single, united weapon system
capable of providing unit protection and collective defense, as well as the previously
discussed ability to conduct offensive strikes and fleet engagements. By leveraging
different combinations of platforms, sensors, weapons, and technologies, the combat power
of a diverse, yet unified force package can be amplified, with increased capability of
neutralizing and counter-engaging multi-dimensional threats across all maritime domains.
In order to comprehend the intended employment of DMO, several major concepts

and terms must be defined as they relate to integrated operations in a contested
environment. The following terms are extracted from the tasking and require further
delineation in order to effectively apply the respective concepts to DMO.
Resilient: “System that is trusted and effective out of the box, can be used in
a wide range of contexts, is easily adapted to many others through reconfiguration and/or
replacement, and has a graceful and detectable degradation of function” (Goerger 2014,
871).
Counter-Measures: “Employment of devices and/or techniques with the objective

of the impairment of the operational effectiveness of enemy activity. Counter-measures
can be active or passive, and can be deployed either preemptively or reactively”
(Department of Defense [DoD] Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 2018, 56).
Counter-Targeting: “Actions that friendly forces take prior to enemy missile launch
that will divert enemy resources (missiles, ISR assets, etc.) away from real targets. Counter-
targeting can include operational deceptions and decoys as well as tactics” (Kline 2017).
8
Decoy: “An imitation in any sense of a person, object, or phenomenon that is
intended to deceive enemy surveillance devices or mislead enemy evaluation” (DoD
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 2018, 63).
Deception: “Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military, causing

the adversary to take actions that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly
mission. Deception is confusing or misleading an adversary by using some combination
of human produced, mechanical, or electronic means” (Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS] 2017,
vii).
Electromagnetic Deception: “The deliberate radiation, re-radiation, alteration,

suppression, absorption, denial, enhancement, or reflection of electromagnetic energy
intended to convey misleading information to an enemy or to enemy electromagnetic-
dependent weapons, thereby degrading or neutralizing the enemy’s combat capability”
(DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 2018, 75).
B. SCOPING THE DMO CONCEPT TO THE PROJECT
Considering the continuous advancement in technologies and the design of major

fleet platforms, designing a system of systems relevant to the DMO concept has the
potential to expand to infinitely large problem and solution spaces. To aid in organization
and to facilitate a focused operational analysis, this report establishes boundaries regarding
the domains, focus areas, platforms, technologies, and tactics associated with DMO.
1. Domains and Focus Areas
The project tasking emphasizes four key domains for supporting tactical distributed
operations: air, surface, undersea and cyber. Due to the subject matter expertise and
operational familiarity of land operations for several group members, the land domain is
added as a separate entity from the surface (sea) domain. In addition to the operational
domains, five focus areas are specified for consideration in the system of systems design;
counter-targeting, decoys, deception, electromagnetic warfare, and manned–unmanned
tactics.
9
2. Platforms
To employ the concept of DMO, fleet assets or platforms are required to project
offensive capability to meet strategic and operational objectives. The specific order of
battle for friendly and enemy forces is discussed in detail in Chapter III, but in terms of
bounding the project scope for platforms that are active in the timeframe of the U.S. Navy
of 2030 to 2035, platforms in various stages of maturity are considered. The major
operational units of the Navy inventory to be incorporated into the team’s research for the
employment of DMO include aircraft carriers, surface combatants, fixed and rotary wing
manned aircraft, and legacy missile systems, as their intended service life extends into the
project timeframe. Additionally, several capabilities that are still in development or early
in maturation stages are also considered, especially in the realm of unmanned surface and
air assets. The new technologies and advances that are incorporated for study in the DMO
concept include not only physical surface and air platforms or missile systems, but also
planned future networking capability and tactics that have an impact on the ability to
conduct distributed offensive operations.
3. Technologies
In the effort to advance the Navy’s DMO concept, several developing and emerging
technologies are incorporated into the team’s research. While the development of new
technologies is not the focus for the SEA-27 team, it is imperative that the advancements
are considered for inclusion when developing a system that contributes to the innovative
DMO concept. This idea is emphasized (Curley 2012, 79) “new technology is not tactics,
but it may have a decisive effect in both altering the face of battle and affecting its
outcome.”
Evolving technologies are being developed for improvements in the performance

of sensors, weapons, surveillance, and networks. For each of these respective areas, the
technological capabilities advance at a rapid rate, and therefore it is difficult to predict the
technological maturation of technologies in the 2030 to 2035 timeframe. For this project,
the team will consider technologies that have been physically tested, but may not be fully
indoctrinated into the Navy’s repertoire of tactics and doctrine. For example, the ability to
10
develop an integrated fire control network that incorporates all platforms and domains is a
technological necessity to employ the DMO concept, but this ability currently remains in
the stages of testing and evaluation.
4. Tactics
As noted in (Hughes 1999) technology and tactics are inherently linked. Tactics
continue to mature and improve drastically with advances in technology, especially related
to military deception, decoy counter-measures, and counter-targeting. For the scope of this
project, the SEA-27 team is considering the inclusion of tactics that utilize the most
recently developed deception platforms to include active and passive unmanned surface
and aerial systems. The following chapters will detail the tactics and counter-measures
considered, as well as their employment and integration within the currently employed and
future DMO force compositions.
C. BOUNDING DISTRIBUTED MARITIME OPERATIONS
To ensure that the team’s proposed DMO system of systems meets intended
strategic and operational objectives, architectures are constructed to determine what
functions the platforms and assets must be able to perform. The formulation of
architectures that describe the intended functionality of the DMO concept reinforces
the boundaries previously described with respect to domains, platforms, technologies,
and tactics.
With DMO applying to all domains, warfare areas, and environments, it is

necessary to delineate the primary functions that must be performed to support integrated
operations in a challenged setting. The functional architecture in Figure 1 serves to create
a “functional description of the system to serve as a basis for identification of the resources
necessary for the system to accomplish its mission” (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011, 106).
The primary function that the team aims to achieve with the system of systems is to perform
Distributed Maritime Operations. This overarching function is then decomposed to
consider DMO in each of the aforementioned operational domains to include air, surface,
subsurface, land, and cyber, as well as the tactics associated with each domain.
11
Figure 1. DMO Top Level Functional Architecture
With the project focus dedicated to the employment of tactics within the DMO
concept, an additional functional decomposition is constructed to identify and categorize
the various classes of tactics that can be performed by existing and proposed future
platforms. The primary tactics considered for DMO across all domains are collected into
the following groupings: swarms of unmanned vehicles, mechanical or physical decoys
and counter-measures, management of electromagnetic emissions, and electronic jamming.
These tactics categories are further decomposed, as shown in Figure 2. These tactics and
their specific integration in to the DMO construct will be further detailed in Chapter IV of
this report.
Figure 2. DMO Tactics Functional Architecture

12
In addition to the architectures described in the previous figures, supplementary
diagrams are detailed in Appendix B, constructed by the team to further define the
boundaries and separations between the systems included in the project focus, and those
external to the scope of this research. The domain specific functions and tactics described
in the architectures serve as the requirements and expected performance characteristics for
the DMO systems. The determination of the capabilities required to perform DMO ensures
that the team’s proposed system of systems meets the minimum standard in terms of
functionality. Additionally, when referenced throughout the iterative systems engineering
process, the architectures facilitate traceability to the critical domains and tactics that must
be considered in the development of the DMO system. These functions are required to be
incorporated into the DMO system in order to contribute effectively to the desired
distribution and integration of the fleet centric fighting power needed to project lethality to
gain and maintain sea control.
13
14
III. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
DMO is a concept that must be applicable to a multitude of strategic scenarios and

operational environments. For the purpose of this project, the SEA-27 team defines a
particular setting and scenario with the intention of providing an underlying operational
situation for the forces and tactics incorporated into the DMO structure. The setting
described in the following sections is used to provide an area of operations and order of
battle with respect to platforms, sensors, and weapons systems, as well as a baseline for the
employment of tactics.
A. SCENARIO
The scenario provides context and describes the setting for the massing of friendly
and enemy military forces in preparation for conflict in the prescribed area of operations.
The SEA-27 team utilizes an adapted version of the narrative described in the “Maritime
War of 2030” framework as described in Appendix A (Kline 2018). The geo-political
situation in the year 2030 is characterized by continued tension between the United States
and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the South China Sea region, with PRC
continuing to construct military basing on contested islands. With the increased threat of
PRC expansionism and potential conflict, the United States maintains its routine patrols
through the region, and maintains its defense treaties with established regional partners.
The maritime war at sea in the 2030 to 2035 timeframe progresses from escalating
aggression and unlawful PRC activities in the region, to harassment of neighboring nations’
fishing vessels and the massing of PRC maritime forces in the South China Sea. The United
States acquires intelligence of the PRC objective to capture the Philippine island nation of
Palawan. The U.S. “blue” forces anticipate imminent engagement with PRC “red” forces
and are consequently conducting preparations for combat at sea, with immediate
mobilization of regional friendly assets to the South China Sea (SCS), specifically to the
northwestern edge of Palawan.
15
B. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND TASKING
The operational tasking for the U.S. maritime forces includes the establishment of
a defensive perimeter on the western coastline of Palawan, the creation and continuous use
of a distributed tactical common operational picture and weapon system network, and the
integration of unmanned assets to enhance defensive and offensive capabilities. In order to
effectively defend friendly forces and the allied island from imminent attack, U.S. maritime
assets must apply the DMO concept through the employment of traditional warfare areas
including air and missile defense, surface warfare, and at-sea strike, as well as manned–
unmanned tactics, counter-targeting, deception operations, and electromagnetic warfare.
While the blue forces are executing a largely defensive operation in the protection of an
island from an imminent attack, the ships and aircraft are emboldened to be forward leaning
to an offensive posture, and to conduct strikes once able, as prescribed by the DMO
doctrine.
C. AREA OF OPERATIONS
As described in the scenario, the friendly assets in the western Pacific region will
deploy to the northern coastline of Palawan to provide a presence and defensive
fortification for the island. Figure 3 depicts the potential SCS area of operations for both
friendly and enemy units, which spans approximately 700,000 square miles of international
waters and territorial seas. The white outline represents the potential operating locations
for friendly and enemy maritime forces, while the yellow box outline denotes the location
of Palawan, the primary objective and location for U.S. forces.
16
Figure 3. Projected Operating Area. Adapted from Google Maps (2018).
1. Environmental Considerations
The environment in the vicinity of Palawan and throughout the SCS has the
potential to impact the ability to perform DMO, specifically with respect to weather
conditions and sea states. World Weather describes the atmosphere for the western coast
of Palawan, which for one half of the year is dry and experiences a mild climate, while the
remaining six months of the year are impacted by seasonal rains and storms. The average
wind speed and visibility vary with these seasonal climates, and can degrade the
performance of the sensors employed on the maritime platforms, as well as limit the
ability for friendly forces to conduct flight operations. The typical visibility is
approximately five miles in the immediate island region, while the dryer months (March
through May and September through November) allow for ideal operating conditions,
with increased visibility to ten miles and fewer extreme wind gusts. Additionally, in these
dryer seasons, the sea state is often more calm and predictable, which promotes an
environment of increased commercial and military maritime operations in the region
(World Weather 2018).
17
2. Regional Considerations
In addition to the environmental considerations, the South China Sea is a complex

area that provides several unique challenges for friendly forces to conduct DMO. The
primary factor of concern in the region is the heavy presence of neutral commercial air and
sea traffic that cause significant congestion in sea lanes and air passages. The United
Nations evaluates that one-third of all global shipping passes through the South China Sea
as it is the one of the most used sea transit lanes in the world (Hoffmann et al. 2016). This
factor of considerable clutter and congestion impacts the forces’ ability to differentiate
between enemy and neutral contacts, but can also be leveraged as an advantage for
deception and decoy operations. Another challenge for the U.S. forces is the PRC maritime
militia fishing fleets that serve as non-militarized ISR platforms. Additional regional
concerns for the friendly forces include general lack of geographical familiarity with the
region, as well as considerations for the attempted control and management of the
electromagnetic spectrum.
D. ORDER OF BATTLE
The defined scenario and concept of operations not only provides the SEA-27 team
with a regional area and tasking to consider, but also allows for the development of an
order of battle (OOB) that incorporates maritime platforms. The OOB is comprised of
surface ships, aircraft, weapons systems and sensors, for both friendly and enemy forces.
The information considered regarding the capabilities of each platform and asset is
compiled from open source databases. From the orders of battle, the team will examine
various configurations of individual and integrated platforms for inclusion in the concept
of employing DMO in the contested SCS environment. Although any actual conflict will
certainly involve joint and coalition forces, the SEA-27 team focuses specifically on the
maritime force contribution to better analyze naval tactics in this environment.
1. Friendly Order of Battle
The U.S. maritime forces order of battle was derived from the U.S. assets available
within the Pacific Command (PACOM) area of responsibility (AOR). The U.S. forces
incorporated into the friendly order of battle include those on rotational deployment, as
18
well as those stationed in major force concentration bases such as Japan, Guam, Hawaii,
and San Diego. In an effort to constrain the total types and quantities of the various
platforms engaged in the conflict against adversary forces, only U.S. assets were
considered in the friendly OOB.
a. Friendly Platforms
The primary driver for the determination of friendly forces in the region is the
surface vessels, as the area of operations is a substantial distance from any major homeports
for the U.S. Navy. By defining the number and type of available surface vessels, the team
can begin to determine the associated air platforms and weapon systems that each vessel
provides. Additionally, in today’s typical force compositions, the surface vessels can be
viewed as independent deployable units, or they can be organized and assembled into
various action groups. Examples of such action groups include a Carrier Strike Group
(CSG) which consists of an aircraft carrier, air wing, and several smaller surface
combatants that provide defense and additional strike capabilities, an Expeditionary Strike
Group (ESG) or Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG) that is comprised of an amphibious
assault ship and several amphibious transports, or a Surface Action Group (SAG) that
provides multi-mission capabilities from guided missile and littoral combat platforms.
These various force compositions of CSGs, ESGs, SAGs, and additional independent units
will be available to blue force commanders for DMO in order to meet the desired
operational objectives.
(1) Surface Platforms
As previously mentioned, the foremost influence for the determination of all blue
forces available for inclusion in DMO is the surface ships available in the region. Table 1
details the various ship types that are considered based on their projected service lives into
the 2030 timeframe, as well as their respective proximity to the intended area of operations
in the vicinity of Palawan. The vessels described below may already be deployed to the
SCS, or may be reassigned to the SCS from their previously given tasking in adjacent areas
or homeports in the Seventh and Third Fleets.
19
Table 1. Friendly Order of Battle—Surface Vessels
Ship Type Ship Class Designator Manning
Aircraft Carrier Nimitz/Gerald R. Ford CVN Manned
Amphibious Assault America/Wasp LHA/LHD Manned
Amphibious Transport Dock San Antonio LPD Manned
Guided Missile Cruiser Ticonderoga CG Manned
Guided Missile Destroyer Arleigh Burke DDG-51 Manned
Guided Missile Destroyer Zumwalt DDG-1000 Manned
Littoral Combat Ship Freedom/Independence LCS Manned
Expeditionary Fast Transport Spearhead EPF Manned
Medium Displacement
Sea Hunter MDUSV Unmanned
Unmanned Surface Vessel
(2) Air Platforms
The aircraft available in the region are then determined as a function of their parent
surface vessel. The fixed wing aircraft are assigned to squadrons in either the Carrier Air
Wing (CVW) stationed on the CVN aircraft carrier, or the Aviation Combat Element
(ACE) located on the LHA/LHD class amphibious assault ships. The rotary wing and
unmanned aircraft are deployed in squadrons or detachments to the aircraft carriers as well
as the smaller surface combatants that possess flight deck and aircraft hangar storage
capabilities. Table 2 specifies the comprehensive list of all aerial platforms to be included
in the friendly forces OOB.
20
Table 2. Friendly Order of Battle—Aircraft
Aircraft Role Aircraft Type Designator Nomenclature Manning
Stealth Multi-role Fixed Wing F-35 Lightning Manned

Fighter
Multi-role Combat Fixed Wing F/A-18 Super-Hornet Manned
Electronic Warfare Fixed Wing EA-18 Growler Manned
Airborne Early Warning Fixed Wing E-2 Hawkeye Manned
Maritime Patrol Fixed Wing P-8 Poseidon Manned
Multi-role Maritime Rotary Wing MH-60 Seahawk Manned

Helicopter
Attack Helicopter Rotary Wing AH-1 Super Manned
Cobra/Viper
Autonomous Fixed Wing MQ-4 Triton Unmanned
Surveillance
Autonomous Helicopter Rotary Wing MQ-8 Fire Scout Unmanned
Autonomous High
Altitude Long Fixed Wing MQ-9 Reaper Unmanned
Endurance
Tactical Exploited Rotary Wing TERN Unmanned
Reconnaissance Node
b. Friendly Unmanned Systems
As presented in the surface ship and aircraft orders of battle, several unmanned
autonomous vessels are incorporated for DMO consideration. With the timeframe set to
2030 through 2035, the various unmanned aerial and surface vessels are expected to be
utilized in a wide variety of mission assignments, and can therefore be evaluated for their
impact on the DMO construct in terms of sensor performance, weapons employment, and
tactical relevance in their use as deceptive platforms or decoys.
c. Friendly Sensors
Another consideration for the order of battle in addition to the platforms that operate
in the various domains, is the sensors that enable the asset to perform the functions of
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DMO. The sensors carried onboard a weapon system allow a surface combatant, aircraft,
or unmanned system to detect contacts in the operating area, identify and classify the
contacts in terms of mission or intent, and target hostile contacts that pose a threat to the
operations and survivability of friendly forces. Table 3 lists the primary sensors and their
parent platform from the U.S. order of battle. The use of the sensor data in the model of
the DMO concept will be discussed in further detail in later chapters of the report.
Table 3. Friendly Order of Battle—Sensors
Sensor Parent Platforms
Visual All Surface, All Air, All Unmanned
CVN, LHD/LHA, CG, DDG-51, DDG-1000, LCS, LPD,

F-35, F/A-18, EA-18, E-2, P-8, MH-60, AH-1, MQ-8 Fire
Infrared
Scout, MQ-4 Triton, TERN
Electronic CVN, LHD/LHA, CG, DDG-51, DDG-1000, LCS, LPD,
Support Measures (ESM) F-35, F/A-18, EA-18, E-2, P-8, MH-60, AH-1, MQ-8 Fire
Scout, MQ-4 Triton
Air Search Radar CVN, LHA/LHD, CG, DDG-51, DDG-1000, LCS, LPD,
MH-60, AH-1, TERN
Surface Search Radar All Surface Platforms,
MH-60, AH-1, TERN
Fire Control Radar CVN, LHD/LHA, CG, DDG-51, DDG-1000, LCS, LPD,
MH-60, AH-1, MQ-8 Fire Scout
Navigation Radar All Surface Platforms
Phased Array Radar CVN, CG, DDG-51, DDG-1000
AESA (Active Electronic
Scanned Array Radar) F-35, F/A-18, EA-18, E-2, P-8, MQ-4 Triton
Airborne Early Warning
Radar E-2, P-8
Synthetic Aperture
Radar—Maritime MH-60, MQ-8 Fire Scout, MQ-4 Triton
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d. Friendly Weapons Systems
In addition to the major platforms and autonomous resources, weapons systems are
also incorporated into the friendly order of battle, with the intention of demonstrating the
offensive and defensive combat power of performing DMO. While many other weapons
and missiles exist and are in development for future use, the systems detailed in Table 4
are the principal assets that are employed in various mission sets, to include air and missile
defense, at-sea strike, and air to air combat.
Table 4. Friendly Order of Battle—Missiles
Missile Designator Type Launching Platform(s)
Standard
RIM-66 Medium Range Surface to Air CG, DDG-51, DDG-1000
Missile-2
Standard
RIM-161 Ballistic Missile Defense CG, DDG-51, DDG-1000
Missile-3
Extended Range Surface to
Standard
RIM-174 Air, Anti-Ship Cruise Missile CG, DDG-51, DDG-1000
Missile-6
(ASCM)
CG, DDG-51, DDG-1000
LRASM AGM-158C Long Range Anti-Ship Missile
F-35, F/A-18
Maritime
MST Long Range Anti-Ship Cruise CG, DDG-51, DDG-1000
Strike
Missile
Tomahawk
Harpoon AGM/RGM- Over the Horizon Anti-Ship CG, DDG-51, LCS, F-35,
84 Missile F/A-18
Evolved Sea Sparrow - CVN, LHA/D, LPD, CG,
ESSM RIM-162 Medium Range Surface to Air DDG-51, DDG-1000,
Missile LCS
F-35, F/A-18, EA-18,
Sidewinder AIM-9 Short Range Air to Air
AH-1
F-35, F/A-18, MH-60,
Hellfire AGM-114 Short Range Air to Surface
AH-1, MQ-8, TERN
Advanced Medium Range Air F-35, F/A-18
AMRAAM AIM-120
to Air
HARM AGM-88 High Speed Anti-Radiation F-35, F/A-18
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2. Enemy Order of Battle
While the friendly force order of battle is assembled as a function of the surface
vessels present in the region, the enemy has the “home field” advantage with respect to the
forces they are capable of providing in order to meet their objective of establishing a
military presence on Palawan. The PRC forces can be deployed from both the naval surface
vessels underway in the SCS, as well as the sea and air bases located on the mainland and
the forward operating bases on the contested reefs and island chains. Similar to the
projections used in the friendly order of battle, the enemy forces predicted to be operational
in the 2030 timeframe include those currently in use with service lives extending into the
2030s, as well as technology advances and platforms in development that are expected to
fulfill an operational role in the China Navy of 2030-2035.
a. Enemy Platforms
The enemy platforms presented are mobilized both from land and sea, with several
major PRC homeports on mainland China positioned approximately seven hundred to one
thousand nautical miles from the western coast of Palawan. Additionally, the PRC
possesses forward basing and “lily pad” capability with the construction and buildup of
military infrastructure on the contested reefs within the Spratly and Paracel island chains,
located at a range of just over 100 and 400 nautical miles from Palawan, respectively. The
mainland and island chain bases are projected to possess the capabilities to support both
surface ships and aircraft of all types, so nearly all of the planned 2030 operational PRC
naval forces are considered in the enemy order of battle.
(1) Surface Platforms
Table 5 details the various PRC surface ship types that are considered in the
opponent order of battle. Many of the vessels listed are currently in development as the
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) undergoes a fleet buildup period, but are
projected to be in an operational status in the 2030 through 2035 time horizon. This is
supported by a statement extracted from China’s Military strategy, “the PLAN is
accelerating the modernisation of its forces for comprehensive offshore operations;
developing advanced submarines, destroyers, and frigates; creating an aircraft carrier fleet;
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and improving integrated electronic and information systems” (State Council Information
Office of the People's Republic of China, 2015).
Table 5. Enemy Order of Battle—Surface Vessels
Ship Type Ship Class Designator Manning
Aircraft Carrier Kuznetsov/ Type Manned

Liaoning, CV03 001A/002/003
Guided Missile Cruiser/Destroyer Renhai Type 055 Manned
Guided Missile Destroyer Luyang III Type 052D Manned
Multi-role Frigate Jiangkai II Type 054 Manned
Multi-role Corvette Jiangdao Type 056 Manned
Stealth/Missile Boat Houbei Type 022 Manned
Amphibious Assault - Landing Not Yet Type 075 Manned

Helicopter Dock Determined
Amphibious Transport Dock Yuzhao Type 071 Manned
Landing Ship—Tank Yuting II Type 072A Manned
(2) Air Platforms
Not only is the PRC constructing new capabilities in the surface warfare domain,
but air warfare is also a major focus of development and modernization for the PLAN and
People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). With the ability to provide land based
aircraft, the enemy order of battle is much larger in terms of types of air assets available.
Additionally, the aircraft carrier fleet and associated air wing is still in the development
stages for the PRC, but is expected to expand drastically over the next ten to fifteen years,
and is considered as a factor in the enemy order of battle.
25
Table 6. Enemy Order of Battle—Aircraft
Aircraft Role Aircraft Type Designator Nomenclature Manning
Air Superiority Fighter Fixed Wing J-11 Flanker B+ Manned
Carrier Based Fighter Fixed Wing J-15 Flying Shark Manned
Multi-role Strike Fighter Fixed Wing J-16 Shenyang Manned
Electronic Warfare Fixed Wing J-16D Shenyang Manned

Fighter
Multi-role Stealth Fighter Fixed Wing J-20 Chengdu Manned
Attack & Close Air Fixed Wing Q-5 Nanchang— Manned

Support Fantan
Strategic Bomber Fixed Wing H-6K Xian Manned
Airborne Early Warning Fixed Wing KJ-3000 Mainring Manned
Maritime Patrol Fixed Wing Y-8FQ Shaanxi Manned
Utility/ASW Helicopter Rotary Wing Z-18 Changhe Manned
Airborne Early Warning Rotary Wing Z-8AEW Super Frelon Manned

Helicopter
High Altitude Long Fixed Wing Soaring Dragon Unmanned
Endurance UAV
Medium Altitude Long Fixed Wing Pterodactyl Unmanned
Endurance UAV
Stealth Supersonic UAV Fixed Wing AVIC 601 Dark Sword Unmanned
b. Enemy Unmanned Systems
Similar to the friendly order of battle, various unmanned aerial systems are
incorporated into the platforms available for employment in the scenario. The PRC has an
extensive list of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) currently in development, so for the
purposes of this project, the primary asset in each major autonomous aircraft category was
considered. These unmanned aircraft are capable of providing intelligence collection,
surveillance, information sharing, and strike capabilities.
26
c. Enemy Sensors
An additional consideration for the enemy order of battle is the various sensors
inherent to each surface and air platform. The sensors employed on the ships and aircraft
are used for a wide range of purposes to include ISR, maneuvering, establishing a tactical
operating picture, and weapons deployment. The use of the sensor data in the simulation
of the fleet-on-fleet engagement will be described in additional detail in Chapter IV of this
report, but Table 7 lists the primary sensors and their parent platform from the red order
of battle.
Table 7. Enemy Order of Battle—Sensors
Sensor Parent Platforms
Visual All Surface, All Air, All Unmanned
Infrared Aircraft Carrier, Renhai, Luyang, Jiangkai, Houbei,

J-11, J-15, J-16, J-20, Z-18, Z-8AEW
ESM (Electronic Aircraft Carrier, Renhai, Luyang, Jiangkai, Helicopter Dock,
Support Measures) Landing Dock, J-15, J-16, J-16D, J-20, KJ-3000
Air Search Radar Aircraft Carrier, Renhai, Luyang, Jiangkai, Helicopter Dock,
Landing Dock, All Manned Aircraft
Aircraft Carrier, All Amphibious Assault,
Surface Search
Renhai, Luyang, Jiangkai, Houbei
Radar
J-15, J-16, Q-5, H-6K, KJ-3000, Z-18, Z-8AEW
Fire Control Radar All Surface, J-11, J-15, J-16, J-16D, Q-5, H-6K, Z-18, Z-8AEW
Navigation Radar All Surface
Phased Array Radar Aircraft Carrier, Renhai, Luyang, Jiangkai, Jiangdao
AESA (Active
Electronic Scanned Renhai, J-15, J-16, J-16D, J-20, All Unmanned Air
Array Radar)
Over the Horizon
Renhai, Luyang, Jiangkai
Radar
Synthetic Aperture Aircraft Carrier, Renhai, Luyang,
Radar—Maritime KJ-3000, Y-8FQ, All Land-Based Missiles & Unmanned Air
Synthetic Aperture Yaogan Satellite
Radar—Space
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d. Enemy Weapons Systems
The final element in the enemy order of battle are the weapons systems carried by
the surface ships and aircraft, as well as the land based missile sites that have the potential
to strike friendly forces in the area of operations. The various armaments listed in Table 8
are capable of both offensive strike in the air and surface warfare domains, and defense
from incoming aircraft and missile threats.
Table 8. Enemy Order of Battle—Missiles
Missile Designator Type Launching Platform

Dong-Feng DF-21D Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Land—Mobile Launcher
21 (ASBM)
Dong-Feng DF-26 Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Land—Mobile Launcher
26 (ASBM)
Silkworm HY-2 Anti-Ship Cruise Missile Land—Mobile Launcher
(ASCM)
Eagle Strike- YJ-12 Anti-Ship Cruise Missile Aircraft Carrier, H-6K,
12 (ASCM) Q-5
Eagle Strike- YJ-18 Anti-Ship Cruise Missile Renhai, Luyang, J-15, J-
18 (ASCM) 16
Eagle Strike- YJ-62 Anti-Ship Cruise Missile Luyang
62 (ASCM)
Eagle Strike- YJ-83 Anti-Ship Cruise Missile Lyuang, Jiangkai,
83 (ASCM) Jiangdao, Houbei, J-15, J-
16, Z-18
Eagle Strike- YJ-100 Anti-Ship Cruise Missile Renhai, Luyang, H-6K
100 (ASCM)
Flying FN-16 Man Portable Air Defense Jiangdao, Houbei, All
Crossbow (MANPAD) Surface to Air Amphibious Assault
Hongqi-16 HQ-10 Surface to Air Aircraft Carrier, Luyang,
Jiangkai, Jiangdao
Hongqi-16 HQ-16 Medium Range Surface to Air Renhai, Luyang
CM-102 Anti-Radiation/Anti-Ship J-16D
Thunderbolt- PL-9 Short Range Air to Air Missile J-11, J-15, J-16, J-16D, J-
9 20
Thunderbolt- PL-12 Medium Range Air to Air J-11, J-15, J-16, J-20
12 Missile
VLRAAM Very Long Range Air to Air J-16
Missile
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With the orders of battle determined for the friendly and enemy forces, comprised
of surface vessels, aircraft, sensors, and weapons systems, the DMO concept can be
evaluated with respect to the capabilities these platforms provide in the operational
scenario.
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30
IV. KILL CHAIN AND TACTICS
In an effort to model and simulate the influence of various platforms, sensors,

weapons systems, and tactics within the DMO construct, the process or structure used for
the employment for those systems must be determined. Given that the goal of this research
is to assess the utility of various countermeasures in the DMO context, the definition of a
kill chain is useful to identify the times at which those counter measures could be
introduced. While there are dissimilarities in the engagement processes employed by
different ships and aircraft based on the sensors and weapons systems available to them, as
well as the doctrine in effect, the underlying structure for the kill chain process is
analogous, and is therefore be assumed to apply to all elements in both the friendly and
enemy orders of battle.
A. TRADITIONAL ENGAGEMENT PROCESS
There are many different types of procedures or action chains used to conduct a
detect-to-engage (DTE) series of events for armed platforms. A targeting sequence is
typically broken down into the sub-tasks that must occur for a weapons system to
effectively engage an enemy platform or location. The primary required tasks include
detecting or finding the target, establishing a track on the targets location and movement,
communication of targeting data between the sensor and weapon system, conducting the
engagement with either kinetic or non-kinetic weapons, and evaluating the engagement to
determine follow-on actions.
The most commonly used kill chain for military applications is the F2T2EA model,
which is decomposed into the following subtasks: find, fix, track, target, engage, assess, as
detailed in Figure 4. The first half of the F2T2EA kill chain describes the role that sensors
play in the DTE process. The find task involves the initial detection of the target, fix refers
to the determination of the physical target location, and tracking ensures a consistent ability
to fix the target as it maneuvers. The second half of the kill chain then uses the information
provided by the sensors in order to conduct an engagement. Once a stable track has been
established, the sequence can progress to targeting, where calculations can be performed
31
to determine if a weapon has the capability to intercept or engage. Once an adversary
platform has been targeted, the operator may then move on to the process of engaging,
where a weapon has been selected and fired from the targeting platform or other friendly
platforms in the integrated targeting system. The final stage of the kill chain is to perform
an assessment, where results of the engagement are calculated to determine if the
employment of the kill chain and weapon was successful.
Figure 4. F2T2EA Kill Chain. Source: Joint Publication 3-60 (2013).
B. KILL CHAIN WITH IMPROVEMENTS IN WEAPONS SYSTEM

TECHNOLOGY
With advancements in the technological capabilities of current and future weapons

systems, some of the processes detailed in the F2T2EA kill chain can be combined due to
the rapid transition from one phase of the kill chain to another. The F2T2EA sequence was
developed in the early 1990s, and while the framework is still valid and used by many of
today’s air and surface platforms, the ability for sensors and weapons to nearly
simultaneously find, fix, track and target an enemy platform is almost routine in practice.
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Additionally, many systems do perform these exact functions, but not necessarily in a linear
or series fashion where one stage directly precedes the next. For example, with the tracking
of electromagnetic signals, the ability exists where a platform may be able to find and
establish a track based on the presence of electromagnetic radiation, prior to being able to
identify the exact location of the electromagnetic source. Furthermore, with the extended
range of some weapons currently in use and planned for future employment, a missile may
be able to be re-routed in flight to a different target location after the targeting and
engagement steps have been completed.
These advancements in weapon capabilities allow for a compressed or simplified

version of the kill chain to be incorporated into an operational model representative of
detect to engage sequences in the context of DMO. The SEA-27 team has deemed the
critical functions of the F2T2EA kill chain in the context of DMO to be find, target, and
engage (FTE). Figure 5 describes how these functions are adjusted into the abridged
version of the traditional kill chain. Find, fix, and track are collapsed into a distinct activity,
target remains a singular event in the kill chain, and engage is incorporated with the task
of assessing the success or failure of the engagement. These fundamental functions will be
incorporated into the team’s model of the DMO concept, and the implementation will be
discussed in further detail in later sections of the report.
Figure 5. Simplification of F2T2EA Kill Chain to FTE Process.

Adapted from Joint Publication 3-60 (2013).
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For a platform to prevent the targeting or engagement from an adversary weapon
system, typically only one phase in the kill chain must be disrupted. The application of the
FTE kill chain in DMO allows for an examination of how certain tactics and counter-
measures can cause this disruption and allow for friendly forces to perform counter-
targeting and counter-engagements. Additionally, if an adversary platform is required to
dedicate extended time to locating and targeting friendly platforms, blue assets have the
increased capability to conduct offensive strikes, with the goal of targeting adversary
systems once within range of blue weapons systems, as advocated in the forward-leaning
DMO concept.
C. TACTICS AND COUNTER-MEASURES
Hughes (1999, 7) states “the traditional definition of tactics is the art or science of
disposing of or maneuvering forces in relation to each other and the enemy, and of
employing them in battle.” The primary focus for the SEA-27 team with respect to the
DMO construct is the employment of various tactics and counter-measures that enable the
disruption of the enemy kill chain to either prevent, or lower the probability of a successful
enemy engagement of friendly forces. While many types of tactics and counter-measures
exist for the purpose of confusing adversary sensors and targeting systems, as previously
identified in the tactics architecture, the team determined several predominant categories
of deceptive methods to examine with respect to the platforms detailed in the orders of
battle. These categories include swarms of unmanned assets, mechanical and physical
decoys, controlled emission of electromagnetic radiation, and electronic jamming. Each of
these categories are further described to consider the functionality and employment of each
tactic type, as well as the intended impact on the FTE kill chain.
1. Swarm
The continual advancement and employment of swarm technologies and

capabilities is both an advantage and concern for friendly forces operating in a contested
environment. As stated by (Chung 2015, 2341), with the “increasing availability and
proliferation of unmanned system technologies, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
in civilian and military applications, both opportunities and challenges arise in addressing
34
large numbers of robots capable of collective interactions.” While detailed study has only
begun into the potential for these unmanned swarm systems and development of integrated
tactics in defense, the SEA-27 team will examine and model the capability for a swarm to
act as a decoy or counter-measure to prevent or disrupt enemy targeting systems from
engaging friendly forces.
Although employing swarms of unmanned aerial platforms is an emerging tactic

that has yet to be demonstrated in major combat, considering autonomous vehicle
technology is critical, as supported by the Director of the Technology and National Security
Program who states, "militaries that figure out how best to employ swarms, along with the
doctrine, training, command-and-control structures, and other key enablers needed to
support them, will have a significant advantage over those who do not" (Scharre 2014).
These collaborative autonomous systems, both active and passive, have the potential to
impact the outcome of a fleet engagement, even between two powers that possess advanced
systems capable of tracking and classifying hundreds of targets simultaneously.
a. Employment of Swarm as a Tactic for Deception
For the purposes of this project, a swarm is described as a cooperative system

comprised of numerous unmanned vehicles that function with limited operator
involvement (Lachow 2017). The swarm systems are characteristically classified in terms
of their size, range, and capability. These unmanned aerial systems range from small hand-
held, short-range micro-UAVs to high-altitude long endurance aircraft that provide ISR
and strike capabilities out to distances exceeding thousands of miles. These systems can be
used in support of military deception in numerous ways: including saturation of radar and
detection systems by deploying a large number of remotely piloted vehicles, as well as the
ability to emulate a larger vessel such as a surface combatant or manned aircraft by
radiating active emissions from the unmanned systems.
The primary difference between using swarms for saturation of enemy radar and
radiating active emissions is the use of the vehicle as an active or passive asset. In order to
imitate a larger vessel or aircraft, the drone is required to broadcast electromagnetic
emissions with the intent of misleading adversary sensors. The same is true to produce a
35
deceitful radar cross section that provides a false surface, air, or missile contact for the
enemy to differentiate from a real blue platform. The active swarm requires larger
unmanned platforms and greater power generation in order to propagate the energy needed
to effectively mimic a surface combatant or aircraft. The passive swarm predominantly
serves as clutter for the adversary sensors, with the effectiveness of the swarm directly
proportional to the quantity of vehicles that aim to cause disorder and confusion for the red
radars and weapons systems.
b. Impact of Swarm on the Kill Chain
For both types of swarms, active and passive, the purpose of the collective system
of unmanned vehicles in the DMO concept is to hamper the adversary’s ability to find and
target blue platforms. Whether or not the drones radiate electromagnetic energy, the aim
of deploying the vehicles is to gain the tactical advantage by overwhelming the enemy
sensors searching for and targeting friendly forces. A greater quantity of autonomous
vehicles deployed by blue platforms results in an increased number of radar and sensor
contacts that the enemy sensors must sort through and classify when conducting the find
and targeting sequence of the kill chain. The additional time required for the adversary to
detect all radar contacts and distinguish the unmanned vehicles from the larger blue
platforms may allow for blue to conduct the first strike in the engagement, or counter the
red platform earlier in the FTE sequence, increasing overall blue survivability.
Additionally, if the red platforms misidentify the autonomous vehicle as a legitimate target,
the enemy may misappropriate targeting and engagement resources on the illusory contact.
2. Mechanical and Physical Counter-measures
When compared with the technologically advanced swarm tactics, mechanical and
physical counter-measures are rather rudimentary and archaic as they have been employed
for decades with few notable groundbreaking improvements. That being said, mechanical
jamming, through the deployment of decoy devices can be exceptionally effective when
confusing or deceiving adversary systems. The definition of counter-measure encompasses
a wide variety of mechanisms that facilitate military deception against an enemy, and is
defined as the “form of military science that, by the employment of devices and/or
36
techniques, has as its objective the impairment of the operational effectiveness of enemy
activity” (DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 2018, 56).
With respect to physical or mechanical counter-measures, this concept is typically

synonymous with decoys, or objects that deceive sensors and ISR assets for the intention
of disseminating misleading information. Numerous types of physical counter-measures
are currently employed to generate misrepresentative information for the enemy. The
categories of decoys and tactics that are further detailed and considered for this project of
analyzing the concept of DMO include visual, radar, and infrared counter-measures.
a. Employment of Mechanical and Physical Counter-measures for

Deception
Within DMO, the decoys and counter-measures serve to either create a false image
of contacts, deceive sensors by creating saturation or clutter tracks, and/or distract
surveillance and tracking systems from detecting, targeting, and engaging a friendly asset.
The counter-measures are classified in terms of their respective objectives or the sensor in
which they are intended to deceive. Mechanical and physical decoys are typically
categorized as defensive tactics or soft-kill options that reduce the probability of intercept
for a weapon in the terminal phases of guidance.
(1) Visual Counter-measures
The first category of physical decoys and tactics that are employed to obscure or
confuse visual systems and the personnel that operate the imaging systems are visual
counter-measures. Examples of the decoys or tactics that prevent the detection and
targeting capability from visual instruments include deploying smokescreens; the setup of
inflatables or passive decoys that emulate the size, shape, and general appearance of an
actual friendly platform; and the tactical maneuver of vessels, aircraft, and personnel to
deceive enemy forces. Visual smoke can be deployed from any vessel, aircraft, or even
unmanned vehicles, and creates a barrier between enemy sensors or ISR platforms and the
assets in the vicinity of the deployed smoke screen. The obscurant serves as a cloak to mask
movements of forces, and prevent the enemy equipped with visual and imagery systems
from detecting or targeting a friendly platform. Inflatables and passive decoys can also be
37
launched or dispensed from any platform, with the objective of deceiving enemy scouting
systems through the misidentification of a decoy as the actual opponent platform.
Additionally, a substantial quantity of passive decoys can saturate and create excessive
clutter for enemy systems.
(2) Radar Counter-measures
The primary sensor for detection and targeting for the majority of combat capable
platforms is radar. There are a number of radar counter-measures available that are
typically employed by units for close-in self-defense. One of the most common radar
counter-measures is chaff, or clusters of metal strips that are projected away from a targeted
platform in an effort to seduce or distract an inbound missile. The metal pieces are
dispersed into a cloud of radar clutter from a canister that is deployed from a launcher on
the parent vessel, and serve as the soft-kill option for preventing a radar-guided missile
from striking the friendly ship or aircraft. Another type of counter-measure that has the
objective of deceiving radars and radar-guided missiles are active decoys such as Nulka,
or similar devices that imitate the radar cross section of the targeted platform. These
counter-measures can currently be deployed from surface ship platforms, but may also be
developed for integration onto aircraft and unmanned platforms.
(3) Infrared Counter-measures
The final category of counter-measures considered for inclusion in the DMO

construct are intended to deceive infrared (IR) or heat-seeking sensors and weapons.
Similar to a visual smoke screen, IR Smoke is employed to create a barrier between the
parent platform and IR seeking threat. For major heat producing platforms such as ships
and aircraft, IR-guided missiles pose a significant threat, especially during prolonged
combat operations in which the reduction of the heat signature becomes increasingly
difficult. An additional decoy to counter the threat of IR-seeking weapons are flares.
Aircraft serve as the primary launch platform for flares, as a single canister can hold several
dozen flare targets, providing additional target for the threat missile to acquire instead of
the friendly platform. For aircraft especially, a tradeoff is apparent as the ability to carry
38
offensive strike weapons is diminished if any pylons or hard points are dedicated to these
defensive counter-measures.
b. Impact of Mechanical and Physical Decoys on the Kill Chain
The employment of visual, radar, and IR counter-measures influence all phases of

the FTE kill chain. The use of passive and active decoys create clutter for adversary ISR
systems, making it harder to differentiate between false and real contacts. The presence of
additional contacts creates a time delay for the red threat to effectively detect and classify
its assigned blue platform for targeting and engagement. Chaff, flares, and smoke are more
geared towards interrupting the targeting and engagement phases, as these decoys primarily
serve as close-in defense once all other hard-kill options have been expended. The value
of each of the physical and mechanical counter-measures can be determined within the
DMO construct as a function of the surviving blue and red forces upon completion of the
fleet on fleet engagement simulation.
3. Electronic Jamming
A critical component of conducting military deception within the DMO framework

is electronic warfare (EW), especially in relation to the FTE kill chain for platforms that
rely on the transmission and receipt of electromagnetic signals to detect, target, and engage
an enemy. Electronic jamming is a function within the EW subcomponent of electronic
attack, and serves to overwhelm or deceive a sensor through the controlled and directed
propagation of electromagnetic signals. The practical application of jamming is defined as
“the deliberate radiation, re-radiation, or reflection of electromagnetic energy for the
purpose of preventing or reducing an enemy’s effective use of the electromagnetic
spectrum, and with the intent of degrading or neutralizing the enemy’s combat capability”
(DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 2018, 75).
The objective of jamming is to obstruct the open transmission and absorption of

electromagnetic energy for an adversary system. Electronic jamming with the intent of
incapacitating or degrading a sensor is effective if the signal generated either replicates the
operating parameters of the system and overpowers the enemy signal, or exploits a specific
vulnerability such as the reliance on a single frequency. For example, if a sensor is known
39
to only operate at a single frequency on the electromagnetic spectrum, spot or barrage
jamming may be executed to transmit signals that block or saturate the exact frequency
required for operation. If a system functions via the use of multiple frequencies, barrage
jamming is more effective as the interfering signals are produced for the intended
impediment of several different frequencies. This project will detail these and several other
specific types of jamming that aim to target or degrade various enemy sensors and targeting
systems.
a. Employment of Electronic Jamming as a Tactic
Electronic jamming is accomplished by transmitting a radio frequency or

electromagnetic signal that interferes with the regular operation or attacks a susceptible
element in the enemy’s communications or sensing systems (Pardhasaradhi et al. 2013).
The outgoing jamming signal can simply overpower or saturate the adversary’s antenna or
receiver, or the signal can be a targeted energy that is intended to impede a particular
function or portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. There are numerous categories of
electronic jamming, classified either by the method of employment or desired impact on
an adversary system. For this project, five particular types of jamming were considered as
individual and combined tactics for friendly forces employing DMO to defend maritime
and land assets from imminent attack.
(1) Spot Jamming
The first and simplest form of electronic attack is spot jamming, in which a system
that outputs the jamming signal generates power to propagate a signal of a distinct, singular
frequency. Spot jamming is a form of noise jamming, which is designed to increase the
noise or inherent signal clutter created by the transmitting system (air combat command
training support squadron Electronic Warfare Fundamentals 2000). By contributing
additional noise to the system, the radar is less able to distinguish actual contacts in the
noise prominent environment, therefore allowing actual contacts to go undetected. This
spot jamming technique is effective against communication systems or radars that emit
energy of a single frequency, so long as the jammer signal and associated noise is stronger
in terms of power and bandwidth, than the victim radar output and received signals.
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(2) Barrage Jamming
Another form of electronic attack that is considered for employment in DMO is

barrage jamming, which also falls under the larger classification of noise jamming. While
spot jamming focuses the generated energy on a narrow band or single frequency, the same
method of signal generation is used, but applied to a wider band or frequency range. Greater
power is needed from the source platform in order to conduct barrage jamming of an enemy
system, but it allows the friendly forces to hinder the performance of frequency-agile radars
or systems that use multiple frequency ranges for operation.
(3) Sweep Jamming
The final form of noise jamming is sweep jamming, which is essentially a

combination of the two previously addressed types of electronic attack. In order for a
jamming signal to be effective at interfering with the adversary system, enough power must
be generated to block or inhibit the radar from transmitting or receiving its electromagnetic
signals. Spot jamming provides the power along a single beam, so the power generation is
typically sufficient, but limited to only one frequency. On the other hand, barrage allows
for simultaneous disruption of multiple frequencies, but with reduced output power. Sweep
jamming is conducted to focus all of the energy produced on a single beam that shifts
frequencies, which allows for jamming of various frequencies at greater power. While this
method of electronic attack is advantageous when applied to systems that function on
various frequencies, if the timing of the jamming signal frequency shifts are not aligned
with the adversary system, the jamming has the potential to lag behind the victim system
and be rendered completely ineffective.
(4) DRFM Jamming
Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) jamming is not classified as noise

jamming, instead this type falls under the category of a repeater technique, in which the
jamming system receives the electromagnetic energy from the adversary radar or
communications system, and retransmits the same signal to create a deceitful or fraudulent
return. The advantage to deception or DRFM jamming over the previously described EW
attack types is that the power required to absorb and retransmit a false contact signal is
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much less than a jammer that is trying to overpower output signals. Additionally, DRFM
jammers are less prone to detection by the adversary, as the returned signal is what is
expected to be received by the radar or communications system, as opposed to noise
jamming which operators are typically able to detect due to the noticeable change in
interference. Additionally, due to the reduced power requirements, DRFM jammers are
able to deceive multiple adversary sensors simultaneously, as opposed to noise jamming
which requires a precise, directed path of electromagnetic energy towards a single enemy
platform (Pardhasaradhi et al. 2013).
(5) GPS Jamming
The final EW tactic considered is GPS jamming, which intends to disrupt the
operation of navigation and targeting systems that rely on the satellite based GPS radio-
frequency network for location and tracking services. GPS operates on two primary
frequencies, and can therefore be blocked or jammed using instruments that produce radio
waves that create substantial interference for these operating bands. While GPS is rarely
used as a sole source for targeting information, missile guidance often times requires inputs
from a GPS system, and therefore the interference with these signals has the potential to
reduce the probability of hit for an enemy weapon system.
b. Impact of Electronic Jamming on the Kill Chain
Depending on the friendly forces’ timing for executing the jamming of adversary
radar and communications systems, the electronic attack tactics have the potential to
degrade the adversary sensors and weapons during any phase of the FTE kill chain. By
jamming enemy air and surface search radars, the blue aircraft may be able to conduct
scouting at longer ranges, and ships may be able to maneuver undetected to avoid targeting
from enemy systems. The electromagnetic interference caused by jamming has the
potential to reduce susceptibility to attack from enemy threats, and enhance the ability to
project combat power at farther ranges as friendly assets conduct offensive strike
operations rather than focusing on unit protection and collective self-defense of the entire
operating group.
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4. Emissions Control
The final tactic considered is emissions control, or EMCON, which is defined as

“controlled use of electromagnetic, acoustic, or other emitters to optimize command and
control capabilities while minimizing, for operations security, detection by enemy sensors,
mutual interference among friendly systems, and/or enemy interference with the ability to
execute a military deception plan” (DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
2018, 79). EMCON is another form of electronic warfare that is employed primarily to
prevent adversary forces from determining the precise location of ships and action groups.
EMCON encompasses not only the limiting of radiation propagated from the ship radar
systems, but also entails the reduction of radar cross section by external physical means,
and altering the internal ship equipment configurations to reduce the platforms acoustic
signature.
a. Employment of EMCON as a Tactic
With the intent of deceiving enemy sensors or preventing the adversary from
ascertaining the exact location of friendly forces, various levels of EMCON are employed.
EMCON Delta is the level associated with routine operations, in which all available sensors
and equipment are in their standard configuration. There is no limitation on transmitting
radio or electromagnetic energy, and no additional measures in place to restrict acoustic
and infrared signatures or radar cross section. The most extreme level of EMCON, known
as EMCON Alpha, employs measures to reduce the electromagnetic, acoustic, heat, and
radar cross section signatures from the platform. Essentially, the ship or aircraft limits
nearly all navigation, communications, propulsion, and weapons systems to nominal levels
of external signals in order to reduce the probability of being detected. EMCON Alpha
describes the maximum level of stealth that an asset can achieve. Intermediate levels of
EMCON are employed to cause confusion by a warship or aircraft reconfiguring its
systems and physical presence to imitate a commercial or fishing vessel.
EMCON is employed primarily as a defensive measure to prevent the enemy ISR

and combat capable platforms from locating and targeting friendly platforms. While the
intent is to reduce the adversary’s probability of finding and targeting, therefore increasing
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blue survivability, this limitation of blue capabilities also hinders friendly forces. With
instruments and equipment reconfigured to reduce susceptibility of being attacked, the
friendly platform is also unable to fully employ its sensors and weapons systems that are
restricted in operation. For example, a surface ship set in EMCON Alpha is required to
restrict the performance of its air search and fire control radar, making it difficult to detect
and classify any inbound enemy aircraft and missile threats. In order to conduct an
offensive strike or counter-engage any enemy threat, the ship must revert to EMCON Delta,
which may take several seconds, reducing the available time to engage as a function of
sensor and weapon system range and capability.
b. Impact of EMCON on the Kill Chain
A platform that employs EMCON aims to avoid detection and classification as an

enemy target by converting to a stealth condition that worsens the adversary’s ability to
find, target, and engage. The altering of equipment arrangements that reduce acoustic and
infrared signatures, changing of external features and lighting configurations, and
restriction of electromagnetic transmissions all contribute to the intended degradation of a
wide variety of sensors. For example, a large majority of missiles utilize radar or radiation
seeking terminal guidance, if a platform is in an EMCON setting that restricts radar
transmissions, the probability of hit for that specific missile may be reduced. Similarly, for
a platform that only inherently retains the capability to search and target via an ESM sensor,
the ability for that specific platform to detect and engage a platform in EMCON is
diminished.
While there are obvious advantages to employing EMCON on friendly vessels with
the objective of increasing survivability, these restrictive settings also incur a tradeoff with
reduced offensive and counter-engagement capabilities. The limiting of the propagation of
electromagnetic energy hinders the friendly forces’ ability to sense, communicate, target
and engage. A restrictive EMCON setting makes the conducting of flight operations for
surface vessels challenging, impedes usual communications and networking capacities
between friendly platforms, and causes a delay or increased time required to conduct
synchronized command and control operations. For purposes specific to DMO, the inability
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to radiate while in an EMCON condition impedes the detection and engagement of threats
via active means, which is essential to obtain a targeting solution and launch guided
missiles to intercept the threat.
The tactics and counter-measures described are incorporated into the simulation
and analysis of DMO as applied to a fleet on fleet engagement. The following section will
describe how the implementation of the tactics impact the kill chain, and relate to the
performance of DMO. Measures of performance and effectiveness are determined for the
DMO construct, with consideration to the friendly and enemy forces that survive the
conflict, as well as the effect of the various swarm, decoys, jamming, and EMCON
techniques to degrade the ability for red threats to execute the phases of the kill chain to
target and prosecute friendly assets.
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V. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS AND PERFORMANCE
To evaluate the proposed system that aims to contribute to the friendly forces’
ability to perform DMO, an assessment can be conducted with respect to the performance
of the platforms and efficacy of the tactics within the DMO construct. The metrics
established to determine the level of successful DMO employment are the Measures of
Effectiveness (MOEs) and Measures of Performance (MOPs). These quantifiable measures
allow the team to conduct an analysis of the numerous systems and force compositions,
and determine which of the alternatives best achieves the defined goals and requirements.
A. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
MOEs serve to measure the extent to which a system accomplishes the overall
mission. For this project, the MOEs are reflective of the ability to perform distributed,
tactical offensive operations in a contested environment. The SEA-27 team has established
four principal MOEs that are used to evaluate the ability for a configuration of friendly
platforms to accomplish the task of employing tactics across all domains in support of
conducting offensive and defensive engagements of attacking adversary threats.
1. MOE 1: Surviving Blue Forces
The first and most fundamental measure for assessing overall mission success is
the ability for friendly forces to survive the war-at-sea. In order to be able to employ tactics
and counter-engage the inbound red threats, the friendly order of battle needs to remain
present throughout the simulation. As described in Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat,
“success is measured in ship casualties and a comparison of the numbers put out of action
on both sides” (Hughes 1999, 8). This metric is described mathematically as the ratio of
remaining blue forces upon conclusion of the engagement to the quantity of friendly
platforms that entered the simulation.
Quantity of Blue assets surviving at end of simulation

Percentage Surviving Blue Forces =
Quantity of initial Blue assets
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2. MOE 2: Remaining Red Threats
An additional simple, yet essential measure of success for friendly forces is the
percentage of adversary threats that are eliminated during the engagement. In naval warfare
when considering the operational objectives, ships and aircraft eliminated from the fight
typically serve as the primary metric for success or failure, as supported by the statement
from Hughes (1999, 9), “When fleets meet in battle it is force-on-force, and enemy
warships incapacitated are the aim and satisfactory measure of effectiveness.” The method
of calculating this measure is the proportion of red threats that survive the conflict to the
total quantity of red platforms that are generated in each model run.
Quantity of Red platforms remaining at end of simulation

Percentage Remaining Red Forces =
Quantity of total Red platforms
3. MOE 3: Red Threats that Successfully Complete the Find Sequence of

the Kill Chain
In addition to the metrics that evaluate the number of forces that survive the
projected engagement between friendly and enemy forces, the SEA-27 team evaluates the
percentage of enemy platforms that complete the various stages of the kill chain. The
simulation of the war-at-sea scenario generates a red threat which is assigned a specific
blue platform type to find, target, and engage. With the various tactics employed by blue
assets that aim to diminish sensor performance to reduce the probability of enemy detection
and engagement, metrics can be used to gauge the value of the deceptive strategies and
counter-measures. The expression used to calculate the red threats that are successful in
their search to find their assigned blue platform is the ratio of red assets that complete the
find sequence in the simulation to the total number of red assets generated in the model.
Quantity of Red threats successfully find assigned Blue platform

Percentage Red find Blue =
Quantity of total Red threats
The requirement for the red threat to successfully complete the find sequence of the
model is to successfully determine the location of the assigned blue platform via the various
sensors carried by the red threat. For example, a red surface ship may be able to detect and
find its assigned target at greater distances by employing its electronic support measures
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(ESM) sensor and numerous onboard radars, or at shorter ranges, the surface ship personnel
may be able to exploit line-of-sight visual and electro-optical capabilities to acquire the
target.
4. MOE 4: Red Threats that Successfully Execute the Target and Engage
Sequences of the Kill Chain
The final MOE to evaluate the success or failure of a set of blue platforms and their
associated tactics is the number of enemy threats that successfully execute the complete
kill chain sequence, including the obtaining of a targeting solution and weapons
engagement against its assigned target. This metric is calculated by determining the
quantity of red threats that are able to complete the targeting and engagement stages of the
sequence as a function of either the total quantity of threats that were simulated in the run,
or the number of enemy threats that successfully found their assigned target. While many
of the tactics available to blue forces support the objective of reducing the threats’
capability to detect and find a friendly asset, there are also several counter-measures that
serve to create confusion and disruption in the targeting and engaging phases, including
active electronic jamming as well as the limiting of electromagnetic radiation from the
targeted blue platform.
Quantity of Red threats that target/engage assigned Blue platform

Percentage Red target Blue - Total =
Quantity of Red threats that target/engage assigned Blue platform

Percentage Red target Blue =
Quantity Red threats that successfully find their assigned Blue
For a red threat to be considered as a platform that completes the targeting stage
and conducts an engagement, a fire control solution must be established and a weapon must
be capable of reaching the assigned friendly platform at a specified range. For example,
while an adversary surface ship may be able to detect a blue aircraft at an extended range,
if the enemy warship does not have the capability to engage the friendly aircraft due to fire
control radar limitations or an inadequate weapon engagement range, the red threat has not
successfully completed the targeting sequence. Conversely, even if the enemy platform is
within firing solution range of the assigned blue asset, but has not adequately detected and
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located the target during the find phase, then the red threat again has not reached the
completion of the targeting phase of the kill chain.
In the engagement phase of the kill chain, the blue assets do not possess any
counter-measures or the ability to employ tactics that specifically interrupt the engagement
phase once a firing solution has been obtained by the adversary threat, but instead are able
to conduct counter-engagements to neutralize the adversary prior to a weapons launch. The
counter-measures and deceptive tactics are instead employed only after a weapon is
launched from the red platform. Additionally, this metric does not consider whether or not
the enemy missile actually intercepts or mission kills the blue asset, as that data is
considered in MOE #1, or the number of surviving blue forces.
B. MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE
The effectiveness measures serve to measure overall mission success, and measures
of performance (MOPs) assess the sub-tasks of the tactical DMO mission. The MOPs
provide supporting data to evaluate the effectiveness measures for the scenario of
performing distributed operations in a contested environment. For the team’s model, the
following data can be captured and assessed to support the evaluation of the primary
metrics for the friendly assets’ ability to perform DMO against the multi-domain capable
adversary forces.
1. Area of Uncertainty
The first MOP calculated from the simulation is the area of uncertainty, or AOU.
This metric is associated with the red threats’ ability to search and detect its assigned blue
asset. The AOU is calculated as an expanding area of increasing radius from the platform’s
actual location based on the blue platforms average speed and the tactics employed. The
blue forces’ objective is to create as large of an AOU as possible by increasing the time for
the enemy threat to find the friendly platform.
Various tactics can be activated by blue forces to degrade the adversary’s ability to
detect and ascertain the location of the blue force platform. Emissions control, electronic
jamming, physical decoys, and unmanned swarms are the primary tactics that impact the
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AOU size. By creating additional clutter or contacts for the red threat to differentiate the
actual assigned target from the neutral traffic and additional platforms that serve as
distractions, the AOU grows larger with the increased time the red threat consumes
attempting to find its assigned blue platform. Additionally, the limiting of radiation
emissions from a blue platform reduces the probability of being detected by an ESM sensor
at extended ranges, and electronic jamming of the threat radars aims to prevent the red
threat from obtaining a clear radar fix on the blue asset. The goal for employing any of the
counter-measures or tactics is to increase the AOU, which may ultimately have an impact
on the MOEs of surviving friendly forces and/or the reduction of the quantity of red
platforms that successfully execute various stages of the FTE kill chain
2. Counter-engagement of Enemy Missiles
In support of the MOEs detailing the number of surviving friendly forces and the
red threats that complete the engagement sequence, a potentially insightful MOP is the
ability for the blue platforms to counter-engage or divert the incoming missiles from the
red threats. The blue assets possess various hard-kill and soft-kill options to prevent an
inbound missile from striking the blue assets as a function of the range from the friendly
asset to the inbound missile. Traditional anti-air and missile defense methods can be
employed such as defensive missile intercepts, as well as counter-measures and tactics
including mechanical and physical decoys. The team aims to capture the quantity of soft-
kill decoys employed including chaff and smoke in an effort to determine which counter-
engagement methods are most effective at preventing an inbound missile from collision
with a friendly asset.
Additionally, with the primary focus of DMO geared towards the ability to conduct
tactical offensive operations, the team will determine the percentage of missiles and
counter-measures that friendly forces employed in a defensive manner as opposed to an
offensive strike. The missiles employed in a defensive manner are those categorized by
counter-engaging an enemy inbound missile, while the weapons used in an offensive
posture are those that are used to target the platforms that serve as the source of the missile.
For example, if a red threat aircraft enters the targeting sequence, a blue asset is capable of
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conducting an offensive strike if the threat is within weapons engagement range. If the
friendly platform conducts an engagement to neutralize the red aircraft prior to enemy
missile launch, the missiles are employed offensively. If the enemy aircraft obtains a
targeting solution and fires missiles at the assigned blue platform, then the counter-
engaging missiles are employed in a defensive capacity. The comparison of the two metrics
will provide insight into the ability for the friendly force to enforce a more forward leaning
DMO doctrine.
3. Threat Time in Find Sequence
Similar to the AOU performance measure with relation to the probability of the red
threats ability to locate the friendly forces is the evaluation of the time that each red threat
devotes to the detection and find activities in the kill chain. The metric is calculated as a
function of the start time of the simulation and the starting position of the red platform. As
time elapses, the enemy threat maneuvers and searches for the blue asset it has been
assigned. With the blue employment of DMO and the associated tactics that aim to degrade
sensor performance, the red threat may take an extensive amount of time to locate and
classify the assigned ship or aircraft.
The additional time in the find portion of the kill chain allows the closure distance
to decrease between friendly and enemy systems, potentially giving the advantage to blue
forces who can conduct a counter-engagement when a red threat is within the engagement
zone of friendly weapons systems. The team also hopes to address the question, “is
additional time spent in the find sequence advantageous to blue forces in actuality, or does
it allow for the red threat to close the distance to the assigned blue platform before
engaging, providing friendly forces with less time to conduct a counter-engagement?”
4. Threat Time in Target Sequence
Another time delay based MOP details the time that a red air or surface threat
spends in the targeting sequence. The adversary land-based missiles do not progress
through the targeting sequence, as once a missile finds its assigned target, it transitions to
the engagement phase where it advances to its inherent terminal guidance mode. Once the
adversary platform is able to successfully locate the blue surface vessel or aircraft that it
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has been assigned, the threat transitions to the targeting phase. In the targeting portion of
the kill chain, the red platform must employ its fire control systems to prepare to conduct
an engagement. The primary method of delaying a red platform in the sequence of targeting
activities is to prevent or diminish the ability to obtain the fire control solution through the
application of electronic jamming, reduction of the platforms heat signature, and governing
the emanation of electromagnetic radiation.
The output data and associated MOEs and MOPs provide a method of
quantitatively examining the impact of employing tactics and counter-measures associated
with the objective of performing DMO. The friendly force assets are capable of employing
emissions control, electronic jamming, swarms, and/or mechanical-physical decoys in an
effort to establish a forward-leaning offensive posture, and prevent the adversary forces
from conducting an engagement against significant elements in the blue force order of
battle. In Chapter VII of this report, various data analysis and statistical techniques are
applied to determine the effectiveness of individual tactics and combinations of counter-
measures with respect to the survivability of friendly forces, as well as the desired increase
in offensive firepower and lethality.
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VI. DMO MODEL AND SIMULATION
To evaluate the alternative force combinations in terms of the established metrics

for DMO, the SEA-27 team represents the events of the engagement through the creation
of a model. By constructing a model, the team is able to examine the ability for
arrangements of multi-domain assets to employ DMO and the associated tactics, while
simulating the engagement between the competing fleets. The objective of developing the
model is to facilitate an analysis of alternatives, and determine the force compositions that
demonstrate the DMO principles of an effective shared network of resources and a forward
leaning posture through increased lethality and offensive firepower. The following sections
of this chapter describe the structure and framework for the model, as well as the variable
inputs with the implementation of a design of experiments.
A. MODELING DISTRIBUTED MARITIME OPERATIONS
Simulating the fleet-on-fleet engagement to perform an analysis of DMO is

accomplished through the use of a discrete event simulation, or DES. “A DES models
queuing systems as they progress through time. In doing so it represents the world as
entities that flow through a network of queues and activities” (Brailsford et al. 2014, 17).
In the case of a battle between opposing military forces, the items or entities in the
simulation are the ships, aircraft and missiles. These items progress through a sequence of
activities or events, which for an engagement between armed forces, are the primary phases
of the kill chain; find, target, and engage.
In a DES, time is event based as opposed to specified intervals or time steps,

meaning that the simulation runs as a function of distinctive points in time when the system
changes, such as when an item performs an activity. In a time-step simulation, the model
records the state of the system at predetermined equal time steps, but for an event-based
simulation, the model progresses through time intervals of varying lengths, and records the
state of the system whenever a change or event occurs. For a model that represents
hundreds of ships, aircraft, and missiles, the event driven simulation ensures the capture of
activities that result in a change in the system, such as the loss of an aircraft or an
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engagement of an enemy ship. The DES employed by the SEA-27 team aims to facilitate
the analysis of tactical offensive and defensive capabilities projected from either a baseline
traditional force structure or an innovative DMO force composition, as well as the
associated deceptive tactics and counter-measures.
1. Model Structure
The structure of the model is governed by the process or sequence of activities that
the items must progress through, from the initialization of the model to the conclusion of a
given run within the simulation. Each run within the simulation represents a new
replication of the battle between friendly and enemy forces. At the initialization of every
run, each red threat is assigned a friendly force asset to target and engage. In order to do
so, the series of events that the enemy threats execute are the primary functions of the
detect-to-engage kill chain. The items that conduct this sequence of activities are the enemy
order of battle platforms, including the PLAN surface vessels, aircraft, and land-based
missile systems. The adversary threats are simulated to progress through the find, target,
and engage phases of the kill chain against an assigned friendly asset. The red threats aim
to complete the entirety of the sequence to engage and destroy the blue forces, while the
friendly assets employ offensive and defensive measures to prevent potential losses. The
model explores the ability for various arrangements of U.S. forces to employ offensive
tactics and deceptive counter-measures to divert or prevent the enemy from completing the
kill chain sequence.
a. Threat Generation
The initial stage of the simulation is the generation of the adversary aircraft, surface
vessels, and land-based missile systems. The types and quantities of the enemy platforms
in the model remain constant throughout all runs of the simulation, and are further detailed
in Appendix D. While the fundamental red order of battle is essentially constant with
respect to the platforms generated, several attributes or characteristics of each of the threats
vary upon the creation of the platform within the model. Once an enemy threat is generated,
it is attributed with a set of sensors and weapons systems along with the associated
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operating and engagement ranges, as well as the speed of advance. These attributes
contribute to the performance of the enemy threat in later stages of the model.
Additionally, a threat generated in the model is assigned a starting range as a

function of the distance from the location of friendly forces on the western coast of
Palawan. The type of threat dictates the values of the starting range which it can be
assigned. For example, PLAN surface vessels and aircraft conducting routine operations in
the South China Sea could have a uniformly distributed starting position ranging anywhere
from forty to eight-hundred nautical miles from friendly forces. The land-based missile
systems are more restricted in their potential starting ranges. Rather than a random,
continuous value ranging from forty to eight-hundred, the possible locations of the land-
based missile sites are limited to three discrete values, as determined by the location of the
forward operating bases on the Spratly and Paracel island chains, or on the primary
mainland bases. Figure 6 depicts the distinct values for the potential land-based missile
ranges. The missile boats are also limited in starting distance, as they are assumed to be
staged at the forward operating bases, and are tethered by a maximum operating range of
one hundred and fifty nautical miles.
Figure 6. Starting Ranges of Enemy Platforms and Land-Based

Missiles. Adapted from Google Maps (2018).
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At this stage in the model, the enemy platforms and missiles are created as
individual entities, with each threat assigned its own performance characteristics as a
function of its inherent sensors and weapons, as well as the geographical and physical
features of starting distance and speed of advance. The speed of each threat is based on the
specific platform type, but the starting position varies for each individual threat. For
example, with multiple Renhai destroyers generated in the run, all have the same speed of
advance of twenty-five knots, but the individual surface combatants are given various
starting separation distances from the location of the friendly forces. The next stage in the
initialization of the enemy order of battle is the engagement mission assignment, or pairing
of a friendly platform type to the enemy threat.
b. Mission Assignment and Pairing
In order for the adversary aircraft, surface combatant, or land-based missile to

progress through the various stages of the kill chain, the threat is first assigned a type of
friendly asset to find, target, and engage. The mission assignment is determined based on
the quantities and types of friendly forces available for targeting in the model, which vary
from run to run, unlike the enemy order of battle that is fixed and constant for all runs of
the engagement. In the model, the threats are paired against a friendly asset to target prior
to initialization of the kill chain. This eliminates the potential for a threat to engage a
friendly platform that has not been assigned, even if the non-assigned friendly asset is a
more practical or valuable target than the assigned platform. For example, an adversary
fighter may be tasked with targeting a friendly LPD surface ship. The enemy fighter aircraft
may encounter a more valuable friendly asset such as the amphibious assault LHA, but will
not deviate from its mission assignment to find, target, and engage the LPD.
Mission assignment probabilities are calculated and implemented to ensure that

only feasible engagement options are allowed for enemy threats within the model. For
example, the U.S. aircraft carrier is the high value unit that is typically the highest targeting
priority for an enemy fleet. The majority of the adversary’s combat capable platforms will
have a non-zero probability of being assigned the CVN for targeting and engagement, but
an aircraft carrying only air-to-air missiles or an unmanned vehicle with only ISR
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capabilities cannot possibly engage the CVN, so these platforms will have a probability of
zero for a targeting assignment to the friendly force aircraft carrier.
The probabilities of viable mission assignments are determined via a multi-criteria

scoring model. The weighting and scoring of representative criteria for each friendly asset
ensures a systematic determination of the engagement priorities for an enemy threat. This
consistent method of scoring is accomplished by identifying the levels of combat power
and sensor reach for each U.S. platform type, and assigning higher enemy prioritization to
the friendly assets that have greater influence as a function of the platforms’ weapon and
sensor capabilities. The first criterion is the combat power of a friendly platform in terms
of ordnance inherent to the platform, as well as the organic assets attached to the platform.
For example, an amphibious assault ship (LHD/LHA) does not carry a substantial quantity
of missiles for offensive strike, but the platform provides an aviation combat element of
attack aircraft. Therefore, the priority for enemy engagement of the LHD/LHA is higher
than the amphibious transport dock (LPD) ship, even though the LPD has a greater
inventory of shipboard missiles.
The second criterion evaluated is the level of reach, which considers both
operational range, as well as the maximum range of sensors, network capability, and
weapons. An example of a high value unit according to this criteria is the E-2 Airborne
Early Warning (AEW) aircraft, which has no intrinsic strike capability and a limited
operational range, but much more robust network and sensor integration capability.
Appendix F details the criteria intervals for both combat power and level of reach, and the
resulting scores for each of the blue assets. With the primary mission of DMO being the
ability to amplify offensive firepower, a higher weighting for the prioritization of enemy
targeting is given to combat power at 65%, while level of reach contributes to 35% of the
overall score.
As described in the example of the aircraft carrying only air-to-air missiles, an

enemy threat generated in the model may only be capable of targeting a specific platform
type. This scenario is considered in the mission assignment calculations, as the
probabilities for targeting the blue platforms are redistributed among the platforms that the
threat is capable of engaging. For the aircraft carrying only air-to-air missiles, the
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probabilities that the red aircraft could be assigned a blue surface platform to engage are
decreased to zero, and the percentages for the surface vessels are evenly redistributed to
the friendly air platforms that can be targeted. Additionally, the primary multi-role
platforms such as a blue F-35 or red J-20, were separated in the model into air engaging
and surface engaging platforms as a function of the missiles carried onboard. This ensured
that a PLAN J-20 (Air) carrying only air-to-air missiles could not be assigned to target and
engage a surface ship. This simplification is applied to both friendly and enemy forces, as
to not give the advantage to one fleet over another.
Additionally, the enemy platform is solely assigned a blue asset category for
engagement rather than one specific platform. For example, a single PLAN J-15 fighter
aircraft may receive the assignment to find, target, and engage a U.S. guided-missile
cruiser, or CG. This assignment does not correspond to a specific cruiser in the model, but
instead applies to any CG. There may be anywhere from zero to five cruisers in the friendly
forces order of battle as a function of the quantity generated, so the J-15 fighter can attack
any CG in the simulation. Additionally, the J-15 may be assigned the CG, along with an
enemy surface combatant who is also assigned to prosecute the friendly CGs. The enemy
surface combatant could potentially target and destroy the CG prior to the arrival of the J-
15, but the J-15 in the model is not capable of determining if the CG has been successfully
mission killed, so it will still continue to target and engage the already damaged friendly
cruiser. In the event that there are no cruisers generated for friendly forces, the J-15 reenters
the pairing sequence to receive a new assignment to a different platform type. The mission
assignment sequence allows for dissimilar categorical pairings, (enemy surface ship to
friendly aircraft, enemy missile to friendly surface ship, etc.) as well as unequal quantities
such as a single J-15 fighter having to find and target a single cruiser out of the three
cruisers in the vicinity of Palawan.
The final scenario in which an adversary platform may require a new targeting
objective is the frustration reassignment, or when an enemy threat is unsuccessful in
finding the assigned friendly platform due to sensor incompatibility or failure. The
targeting assignment for an adversary to locate the friendly forces assigned aircraft,
warship, or land-based missile is provided at the start of the simulation, but the threat can
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potentially be reassigned during the run if a platform allocates greater than 75 percent of
its allowable time to find the assigned asset and is unsuccessful. This maximum allowable
time is a function of the starting separation distance between the threat and the assigned
blue force asset, as well as the speed of advance for the enemy platform or missile. An
example of this reassignment is a PLAN Z-18 helicopter with an operating speed of 120
knots assigned to target a friendly force MDUSV at a range of one hundred and eighty
miles. The maximum allowable time for the Z-18 to find and target the MDUSV is one-
and-a-half hours based on the range separation and speed. If the Z-18 dedicates greater than
approximately an hour and ten minutes or transits more than 100 and 35 miles towards the
asset without finding the MDUSV, the Z-18 can request a reassignment to a different
friendly force asset. In this case, the threat is essentially requesting a new assignment which
may be denied, or could result in a new assignment to a different targetable asset.
c. Environmental Considerations
The concluding element of the initialization sequence for the group of enemy
threats is the determination of environmental factors including weather and clutter. These
attributes influence the threats sensor performance, resulting in either an enhanced or
degraded capability of finding and targeting the assigned friendly platform. The first
component of the environmental factors is weather. For the model, the various
meteorological conditions are simplified to 3 conditions and given a probability of
occurrence. For the majority of the simulation runs in which weather is not a factor, the
cloud cover and rains are negligible, and therefore there is no degradation to sensor
performance for both friendly and enemy forces. In the occasional event of storms or
reduced visibility, a degradation factor of 10 percent is applied to detection systems
including radars, as well as infrared, visual, and electronic support measure sensors. The
final, and least frequent, weather condition considered in the vicinity of Palawan is severe
weather that degrades sensor performance by 30 percent. Appendix C details the
probability of each weather condition as well as the associated degradation to the systems
used for detection of the assigned friendly platforms. The weather condition and
degradation factors simultaneously impact all platforms in the simulation, and remain
constant throughout the duration of the run.
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The generation of clutter in the model contributes to the overall quantity of air and
surface contacts in the simulation. Clutter includes neutral commercial and shipping traffic
through the air and sea lanes in the region. The presence of the neutral vessels provides
additional contacts for the enemy platforms to differentiate from targetable threats when
conducting the find and targeting phases of the kill chain. The model represents clutter
through the creation of approximately 55 to 75 additional contacts in the operating area,
determined as a function of typical congestion of merchant vessels and aircraft in the local
region. The average quantity of sea and air traffic in the vicinity of Palawan is determined
from the annual average of Automatic Identification System (AIS) tracks that travel
through the prescribed area of operations during a 3-hour time interval (Marine Vessel
Traffic 2018).
d. Kill Chain Sequence
Upon generating the complete enemy order of battle, assigning all enemy threats to
friendly platforms for targeting, and setting the environmental conditions, the engagement
simulation begins with each threat at the start of the kill chain. The model clock now
progresses forward from time 0, as each adversary aircraft, surface ship, and land-based
missile proceeds toward the location of the U.S. forces at its attributed speed. Each
individual threat attempts to find its assigned target by employing its onboard sensors. If a
threat is able to find its assigned friendly platform, the enemy combatant or missile
advances to the targeting phase, and with the acquisition of a firing solution, ultimately the
threat is able to engage the blue asset. Each phase of the enemy’s kill chain consists of a
variety of activities or events that dictate the platform’s performance with respect to the
ability to find, target, and engage. Additionally, the modeled activities within each phase
incorporate the ability for friendly forces to employ DMO offensive counter-engagements
as well as counter-targeting and tactics to divert or prevent the adversary from conducting
a successful engagement. Figure 7 depicts the fundamental functionality and sequence of
the model, with further detail and annotations of the ExtendSim event based simulation
shown in Appendix H.
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Figure 7. Primary Functions of the DMO Model
(1) Finding
The initial phase of the kill chain consists of a sequence of activities for an enemy
threat to detect and locate the friendly force target that it has been assigned. The ability for
the adversary to find the assigned platform type is a function of the sensors carried by the
searching platform, the maximum range of the sensors, and the relative performance of that
sensor in finding the blue asset. The probability of find values represent the single-look
chance of successful detection specific to an individual enemy sensor and the friendly
platform the sensor is attempting to locate. The enemy platform employs its appropriate
sensors to conduct a single-look scan of the operational area in an attempt to find the
assigned friendly force asset. This process of sensor single-look, independent scans to find
the assigned blue target is iterated many times as the enemy platform progresses inbound
toward the friendly forces’ location.
With each sensor scan, clutter is also considered as the need to differentiate neutral
and friendly traffic from a targetable rival platform. The ability to reduce clutter by a certain
quantity for each scan is dependent on the performance of a specific sensor. An advanced
radar may be able to instantaneously categorize a large group of contacts as neutral traffic
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with each look, resulting in a significant reduction in clutter and a higher probability of
find, while an optical or infrared sensor requires several seconds per an individual contact
to distinguish the platform as a legitimate target or neutral traffic. An adversary surface
combatant equipped with advanced high power radars can perform rapid scans of the
operating area, so even with high clutter saturation and a full friendly order of battle to
include swarm and decoys, the enemy ship can typically perform enough independent scans
to decipher and classify all contacts, resulting in an overall high probability of finding the
assigned friendly force platform.
The range gates implemented for each sensor type ensure that a friendly asset
located at a distance greater than the operational range of a radar or other available
detection methods cannot be found successfully. For example, a small missile boat with
only a short-range surface search radar cannot locate a friendly force aircraft at a range of
several hundred miles because the associated probability of finding an aircraft with the
surface search radar at this range is 0. There may also be instances where a targetable
platform is within range of an enemy sensor, but due to weather conditions or clutter or
employed counter-measures, the probability of find may be reduced to a level in which the
enemy is unable to detect the assigned friendly asset on a single look.
Additionally, sensor fusion, or the ability for a platform to use multiple onboard
sensors to find is accomplished by applying a calculation that considers the probability of
find for all sensors that are able to be employed for a certain range. An example of the
sensor fusion can be explained as an adversary fighter J-16 aircraft assigned to target a
friendly force littoral combat ship (LCS). The J-16 may be able achieve an initial detection
at a range of eighty miles using the AESA radar, but due to clutter or other contacts in the
area, the J-16 has not successfully identified all targets and determined the exact location
of the LCS target. As the J-16 continues to progress inbound towards the location of the
LCS, in addition to the AESA radar, the aircraft’s surface search radar can also be
employed to assist in the finding of the blue force surface combatant. With multiple sensors
in range of the assigned target, the probability of find for both independent radars are
considered, increasing the overall probability of the J-16 finding the friendly LCS.
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Throughout the simulation, an adversary platform only attempts to detect and locate
the friendly force platform type that it has been assigned. There is no benefit or penalty
applied to either force for an enemy combatant detecting an asset of a different platform
type. A PLAN aircraft, such as the bomber H-6K, could be assigned to target the LHA
amphibious ship, and in its efforts to locate the LHD/LHA(s), the H-6K conducts an
overflight of an entire carrier strike group without conducting an engagement because the
threat aircraft is not assigned any element of the strike group. By not allowing the enemy
platforms to engage friendly targets of opportunity, this artificially skews the attrition rates
to benefit blue forces. However, the relative impact of the employment of tactics remain
unaffected by the modeling limitations of preventing enemy threats from targeting and
firing upon the first available blue asset. Furthermore, it is assumed that each enemy
platform is independent in its kill chain efforts, meaning that the H-6K that overflew the
strike group does not communicate the information to any other platforms in the
simulation. Each aircraft, warship, or missile threat continues its attempts to find the
assigned friendly asset until either the run time expires, the threat is unable to reach the
assigned platform due to range and speed, or the friendly asset is successfully found by the
enemy, resulting in the transition to the targeting stage of the kill chain.
An example of an enemy platform conducting the activities of the find phase is a

PLAN surface ship that has been assigned the mission of neutralizing the Zumwalt DDG-
1000(s). The surface threat can employ a variety of sensors including ESM, surface search
radar, and visual sensors to locate the DDG-1000(s). The ability for the threat surface
combatant to detect and locate the DDG-1000 is dependent on the operational ranges of
these sensors, and a probability of find associated with each of the sensors. In the case that
the DDG-1000 is operating in an EMCON condition, the ability for the PLAN surface ship
to detect using ESM is reduced to 0. If the adversary ship is located over 300 miles from
the nearest DDG-1000 platform, the surface search radar is unable to be employed due to
operating range restrictions. Additionally, due to the reduced radar cross section of DDG-
1000, the probability of finding the Zumwalt class using the surface search radar is much
lower than the probability of locating a much larger vessel such as an aircraft carrier or
amphibious assault ship. In each of these cases related to the ability for a threat to detect a
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friendly force platform, the DDG-1000 platform has the advantage due to separation
distance and employment of deceptive tactics. The opposite may be also true for a given
run, in which the separation distance is not nearly as great and the enemy has several
sensors within range to successfully locate the stealth destroyer. With the PRC warship’s
successful find of the assigned DDG-1000, the enemy combatant can advance to the
targeting stage of the kill chain.
(2) Targeting
Only an adversary aircraft, surface ship, or land-based missile that has successfully
found the friendly force platform it was assigned can advance to the targeting stage. In the
targeting phase, there are additional conditions that an enemy platform must meet in order
to obtain a firing solution and conduct an engagement. Each platform that advances to the
targeting stage essentially has to conduct similar activities to those encountered in the find
stage. This is described as the enemy threat starts the targeting phase without any feasible
targeting data or a firing solution, and has to use the platform’s employable sensors with
associated probabilities of targeting in order to build up to obtaining a target solution
through numerous scans of the operating area. Additionally, even if a radar that is able to
generate a firing solution is employed to successfully find a targetable platform, a new
probability of target value is applied in this phase, which considers not only the radar’s
sensor capability, but also the ability of the weapon system to obtain a feasible firing
solution. Several red force threats employ sensors that can be used to find the assigned blue
platform, but cannot be applied to generate a firing solution. The systems that may assist
in finding a friendly force asset but require a secondary targeting capability include ESM,
navigational radar, and visual sensors. An example of this restriction may be a small
surface combatant that can detect and classify a target using a surface search radar, but
requires the integration of a fire control radar to successfully complete the targeting phase
of the sequence.
An enemy platform progresses through the activities of the targeting phase to

achieve the ability to engage until either the simulation expires due to run time constraints,
the combatant is unable to obtain the targeting solution by the time the adversary platform
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passes the assigned blue asset, or until the threat is counter-engaged by friendly forces.
Only a threat that successfully obtains a viable targeting solution can proceed to the final
phase of the kill chain to conduct an engagement. Success in the targeting stage only
considers the platform’s capability for achieving a firing solution from the onboard sensors
and fire control systems, and does not reflect the available weapon engagement range. For
example, a J-16 aircraft may employ the AESA radar to obtain a firing solution against a
blue threat at a range of over one hundred miles, but the aircraft is restricted by only
carrying short-range missiles onboard to conduct a physical engagement. The J-16 platform
will advance to the engagement phase due to the success in obtaining a targeting solution,
even though an engagement will not be effective until the separation distance is reduced to
the maximum weapon range.
An example of a red threat that may reach the targeting phase is the DF-26 anti-
ship ballistic missile which has been assigned to neutralize the friendly forces aircraft
carrier. Using the launcher’s radar capability and guidance communications linked to the
in-flight missile, the DF-26 may have successfully located a CVN, and transitioned to the
target phase. Based on the operating condition of the CVN and/or counter-measures
employed by the targeted platform and supporting friendly assets, the DF-26’s probability
of target may or may not be degraded for each scan, resulting in either an engagement of
the CVN, or a diversion of the inbound ballistic missile threat through kinetic or non-
kinetic means.
(3) Engaging
The final phase of the kill chain is the series of events that represent an engagement
from an enemy platform against its assigned blue force asset. Once an adversary obtains a
firing solution, the platform is advanced to the engagement phase where an ordnance
launch occurs or the land-based missiles reach their terminal guidance phase against the
assigned friendly force asset. In this phase of the FTE chain, the enemy surface and air
platform-based missiles launched from the parent threat enter the simulation as separate
entities. The starting range of the enemy platform-launched missiles is the launch point
from the parent aircraft or surface vessel, and is assigned the same target as the launching
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platform. The missiles launched are generated and prescribed similar attributes as the
parent platforms, to include an independent speed of advance, terminal guidance type, and
probability of hit against a specific friendly platform. The threat missiles can be counter-
targeted in this phase by the counter-measures and tactics available to friendly forces. For
example, a YJ-83 anti-ship cruise missile launched from an enemy surface or air platform
is terminally guided by active radar homing, and therefore could potentially be countered
by hard-kill methods as well as diverted through the use of active decoys, electronic
jamming, or physical counter-measures such as chaff. The parent platform that
conducted the engagement with the launch of missiles towards a friendly asset, then turns
outbound to increase the separation distance to attempt to prevent being counter-engaged
by friendly forces. The parent platform or land-based missile remains in the engagement
phase until the entirety of available weapons is expended, the combatant or missile passes
the assigned targeted platform, the run expires due to time, or the threat is counter-engaged
by friendly forces.
e. Counter-engagements and Counter-targeting
While the operational scenario describes the U.S. forces’ objective as defending an
allied nation from friendly attack, and the model is created from the viewpoint of adversary
forces conducting an attack on the U.S. assets, DMO focuses primarily on the shared
projection of offensive firepower. Therefore, incorporating the ability for blue forces to
conduct strikes from a forward leaning posture is critical to the evaluation of the DMO
capability. The portrayal of an offensive stance is accomplished through the ability to
conduct engagements of threats prior to the establishing of a targeting solution. Once an
enemy surface or air platform successfully finds its assigned blue asset and reaches the
targeting phase of the kill chain, any of the platforms in the friendly order of battle with
combat capability can conduct a strike to engage the red combatants.
In addition to the strike or counter-engagement capabilities, the friendly forces can

also employ counter-targeting tactics, meaning actions taken by U.S. assets to prevent an
enemy from conducting an engagement, or divert enemy resources away from actual
friendly forces. These counter-targeting methods enable an offensive posture due to
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employment prior to enemy missile launch, and can include the various types of electronic
jamming, deployment of a swarm or decoys, and operating in a limited emission condition.
(1) Resource Pool
For both offensive engagements (prior to an enemy missile launch), and defensive
purposes (post enemy missile launch), the missile inventory available to friendly forces are
maintained within a collective resource pool. This contrasts the red order of battle in which
the missiles generated are tethered to the parent platform and are not collaboratively shared
between threats. The model represents DMO as a united network of offensive lethality and
firepower, and therefore all missiles are shared for cooperative engagements from all
launch platforms. The missiles available for friendly forces in the shared resource pool for
a given run of the model are determined as a function of the generated friendly order of
battle. For example, a single run in which a CG and several F-35 aircraft are generated will
have a greater quantity and variety of missiles in the resource pool than a run which only
contains an LCS and a P-8 patrol aircraft.
The selection of the missile to perform an engagement is based on range gates and
logic statements implemented in the model. An example scenario of this model
functionality can be explained as an enemy surface combatant that successfully finds its
assigned target, and consequently becomes a targetable platform for a friendly force
engagement due to the adversary platform switching to a targeting system to complete the
engagement. This adversary warship is located at a range of 90 miles from the location of
friendly forces, so the counter-engagement range gates in the model can be applied. The
most capable friendly force anti-ship missile at the range of ninety miles is the LRASM.
The resource pool is checked to see if any LRASMs are available for employment based
on friendly force platforms generated in the run. If there are no LRASM assets available,
the next most capable missile at the given range will be checked for quantities available.
In this scenario, the next blue force missile for employment is the SM-6 in surface mode,
which is available due to the presence of a DDG-51 in the simulation. For this specific
missile, an additional check is done for an extended range capability if an E-2 is present.
As the enemy platform continues inbound towards friendly forces, more missile types
become available for employment as the range gates open. If a suitable friendly missile is
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available based on the platform needed to launch the attack weapon, an engagement of an
adversary threat can occur. In any event, if a friendly force platform launches a missile to
engage an adversary threat, the targeted enemy platform’s inbound progression and ability
to conduct the various stages of the kill chain is unaffected.
(2) Elimination of Missiles from Mission Killed Platforms
In the event an enemy threat is able to damage or mission kill a friendly force asset
that contributes to the shared missile inventory, the ordnance contribution of the degraded
U.S. ship, aircraft, or unmanned asset is potentially reduced. This decrease in weapons
inventory is accomplished by considering the types and quantities of missiles carried by
the affected platform, and applying a random percentage to remove a portion of the
platforms missile capacity, potentially ranging from zero missiles to the full inventory
carried by the battle damaged asset. For example, a DDG-51 class destroyer may be
engaged by an adversary aircraft and struck by an anti-ship cruise missile. If the model
registers the DDG-51 as hit, the contributions of the ship to the missile resource pool are
multiplied by a percentage factor ranging from 0 to 1, and the missiles remaining in the
pool from the damaged ship becomes the initial total minus the quantity lost due to the
percentage calculation. An example to better illustrate this case is the DDG-51 that
contributes 83 missiles to the resource pool. If the DDG-51 is struck by an enemy missile,
and the random percentage factor generated is 0.4, which corresponds to 33 missiles, the
DDG-51 now contributes only 50 missiles to the resource pool after the missile strike (83
minus 33). The random percentage factor is justified by the potential impact of a threat
missile, which may completely mission kill the destroyer, resulting in a full reduction of
the ship’s missile contributions to the friendly resource pool, or the enemy missile may
only damage the aft missile cells, resulting in a partial reduction of counter-engagement
capability.
f. Inclusion of ISR Platforms and Area of Uncertainty
With the fundamental principles of DMO aimed towards the enhancement of

operational lethality, the model primarily focuses on the simulation of attack capable
platforms and engagements using both kinetic and non-kinetic means. An additional facet
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of the DMO concept is the ability for an action group to share a common tactical operating
picture that allows for cooperative engagements between multi-domain platforms. In both
the friendly and enemy orders of battle, there are several platforms that enable this link or
network capability, such as the airborne early warning aircraft and unmanned ISR assets.
While these resources do not contribute any missiles to the shared resource pool, they
contribute to the fleet’s ability to perform the finding stage of the kill chain.
The area of uncertainty only applies to the adversary in the finding phase who is
actively attempting to find its assigned target, and represents a geographical area around
the targeted asset that increases as a function of the friendly platforms speed as well as the
time that the blue asset goes undetected. For each unsuccessful find scan from the adversary
threat sensors, the AOU grows larger around the targeted friendly platform. The presence
of the enemy ISR platforms in a particular run directly correlates to a change in the area of
uncertainty calculations for a friendly asset. The various adversary airborne early warning
rotary and fixed wing aircraft, maritime patrol aircraft, and reconnaissance satellite are
advantageous to the enemy as the AOU for any targetable blue platform is decreased. By
diminishing the AOU, an adversary system is able to devote more detection resources to a
smaller geographical area, resulting in either a higher probability of finding the assigned
blue platform, or less time spent in the find phase of the kill chain sequence. Additionally,
for both friendly and enemy forces, the presence of the ISR platforms creates additional
clutter, or contacts that the strike assets must dedicate time and resources to detect and
classify. These ISR assets also serve as a mission assignable or targetable platform for both
forces, and contribute to the overall fleet survivability metrics.
g. Employment of Tactics
The final major component of the model’s functionality is the incorporation of the
counter-measures and tactics employable by the friendly forces. Each of the 4 major
categories of counter-targeting and deceptive tactics identified for inclusion in the DMO
evaluation are considered in the model. The tactics are implemented separately as a
function of the intended impact of applying the tactic, and where the counter-measure
influences the adversary’s kill chain.
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(1) Swarm
The first of the DMO tactics available for employment by friendly forces is the use
of swarms of unmanned assets. Swarms serve as a counter-targeting measure, as it can be
employed prior to an enemy threat launching a missile in an effort to divert threats or
prevent the ability to target friendly forces. The primary objective of deploying a
cooperative group of remotely piloted or controlled vehicles is to create clutter for enemy
sensors, or emulate a targetable friendly forces asset. If the swarm is able to effectively
imitate a blue vessel or aircraft, the enemy resources used to perform the functions of the
kill chain are diverted from the actual targetable friendly assets, and are then dedicated to
pursuing a false contact.
The swarm capability is incorporated into the model in terms of an input variable
as well as the adversary’s mission assignment calculations. The swarm random input
provides a continuous value ranging from 0 to 1, corresponding to the effectiveness of the
swarm, or the ability to emulate a high value unit. If the swarm is present in the model,
then the mission assignment calculation is considered, in which the swarm probability of
assignment is a random value that ranges from 0 to the percentage equal to the high value
unit. The greatest level of effectiveness for a swarm of vehicles is to successfully emulate
the high value units, either the aircraft carrier in the surface domain, or the E-2 airborne
early warning aircraft in the air domain. If the swarm mission assignment probability is set
to the value of the critical friendly assets, this results in the enemy resources being equally
distributed between the actual, manned high value asset, and the false high value unit that
is comprised of numerous remotely controlled vehicles.
Tables 9, 10, and 11 detail sample calculations for the employment of swarm in the
model, in which the initial mission assignment values are considered, normalized, and
redistributed among the platforms and swarm asset. Table 9 defines the example mission
assignment probabilities with no change due to swarm not being active for a particular run
of the simulation. The following example shown in Table 10 is the other extreme, in which
a swarm is present and is determined to be extremely effective in imitating the carrier via
either radar cross section or electromagnetic emissions. For this case, the probability of an
enemy threat being assigned the swarm is equal to the value of the mission assignment
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probability for the aircraft carrier, and the remaining percentage of assignment probabilities
are redistributed among the other targetable platforms in the simulation. The final example
depicted in Table 11 demonstrates the case in which a swarm is partially effective, or may
be successful at emulating a vessel or aircraft other than the aircraft carrier or E-2 high
value units. The aircraft carrier accounts for nearly half (45 percent) of the mission
assignment probability, and swarm is generated to represent a partial effectiveness of
emulating the carrier. The probability of mission assignment for swarm is generated
relative to the CVN, as 23 percent of possible assignment in the sample simulation, which
reduces the targeting probabilities for the other friendly force assets in the simulation due
to the normalization and redistribution of the probabilities upon consideration of the
addition of the swarm vehicles.
Table 9. Mission Assignment Sample Probabilities—No Swarm
CVN LPD DDG-51 F-35 SWARM TOTAL

SWARM
INACTIVE 45% 30% 20% 5% 0% 100%
Table 10. Mission Assignment Sample Probabilities—Effective Swarm
SWARM CVN LPD DDG-51 F-35 SWARM TOTAL

ACTIVE
INITIAL 45% 30% 20% 5% 0% 100%
100%
EFFECTIVE
-NESS REDISTRIBUTED 31% 21% 14% 3% 31% 100%
Table 11. Mission Assignment Sample Probabilities—Partially

Effective Swarm
SWARM CVN LPD DDG-51 F-35 SWARM TOTAL

ACTIVE
INITIAL 45% 30% 20% 5% 0% 100%
65%
EFFECTIVE
-NESS REDISTRIBUTED 35% 23% 15% 4% 23% 100%
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(2) Mechanical and Physical Counter-measures
For the various types of mechanical and physical decoys and tactics, each device is
considered independently, and incorporated into the specific phase of the model that is
impacted by the counter-measure. Passive and active decoys serve as counter-targeting
measures as they are employed preemptively at the start of the simulation to hinder or
prevent enemy finding and targeting of friendly forces. The decoys serve as additional
contacts or clutter for the enemy forces to have to allocate resources to classify and identify.
Chaff, flares, and the various types of smoke are implemented as defensive counter-
measures once an enemy missile is launched, rather than assets used in the counter-
targeting stages. These counter-measures are deployable upon the event of an enemy
weapons launch, and aim to divert inbound enemy missiles that have reached the terminal
guidance phase. The chaff, flares, and smoke counter-measures are applied as the final
effort to prevent an enemy threat from intercepting a friendly asset once all other hard-kill
options have been exhausted or are no longer applicable due to range restrictions.
The quantities and types of mechanical and physical decoys and counter-measures
are input variables that are determined prior to the initialization of the model. The decoys,
chaff, flares, and smoke are all continuous variables ranging from 0 to a prescribed
maximum value, and are incorporated into the model for the defense of the friendly forces
against an enemy threat in the engagement phase. These mechanical devices are not
associated with any specific platform, and are maintained in a resource pool, similarly to
the missiles available for engagements.
The counter-measures are modeled as advantageous to the friendly forces, as the

ability to employ a mechanical or physical distraction is determined by the terminal
guidance of the inbound threat missile. For example, a chaff counter-measure is not
deployable for an enemy launched IR seeking missile, as the chaff would be ineffective at
diverting the threat from striking a blue asset. While this assumes that the friendly forces
are able to correctly identify all inbound threats and determine the appropriate counter-
measure, the tradeoff is that these counter-measures are only employed against missiles
that have reached their terminal guidance and are within 10 nautical miles from the
targetable asset. This ensures a very limited time for counter-measure employment to
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defend friendly force platforms, as a function of the terminal speed of the inbound threat.
Additionally, a deployed physical counter-measure impacts only 1 enemy threat in the
model. For example, the employment of chaff is directed towards only 1 enemy threat, and
has no impact on any subsequent missiles.
(3) Electronic Jamming
The controlled radiation of energy to prevent the enemy’s unobstructed use of the
electromagnetic spectrum is modeled as a counter-targeting measure, or actions taken prior
to an adversary missile engagement against friendly forces. The 5 methods of jamming
considered in the DMO model are simulated by employing degradation factors against
enemy sensors in the finding and targeting phases of the kill chain. These degradation
factors are numerical values ranging from 0 to 1, with 0 relating to complete deprivation
of the use of a sensor, and 1 corresponding to jamming having no impact on a certain
sensor. For example, employing spot jamming to interfere with a frequency agile radar will
have a lower degradation factor (value closer to 1), than barrage or DRFM jamming which
inhibits multiple operating frequencies simultaneously. The degradation factors are
determined relative to each jamming type against all threat sensors in each phase of the kill
chain, and are incorporated into the model by multiplying these values by the normal sensor
performance parameters. For example, conducting barrage jamming against an enemy Y-
8FQ aircraft radar corresponds to a degradation factor of 0.4, resulting in a 60 percent
degradation of the adversary aircraft’s sensor performance and ability to find the assigned
friendly force asset.
The application of jamming in each run of the simulation is an input variable that
is determined prior to the start of the model. Each type of jamming is either active or
inactive, with allowable values of 0 or 1 and is assumed to remain active or inactive
throughout the duration of the simulation. Multiple types of electronic jamming can be
practiced in a single run, and are considered as cumulative yet independent effects.
Jamming is initiated at the start of the simulation, and is not conducted by any specific
friendly platform. Jamming is modeled as advantageous to friendly forces as there is no
penalty or degradation to own force sensor performance or additional interference with the
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employment of multiple jamming types. The only modeled consequence for employing
jamming is a larger ESM signature for each friendly platform, resulting in a higher
probability of find for enemy threats using an ESM suite to detect and locate assigned blue
platforms. The jamming counter-targeting tactic is assumed to impact all threat sensors in
the engagement. Additionally, perfect information is assumed for jamming, meaning that
the jamming employed is prescribed to be effective against the operating frequency of an
adversary sensor. For example, if spot jamming is employed by friendly forces, it is
assumed that the exact frequency radiated by an adversary platform is known, and able to
be effectively overpowered by the spot jamming signal.
(4) Emissions Control
The final tactic available for employment by friendly forces is the ability for certain
platforms to operate in a restrictive EMCON condition. In the model, only the major
missile carrier surface combatants (cruisers and destroyers), are able to fully limit their
electromagnetic radiation and operate in EMCON Alpha. The decision to limit the
employment of EMCON to only the primary missile carriers is due to the simulated impact
of EMCON for a specific platform, specifically with regard to the contributions to the
common resource pool. The advantage to employing EMCON Alpha for the friendly force
missile carriers is that the adversary sensors are not capable of finding the CG, DDG-51,
or DDG-1000 warships using the ESM sensors, and the enemy’s active radar homing
threats have a lowered probability of intercept. The tradeoff for the U.S. fleet is the
significant loss in strike capability, as a missile carrier in the restrictive EMCON posture
does not contribute any missiles to the shared resource pool, since the platform is required
to radiate in order to launch the shipboard missiles.
The application of EMCON is an input to the model, determined as a 2 level

variable (EMCON Delta or EMCON Alpha) for the CG, DDG-51, and DDG-1000
platforms. Additionally, if the model prescribes that the cruiser is to operate in EMCON
Alpha, all cruisers in the simulation will be set to EMCON Alpha. The employment of
EMCON begins at the start of the simulation, and remains constant throughout the duration
of the specific replication.
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2. Model Assumptions and Limitations
While any model can be improved to incorporate additional fidelity to simulate

realistic operating conditions, the project time constraints required the SEA-27 team to
make decisions regarding the implementation of simplifying assumptions. Overall, the
team objective is to create a simulation that models the DMO concept in terms of a balanced
fleet-on-fleet engagement between near-peer adversaries. While many realistic battle
environment conditions are simplified in the model, the aim is to facilitate the gathering of
insights as to which deceptive tactics and counter-measures best suit the friendly force’s
objectives of increased lethality and distributed offensive capabilities across all domains.
While many of the simplifying assumptions result in advantages to either the friendly or
enemy forces, the aim of creating the model and analyzing the results is to examine the
impact of the platforms and tactics employed with respect to the overall metrics of success
for the blue maritime forces.
One of the primary limitations of the DMO model is the run time for each
simulation. The time allocated for the engagements is approximately 3 hours, which is
determined as a function of the slowest moving platform in the enemy order of battle, and
its speed of advance to reach the location of the friendly forces. With the relatively short
run time, the model is effectively examining only the initial round of strikes against the
friendly forces providing defense of the island. In addition to the simulation run time, the
enemy order of battle remains constant for all replications of the simulation. For both of
these simplifying assumptions, only the initial wave of engagements is examined, in which
a follow on study could investigate the possibility of extending the run time and
considering the loss of major platforms during the first sequence of engagements.
For all platforms and their respective operating parameters, simplifications were
implemented with regards to sensors and networking capability. For example, friendly
forces are assumed to have a network established for shared offensive strike capabilities,
but the enemy platforms are assumed to operate independently with no shared detection or
targeting information. To counter-balance this advantage to friendly forces, the sensor
performance advantage is provided to the enemy forces. For each adversary platform, their
best inherent sensor is assumed operational and able to be employed against friendly assets.
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An example of this implementation is a PLAN surface threat being assigned to target and
engage an F-35. The enemy surface vessel probabilities of find, target, and engage are
determined as a function of the highest performing, most capable radar against the F-35
target. The performance characteristics for the sensors are not specified to the level of
considering different variations onboard platforms of different classes. The phased array
radar is assumed to be equivalent on the Renhai class destroyer as the phased array radar
onboard the Luyang III destroyer.
A simplification for the forces is that each aircraft is considered as an independent

entity without consideration of the association to a specific parent platform. For example,
an F-35 aircraft may be generated in a run where there is no aircraft carrier or amphibious
assault ship that serve as the landing platform for the F-35. The justification for considering
aircraft as separate entities from the carrying and landing ship, is the assumption of the
ability to utilize regional air bases for additional staging and landing facilities. The
proximity of the operating area to U.S. friendly ashore bases such as Clark Air Force Base
in the Philippines is advantageous to the friendly forces, while the enemy aircraft are able
to utilize the mainland bases as well as the forward staging on the militarized island chains.
With respect to staging and forward deployed operations, the model does not
consider logistics as a limiting or enabling factor for either fleet. Due to the short run time
of the simulation, it is assumed that all resources needed for maneuver and engagements
are contained within the units in the operating area, with no consideration given to the need
for refueling or rearming. Additionally, no supply ships or aircraft are incorporated into the
either belligerent’s order of battle, which would serve as targetable platforms in a realistic
engagement.
B. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS
Simulating the application of DMO is contingent on the ability to examine

alternative force compositions and structures, as well as the various potential
implementations of tactics and counter-measures. In order to perform a comparison of a
traditional force structure to an innovative, distributed force structure capable of
conducting DMO, two separate operational simulations are conducted. The first simulation
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occurs with a projected baseline or traditional force structure of 2030, which includes a
carrier strike group, an expeditionary strike group, and several independent units, as
detailed in Table 12. The input variables for the simulation, depicted in Table 13, of the
baseline force composition consists of only the various counter-measures and tactics that
can be employed by the friendly forces, as the platforms available to be generated and
paired against an enemy threat are determined prior to the start of the simulation.
Table 12. Baseline Fixed Force Structure
Carrier Strike Expeditionary Strike Independent

Group (CSG) Group (ESG) Units
1 CVN 1 LHA/LHD 1 CG
1 CG 2 LPD 1 DDG-1000
3 DDG-51 1 DDG-51 2 DDG-51
1 LCS 2 LCS 2 LCS
10 F-35 (Air) 4 F-35 (Air) 4 MDUSV
10 F-35 (Surface) 4 F-35 (Surface) 2 EPF
10 F/A-18 (Air) 4 MH-60 R/S 3 P-8 MPRA
10 F/A-18 (Surface) 6 AH-1 2 MH-60 R/S
6 EA-18 2 MQ-8 6 MQ-8
2 E-2 2 MQ-9 4 MQ-9
4 MH-60 R/S 4 TERN 2 MQ-4
2 MQ-8 12 TERN
2 MQ-9
4 TERN
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Table 13. Baseline Force Structure Input Variables
Tactics & Counter-Measures
Variable Minimum Maximum Type

Swarm 0 1 Discrete
Chaff 0 200 Continuous
Flares 0 50 Continuous
Visual Smoke 0 50 Continuous
IR Smoke 0 50 Continuous
Active Decoys 0 25 Continuous
Passive Decoys 0 300 Continuous
Spot Jamming 0 1 Discrete
Barrage Jamming 0 1 Discrete
Sweep Jamming 0 1 Discrete
DRFM Jamming 0 1 Discrete
GPS Jamming 0 1 Discrete
CG EMCON 0 1 Discrete
DDG-51 EMCON 0 1 Discrete
DDG-1000 EMCON 0 1 Discrete
The second event simulation of the experiment considers the employment of non-
traditional force architectures, as the discrete integer quantities of the multi-domain
platforms are varied within the model. Table 14 details the input variables for the DMO
experimental design, which includes not only the application of deceptive counter-
targeting tactics and defensive counter-measures, but also the adjustable platform
quantities. This design allows for cooperative, networked friendly assets that do not
conform to a prescribed action group structure. For example, a single run may consist of
non-traditionally grouped platforms such as a DDG-1000, EPF, EA-18s, AH-1s, an MQ-
9, and various deceptive tactics and counter-measures that must function in an integrated
manner to meet operational objectives and protect own force assets.
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Table 14. Variable Force Structure Input Variables
Platforms Tactics & Counter-measures
Variable Min Max Variable Min Max Type

CVN 0 2 Swarm 0 1 Discrete
LHA/LHD 0 2 Chaff 0 200 Continuous
LPD 0 4 Flares 0 50 Continuous
CG 0 3 Visual Smoke 0 50 Continuous
DDG-51 0 10 IR Smoke 0 50 Continuous
DDG-1000 0 1 Active Decoys 0 25 Continuous
LCS 0 6 Passive Decoys 0 300 Continuous
EPF 0 3 Spot Jamming 0 1 Discrete
MDUSV 0 6 Barrage Jamming 0 1 Discrete
F-35 (A) 0 30 Sweep Jamming 0 1 Discrete
F-35 (S) 0 30 DRFM Jamming 0 1 Discrete
F/A-18 (A) 0 10 GPS Jamming 0 1 Discrete
F/A-18 (S) 0 10 CG EMCON 0 1 Discrete
EA-18 0 5 DDG-51 EMCON 0 1 Discrete
E-2 0 2 DDG-1000 EMCON 0 1 Discrete
P-8 0 8
MH-60 0 16
AH-1 0 6
MQ-4 0 3
MQ-8 0 20
MQ-9 0 15
TERN 0 54
Determination of the desired simulation objectives and input variables leads to the
selection of the experimental design needed to facilitate the data generation and analysis
of various DMO alternatives. With the presence of both continuous and discrete input
variables or various levels, and the potential for over several million design points to
simulate, the nearly orthogonal balanced (NOB) design is selected as an appropriate
method for the DMO simulation and analysis (Vieira et al. 2011).
The NOB process creates a space filling design that enables the consideration of
the various variable types and levels, while minimizing correlation between the input
variables. The balanced portion of the design refers to the same frequency of occurrence
for every factor of an input variable. Nearly orthogonal describes the method that ensures
the maximum absolute pairwise correlation between any two factors is less than 0.05,
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meaning that the effect of one factor is essentially independent of the effects for another
factor. Lastly, the space filling capability refers to the creation of a representative sample
of the solution space since the examination of every possible combination of variables is
impossible due to time constraints (Vieira et al. 2011).
The NOB space filling design enables the creation of 512 design points, or
combinations of the input variables including tactics for the baseline force structure, and
platforms as well as tactics for the DMO capable force structure. A sample of these design
points is detailed in Appendix I. Figure 8 depicts a representation of the input variables for
the DMO force structure simulation to demonstrate the space filling capability of the
experimental design. The manned platform input variables can accept discrete integer
quantities, while the decoys and tactics variables shown on the scatterplot can take on a
wider range of continuous values. Additionally, the maximum absolute pairwise
comparison between the full set of input variables is 0.0299, which is within acceptable
limits for a simulation of this nature. Each of the 512 design points is replicated 30 times
to limit the impact of variability, resulting in 15,360 simulation runs for both the baseline
and DMO-centric force structures, for an overall total of 30,720 simulation runs. While
each run varies due to the changing input variables, the approximate time to run each
replication of the simulation is 10 to 30 seconds, resulting in an overall run time of nearly
16 hours.
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Figure 8. DMO Structure Input Variable Scatterplot Matrix—First 10
Input Variables
83
84
VII. MODEL ANALYSIS
Using the data extracted from the 30,720 total runs of the model as described in
Chapter VI.B, the team applies various statistical analysis methods to determine the impact
of the various platforms, unmanned systems, counter-measures, and tactics on the ability
to perform DMO. The model output is divided into two major groups of 15,360 runs, or
512 observations or data points with 30 replications of each individual data point. The first
set of output data corresponds to the baseline fixed force structure that considers only the
tactics and counter-measures as model input variables. The second data set refers to the
variable DMO force structure in which the tactics and friendly force platforms that can
be employed against the enemy forces in the engagement simulation are changed from
run to run.
By performing an analysis of both sets of extracted data, the team aims to gain
insights and provide evidence to support recommendations for various levels of leadership.
The baseline force structure insights are directed towards operational commanders that may
not have the ability to determine or allocate the specific forces for employment, but can
alter the tactics in order to increase the survivability and lethality of the forces available at
the time of the engagement. The analysis conducted on the modifiable DMO force structure
enables recommendations that provide insight for the echelons of leadership that are
capable of making force architecture recommendations and assignments, as the simulation
considers various groupings of platforms, assets, and tactics, for employment in the fleet-
on-fleet engagement.
In order to develop these insights from the model outputs, the data captured by the
simulation allows for the calculating of the measures of performance and effectiveness as
described in Chapter V, as well as several additional metrics that provide further fidelity
into the overall performance of the friendly forces participating in the engagement. Table
15 details the parameters captured by the model, which are further detailed in the equations
shown in Appendix E.
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Table 15. Metrics Captured by the ExtendSim Model
Percentage of Friendly High Value Surface Assets Killed

(CVN/LHD/LHA)
Percentage of Percentage of Friendly Missile Carriers Killed (DDG(s), CG)
Friendly Force
Assets Killed Percentage of Friendly Force High Value Aircraft Killed (E-2)
Percentage of Friendly Force Fighter Aircraft Killed
(F-35, F/A-18, EA-18)
Percentage of Percentage of Enemy Platforms Killed (Surface & Aircraft)
Enemy Killed Percentage of Enemy Missiles Killed
Percentage of Percentage Enemy Aircraft Successfully Find Friendly Asset
Enemy Percentage Enemy Surface Successfully Find Friendly Asset
Complete Find Percentage Enemy Missile Successfully Find Friendly Asset
Percentage Enemy Aircraft Successfully Target Friendly Asset
Percentage of
Percentage Enemy Surface Successfully Target Friendly Asset
Enemy
Complete Percentage Enemy Missile Successfully Target Friendly Asset
Targeting Percentage of Enemy Missiles Reach 10 nmi from Friendly Forces
Enemy Aircraft Average Time to Find Assigned Friendly Asset
Time to Find Enemy Surface Average Time to Find Assigned Friendly Asset
Enemy Missile Average Time to Find Assigned Friendly Asset
Enemy Aircraft Average Time to Target Assigned Friendly Asset
Time to Target Enemy Surface Average Time to Target Assigned Friendly Asset
Enemy Missile Average Time to Target Assigned Friendly Asset
Utilization Percentage of Friendly Force Chaff
Utilization Percentage of Friendly Force Flares
Employment of Utilization Percentage of Friendly Force IR Smoke
Counter- Utilization Percentage of Friendly Force Visual Smoke
Measures Utilization Percentage of Friendly Force Active Decoys
Success of Employed Mechanical and Physical Counter-Measures
Success of Employed Defensive Missiles
Enemy Aircraft Average Area of Uncertainty for Friendly Asset
Area of
Enemy Surface Average Area of Uncertainty for Friendly Asset
Uncertainty
Enemy Missile Average Area of Uncertainty for Friendly Asset
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These metrics are captured, calculated, and analyzed to determine the input
variables that have the largest impact on each metric through regression analysis. A
statistical analysis program, JMP, is used to assist in the regression analysis and
determination of significant factors and relationships between variables with respect to the
ability of the friendly force assets to perform DMO. In an effort to create models that
appropriately fit the data generated from the model, both the individual input variables are
considered in the regression, as well as the first order interactions between variables.
Additionally, the regression is performed in a stepwise manner through the application of
the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) algorithm. The BIC method produces a
parsimonious model by considering the singular input variables and impactful interactions
between input variables that have an impact on the respective dependent variable or output
being examined (Schwarz 1978, 461). The execution of the BIC procedure for the
regression analysis assists in the determination of the statistically significant variables that
have an impact on the ability to perform DMO.
Not all of the captured data and associated metrics proved to be insightful, and may
not be addressed in the following analysis sections. The determination of the insightful
metrics as compared to those that did not provide any substantial value during the analysis
was accomplished through the use of the JMP statistical software tool, and the selection of
a significance criteria. For the following analysis, only the input variables and interactions
that present a p-value of less than 0.01 are considered as statistically significant factors.
In addition to recognizing the statistical significance of certain input variables with

respect to performing DMO, the team aims to identify the factors with operational
significance that contribute to the MOEs and MOPs. Some factors that are determined to
be statistically significant in the output data from the model, may only be considered due
to the way in which the forces and engagement is modeled, and not necessarily reflective
of any operational significance. The determination of the operational significance of input
variables is accomplished through the examination of a partition tree as created by the JMP
analysis program. The partition tree allows for the consideration of only the single input
variables as the interactions terms are removed from the regression analysis and the data is
grouped into sub categories that improve the fit of the overall statistical model. This enables
87
a more detailed analysis of the relative impact of singular factors on a certain metric. For
example, if barrage jamming is shown to have a statistically significant impact on the
survivability of friendly force aircraft, the creation of a partition tree for a certain measure
assists in the identification of any operational impact of conducting barrage jamming with
respect to the platforms and tactics employed in the engagement. The leveraging of the
team’s operational experience serves to provide context for the results within the tactical
scenario and an additional level of fidelity when conducting the analysis of the integration
of multi-domain platforms, assets, and tactics.
A. BASELINE FIXED FORCE STRUCTURE
The analysis of the baseline force structure considers only tactics and counter-
measures as input variables, as the force composition is fixed and remains constant for all
15,360 runs of the simulation. As described in Chapter VI, the variable tactics include the
five various types of jamming, employment of swarm assets, mechanical and physical
counter-measures, and the limiting of emissions from the primary missile carrying
platforms (CG, DDG-51, DDG-1000). These input variables and their interactions are
analyzed against the output metrics of the model including the survivability of friendly and
enemy forces, as well as the ability of the enemy threats to complete the finding and
targeting phases of the kill chain.
1. Analysis of MOE #1: Survivability of Friendly Forces
The survivability of the friendly forces is a metric defined as the proportion of blue
force assets that survive the engagement as compared to the quantity of friendly force
platforms that are initialized in the specific run. The overall survivability metric is difficult
to discern in terms of value due to the lack of weighting for individual platforms. For
example, due to the calculation of the MOE, the loss of an aircraft carrier in a run is
equivalent to the loss of an unmanned vehicle, as each asset is counted in the equation
solely in terms of quantity, rather than total value. While an aircraft carrier would be a
much more devastating loss to friendly forces than an MDUSV or TERN asset, this is not
accounted for in this metric, and therefore the metric is more valuable in terms of sub-
metrics of categorized platform groupings. The decomposition of overall survivability
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MOE into several sub-metrics of categorical platform groupings provides additional insight
into the ability for certain platforms to persist through the engagement against enemy
forces. The team examines the survivability of four major groups; the complete fixed blue
force order of battle across all domains, the aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships,
the primary missile carrier surface platforms, and the fighter aircraft (F-35, F/A-18, EA-
18). For each of these groupings of platforms, the input variables that significantly
contribute to survivability are determined.
Prior to examining the individual significance of the input variables, the first JMP
output of the regression analysis is the actual by predicted plot, as depicted in Figure 9 for
the overall survivability of the fixed OOB blue forces. The plot provides insight into the fit
of the model and the predicted response as compared to the actual model output response.
While an ideal R squared value is much closer to a value of 1, this model is acceptable for
this simulation due to the relatively low number of input variables, and the high variability
for survivability between individual runs.
Figure 9. MOE #1: Friendly Force Overall Survivability Regression

Model
89
Upon examining the fit of the model, the analysis of the individual factors and
interactions between input variables that contribute to friendly force overall survivability
is performed. Table 16 provides a summary of the insights found from the analysis of the
data outputs as created by the statistical program. For the survivability of each of the
platform groupings in the summarized table, the individual factors that are determined to
be statistically significant from the sorted parameter estimates are listed. While the
interactions between various input variables may be significant, especially for determining
the parameters needed to fit the model to the data, only the individual input variables are
listed in the summary tables. For example, the overall survivability of the baseline friendly
force structure is impacted by the statistically significant singular input variables of spot
jamming, swarm, and barrage jamming. In order to determine which of the factors may
have had a positive or negative operational impact on the survivability of the friendly forces
in the simulation, additional JMP outputs are considered including the sorted parameter
estimates and a partition tree.
Table 16. Analysis Summary of Baseline Structure—MOE #1: Friendly

Force Survivability
MOE Quantity of Blue assets surviving at end of simulation

Calculation Quantity of initial Blue assets
Baseline Fixed Force Stucture
Overall High Value Missile Fighter Aircraft
Statistically
Significant
Survivability Ships Carriers
Contributing Spot Jamming Swarm Barrage Jamming
Swarm Spot Jamming Swarm DRFM Jamming
Factors Barrage Jamming
Barrage Jamming Barrage Jamming Sweep Jamming
90
Figure 10. MOE #1: Statistically Significant Factors—Fixed Friendly
Force Overall Survivability
Figure 10 depicts a more detailed snapshot of the input variable factors and first
order interactions that contribute to overall friendly force survivability. It is observed that
for this specific MOE, the interactions between the various types of jamming actually has
the most statistically significant impact on the survivability of the fixed blue order of battle.
In this particular analysis, a partition tree is valuable in determining the operational impact
of each of the statistically significant individual input variables with respect to the overall
survivability of friendly forces.
Figure 11. MOE #1: Operational Impact of Statistically Significant

Factors—Fixed Friendly Force Overall Survivability
91
Figure 11 details the partition trees that examine three individual factors that are
identified as statistically significant in the regression analysis of the overall friendly force
survivability. As observed, the data is not able to be tightly grouped based on a single input
factor, and the impact or significance of each of the individual tactics with respect to overall
survivability is less than 0.35 percent. Considering each factor as an independent tactical
option; either having spot jamming on, swarm employed with an effectiveness of over 68
percent, or barrage jamming on, there is minimal increase in the ability for blue forces to
survive and continue to perform DMO in the engagement. With these percentage changes
being seemingly minor, the groupings of the blue platforms into subcategories may provide
additional fidelity into the significance of these input variables.
For example, the statistically significant factors described in Table 16 for the
subgroup of friendly force missile carriers detail the employment of swarm and barrage
jamming as having the largest potential impact on the ability for the CG and DDG
platforms to remain in the engagement throughout the duration of the simulation. Figure
12 details the parameter estimates that assist in identifying swarm and barrage jamming as
the statistically significant input variables. Again, a partition tree is created to further
examine these factors for their respective operational significance.
Figure 12. MOE #1: Statistically Significant Factors—Survivability of

Friendly Force Missile Carriers
92
Factors—Fixed Friendly Missile Carrier Survivability
From the partition trees detailed in Figure 13, the parameter estimates identified as
statistically significant are examined as independent, singular input variables. The tree on
the left details the impact of swarm on friendly missile carrier survivability. The
employment of swarm with an effectiveness of emulating the high value units is greater
than 37.4 percent, results in a four percent increase of CG and DDG platforms that remain
at the conclusion of the battle. Additionally, if swarm effectiveness is increased to nearly
ninety percent, the overall survivability of missile carriers increases again by over 4
percent, resulting in an overall 8 percent increase in CGs and DDGs remaining at the end
of the engagement simulation. This can be attributed to the mission assignment function
within the model, when swarm is more effective at deceiving the enemy as the aircraft
carrier, additional assignment probability is given to the swarm, and therefore reduced from
the missile carrier platforms. Considering the impact of only barrage jamming being
employed to impact missile carrier survivability, there is a nearly 3 percent positive
relationship between the use of barrage jamming in the battle and the ability for missile
carriers to remain operational in the battle.
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The detailed analysis for the remaining subgroups of the high value ships and
fighter aircraft are considered in Appendix K.
2. Analysis of MOE #2: Survivability of Enemy Forces
A similar process of analysis is applied to the remaining MOEs for the data set that
considers the fixed baseline force structure. For this MOE, the enemy survivability is
considered as an overall force survivability, and is not decomposed into various
subgroupings of similar platforms or domain-centric assets. The data output regarding the
overall survivability of enemy forces produces a much more aptly fit model, with an R
squared value of 0.97, as depicted in the actual by predicted plot in Figure 14.
Figure 14. MOE #2: Enemy Force Survivability Regression Model
Again, considering only tactics, counter-measures, and the interactions between

these factors as variables for the fixed force structure simulation, the statistically significant
factors identified to impact enemy survivability include the following types of jamming;
barrage, spot, DRFM, and sweep. As shown in the sorted parameter estimates in Figure 15,
as each jamming is employed independently by friendly forces, the enemy force
survivability decreases.
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Figure 15. MOE #2: Statistically Significant Factors—Enemy Force
Survivability
In order to gain additional insight regarding the operational effectiveness of the

individual jamming tactics as applied to the survivability of the enemy threats, a partition
tree as shown in Figure 16 is created. With barrage jamming identified as the most
statistically significant factor, the model data for the fixed force structure is grouped into
barrage jamming on, and barrage jamming off. From the partition tree, it is observed that
without conducting barrage jamming, the average survivability of the enemy forces is 39.5
percent. The friendly force employment of barrage jamming results in a decrease of overall
red forces remaining to an average of 32.7 percent. The difference between barrage
jamming on or off in this data set is approximately seven percent. Further grouping is then
performed to consider spot jamming with respect to the employment of barrage jamming.
The greatest reduction in overall survivability of the adversary forces is when both barrage
and spot jamming tactics are able to be employed. When both jamming tactics are activated
in the simulation, this results in a ten percent difference between the ratio of overall enemy
assets remaining to the 149 red force platforms and missiles that are generated in the
simulation, from 41.08 percent to 30.78 percent.
95
Factors—Fixed Force Structure Enemy Survivability
This noticeable reduction in enemy forces can be explained by the implementation

of barrage jamming in the model, which has the greatest degradation against numerous
enemy sensors used in the finding and targeting stages of the kill chain. Since all of the
various jamming types are applied with the objective of confusing and degrading enemy
search and targeting radars, the decrease in overall red force survivability can be attributed
to the increase in time required for a red threat to successfully generate a targeting solution.
With a jammed radar, more time is needed in order to accurately identify and target an
assigned blue vessel. Likewise, friendly forces are capable of conducting counter-
engagements during the targeting phase, which results in a greater number of potential
counter-engagements if the threat requires additional time to obtain a firing solution.
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3. Analysis of MOE #3: Enemy Force Effectiveness in Find Sequence of
Kill Chain
In addition to the survivability metrics, the MOEs to evaluate the fixed force
structure include the percentage of enemy threats that are able to evade friendly force
counter-targeting efforts and complete the various stages of the kill chain. The first MOE
is the effectiveness of the overall enemy force in completing the find portion of the kill
chain. This metric is calculated by determining the percentage of enemy threats that
successfully find their assigned blue target.
Table 17 describes the statistically significant individual factors that contribute to

the enemy air, surface, and land-based missile threats’ ability to find the assigned friendly
force asset. Each enemy platform in the various domains experiences different significant
factors as a result of the sensors employed to complete the finding stage of the model.
Table 17. Analysis Summary of Baseline Structure—Enemy Find

Effectiveness
MOE Quantity of Red threats successfully find assigned Blue platform

Calculation Quantity of total Red threats
Statistically Enemy Air Find Enemy Surface Find Enemy Missile Find
Significant Spot Jamming
Contributing Spot Jamming
Barrage Jamming DRFM Jamming
Factors Passive Decoys
Barrage Jamming
DRFM Jamming
Sweep Jamming
Due to the simulation run time of approximately three hours, the enemy threats are
provided ample time to transit the operating area and successfully complete the find phase.
Additionally, friendly forces are incapable of conducting counter-engagements while a
threat is in the find sequence, therefore the only potential impact to a an enemy threat
97
conducting search is the application of tactics and the associated degradation factors. The
only instance in which a red threat could be unsuccessful during this find phase is when
the red threat sensor is substantially degraded or incompatible with the assignment
platform. This scenario is rarely an issue for the slower surface platforms, but is much
more prevalent for the significantly faster red missiles and aircraft that are capable of
closing this distance due to their attributed speed of advance. If a red threat is unsuccessful
in finding its intended blue target, the enemy platform or missile exits the model and does
not proceed to the targeting or engagement portion.
For this specific MOE, air and surface platforms are nearly guaranteed to find their
assigned asset in the simulation, and are therefore rarely impacted by any particular tactic
of counter-measure. Due to the excessive speeds on the enemy missiles, some tactics can
be employed by friendly forces to delay the finding just enough to divert or force the missile
out of the model. As depicted in the parameter estimates of the enemy missiles’ ability to
find an assigned blue force asset in Figure 17, an interaction term is deemed significant in
the regression analysis, therefore a partition tree is created to examine the operational
impact of the various, independent types of jamming.
Figure 17. MOE #2: Statistically Significant Factors—Enemy Missile

Ability to Find the Assigned Friendly Force Asset
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Factors—Enemy Missile Ability to Find the Assigned Friendly Force Asset
With respect to the enemy missiles’ ability to find an assigned friendly force asset,
spot jamming has the greatest operational impact at 11.4 percent. This value represents the
difference in the effectiveness of the enemy missile with respect to its ability to find the
assigned blue force asset, with either spot jamming on or off in the simulation. Without
spot jamming activated, the percentage of enemy missiles that are able to find the assigned
target is nearly 88 percent, while the activation of spot jamming results in an eleven percent
reduction to 76.4 percent. While this is still a relatively high percentage of successful find
for the enemy missiles, additional opportunities to counter the inbound threat occur during
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the engagement phase with the employment of hard-kill and soft-kill counter-measures.
Additional detailed analysis for the air and surface domains considered in MOE #3 of
enemy force effectiveness in the find sequence is contained in Appendix K.
4. Analysis of MOE #4: Enemy Force Effectiveness in Target Sequence of

the Kill Chain
The fourth MOE for consideration in the analysis of the baseline force structure is
the effectiveness of the enemy threats in the targeting and engaging phases of the kill
sequence. This metric is calculated as a function of the quantity of enemy threats that
successfully complete the targeting phase as compared to the number of platforms that
enter the targeting phase. The enemy missiles do not enter the targeting phase, once a
missile is able to successfully find the assigned target, it automatically transitions to the
engagement portion of the kill chain. Therefore, the threat missiles are not considered in
this metric. Additionally, the adversary threats that are unsuccessful in the find phase are
not captured in this metric, as a platform cannot progress to the targeting stage until a
location is determined for the assigned blue asset. The primary differences between the
targeting percentage and the finding percentage is due to the capability of enemy sensor
performance for finding as opposed to targeting, as well as the ability for friendly force
assets to conduct an engagement against red threats that advance to the targeting phase.
Additionally, in the simulation, if the threat is able to complete the targeting sequence, a
weapons engagement of the friendly asset is conducted.
Table 18. Analysis Summary of Baseline Structure—Enemy Target

Effectiveness
MOE Quantity of Red threats that target/engage assigned Blue platform

Calculation Quantity Red threats that successfully find their assigned Blue

Enemy Air Enemy Surface
Statistically
Target & Engage Target & Engage
Significant Barrage Jamming Barrage Jamming
Contributing Spot Jamming Spot Jamming
Factors DRFM Jamming DRFM Jamming
Sweep Jamming Sweep Jamming
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As captured in Table 18 from the parameter estimates from the various domains,
four of the jamming types are deemed statistically significant for the targeting sequence of
the kill chain, regardless of platform type. To determine the operational significance of
these input tactics, the partition tree for the effectiveness of enemy aircraft in the targeting
sequence is studied.

Factors—Enemy Aircraft Ability to Target an Assigned Friendly Force Asset
With the activation of barrage jamming as an independent tactic in the model, the
percentage of enemy aircraft that are able to successfully complete the targeting phase is
reduced by over twenty percent. This reduction in targeting capability subsequently
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diminishes the ability for the enemy to employ their weapons systems against blue force
platforms. Barrage jamming also reduces the percentage of red surface vessels able to reach
the engagement phase by 9.4 percent. Both of these reductions can be attributed to the
impact barrage jamming has on the adversary targeting radars. By degrading these targeting
radars, barrage jamming is able to keep the red threats in the targeting phase longer, where
blue has more opportunities to counter-engage the enemy platform or missile.
The employment of spot, DRFM, or sweep jamming as independent tactics also has
a noticeable reduction in the ability for enemy aircraft to conduct targeting and
engagement. These jamming capabilities lead to scenarios in which the friendly forces are
able to successfully engage and destroy an adversary platform before threat missiles can
be launched to strike blue forces. Since jamming is modeled in a way that benefits the
adversary ESM sensors and degrades enemy radars, this result is noteworthy. It is evident
that the drawback of using jamming, as it is currently modeled, is greatly surpassed by the
benefit associated with degrading enemy radar systems.
5. Analysis of Measures of Performance
When examining the MOPs for the fixed friendly force structure, similar general
trends are observed. This is especially true as many of the measures of performance are
capturing similar information to the metrics described in the MOEs. For example, an enemy
aircraft time to target is similar and largely correlated to the overall effectiveness for an
enemy aircraft in the targeting phase of the kill chain. With the number of input variables
limited to only the employment of tactics and counter-measures, the various types of
jamming are frequently observed to be a dominant factor for both the MOEs and related
MOPs. The correlation between the MOEs and MOPs can be observed in the scatterplot
matrix displayed in Figure 20. The six factors depicted in the scatterplot are the MOEs of
percentage of enemy threats that successfully target their assigned friendly force asset, as
well as the related MOPs of time to target for air, surface, and missile threats. Due to the
correlation between the MOEs and MOPs, along with the prevalence of jamming as the
dominant factor in each regression analysis, the analysis of the MOPs are omitted from this
section, as little additional insight is gained from the specified analysis of the area of
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uncertainty, time to find, and time to target with respect to the three threat categories of air,
surface, and missile threats. The analyses for the fixed force structure MOPs are contained
in Appendix K. Additional MOPs are evaluated and discussed in further detail for the
analysis of the DMO variable force structure in the following section.
Figure 20. Correlation Analysis—Baseline Force Structure MOEs and

MOPs—Enemy Force Ability to Target
B. DMO VARIABLE FORCE STRUCTURE
The second portion of the analysis considers the simulation of a variable force
structure, with not only the tactics incorporated as input variables, but also the friendly
force platforms and order of battle are generated as a function of the DOE. The tactics and
counter-measure variables remain unchanged from the first set of outputted data, but the
total quantity of input variables is increased by 23 platforms, with multiple levels per each
blue force asset, as previously described in Chapter VI. The expanded input variables list
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for the modifiable force structure is compared to the same metrics as the first data set, with
additional analysis performed to examine not only the MOEs for the scenario, but also
several MOPs. In this data set, special attention is paid to identifying the crucial platforms
that had the largest impact on these outputs.
1. Analysis of MOE #1: Survivability of Friendly Forces
The first overall MOE examined for the variable force structure is the survivability
of the friendly forces. The DMO-centric force structure incorporates any combination of
manned and unmanned assets across all domains in the engagement with opposing enemy
forces. This metric is particularly useful when considering the ability to employ DMO
because it represents the platforms that can defend against attack, as well as conduct
offensive strikes against enemy threats prior to engagement. This measure also requires
more consideration in each scenario as the variability of the results is much greater due to
the wide range of orders of battle that can be generated. For example, a single run in the
simulation may have generated the 149 total threats from the enemy order of battle paired
against a nearly equivalent friendly force of major surface combatants, fighter aircraft, ISR
platforms, and unmanned assets. Another run in the same set of data may have generated
the 149 enemy threats to be paired up against a single small surface action group of LCS
and rotary wing aircraft. As noted in Table 19, there are more factors that are determined
to be significant with the analysis of the variable force structure, but additional levels of
analysis can be performed for each metric to determine the operational impact of the
statistically significant platforms and tactics in the DMO force structure.
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Table 19. Analysis Summary of DMO Structure—Friendly Force
Survivability
MOE Quantity of Blue assets surviving at end of simulation

Calculation Quantity of initial Blue assets
DMO Force Stucture
Overall High Value Missile Fighter
Survivability Ships Carriers Aircraft
Qty F-35 Surface
Statistically Qty TERN Qty DDG-51 Qty DDG-51 Qty F-35 Air
Qty DDG-51 Qty LHA/LHD Swarm Qty DDG-51
Significant
Qty F-35 Air Swarm Qty LCS Qty EA-18
Contributing Qty F-35 Surface Qty CG Qty CVN Qty CG
Factors Barrage Jamming Barrage Jamming Barrage Jamming
Spot Jamming Chaff Qty F/A-18
Surface
Spot Jamming
Qty TERN
For the variable DMO force structure, a regression analysis is performed for each
of the platform groupings with respect to survivability, including the overall order of battle,
high value surface ships, missile carriers, and fighter aircraft. The regression model plots
and parameter summaries are further detailed in Appendix K. The sorted parameter
estimates output for each of the groups is again used to determine the factors of statistical
significance, as summarized in Table 19.
Even with the regression analysis now considering the quantities and types of
platforms in the simulation as well as tactics, it can be observed that jamming continues to
be an apparent significant factor in the ability for friendly forces to survive the engagement.
The application of jamming to interrupt the finding and targeting sequences of the enemy
threat platforms and missiles results in fewer engagements of blue force assets.
Additionally, the DDG-51 class destroyer is consistently incorporated as a statistically
significant factor in the overall and each of the subgroups survival capability. The destroyer
is a statistically and operationally critical platform due to the average quantity generated in
each simulation which corresponds to a substantially larger quantity of missiles contributed
to the shared resource pool, as well as the ability to offensively and defensively sense,
target, and engage all enemy threat types.
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2. Analysis of MOE #2: Survivability of Enemy Forces
An additional metric for the DMO variable force structure with respect to the ability
to perform DMO, particularly in an offensive capacity, is the enemy forces that remain at
the end of each simulation as compared to the initially generated 149 enemy entities. Table
20 summarizes the statistically significant factors that contribute to the quantity of red force
platforms and missiles that are not engaged or diverted by friendly forces.
Table 20. Analysis Summary of DMO Structure—Enemy Force

Survivability
MOE Quantity of Red platforms remaining at end of simulation

Percentage Remaining Red Forces =
Calculation Quantity of total Red platforms
DMO Force Stucture
Overall Enemy Force Survivability
Statistically Quantity of DDG-51
Significant Quantity of CG
Contributing Barrage Jamming
Factors Quantity of F-35 (Air)
Sweep Jamming
Spot Jamming
DRFM Jamming
The most statistically significant factors contributing to the MOE of enemy forces
remaining are the number of DDG-51s, CGs, and anti-air F-35 assets available, as well as
the ability to perform barrage jamming against enemy targeting sensor. The number of
DDG-51s, CGs and F-35s (Air) are statistically significant and have a notable operational
impact due to the number and types of missiles they bring to the fight. Additionally,
jamming decreases the enemy’s ability to successfully target their intended friendly force
asset, while also increasing the time that the enemy threat needs to acquire a targeting
solution. This increase in time spent in the targeting sequence allows friendly force
platforms more opportunities to successfully counter-engage, which has a significant
impact on the percentage of surviving forces. In summary, more missiles and more time to
counter-engage significantly decreases the percentage of surviving red forces.
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The operational impact of these assets and tactics on red survivability is supported
by the sorted parameter estimates in Figure 21. An increase in the quantity of DDG-51
platforms results in approximately a 1 percent reduction in overall enemy survivability per
friendly destroyer, while each additional CG in the simulation decreases the overall enemy
survivability by nearly 2.6 percent. The biggest reduction in red force survivability is
noticed as a result of the employment of barrage jamming, with an approximate predicted
percentage decrease of 5.5 percent.
Figure 21. MOE #2: Statistically Significant Factors—DMO Structure

Enemy Force Survivability
3. Analysis of MOE #3: Enemy Force Effectiveness in the Find Sequence

of the Kill Chain
The final set of MOEs analyzed with respect to the variable force structure details
the impact of various platforms and tactics to degrade enemy sensor performance in the
finding and targeting stages of the kill chain. Table 21 details the input factors identified
as statistically significant for enemy aircraft, surface vessels, and land-based missiles in
their finding of an assigned friendly force asset.
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Table 21. Analysis Summary of DMO Structure—Enemy Find
Effectiveness
MOE Quantity of Red threats successfully find assigned Blue platform

Calculation Quantity of total Red threats
DMO Force Stucture
Enemy Air Find Enemy Surface Find Enemy Missile Find
Statistically
Significant Barrage Jamming
Contributing Spot Jamming Spot Jamming Spot Jamming
Factors DRFM Jamming DRFM Jamming Quantity of TERN
Sweep Jamming Sweep Jamming DRFM Jamming
Quantity of DDG-51 Barrage Jamming Quantity of F-35 Surface
Quantity of CG
While the regression analysis identified factors that were statistically significant
with respect to the percentage of enemy aircraft, surface assets, and land-based missiles
that find their assigned target, the data shows that these factors have limited operational
impact within the model. Both enemy air and surface assets found their targets in over 97
percent of simulation runs, indicating that while certain factors may be statistically
significant, the reduction from 99 percent success in finding the blue force to 97 percent is
operationally inconsequential. This overall insignificance of friendly force platforms and
tactics for the find phase of the kill chain is attributed to the run time of the simulation,
which grants the enemy platforms more than adequate time to transit and conduct multiple
iterative searches of the operational area for the friendly force assets.
4. Analysis of MOE #4: Enemy Force Effectiveness in the Target

Sequence of the Kill Chain
With the platforms and tactics having minimal operational impact on the ability for
the enemy forces to find the blue force asset it is assigned, additional analysis is conducted
to determine if the same conclusion is true about the targeting phase of the kill chain. Table
22 represents the factors determined to be statistically significant for the percentage of
enemy aircraft, warships, and land-based missiles that reach the targeting portion of the
simulation and are successful in targeting their assigned friendly force asset.
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Table 22. Analysis Summary of DMO Structure—Enemy Target
Effectiveness
MOE Quantity of Red threats that target/engage assigned Blue platform

Calculation Quantity Red threats that successfully find their assigned Blue
DMO Force Stucture

Enemy Air Enemy Surface Enemy Missile
Target & Engage Target & Engage Target & Engage
Statistically Barrage Jamming Barrage Jamming Spot Jamming
Significant Spot Jamming Spot Jamming Quantity of TERN
Contributing DRFM Jamming DRFM Jamming DRFM Jamming
Factors Sweep Jamming Sweep Jamming Quantity of F-35 Surface
Quantity of DDG-51 Quantity of DDG-51 Quantity of F-35 Air
Quantity of CG Quantity of CG Quantity of FireScout
Quantity of F-35 Air Quantity of TERN Quantity of MH-60
This metric of targeting effectiveness is decomposed into the various platform types
to consider the individual ability of enemy aircraft, surface combatants, and land-based
missiles to successfully obtain a targeting solution and engage the assigned blue force asset.
The resulting statistically significant factors are similar to many other analyzed measures
for both the fixed and variable force structures, as the prevalence of jamming is apparent,
especially in the case of enemy surface vessels targeting an assigned asset. The sorted
parameter estimates detailed in Figure 22 depict the various types of jamming as the most
impactful tactic, with several interactions between the jamming measures also determined
to be statistically significant.
Figure 22. MOE #4: Statistically Significant Factors—DMO Structure

Enemy Surface Vessels Targeting Effectiveness
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In order to determine the operational impact of the factors detailed in the parameter
estimates, the partition tree can serve as an additional tool to provide these insights. As
detailed in Figure 23, the ability for an enemy aircraft to successfully target the assigned
friendly asset is largely affected by the employment of barrage jamming. With barrage
jamming off in the simulation, the average proportion of enemy aircraft that are able to
successfully target the assigned friendly asset is 79 percent, but with the employment of
barrage jamming by friendly forces, this enemy aircraft targeting success rate is reduced to
61 percent. Additionally, the presence of greater than 4 DDG-51 surface combatants results
in a reduction of enemy targeting effectiveness by nearly 4 percent.

Factors—Enemy Aircraft Ability to Target an Assigned Friendly Asset
5. Analysis of MOPs for the DMO Variable Force Structure
While the MOPs analyzed for the fixed force structure did not provide any specific
insight into the impact of the various tactics on the enemy kill chain, the DMO force
structure incorporates many additional input variables; and therefore, the regression
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analysis for the various DMO MOPs facilitates the determination of several statistically
and operationally significant factors for consideration. The statistical analysis of the output
data from the DMO force structure provides many opportunities for further consideration
of tactics and platforms, which are fully detailed in Appendix K.
The primary set of MOPs considered to be insightful during the analysis of the
variable force structure is the time spent by each of the enemy force threats in the finding
and targeting sequences of the kill chain. The time dedicated to finding and targeting an
assigned friendly force asset is impacted by factors that degrade the ability for a threat to
detect and locate as well as obtain a targeting solution. These MOPs are particularly
interesting due to the tradeoff that exists for the survivability of friendly forces. While an
increase in the time spent by an enemy threat in either the find or targeting phase may force
the adversary platform out of the simulation if time expires or the separation distance is
closed prior to the obtaining of a firing solution, there is also potential for reduced
opportunities for friendly forces to engage the inbound threat if the adversary does not
reach the targeting stage until close range. Tables 23 and 24 depict the statistically
significant factors as determined by the regression analysis for both the mean time to find
for all platform types, as well as the average time to target for adversary air and surface
platforms that have successfully completed the find stage of the kill chain. The enemy land
based missiles do not progress through the targeting phase in the model, therefore this
platform type is not considered for time to target.
Table 23. Analysis Summary of DMO Structure—Enemy Time to Find
DMO Force Stucture

Enemy Air Enemy Surface Enemy Missile
Time to Find Time to Find Time to Find
Statistically Quantity of TERN Spot Jamming Spot Jamming
Significant Quantity of F-35 Surface Barrage Jamming DRFM Jamming
Contributing Quantity of F-35 Air Quantity of TERN Quantity of TERN
Factors Quantity of FireScout DRFM Jamming Sweep Jamming
Quantity of MH-60 Sweep Jamming Barrage Jamming
Quantity of Reaper Quantity of F-35 Surface
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Table 24. Analysis Summary of DMO Structure—Enemy Time to
Target
DMO Force Stucture

Enemy Air Time to Target Enemy Surface Time to Target
Barrage Jamming
Statistically Barrage Jamming Spot Jamming
Significant Spot Jamming DRFM Jamming
Contributing DRFM Jamming Sweep Jamming
Factors Sweep Jamming Quantity of F-35 Surface
Quantity of F-35 Air Quantity of DDG-51
Quantity of F/A-18 Surface
The various types of jamming tend to have the greatest statistical and operational
impact, while other unmanned clutter factors such as TERN and Fire Scout are also
incorporated as potential contributing factors in the ability to find for the various platforms
of the air and surface domains. The variants of the F-35 fighter aircraft also impact the time
an adversary threat spends in the find and target stages due to both the sheer quantity of
these friendly platforms generated in each run, as well as the counter-engagement
capability carried onboard.
Figure 24 depicts the analysis conducted to gain additional fidelity into the impact
of the F-35 aircraft and TERN unmanned system with respect to an enemy aircraft’s time
to find. The initial average time for a red force aircraft in the finding stage is approximately
90 seconds. When examining the grouped output data as a function of quantities of TERN
and F-35, this mean value for time spent in the searching stage changes. The best case
scenario occurs with the maximum time to find of nearly 98 seconds, when the quantities
of TERN and F-35 platforms is greater, as this increases the clutter and additional contacts
that an enemy platform has to sort through in order to locate the assigned asset. Conversely,
the least desirable time to find for an enemy platform or missile occurs with fewer air assets
in the model. While these insights are very specific in terms of quantity of assets needed to
make a substantial impact on time in the targeting sequence, the ability to determine an
approximate number of assets needed is potentially useful for leaders charged with
determining the resources needed to be successful in a major engagement against a capable
adversary.
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Figure 24. MOP: Operational Impact of Statistically Significant
Factors—Enemy Aircraft Time to Find
Similarly to Figure 24, the partition tree shown in Figure 25 details the analysis of
the independent tactics and platforms that can be employed to prolong the time to target
for an enemy aircraft. Jamming, the F-35 aircraft and the F/A-18 serve as the primary
factors that impact the ability for an adversary aircraft to target a friendly force vessel or
aircraft. With a mean time of nearly 13 seconds for a threat aircraft to obtain a targeting
solution upon finding the assigned asset, a delay of 10 seconds caused by jamming is
substantial.
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Figure 25. MOP: Operational Impact of Statistically Significant
Factors—Enemy Aircraft Time to Target
C. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS
Overall, the application of the statistical analysis software to the data sets of a fixed
force structure and a variable force composition enable the team to develop insights into
the relative performance of the platforms and tactics employed in the scenario. From each
of the model outputs represented by the MOEs and MOPs, the team identifies the most
statistically significant factors that contribute to the overall success of the friendly forces
when considering survivability, lethality, and defense of the operational units. For each of
the recognized statistically significant factors, the level of significance is captured as well
as the frequency of occurrence. For example, spot jamming has a high frequency of
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occurrence as it is noticed as a significant factor in the majority of the regression analysis
outputs, but for most metrics spot jamming has a relatively low level of operational
significance. Another parameter or input variable is the quantity of the DDG-51 class
destroyer, which is not as frequently mentioned as a significant factor, but for the metrics
in which it appears, the tendency is for the platform to have a much higher level of
significance.
The team considers the data sets for the variable and fixed force structures
separately due the difference in input variables as the variable force structure includes the
potential for modifying the underlying major fleet platforms that comprise the majority of
the overall friendly force structure. The conclusions developed from the consideration of
the frequency of occurrence and level of significance regarding the factors that have the
greatest contributions to the success of the friendly forces in the DMO scenario are listed
in Table 25. For both the fixed and variable force structure MOEs and MOPs, spot and
barrage jamming were consistently noticed as key performance enablers in measuring
friendly force success. The jamming tactics have an evident impact due to the ability for
the tactic to degrade the adversary in the critical phases of targeting and engagement within
the kill chain. Additionally, with a minimal penalty imposed on friendly forces for
employing jamming, it is apparent that this tactic demonstrates the greatest impact on the
survivability and associated ability to conduct offensive engagements against degraded
enemy threats.
Table 25. Ranking of the Significant Factors for Fixed and Variable
Force Structures
Fixed Baseline Force Structure Variable Force Structure

Spot Jamming Barrage Jamming
Barrage Jamming Spot Jamming
DRFM Jamming Quantity of DDG-51
Sweep Jamming DRFM Jamming
Swarm Sweep Jamming
EMCON (DDG-51) Quantity of CG
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The SEA-27 Capstone project team aimed to examine the capabilities of various
manned platforms, unmanned assets, tactics, and counter-measures in an effort to
investigate the ability for the Navy’s fleet assets to perform DMO against a capable
adversary in a contested environment. In order to gain insights into the potential force
assets of the future 2030 timeframe, the team developed an event-based model to simulate
the operation of integrated and distributed force compositions. The team considered the
performance parameters of various aircraft, surface vessels, and weapons systems along
with the ability of these platforms to employ both offensive and defensive tactics to enforce
a more forward-leaning posture during an engagement with enemy forces. With the
objective of increasing lethality and offensive firepower across all operating domains, the
model served to provide quantitative data for analysis in support of fleet level
recommendations.
In order to compare the innovative DMO concept to current operating procedures,

2 major sets of data were generated and analyzed. The first simulation investigated the
impact of various tactics as employed by a traditional fixed force structure. The insights
gained from the fixed force structure can be provided as supporting evidence for
operational commanders who are unable to allocate additional forces or assets, but can alter
the tactical employment of the forces he or she has been provided. The second set of data
generated from the model reflects the variable, DMO-oriented force structure than is
intended to operate as a unified force structure comprised of dissimilar platforms in all
domains. The recommendations produced from the analysis of the variable force structure
data applies towards the higher echelons of leadership that have the authority to make force
level decisions regarding the acquisition of new platforms or technologies in order to
further the DMO concept.
While the model and analysis is subject to limitations and simplifications as a

function of the project timeline and level of expertise within the group, the simulation
provides fundamental insights for the architectures of various force structure and the
relative employment of offensive counter-targeting assets and defensive counter-measures
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with respect to survivability and lethality of the friendly forces. The foremost limitations
or assumptions that impacted the model outputs include the modeling of only the first
possible set of engagements, the assumption of perfect information for jamming, the lack
of networking capability for enemy forces, and the abridged order of battle for both
participants in the engagement.
The implementation of jamming within the model is advantageous to friendly

forces due to the assumption of correct knowledge for an enemy sensors operating
frequencies and parameters. For example, if barrage jamming is determined to be active in
the model, the jamming is assumed to impact all enemy threats simultaneously. While this
is a simplification that impacts the outputs of the simulation, the understanding that
jamming is modeled as a major advantage to friendly forces can be accounted for and
considered in the analysis of the statistical outputs. Additionally, the simplification that
friendly forces share a common tactical operating picture and resource pool for offensive
strike capability and defensive counter-measures is not matched by the enemy fleet, as the
assumption is that each threat platform or missile is independent as it progresses through
the kill chain. Furthermore, the simplification of the potential technologies able to be
employed in the 2030 timeframe resulted in swarms of unmanned assets that served as only
additional clutter for enemy sensors. Even with today’s swarm capabilities, the technology
may be able to provide additional lethal and ISR capabilities that were not considered in
this model. Lastly, the order of battle was consolidated for the model to incorporate only
the major platform variants in each category. For example, only one variant of the PLAN
Frigate class ships is considered, while the current and projected future inventory includes
several different variants and classes of the Frigate. From the previously discussed
assumptions and limitations the team attempts to balance the overall assumptions and
consequences of the limitations in order to simulate a fair engagement and analyze
subjective data to provide useful insights into employable tactics and counter-measures.
A. CONCLUSIONS
From the analysis of the model outputs and the consideration of the prevalence of
the significant factors, the primary factors that contribute to the DMO concept as employed
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in the simulation can be determined and summarized. The various jamming tactics provide
blue forces with the capability to lower the probability of being found and targeted, while
also increasing the time a threat dedicates to the targeting and engagement sequence. This
time delay results in a greater number of opportunities for counter-engagements of enemy
platforms. The targeting phase is not only critical in terms of jamming, but the ability to
delay a threat who has successfully located a friendly force asset must be achieved in order
to allow friendly forces the ability to conduct a counter-engagement or deploy defensive
counter-measures. Swarms, or clutter created by unmanned assets, is also an effective
counter-targeting measure that serves to prevent the enemy from being able to obtain a
targeting solution, especially if the collection of unmanned vehicles is capable of
successfully emulating a manned platform or high value unit. The primary operational
significance of swarm is noticed in the analysis of the survivability of the missile carriers.
Even though the swarm in the model is generated to imitate an aircraft carrier or E-2, the
redistribution of the mission assignment probabilities to the unmanned swarm reduces the
chance of a critical missile carrier being targeted and engaged by an enemy threat.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The continued development and practicable employment of jamming techniques is

critical to the success of naval warfare in the age of electromagnetic sensors that dominate
the battle space. Further research and development to improve the friendly force ability to
employ jamming while incurring only minor penalties is paramount to success in a
contested environment, specifically within the context of the DMO concept. Additionally,
with the apparent effectiveness of jamming, it can be assumed that the enemy will also
apply electronic warfare to prevent friendly force use of the electromagnetic spectrum. The
efforts to reduce or mitigate the risks of the impact of electronic warfare against friendly
units is critical, especially with the reliance on current and future advanced radars and
network capabilities.
For the purposes of what the Navy could focus on in terms of force restructuring is
the continued development and integration of unmanned systems in the construct of carrier
strike groups, expeditionary strike groups, and surface action groups. From the analysis of
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the variable force structure, the team identified the TERN as a significant factor for both
the measures of effectiveness and performance. Specifically, the significance became
apparent only when the model generated a quantity greater than 15-20 TERN assets. The
presence of the TERN vehicle in the simulation is represented not with respect to the
specific functionality of the TERN, but instead as a clutter-creating aerial vehicle that
provides additional targets for the adversary to sift through in order to ascertain the location
of their blue platform assignment or develop a firing solution. Additionally, the small
payload of air to surface missiles facilitates the presence of an unconventional air to surface
threat to conduct counter-engagement of enemy forces. The value of the additional
unmanned systems, such as the TERN vehicle, is to force the enemy to allocate resources
and dedicate time to identify, classify, and potentially target the unmanned vehicles,
especially if they possess combat capabilities such as jamming or the ability to employ
weapons.
Similarly, the swarm tactic was also a significant factor that used unmanned
systems. The swarm played a key role in both the fixed and variable force structure data
analysis. The result of a swarm that successfully impersonates a CVN proved to be an asset
for all friendly force platforms in the simulation as the swarm detracted from the enemy’s
ability to develop viable targeting solutions. Follow-on recommendations would be to
consider using swarm assets with deceptive radar cross sections to impersonate carriers or
destroyers, as this tactic could potentially influence red platforms to prioritize their target
selection to missile platforms more than they would the aircraft carriers. Also, utilizing
unmanned surface vessels as not only a missile sponge, but as a legitimate offensive threat
against enemy platforms could influence the outcome of the success of friendly forces.
Lastly, the team identified that the number of destroyers and cruisers that the Navy
brought to the fight significantly increased the overall survivability of the friendly forces
remaining at the end of the engagement, and decreased the percentage of enemy platforms
remaining. The missile carrier platforms serve as the primary force multipliers in the DMO
concept. This was apparent due to the number of missiles that each surface combatant
brought to the fight, even in a shared resource pool environment which facilitated the
employment of friendly offensive and defensive missile by any combat capable asset. The
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obvious recommendation would be to increase the number of destroyers and cruisers, but
realistically, due to the financial constraints, this just is not a feasible option for the future.
Moving towards what DMO brings to the fight: allowing time for decision makers, counter-
targeting, deception, and confusing the adversary; the integration of the tactics discussed
throughout this report will provide an effective alternative vice relying solely on our missile
carriers to win the fight. The team determined that the approximately two-thirds of the
missiles fired from blue platforms were employed in a defensive capacity. The obvious
recommendation for the Navy is to move towards a more offensive, “strike first” mentality.
If the adversary is targeted and engaged before they get a chance to engage blue forces,
especially with the presence of the advanced missile technologies available to state and
non-state actors, the overall stability and presence of the force is able to be maintained.
C. AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH
Due to the limited timeframe to complete this Capstone project, there are many
avenues of future research that can be explored to better examine the ability to perform
tactical offensive operations in contested environments. A considerable boundary that the
SEA-27 team implemented was to focus efforts only on the traditional warfare areas
including air, surface and land warfare, while limiting the inclusion of today’s critical
domains of sub-surface, space, and cyber warfare. In the current and future environment
that relies on shared information and network connectivity, the ability to interrupt this
capability would be instrumental in winning a fleet-on-fleet engagement against a capable
adversary. Further analysis of the available innovative technologies that can be employed
on unmanned assets could be incredibly beneficial in analyzing the impact of tactical
systems employment within the DMO framework of increased offensive power and
deceptive tactics. Finally, as discussed with the limitations of the model, additional fidelity
could be applied to the tactics and counter-measures to ensure a more realistic employment
of the counter-targeting and defensive measures in the operational environment.
121
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122
APPENDIX A. MARITIME WAR OF 2030 SCENARIO
The scenario detailed in the following narrative is used to provide the framework
for the prescribed DMO operational scenario for the fleet-on-fleet engagement. The
narrative is adapted from the Naval Postgraduate School’s Joint Campaign Analysis
(JCA) course.
2030 Political, Social, and Economic Narrative:
Although China’s economic growth began to slow in 2018, she continued her political,
fiscal, economic, and military expansionism. In 2030 China is the world’s first economy,
has a large and growing middle class population and consequently generates a higher
demand for oil and natural gas. Relationships between Russia and China are thriving,
underwritten by a strong energy trade. China depends on the trans-Siberian pipeline
developed after negotiations with Russia on oil purchases were signed in 2014. Further
economic ties were generated by a series of trade agreements that began in 2019.
Since 2015 the increased economic and social ties between mainland China and Taiwan,
combined with an economically (yet not necessary democratically) more liberal Chinese
central government, resulted in a 2025 non-aggression treaty between the two states with
agreements to begin discussions on unification. By 2030, although not yet under “one
government”, the Taiwan parliament has Communist party representation and the joint
government, military and economic initiatives between China and Taiwan have grown to
the point they are a de-facto Chinese economic and military federation. For example,
Taiwan has allowed China to build High Frequency Surface Wave radar stations and
passive collection systems on Taiwan with joint intelligence sharing responsibilities.
Taiwan no longer relies on military sales from the United States.
China has populated several islands terra-formed through dredging in 2015 with military
installations. For example, Fiery Cross Reef has a squadron of J-20s (fifth generation
plus) with 10 Dark Sword UCAVs, while both Fiery Reef, Gaven Reef , and Hughes Reefs
have both surface to air installations (S-500) and anti-surface cruise missile mobile sites
(advanced YJ-62s). China is now building facilities on terra-formed islands made from
the western end of the Scarborough Shoal reef, protested by the Philippines and the United
States.
Tensions remain high on the Korean Peninsula with North Korea developing greater
ballistic missile and cruise missile capabilities. The successful submarine launched
ballistic missile in 2017 was followed by a series of failures, then successes of both land
launched and sea launched ballistic missiles and well as shore to ship cruise missiles.
North Korea retains a nuclear capability.
123
Japan and the United States have strengthened their social, economic, and military ties in
response to China’s and Russia’s growing influence. The Yokosuka naval facility has
evolved to a joint JMSDF and United States Navy base with GEORGE WASHINGTON and
its air wing, three United States DDGs, eight United States LCSs, and the Japanese fleet
sharing the installation. In Sasebo, the United States Navy retains LHA-6, LPD-25 and
LSD-52 and two LCS for mine clearance and protection.
The United States also established closer ties to Singapore, stationing eight LCSs, a
squadron of P-8s and their shore support in the city-nation. In addition, the United States
now maintains logistic support bases in Diego Garcia and pre-positioned expeditionary
supplies in Subic, with joint agreements with the U.K. and Philippines respectively. These
bases can act as “rapid build-up” support bases if the host country agrees. Additionally
the Philippines have invited the United States Air Force to use Clark AFB as an
expeditionary field. It is currently used in joint training exercises. The United States Air
Force has retained Kadena AFB on Okinawa, and III MEF completed its move from
Futenma to the newly constructed land-fill air base in Henoko village.
South and East China Sea:

In the spring of 2029, a Vietnamese fisher was rammed and sunk by a Chinese maritime
security ship. The Chinese government justified the unfortunate action as an enthusiastic
Captain defending China’s EEZ rights, although similar incidents have occurred over the
past 20 years. Vietnam did not accept the rationale and vowed their fishing fleet, as well
as their at sea drilling rigs, would henceforth be protected. Two weeks later a Chinese
deep-sea exploration ship exploded without warning 100 nautical miles north of Natuna
Besar.
China claimed either Vietnam, Indonesia or the Philippines were responsible. They
mobilized their South China Seas fleet and demanded restoration from all three countries
or they would “secure” their sea. One month later the Chinese sank a patrolling
Vietnamese ship using a land-based surface to surface missile launched from Woody Island
(YJ-83) in the Paracels and moved a squadron of SU-37s to Woody Island. They
announced all traffic through the South China Sea would henceforth be subject to
inspection and control by Chinese forces. They threatened to assume governorship of the
island of Natuna Besar Indonesia to control the South China Sea’s southern approaches
and in compensation for the attack on their deep sea exploration ship. The 1st Marine
Brigade at Zhanjiang, Guangdong has embarked in the South China fleet’s amphibious
flotilla (13 landing ships modernized Type 71 LPDs and Type 72II LSTH). They can be
underway in one day’s notice and intelligence indicates their objective is the occupation
of Natuna Besar.
During these events a Philippine helicopter fired on a PLAN Type 56 corvette conducing
gunnery exercises four miles from Palawan Island. In response, China also threatened
invasion of Palawan. Increased activity by the PLA’s 124th Amphibious Mechanized
Infantry Division in Guangzhou district indicates they may be readying for this operation.
124
Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines have requested UN support, specifically calling
on the United States and Japan to act. In response, China has warned Japan and the
United States any interference with their enforcement policy will lead to war, with the
threat of nuclear escalation. To show their resolve, China mobilized the East Sea and
South Sea fleets and sailed at least 50 submarines from both fleets, including two SSGN on
what are assessed to be strategic deterrence patrols. They have declared a quarantine on
all military logistics support (including oil) to Okinawa and have set up ships in blocking
positions around the island to conduct MIO.
125
126
APPENDIX B. ICOM AND CONTEXT DIAGRAMS
A. ICOM DIAGRAM
The ICOM diagram is generated in an effort to decompose the primary inputs,

controls, mechanisms, and outputs for a given function. The function described for this
project is performing DMO. The team determined the primary inputs for DMO as a fleet
level strategic concept as the platforms and sensors that conduct the operations, the
organization of the fleet as a whole, the employed tactics and associated training for the
operators of the DMO systems, as well as the known adversary capabilities. The controls
that bound or restrict the ability to perform DMO include environment, budgetary
considerations, availability and trust in innovative technologies, as well as the geopolitical
environment and related policy restrictions. The mechanisms that enable a composition of
fleet assets to perform DMO are the operators, existing platforms and systems, and the
infrastructure required to support the platforms and personnel. The primary desired output
of performing DMO include is the improved ability to conduct offensive operations from
a group of integrated and distributed fleet assets.
127
B. CONTEXT DIAGRAM
The context diagram serves to distinguish the system being considered from the
surrounding systems that interact and impact the central system. For the DMO concept,
several external systems affect the ability to conduct tactical offensive operations in a
contested environment. The context diagram enabled the team to discern which systems
were considered within the scope of the project as variable that can be modeled, and which
are considered external or uncontrollable when simulating the ability to perform DMO.
128
APPENDIX C. ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS
A. WEATHER CONDITIONS
Percentage of Occurrence Weather Condition Sensor Degradation Factor

1: Negligible 0%
70%
2: Marginal 10%
20%
3: Poor 30%
10%
B. CLUTTER CONDITIONS
Model: Mean Clutter (Neutral Traffic): 65 vessels. Standard Deviation: 10 vessels.
Figure 26. AIS Tracks in the Prescribed Area of Operations. Source:

Marine Vessel Traffic (2018).
129
130
APPENDIX D. DETAILED ORDERS OF BATTLE
A. FRIENDLY FORCES
1. Platforms and Quantities (Variable Force Structure)
Surface Combatants Aircraft
0-2 CVN Aircraft Carrier 0-30 F-35 (Air)

0-2 LHA/LHD Amphibious Assault 0-30 F-35 (Surface)
0-4 LPD Amphibious Transport Dock 0-10 F/A-18 (Air)
0-3 CG Guided Missile Cruiser 0-10 F/A-18 (Surface)
0-10 DDG-51 Guided Missile Destroyer 0-5 EA-18
0-1 DDG-1000 Guided Missile Destroyer 0-2 E-2
0-6 LCS Littoral Combat Ship 0-8 P-8
0-3 EPF Expeditionary Fast Transport 0-16 MH-60
0-6 MDUSV Medium Displacement 0-6 AH-1
Unmanned Surface Vessel
0-3 MQ-4 Triton
0-20 MQ-8 Fire Scout
0-15 MQ-9 Reaper
0-54 TERN
Total U.S. Assets in Model = 1 - 246
131
2. Missile Loadouts
ESSM/RAM
HARPOON
AMRAAM
HELFIRE
LRASM
HARM
SM-2
SM-3
SM-6
MST
AIM
CVN 24
LHA/LHD 24
LPD 21
CG 36 5 25 8 14 8 12
DDG-51 32 5 10 8 8 8 12
DDG-1000 10 10 6 30 12
LCS 4 21
EPF
MDUSV
F-35 (A) 2 4 4
F-35 (S) 4 2 2 2
F/A-18 (A) 2 4 4
F/A-18 (S) 4 2 2 2
EA-18 4
E-2
P-8
MH-60 4
AH-1 2 16
MQ-4
MQ-8 2
MQ-9 2
TERN 4
132
3. Missile Ranges
Missile Range (Nautical Miles)
Standard Missile-2 60
Standard Missile-3 1000
Standard Missile-6 With E-2: 250
Without E-2: 150
Long Range Anti-Ship Missile 300
Maritime Strike Tomahawk 100
Harpoon 65
Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles 12
Sidewinder 18
Hellfire 4
Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile 75
High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile 80
4. Platform and Missile Speeds
Surface Combatants Aircraft Missiles

CVN 34 F-35 1100 SM-2 2300
LHA/LHD 25 F/A-18 1085 SM-3 6620
LPD 25 EA-18 1085 SM-6 2300
CG 32 E-2 400 LRASM 650
DDG-51 32 P-8 550 MST 650
DDG-1000 35 MH-60 120 HARPOON 470
LCS 45 AH-1 120 ESSM 2630
EPF 45 MQ-4 320 AIM 1650
MDUSV 30 MQ-8 150 Hellfire 864
MQ-9 330 AMRAAM 2630
TERN 70 HARM 1200
Speeds in Knots (Nautical Miles per Hour)
133
B. ENEMY FORCES
1. Platforms and Quantities
Surface Combatants Aircraft Land Based Missiles

2 Type 001/002/003 Carrier 14 J-11 Fighter 8 DF-21D
4 Type 055 Renhai 16 J-15 Fighter 4 DF-26
6 Type 052 Destroyer 16 J-16 Fighter 8 YJ-62
8 Type 054 Frigate 4 J-16D EW 4 HY-2
8 Type 056 Corvette 8 J-20 Fighter
14 Type 022 Missile Boat 4 Q-5 Surface Attack
1 Type 075 LHD 3 H-6K Bomber
2 Type 071 LPD 1 KJ-3000 AEW
2 Type 072 LST 1 Y-8FQ MPRA
6 Z-18 Helo
2 Z-8AEW
1 Soaring Dragon
1 Pterodactyl
1 Dark Sword
Total Red Threats in Model = 149
2. Sensor Ranges
Sensor Range (Nautical Miles)

Visual 10
Infrared 25
ESM (Electronic Support Measures) 150
Air Search Radar 160
Surface Search Radar 60
Fire Control Radar 40
Navigation Radar 40
Phased Array Radar 180
AESA (Active Electronic Scanned Array Radar) 200
Over the Horizon Radar 1800
Synthetic Aperture Radar—Maritime 530
Synthetic Aperture Radar—Space 4000
134
3. Missile Loadouts
VLRAAM
CM-102
YJ-100
HQ-10
HQ-16
FN-16
PL-12
YJ-12
YJ-18
YJ-83
PL-9
Carrier 10 120
Renhai 20 50 20
Luyang 30 10 10
Jiangkai 6 18
Jiangdao 4
Houbei 6 2
LHD 10
LPD 10
LST 5
J-11 4 4
J-15(A) 2 4
J-15 (S) 4
J-16 (A) 4 6
J-16 (S) 4 6
J-16D (EW) 8
J-20 4 6
Q-5 4 4
H-6K 6 6
KJ-3000
Y-8FQ
Z-18 2
Z-8AEW 2
Land Based Missiles Quantity

DF-21D 8
DF-26 4
YJ-62 8
HY-2 4
135
4. Missile Ranges
Missile Terminal Guidance Range (Nautical Miles)

DF-21D ASBM Active Radar 800
DF-26 ASBM Infrared 1730
HY-2 ASCM Infrared 125
YJ-12 ASCM GPS 215
YJ-18 ASCM Active Radar 290
FN-16 MANPAD Infrared 4
HQ-10 SAM Infrared 65
HQ-16 SAM Active Radar 65
CM-102 ARM Radiation Seeking 65
PL-9 Air to Air Infrared 12
PL-12 Air to Air Active Radar 60
VLRAAM Air to Air Active Radar 180
136
5. Platform and Missile Speeds
Surface Combatants Aircraft Missiles
Type 001/002/003 Carrier 22 J-11 Fighter 660 DF-21D 6620

Type 055 Renhai 25 J-15 Fighter 1130 DF-26 7920
Type 052 Destroyer 22 J-16 Fighter 660 YJ-62 465
Type 054 Frigate 20 J-16D EW 660 HY-2 540
Type 056 Corvette 20 J-20 Fighter 1130 YJ-12 1980
Type 022 Missile Boat 30 Q-5 Surface Attack 370 YJ-18 1980
Type 075 LHD 20 H-6K Bomber 560 YJ-62 465
Type 071 LPD 20 KJ-3000 AEW 220 YJ-83 600
Type 072 LST 20 Y-8FQ MPRA 350 YJ-100 465
Z-18 Helo 120 FN-16 1110
Z-8AEW 120 HQ-10 1330
Soaring Dragon 300 HQ-16 2770
Pterodactyl 120 CM-102 2380
Dark Sword 600 PL-9 2300
PL-12 2625
VLRAAM 3990
Speeds in Knots (Nautical Miles per Hour)
137
138
APPENDIX E. METRICS EQUATIONS
This appendix presents the various calculations performed to transform the raw data
outputted from the model to the MOEs and MOPs used in the analysis of the variable and
fixed force structures.
A. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
Survivability Quantity of Blue assets surviving at end of simulation

of Friendly Percentage Surviving Blue Forces =
Forces
Quantity of initial Blue assets
Survivability Quantity of Red platforms remaining at end of simulation
of Enemy Percentage Remaining Red Forces =
Quantity of total Red platforms
Forces
Enemy
Threats Quantity of Red threats successfully find assigned Blue platform
Successfully Percentage Red find Blue =
Find Quantity of total Red threats
Friendly
Asset
Enemy Quantity of Red threats that target/engage assigned Blue platform
Threats Percentage Red target Blue - Total =
Successfully
Engage Quantity of Red threats that target/engage assigned Blue platform
Friendly Quantity Red threats that successfully find their assigned Blue
Asset
B. MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE
Friendly Missiles
used in an
Offensive Quantity of Blue missiles targeting Red platforms
=
Capacity Quantity of total Blue missiles shot in run
(Targeting Red
Platform)
Offensive Missile Quantity of successful Blue offensive missiles
Success =
Quantity of Blue missiles targeting Red platforms
Friendly Missiles
Used in a
Defensive Quantity of Blue missiles targeting Red threat missiles
=
Capacity Quantity of total Blue missiles shot in run
(Targeting Red
Missile)
Defensive Quantity of successful Blue defensive missiles
Missile Success =
Quantity of Blue missiles targeting Red missiles
139
Defensive Quantity successful Blue defensive missiles + successful M / P countermeasures
=
Success Quantity of Blue missiles targeting red missiles + total M / P countermeasures used
Enemy Aircraft Quantity Red Aircraft that successfully find their assigned Blue platform
Successfully Find =
Quantity Red Aircraft that entered the Find Phase
Enemy Surface Quantity Red Surface Platforms that successfully find their assigned Blue platform
Successfully Find =
Quantity Red Surface Platforms that entered the Find Phase
Enemy Missiles Quantity Red Land Based Missiles that successfully find their assigned Blue platform
Successfully Find =
Quantity Red Land Based Missiles that entered the Find Phase
Enemy Aircraft Quantity Red Aircraft that successfully target their assigned Blue platform
Successfully =
Target
Quantity Red Aircraft that entered the Target Phase
Enemy Surface Quantity Red Surface Platforms that successfully target their assigned Blue platform
=
Successfully Quantity Red Surface Platforms that entered the Target Phase
Target
Enemy Missiles Quantity Red Land Based Missiles that successfully target their assigned Blue platform
=
Successfully Quantity Red Land Based Missiles that entered the Target Phase
Target
Enemy Aircraft Quantity Red Aircraft that successfully target their assigned Blue platform
Successfully =
Target (Total)
Quantity total Red Aircraft threats in simulation
Enemy Surface Quantity Red Surface Platforms that successfully target their assigned Blue platform
Successfully =
Quantity total Red Surface Platforms in simulation
Target (Total)
Enemy Missiles
Successfully
Target (Total)
Enemy Missiles
in M/P Range
(10 nmi)
Success of M/P
Countermeasures
M/P Utilization
Metrics
140
APPENDIX F. MISSION ASSIGNMENT CRITERIA AND SCORING
This appendix details the weighting or scoring of the capabilities of friendly force
vessels to facilitate a systematic method of assigning probabilities for the adversary
mission assignment to target and engage the friendly force assets.
A. SCORING CRITERIA DEFINITION
SCORE LEVEL OF REACH

COMBAT POWER
10 Range > 1000 nautical miles
Platform & Assets > 300 missiles/bombs
9 Range 800—999 nautical miles
Platform & Assets 250—299 missiles/bombs
1 Range 4—9.99 nautical miles
0 Range 0—3.99 nautical miles
141
B. SCORING OF FRIENDLY PLATFORMS
COMBAT LEVEL OF OVERALL RANKING

FRIENDLY
POWER SCORE REACH SCORE SCORE
PLATFORM
CVN 7 8.95 1
10
LHA/LHD 7 7 3
7
LPD 5 3.7 7
3
CG 8 7.35 2
7
DDG-51 8 6.7 4
6
DDG-1000 8 6.7 5
6
LCS 5 3.05 11
2
EPF 5 2.4 16
1
MDUSV 4 1.4 19
0
F-35 7 4.4 6
3
F/A-18 5 3.7 8
3
EA-18 7 2.45 15
0
E-2 10 3.5 9
0
P-8 9 3.15 10
0
MH-60 5 2.4 17
1
AH-1 4 2.7 14
2
MQ-4 8 2.8 13
0
MQ-8 8 2.8 12
0
MQ-9 5 1.75 18
0
TERN 4 1.4 20
0
142
APPENDIX G. DEGRADATION FACTORS
THREAT SENSOR EMCON SPOT BARRAGE SWEEP DRFM GPS

TYPE A JAMMING JAMMING JAMMING JAMMING JAMMING
Visual
Infrared 0.95
ESM (Electronic
Support Measures) 0 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Air Search Radar 0 0.6-0.9 0.3-0.6 0.6-0.9 0.6-0.9
Surface Search
Radar 0.6-0.9 0.3-0.6 0.6-0.9 0.6-0.9
Fire Control Radar 0 0.6-0.9 0.3-0.6 0.6-0.9 0.6-0.9
Navigation Radar 0.6-0.9 0.3-0.6 0.6-0.9 0.6-0.9
Phased Array Radar 0.8 0.6-0.9 0.3-0.6 0.6-0.9 0.6-0.9
AESA (Active
Electronic Scanned 0.8 0.6-0.9 0.3-0.6 0.6-0.9 0.6-0.9
Array Radar)
Over the Horizon
Radar 0.8 0-0.3 0.6-0.9 0.6-0.9 0.3-0.6
Synthetic Aperture
Radar—Maritime 0.6 0.6-0.9 0.3-0.6 0.6-0.9 0-0.3
Synthetic Aperture
Radar—Space
0 = Maximum/Complete Degradation
1 = No Degradation to Sensor
>1 = Adverse Impact (Increased Signature) for Friendly Platforms
Ranges follow a uniform distribution between noted minimum and maximum values in table
143
144
APPENDIX H. ANNOTATED EXTENDSIM MODEL
DESCRIPTION
145
146
APPENDIX I. SAMPLE MODEL INPUT DATA DMO FORCE STRUCTURE—
DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS
Set Replication Run # # # # # # # # # #

DRFM EMCON
CVN CG DDG- MDUSV F-35 P-8 TERN Swarm Flares Chaff
Jamming CG
51 AIR
1 1 1 1 1 4 1 2 2 48 0 1 0.746 33 87
1 2 513 1 3 7 2 15 4 29 1 0 0.417 16 102
1 3 1025 0 0 0 1 11 4 19 1 1 0.562 12 50
1 4 1537 2 1 10 3 13 0 19 0 1 0.804 4 28
1 5 2049 1 1 8 6 24 2 36 1 1 0.219 19 153
1 6 2561 2 2 1 2 30 8 21 0 0 0.072 41 90
1 7 3073 0 0 5 3 27 4 13 0 1 0.916 30 126
1 30 14849 1 3 6 6 14 0 37 0 0 0.871 17 45
2 1 2 1 1 4 1 4 8 4 0 0 0.569 12 148
2 2 514 1 2 2 3 13 6 16 1 1 0.831 8 112
2 3 1026 0 0 2 2 2 0 18 0 0 0.534 42 169
2 4 1538 2 2 9 2 16 2 34 1 1 0.135 13 84
2 5 2050 2 0 2 3 12 0 22 0 1 0.973 0 59
2 6 2562 1 0 10 3 27 4 39 1 0 0.135 26 70
2 7 3074 0 1 4 4 24 2 21 1 0 0.778 12 144
2 30 14850 2 0 6 1 6 2 38 0 1 0.820 45 171
512 1 512 0 2 9 5 0 6 1 0 0 0.209 23 4
512 30 15360 1 1 7 3 19 8 35 1 0 0.009 34 200
147
148
APPENDIX J. SAMPLE DATA EXTRACTED FROM MODEL
% % Red % % % % Avg % % Time to

Set Replication Run # Friendly Enemy CVN/ Missile Fighter Enemy AOU Success- Success- Target
Blue Killed LHA/ Carriers Aircraft Success- (Enemy fully Find fully (Air)
Killed LHD Killed Killed fully Missile) (Surface) Target
Killed Target (Missile)
1 1 1 0.1724 0.6472 1.000 0.7259 0.0654 0.6641 37.539 0.9993 0.7194 13.589
1 2 513 0.1752 0.6074 1.000 0.7333 0.0438 0.7453 50.990 1.0000 0.8486 9.981
1 3 1025 0.1790 0.6374 1.000 0.7185 0.0772 0.6350 22.916 1.0000 0.8944 16.239
1 4 1537 0.1464 0.7179 1.000 0.5926 0.0327 0.4132 43.578 0.9986 0.7042 26.628
1 5 2049 0.2026 0.6579 1.000 0.9111 0.0605 0.6175 53.568 1.0000 0.7944 17.693
1 6 2561 0.1843 0.6660 1.000 0.8630 0.0605 0.5974 60.470 0.9993 0.7972 17.599
1 7 3073 0.1690 0.6058 1.000 0.7741 0.0327 0.7560 29.232 1.0000 0.9028 9.176
1 30 14849 0.1755 0.6425 1.000 0.8444 0.0475 0.6338 28.008 1.0000 0.8708 14.274
2 1 2 0.1733 0.6136 1.000 0.7630 0.0444 0.7487 45.600 1.0000 0.8653 10.327
2 2 514 0.1712 0.5890 1.000 0.7889 0.0364 0.7889 21.058 1.0000 0.8861 6.411
2 3 1026 0.1712 0.6877 1.000 0.7556 0.0556 0.5111 59.392 1.0000 0.7375 20.073
2 4 1538 0.1652 0.6054 0.983 0.7852 0.0364 0.7432 38.143 0.9993 0.7917 9.459
2 5 2050 0.1798 0.6506 1.000 0.7741 0.0642 0.6637 90.327 0.9993 0.7250 13.767
2 6 2562 0.1848 0.6794 1.000 0.8370 0.0463 0.5308 38.163 1.0000 0.8625 19.072
2 7 3074 0.1752 0.6553 1.000 0.7111 0.0630 0.6479 30.573 1.0000 0.7403 14.359
2 30 14850 0.1402 0.7217 1.000 0.6407 0.0315 0.3940 44.584 0.9993 0.7125 25.457
512 1 512 0.1567 0.7235 1.000 0.6481 0.0395 0.3915 62.767 1.0000 0.7000 24.190
512 30 15360 0.1683 0.6857 1.000 0.7519 0.0556 0.5316 58.811 0.9993 0.7722 19.946
Sample Values for Visualization
149
150
APPENDIX K. MODEL ANALYSIS OUTPUTS
This appendix presents additional regression analysis outputs as created through

the JMP statistical program. These plots and summaries are not presented in the analysis
chapter of the report, but are provided for further support of the conclusions made regarding
the analysis of both the baseline fixed force structure, and the DMO variable force
structure.
151
A. FIXED FORCE STRUCTURE
152
153
154
155
156
B. DMO VARIABLE FORCE STRUCTURE
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
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NAVAL

DISTRIBUTED MARITIME OPERATIONS AND

Christopher H. Popa, Sydney P. Stone, Ee Hong Aw, Choon Pei

Project Advisors: Paul T. Beery

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING

14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF

16. PRICE CODE

NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)

DISTRIBUTED MARITIME OPERATIONS AND UNMANNED SYSTEMS

LT Christopher H. Popa (USN), LT Sydney P. Stone (USN), Ee Hong Aw,

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN COMPUTER SCIENCE

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN SYSTEMS ENGINEERING

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Lead editor: Christopher H. Popa

The concept of Distributed Maritime Operations intends to enable a force that is

II. DISTRIBUTED MARITIME OPERATIONS ....................................................7

III. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS ..........................................................................15

IV. KILL CHAIN AND TACTICS ...........................................................................31

V. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS AND PERFORMANCE.......................47

VI. DMO MODEL AND SIMULATION .................................................................55

VII. MODEL ANALYSIS ...........................................................................................85

VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...........................................117

APPENDIX A. MARITIME WAR OF 2030 SCENARIO ........................................123

APPENDIX B. ICOM AND CONTEXT DIAGRAMS .............................................127

APPENDIX C. ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS ...............................................129

APPENDIX D. DETAILED ORDERS OF BATTLE ................................................131

APPENDIX E. METRICS EQUATIONS...................................................................139

APPENDIX F. MISSION ASSIGNMENT CRITERIA AND SCORING ...............141

APPENDIX G. DEGRADATION FACTORS ...........................................................143

APPENDIX H. ANNOTATED EXTENDSIM MODEL DESCRIPTION ..............145

APPENDIX I. SAMPLE MODEL INPUT DATA DMO FORCE

APPENDIX K. MODEL ANALYSIS OUTPUTS......................................................151

LIST OF REFERENCES ..............................................................................................167

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .................................................................................171

Figure 1. DMO Top Level Functional Architecture..................................................12

Figure 2. DMO Tactics Functional Architecture.......................................................12

Figure 4. F2T2EA Kill Chain. Source: Joint Publication 3-60 (2013)......................32

Figure 5. Simplification of F2T2EA Kill Chain to FTE Process. Adapted from

Figure 6. Starting Ranges of Enemy Platforms and Land-Based Missiles.

Figure 7. Primary Functions of the DMO Model ......................................................63

Figure 8. DMO Structure Input Variable Scatterplot Matrix—First 10 Input

Figure 10. MOE #1: Statistically Significant Factors—Fixed Friendly Force

Figure 11. MOE #1: Operational Impact of Statistically Significant Factors—

Figure 12. MOE #1: Statistically Significant Factors—Survivability of Friendly

Figure 13. MOE #1: Operational Impact of Statistically Significant Factors—

Figure 15. MOE #2: Statistically Significant Factors—Enemy Force

Figure 16. MOE #2: Operational Impact of Statistically Significant Factors—

Figure 17. MOE #2: Statistically Significant Factors—Enemy Missile Ability to

Figure 19. MOE #4: Operational Impact of Statistically Significant Factors—

Figure 20. Correlation Analysis—Baseline Force Structure MOEs and MOPs—

Figure 21. MOE #2: Statistically Significant Factors—DMO Structure Enemy

Figure 22. MOE #4: Statistically Significant Factors—DMO Structure Enemy

Figure 23. MOE #4: Operational Impact of Statistically Significant Factors—

Figure 24. MOP: Operational Impact of Statistically Significant Factors—

Figure 25. MOP: Operational Impact of Statistically Significant Factors—

Table 1. Friendly Order of Battle—Surface Vessels ...............................................20

Table 2. Friendly Order of Battle—Aircraft ............................................................21

Table 3. Friendly Order of Battle—Sensors ............................................................22

Table 4. Friendly Order of Battle—Missiles ...........................................................23

Table 5. Enemy Order of Battle—Surface Vessels..................................................25

Table 6. Enemy Order of Battle—Aircraft ..............................................................26