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# 2004 University of South Africa
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Revised edition 2011
Printed and published by

the University of South Africa
Muckleneuk, Pretoria
APC3701/1/2012±2015
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(iii) APC3701/1/2012±2015
Contents
Study unit Page
OPTION 1
The politics of Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana 1
Introduction 2
1 GOVERNANCE, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT 3

1.1 A word of welcome 3
1.2 Definition of concepts 3
TOPIC 1
Nationalism, the rise of political formations and the emergence of
constitutionalism 9
2 THE ORIGINS OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE IN ZIMBABWE 11

2.1 Introduction 12
2.2 Joshua Nkoma and the African National Congress (ANC) 13
2.3 The formation of the National Democratic Party (NDP) 13
2.4 Factionalism within Black Formations 14
2.5 Opposition to internal settlement and the beginning of the armed
struggle 15
3 THE EMERGENCE AND GROWTH OF ANTICOLONIALISM IN NORTH-

ERN RHODESIA 18
3.1 Introduction 19
3.2 The formation of a federation 20
3.3 The emergence of Militant Nationalism 21
3.4 The road to Independence 21
4 LATE POLITICAL FORMATIONS IN BECHUANALAND 24

4.1 Introduction 25
4.2 The emergence of political parties 25
4.3 Moving towards Independence 26
5 THE EMERGENCE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 28

5.1 Introduction 28
5.2 Independence constitutions 29
(iv)
Study unit Page

TOPIC 2
Postindependence ideology and development 31
6 ZIMBABWE AND SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM 32
6.1 Introduction 32
6.2 Growth with Equity 33
6.3 Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP) 34
6.4 Adaptions of scientific socialism 35
7 SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN ZIM-

BABWE 37
7.1 Introduction 37
7.2 The failure to impliment scientific socialism 38
7.3 Constraints of the Lancaster House agreement 38
7.4 The lack of commitment to scientific socialism 39
7.5 The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) 41
8 POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN ZAMBIA'S THREE

REPUBLICS (SINCE 1964) 43
8.1 Introduction 43
8.2 The decline in the price of copper 44
8.3 Corruption in the first Republic (1964±1972) 45
8.4 The one-party state and corruption in the second Republic
(1972±1991) 46
8.5 Corruption and mismanagement by government officaials 47
8.6 Zambia's worsening economic crises and the demise of Kaunda's
goverment 49
9 THE EMERGENCE OF THE MOVEMENT FOR MULTIPARTY DEMOC-

RACY (MMD) 51
9.1 Introduction 51
9.2 Political and economic developments under the MMD 52
9.3 Failure to effect economic reforms 54
9.4 Corruption within the MMD 55
9.5 Kaunda's return to politics 57
9.6 Chiluba's exit from the political arena 59
10 BOTSWANA: A DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 61

10.1 Introduction 61
10.2 Botswana: A developmental state 61
11 RAPID ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN BOTSWANA 63

11.2 Reasons for Botswan's success 64
11.3 Botswana's continued economics prosperity 67
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12 BOTSWANA'S SOFT AUTHORITARIANISM 69
12.2 Corruption and mismanagement in Botswana 69
12.3 Social control by the elite 71
12.4 Botswana's authoritarian liberalism 72
12.5 Question markss over Botswana's much praised democracy 74
TOPIC 3
The democratic process 79
13 ZIMBABWE: AN AUTHORITARIAN DEMOCRACY 80
13.2 The quest for a one-party system 80
13.3 Oppositionto a one-party system 82
13.4 Weak opposition in Zimbabwe 83
13.5 The emergence of a strong opposition 84
13.6 Repression of the MDC 85
14 ZAMBIA: FROM ONE-PARTY TO MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY 87

14.2 The Chona commission 88
14.3 End of the year one-party system 89
14.4 Democracy in Zambia under the MMD 90
14.5 Zambia's third democratic elections 91
15 MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY IN BOTSWANA 92

15.2 Factors behind the Botswana Democratic Party's (BDP) predomi-
nance 94
15.3 Ian Khama and dissension within the BDP 98
TOPIC 4
Conflict in Zimbabwean and Zambian politics 101
16 INCREASING OPPOSITION TO AUTHORITARIANISM IN ZIMBABWE 102
16.2 From success to failure 103
16.3 Zimbabwe's continuing economic problems 104
16.4 Strike action 105
16.5 Protest action 106
16.6 Conflict before and after the 2000 elections 107
16.7 Zimbabwe's perennial land crises 108
16.8 Government's half-hearted attemps to redistribute land 109
16.9 The fresh approach to land redistribution 109
16.10 The forceful seizure of farms 111
16.11 Implications of the conflict 113
16.12 Zimbabwe from one crise to another 115
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17 FACTIONALISM IN ZAMBIAN POLITICS 124
17.2 Origins of factionalism in the third Republic 124
17.3 Zambia under leadership of Mwanawasa 127
Bibliography 131
OPTION 2
The politics of Angola, Mozambique and Namibia 137
1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 139
1.1 Studying the politics of Africa 139
1.2 Why study Angola, Mozambique and Namibia? 142
1.3 Regional relations: Angola, Mozambique and Namibia 145
1.4 Portuguese colonial policy: Angola and Mozambique 146
1.5 Namibia and South African policy 148
2 ANGOLA 151
2.1.1 Some basic facts 153
2.1.2 A brief history of Angola 153
2.1.3 The post-1884 period 153
2.2 The nationlist movement 155
2.2.1 The origins of the nationalist movement 155
2.2.2 The People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola
(MPLA) 156
2.2.3 The National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) 157
2.2.4 Unita 157
3 DEVELOPMENTS BEFORE INDEPENDENCE 159

3.1 Independence 160
3.2 War and disintegation 162
4 THE QUEST FOR PEACE 163

4.1 The 1992 elections: background to the elections and the
resumption of hostilities 164
4.2 New constitution, peace efforts and challenges 165
4.3 Economy and reconstruction 166
4.3.1 Inheritance 166
4.3.2 The government's economic policy since 1976 166
4.4 Constraints on future economic development 169
4.4.1 The present state of the economy 169
4.4.2 War damage 169
4.4.3 Agricultural development 169
4.4.4 Industrial development 170
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5 ANGOLA'S RESOURCE WAR 171
5.1 Challenges for the future: the attainment of a lasting peace 172
5.2 Governance: a preliminary assessment 173
6 MOZAMBIQUE 176
6.1.1 Some basic facts 179
6.1.2 Population groups 180
6.1.3 Early history 181
6.1.4 Indigenous state formation 181
6.1.5 Trade, conquest and slavery 181
6.2 Colonial rule 183
6.2.1 Background 183
6.2.2 The establishment of Portuguese colonial rule 183
6.2.3 Company rule 184
6.2.4 The nature of Portuguese colonial rule 184
7 THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT 186

7.1 The founding of Frelimo and the beginning of the armed struggle
against Portuguese rule 186
7.1.1 The end of the war 188
7.1.2 Decolonisation and the transition to independence 188
7.2 Independence 189
7.2.1 The Mozambique National Resistance Movement (MNR/
Renamo) 190
7.2.2 External support for the MNR 191
7.2.3 Internal reasons for the success of the MNR 191
8 THE QUEST FOR PEACE AND THE NEW CONSTITUTION 194

8.1 Elections and the democratisation progress 195
8.2 Frelimo's economic inheritance and evolving economic policy 197
8.3 Economic reform and structural addjustment 199
8.4 Mozambican control and foreign donors 199
9 DEMOCRATISATION: PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE 202

10 NAMIBIA 205
10.1 Introduction: some basic facts 205
10.2 A brief history 206
10.2.1 Uniqueness 206
10.2.2 The internal dimension 207
10.2.3 An international issue: summary 208
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11 THE ORIGINS AND DRAFTING OF THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITU-
TION 213
11.1 The constitution 213
12 ELECTIONS 217
12.1 Postindependence 218
12.1.1 Twenty years after independence 219
Bibliography 222
OPTION 1
The politics of Zambia, Zimbabwe

and Botswana
2
Introduction
This study guide introduces you to the politics of Zambia, Zimbabwe

and Botswana (option 1) OR Angola, Mozambique and Namibia (option
2). Please choose the group of countries you wish to study and omit the
other group. Ensure that you read only the prescribed articles
pertaining to the option you have chosen. The examination paper will
include sections on both these groups, but you will only be required to
answer questions on the group you have studied.
Firstly, we will give you a taste of the different countries in a regional
context. We will discuss their history briefly and look at some of the
main political themes in each country. Then we will introduce you to
some of the debates and controversies in their politics, and look at their
prospects for enduring peace, the consolidation of democracy and
economic development. To this end we supply some historical back-
ground, but our focus will be on contemporary issues. You need to
become acquainted with historical issues in order to understand the
origins of the present political realities.
The study guide provides only a basic framework for the study of the
countries under discussion. In addition to this study material, you are
required to study the prescribed articles included in the tutorial letter.
The prescribed articles in the tutorial letter form an integral part of the
study material and, together with the study guide, deals mainly with
contemporary themes in a comparative context.
Assignments are based on the contents of the study guide and the
prescribed articles included in the tutorial letter. It is a good idea to
summarise the contents of each article to ensure that you know what it
is about and understand the main points of the article.
Examination questions will be based on the study guide and the
prescribed articles included in your tutorial letter, the assignment
topics and the self-test questions at the end of each study unit.
We want to encourage you to read more than just the prescribed
articles. A number of recommended and additional books are listed in
Tutorial Letter 101. If you have access to the internet, you should
explore websites that deal with the politics of Africa. A number of
useful websites are listed in Tutorial Letter 101. Remember that the
politics of Africa is a dynamic field and you should do your best to keep
up to date with contemporary developments by reading academic
material, newspapers and periodicals, and listening to and watching
news broadcasts on radio and television.
We trust that you will find this course stimulating and exciting.
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STUDY UNIT 1
Governance, democracy and

development
LEARNING OUTCOMES
After you have completed this study unit, you should be able to
(1) define the concepts ``governance'', `ìdeology''' and ``develop-
ment''' by stating them in your own words
(2) state clearly in your own words what the scope of this module is
1.1 A WORD OF WELCOME

Welcome to the third-level module in African Politics in which we look
at Southern African countries. This module focuses on different types
of governance in three Southern African countries, namely Zimbabwe,
Zambia and Botswana. These countries are adjacent to one another and
share common borders. They all belong to the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) and were frontline states in the fight
against apartheid.
Zimbabwe, Zambia and Botswana are all former British colonies, but
they have adopted different styles of governance since their independ-
ence. These different styles of governance have not all led to national
prosperity. Postindependence Botswana has experienced success, but
the same cannot be said about its two neighbours. Zimbabwe and
Zambia have been beset with social, economic and political problems.
Before we continue, you have to understand the meaning of the
concepts governance, development and ideology, because we will refer
to them repeatedly throughout the study material. These terms, like
most political science concepts, have been explained in a variety of
ways.
1.2 DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS
Good governance
According to Leftwich (1993:610) the first public appearance of the
notion of good governance came in a 1989 World Bank report on Africa,
which argued that `ùnderlying the litany of Africa's development
4
problems is a crisis of governance''. Governance was described as ``...

the exercise of political power to manage a nation's affairs''. Good
governance includes
. an efficient public service
. an independent judicial system and legal framework to enforce
contracts
. the accountable administration of public funds
. an independent public auditor; responsible to a representative
legislature
. respect for the law and human rights at all levels of government
. a pluralistic institutional structure
. a free press
If we take the above as a yardstick of good governance, then African

governance is poor. With a few exceptions, African countries fail the
test for good governance. Africa's experiment with democracy has been
brief and as a result its citizens do not participate in decision-making
processes. Africa's self-appointed leaders have the prerogative to
choose their countries' policies and the constitutions adopted at
independence are either ignored or abrogated. In a majority of cases
countries are ruled by decree. And because of this, Africa experiences a
myriad of problems. One of these problems is the lack of development,
which is crucial for the wellbeing of the citizenry.
Development
According to Tordoff (2002:259), development is usually associated
with economic growth. However, he cautions against a one-dimen-
sional view of development, because development is multifaceted. It
embodies social justice (ie the equitable distribution of the benefits of
economic growth among the country's regions and citizens). In
addition, development has a political component, because provision
must be made for popular participation in the political process and for
the protection of civil rights and essential freedom, and an adminis-
trative component, so that the state has the capacity to respond to
people's needs.
Ideology
Ideology is closely tied to development. This concept is very
controversial and has defied a common interpretation by scholars,
who argue that it has no precise meaning. In fact, if 10 political
scientists are asked to define ideology, they will come up with 10
different descriptions. This is what Eccleshall (1984:23±24) says about
the confusion surrounding ideology:
5 APC3701/1
In fact the concept has provoked an enormous output of

sophisticated, often abstruse, academic literature; bucketfuls
of a largely dense and opaque theoretical liquid. For many
commentators the concept is licence to engage in what, to the
uninitiated, might seem gibberish.
Christenson, Engel, Jacobs, Rejoi and Woltzer (1972:5) define political

ideology as follows:
Political ideology is a belief system that explains and justifies a
preferred political order for society, either existing or proposed,
and offers a strategy (processes, institutional arrangements,
programs) for attainment.
Ideologies serve a variety of purposes, but they are by and large

concerned with the desirable ordering of society, and as such are
generally relevant to all aspects of society. They review and even
criticise the present order in an attempt to bring about a new or
different order. Since ideologies usually have a wide scope and since
they have an impact on every aspect of society, they usually include
specifications for the desirable nature of all spheres of society,
including the economic, educational, social and religious spheres.
The most important of these is the economic sphere.
The development strategy of a country is determined by the ideology it
adopts (Tordoff 2002:265). After African states had attained independ-
ence, their new leaders adopted different ideologies in an attempt to
bring about development. Some adopted Marxism and others adopted a
tailor-made form of Marxism referred to as Afro-Marxism. A third
group of countries adopted an ideology known as African socialism.
Only a few African countries remained faithful to the capitalist ideology
of their former colonisers.
Young (1982:2) plays down the importance of ideology in the
development of a country. He says:
I do not expect to find that ideology alone will explain relative
success or failure in achieving the central goal of a better life for
the citizenry. Simple political effectiveness, which cuts across
ideologies, is one obvious factor.
Consider what Tordoff (1992:43) has to say about governments and

ideology:
For each type of regime one can say that ideology is helpful if it
enables the leadership to instil a sense of direction and purpose
in their followers once independence has been achieved. No less
obviously, ideology can be a handicap if it is too rigidly applied
and makes change difficult. It can then become an economic
straightjacket.
6
While Botswana did not adopt any radical ideology on attaining

independence, both Zimbabwe and Zambia implemented ideologies
which they hoped would `ìnstil a sense of direction and purpose'' in
their people. We can argue that the policies based on these ideologies
have been responsible for the poor economic performance of Zimbabwe
and Zambia, and the problems that this has caused. You will have to
determine whether the ideologies of these countries were responsible
for their poor performance.
Tordoff (1992:48) argues that some countries face internal and

external constraints that affect their performance, irrespective of their
ideologies. Among these external constraints, he mentions lending
agencies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World
Bank. He maintains that the interventionist strategies of both
organisations are capitalistically inclined and aimed at subverting
socialist planning. He also reasons that the incorporation of Third
World countries into the world economy and increases in the price of
oil and other goods are external factors that impinge on the
performance of these countries.
Tordoff (1992:49) gives the following as examples of internal

constraints:
. corruption
. factionalism
. absence of democracy
. shortage of administrative, managerial and technical skills
. natural disasters such as droughts and floods
While you are reading through your study guide, tutorial letters and
recommended reading material, you should try to identify both the
external and internal constraints that have hampered the performance
of Zimbabwe and Zambia. Consider the conditions in these countries
and contrast them with conditions in Botswana.
As a result of their poor performance, Zimbabwe and Zambia had no

alternative but to abandon their ideologies in the early 1990s and to
implement structural adjustment programmes to give their economies a
chance to recover. However, this did not have the effect of improving
the economic performance of either country ± both countries are still
fighting for survival. Their economies show no improvement, while
Botswana's economic success and political stability continue.
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ACTIVITY
Define the concepts ``governance'', `ìdeology'' and ``development''
in your own words. Write down your definitions in the space
provided below.
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Good governance is
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Development in a political environment entails

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Ideology is
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FEEDBACK
Good governance is the government's ability to rule in accordance
with the constitution. The government has to be accountable and
respect the rule of law and civil liberties. Good governance requires
an efficient, open and accountable government.
Development is a multifaceted word that encompasses a wide
range of issues. It is always associated with the economic growth of
a state and how the government provides for its citizens.
Ideology refers to a policy (mainly an economic policy) adopted
by a government. Ideologies are concerned with the desirable
ordering of society. They include specifications for the desirable
nature of all spheres of society, including the economic, educatio-
nal, social and religious spheres.
8
ACTIVITY
Students usually call us, the lecturers, a few days before the
examination and ask us for more information about the scope of the
prescribed material. Let us talk about the scope of this module right
at the start of your studies.
In your own words, summarise the scope of this module. In the
space below, write down what the different aspects of the course
entail (themes, prescribed material, etc).
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FEEDBACK
This study guide focuses on the political and economic develop-
ments of three Southern African countries, namely Botswana,
Zimbabwe and Zambia. The following themes are discussed in the
study guide: nationalism; the rise of black political formations; the
emergence of constitutionalism; postindependence ideologies and
development; the democratic process; and political conflict.
TOPIC 1
Nationalism, the rise of political

formations and the emergence
of constitutionalism
10
Zimbabwe
11 APC3701/1
STUDY UNIT 2
The origins of the armed struggle in

Zimbabwe
CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR POLITICAL EVENTS IN ZIMBABWE'S POLITICAL

HISTORY
1888 Cecil John Rhodes persuades Lobengula to sign over the
mineral rights of his kingdom
1922 Southern Rhodesia becomes a British colony
1930 Land Apportionment Act
1953 Federation of Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and
Nyasaland established
1956 Formation of the African National Congress (ANC)
1962 Formation of Zimbabwe African People's Union (Zapu)
1963 Formation of Zimbabwe African National Union (Zanu)
1964 Zanu and Zapu banned
1965 Start of the armed struggle
1963 Break-up of the Federation
1965 Rhodesian Front party elected into power
1966±1979 Attempts to achieve internal settlements
1979 Lancaster House negotiations for internationally recog-
nised settlement
1980 Elections leading to victory for the Zimbabwe African
National Union Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF)
1982 Government violence against the Matabele
1985 Zanu-PF wins Zimbabwe's second elections
1987 Merger between Zanu-PF and Zapu
1990 Zanu-PF wins Zimbabwe's third elections
1991 Zanu-PF accepts an economic structural adjustment plan
(ESAP)
1995 Zanu-PF wins Zimbabwe's fourth elections
2000 Draft constitution rejected at a referendum
12
2000 Formation of the Movement for Democratic Change

(MDC)
2000 Invasion of white-owned farms
2000 Zanu-PF wins Zimbabwe's fifth postindependence elec-
tions
2002 Mugabe wins presidential elections against the MDC's
Morgan Tsvangirai
2005 ZANU-PF wins parliamentary elections
2008 MDC wins parliamentary elections leading to worsening
political crisis in Zimbabwe
COUNTRY PROFILE
Population: 12,9 million
Capital: Harare
Major languages: English, Shona, Ndebele
Major religions: Christianity, indigenous beliefs
Currency: Zimbabwean dollar
Major exports: Tobacco, cotton, agricultural products, gold,
minerals
LEARNING OUTCOMES
(1) trace the origin of black political formations in Zimbabwe
(2) explain why factionalism occurs within these formations
(3) analyse the factors that caused these formations to embark on
an armed struggle
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Although this module focuses on events that took place after Zimbabwe
had gained independence, you should be familiar with Zimbabwe's
history. We therefore include a brief discussion on the emergence of
Zimbabwe, the formation of black political parties and the struggle of
nationalist movements to gain independence.
In 1888, Cecil John Rhodes, the diamond millionaire and prime
minister of the Cape Colony, persuaded Lobengula to sign over the
mineral rights of his kingdom, Mashonaland. Thereafter Rhodes
initiated the first significant white settlement by organising and
financing the famous ``pioneer column'' under the guidance of the
famous Selous Scouts; there were about 200 men and each was given a
13 APC3701/1
number of gold claims and a tract of farming land. By 1896, the white
population had grown to some 5 000 souls. The country was renamed
after Rhodes and in 1922 Southern Rhodesia became a British colony.
Zimbabwe (a name derived from the famous Zimbabwe ruins) is
situated in central Southern Africa between the Zambezi and Limpopo
rivers. It is landlocked by Botswana (west), South Africa (south),
Zambia (north) and Mozambique (east). If a country is landlocked, it
means that the country is surrounded by other countries and has no
access to the sea. Zimbabwe uses the ports of South Africa and
Mozambique for its imports and exports. Look at the map of Africa and
identify other landlocked countries.
2.2 JOSHUA NKOMO AND THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS (ANC)

In 1956, a group of young blacks organised themselves into a youth
league (matching a similar development in South Africa at the time)
with the purpose of adopting a more militant style of protest against
the white authorities. At first the youth league was not aimed at
insurgency. They focused on organising various forms of strike action
and soon tried to found a national organisation that would incorporate
the multitude of smaller black groupings throughout the country. This
initiative gave rise to the formation of the African National Congress,
then known in Zimbabwe as the `òld ANC''.
Joshua Nkomo was elected to lead this new formation and under his
leadership a vigorous campaign of urban and rural protest rallies soon
swept the country. In February 1959, these activities led to the mass
arrests of the ANC's leadership (with the exception of Nkomo, who
happened to be out of the country at the time). During the next year
black leaders both in and out of detention pondered the strategies
which would now have to be followed. One group or school of thought
was in favour of going underground and abandoning the process of
open party formation and constitutional opposition, while another
group was in favour of creating a new political party to replace the
banned ANC.
2.3 THE FORMATION OF THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (NDP)

In due course the National Democratic Party (NDP) was founded. It was
led by Nkomo, and Ndabaningi Sithole and Robert Mugabe held senior
positions in the party. Smith and Simpson (1981:36) argue that the
NDP introduced a new style and content to black protest. The old ANC
had focused its attentions on injustice and the repeal of discriminatory
laws (in particular the Land Apportionment Act), but the NDP now
started to talk the language of undiluted majority rule. One of its
founders, Takawira, told an NDP meeting: ``We are no longer asking
Europeans to please rule us well. We wish to rule ourselves'' (Windrich
1975:6).
14
Encouraged by the assertiveness and bold leadership of the NDP and by

the vigorous challenge to colonialism in countries like Ghana, Kenya
and Nigeria, the grassroots support for the party far exceeded that of
the ANC. Within 16 months the NDP had enlisted some 250 000 paid-up
members (Windrich 1975:6) who enthusiastically attended mass rallies
throughout the country (Smith & Simpson 1981:37±38). The enormous
improvement in the organisational structure of the NDP also enabled it
to mobilise a largely successful boycott of the 1962 elections. It is
worth mentioning here that although Nkomo was still a towering figure
in the black nationalist movement in Rhodesia, his initial agreement to
the 1961 constitution had severely dented his credibility as a
committed exponent of majority rule. Although he quickly retracted
his support for this constitution, he had earned himself a reputation for
indecisiveness, which his opponents exploited. The Rhodesian govern-
ment banned the NDP in 1962.
ACTIVITY
Describe in a few sentences how the NDP differed from the ANC.
Write down your answer in the space provided below.
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FEEDBACK
The NDP comprised militant youths who were agitating for action
against the Rhodesian government. It had widespread grassroots
support. The ANC did not have a cohesive strategy to challenge the
government and comprised the older generation of politicians.
2.4 FACTIONALISM WITHIN BLACK FORMATIONS

Within days of the banning of the NDP, Nkomo launched his new party,
the Zimbabwe African People's Union (Zapu), a party which was itself
outlawed late in 1962. This was followed by what appears to have been
an attempt by Nkomo to set up a sort of government-in-exile. Senior
party leaders such as Sithole and Mugabe were despatched to Dar es
Salaam.
By the middle of 1963, their dissatisfaction with Nkomo's leadership
15 APC3701/1
led them to announce that they were suspending him as party leader
and that Sithole would be taking his place as interim leader. The real
reasons for this step are not clear. It appears that Nkomo had misled
Sithole and Mugabe into believing that President Nyerere and President
Kaunda wanted Zapu to set up an external base for political operations.
(At this stage no military operations were planned.) Mugabe was
strongly in favour of remaining in the country (even at the almost
certain risk of being detained) in order to pursue the process of mass
politicisation and protest (Windrich 1975:57±58; Smith & Simpson
1981:46±50).
The outcome was that Nkomo dismissed Sithole, Mugabe and others
from Zapu. In reply, Sithole announced the formation of the Zimbabwe
African National Union (Zanu) in August 1963. The stage was now set
for a struggle between the two leaders. It began with violent
confrontations between the supporters of the two parties, particularly
in the then Salisbury, during which a great many lives were lost. This
strife was to continue throughout the years that followed, with the
military wings of both parties expending much of their energies in
fighting each other and building on a legacy of bitterness. Were it not
for the fact that Zapu used Zambia, and Zanu Mozambique, as the bases
of their war operations against the Rhodesian government, it is likely
that their attempts to break this government would have been
considerably delayed.
2.5 OPPOSITION TO INTERNAL SETTLEMENT AND THE BEGINNING OF

THE ARMED STRUGGLE
Barely one year after they had been formed, both Zanu and Zapu were
banned and their main leaders, including Nkomo and Mugabe, spent
the next decade in prison. These two movements then embarked on the
armed struggle in order to liberate their country. They emerged in the
wake of the mid-1970s' detente talks initiated by President Kaunda of
Zambia and Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa. During their period
in prison the political leaders of Zanu had banded together against
Sithole and voted for Mugabe to take his place, largely on account of
Mugabe's more determined opposition to the idea of reaching an
arrangement with Ian Smith. Eventually Sithole and Bishop Abel
Muzorewa joined Smith in a so-called internal (but not internationally
recognised) settlement, with Muzorewa becoming prime minister in
1979. (Muzorewa had come to prominence during the early 1970s by
mobilising black opinion against an attempt by the British government
and Smith to grant Rhodesia independence without an immediate
surrender of white rule.)
Nkomo and Mugabe responded by forming the Patriotic Front (PF) as a
political vehicle for their respective military wings ± Zimbabwe
People's Revolutionary Army (Zipra) in the case of Zapu and the
Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (Zanla) in the case of Zanu.
Their military wings continued the war unabatedly in a tangled web of
16
involvement by South Africa, America and the frontline presidents

(particularly Kaunda, Machel of Mozambique and Nyerere of Tanzania)
until 1979, when all contestants were brought to the British-sponsored
Lancaster House talks. These talks paved the way for the independence
elections of 1980 and an overwhelming victory for Mugabe's Zanu-PF
party. Zanu-PF won 63 percent of the votes cast and 57 percent of the
black seats. The 20 seats which had been specifically reserved for
whites were all won in a separate election by the Rhodesian Front led
by Smith.
Both Zanu and Zapu engaged in the Lancaster House talks as the PF.
However, before the independence elections, Zanu reverted back to the
name (Zanu) and added the acronym PF. It contested the elections on
its own as Zanu-PF (Stoneman et al 1989:33).
To what can we attribute Zanu-PF's victory? Gregory (1981:67±71)
argues that instead of looking at policy declarations for a clue to the
election outcome, the key to this should be sought within the context of
two decades of resistance to white rule and Zanu-PF's contribution to
the armed struggle. A popular saying in Zimbabwe went ``Zanu-PF
started the war, and Zanu-PF will end the war''.
SELF-EVALUATION QUESTIONS
(1) Discuss the two schools of thought which existed among black
nationalists after the detention of the ANC leaders.
(2) What, in your view, accounted for the large support which the
NDP attracted after its formation?
(3) ``Nkomo was a militant African leader.'' Is this statement true
or false? Substantiate your answer.
17 APC3701/1
Zambia
18
STUDY UNIT 3
The emergence and growth of

anticolonialism in Northern Rhodesia
CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR POLITICAL EVENTS IN ZAMBIA'S HISTORY

1889 The British South Africa (BSA) Company receives a
charter from the British government allowing it to
conclude treaties north of the Limpopo river
1890 The BSA Company occupies Southern Rhodesia
1924 The administrative responsibility of the BSA Company in
Northern Rhodesia is ended; Britain takes over the
administration
1946 The Federation of Welfare Societies is founded
1948 The Northern formed Rhodesia African Congress is
founded
1949 The African Mineworkers' Union is formed
1953 The Central African Federation is formed
1959 Zambia African National Congress is formed and banned
in the same year
1960 The United National Independence Party (Unip) is formed
1963 The Central African Federation dissolved
1964 Zambia is granted independence
1968 General elections
1971 The founding the United Progressive Party (UPP)
1972 The UPP is banned by government
1972 Second Zambian Republic and one-party state come into
effect
1980 Attempted coup fails
1981 Detention of Chiluba
1990 Pressure mounts for government to restore multiparty
democracy
1991 Unip defeated by Movement for Multiparty
Democracy (MMD) led by Chiluba
19 APC3701/1
1994 Kaunda returns to politics

1996 MMD wins second democratic elections
1997 A coup attempt is reported
2000 Third general elections won by MMD and Levy
Mwanawasa becomes president
2008 Banda becomes Zambia's fourth president after winning
elections necessitated by Mwanawasa's intimely death
2011 Michael Shata wins elections and become Zambia's fifth
president
COUNTRY PROFILE
Capital: Lusaka
Major languages: English, Bemba, Lozi, Nyanja, Tonga
Currency: Kwacha
Main exports: Copper, minerals and tobacco
LEARNING OUTCOMES
(1) trace the reasons why the Central African Federation was
formed
(2) analyse the formation of black political movements
(3) classify events that culminated in independence
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The Republic of Zambia was formerly known as the British Protectorate
of Northern Rhodesia. It was first occupied by the BSA Company in the
1890s, after the Company had obtained concessions from local chiefs
north of the Zambezi river. In 1924, Britain took over from the BSA
Company and administered the territory.
Zambia is situated in central Southern Africa and is bordered by
Tanzania, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambi-
que, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Malawi. Like Zimbabwe, Zambia
is landlocked.
A significant characteristic of the first two decades of British colonial
rule in Northern Rhodesia was the prohibition of black trade unions.
Consequently, black mineworkers had no organisations to negotiate on
their behalf. Because trade unions were banned, the miners in the
20
Copper Belt formed ``welfare organisations'', led chiefly by clerks and

foremen (Roberts 1981:1161). According to Roberts, these organisa-
tions served as a forum where mineworkers could discuss their
problems and bring pressure to bear on local authorities. They also
helped form a communications network in Northern Rhodesia that
embraced both urban and rural areas. The expansion of these
organisations led to the formation of the Federation of Welfare
Societies in Lusaka in 1946. Shortly thereafter, in 1948, this federation
changed and became a nationalistic political organisation known as the
Northern Rhodesia African National Congress (NRANC). This organisa-
tion, led by Harry Nkumbula, led the antifederation campaign in
Northern Rhodesia during the 1950s.
3.2 THE FORMATION OF A FEDERATION

When the Labour Party came into office in Britain during 1945,
permission was granted for the formation of trade unions in Northern
Rhodesia. This concession led to the creation of the African
Mineworkers' Union (AMU) in 1949, which united all the mineworkers
in one trade union. The main stimulus to anticolonial nationalism in
Northern Rhodesia was the formation of the Central African Federa-
tion, which included Northern and Southern Rhodesia and the former
Nyasaland (Malawi). Pettman (1974b:11±15) explains the motivations
and protests surrounding the formation of the Federation as follows:
``The white settlers in Northern Rhodesia saw the formation of a
federation as a mechanism whereby Britain would transfer political
control of the territory to them.''
The Federation would also serve as a means of arresting black political
progress in the territory. According to Pettman (1974b:15), the
establishment of the Federation was never endangered by black
opposition and was given added impetus by the election of a
Conservative government in Britain in 1951. A number of factors
spurred the new British government to permit the establishment of the
Federation. Firstly, Nyasaland was a considerable financial burden on
the British exchequer; secondly, Britain was disturbed by an increasing
community of interests between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa;
and thirdly, a federation appeared to offer economic advantages.
The Central African Federation was officially instituted on 3 September
1953 in the face of considerable black protest. Pettman (1974b:13)
remarks that the formation of the Federation was a serious blow to
black confidence in Britain as the protectorate power in Northern
Rhodesia. As a result, what started as antisettler nationalism
developed into anti-British nationalism and blacks began to believe
that they would have to achieve liberation by themselves. Once the
Federation had become a reality, popular support in Northern Rhodesia
for Nkumbula's ANC dwindled considerably. After 1953, the ANC
leaders made a serious effort to rejuvenate the organisation. A number
of boycotts against white-owned and Indian-owned shops followed.
21 APC3701/1
ACTIVITY
Which of the following do you think was not a factor in the
formation of a federation?
(1) Nyasaland was a financial burden on Britain.
(2) A federation appeared to offer economic advantages to Britain.
(3) Blacks were at the forefront of the formation of the federation.
FEEDBACK
The answer is (c). Blacks were opposed to the idea of a federation
and they were not consulted about its formation.
3.3 THE EMERGENCE OF MILITANT NATIONALISM

A short-lived cooperation between the AMU and the ANC led to a series
of strikes in the Copper Belt. At the same time the younger ANC leaders
began to display a more militant and conscious nationalism. In 1957,
the Prime Minister of the Federation, Sir Roy Welensky, obtained four
significant concessions from the British government without prior
consultation with the black population. The most important of these
provided for a programme to examine the possibility of independence
for Northern Rhodesia. This concession was aimed at white settler
domination. Soon afterwards the federal government ratified legisla-
tion which weakened the political bargaining position of blacks,
provoking renewed protest.
The moderate leadership of Nkumbula aroused opposition within the
ANC. The younger leaders in particular, such as Munu Sipalo and
Simon Kapwepwe, called for more purposeful action against the federal
government.
Dissatisfaction with the ANC leadership eventually compelled Kenneth
Kaunda, Kapwepwe and their supporters to break away from the
organisation. The Zambia African National Congress (ZANC) was
founded shortly afterwards in 1959. In the same year, after protest
campaigns in Northern Rhodesia, the organisation was banned and all
its leaders arrested.
3.4 THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE

The period after the banning of the ZANC was marked by growing
unrest and protest. In the black schools, particularly, strikes, boycotts
and insubordination reflected the mounting resistance to cooperation.
22
In 1961, anticolonial
violence in the rural
areas escalated as
hundreds of bridges
were destroyed,
schools burned
down and access
routes to the rural
areas of four pro-
vinces blockaded.
The ZANC was ban-
ned in 1959, and in
January 1960 two
splinter groups ±
the African National
Independence Party
(ANIP) and the Uni- Kenneth Kaunda
ted National Free- Source: New African
dom Party (UNFP) ±
united to form the
United National Independence Party (Unip) under the leadership of
Kenneth Kaunda. Gupta (1975:131) points out that Unip enjoyed wider
popular support among the population than the ANC, partly because of
the party's militant stance that suited the mood of the times. According
to Gupta, support for Unip increased swiftly because the party
successfully recruited functionaries from among the unemployed urban
youth and because it ran a successful campaign in rural areas.
Widespread unrest in the territory forced the British government to
realise that black aspirations could be suppressed only by force ± a
solution that was unacceptable. This realisation led to a new series of
constitutional proposals by which majority rule became possible. The
new constitution prepared the way for general elections in October
1962. During the elections, the ANC and Unip formed a coalition which
gave the two parties a majority of seats. In 1964, the first elections
were held with a view to granting Zambia its independence. Unip won
55 of the 75 seats, and Kaunda formed a cabinet to lead the country to
independence. On 24 October 1964, the Republic of Zambia gained
independence and became a member of the British Commonwealth.
(1) Explain the reaction of black political leaders to the formation
of the Central African Federation.
(2) Discuss the reasons that led to a split within the African
National Congress.
(3) What caused unrest in the territory?
23 APC3701/1
Botswana
24
STUDY UNIT 4
Late political formations in

Bechuanaland
CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR POLITICAL EVENTS IN BOTSWANA'S HISTORY

1895 Protectorate status conferred
1919 Native Advisory Council appointed
1951 Joint Advisory Council established
1960 Botswana People's Party formed
1962 Botswana Democratic Party formed
1963 Legislative Council established
1964 The formation of the Botswana Independence Party (BIP)
1965 Constitutional review conference held
1965 The BDP (led by Seretse Khama) wins pre-independence
elections
1965 Botswana National Front formed
1966 Botswana granted independence
1969 The BDP wins first postindependence elections
1979 The BDP wins third elections
1980 Sir Seretse Khama dies; Ketumile Masire becomes
president
1984 The BDP wins fourth elections
1989 The BDP wins Botswana's fifth elections
1994 The BDP wins sixth elections
1998 Sir Ketumile Masire retires and is succeeded by Festus
Mogae
1999 The BDP wins Botswana's seventh elections
2004 The BDP wins Botswana's eight elections. Ian Khama
becomes Botswana's fourth president
2009 The BDP wins Botswana's ninth elections
25 APC3701/1
COUNTRY PROFILE
Capital: Gaborone
Major towns: Francistown, Lobatsi
Major languages: English, Setswana
Currency: Pula
Main exports: Diamonds, copper, nickel
LEARNING OUTCOMES
(1) identify and explain the reasons behind the late formation of
political parties in Bechuanaland
(2) discuss the manner in which Bechuanaland attained its
independence
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Botswana, also a landlocked country, is situated in central Southern
Africa and is surrounded by South Africa, Zambia, Namibia and
Zimbabwe. Unlike other territories in Africa, Britain did not conquer
Bechuanaland (as Botswana was called before independence). British
control was established at the invitation of some tribal leaders. Britain
was reluctant to establish control over the territory. Botswana's
history and constitutional development prior to independence were in
many respects dominated by the prospects of incorporation into the
then Union of South Africa. Upon its formation, the Union of South
Africa pursued the goal of incorporating Botswana. It was only in the
late 1950s that the possibility of incorporation into South Africa
appeared to have been finally shelved, which left the British with the
only one option, namely to prepare the territory for independence at
some future date. The end of the road as far as incorporation was
concerned came with South Africa's withdrawal from the Common-
wealth (Hyam 1972:195).
4.2 THE EMERGENCE OF POLITICAL PARTIES

Political parties emerged much later in Bechuanaland than they did
elsewhere in Africa, partly perhaps as a consequence of the uncertainty
over its constitutional future. The first party to be formed in the
territory was the Bechuanaland People's Party (BPP) in 1960. It was
followed by the Bechuanaland Democratic Party (BDP), which came
into existence in 1962. Factionalism within the BPP gave rise to
26
another party, the Bechuanaland Independent Party (BIP) formed in

1964. The last party to be formed was the Bechuanaland National Front
(BNF) in 1965.
Although incorporation was no longer an issue by the early 1960s,
Britain still appeared hesitant to grant independence, but internal
pressure from the various political parties which had emerged in
Bechuanaland during this period expedited the process. The colonial
authorities had initially scheduled a constitutional review conference
for 1968, but in August 1962 the Resident Commissioner announced
that the conference would be brought forward to 1963.
ACTIVITY
Explain how Britain established control over Bechuanaland.
FEEDBACK
Britain was a reluctant coloniser in Botswana. It only established a
presence in Botswana after it had been invited by some tribal
leaders (chiefs).
4.3 MOVING TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE

The constitutional review conference was attended by representatives
of the two political parties (the BDP and the BPP), the chiefs and the
white community. They agreed on measures for a considerable extent
of self-government with a legislative council elected on the basis of
universal adult suffrage. Of the 38 seats, 32 would be elected on a
common roll, four seats would be reserved for persons nominated by
the legislative council and colonial officials would fill the remaining
two seats. The colonial administration retained responsibility for
external affairs, defence, internal security and the public service, but
these powers would be exercised only on advice from the cabinet.
The conference agreed to establish a separate structure to represent
the chiefs. Proposed legislation affecting the chiefs and tribal matters
would be referred to the House of Chiefs for comment before being
debated in the legislative assembly; however, such comments were
only advisory. It also agreed that no seats would be reserved for the
small white community, and a bill of rights was drafted, largely in
compensation. Many members of the white community, particularly
among farmers, had opposed independence, but this did not deflect the
British government from its course. The granting of independence was
reached amicably among all the stakeholders.
Pre-independence elections were held in March 1965 and were
27 APC3701/1
convincingly won by Seretse Khama's BDP. The BDP won 28 of the 31

seats to the opposition BPP's three seats. In February 1966, a final
constitutional review conference was held in London where minor
changes to the constitution were made. On 30 September 1966, the
territory was granted independence and its name was changed to
Botswana. The political parties discarded the name Bechuanaland.
ACTIVITY
Explain the reason why Britain was not keen on colonising
Bechuanaland.
FEEDBACK
Bechuanaland was a poor territory and there was a possibility that
it would be incorporated into the Union of South Africa, which made
Britain reluctant to establish a presence in this territory.
(1) Discuss the reasons why Britain was not keen on granting
Botswana independence.
(2) Botswana's independence was the culmination of a liberation
struggle. Is this statement true or false? Substantiate your
answer.
(3) With whom was the BDP associated?
28
STUDY UNIT 5
The emergence of constitutionalism
LEARNING OUTCOMES
(1) discuss the meaning of the concept ``constitution''
(2) explain what is meant by Western liberal constitutions
(3) describe the manner in which African states adopted their
constitutions
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Ranney, the well-known American political scientist, contends that
every nation has a written document formally and officially designated
as its constitution (Ranney 1975:116). A constitution, according to
Heywood (1997:274), is a set of written and unwritten rules that seeks
to establish the duties, powers and functions of the various institutions
of government, regulate the relationships between them, and define the
relationship between the state and the individual.
A constitution is the supreme law of a state. It limits the government's
exercise of power and establishes boundaries for the organisation and
functioning of government. It also safeguards the public from the abuse
of power by a government. Governments are expected to rule in
accordance with a constitution. A constitution brings stability,
predictability and order to actions of government (Heywood
1997:274). Both the government and the citizens of a country are
bound by a constitution and should respect it. A constitution cannot be
changed or amended at the whim of authorities. In liberal democracies
it is often taken for granted that the central purpose of a constitution is
to constrain government with a view to protecting individual liberty.
Constitutions are not the preserve of nations; even ordinary organisa-
tions have rules that have some kind of constitutional effect. Most of us
belong to an organised group that is governed by certain rules and
regulations, which forms the constitution of the organisation. Con-
stitutions play a vital role in the running of organisations.
''Constitutionalism'' is a term used to describe a nonarbitrary form of
government, that is governing in terms of a set of objective rules and
29 APC3701/1
procedures that restrains arbitrary and potentially vindictive modes of

government. A nonarbitrary government can also be called a constitu-
tional government.
Most countries have written constitutions, but there are three
countries with unwritten constitutions. These countries are Israel,
New Zealand and the United Kingdom. Constitutions are not uniform ±
they differ from country to country.
Constitutions do not serve a single purpose ± they may have many
functions. They empower states by defining a sphere of independent
authority; they establish a set of values, ideals and goals for a society;
they bring stability, order and predictability to the workings of
government; they protect individuals from the state; and they
legitimise regimes in the eyes of other states and their people
(Heywood 1997:290).
5.2 INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTIONS

Like many other African countries, the three countries discussed in this
module had constitutions that were bequeathed to them. The British
bequeathed to their former colonies written constitutions as the
framework of institutions, powers, procedures and rights that were
invested with an accepted authority. Ihonvbere (2000:15) points out
that these constitutions were either directly imposed by the colonial
government or were agreed upon by urban elite who participated in the
negotiations leading to the independence of their countries. The masses
were not involved in the drafting of these constitutions. These
constitutions made provision for the existence of more than one
political party, regular elections and a bill of rights, and they
guaranteed individual rights such as freedom of association, free
movement, a free press and religious freedom.
ACTIVITY
What do you think was the major flaw of the independence
constitutions?
FEEDBACK
The nationalist leaders simply accepted these constitutions because
they wanted a speedy transfer of power. They never ensured that
the constitutions would serve the needs of their societies.
Okoth-Ogendo (2000:35) makes a valid observation when he says ``to

have a constitution is not the same as enjoying or living under a system
of constitutional government''. According to him, that depends on
30
whether society in general and those responsible for the management

of public affairs in particular adhere to the basic principles of
constitutionalism. The road to the orderly process of government
commences with a publicly acknowledged constitution.
The three countries in our study inherited liberal Western constitutions
from Britain, their former coloniser.
(1) Briefly explain what you understand by the concept ``constitu-
tion''.
(2) Discuss the purposes of a constitution.
(3) Discuss the nature of the constitutions inherited by the
Zimbabwe, Zambia and Botswana.
TOPIC 2
Postindependence ideology and

development
32
STUDY UNIT 6
Zimbabwe and scientific socialism
LEARNING OUTCOMES
(1) offer reasons for Zanu-PF's decision to opt for scientific
socialism
(2) evaluate Zanu-PF's concerns about the inherited economy
(3) analyse how Zanu-PF intended to adapt scientific socialism
6.1 INTRODUCTION
When nationalist movements were involved in the struggle to free their
countries from colonial rule, very few of them had crafted an ideology
with which to develop their countries. Only after independence had
been attained did they discover that the nationalist ideology was
inappropriate for their new states. They then started searching for an
appropriate ideology to replace the colonialist ideology, which they
equated with capitalism. This study unit focuses on Zanu-PF's search
for an appropriate ideology after coming to power in 1980.
Zimbabwe's nationalist movement, Zanu-PF, differed from other
African movements in that while the movement was involved in the
liberation struggle, it already had an ideology in place. In 1977, while
involved in the armed struggle to overthrow the Smith regime, Zanu-PF
accepted scientific socialism as its guiding philosophy (Herbst
1992:48). When Zanu-PF came to power in 1980, it committed itself
to transforming the socioeconomic system inherited from the previous
Rhodesian government (Bratton 1987:202).
ACTIVITY
What is your understanding of the term ``scientific socialism''?
Write down your thoughts in the space below.
.................................................................................................
.................................................................................................
.................................................................................................
.................................................................................................
33 APC3701/1
.................................................................................................
.................................................................................................
.................................................................................................
.................................................................................................
.................................................................................................
.................................................................................................
FEEDBACK
Scientific socialism is an economic system where the means of
production and exchange are owned by the state. Under this system
nationalisation of property occurs. The government is in control of
industry and there is no individual ownership of property.
Stoneman et al (1989:43) point out that before independence, Zanu-PF

did very little detailed work on development strategy. However, two
years after they had come to power, Zanu-PF released two policy
documents, namely Growth with equity and the Transitional National
Development Plan (TNDP) (Stoneman et al 1989:44). The objective of
Growth with equity was to generate substantial economic growth, for
the purpose of redistribution (Bratton 1987:203). The TNDP was
supposed to pave the way for transformation to socialism (Herbst
1992:50).
6.2 GROWTH WITH EQUITY

According to the Growth with equity document (Stoneman et al
1989:121), the government's primary objectives are to
(i) establish progressively a society founded on socialist, democratic
and egalitarian principles which are inherent in the policies and
measures enunciated herein;
(ii) achieve a sustained high rate of economic growth and speedy
development in order to raise incomes and standards of living of
all our people and expand productive employment of rural
peasants and urban workers, especially the former;
(iii) develop and restructure the economy in ways which will promote
rural development, desired changes in patterns of consumption,
technology, exports, and in ways consistent with the most
desirable use and conservation of our natural resources and the
environment;
(iv) end imperialist exploitation, and achieve greater and a more
equitable degree of ownership of natural resources including land;
promote participation in, and ownership of, a significant portion
of the economy by nationals and the State;
34
(v) create and maintain high levels of employment for Zimbabweans

in all sectors and at all levels of skill and responsibility, and
redress the historical racial imbalance in skilled employment.
6.3 TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN (TNDP)

The following extract is taken from the TNDP published at the end of
1982. It elaborates on the proposed ``New Social Order'':
The inherited economy of Zimbabwe has enormous potential for
growth and development if all the energy and resources of its
people can be released and utilised through dynamic socio-
economic institutions but, as will have been apparent from the
preceding chapter, it is pronouncedly dualistic, has a high
degree of foreign control and was primarily designed to benefit
a small segment of society. It has, on the one hand, an advanced
modern sector and, on the other, a historically depressed and
impoverished rural peasant sector. The two sectors, however,
are not functionally separate and of particular importance in
this regard is that the one, the modern sector, has historically
fed on the other. This exploitation has resulted in gross income
and wealth (particularly land) inequalities, especially between
the Black majority and the White minority. Government is
anxious to reduce the degree of foreign control by increasing
state participation in the economy, and establishing new socio-
economic institutions run and controlled by the people ... . The
underlying philosophy of the Transitional National Develop-
ment Plan is that the structure of property relationship has to be
transformed in Zimbabwe in order to create the basis of a
socialist order.
(Stoneman et al 1989:124)
ACTIVITY
Which one of the two documents discussed so far contains the
tenets of scientific socialism?
FEEDBACK
The TNDP contains the following terms, which are closely identified
with scientific socialism: ``state participation'', ``transformed
structure of property relationship'' and ``socialist order''.
The Growth with equity document does not indicate any
government proclivity for scientific socialism. With this policy
document the government of Zimbabwe intended to improve the
lives of the black Zimbabweans. Identify two clauses in the
document that support this view.
35 APC3701/1
6.4 ADAPTATION OF SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM

As stated above, Zanu-PF committed itself
to Marxist-Leninist scientific socialism,
with which it intended to transform Zim-
babwe's economic system. After assuming
power, Mugabe explained in speeches and
interviews how his party intended to adapt
this ideology to suit the country. He also
clarified the relation between Marxism and
Christianity. Marxism is usually regarded
as anti-Christian and the two ideologies are
antithetical. This is how Mugabe, a devout Robert Mugabe
Catholic, explained how Marxism and Source: Parade
Christianity would co-exist in Zimbabwe:
Principles of Marxism will take into account our own traditions,
the circumstances of our own country, the traditions we have
inherited from others which we find useful and desirable to
retain. I am referring here to some Christian principles which
have become part of our society ± loving your neighbour and
doing unto others as you would want them to do unto you. I
think those are consonant with Marxism, with the basic spirit of
Marxism. In fact Christianity and Marxism should be in love
with each other. Unfortunately they are at war with each other.
But one would want to see them reconciled in our society.
(Interview with Mr Adetiba of The Punch, Nigeria, 20 February
1982).
Mugabe went on to explain that the application of Marxism
in Zimbabwe would be different from that in Russia, China,
Cuba, Yugoslavia, Mozambique and Angola. He did concede that
their experiences were relevant, but he added that the applica-
tion of Marxism in Zimbabwe would depend entirely on the
objective conditions that obtain in our society and hence we
have to adapt those principles to circumstances in our own
environment. (Interview with Mr Razumousky of Frankfurter
Algemeine, West Germany, 19 September 1980).
ACTIVITY
Since ideology would be a ``home-grown'' scientific socialism
exclusive to Zimbabwe, would it be proper to call it scientific
socialism?
FEEDBACK
No. This ideology, which is an adaptation of scientific socialism for
an African state, is called Afro-Marxism.
36
(1) Explain how Zanu-PF intended to transform the socioeconomic
structure that Zimbabwe had inherited.
(2) Discuss how Mugabe intended to adapt scientific socialism to
suit Zimbabwe.
(3) How do the Growth with equity document and the TNDP differ
from each other?
37 APC3701/1
STUDY UNIT 7
Scientific socialism and economic

development in Zimbabwe
LEARNING OUTCOMES
(1) highlight the most important aspects of the Lancaster House
Agreement
(2) compare and contrast the views of scholars on the reasons why
Zanu-PF abandoned socialist transformation
(3) assess whether Zanu-PF was justified in adopting a structural
adjustment programme
A The most important reading material for this study unit is the
articles by Van der Walt (1998), Sachikonye (2002), and Addison
and Laakso (2003).
7.1 INTRODUCTION
Sachikonye (2002) and Addison and Laakso (2003) inform us that
during the first few years after assuming power, Zanu-PF succeeded in
satisfying the needs of the country and its people. This is how
Sachikonye (2002:13) describes the success during this period:
When it gained independence in 1980, there were high hopes
expressed for Zimbabwe's political and economic future. It was
among the top four more industrialised countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa ... . For some years, especially in its first decade
of independence, it (Zanu-PF) appeared to live up to some of these
expectations. There were considerable investments in social
development (characterised by a massive expansion in the
education and social sectors); the economy itself grew; and it
quickly became the regional breadbasket. Furthermore, the
country was an oasis of stability in a region then mired in
turmoil from Angola to Mozambique and in liberation struggles
from Namibia to South Africa.
38
The purposeful Zanu-PF government succeeded in many areas: Primary

and secondary school enrolments increased. The government built
more health centres and people with an income of less than 150
Zimbabwean dollar per month received free medical treatment. The
infant mortality rate was significantly reduced. Subsistence farmers
increased the maize production of Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe became one of
Africa's self-sufficient and maize-exporting countries (Moyo
1992:318).
Note the discussion by Addison and Laakso (2003:458) about the
successes of the party in education, welfare and health services. You
will notice that there are similarities between their projection and that
of Sachikonye (2002).
7.2 THE FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM

Towards the end of its first decade of rule, Zanu-PF encountered
problems that resulted in a change of heart towards a socialist
transformation. At the start of the second decade of independence,
Mugabe, an avowed Marxist, was forced to adopt a programme known
as the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) ± this was
antithetical to the socialist economic policy to which Zanu-PF had
committed itself when it came to power in 1980. (What do we
understand by the word `àntithetical''? It means opposite or in
contrast to something.)
In their article Addison and Laakso (2003:458) explain the problems
that Zanu-PF encountered. What were these problems? Write them
down and try to remember them.
Scholars have offered various reasons for the problems that forced
Zanu-PF to abandon scientific socialism. Familiarise yourself with their
views and formulate your own opinion. Some scholars blame the
Lancaster House Agreement, while others blame the party itself.
7.3 CONSTRAINTS OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT

Initially, a first wave of scholars blamed the Lancaster House
Agreement for Zanu-PF's inability to transform the socioeconomic
system. This agreement, brokered by the British government, was
between the Smith government, Muzorewa's United African National
Council (ANC) and the Patriotic Front. It stipulated that the new
government had to respect property rights (Stoneman & Cliffe
1989:91). This meant the government could not arbitrarily seize and
redistribute land, and residential and industrial resources without
paying compensation ± whites owned most of the property and ran the
economy in Zimbabwe. It would have cost Zanu-PF a fortune to pay for
whatever it seized and the new government did not have the money
available.
39 APC3701/1
During the negotiations at Lancaster House promises were made that

finances would be made available to buy property belonging to whites.
However, this aid was not forthcoming. This had serious implications
for Zimbabwe, as you will see from our discussion below. When Zanu-
PF came to power, its socialist rhetoric unsettled the West. Western
governments adopted a wait-and-see attitude before offering aid to
Zimbabwe. Very little foreign investment and aid were in fact to come
Zimbabwe's way.
ACTIVITY
Why was the West unsettled by Zanu-PF's ideology?
FEEDBACK
The West propagated a capitalist free-market economic system
where private ownership of property was encouraged. This was in
contrast to scientific socialism, propagated by the Soviet Union and
the Eastern bloc countries.
7.4 THE LACK OF COMMITMENT TO SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM

Towards the end of the 1980s, a second wave of scholars shifted the
focus away from the constraints imposed by the Lancaster House
Agreement. They concentrated on the party and its ideology (or lack
thereof). According to these scholars the reasons for the failure to
transform the inherited socioeconomic system were to be found in
Zanu-PF's policies. These scholars include Herbst (1990; 1992), Davies
(1988), and Stoneman and Cliffe (1989); Van der Walt (1998) joined
them later. Note that Zanu-PF's policies were criticised as early as
1983 by Astrow in his work Zimbabwe: the revolution that lost its
way. (Copies of this book are available in the Unisa library.)
Davies (1988:18±19) argues that Zanu-PF did not act on the proposals it
had made to effect the transformation. Its well-meaning plans, which
were encapsulated in Growth with equity and the TNDP, were not
implemented ± they simply remained on the drawing boards. Davies
(1988:19±20) maintains that Zanu-PF's claim to being a Marxist-
Leninist party does not hold since its government has not destroyed the
inherited capitalistic order to create a new order, as has happened in
places like Cuba, Vietnam, Mozambique and North Korea.
Herbst (1992:50) says that while Zanu-PF declared itself to be socialist,
the claim was hardly justified. Herbst points out that Zanu-PF did very
little to define and implement its ideology during the early years of its
rule. His opinion is that the new government started to wonder about
the practicability of socialist policies. Zanu-PF was content to continue
40
implementing the capitalist economic policies of the previous regime,

as these policies enabled the leaders to amass property and wealth. A
leadership code intended to prevent Zanu-PF officers from enriching
themselves had failed.
This assertion is supported by Van der Walt (1998:95), who maintains
that Zanu-PF followed a capitalist path of development from the outset,
``contrary to the expectations of those who took the rhetoric of radical
nationalisation, and Zanu-PF's proclaimed adherence to Marxism-
Leninism, at its face value''. He points out that very little nationalisa-
tion of property took place. He argues that state intervention in
industry consisted of selective nationalisations to rescue faltering
corporations (parastatals).
Consider the following statement by Van der Walt (1998:95):
Little distinguished Zanu-PF from other African nationalist
parties who spoke the discourse of Marxism while overseeing the
functioning of capitalism, other than, perhaps, a pretence that
socialism would follow this capitalist period as vague second
stage after the completion of the national democratic revolution.
In his view, Zanu-PF was not sincere about implementing scientific

socialism, because its members embraced capitalism.
ACTIVITY
What do you think would have been the implications if Mugabe had
taken over the economy, destroyed the inherited capitalistic system
and implemented scientific socialism?
FEEDBACK
This would have had serious consequences for Zimbabwe. The
whites, who owned the most property and ran the economy, would
have fled the country. Their expertise was still sorely needed during
the early phase of the country's independence. Samora Machel of
Mozambique warned Mugabe not to force whites to leave
Zimbabwe ± Mozambique had made that mistake and it had cost
the country dearly. This meant preventing a propaganda campaign
that would drive out the country's commercial farmers, skilled
workers and middle class (whites) before blacks had acquired the
necessary skills.
The failure to transform the inherited economy could also be attributed

to the capitalist system that operated in Rhodesia. Mugabe was aware
that this system could pose problems for the intended transformation
and that a socialist system would have to be adapted to the situation as
41 APC3701/1
it stood (Herbst 1992:49). He recognised that the strong influence of

capitalism could steer the government off course, in spite of its
commitment to socialism (Raftopoulos 1992:65). The capitalist and
socialist systems are not compatible and cannot operate side by side.
Mugabe was also well aware of the fact that not all members of Zanu-
PF were socialists. They paid only lip service to a socialist
transformation. He criticised cabinet ministers who `ùnder the one
guise or another, proceeded to acquire huge properties by way of
commercial farms and other business concerns'' (Chisaka & Wetherell
1984:3).
7.5 THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMME (ESAP)

Herbst (1992:58) points out that Mugabe omitted his customary
reference to socialism, the economic policy of the government at the
time, in his year-end speech in 1990. According to Herbst, the
economic plan announced by the government in 1991 was far from
socialist in orientation.
Zanu-PF's decision to adopt the Economic Structural Adjustment
Programme (ESAP, which the local people cynically referred to as the
`Èver Suffering African People'') came as a surprise, according to
Raftopoulos (1992:65) and Skalnes (1993:409). Both contend that the
economy was not in a serious state of crisis. The Zimbabwean economy
was in better shape than the economies of many other African states.
Van der Walt (1998:96) concurs with this viewpoint and to him the
adoption of ESAP was a confirmation of the capitalist nature of the
Mugabe government. Mugabe had no alternative but to swallow the
bitter pill of ESAP. Would you agree?
Scholars such as Herbst (1992) do not agree with Raftopoulos (1992)
and Skalnes (1993). Herbst holds the view that Zimbabwe faced serious
economic problems at the time of adopting ESAP at the beginning of
1990. According to Herbst it had become obvious to the government
that the economy was not performing and that the country was unable
to continue `èven at its unsatisfactory level'' of operation (Herbst
1992:58). The drought, the failure to attract investment, the scarcity of
foreign exchange and rising unemployment probably all played a role in
the decision to adopt the adjustment programme (Africa South
1991:15).
During this period the Zimbabwean government was under pressure
from local business to liberalise the economy. The World Bank and
local business combined to persuade the government to adopt a new
recovery programme. At that time white business interest groups had
considerable influence in the country (Skalnes 1993:412).
42
ACTIVITY
Do you think the Zimbabwean government was justified in adopting
an adjustment programme?
FEEDBACK
With the economy not performing well, Mugabe's government had
no alternative but to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
for salvation.
The adoption of ESAP introduced a myriad of problems which

bedevilled Zimbabwe in its second decade of independence and
eventually resulted in growing opposition to the Zanu-PF government.
This will be discussed in another study unit.
(1) Discuss the reasons why a socialist transformation has not
occurred in Zimbabwe.
(2) To what extent was Zanu-PF's ideology a stumbling block to
receiving aid?
(3) With which one of the views expressed by the scholars do you
agree? Explain.
(4) How serious were the problems which forced Zanu-PF to accept
a structural adjustment programme?
43 APC3701/1
STUDY UNIT 8
Political and economic developments in

Zambia's three republics (since 1964)
LEARNING OUTCOMES
(1) analyse humanism as a developmental strategy
(2) list the disadvantages of relying on a single economic resource
(3) indicate how introducing a one-party system facilitated corrup-
tion and mismanagement in Zambia
A Your core reading material for this unit is the articles by Good
(1989) and Szeftel (2000). I strongly recommend that you request
the book by Burdette (1988) from the Unisa library, because it is an
important source.
8.1 INTRODUCTION
Humanism is a form of African socialism. Humanism was close to the
heart of Kaunda, just as Ujamaa was to Nyerere. It strongly emphasises
morality and religious beliefs. Note that Kaunda came from a very
religious family ± his father was a missionary. Humanism appeals to
human beings' inner self to do good, and this would be accomplished by
exhortation rather than force. Kaunda said he had a passionate belief in
the worth and the possibilities of humans, and he expected them some
day to achieve perfection (Kaunda 1966:19). Humanism is anthropo-
centric ± it centres on man who is regarded as centre of the universe.
Kaunda had faith in the individual from whom he was expecting
perfection and devotion. On this he said (Kaunda 1973:119):
From the importance of the individual flows his right to
participate in controlling not merely the state, but all institu-
tions affecting his environment (hence party, trade union,
company and village democracy). The state is obliged, as are
political leaders and other institutions, to serve the interest of
ordinary workers and villagers. The economic system must exist
44
to benefit primarily the citizens of the country and, within the

country, the state must limit exploitation.
Humanism was officially adopted as the ideology of the ruling party in

April 1967.
In 1973, Dr Henry Meebelo of the Unip research office elaborated on
the underlying principles of humanism:
Zambian humanism is an adaptation to modern conditions of
oldage social principles; traditional African society was in-
clusive, communal and egalitarian, consequently Zambian
humanism is anti-capitalist, calls for mutual aid and respect
and consensus between ruler and ruled, and lastly Zambian
humanism is mancentred.
Bearing all this in mind, therefore, humanist society
required: political morality; participatory democracy in a one
equitable distribution of national resources; total control of the
national economy; avoidance of class formation; a mixed
economy; communal as opposed to individual land ownership
and rural development.
8.2 THE DECLINE IN THE PRICE OF COPPER

Zambia encountered economic problems during the time of the first
republic and these problems continued throughout the second and third
republics. Burdette (1988:95) identifies the decline in the price of
copper as the first factor that triggered Zambia's economic decline.
Corruption, which was a recurring theme throughout the three
republics, exacerbated the situation. Good (1989) and Szeftel (2000)
agree with Burdette (1988) on the effect of corruption on the economy
of Zambia.
When it gained independence, Zambia was one of the world's leading
producers of copper. Copper was the mainstay of the country's
economy. According to Burdette (1988:95), the basic reasons for the
economic downturn were the ailing mining industry and the negative
international terms of trade for Zambian base metals. As Zambia's main
export, copper was the country's major foreign exchange earner. The
foreign exchange sustained other sectors of the economy. According to
Burdette (1988:95), Zambia's economy always balanced precariously
on the prosperity of the copper mines. When the price of copper
fluctuated and finally dropped on the international market, Zambia's
economy suffered. The situation was aggravated by the increasing cost
of copper mining.
The Zambian government was inclined to borrow heavily when copper
prices were high in order to invest in industrial and infrastructural
development. This resulted in enormous debt, which the country was
45 APC3701/1
unable to repay when the price of copper fell. When it could no longer
earn much-needed foreign currency, other sectors of the economy such
as agriculture and manufacturing were adversely affected.
The country was no longer able to import raw materials, spare parts
for machinery and fertilisers, and production by factories dropped.
This inevitably led to dismissals and rising unemployment (Burdette
1988:118). Declining revenues forced the government to suspend
welfare programmes, which caused bitterness among the people. As a
result, the government had no choice but to borrow money from the
IMF, albeit on a small scale. This borrowing increased as the situation
grew more desperate (Burdette 1988:122).
ACTIVITY
Discuss the extent to which Zambia's reliance on a single product
affected its economy.
FEEDBACK
The Zambian government relied on copper to sustain the economy.
As a result, other sectors of the economy, such as agriculture and
manufacturing, remained underdeveloped.
8.3 CORRUPTION IN THE FIRST REPUBLIC (1964±1972)

Szeftel (2000:208) says the following about the first republic:
(I)n the first republic (1964±1972) intense factional competition
for office and public resources within the ruling United
National Independence Party (Unip) created political conflict
over the spoils of power.
What Szeftel (2000) is telling us is that corruption took root in the first
republic because Unip members vied for positions of power. This
resulted in factionalism within the party. Persons in public office could
enrich themselves (they accumulated wealth and status) and they could
pay off the public to get their support and to establish a patron-client
relationship (Szeftel 2000:210). People in public office rewarded
supporters from their own areas or ethnic groups and looked after
their own people. The corruption was aided and abetted by foreigners
who were prepared to pay bribes to sidestep official procedures and to
obtain licences. Read the discussion by Szeftel (2000:211) on public
officials and how they appropriated government funds and other
resources for their personal enrichment with impunity.
46
ACTIVITY
You need to know why Unip was powerless to punish corrupt public
officials. This is discussed in Szeftel's article (2000:212).
8.4 THE ONE-PARTY STATE AND CORRUPTION IN THE SECOND REPUBLIC

(1972±1991)
The second Zambian republic came into being in December 1972,
following the imposition of a one-party state. During the first republic
Unip officials held the party to ransom while they were involved in
corruption. Dissatisfaction with the distribution of rewards led to
numerous threats by Unip members to leave the party, either to join the
opposition or to form other parties. A one-party state was seen as a way
of stopping the party from being blackmailed. This is how Kaunda
justified the implementation of a one-party system (Szeftel 2000:213):
The one-party democracy will help us to weed out political
opportunists ... (I)t has been fashionable in the past for any party
member ... to threaten to quit, or indeed quit the party to join the
opposition; for any civil servant ... to threaten to quit ...; for any
businessmen denied a licence or a loan on perfectly legal
grounds to run to the opposition; in the hope that if they formed
the government, he would be favoured. This era in which
politics of patronage has been a feature of life is gone.
But to what extent did this measure assist in eradicating corruption in

Zambia? Burdette (1988), Good (1989) and Szeftel (2000) argue that
this system exacerbated corruption instead of eliminating it. Kaunda
intended to curb corruption, but this measure had exactly the opposite
effect.
Burdette (1988:105) argues that under the one-party system, the party
was superior to the government. Members of the central committee
outranked the cabinet ministers and their decisions took precedence
over those of the cabinet ministers. Power was concentrated in the
hands of the executive at the expense of the cabinet and at the top was
Kaunda who ruled with a clique of advisers.
This is how Good (1989:306) views the one-party system:
The constitutional arrangements and political practice of the
one-party state in Zambia mean that mismanagement is directly
connected to Unip's monopoly of power and the personal rule of
Kenneth Kaunda. The president need consult no one before
making a decision, and no legal opposition is permitted. Good
(1989) expresses the view that since opposition parties were
outlawed, criticism of government policies could be aired only
through Unip. In election campaigns the candidates, who were
47 APC3701/1
all Unip members, were not allowed to discuss sensitive issues

such as the economy. Backbenchers in parliament did not raise
sensitive issues for fear of losing their endorsement to stand in
elections (Good 1989:307).
Good (1989:311) further states that the single-party state aspired to

control everything in the country and, despite all the resultant failures
and waste, actually ensured that Kaunda and his close colleagues could
remain in power. The regime also facilitated the acquisitiveness of the
political elites, and further clarified the close connections between the
single ruling party, mismanagement and debt in Zambia.
Szeftel (2000:213) maintains that instead of ending patronage politics,
the one-party state gave the government more control over patronage.
The government then took over the job of managing and rationing
patronage. The patronage state essentially institutionalised the fact
that it paid to belong to Unip. If you did not belong to Unip you had no
access to the state and very little opportunity to accumulate wealth.
According to Szeftel (2000:214) the one-party system was responsible
for the expansion of the public sector, as people were simply hired even
when jobs were not available. Jobs for pals became a common
phenomenon. Party credentials were used to acquire jobs and earn high
salaries. Managers could not dismiss people who had patronage and
connections in high places.
ACTIVITY
You should have a reasonable idea of how a government operates in
a multiparty political system. Do you think it is possible to prevent
corruption in a one-party state?
FEEDBACK
This would not be possible. The existence of representatives of
political parties other than the ruling party in parliament ensures
that the government is accountable. In a one-party system there is
no opposition that will put the performance of government under
close scrutiny. Corruption thrives under such circumstances.
8.5 CORRUPTION AND MISMANAGEMENT BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
A READING
Burdette (1988), Good (1989) and Szeftel (2000) point an accusing
finger at the government, implying that it was responsible for the
country's economic problems. Do you agree? Read on.
48
Burdette (1988:115) lists some of the ``crimes'' committed by members

of the ruling class, such as the theft of foreign currency, failure to pay
taxes and involvement in drug dealing. According to her, yearly reports
of the Auditor-General revealed improper activities ranging from
misuse of funds by ministries to actual corruption among public
officials.
In his article, Good (1989) details the unpaid debts of state
departments and parastatal institutions. He also cites cases of
mismanagement and careless spending, as well as unpaid personal
loans made by senior government and party officials. The following are
a few examples from the cases that Good (1989:298±299) mentioned:
(1) In 1987, the state-owned Zambian Airways Corporation owed the
Department of Civil Aviation one million kwacha in unpaid revenue.
(2) Zambian Railways was owed 30 million kwacha by various
organisations.
(3) The Kenneth Kaunda Foundation was owed 4,5 million kwacha by
the Ministry of General Education and Culture.
According to Good (1989:299), too many officials in high places

incurred sizeable debts which they were reluctant to pay back. He
mentions two key officials who were posted in the Bonn embassy.
These officials made no effort to meet their debts, which totalled
170 000 kwacha. No action was taken to recover their debts.
Szeftel (2000:215) focuses on Zambia Airways as an example of the
corruption of the ruling elite. Employees of the company and their
relatives used to travel locally and abroad without having paid their
fares. Paying passengers were often unable to travel because flights
were full of non-paying passengers. Read more about the demise of
Zambia Airways in Szeftel's article.
How did the Zambian government view corruption? Good (1989:311)
records the reaction of the government as follows:
The government continued to proclaim its blamelessness for
what it had created, and searched feverishly at home and
abroad for those who could be held responsible for its own
failures and exacerbated problems.
According to Good (1989:311), Kaunda considered the economy to be

sound and saw the problems as events that were beyond the
government's control.
The government held the IMF and the World Bank responsible for
Zambia's problems. In May 1987, Kaunda described the IMF reform
programme as murderous and suggested that the IMF was against
everything the government wanted for the people (Good 1989:312). An
official of Unip accused the West of having declared total war on
Zambia (Good 1989:312). You will have to decide for yourself which
view is correct.
49 APC3701/1
ACTIVITY
How valid was Kaunda's criticism of the IMF and World Bank? Read
Good's article carefully and answer the question in four para-
graphs.
FEEDBACK
It is true that the IMF imposed stringent conditions, but the Kaunda
government was responsible for the economic problems which the
country experienced as the result of mismanagement and corrup-
tion.
8.6 ZAMBIA'S WORSENING ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE DEMISE OF

KAUNDA'S GOVERNMENT
Zambia's economic crisis worsened in the late 1980s, setting off a chain
of events that led to mounting opposition and finally culminated in the
defeat of Unip, which was already in a state of atrophy.
Without any hope of economic recovery, Kaunda was left with no
choice but to rely on the IMF for financial assistance once more. The
IMF was prepared to assist Zambia if Zambia would agree to certain
conditions. Burdette (1988:122) mentions that IMF-Zambia relations
were characterised by a steady increase in borrowings matched by
increasingly stringent conditions, which essentially demanded a major
restructuring of the economy. One of the conditions that the IMF
always insists upon is that the country applying for a loan should put
its house in order.
In his article Szeftel (2000:216) discusses the relationship between the
IMF and the Zambian government in the light of the adjustment
programmes. The adjustment programmes entailed the following:
devaluation of the currency; privatisation of public sector enterprises;
removal of subsidies; and reducing the number of civil servants. Pay
close attention to the effects of the removal of subsidies on food prices,
and the consequences thereof on the Zambian people. Kaunda found
himself caught between the IMF and the masses. While the IMF felt
that he did not make a serious effort to implement the adjustment
programmes, the masses felt that he had gone too far. The government
found itself in a typical catch-22 situation: If it complied with the
conditions of the IMF, it would earn the wrath of the people; if it did
not, the IMF would blame it for not being serious about implementing
the programme.
The trade union movement and student organisations opposed
Zambia's conversion to a one-party state. Throughout the second
republic the labour movement acted as the unofficial opposition to the
50
government within the constraints of the one-party system. From time

to time the church and the press also expressed their opposition to
certain government policies (Lungu 1988:385), but the opposition was
not coordinated.
A demonstration in 1990 against the removal of subsidies on food
prices, including maize meal, may be regarded as the turning point in
the politics of the country. It was this opposition that ushered in a new
era in Zambian politics. It occurred at a time when the legitimacy of the
government was questioned. Thousands of people took to the streets,
calling for Kaunda to resign and violence broke out. By 1991, Kaunda's
government was beleaguered and out of favour with both the donors
and the masses. Internal pressure forced Kaunda to agree to the
establishment of a multiparty democracy.
ACTIVITY
Which condition of the IMF, other than the removal of subsidies,
would impact adversely on the masses?
FEEDBACK
In most cases the IMF would also insist on the privatisation and
liberalisation of the economy, which would result in job losses in
the civil service.
(1) How effective was humanism as an economic development
ideology of Zambia?
(2) Explain the consequences of relying on a single commodity.
(3) Discuss how the implementation of a one-party system
facilitated corruption.
(4) Trace the events that culminated in the demise of Kaunda's
government.
51 APC3701/1
STUDY UNIT 9
The emergence of the Movement for

Multiparty Democracy (MMD)
LEARNING OUTCOMES
(1) discuss the rise to power of the MMD
(2) evaluate the MMD's efforts to correct the country's economic
malaise
(3) compare and contrast the MMD and Unip, and how they ruled
Zambia
A READING
The most important reading material for this study unit is the
articles by Szeftel (2000) and Ihonvbere (1998).
9.1 INTRODUCTION
The rioting discussed in study unit 8 led to the changing of the
constitution to allow for an open political system. This new system
allowed parties other than Unip to enter the political arena. When the
rioting stopped, trade unionists, students, businessmen and politi-
cians who were dissatisfied with Unip came together and proposed an
alliance to oust Kaunda. This led to the formation of the Movement for
Multiparty Democracy (MMD), which put pressure on the government
to restore the country to a multiparty democracy. Remember that
Zambia had not had an opposition party since 1972, when the
government introduced the one-party system. All Zambians were
supposed to belong to Unip.
Elections were held in October 1991 and Kaunda's Unip was defeated
by the MMD. (The MMD won 125 seats, while Unip only won 25 seats.)
Frederick Chiluba became Zambia's second leader since its indepen-
dence more than 27 years earlier; and so the country's third republic
52
began under his leadership. Remember that Zambia was among the
first African countries to be democratised when the second ``winds of
change'' swept across Africa.
K When did the first ``winds of change'' sweep across Africa and what
were the results? The first ``winds of change'' resulted in the rise of
nationalist movements and the independence of former colonies.
9.2 POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE MMD

We now look at the political and
economic developments in Zam-
bia's third republic as discussed
by Ihonvbere (1998) and Szeftel
(2000). According to these wri-
ters, corruption was still wide-
spread in the third republic.
Chiluba's new government faced
a host of problems inherited from
the previous government. The
economy had collapsed and do-
nors had frozen all aid to Zambia.
The MMD's condemnation of the
Kaunda government's economic
mismanagement raised expecta- Frederick Chiluba
tions that it would do better than Source: BBC Focus on Africa
its predecessor.
The new government's first priority was to restore relations with the
IMF, the World Bank and donor agencies. Relations between Zambia
and the lending institutions had been at their worst during the last
years of Kaunda's government in the late 1980s. According to Szeftel
(2000:216), the new government inherited massive international debts
and was inaugurated under the shadow of an IMF restructuring
package that required Zambia to undertake a rapid process of
deregulation, privatisation and liberalisation.
The Chiluba government needed to be resolute and optimistic about
succeeding where Kaunda had failed. According to Ihonvbere
(1998:210), enormous challenges were faced by the new democratic
government. However, the government had no illusions about the
difficult challenges that lay ahead. Remember that the MMD based its
election campaign on criticising Unip for the malaise afflicting the
country. In order to kick-start the country's economy, Chiluba was
obliged to adopt a structural adjustment programme to get aid from the
lending agencies. Was this wise, following the running battle between
Kaunda and the IMF?
Chiluba's government was prepared to accept a structural adjustment
programme, and mapped out an ambitious programme of constitutional
53 APC3701/1
change and democratisation. Szeftel (2000:216) points out that the

donors were impressed with the zeal of the MMD and responded by
giving Zambia increased aid. The government had also promised to end
corruption and prosecute those members of Unip involved in corrupt
practices.
The new government intended to introduce tighter fiscal discipline.
This was done by reducing domestic borrowing by government and
parastatals; bringing inflation down to 10 percent; abolishing supple-
mentary appropriations to government ministries; repaying much of
government's outstanding debt to banks; freeing up resources for
private sector expansion; and running the government on a cash basis
(Ihonvbere 1998:228). The MMD was prepared to move away from
state intervention in the economy and centralised political control.
Because of its willingness to implement a reform programme, Chiluba's
government received pledges of aid from Western countries, the World
Bank and the IMF. A year after coming to power, Chiluba had more or
less started implementing the reform programme. The government was
moving slowly towards liberalising and privatising the economy (Due
1993:1985).
ACTIVITY
What do you understand by the concepts ``liberalisation'' and
``privatisation''?
FEEDBACK
. Liberalisation refers to the relaxation of government controls so
that government agencies no longer control certain prices,
production, marketing, foreign exchange allocations and trans-
port.
. Privatisation refers to selling off publicly owned loss-making
enterprises (parastatals), including industries, banks, marketing
agencies and agricultural cooperatives.
During Kaunda's regime there were 146 parastatals in Zambia. These

parastatals were wasteful and did not contribute to the country's GDP,
but they consumed 57 percent of domestic investment (Due
1993:1984). In 1992, the government established the Zambia Privati-
sation Agency (ZPA), which was to be responsible for the valuation and
privatisation of parastatals (Due 1993:1985). One of the World Bank's
requirements for granting a loan to Zambia was that it should dispose
of at least 10 parastatals by the end of 1992. The government was able
to comply with this requirement.
Much as Zambia was eager to privatise the parastatals and made
54
positive efforts in this direction, some donor agencies were concerned

that the process was not going as fast as they would have liked. There
was also concern that Zambia was not moving fast enough in cutting
the number of civil servants (Africa Economics Digest 1994:7): 25 000
civil servants were supposed to be laid off.
In an interview with Novicki (1993:36), Chiluba stated that the
government had to begin with the hardest measures ± liberalisation
and privatisation ± to create breathing space and to start improving the
economy. Subsidies had been cut, even for maize meal. Remember that
one of the reasons for the collapse of Kaunda's government was his
reluctance to remove subsidies from basic foods such as maize meal.
ACTIVITY
Describe the state of the Zambian economy when the MMD assumed
power. How did the MMD hope to correct the situation? Write down
your answer in the space below.
.................................................................................................
.................................................................................................
.................................................................................................
.................................................................................................
.................................................................................................
FEEDBACK
Under the leadership of Kaunda, Zambia's economy had all but
collapsed. The government was forced to borrow money from the
IMF and the World Bank. The MMD promised to reform the
economy. Its priority was to restore relations with both the IMF
and the World Bank.
9.3 FAILURE TO EFFECT ECONOMIC REFORMS

The economic reform programme to which the Zambian government
had committed itself and which it was implementing, did not bring
about immediate changes in people's lives. The euphoria which had
greeted Kaunda's downfall was dampened by the lack of visible
progress towards improving living standards by creating employment.
By the middle of 1995, the government had achieved only limited
success in its recovery programme.
By 1995, none of the pledges for financial assistance made when the
Chiluba government showed its willingness to introduce an economic
recovery programme, had materialised (Africa Confidential 1995:6).
Chiluba was in the frustrating position of being unable to meet his
promises to the Zambian people ± and national elections were due in
55 APC3701/1
1996. Moreover, he was obviously concerned about losing support as a

result of the retrenchment of thousands of civil servants. Chiluba's
party was facing a tough choice: to defy the donors or court
unpopularity at the polls (Africa Confidential 1995:10). This was the
same dilemma which Kaunda had faced.
The economic situation continued to deteriorate in the second half of
1990. Zambia was still facing a host of problems. One of its major
problems was that it could not service its debts. Between 1992 and
1997, Zambia's debt progressively increased beyond its control. By the
end of 1997, it had reached US$ 6 billion. Copper, the country's main
export, could not rescue the economy because production had declined
and the world market price was low. Very little foreign exchange was
reaching the country.
Ihonvbere (1998:229) maintains that the adoption of the recovery
programme did not bring Zambia any success. On the contrary, it
caused more problems as workers had to be laid off as the result of the
privatisation of industry. The privatisation programme alienated the
people from the government and resulted in rising opposition. The
people of Zambia also did not notice any improvements in their
country's infrastructure. The MMD government had not been able to
rehabilitate roads, bridges, public buildings and services (Ihonvbere
1998:229). Sakala (1997:6) argues that the MMD was more concerned
with macroeconomic stability at the expense of social and political
reforms, and that this led to a mixture of economic ruin and severe
political crisis in Zambia.
9.4 CORRUPTION WITHIN THE MMD

According to Ihonvbere (1998:226), the MMD based its election
campaign on the promise to run a corruption-free, transparent and
accountable government that would be very sensitive to the aspira-
tions of the Zambian people. This promise could not be kept and
corruption became even worse than before. The following are some of
the reasons that Ihonvbere gives for the rampant corruption among
MMD officials:
. the accumulative base of the Zambian bourgeoisie
. the fact that leaders of the MMD were formerly members of Unip
. Chiluba's own weakness, indecisiveness and reluctance to take
action against those involved
Chiluba came under pressure from donors to clean up his administra-

tion and address the allegations of corruption and drug trafficking. His
response was that the allegations had not been tested in court.
However, it was difficult for Chiluba to take action against people who
were, according to Ihonvbere, far more sophisticated than he was, with
long records of service to Zambia as civil servants in the previous
56
government. Some of these people had also sponsored his election

campaign. Donors withheld aid money in an attempt to force Chiluba to
take action and to get rid of corrupt ministers (Ihonvbere 1998:230).
It is important to remember that most of the people who formed the
MMD had at one time or another been senior members of Unip. Their
departure from Unip was not cordial. Szeftel (2000:216) informs us
that many of them had personally fallen foul of Kaunda during his 28
years as president. A disparate group of people formed the core of the
MMD leadership.
A former founder member of the MMD, Arthur Wina, made the
following comments about the party (Ham 1993:31):
As far as I am concerned, the real bad eggs are still in the
government, and I do not think anybody can walk with his head
high and say that the MMD is clean. Chiluba has ignored
corruption among ministers in his circle and drug traffickers
are protected.
How serious was the MMD in pursuing those people who were involved
in corruption? Szeftel's view is that it did practically nothing. On the
contrary, no sooner had the MMD taken office than its officials became
involved in corruption (Szeftel 2000:217). Szeftel describes the
situation as follows:
Yet, despite the creation of independent anti-corruption and
drug enforcement commissions, the promises to punish corrup-
tion of the Kaunda period were not kept and the early zeal to
tackle the problem actually withered with time. Instead,
members of the new elite again used political access to enrich
themselves and reward followers.
ACTIVITY
Find out why the MMD could not seriously apply its mind to the
eradication of corruption. The necessary information appears in the
article by Szeftel (2000). Note the factors that promoted corruption,
for example liberalisation and structural reform. Can you explain
how these factors promoted corruption?
FEEDBACK
The definition of corruption was narrowed down to acts such as
stealing from the government, or charging people for doing one's
job as a member of government or for awarding contracts. Any
other misdemeanours escaped the net of corruption. Also note that
some of the MMD officials left Unip under a cloud. Not all of them
were clean, so to say.
57 APC3701/1
The government adopted a laissez faire attitude to corruption and left

the onus of proving it to those who reported it. ``Bring me the evidence
and I'll take action'', became the stock response from politicians when
allegations of corruption were raised. This obviously put the people
who reported corrupt practices in a difficult situation.
Drug trafficking was a serious problem in Zambia during the Kaunda
era and it was alleged that senior Unip officials were involved. This
problem continued in the third republic. The MMD had promised to
attend to drug trafficking, because donors demanded that the
government attend to the problem and threatened to withhold aid.
This became a hot potato for Chiluba, who was asked to dismiss three
government officials suspected of being involved in drug deals.
K Was this issue satisfactorily resolved? How did Chiluba respond to the
demand to dismiss three officials and what effect did this have on the
unity of the party? The answer is found in the article by Szeftel
(2000:220).
ACTIVITY
Szeftel (2000) points out that the illicit dealing in drugs, minerals
and arms was worsened by democratisation. Why does he say so?
FEEDBACK
Democratisation led to the opening of borders throughout Southern
Africa, and this facilitated the smuggling of drugs, minerals and
arms.
Szeftel (2000:221) states that constitutional changes seem to have

affected the patterns of clientelism and corruption very little, therefore
liberalisation may have increased rather than decreased the scope of
corruption.
9.5 KAUNDA'S RETURN TO POLITICS

Chiluba's problems were compounded by Kaunda's return to the
Zambian political scene. Although his party's crushing defeat had
condemned him to political obscurity, Kaunda won acclaim for having
magnanimously stepped down to retire from politics. In 1994, three
years after his humiliating defeat, he made a slow return to politics.
His reason for returning was, in his words, ``to clear up the mess
created by Chiluba's government''. You will agree that this is
interesting. Chiluba came to power because he promised to get rid of
the problems created by Kaunda. After only three years in power, he
58
was also accused of having created a ``mess''. This simply means that
Zambia under Chiluba was no different from Zambia under Kaunda. Do
you agree?
In June 1994, Kaunda began a low-key tour of the rural areas, where he
was well received (Sayila 1995:18). In his public addresses he pointed
to the Chiluba government's economic policies as the root cause of
people's problems. He won support for his criticism of government
policy on medical services, because he stated that people's lives were
being put at risk since medical care was now no longer accessible to
ordinary people. He further accused the government of corruption,
drug trafficking and ethnic bias (Sayila 1995:18).
Kaunda's return to politics both enlivened and complicated the political

scene in Zambia. Kaunda and Kebby Musokotwane, who took over the
leadership of Unip when Kaunda retired from politics, contested the
leadership of Unip. Their power struggle led to division and conflict
within the party (Sayila 1995:18). Some members remained loyal to
Kaunda and wanted him to resume the party leadership, while others
stood firmly behind Musokotwane. Kaunda was later elected as party
leader.
Kaunda's reappearance on the political scene and his enthusiastic

reception were a source of concern for the MMD. It was feared that
Kaunda would capitalise on the new government's inability to improve
the economy by criticising and jeopardising the economic recovery
programme (Sayila 1995:19). Kaunda had been unpopular in the past
and his removal of the maize meal subsidy was the last straw.
However, Chiluba had also lifted subsidies and had not fulfilled his
promises, which meant that people could well turn their backs on him.
The MMD tried everything, including assassination attempts, to stop

Kaunda's second bid for power. He was arrested on numerous
occasions, charged in court and placed under house arrest. The MMD
government passed a law preventing people who were not first-
generation Zambians from contesting elections. It argued that Kaunda's
parents were not born in Zambia. Kaunda was prevented from
contesting the 1996 election and was later persuaded to retire from
politics, which he did.
A host of political organisations were formed to oppose the MMD.

According to Ihonvbere (1998:232), half of these could be dismissed as
nuisance organisations. Only a few could be regarded as a threat to the
MMD.
59 APC3701/1
ACTIVITY
To what extent was Kaunda's return to politics a threat to the MMD
government?
FEEDBACK
Kaunda and Unip had been discredited, but they took advantage of
the lack of progress made by the MMD government in fulfilling its
election promises.
9.6 CHILUBA'S EXIT FROM THE POLITICAL ARENA

The country's new constitution stipulated that a president could serve
only two terms. This did not go down well with Chiluba, who wanted to
stay in power for a third term. Some party members opposed the idea
of a third presidential term, and as a result the MMD split. Chiluba was
eventually forced to step down, but not before appointing his
successor, Levy Mwanawasa. The MMD won the country's third
democratic election in 2001 and Mwanawasa became the country's
third president.
Zambia's political and economic problems continued under Mwana-
wasa. The copper mines that had been privatised in Chiluba's time
were struggling to stay open. This threatened the livelihood of
thousands of families. Zambia's mines were once the pride of Southern
Africa ± at their peak they produced 12 percent of the world's copper.
By the beginning of 2000, production had fallen by about two-thirds.
No sooner had he taken power, than Mwanawasa turned on his mentor,
Chiluba. Stories were rife in Zambia that Chiluba was involved in
corruption and had si-
phoned money out of
the country. He strenu-
ously denied these alle-
gations. As a former
president he had immu-
nity from prosecution.
This issue was submitted
to parliament, which
voted overwhelmingly to
strip him of immunity
from prosecution so that
he could face charges of
corruption. Despite his
protestations Chiluba
was finally charged with Mwanawasa
corruption in 2003. Source: BBC Focus on Africa
60
(1) Describe the problems that confronted the MMD government
when it came to power.
(2) Explain the reasons for the lack of legitimacy of some members
of the MMD.
(3) Evaluate the performance of Chiluba's government during the
first five years of its rule.
(4) Discuss the effect of Kaunda's return to the Zambian political
arena.
(5) Explain why corrupt practices still continued in third republic.
61 APC3701/1
STUDY UNIT 10
Botswana: a developmental state
LEARNING OUTCOMES
(1) discuss the implementation of Botswana's developmental
strategy in detail
(2) analyse the central role of the state in the economic activities of
Botswana
A The most important reading material for this study unit is the
articles by Wiseman (1998) and Taylor (2003).
10.1 INTRODUCTION
When the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) came to power in
Botswana, the country was poverty stricken and did not have a strong
economic base. Botswana was among the poorest countries in the
world and its struggling economy was based on cattle production and
labour exportation (Edge 1998:343). Given this situation, Botswana
could not have been concerned with the formulation of a new ideology
to bring about development.
Edge (1998:333) says after Botswana had gained independence, the
new government sought development through foreign aid, a democratic
government structure, peaceful coexistence with regional neighbours,
a market economy and the active promotion of Botswana's interests.
Note the words ``market economy''. At this early juncture they give us
an indication of the economic policy that Botswana intended to pursue
in an attempt to facilitate development. A market economy is a
capitalist economy that allows the private ownership of property.
K How did this market economy differ from the scientific socialism
adopted by Zanu-PF? Refer to study units 6 and 7 above.
10.2 BOTSWANA: A DEVELOPMENTAL STATE

Botswana became a developmental state. Edge (1998:333) defines a
62
developmental state as ``the state in its developmental capacity: those

specific institutions, ideas and policy interventions which embody the
socioeconomic aims and actions of a given state''.
Edge (1998:333) says that a developmental state is characterised by:
. the government's leading role in the development process
. the existence of an authoritarian government that directs the state
administration
. state control and the mediation of workers' wage demands
. the existence of a weak military
. vast foreign aid provision in the state's infancy
. the expansion of social services and infrastructure
. increases in the rates of growth, gross national product (GNP) and
per capita income during an extended period of time
. increased manufacturing output and government effectiveness in the
delivery of goods and services
. a national development plan that serves to unify the various sectors
of economic, social and infrastructural development as a whole
The state opted to be the engine of development in Botswana after

independence, because no other sources of development were readily
available given the poverty that gripped the country. The British
government had failed to develop the country during its rule. The
Botswana government was faced with an uphill battle to develop the
country.
Wiseman (1998:243) points out that although Botswana is often
perceived as following a capitalist mode of development, with its
emphasis on market forces, the state has in fact played a crucial and
largely positive role in promoting economic development.
From this observation by Wiseman (1998), you should be able to
compare the development strategies of the three countries. In all three
countries there was state involvement in the economy, but in Botswana
the state did not follow a socialist ideology.
(1) Explain why Botswana was impoverished when it gained
independence.
(2) Botswana had opted for an economic system where the
ownership of private property was not allowed. True or false?
(3) Discuss the characteristics of a developmental state.
63 APC3701/1
STUDY UNIT 11
Rapid economic development in

Botswana
LEARNING OUTCOMES
(1) account for Botswana's transition from a poor to a wealthy
state
(2) analyse how the country's economic prosperity was managed
(3) discuss factors that contributed to the country's political
stability
A READING
articles by Osei-Hwedie (2001), Wiseman (1998) and Taylor (2003).
11.1 INTRODUCTION
While many British colonies had suffered from benign neglect,
Botswana was probably neglected to a far greater degree than the
others (Harvey & Lewis 1990:15). As a result, Botswana was one of the
poorest countries in the world at the time of its independence. Yet,
within a short period of time, it was experiencing the most rapid
economic growth of any country worldwide (Harvey & Lewis 1990:1).
Botswana's economy grew by 10 percent between 1965 and 1990, the
largest increase in GDP of all countries (Edge 1998:337). Wiseman
(1998:242±243) says that, in marked contrast to most African states,
the postindependence era in Botswana was one of monumental
economic growth and development.
Botswana's success has drawn praise from scholars ± negative views
have seldom been expressed in the past. Many scholars argue that
Botswana has distinguished itself from other African countries because
it has succeeded in sustaining a multiparty political system, a
competent government, a stable country and a growing economy.
However, this perception is now changing. In a recent article, Taylor
(2003) evaluated the events in Botswana critically. We will come to this
64
later. Let us begin with the positive picture of Botswana. Below we

discuss the factors that have contributed to Botswana's economic
growth.
Seretse and Ruth Khama

Source: New Africa
11.2 REASONS FOR BOTSWANA'S SUCCESS

Botswana's success has been attributed to various factors, including
the following:
. the role of Sir Khama in the formation of the new political system
. political stability
. the retention of a free-market system
. the discovery of diamonds
. the retention of a multiparty system
Harvey and Lewis (1990:30) attribute Botswana's economic growth to

the following factors:
. the end of the drought in the mid-1960s
. access to the European Economic Community for beef exports,
trading at above world prices
. renegotiation of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU)
Agreement
. increasing aid from a widening range of donors
. the discovery and successful mining of diamonds, copper and nickel
The end of the drought

Upon independence in 1966, Botswana was suffering a severe drought.
To compound the problem there was an outbreak of foot-and-mouth
disease. This had serious implications for a country whose economy
65 APC3701/1
was based on livestock, with beef as its major export product (Harvey
& Lewis 1990:78). Fortunately the drought broke and Botswana
enjoyed good rains for the next 15 years.
Sound management
While the discovery of diamonds
is without question a major con-
tributor to Botswana's economic
success, Lewis (1993:14) adds
another important contributory
factor to this success, namely
management. He argues that
sound economic policy choices
were essential to Botswana's
phenomenal economic growth.
The sound management of the
country is attributed to Khama
and his successor, Masire. Lewis
points out that luck alone (the
discovery of diamonds) would be
insufficient to explain this suc-
cess, since a number of African
Ketumile Masire countries are also blessed with
natural resources, but they have
Source: Unisa
not achieved the same results as
Botswana. Here one thinks of
countries such as Nigeria, which produces oil, and the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) and Zambia, which produce copper. These
countries' economic performance has been dismal, largely as the result
of poor management.
The leadership of Sir Seretse Khama

Leadership is an important factor in the good management to which
Lewis (1993) refers. Botswana was very fortunate to have a leader like
Khama when it gained independence. Khama, who was later knighted
by the British, possessed a number of important qualities: He was a
chief and an intellectual, and yet he identified with the common people.
He was of royal blood and although he was forced to relinquish his
chieftaincy in the early 1950s, the Batswana continued to regard him
as their chief. According to Osei-Hwedie (2001:68), Khama was revered
by most Tswanas, especially in the central district which is the most
populous and his original base. Read the accolades that Wiseman
(1998:248) showers on Khama.
Khama was an educated tribal leader, a rarity at the time. He had
received a degree from the University of Fort Hare in South Africa.
From the very outset Khama's fine leadership laid the foundation for
sound policy decisions in government (Harvey & Lewis 1990:9). Under
66
his inspirational leadership, Botswana government officials were cau-

tious, pragmatic and hardworking. Harvey and Lewis (1990:21) credit
the government with having achieved commendable results in negotia-
tions with powerful countries such as South Africa.
The discovery and marketing of diamonds

The mining sector is the leading sector in Botswana's economy and has
provided much of the stimulus for the phenomenal growth of the
country. Diamonds were first discovered at Orapa in the north of
Botswana in 1967, and then at Jwaneng in the south in 1976 (Harvey &
Lewis 1990:119). According to Harvey and Lewis (1990:120),
Botswana moved from ``nothing to a position of world importance''
after the discovery of diamonds.
Following the economic boom of the 1980s, Botswana's economy
slowed down. Between 1989 and 1993 the annual GDP growth rate
declined from 13,2 percent to 0,7 percent. Inflation increased to 14,3
percent per year and exports declined by 20 percent (Rule 1995:26).
The sound management of Botswana's sudden new wealth was an
important factor in the country's economic growth. Bad policy
decisions would have negated this good fortune, as had happened in
Nigeria when its oil riches were not properly managed and utilised.
Botswana negotiated advantageous agreements with De Beers' Central
Selling Organisation (CSO), which markets diamonds worldwide. The
government was adamant that the country's major product should be
properly marketed and also that its share of the resulting revenue
should reflect the successful development of the resource. Botswana
went on to obtain the best possible prices for its diamonds (Harvey &
Lewis 1990:131).
Income from SACU

Botswana was a member of the Southern African Customs Union
(SACU). The other members were Swaziland, Lesotho and South Africa.
Since Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho are landlocked, they used
South Africa's ports for their exports and imports; South Africa paid
them for all goods coming through its ports. Payments due were subject
to regular negotiations and Botswana was able to negotiate more
profitable terms with South Africa (Harvey & Lewis 1990:51). These
payments became another important source of revenue for the country.
Donor funds
Britain was Botswana's only donor country at the time of independ-
ence, but within a few years the country was receiving aid and
financial assistance from the majority of Western countries (Harvey &
Lewis 1990:8). Aid was important to sustain economic development.
67 APC3701/1
The economy gained another boost when it negotiated successfully

with the European Economic Community to supply its member states
with beef at premium prices (Molutsi 1993:52).
Multiparty democracy
This issue will be discussed in detail in study unit 15; therefore it will
suffice to mention that since the country gained independence,
multiparty elections have been held regularly. These elections have
been judged to be free and fair, and the opposition has accepted their
outcome.
Political stability
While most African countries have experienced political instability,
Botswana has been enjoying continued stability. There has been no
ethnic, regional or internecine political conflict that could plunge the
country into bloodshed. The country's political system has remained
the same and has not undergone any forced changes as has been the
case in other African states.
11.3 BOTSWANA'S CONTINUED ECONOMIC PROSPERITY

There is no doubt that Botswana is Africa's only success story.
Towards the end of the 1990s it was still showing robust growth in
spite of a slump in diamond prices. The country holds a reserve of
about US$ 6 billion and has avoided any debt for the past 18 years. In
addition, its currency performs well in world markets. During the
1990s, diamond sales accounted for 34 percent of GDP, 70 percent of
exports and about 50 percent of government revenue (African Business
1998:23).
At the beginning of 2000, Botswana's economic prospects were
positive. The government was expected to continue with its prudent
economic policies in 2004/2005. The central bank retained its 4 to 6
percent inflation target in 2003. Inflation continued to edge down-
wards, and Botswana's currency, the pula, continued to be firmer than
other currencies on the continent, including the South African rand
(Economic Intelligence Unit January 2004:1).
Botswana's economic growth benefited all sectors of society. Osei-
Hwedie (2001) discusses how this was effected by the government. She
points out that the government's socioeconomic programmes have been
aimed at a wide section of the population, both supporters and
nonsupporters. This has helped to garner support for the party (Osei-
Hwedie 2001:67). Read the relevant section in Osei-Hwedie's and
Wiseman's (1998) articles.
68
ACTIVITY
Explain why Botswana is economically stable and prosperous. Your
answer should only be one page.
FEEDBACK
You should not have a problem with this question, because the
answer is set out in this study unit. Factors you could have added
are the homogeneity of the Tswanas and their placid disposition.
(1) Account for Botswana's rapid and impressive economic growth.
(2) Discuss the role that sound policies have played in Botswana's
development.
(3) What does Osei-Hwedie mean when she refers to the ``Khama
spirit''?
69 APC3701/1
STUDY UNIT 12
Botswana's soft authoritarianism
LEARNING OUTCOMES
(1) explain the disquiet that Taylor (2003) expressed about the
BDP's rule
(2) decide whether it is appropriate to use the words `àuthorita-
rian liberalism'' with reference to Botswana
(3) determine whether Botswana's economic success benefits all its
citizens
(4) have an awareness of a contrary view regarding Botswana's
democracy
A READING
articles by Taylor (2003), Wiseman (1998); Sebudubudu and Osei-
Hwedie (2006)
12.1 INTRODUCTION
After four decades of BDP rule, Botswana was described as a success
story. This is a country which does not generate any negative stories
either in the media or in journal articles written by scholars. While
admitting the successes achieved by Botswana, Taylor (2003) argues
that not everything is right in this country. He uses words such as
``dictatorship of the bourgeoisie'' and `àuthoritarian liberalism'' in his
article. These are indeed very strong words. Taylor (2003:216)
expresses the opinion that a critical evaluation of Botswana is needed.
Prior to Taylor (2003), Good (1994) also raised some questions about
events in Botswana. Wiseman (1998:250) also alludes to problems; he
argues that the image of the ruling party has been seriously damaged
by its indifference to corruption and dubious financial practices.
12.2 CORRUPTION AND MISMANAGEMENT IN BOTSWANA

Good (1994) discusses the corruption and mismanagement that have
occurred in Botswana since the beginning of the 1990s. He maintains
70
that Botswana's reputation for good government has crumbled in the

face of a series of scandals involving senior government officials (Good
1994:500).
He focuses on specific areas where instances of corruption and
mismanagement have been identified. Presidential commissions of
inquiry have been appointed to probe allegations of corruption relating
to the supply of teaching materials to primary schools, charges of
illegal land sales, and the affairs of the Botswana Housing Corporation
and the National Development Bank (Good 1994:500). Good mentions
the example of a contract to supply teaching materials to primary
schools. A company called International Project Managers (IPM) was
awarded the contract, but its track record had not been scrutinised. It
transpired that IPM was run by an insolvent person who had no
experience in the purchase and supply of school materials. As a result,
more than one million pula was lost in the misallocation of books (Good
1994:501).
In the second instance of corruption that Good (1994) cited, two senior
government officials were involved in illegal land transactions. They
were PS Mmusi, Vice President and Minister for Local Government,
and DK Kwelagobe, Minister of Agriculture, both of whom allocated
land to themselves for the purposes of self-enrichment (Good
1994:503). This occurred at a time when there was a freeze on land
allocation and home construction, which left many ordinary people
without housing.
The Botswana Housing Corporation lost 8,5 million pula through
mismanagement and dishonesty. The construction of 407 high-cost
houses at Lobatse was planned, even though no market existed for such
housing. The 8,5 million pula was paid for professional services
relating to the site where the houses were supposed to be built (Good
1994:504).
In addition, the president and other government officials received loans
from the National Development Bank, which they were far from eager
to repay. As a result, the bank accumulated losses amounting to 41,1
million pula.
According to Good (1994:505), the people involved in corruption and
mismanagement did not regard their actions as wrong and harmful to
the country; they believed that there had been no personal wrong-doing
and they took no responsibility for the consequences of their actions.
For example, when they were dropped from the cabinet, Mmusi and
Kwelagobe organised public rallies where they proclaimed their
innocence. They were subsequently re-elected to the Central Committee
of the BDP with overwhelming majorities (Good 1994:506).
Government officials who did not repay their loans blamed the banks
for failing to remind them of their debts. On repaying his debt,
71 APC3701/1
President Masire stated that he, like all farmers, had the occasional
problem of being in arrears. He accused the press of launching a witch-
hunt directed at government officials (Good 1994:513).
Good (1994:519) argues that corruption and mismanagement will
continue in Botswana, unless everybody involved is brought to justice.
Finally, he also links corruption to the BDP's dominance of the political
scene in Botswana.
Wiseman (1998:250±252) discusses the corruption in Botswana; read
his discussion carefully and make sure that you know what his opinion
of this is.
ACTIVITY
What was the government's attitude towards corruption and
mismanagement?
FEEDBACK
The Botswana government did not seem perturbed by the
incidences of corruption and mismanagement discussed here. In
fact, the government was indifferent to these incidences.
12.3 SOCIAL CONTROL BY THE ELITE

The general assumption has been that all is well in Botswana, and that
the people are content and enjoy civil liberties. Good (1992) paints a
different picture by saying that the political elite exercises complete
control over civil society. He nevertheless regards the nature of this
control as mild in comparison with authoritarian regimes elsewhere in
Africa (Good 1992:85). Before you continue, pause and consider how
African leaders exercise control over civil society.
A strong civil society underpins democracy. In a country where civil
society is weak, the political elite is likely to be undemocratic. Civil
society includes a strong and vigilant press, a labour movement, and
professional, student, youth and civic organisations. Such groups, if
they exist, are not notably active in Botswana. Good's (1992:85)
explanation for this state of affairs is that the interest groups in
Botswana are monitored by the government, which discourages them
from any affiliation with political parties.
The trade union movement has not been allowed to develop into a
strong pressure group. Severe restrictions have been placed on the
labour movement, including the following (Good 1992:85):
. Young people between the ages of 15 and 18 and workers classified
as members of management are excluded from union membership.
72
. When an employee loses his or her job for whatever reason, it

terminates his or her union membership. This includes employees
who are dismissed unfairly.
. Trade unions are denied the right to affiliate with political parties.
The trade unions are under direct government surveillance. Police are
present at all trade union meetings. Trade unions can be dissolved by
the government; if a union has to be dissolved, government appoints a
commissioner to take charge of the workers (Good 1992:86). The
government intervenes in labour disputes, and strong-arm tactics are
used to end strikes and force workers to return to work (Good
1992:86).
More serious than the political control of civil society are the unequal
possession and distribution of wealth in Botswana. Good (1992:90)
points out that while the elite becomes increasingly wealthy, a growing
number of people are so poor that they have to register as destitute to
receive a payment of P30 per month from the government. In Gaborone
and Francistown, the phenomenon of street children has appeared for
the first time in Botswana. Rapid urbanisation has led to an increasing
number of unemployed youths in these towns.
Good (1992:92) describes some of the privileges enjoyed by members
of the elite. He describes the situation of the utterly poor, relative to
the state's wealth, as being in sharp contrast with the lifestyles of the
big cattle owners. While senior government officials have benefited
from huge salary increases, the government has opposed the introduc-
tion of statutory minimum wages for domestic and agricultural
workers.
The government has also opposed the extension of social welfare
programmes: These must take second place to projects that will create
employment. It has also ruled that monthly financial assistance to the
poor and unemployed should be below the average minimum wage, so
as not to discourage people from finding work.
12.4 BOTSWANA'S AUTHORITARIAN LIBERALISM

Taylor (2003:216) contends that all is not well in Botswana. He points
out that
`àlthough it is true that the state has provided social services in
the form of schools and clinics to the populace, and has
exhibited features of the ``developmental state'', major contra-
dictions within the country's political economy and the
qualitative nature of its democracy means that the country
exhibits authoritarian liberalism''.
The words authoritarianism and liberalism contradict each other. They

mean two different things, one good and the other bad.
73 APC3701/1
In his article, Taylor (2003) points out a number of themes to

substantiate his usage of the words authoritarian liberalism. They
are the following:
. limitations on the credibility of democracy in Botswana
. the media and the threat of government surveillance and control
. a weak civil society
. poverty amid plenty
. the situation of the Basarwa
. workers' rights and the limitations on workers' organisations
These themes will be discussed briefly in this study unit. Please study
Taylor's article for more information on these themes.
Limitations on the credibility of democracy in Botswana

Taylor (2003:216) points out that the BDP had no opposition. Both civil
society and the opposition were underdeveloped. Botswana was a de
facto one-party state. Taylor (2003:216-219) provides the reasons for
the weakness of the opposition.
The media and the threat of government surveillance and

control
Here Taylor (2003:219±221) focuses on the control of the media by the
government. Botswana has only one independent newspaper. Most of
the media, both electronic and print media, are controlled by the
government. This becomes very useful to the BDP during elections as
the media act as the mouthpiece of the ruling party. The government
also interferes with the independent media. In addition, the govern-
ment imposes restrictions on the independent media. Acquaint yourself
with the reasons that Taylor (2003:219) provides for the ineffective-
ness of the independent media.
A weak civil society

As you know by now, Botswana did not come to independence after a
struggle by nationalist movements. The result of this was an absence of
a strong civil society. Botswana also lacks a tradition of questioning.
The country is characterised by a culture of acquiescence, a traditional
society and deference to superiors. The government has also not
tolerated criticism from the weak civil society ± it deals ruthlessly with
those who dare to stand up to it. Those who dare to challenge the
government are regarded as traitors, foreign agents and enemies of the
state (Taylor 2003:221).
Poverty amid plenty

While many scholars express the opinion that Botswana's success has
benefited the majority of the country's citizens, Taylor (2003:223)
holds a different opinion. He writes about `à number of serious
74
negatives that Botswana has engendered in the post-independence

period''. According to Taylor (2003), there is an equity problem in
Botswana. There is a wide gap between the rich and the poor. Taylor
(2003:223) points out that 47 percent of the population lives in
poverty. (Compare this to Osei-Hwedie's statement in study unit 11.)
The situation of the Basarwa

Who are the Basarwa? The Basarwa are the indigenous inhabitants of
the country who live mainly in the southwest of the country in the
Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park (formerly the Great Kalahari Game
Reserve). The government had its own ideas about the area and moved
the Basarwa from their ancestral lands. The Basarwa resisted this
``forced removal'', but the government did not take kindly to their
resistance. What measures did the government take to force the
Basarwa to leave their land? In 2004 the Basarwa took the Botswana
government to court challenging their forced removal.
Workers' rights and the limitation on workers' organisations

Workers' rights are severely limited in Botswana and there has never
been a strong worker movement in Botswana. Union officials in
Botswana are not supposed to be working as full-time unionists; they
have to do this work on a part-time and ad hoc basis. These officials
can therefore not give full attention to their work as unionists.
Workers' right to strike is severely constrained.
ACTIVITY
To what extent is Taylor's (2003) disquiet about events in Botswana
justified?
FEEDBACK
It is true that Botswana's authoritarianism is soft in comparison
with that of other African countries, but there are many issues that
should cause the government concern and that have to be
addressed.
12.5 QUESTION MARKS OVER BOTSWANA'S MUCH PRAISED DEMOCRACY

Botswana has received international acclaim for its adherence to the
tenets of western liberal democracy. It has been hailed as a shining
example for the rest of Africa, which after 30 years of authoritarian
rule is still struggling to consolidate democracy. However, beneath the
veneer of perfection, Botswana's democracy has also been found
wanting in certain areas. Two academics at the University of Botswana
75 APC3701/1
have questioned certain elements of Botswana's parliamentary

democracy. In their article, Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedie (2006),
who lecture in the Department of Political and Administrative Studies,
express the view that Botswana's democracy is not without fault.
Please read this article.
They argue that in spite of positive observations of the country's
democracy, it has some limitations. Some of their observations are
more or less similar to those mentioned by Taylor (2003) in his article;
refer to it and identify the similarities. According to the two authors,
the flaws in Botswana's parliamentary democracy arise from a
combination of a weak parliament, weak opposition, weak civic
associations and a struggling media (Sebudubudu & Osei-Hwedie
2006:111). Their discussion focuses on the following:
. the role of parliament
. the opposition
. the role of parliament within society
. the relationship between parliament and civil society
. the media
. judiciary
However, it is important to note that much as they have included the

media and judiciary, they are complimentary of their role in the
country's democracy.
The role of parliament

The authors' starting point is on the role of parliament within society.
Parliament is an important institution of every democratic government.
They point out that it is the voice and protector of the general interests
of constituents, and an overseer of the executive (Sebudubudu & Osei-
Hwedie 2006:109). Importantly, it also represents the electorate who
have sent them to parliament. However, it could only execute this
function if it interacts and is accountable to them. They express the
view that the main mechanism of representation in a representative
democracy is popular election; in accountability it is consultation.
One of the major functions of parliament is to initiate laws. In
Botswana this important function is not performed by parliament.
Laws are instead initiated by the attorney-general who is also the
government's lawyer. This means he has a heavy workload. There is a
lack of skills in drafting legislation. The authors point out that
parliament neglects one of its most important functions, namely
challenging the government's budget. A weakness of Botswana's
parliament that they mention, is a weak and underdeveloped committee
system. Please familiarise yourself with the functions performed by
portfolio committees in parliament as explained in the article. Why do
the authors say Botswana's committee system is weak? Another
shortcoming of Botswana's parliament which they identify is that it
has not been able to call the executive to account. Instead of ministers
76
being called to account for their decisions, this is done by their

permanent secretaries who appear before the Public Accounts
Committee (PAC).
ACTIVITY
How has the performance of the PAC been? What are its limitations?
Where did it have success? Is this a satisfactory system?
The opposition
After the BDP came to power in 1966, the country's opposition parties
consisted of the BIP, BPP and BNF. From its inception, the opposition
has been dogged by factionalism which has seen the regular occurrence
of splits. Currently Botswana has eight opposition parties. This has
weakened the opposition by rendering it as ineffective in parliament
against a strong ruling party. The authors put the view forward that
`àpart from contributions to lively debates, questioning of government
performance, and introducing of motions to appoint commissions of
inquiry to investigate public offices, it has largely remained weak and
un-influential''. Take into account the following factors regarding the
unimpressive performance of the opposition in parliament:
. lack of resources
. small numbers
. lack of credible policies
. electoral system
. factionalism
. failure to form electoral alliances
. support coming mainly from regions inhabited by non-Tswanas
. lack of public funding
ACTIVITY
Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedie (2006) discuss at length how the
first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system disadvantages the
opposition in Botswana. They express the opinion that had
Botswana been using proportional representation, the opposition
would have done better. What is the difference between the two
systems? Which Southern African countries use the PR system and
which use the FPTP system?
The role of parliament within society

There is a negative perception of parliament in Botswana. Most people
are indifferent to the role that parliament should exercise in society.
77 APC3701/1
While there is enthusiasm during voting, in-between elections nothing

happens. The electorate is not impressed with parliamentarians whom
they accuse of representing their selfish interests at the expense of the
people. The Kgotla and constituency offices are the two most important
structures at the disposal of parliamentarians in order to communicate
with the electorate. The Kgotla is an age-old structure which was used
by the Tswana people and predates colonialism. It was a form of a
traditional parliament. It is still being used in Botswana up to the
present period with great success.
Explain how the Kgotla system complements democracy in Botswana?
How does it perform its political administrative and judicial functions?
What are the limitations of the Kgotla system as identified by
Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedie? What inhibited the functioning of the
committee system?
The relationship between parliament and civil society

Botswana has a very weak civil society which is incapable of playing an
oversight function and influencing parliament. Botswana has four civil
society associations; name them and familiarise yourself with their
functions. These associations have shied away from involvement in
politics. They have not forged alliances or working relations with
parties, nor have they endorsed candidates for elections. They prefer to
be nonpartisan, wanting to have relations with all parties. The
members of parliament (MPs) are also not dependent on the support
of civil associations in order for them to succeed. Botswana's civil
associations concentrate on issues for which they have been formed.
They are different from civil associations in South Africa, which
exercise some influence on the politics of the country. They make their
voices heard on political issues and lobby MPs. It is important to note
the issues they have raised and the campaigns they have been involved
in, particularly Ditshwanelo and Emang Basadi.
ACTIVITY
According to you, how successful have Parliamentarians been in
representing their constituencies? What were Parliamentarians
limitations? What other problems did they face?
The judiciary
Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedie (2006:48) are positive about the
judiciary in Botswana. They state that the judiciary has a good
reputation and is seen to be upholding the rule of law. They point out
that the judiciary is efficient in handling cases brought before it. All of
the country's citizens have access to the judicial system. To illustrate
this, they use the case of the Basarwa who took the government to
78
court to contest their removal from their ancestral home in the Greater
Kalahari Game Reserve. The Basarwa also later took the government to
court when they were denied access to water in the area. An earlier
decision went against them, but on appeal it was rescinded with the
judge criticising the government. The judge said the government's
conduct towards the Bushmen amounted to ``degrading treatment''
(Mail & Guardian 2011:4). The judiciary has even prosecuted cases
involving senior government officials.
The media
Botswana has both a public and a private media. The public media is
controlled by the government and includes television, radio and
newspapers. Government-controlled media reaches a large section of
the population. It is relayed through both English and Setswana and is
thus accessible to people in the rural areas. Radio is very popular and
is the only media available to people in the rural areas. It gives the
government advantage over the opposition. The private media is
vibrant, aims at the urban areas and uses English as a communication
medium. It does not cater for people in the rural areas, which is a
disadvantage. The private media caters largely for opposition parties.
The public media has been accused of being biased in favour of the
government.
The private media has not been afraid to criticise the government on
some of its policies, reminding it of its responsibility to the public. It
also addresses sensitive issues such as minority rights and covers
election campaigns of the opposition as well as exposing corruption.
However, the government takes a keen interest in what the private
media publishes and there is legislation in place which could be used
against the private media if it is seen to be endangering national peace
and security. What other measures are open to the government to use
against the private media? The public media has given the opposition
fair coverage during election campaigns, boasting the democratic
credentials of the country.
(1) Discuss the incidences of corruption and mismanagement that
Good (1994) identified.
(2) How did the government react to corruption?
(3) Analyse the attitude of the Botswana government towards civil
society.
(4) Briefly discuss the flaws in Botswana parliamentary system
that Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedie identified.
TOPIC 3
The democratic process

80
STUDY UNIT 13
Zimbabwe: an authoritarian democracy
LEARNING OUTCOMES
(1) discuss Mugabe's quest for a one-party system
(2) evaluate the reasons for the failure to implement this system
(3) trace the rise of the growing opposition to Zanu-PF
A READING
articles by Van der Walt (1998), Sachikonye (2002), and Addison
and Laakso (2003).
13.1 INTRODUCTION
In study unit 3 above, we discussed the constitution that ushered
Zimbabwe's independence. As you know, Zimbabwe's constitution
made provision for a Western-type political system, including various
political parties and periodic elections contested by these parties as
well as independent candidates. Zimbabwe's first democratic elections
that were contested by various parties were held in 1980. Although
multiparty elections were also held in 1985 and 1990, Mugabe
frequently said he was in favour of a one-party system.
13.2 THE QUEST FOR A ONE-PARTY SYSTEM

Five months after coming to power, Mugabe made his views on the one-
party political system known. In a speech delivered to the senate on 26
September 1980, Mugabe said:
A one-party system can really be democratic; it depends
entirely, of course, on who are at the head of that one party.
Democracy could exist within the sphere of one party if that
party was democratic. There could be election candidates
fielded not just by the party but by other groups within the
party. Some could stand as independents. Criticism is allowed
within the party and there is freedom to contribute at various
81 APC3701/1
levels of the branches of the party; at the branch level or the

village level, and the decisions go up to the central committee,
and the people's fears and concerns are taken into account.
(Speech in Senate, 26 April 1980)
Mugabe argued that the one-party system was more in keeping with
African tradition. His sentiments were in line with those expressed
earlier by other African leaders such as Nyerere (Tanzania), Nkhrumah
(Ghana) and Senghor (Senegal). He maintained the following:
(I)n African tradition you have one society right through. You
may have various tribes but they all merge to form one society
with one paramount chief. It makes for greater unity for the
people. It puts all opinions together under one umbrella,
whether these opinions are radical or reactionary. They are
heard in the one-party orbit and people express their views and
having done so, and the majority having decided what the
situation should be, that becomes the decision to be implemen-
ted by the party through government (interview with the
Nigerian News Agency, 12 October 1981).
ACTIVITY
Without opposition parties, how democratic would Mugabe's
envisaged system have been?
FEEDBACK
The existence of opposition parties that freely contest elections is a
hallmark of a democratic political system.
Mugabe was dismissive of the multiparty system:

The party in opposition vows never to be in agreement with the
party in government because to be seen to be in agreement with
the party in government on fundamental issues is to show
oneness with that party and therefore to create no basis for the
existence of a separate party. Occasionally you find the opposi-
tion party supporting the governing party on matters of
international interest or where threat to the sovereignty of the
state is imminent and in similar situations. But by and large the
opposition party is there to oppose the government, whether the
government is right or wrong. They must find some basis of
opposition. That is a waste of the taxpayer's money (interview
with Australian television, 8 April 1981).
Throughout the 1980s, Mugabe remained wedded to the idea of a one-

party political system, but he was unable to put his plans into effect as
82
the Lancaster House Agreement made provision for the representation

of other parties in parliament. Twenty seats were reserved for whites
for a period of seven years. Nkomo's Zapu also held a number of seats
in parliament. Mugabe could not wish away Nkomo, who was opposed
to a one-party system. In pursuit of his dream of a one-party system in
Zimbabwe, Mugabe had to coerce Zapu into merging with Zanu to form
a new party. He succeeded in 1987. Nkomo and his party were
harassed to the point of submission. The merger was really a co-
optation, because Zanu retained its name while Zapu faded from the
political scene. The only addition was the acronym PF. `Ìt was more a
unity from above than unity from below'' (Sachikonye 2002:16).
Mugabe was wary of unilaterally proclaiming Zimbabwe a de jure one-
party state, as this could have had serious ramifications. Note the
sentiments that Sachikonye (2002:16) expressed in this regard.
ACTIVITY
Why does Sachikonye (2002) say the merger was ``more a unity
from above than unity from below''?
FEEDBACK
It is evident that Nkomo's Zapu had little or no say in the merger
and had no alternative but to agree to the merger. Nkomo was left
powerless after the government's repression of the people of
Matabeleland, his stronghold.
13.3 OPPOSITION TO A ONE-PARTY SYSTEM

There was widespread opposition to a one-party state in Zimbabwe.
According to Van der Walt (1998:101) the opposition came from
capitalist associations, the legal profession, trade unions, newspapers,
and students and staff at the University of Zimbabwe. Newspapers took
up the one-party debate, publishing letters from people opposed to this
system. On 24 February 1984, a lead article appeared in the Zimbabwe
Financial Gazette opposing the idea of a one-party state:
The creation of a one-party state would undoubtedly serve the
interests of Zanu, but whether it would serve the interests of
Zimbabwe is doubtful, particularly if the record of other single-
party states is examined. Zanu-PF does not need exclusive
political power to remain the legitimate government of Zimbab-
we for the foreseeable future. The pursuit of this objective harms
the party's and the country's reputation.
Edgard Tekere, a founder member of Zanu-PF who had left to form his
own party, expressed his opposition to a one-party state. He argued
83 APC3701/1
that it should evolve through the organisational ability of the party and
should not be imposed on the people. After leaving Zanu-PF, he formed
his own party, the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM), which thwarted
the formation of a one-party system in Zimbabwe after the disappear-
ance of Zapu.
Mugabe's plans suffered a further setback during a Central Committee
meeting in 1990 where a one-party system was discussed. Only five
people out of 28 voted in favour of a one-party system (Knight
1991:28). Mugabe's defeat occurred during a resurgence in the
movement to restore multiparty democracy in Africa. One-party
democracies had collapsed in Eastern Europe and African leaders
were under pressure to democratise their political systems.
The decision by the Central Committee to retain the multiparty system
was welcomed by scholars and politicians alike in Zimbabwe. While
multiparty elections continued to be held there were questions about
their quality. Although no party was prevented from contesting
elections, intimidation and harassment of the opposition were rife.
Zanu-PF became increasingly authoritarian and intolerant of criticism.
Zanu-PF easily won the elections held in 1990 and 1995. However,
these elections were marked by intimidation and violence perpetrated
against the opposition. Some opposition parties had boycotted the 1995
elections (Van der Walt 1998:102). In the 1990 elections a number of
people who stood against the party were severely beaten by people who
identified with Zanu-PF (Van der Walt 1998:101). Quantin (1992)
raised doubts about the democratic process in Zimbabwe, listing the
following irregularities which occurred during the 1990 elections:
. restricted opposition campaigning facilities
. bias in media coverage
. misappropriation of public transport to aid the ruling party
. manipulation of electoral rolls
. intimidation and arrest of opponents of the ruling party by the police
. abuse of the secret ballot
13.4 WEAK OPPOSITION IN ZIMBABWE

The opposition in Zimbabwe was never sufficiently strong and united to
challenge Zanu-PF. It was marked by feuds, acrimonious exchanges
and splits ± it was its own worst enemy. An attempt to form a united
opposition to challenge Mugabe during the 1995 elections, came to
nothing. Those who were in the forefront of this effort were Reverends
Sithole and Muzorewa, Tekere and former Chief Justice, Enock
Dumbutshena. They established the Forum Party, but little progress
was made towards consolidating the alliance.
Van der Walt (1998) gives several reasons for the weakness of the
opposition. This is how Van der Walt (1998:102) categorises the
opposition in Zimbabwe:
(T)he opposition was and is itself typically poorly organised,
84
lacking clear policies, and hampered by a low profile and a lack

of resources.
Familiarise yourself with Van der Walt's (1998:101) discussion of the

problems that opposition parties encountered when trying to contest
elections against Zanu-PF.
13.5 THE EMERGENCE OF A STRONG OPPOSITION

In this section we take a look at the events which culminated in the
formation of a new opposition party, the Movement for Democratic
Change (MDC), and the changes it brought to the Zimbabwean political
situation. According to Makumbe (2002), the MDC was formed in late
1999 ``with personnel, ideas, and inspiration from the National
Constitutional Assembly and a
strong base of support in the
labour movement, especially
the Zimbabwe Congress of
Trade Unions (ZCTU), under
its then secretary-general, Mor-
gan Tsvangirai'' (Makumbe
2002:89±91). Soon after its for-
mation, the MDC made known
its intention of contesting the
2000 parliamentary elections.
The MDC was born out of the
problems the country had ex-
perienced in the second half of
the 1990s. The country had
serious economic problems
which impacted on the masses.
These problems resulted in a
spate of strikes by workers,
who were demanding salary
increases. In order to stop the
Morgan Tsvangirai angry masses, the Mugabe gov-
Source: Parade ernment became authoritarian.
ACTIVITY
Read the articles by Van der Walt (1998) and Sachikonye (2000),
and discuss (in two paragraphs) the economic problems that
confronted the masses in Zimbabwe.
The MDC attracted to its ranks a diverse constituency that included not
only workers, but also a large number of students, professionals,
whites and business people (Makumbe 2002:90). Zanu-PF became
85 APC3701/1
uneasy with the MDC which attracted large crowds to its meetings.
This posed a threat to the ruling party that had never had to face strong
opposition before. The formation of the MDC coincided with deepening
economic crisis, tension and violence within the country. The MDC
exploited the economic problems facing the country and blamed the
ruling party for mismanaging the economy. Thousands of people
attended its meetings.
13.6 REPRESSION OF THE MDC

Before the 2000 parliamentary elections, Zanu-PF orchestrated a
campaign of harassment and intimidation against the MDC (Sachiko-
nye 2002:17). MDC meetings were banned or disrupted and some of its
members were assaulted. The election campaigns were marked by
violence which claimed many lives, mostly those of opposition
supporters (Sachikonye 2002:18).
The rural areas where most of Zanu-PF's supporters lived became ``no-
go areas'' for MDC members. This gave rise to fears that the elections
would not be free and fair. Election monitors from international
organisations such as the European Union and the Commonwealth
descended on the country. Take note of Mugabe's response to the
MDC's challenge as discussed by Sachikonye (2002:18±19).
It is important that you should compare the election strategies of the
MDC and Zanu-PF. Which issues were raised by these two parties? A
discussion of these issues appears in Sachikonye's article (2002:20). In
a close contest the MDC won 57 seats to Zanu-PF's 62 seats. Not since
the first election had Zanu faced such strong opposition. Addison and
Laakso (2003:464) point out that the MDC won a majority of its seats in
the urban areas and in Matabeleland. Remember that Matabeleland
was Nkomo's stronghold, and the people from that area were subjected
to brutality by the government in the early 1980s. They voted for the
MDC out of revenge for the atrocities that had been visited upon them
by the government.
ACTIVITY
Note Sachikonye's (2002:17) positive comments about the appea-
rance of the MDC on Zimbabwe's political scene. Make sure that
you understand what Sachikonye (2002:17) means by a ``dominant
party system'' and a ``highly competitive two-party system''.
FEEDBACK
A dominant party system occurs when one party has no strong
opposition that challenges it. That one party then wins consecutive
elections for a long period of time. In a highly competitive two-party
system, the contest is tough and no party is guaranteed of victory.
86
The MDC was not satisfied with the outcome of the elections and
claimed that Zanu-PF had committed irregularities. It challenged some
of the results in court. The MDC won some of the cases it had taken to
court, and as a result by-elections were held. With a few exceptions, a
majority of observers ruled that Zimbabwe's 2000 parliamentary
elections had not been free and fair. For the first time since Zanu-PF
had come to power, it was now faced with strong opposition in
parliament. This did not go down well with the ruling party, which
went out of its way to make life difficult for the MDC.
Two years after the parliamentary elections, Zimbabweans went to the
polls to vote for a president. Mugabe was Zanu-PF's candidate, while
the MDC chose the party leader, Tsvangirai. The period between the
two elections exacerbated the tension between the two parties. This
aspect will be discussed in study unit 16, which focuses on the growing
conflict in the country.
(1) Evaluate the reasons that Mugabe advanced for wanting to
implement a one-party system in Zimbabwe.
(2) The community of Zimbabwe was in favour of a one-party
system. True or false?
(3) Trace the factors that led to the formation of the MDC.
(4) Develop an argument on the need for a competitive two-party
system.
(5) Elaborate on Van der Walt's (1998) assertion that the opposi-
tion in Zimbabwe has always been divided.
87 APC3701/1
STUDY UNIT 14
Zambia: from one-party to multiparty

democracy
LEARNING OUTCOMES
(1) explain the reasons that compelled Unip to adopt a one-party
system
(2) analyse the method used to implement this system
(3) discuss the factors that led to the end of the one-party system
A READING
The most important reading material for this study unit is
Ihonvbere's (1998) article.
14.1 INTRODUCTION
Before a one-party state was established in Zambia, Unip had resisted
and undermined opposition parties. An increasingly close association
also emerged between Unip, the state and the government. It is
interesting to note that Kaunda repeatedly expressed his opposition to
using coercion in order to create a one-party state. According to him, a
one-party state would be the ideal form of government for Zambia, but
it would have to be called for by the citizens themselves in a
spontaneous and democratic manner.
The period before the establishment of a one-party state was
characterised by more stringent measures to prevent the establish-
ment or growth of opposition parties. For example, the United Party
(UP), which had been founded in 1966, was banned after factions of the
UP clashed with Unip supporters in the Copper Belt. (Members of the
UP subsequently joined the ANC.) In 1969, Simon Kapwepwe, the vice-
president, resigned on the grounds that Unip had persecuted his fellow
Bemba speakers. Later Kapwepwe withdrew his resignation, but he lost
his post the following year.
In August 1971, a group of Unip dissenters founded the United
Progressive Party (UPP) in the Copper Belt and Kapwepwe became their
88
leader. Roberts (1976:244) maintains that support for the UPP

reflected increasing unemployment and the end of the upswing in the
copper price in 1970. Soon after the formation of the party, its
leadership was arrested, with the exception of Kapwepwe. In February
1972, the UPP was banned and Kapwepwe was arrested.
Kaunda and the Unip leaders eventually made it clear that a one-party
state was more desirable than facing the dangers of an opposition. The
risk of political disintegration, the possible exploitation of Zambia's
internal differences by her white-ruled neighbours, the necessity of
mass mobilisation for development purposes, and the view that a
multiparty system was part of a colonial heritage foreign to Africa were
some of the arguments advanced for the creation of a one-party state
(Pettman 1974a:226).
Added to this was the factionalism within the party. Party members
were always threatening to leave the party if they did not get what they
wanted, as we have discussed in one of our previous study units.
14.2 THE CHONA COMMISSION

In February 1972, a commission of inquiry, the Chona Commission,
was appointed to assist the government in drafting a new constitution
based on the principles of a one-party system.
The Chona Commission heard evidence throughout Zambia which
reflected dissatisfaction about the introduction of a one-party system
and the progressive centralisation of power. Opposition came espe-
cially from the National Union of Zambian Students (NUZS) and the
opposition parties. At the same time, Unip members were travelling
through the country, addressing meetings to propagate the idea of a
one-party system. It is interesting to note that the extent to which the
Chona Commission was to be given a voice in the final drafting of the
proposed constitution was not established before the commission
began its work. After the commission had tabled its report, the
government published a White Paper in November 1972. This White
Paper made it clear that the government had only partially accepted the
commission's recommendations. On 8 December 1972, the Zambian
Legislative Assembly ratified the new constitution and the second
Zambian republic came into being.
The first elections under the new constitutional dispensation were held
in December 1973. President Kaunda was elected to a third term as
president, although 20 percent of the votes were against him. Three
cabinet ministers and six junior ministers lost their seats. Roberts
(1976:244) draws attention to the low voter turnout: 39 percent as
against a 77 percent poll in the 1968 election. This system was retained
for nearly 20 years.
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ACTIVITY
Which method did Kaunda use to effect a one-party system in
Zambia?
FEEDBACK
Kaunda used two methods: the illegal and the legal. The illegal
constituted threats that were made against the opposition,
culminating in its banning. He went the legal route when he
established the Chona Commission which investigated the views of
the Zambian people.
Throughout the second republic, Zambia was a one-party state. Unip

was the only party recognised and since it did not have any opposition,
it won all the elections held in the country.
14.3 END OF THE ONE-PARTY SYSTEM

Towards the end of the 1980s Zambia faced serious economic problems
which forced it to seek assistance from the IMF. The IMF was prepared
to offer Zambia assistance, but only on condition that it implemented a
structural adjustment programme. This programme did not find favour
with the masses as massive increases in food prices followed the
ending of subsidies (Szeftel 2000:216). This led to food riots. The
Kaunda government was becoming increasingly unpopular and was
beleaguered.
A number of organisations, politicians and academics who were calling
for reforms from the government formed themselves into a political
party, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). Under both
internal and external pressure, Kaunda had no option but to sign a
constitutional amendment ending the status of Unip as Zambia's sole
legal party (Polhemus 1997:44). Multiparty elections were held in 1991
and Unip suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the MMD, which
then formed Zambia's third republic.
The restoration of multiparty democracy in Zambia came as a breath of
fresh air to Africa. Zambia was congratulated for its peaceful transition
to democracy. The international world pledged to support Zambia to
help it overcome its economic problems and to alleviate the suffering of
the masses (Ihonvbere 1998:228).
Polhemus (1997:44) points out that after the 1991 elections Zambia
was seen as an example for Africa because it had taken the plunge and
90
restored multiparty democracy while other countries still hesitated.

The MMD's victory was hailed as a shining example to other African
countries (Ihonvbere 1998:227).
14.4 DEMOCRACY IN ZAMBIA UNDER THE MMD

The MMD had promised to rule by the letter and spirit of the
constitution. But did the party keep this promise? Ihonvbere
(1998:231) tells us that democracy in Zambia suffered a setback under
the rule of the MMD. What prompted this statement? Ihonvbere (1998)
explains his reasoning on pages 36 to 37. After he had come to power,
Chiluba became authoritarian and did not brook any opposition.
Kaunda's return to politics also unnerved him.
According to Ihonvbere (1998:233) Chiluba started to show extreme
hostility and intolerance to those who contemplated or showed an
interest in opposing him. The MMD became repressive and intolerant
of opposition. It went so far as to declare a state of emergency.
Students were harassed and journalists arrested. Ihonvbere (1998)
states that democracy in Zambia had suffered a reversal and the
country's second elections were held amidst repression by the
government. Remember that the MMD had made it difficult for Kaunda
to return to politics by obstructing him in every possible way. Write
brief notes on the methods the MMD used to frustrate Kaunda.
Chiluba's second and last term in office started after the MMD had won
the 1996 elections. These elections were boycotted by some opposition
parties that were dissatisfied because the MMD had not taken into
consideration their recommendations to a Constitutional Review
Commission. (This commission was appointed to gather evidence on
amending the constitution.)
Factionalism reared its head in the MMD towards the end of the party's
second term in office. This was caused, firstly, by Chiluba's reluctance
to leave office and, secondly, by his insistence on choosing his
successor. He tried to convince some party members that he should
serve another term. This split the party into two factions, namely those
who were in favour of this suggestion and those who were opposed to
it. His wish to appoint his successor had the same effect. Some
members left the party to join another one, while others formed their
own parties.
ACTIVITY
Describe the nature of democracy under Chiluba's government.
91 APC3701/1
FEEDBACK
Chiluba disappointed those people who had praised Zambia for its
smooth transition to democracy. Authoritarianism took root in
Zambia under Chiluba's rule.
14.5 ZAMBIA'S THIRD DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS

Chiluba's appointed successor, Levy Mwanawasa, stood as the party's
candidate in the 2001 elections. A number of opposition parties
contested the elections. Even before the elections could be held, they
alleged that the MMD was planning to rig the elections. The elections
were won by the MMD. The opposition parties went to court claiming
that the elections were not free and fair. Their assertion was supported
by the European Union, which expressed the view ``that elections'
results were `not' safe and they were not confident that they reflected
the wishes of the Zambian people'' (Africa Confidential 2002:6).
The opposition's claim that the elections were not free and fair was
backed by former president, Chiluba, who said he was prepared to
testify that he had fixed the polls in favour of Mwanawasa. The
opposition claimed that the country's soldiers serving in Sierra Leone
voted when the law prohibited proxy and postal votes. However, when
the case eventually went to court, the allegations of the opposition
parties were rejected and Mwanawasa's victory was confirmed.
(1) Explain the factors that motivated Kaunda to implement a one-
party system in Zambia.
(2) The one-party system was implemented legally and was
accepted by the majority of the Zambian people. Is this
statement true or false? Substantiate your answer.
(3) What events precipitated Kaunda's decision to effect a political
transition in Zambia?
(4) Why did factionalism rear its head within the MMD?
(5) Express your views on the one-party and multiparty systems.
(6) How democratic was the MMD government?
92
STUDY UNIT 15
Multiparty democracy in Botswana
LEARNING OUTCOMES
(1) evaluate the reasons for the endurance of a multiparty system
in Botswana
(2) comment on the weakness of the opposition
(3) discuss the reasons for the BDP's predominance
(4) decide if Ian Khama's rise to power was engineered and if he
was the cause of factionalism within the BDP
A READING
articles by Osei-Hwedie (2001) and Wiseman (1998).
15.1 INTRODUCTION
Botswana is Africa's longest surviving multiparty democracy. It has
regularly held elections since its independence and these elections have
never been dogged by controversy. The outcome of elections has
always been accepted by the opposition parties as well as the citizens
of the country. The BDP has won all the postindependence elections
with a comfortable majority. Unlike other African states, Botswana has
not experienced periods of either single-party or military rule (Wise-
man 1998:217).
Why has Botswana's multiparty system endured for over four decades?
Scholars such as Wiseman (1977), Picard (1985), Molutsi (1989),
Molomo (2000) and Osei-Hwedie (2001) offer various explanations for
the continuing survival of the country's democratic political system.
Their explanations include:
. the absence of a struggle for independence
. a peaceful homogeneous traditional society
. the absence of a strong opposition
. economic prosperity
93 APC3701/1
The absence of a struggle for independence

In a 1977 article, Wiseman named the smooth decolonisation process
as one of the major reasons behind Botswana's stability and
democracy. He pointed out that the political parties did not have to
wage a protracted independence struggle. How did the absence of a
struggle for independence contribute to multiparty democracy in
Botswana? In contrast with what happened in other African states,
no political party in Botswana could claim to have been responsible for
defeating the colonial power. Therefore no political party had a
stronger claim to power than other parties. Nor was there bitter rivalry
between political parties formed for the specific purpose of bringing
the country to independence.
A peaceful, homogeneous, traditional society

Another reason for Botswana's stable democracy is the fact that there
are no deeply divided ethnic groups in Botswana. Its population is
homogeneous and all its citizens regard themselves as Batswana,
although there are smaller subgroups (eg the Bakgatla, Bamangwato,
Bamangwaketsi, Batlokwa, Bakwena, Batawana and Barolong). Wise-
man (1977:75) points out that there are no deep divisions which
political groups could exploit. Although ethnicity does play a role, it
has been less of a factor in elections than in other African countries. A
deliberate policy decision was taken in Botswana to discourage official
recognition of ethnic identity.
Botswana's people are generally easy-going, peace-loving and respect-
ful of traditional institutions. Botswana's democratic system is
characterised by strongly traditional elements. Democratic practices
have long featured in the rural areas of the Kgotlas, for example, where
it has been customary for members of the tribe to meet and discuss
issues and reach consensus (Lewis 1993:21±22). Chiefs have ruled
through traditional institutions that operate on the basis of group
discussion and consensus.
ACTIVITY
In which African state does ethnicity have a negative impact on the
political system?
FEEDBACK
There are strong ethnic groups in Kenya and Nigeria, for example,
and ethnicity has a negative impact on their political systems,
because political readers appeal for votes from members of their
ethnic group and the results of elections are disputed by ethnic
groups. Political tension is often the result of ethnicity.
94
The absence of a strong opposition

The absence of a strong opposition party is also partly responsible for
the survival of multiparty democracy in Botswana. The BDP does not
feel threatened to the extent where it may resort to banning its
opposition, and has so far won elections comfortably. However, in the
election held in October 1994, the Botswana National Front made
inroads into the BDP's majority, winning 40 percent of the votes and
increasing its representation in parliament from 3 to 13 seats (Rule
1995:21).
Economic prosperity
The country's prosperity also contributes to the survival of multiparty
democracy. While economic stability is not necessarily a prerequisite
for democracy, it certainly helps to keep democracy alive. Hunger and
poverty fuel political discontent, as has been the case in most African
countries. The Botswana government uses revenue accruing from the
sale of diamonds to make improvements, particularly in the rural areas
where it has introduced the Accelerated Rural Development Pro-
gramme.
15.2 FACTORS BEHIND THE BDP'S PREDOMINANCE

The issue of predominance was discussed in study unit 13 (Zimbabwe:
an authoritarian democracy). Reread it to refresh your memory.
The following factors contributed to the BDP's continued election
success:
. Sir Seretse Khama's influence and traditional support
. the BDP's organisational capabilities
. the BDP's economic performance
. weak opposition parties
Sir Seretse Khama's influence and traditional support

The BDP was closely associated with Seretse Khama who belonged to
the one of the country's biggest ethnic groups, the Bamangwato. Khama
was a dominant figure in the BDP and he was well respected in
Botswana. He was regarded as the founding father of Botswana. Osei-
Hwedie (2001:68) informs us that Khama was popular and revered by
most Tswanas. Wiseman (1998:248) says that Khama was a man of
high intelligence, integrity and political skill. Even though he was
forced to give up his chieftaincy, the Batswana continued to regard him
as their chief. Under his leadership members of the Botswana
government were cautious, pragmatic and hardworking. Traditional
leaders are still much respected in Botswana and as Molutsi (1998:370)
points out, they exercise a strong influence over their subjects' votes.
95 APC3701/1
The BDP draws its largest support from the Bamangwato and Bakwena
ethnic groups which constitute 50 percent of the population. However,
the party also has nationwide support.
The BDP's organisational capabilities

The BDP is far better organised than the rest of the country's political
parties. The party has sufficient resources, because it is supported by
wealthy cattle ranchers and traditional leaders. Osei-Hwedie (2001:60)
says that the BDP also generates income for election purposes from
membership fees and the rental of its headquarters. The BDP further
receives funding from external sources. This enables the BDP to run
effective election campaigns.
The BDP's economic performance

Although this issue has already been mentioned, we will discuss it in
more detail here. A government is judged on how well it looks after its
citizens; and to look after its citizens, it needs resources. Botswana has
an abundance of economic resources. But unlike other governments
endowed with economic resources, the Botswana government uses its
resources to benefit of the Batswana people. Osei-Hwedie (2001:66±67)
explains how the BDP used the economic success of the country to
improve the country and uplift the standard of living of the masses. In
addition, she points out that the leadership of the BDP exhibited highly
moral political behaviour, and was accountable and incorruptible.
Massive development in the country's infrastructure took place after
independence owing to economic growth (Wiseman 1998:244).
Weak opposition parties

The BDP's dominance has also been assisted by a weak and divided
opposition. After the country's first election in 1965, three opposition
parties emerged, namely the Botswana People's Party (BPP), the
Botswana Independent Party (BIP) and the Botswana National Front
(BNF). Currently Botswana has a plethora of political parties, although
many exist in name only and they have a limited impact (Molomo
2000:75). The three parties mentioned above are the only opposition
parties that play some role in Botswana. Three factors account for the
weakness of the opposition in Botswana (Holm 1988; Molutsi 1989;
Molomo 2000; Osei-Hwedie 2001), namely:
. a lack of resources
. the absence of an alternative to the BDP's programme
. factionalism
A lack of resources
Botswana's opposition parties are poverty stricken, argues Molutsi
(1991:7). Without donors they do not have enough resources to launch
effective election campaigns. They need funds to run their head-
96
quarters, to hire venues for meetings and to print pamphlets to

publicise their policies and programmes. The lack of funds also
handicaps their campaigns in inaccessible areas. Molomo (2000:78)
points out that Botswana is a vast and varied country encompassing
difficult terrain such as the Kalahari sandvelds and the Okavango
swamps. The opposition cannot establish branches and nominate
candidates in all the constituencies (Osei-Hwedie 2001:61).
The absence of an alternative to the BDP's programme

Molomo (2000) and Holm (1988) point out that there is not much
difference between the policies of the opposition and those of the BDP.
Holm (1988) states that the BNF differs from the BDP only in that it is
in favour of a equalitarian programme, and the BPP and BIF ``make
even less of a distinction between themselves and the BDP''. Molomo
(2000:79) argues that voters are unlikely to vote for a party with
similar policies to that of the ruling party. Opposition parties should
present clear ideological policy alternatives to the ruling party.
Botswana's opposition parties criticise the BDP without clearly spelling
out their alternative programme.
Factionalism
Instead of coming together and challenging the BDP as a combined unit,
the opposition in Botswana is fragmented. Originally Botswana had
only 3 opposition parties, but that number has grown to 12. Osei-
Hwedie (2001:62±64) discusses the factors that contributed to
factionalism among opposition parties. She also discusses the
consequences of factionalism within a party. Study her article and
make sure that you can discuss the causes and consequences of
factionalism within the opposition.
The party that has suffered the most from factionalism is the BNF.
According to Osei-Hwedie (2001:63) the factionalism is the result of
ideological tensions between socialists and traditionalists; leadership
struggles; disagreements over procedural arrangements for the conduct
of primary elections for the selection of candidates; and disgruntle-
ments of candidates who have lost primary elections. Opposition
parties made various efforts to form electoral coalitions, but all these
efforts have been unsuccessful. One of these efforts resulted in the
formation of the Botswana People's Progressive Party (BPPF), another
in the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF). This was
followed by the formation of the Botswana Alliance Movement (BAM).
Read Osei-Hwedie's article (2001:72±74) to find out why these three
organisations failed to get off the ground and challenge the BDP. Osei-
Hwedie (2001:74) concludes by saying that opposition parties have
proved that they are not yet ready to rise above party differences to
pave the way for an effective alliance against the BDP.
97 APC3701/1
Rule (1995:25) makes the following observations about the BDP's

success:
. The BDP's support is spread throughout the country.
. Chiefs have great respect for the BDP and this has contributed to the
party's political dominance.
. Although ethnicity plays no role in Botswana politics, Tswana ethnic
affinity plays an important role in keeping the BDP in power.
Botswana recorded another rare feat in Africa's chequered political

history when Masire retired in 1998. Masire was one of only four
leaders in Africa to retire voluntarily. The others were Leopold Senghor
(Senegal), Julius Nyerere (Tanzania) and Nelson Mandela (South
Africa). He was commended by African leaders, including Robert
Mugabe who has been in power in Zimbabwe since independence in
1980. Masire was succeeded by Festus Mogae.
Botswana qualifies to be regarded as a one-party dominant state,
because one party has been re-
turned to power successively for
more than three decades. The
BDP won the last election, which
was held in 1999, by winning 33
of the 40 contested seats. The
BNF became the official opposi-
tion after winning 6 seats. The
Botswana Congress Party, a
breakaway from the BNF, won 2
seats. Ntau and Sebudubudu
(1999:22) argue that if Botswana
had used a system of propor-
tional representation rather than
the ``first past the post'' consti-
tuency system, the opposition
would hold a higher number of Festus Mogae
seats in parliament. Source: BBC Focus on Africa
ACTIVITY
How would a system of proportional representation benefit the
opposition?
FEEDBACK
Under a proportional system the number of votes cast by a party
determines the number of seats it would have in parliament. Parties
are allocated seats in proportion to the number of votes obtained in
an election.
98
15.3 IAN KHAMA AND DISSENSION WITHIN THE BDP

Ian Khama, the Sandhurst trained son of Sir Seretse Khama became
Botswana's fourth president in April 2008. As you should know, his
father was the founding president of Botswana. Naturally the question
that would be asked is if Ian Khama inherited his position because of
the influence and standing of his father in Botswana. Some people may
be inclined to think so. Unlike his three predecessors, Ian Khama was
not associated with the formation of the BDP and the attainment of
independence. Through political socialisation within his family, he was
bound to become a member of the BDP.
Much as Ian Khama's ascendancy to the top-most position in the
country followed the party's procedures, there was some disquiet that
his rise to power was fast-tracked because he is Seretse Khama's son.
The following examples are given as proof of the favouritism that
helped him on his way up. He announced his retirement from the army
on 31 March 1998, which was the same date for the planned retirement
of President Mogae; this had fuelled speculation (http://en.wikipe-
dia.org/wiki/Ian_Khama). He was appointed vice-president of the
country while not being a member of the National Assembly. However,
this appointment was deferred until he became a member of the
Assembly. The position was ratified when he won a by-election in
Serowe. On his way to becoming the president of the country, he
occupied the following positions: Minister of Presidential Affairs and
Public Administration, member of the Central Committee of the BDP
and chairman of the BDP. There were suspicions that he was groomed
to succeed Mogae as the president of the country. When Mogae stepped
down, he was succeeded by Khama.
Khama who was a disciplinarian, had his own ideas about the future
and development of the country. Being a soldier, he was a no-nonsense
man. Khama, a qualified pilot, is a teetotaler and a man of high morals.
According to Moeti (2010:34), discipline is one of the values he wants
to instil in his nation, starting with the party he leads. As was to be
expected from a man who did not drink, he wanted to deal with the
scourge of alcohol. Drinking was identified as a major problem in
Botswana. His idea of controlling the abuse of alcohol was to propose
to impose a 70 percent levy on alcohol. This did not go down well with
those businesses which benefitted from alcohol sales. Because of a
public outcry, he was forced to change his mind and reduced the levy to
30 percent after consulting with industry leaders.
Some members of the BDP were not pleased with Khama, expressing
the view that he was authoritarian. Fissures began appearing within
the party due to this unhappiness. This was something unheard of in
the BDP, a party which had a rich history. Since its formation and
leading the country to independence, the BDP has been a much
respected and united party with no signs of dissension, and the
majority of the Batswanas belonged to it. The BDP experienced serious
problems barely two years into Khama's rule, which resulted in five
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MPs leaving the party and forming their own, the Botswana Movement
for Democracy (BMD). One of the MPs later returned to the BDP,
apologising for his actions.
In his article, which is short and easy to read, Moeti (2010:34) takes us
through the reasons for the split. According to him, Khama has been
characterised as an authoritarian who threatens not only to overrun
the nation and undermine its values, but also to privatise the party and
the state. One of the members who left the party, Botsalo Ntuane, said
Khama wanted to turn Botswana into another Iran after he had
proposed the levy on alcohol. According to Moeti (2010:34), Ntuane
was a thorn in the party's side through his criticism of some of the
legislation which was adopted by the party. He regarded this as a
clampdown on civil liberties.
Another MP who spoke his mind was Gomolemo Motswaledi. According
to Clottey (2010:1) Motswaledi left the party after what most people
described as an acrimonious clash with Ian Khama. Motswaledi and his
group expressed the view that the party had lost its direction under
Khama's leadership. He adds that former members of the ruling party
often accused President Khama of dictatorial tendencies and resent-
ment towards dissenting views. The following are some of the factors
which resulted in the five MPs leaving the BDP (elaborate on these
points by reading the article):
. Allegations of authoritarianism levelled against Khama
. Factionalism
. Defiance of party at Central Committee elections
. Open criticism of Ian Khama
. Undermining of Central Committee by Khama
. Defiance of a directive from the party
. Failed mediation by former president, Masire
The BDP has taken the departure of the four MPs in its stride. The
chairperson of the party, Daniel Kwelagobe, did not regard the event as
a crisis. This is what he said about the split:
''There are concerns within the party, [but] I don't know
whether I can classify that as a crisis. But, certainly, there are
people who are unhappy with the way the party is being run
and, of course, they are entitled to their views'' (Clottey 2010:2).
Moeti (2010:35) expresses the view that Khama is worried about the
developments within the party. The defections have been unnerving.
According to him, Khama does not want to fail the legacy of his father
and he fears the likelihood of leading his father's party to its first
electoral defeat.
The split's impact on Botswana's politics is still unknown. Efforts to
form alliances by the opposition have not been successful and there has
been talk of an alignment of opposition parties. According to Moeti
(2010:35), the new party has been received with open arms by the
100
existing opposition parties such as the BCP and the BNF. Ntuane has
often been heard speaking of a grand coalition of opposition parties. Do
you think that given the fractious nature of opposition parties this
could happen?
(1) Explain why Botswana's multiparty democracy has endured.
(2) How many elections has the BDP won since 1965?
(3) Name Botswana's main opposition parties.
(4) What accounts for the BDP election victories?
(5) Discuss the reasons for the weakness of the opposition in
Botswana.
(6) Provide the reasons for factionalism within the BDP.
TOPIC 4
Conflict in Zimbabwean and

Zambian politics
102
STUDY UNIT 16
Increasing opposition to
authoritarianism in Zimbabwe
LEARNING OUTCOMES
(1) discuss the origins of the problems Zimbabwe has experienced
since the mid-1990s
(2) explain the government's attitude towards these problems
(3) trace the rise of civil society and its challenge to Zanu-PF's
repression
(4) trace the origins of Zimbabwe's land problems
(5) determine whether the government has made a serious effort to
attend to these problems
(6) evaluate the consequences of the conflict for the country
(7) discuss the deteriorating situation in Zimbabwe prior to the
2008 elections
(8) understand the formation of a power-sharing government and
the problems facing it
A READ
Your most important reading material for this study unit are the
articles by Van der Walt (1998), Sachikonye (2000), Addision and
Laakso (2003), Tarisayi (2009) and Soko and Balchin (2009).
16.1 INTRODUCTION
This section deals with the problems Zimbabwe has experienced since
the mid-1990s. At the time of writing (2011) major events were still
unfolding in the country. Among them were rampant inflation, food and
petrol shortages, the absence of foreign exchange, and a stand-off
between the government and civil society led by the opposition, the
MDC. The country was embroiled in conflict that could be categorised
as a ``low-key'' civil war, as citizens of the country were clashing with
one another. Violence escalated after the disputed 2008 elections.
In their article, Addison and Laakso (2003) devote a section to the rise
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of civil society. Civil society was in the forefront of the fight against
Mugabe's authoritarianism. The two authors start their discussion by
admitting that Zimbabwe's civil society is weaker than that of
neighbouring South Africa. However, they add that it has the potential
to halt and reverse the country's increasing anarchy (Addison & Laakso
2003:465). They identify the following factors that underpin the vigour
of the Zimbabwean society:
. the high level of education among Zimbabweans
. the role of the independent press
. Zimbabwe's independent judiciary
. the formation of civil groups that advocate political and human rights
. church leaders who are becoming more outspoken
After you have completed this study unit, you should be able to discuss
any of these factors.
Zimbabwe's independence started on a positive note. Mugabe's
independence speech was reconciliatory and set apprehensive whites
at ease. In his speech he urged both blacks and whites to forget the past
and work together to build their country. De Waal (1990:45) points out
that Mugabe's reconciliation speech stemmed the tide when he assured
whites that they and their property would come to no harm under a
black government, because the government would rule Zimbabwe in
accordance with the constitution. During the first five years Zimbabwe
achieved success. It was a model state that was envied by other African
states. But things went wrong towards the end of the first decade of
Zimbabwe's independence, and continued to go wrong throughout the
rest of the second decade. The once peaceful and successful country
endured problems that resulted in conflict and rising opposition to the
ruling party.
16.2 FROM SUCCESS TO FAILURE

What went wrong in Zimbabwe? The articles by Van der Walt (1998),
Sachikonye (2002) and Addision and Laakso (2003) attempt to provide
us with the answers to this question. Remember that you need to be
familiar with the contents of these articles.
In study unit 7 we briefly discussed the problems Zimbabwe
experienced towards the end of the first decade and the government's
subsequent implementation of an adjustment programme. Many people
were experiencing hardships in the first half of the 1990s, yet there
was very little outward expression of discontentment. However, this
changed as the problems multiplied and became more acute.
Zimbabwe's economy, which had been declining from the middle of
the second decade of the country's independence, became worse. This
resulted in strike action that rocked the country towards the end of the
1990s (Van der Walt 1998:87).
104
Sachikonye (2002) attributes the country's political, economic and

social problems to the ruling party, Zanu-PF. He points out that the
crisis the country faced was born out of the authoritarianism
orchestrated by Zanu as the country's problems increased and the
masses started to get restless and embarked on protest action.
ACTIVITY
Who else supports Sachikonye's viewpoint?
FEEDBACK
Addison and Laakso (2003:465) support this viewpoint. They say
that ``political terror is the state's response so that paradoxically
Zimbabwe's descent into conflict is an outcome of the spread of a
democratic culture across society at large''.
What Sachikonye seems to be saying is that the people whose problems

were increasing would not have revolted if the government had
attended to their needs. Instead government adopted an authoritarian
approach. This means that the government was insensitive to the plight
of the masses.
K QUESTION
Do you think this statement is true? Can you substantiate your answer?
16.3 ZIMBABWE'S CONTINUING ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Van der Walt (1998), Sachikonye (2002) and Addision and Laakso
(2003) identify several factors that were responsible for the economic
problems which led to declining living conditions and widespread
discontentment. These factors included:
. the government's adoption of the economic structural adjustment
programme (ESAP)
. payoffs to war veterans
. the involvement in the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC)
. corruption of the political elite
The economic structural adjustment programme (ESAP)

Both Sachikonye (2002:14) and Addison and Laakso (2003:460) point
out that the government was hopeful that the ESAP would help the
country ``turn the corner'' by reinvigorating the economy. It was hoped
that the ESAP would increase growth and lead to the creation of about
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100 000 new jobs. However, the programme did not result in any
significant progress with regard to economic growth. In fact, the
number of unemployed Zimbabweans increased. The ESAP eroded
incomes, raised the cost of living and forced firms to retrench workers
(Sachikonye 1998:8). Addison and Laakso (2003:460) say the design
and implementation of the ESAP was ``botched'' ± indeed a strong term
to describe the failure of the ESAP.
Payoffs to war veterans and involvement in die DRC

The Zimbabwean government was not only faced with angry people
from outside the party, even people who were closely associated with
the party expressed their anger towards the government. They
included former combatants, otherwise known as war veterans; these
former guerrillas felt that they were being neglected by their comrades
who were now living in luxury. They demanded compensation. The
government had no alternative but to give the war veterans a one-off
payment from funds that had not been budgeted for. Sachikonye
(2002), Van der Walt (1998) and Addison and Laakso (2003) discuss the
effects of this payout on the economy. They also look at the role of the
Zimbabwean government's intervention in the war in the DRC. There is
no doubt that these were both costly exercises.
Corruption of the political elite

While the country was experiencing problems, the political elite were
involved in corruption. Corruption resulted in the loss of billions of
Zimbabwean dollars through shady contracts (Sachikonye 2002:15).
The government failed to deal with corruption.
16.4 STRIKE ACTION

When the situation did not improve, strike action, protests, demon-
strations and stay-away actions became a regular feature in Zimbabwe
during the next three years (1997±1999). Although the strikes were
initially organised by workers' unions, many wildcat strikes were also
held. Later on the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) co-
ordinated strike actions to increase their effectiveness. The ZCTU
emerged as an important roleplayer in these activities and, according to
Van der Walt (1998:105), it began to confront the state on broad social
and political issues.
ACTIVITY
What were these strikes about and who participated?
106
FEEDBACK
The answer to this question is found in Van der Walt's article
(1998:87±88). The major reason behind the strikes was dissatis-
faction with the standard of living and low salaries. The strikes
mostly involved workers from the public sector who were
dissatisfied with low wage increases and demanded high increases.
16.5 PROTEST ACTION

The end of the 1990s saw the country's problems taking a turn for the
worse. In 1998, the economy grew by a mere 1,5 percent. Inflation was
at an all-time high of 52,8 percent; unemployment stood at a staggering
50 percent; and interest rates were above 50 percent (Meldrum
1999:16). The country attracted no foreign investment and foreign
exchange was at an all-time low. This alone had serious consequences
for the country as goods essential to agriculture, commerce and
industry could not be imported.
The situation became critical in 1999, when the country started
running short of fuel and currency. These shortages struck at the heart
of the economy. Motorists queued for hours to get petrol, which was
rationed. Zimbabwe also suffered from an energy shortage and
electricity was rationed. The country owed Eskom, its South African
supplier of electricity, millions of rands. In 2004, Eskom insisted that it
would only supply Zimbabwe with energy after an upfront payment
had been made.
The government's failure to deal with corruption was accompanied by
its neglect of public sector workers who complained about their meagre
salaries. This did not prevent the government from giving hefty
increases to Mugabe, his cabinet and members of parliament (Van der
Walt 1998:98).
Through all these problems, Mugabe remained defiant. He blamed
everyone but himself. He blamed whites for hoarding fuel and foreign
exchange. He was involved in acrimonious exchanges with the IMF,
which he blamed for the country's chronic economic problems. The
IMF withheld funds because of Zimbabwe's involvement in the war in
the DRC.
The dissatisfaction with political and economic events in the country
compelled the ZCTU to assume a leadership role in the fight against the
government. It organised coordinated protests, demonstrations and
stay-away actions. In 1997, the trade union movement organised the
largest mass action ever seen in the country to oppose a 5 percent levy
introduced by the government to fund war veterans' pensions (Addison
& Laakso 2003:464).
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The labour movement laid the blame for the deterioration of the
situation squarely at the door of the government, accusing it of
corruption and maladministration.
Formation of the MDC

The labour movement was instrumental in the formation of a new
opposition group, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The
MDC was welcomed enthusiastically and the secretary-general of the
ZCTU, Morgan Tsvangirai was elected as the MDC's president. The
MDC was founded as the result of a broad coalition of social forces,
including civil society and its various components such as labour,
youth, students, the middle class and business (Sachikonye 2002:17).
The government's decision to draft a new constitution added another
dimension to the struggle between the government and its foes. The
government had appointed a Constitutional Committee (CC) to solicit
the views of Zimbabweans on a constitution that would replace the one
drawn up during the Lancaster House talks. The CC was boycotted by
extraparliamentary organisations that came together under the
umbrella of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) in May 1997
(Addison & Laakso 2003:463). They accused the CC of being composed
of too many people closely associated with Zanu-PF and said its
recommendations would favour the ruling party.
When the draft constitution was made public in January 2000, it
confirmed the NCA's suspicions. Some of the clauses conferred more
power upon Mugabe. These included the retention of an executive
presidency, the creation of a new post of prime minister appointed by
the president and an opportunity to serve two further five-year terms.
It also gave the government the right to seize white-owned farms
without paying any compensation. When the draft constitution was put
to the vote on the weekend of 12 and 13 February 2000, the ``No'' vote
campaigned for by the NCA won the day. According to Addison and
Laakso (2003:464), this was the first time that the government had lost
at the polling booth. This victory by organisations opposed to the
government was seen as a forerunner of events anticipated during the
2000 general election. The government blamed whites for inflating the
``No'' vote to save their farms.
16.6 CONFLICT BEFORE AND AFTER THE 2000 ELECTIONS

The government's defeat occurred a few months before the 2000
parliamentary elections were due to be held. The country was tense
and there were more and more incidents of violence as the election date
drew nearer. The elections were held amid continuing violence and
harassment. We have already explained that the outcome of the
elections was disputed by the MDC while international observers
pointed out that the elections had not been free and fair.
The period between the parliamentary and presidential elections in
108
2002 saw the escalation of violence in the country. The violence

involved the government on the one side, and farmers and the civil
society (including the opposition party) on the other. Sachikonye
(2002:16) discusses the violence that occurred during the period prior
to the elections. The violence resulted in the deaths and displacement
of thousands of people.
ACTIVITY
Who does Sachikonye (2002) blame for the violence?
FEEDBACK
The violence was orchestrated by the war veterans and youths, who
were aligned to Zanu-PF.
Note Sachikonye's (2002:18) description of the government's manipu-

lation of the elections. Various laws were introduced to hamper the
election campaign of the opposition party.
Violence continued unabated after the 2000 parliamentary elections.
The articles by Addison and Laakso (2003) and Sachikonye (2002)
describe the violence and intimidation in Zimbabwe, and how it
affected the MDC's election campaign. Please read the relevant pages.
16.7 ZIMBABWE'S PERENNIAL LAND CRISIS

Why were the nationalist movements formed? It was all about land.
Land was the central issue in the struggle to liberate Zimbabwe. It was
used by the nationalist movements to recruit peasants to join the
struggle and to repossess white farmers' land. The nationalist move-
ments promised peasants that land would be redistributed after the
victory. At the time the nationalist movements envisaged an outright
victory over the Smith regime.
ACTIVITY
How did the failure to achieve an outright victory hamper Zanu±
PF's intentions to redistribute land to peasants?
FEEDBACK
The Lancaster House Agreement determined what the Zanu-PF
government could do when it assumed power. Among other things it
stipulated that Zanu-PF could not arbitrarily seize white-owned
farms.
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16.8 GOVERNMENT'S HALF-HEARTED ATTEMPTS TO REDISTRIBUTE

LAND
Addison and Laakso (2003:459) inform us that when independence was
gained, Zimbabwe had an unequal distribution of land. Landless
peasant families constituted more than 50 percent of the population. It
is this inequality that Zanu-PF promised to correct. The land problem
has been with the Mugabe government since it came to power and still
remains a contentious and sensitive issue, because the Zimbabwean
government has not been able to fulfil its promise to repossess the land
and redistribute it to the peasants. Only a minimal amount of land has
been purchased and very few people have benefited from this.
According to Addison and Laakso (2003:459), only 3,5 million hectares
had been transferred to 73 000 families by the end of 1998. Another
525 000 families were still awaiting resettlement.
The Lancaster House Agreement was seen as the major stumbling block
in the way of land reforms. The Agreement stipulated the following
(Stoneman & Cliffe 1989:166):
. land must be bought on the basis of a willing buyer and a willing
seller
. payment must be in foreign currency
. payment must be adequate and prompt
During the Lancaster House conference a number of organisations had

made monetary pledges to assist in the acquisition of land for
redistribution, but these pledges were not honoured.
Familiarise yourself with the three factors that slowed down the land
reform, according to Addison and Laakso (2003:459).
Despite government's failure to redistribute land, this issue faded in
the mid-1980s. It resurfaced towards the end of the decade, when
peasants put renewed pressure on the government to address their
plight. Zanu-PF raised it during election campaigns to win the vote of
the peasants, but otherwise the land reform issue was not taken
seriously by the government.
K Do you agree that the land reform issue was used for the government's
convenience?
16.9 THE FRESH APPROACH TO LAND REDISTRIBUTION

When the 10-year term of the Lancaster House constitution came to an
end in 1990, the government took steps to make amendments to the
constitution to facilitate land resettlement (Van der Walt 1998:95).
Accordingly the Land Acquisition Act was passed in 1993. This Act
allowed the government to cancel the leases of a number of white
farmers on state-owned farms.
110
The Land Acquisition Act drew strong protests from farmers and other
interest groups. For the first time the government ignored the protests
of white farmers, who on previous occasions had succeeded in
prevailing on the government not to take over their land for
redistribution. Reacting to criticism about the unfairness of this
legislation, Mugabe angrily retorted in The Herald:
Unfairness? Now. Was it ever fair to seize [land] from the people
in the first place? Was colonialism fair in seizing land and
giving it to the whites? So we are actually being very fair, fairer
than the colonialists (Moyo 1992:320).
The land issue emerged strongly towards the end of the second decade
of Zanu-PF's rule. The government announced that it was going to
nationalise half the country's commercial farmland owned by whites
for redistribution to blacks (Meldrum 1998:8). It revealed that the
white owners would not be paid market value for their properties
(including improvements and land), but only for buildings and other
permanent improvements. The announcement disturbed white farm-
ers, who voiced their opposition loudly.
ACTIVITY
What effect could these land reforms have had on the economy of
Zimbabwe?
FEEDBACK
Economists were alarmed at the boldness and determination of the
government. They were concerned about the effect that land
reforms would have on the economy. The agricultural sector
constitutes 30 percent of the GDP and produces 40 percent of the
country's annual export earnings (Meldrum 1998:11). This sector is
the breadbasket of the country. White farmers also employ
thousands of black workers on their farms. If the farms were
repossessed, these workers would find themselves not only without
employment, but also without a place to stay.
The beginning of the year 2000 saw Zanu-PF making a concerted effort
to seize white-owned farms. It used both illegal and constitutional
methods to achieve its goals.
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A draft constitution, which was supposed to replace the one adopted

during the Lancaster House talks, included a clause that would have
empowered the government to seize farms without fair compensation.
Farmers would only get compensation for structures erected on their
farms. This draft constitution was rejected when put to a referendum.
The government did not take kindly to this rejection and accused
whites of having orchestrated the rejection. There were threats that
government would nevertheless go ahead and seize white-owned farms.
Since Zanu-PF had lost the referendum and an election was due in the
same year, the repossession of land became an emotive issue.
16.10 THE FORCEFUL SEIZURE OF FARMS

It is true that threats of seizing white-owned farms had been made in
the past but not carried out, yet this time around the mood was far
more serious and gave rise to concern. Soon after the above-mentioned
referendum, people calling themselves war veterans started to invade
the farms. Farm owners were intimidated, assaulted and told to
surrender their farms. A court order to have the invaders removed was
ignored. Addison and Laakso (2003:464) explain how the war veterans
invaded farms. Read their article to find out how the invasions affected
the Zimbabwean economy.
ACTIVITY
What was the government's attitude to the farm invasions?
FEEDBACK
The government did not speak out against the invasions. No attempt
was made to stop these invasions. In fact, the police refused to evict
war veterans, first claiming that it was a political matter and later
saying they did not have the capacity to stop the invasions. Mugabe
supported the invasions and the accompanying violence (Addison &
Laakso 2003:464). Not only did the government encourage and
applaud the violation of its own laws, it also defied court rulings
against illegal actions.
How did the government legalise farm invasions? Find the answer on
page 464 of the article by Addison and Laakso (2003).
112
113 APC3701/1
Mugabe blamed the white farmers and Britain for the prevailing land
problem. He argued that farmers were refusing to alleviate the
suffering of landless people by offering the government land, and
accused Britain of having failed to keep its Lancaster House promise to
make funds available for the purchase of land. Britain was presented as
the enemy that wanted to recolonise Zimbabwe.
A meeting between the governments of Britain and Zimbabwe failed to
produce a solution to the land crisis and invasions. Britain said it could
only talk about this issue if the Zimbabwean government satisfied the
following conditions:
. put an end to the land invasions
. stop the violence
. promise a free and fair election
With the stand-off between the two governments remaining, the

invasions and the violence continued unabated. Peasants who were
promised land also joined the invasions. White farms were seized from
their owners and property was damaged. White farmers received no
compensation. The seizure of farms was accompanied by violence and
some farmers were killed.
16.11 IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONFLICT

We have already discussed the causes of the conflict that engulfed
Zimbabwe. Below we will discuss the consequences of this conflict.
The intensified farm invasions occurred when the country was
preparing for presidential elections in 2002. As we have explained,
this period was marked by government repression ± both farmers and
the opposition were on the receiving end of government repression.
The evictions continued and after the presidential elections the
government ordered 2 900 white farmers to stop all activities on their
farms. These farmers were then given 45 days to leave their property.
Farmers who defied the order were arrested (Addison & Laakso
2003:465). A discussion of the harassment of civil society by the
government appears in the article by Addison and Laakso (2003:465).
The evictions created uncertainty among commercial farmers. As a
result, many of them stopped cultivating their lands. Production and
export figures dropped, and less foreign currency was earned.
Zimbabwe's economy was on the verge of collapsing: inflation was
over 420 percent, unemployment was at its highest and 70 percent of
the population lived in poverty. There were shortages of food, petrol
and currency.
People could no longer withdraw salaries that had been deposited into
bank accounts. To compound the problem, the government ran out of
money to print currency. Because it was hard to get money out of the
bank, people were reluctant to deposit it. They kept it in safes and in
114
their homes. The government blamed these ``hoarders'' for the

country's cash crisis. The country's petrol crisis did not improve and
long queues at petrol stations became a common sight.
After the parliamentary elections, three senior officials of the
opposition were arrested and charged with plotting to kill Mugabe
and overthrowing the government. The repression of civil society
continued and the government took strong measures to stop protest
actions such as stay-away actions and demonstrations. Civil liberties
were eroded as tough measures were introduced to prevent journalists
from operating in Zimbabwe. The offices of the opposition newspaper,
Daily News, were firebombed. The government eventually closed down
this newspaper.
Solutions to Zimbabwe's problems were suggested, but these were not
well received by the government. Instead government continued its
onslaught on the opposition and the white farming community. The
continuing repression resulted in sanctions being imposed on senior
members of the government. These sanctions included a ban on
travelling overseas and the freezing of their bank accounts in foreign
countries. Zimbabwe was also suspended from the Commonwealth.
Donor agencies and some donor countries withheld their aid, which
was much needed as Zimbabwe was facing a severe drought and
serious food shortages. However, this made no impression on the
Zimbabwean government.
Zimbabwe is a member of the SADC, which had also tried to prevail
upon Mugabe to lift some of the repressive measures imposed by his
government and to explore other methods of redistributing land. Again
Mugabe's response was not positive.
The Western world led by Britain and the United States, urged for
strong censure and action against Mugabe by countries such as South
Africa. South Africa was expected to take the lead in talking tough to
Mugabe. However, Thabo Mbeki, the president of South Africa, had his
own ideas about resolving the conflict in Zimbabwe. He favoured what
came to be known as ``quiet diplomacy''. He argued that the
Zimbabweans had to find their own solution to their problems, and
he was in favour of negotiations between the two adversaries, Zanu-PF
and the MDC. Talks between the two parties never took place, because
Mugabe insisted that his victory in the presidential elections should be
recognised. He demanded that the MDC withdraw their legal action
against him and accept the results of the elections.
Zimbabwe's economic problems still continued unabated. The coun-
try's annual inflation rate reached 526 percent in October 2003,
making it the highest in the world. The cost of living went up by 525,8
percent. Zimbabwe's economy was described as the fastest shrinking
economy in the world, with gross domestic product having fallen 40
percent in four years (www.independent.co.za, 19 November 2003).
As a result of the problems in Zimbabwe and Mugabe's intransigence,
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the Commonwealth of Nations suspended Zimbabwe in 2002. When a

Commonwealth meeting was held in 2003, Zimbabwe was hopeful that
its suspension would be lifted. When this did not happen, Mugabe
withdrew Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth. With the exception of
Botswana, the SADC countries expressed their anger at Zimbabwe's
continued suspension from the Commonwealth.
16.12 ZIMBABWE FROM ONE CRISIS TO ANOTHER

The period following the 2000 elections in Zimbabwe was charac-
terised by violence. The violence was directed against members and
supporters of the MDC in both the urban and rural areas. In the rural
areas sporadic violence occurred during the forced seizure of farms.
Both farm owners and their workers bore the brunt of the violence. As a
campaign of repression against the opposition intensified, the rule of
law came under severe pressure as it was not respected. The victims of
violence had no recourse to the law. The farm owners also had no
protection from the authorities when they reported the illegal seizure of
their properties. The police were reluctant to enforce court orders to
prevent the illegal seizure of farms.
The continued repression in Zimbabwe was a cause for concern to
western countries, particularly Britain and the United States. Organi-
sations such as the European Union were also alarmed at the worsening
situation in Zimbabwe. They had called upon Mugabe to stop the
violence and to ensure that open political participation be allowed. As
their pleas went unheeded, they decided on imposing sanctions on
Zimbabwe in order to pressurise Mugabe to end the repression against
the opposition.
ACTIVITY
Sanctions imposed against Zimbabwe
You have no doubt come across the concept ``sanctions''. But
what does it exactly mean? Sanctions are punitive restrictive
measures imposed upon a country and/or targeted individuals.
The measures are wide ranging and could include among others
the following activities: trade, sports, entertainment, arts and
arms.
Which country in Southern Africa do you know of that was
subjected to sanctions?
Britain, the US and the EU were the first to impose sanctions against
Zimbabwe. According to Smith-HoÈhn (2010:23), restrictions on arms
and military-related trade were the first in a series of steps taken as a
result of dissatisfaction with developments in Zimbabwe. Australia,
New Zealand and Switzerland also imposed an arms embargo from
116
2002. Targeted sanctions were later imposed on individuals and

businesses in Zimbabwe. These comprised an asset freeze as well as a
travel ban. The asset freeze meant that bank accounts of the targeted
individuals were frozen. The travel ban meant that they were
prevented from going to countries that had imposed the sanctions.
For example, they could not go to countries that comprised the EU; this
means over 20 countries. The people who were targeted belonged to the
inner circle of Zanu-PF. The sanctions were for a specified period after
which they were supposed to be reviewed. When the period elapsed,
they were re-imposed after it had been found that the political situation
had not improved in Zimbabwe. In March 2009, US President, Barack
Obama, extended targeted sanctions for another 12 months citing a
lack of progress in resolving the political crisis in Zimbabwe (Smith-
HoÈhn 2010:23). It should be noted that the sanctions imposed on
Zimbabwe were not comprehensive, they only target individuals.
However, the Mugabe government has blamed the country's economic
problems on the sanctions. Smith-HoÈhn (2010:24), who refers to them
as smart sanctions, expresses the view that
Mugabe's manipulative use of terminology by describing smart
sanctions as illegal has meant that instead of pressuring
Mugabe and his allies, these measures have been taken hostage
and are often used as scapegoat, with the Mugabe government
publicly blaming it for the economic decline.
Many Zimbabweans have, however, bought into the story that the
country's economic problems are due to the comprehensive sanctions
imposed upon the country. Most EU countries are still trading with
Zimbabwe. The EU is steadfast that conditions for the lifting of the
sanctions have not been met by Zimbabwe. This includes halting the
fast-track land reform process.
Suppression of protests
Zimbabwe's next elections were held in 2004 and 2005. Although there
was violence during campaigning, it was not as severe as that which
occurred in the previous elections. However, according to Jack Straw,
the British Foreign Secretary, the elections were seriously flawed (BBC
News 2005:1). He pointed out that thousands of voters were turned
away at polling stations and there were serious discrepancies between
votes tallied and the official numbers later announced. In short, he
meant that the elections had been rigged. These elections were won by
Zanu-PF, which gained 78 seats to the MDC's 41. An independent
candidate won 1 seat.
The country remained on a knife-edge after these elections, as violence
continued. There was continued animosity between Zanu-PF and the
MDC. In March 2007, Tsvangirai was badly assaulted when leading a
protest demonstration. Protests and demonstrations organised by the
MDC and civil society were brutally suppressed. In May 2005 the
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government launched Operation Murambatsvina during which illegal

dwellings and informal traders were destroyed, leaving thousands of
people without accommodation (Prys 2009:194). According to Tarisayi
(2009:20), since 2004, the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) had made efforts to resolve the political impasse between the
two parties, but without much success. In March 2007 the SADC
mandated then South African President, Thabo Mbeki to mediate
between the two parties (Matlosa 2010:211). This appointment was
endorsed by the African Union.
Mbeki's mediation efforts and continuing violence

The mediation of Mbeki in Zimbabwe is a very contentious issue. Mbeki
was a proponent of what was referred to as ``quiet diplomacy'' as
opposed to ``tough open negotiations''. According to Prys (2009:195),
quiet diplomacy is defined as a combination of measures that include
behind-the-scene engagements, secret negotiations, and subtle coaxing.
According to Soko & Balchin, the policy of ``quiet diplomacy'' was
predicated on the use of non-violent means to encourage Mugabe's
regime to facilitate democratic change in Zimbabwe. There are differing
views about Mbeki's ``quiet diplomacy''. One view was that it was the
most appropriate given the situation while another view was that it
was not a good strategy and was never going to be successful. Those
who held the latter view derided Mbeki's ``quiet diplomacy'', as for a
long time no tangible progress was achieved. Mbeki's mediation was
also referred to as shuttle diplomacy as he frequently had to go to
Zimbabwe to meet the adversaries. Mbeki did not have an easy time
and made heavy weather in his mediation efforts.
A view was expressed that Mugabe out-manoeuvred Mbeki and used
the mediation for his own purpose, which was to remain in power.
Mbeki seemed to have been out of his depth when dealing with Mugabe.
Mugabe proved to be a tricky customer to deal with. At times he would
appear to be a reasonable person by making promises which he would
never fulfil. The MDC was not overly satisfied with Mbeki's mediation
efforts and questioned his impartiality. They saw him as being
favourably disposed towards Mugabe and being anti-MDC. On a
number of occasions the MDC had called upon the SADC to withdraw
him as a mediator. But the SADC had turned down the request,
expressing its satisfaction with Mbeki's mediation efforts.
ACTIVITY
What are your views on Mbeki's mediation strategy? (Quiet
diplomacy)
Worsening of Zimbabwe's crisis

The political, economic and social situation did not improve in
118
Zimbabwe as the country was heading towards the 2008 elections.

Mugabe had unilaterally declared the date for the elections which was
seen as a snub for the mediator, Mbeki (Southern Africa Report
2009:6). The preparations for the elections occurred in a context of
suffering never witnessed in the country since independence. The
situation simply moved from bad to worse. The article by Tarisayi
which you should read, encapsulates this suffering. Tarisayi (2009:12)
points out that according to the International Crisis Group, May 2008
update, over four million people were in desperate need of food . The
country experienced political, social and economic problems. Of all the
country's problems, inflation was the worst. Zimbabwe's inflation
reached an all-time high during this period. On page 12, Tarisayi
tabulates the problems which the country experienced. Take note of
these problems. Zimbabwe's economy was not performing and as such
was not able to maintain the country, nor to bring in much needed
foreign currency.
The country's currency was not worth the paper it was printed on. It
was worthless and was even rejected by its citizens in preference to the
pula of Botswana and South Africa's rand. Where did the country's
problems originate from? Tarisayi, like Van der Walt, attributes this to
the payout made to the war veterans, the country's involvement in the
DRC dispute, shortage of foreign currency, and most importantly, the
seizure of farms which had a devastating effect on the country's
economy. She points out that the eviction of productive farmers and the
inequitable and irrational redistribution policies destroyed the very
foundation of Zimbabwe's economy (Tarisayi 2009:19). The land grab
and eviction of farmers left 300 000 farm workers without employment
and nearly two million people without a livelihood. It also left the
nation without food. The agricultural sector which was the engine of
the country's economy was severely affected. Take note of the method
which the Governor of the Reserve Bank, Gideon Gono, used to solve
the country's cash-flow problems. From the article, identify the factors
that contributed to the shortage of foreign currency.
Tarisayi (2009:17) points out that the political and economic factors
had a ripple effect impacting on many other sectors in the society.
There was an increase in poverty and unemployment leading to crime,
disease and mass starvation. The morale of the country was low. There
was a shortage of bare necessities in stores. This situation was
exacerbated when owners of businesses were told to reduce their
prices by 50 percent. This resulted in people virtually descending on
these businesses and buying everything that was on offer at a
discounted price. These problems resulted in a mass immigration of
people to neighbouring countries with South Africa being the favoured
destination. This affected the health and education sectors as qualified
people and professionals were among those who left the country. It is
estimated that over three million people left Zimbabwe and are living in
the diaspora (Tarisayi 2009:17). People who worked in the education
sector and remained in Zimbabwe failed to report for work for most of
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the time, because of poor remuneration. What they earned was just not
enough for them to go to work. Take note of the suffering of the
Zimbabwean people as discussed by Tarisayi (2009:19).
During these hardships, the 2008 elections were approaching. Among
one of his mandates, Mbeki was supposed to ensure that the
environment in the country was conducive to free and fair elections.
Given the nature of the previous elections, this was important so as to
prevent the eruption of violence and intimidation of the opposition.
Zimbabwe signed the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing
Democratic Elections.
ACTIVITY
What is the purpose of these guidelines?
FEEDBACK
Refer to Tarisayi's article.
Elections and heightened crisis

Unlike previous elections, these ones went on peacefully from start to
finish. According to Tarisayi (2009:21), between January and March
2008, opposition parties managed to hold rallies in most parts of the
country with only few instances of violence reported. At this juncture it
is important to mention that the MDC had undergone a split giving rise
to a faction led by Arthur Mutambara. It was known as MDC-M to
distinguish it from the MDC-T, led by Tsvangirai.
There was a delay in announcing the results which led to suspicion of
something underhand being done. The election results were not what
Zanu-PF was used to and had expected. However, it was already
speculated that Zanu-PF had lost its majority in parliament. This was
confirmed when the results were officially released after a delay of
about a week. Zanu-PF had won 97 seats, MDC-T won 99 and the other
MDC faction led by Mutambara gained 10 seats. This was the first time
since the country's independence that Zanu-PF lost its majority in
parliament. Zanu-PF grudgingly accepted the results.
As none of the presidential candidates had won a clear majority, this
necessitated a run-off election which was set for 27 June. The
candidates for this election were Mugabe and Tsvangirai. While the
two candidates were preparing themselves for the elections, the
country was visited by violence that was aimed at the opposition.
Tarisayi (2009:22) describes the magnitude of the violence. She points
out that Zanu-PF's campaign was laden with threats of war; statements
such as `Zimbabwe was won through the bullet and not through the
120
ballot' were common. The violence gained momentum and no effort

was made to bring it to an end. The scale of the violence was such that
even Thabo Mbeki made efforts for the elections to be cancelled
(Tarisayi 2009:23). He, however, did not succeed in postponing it.
Concerned by the violence and fearing that innocent people may lose
their lives, Tsvangirai opted to withdraw. The elections nevertheless
went ahead and Mugabe easily won the one-horse race. However, no
country recognised Mugabe's victory due to the violence. The
organisations and countries which monitored the elections were not
satisfied with the conduct of the elections. Amongst them were the Pan
African Parliament, Botswana and the SADC. They had all condemned
the elections, but their condemnation was not translated into action
(Tarisayi 2009:23). Mugabe was not censured nor had punitive action
been taken against him. Mugabe became the president of the country
which was a face-saver after his party had lost the parliamentary
elections. It was business as usual as the SADC started warming up to
him. The political stalemate remained unresolved and continued
breaking out from time to time. The MDC and Zanu-PF continued their
distrust of one another. The SADC at this juncture had thrown its
weight behind Mugabe. Of the SADC members, it was only Botswana
and Zambia which were critical of Mugabe.
Breakthrough in Mbeki's mediation efforts

With political instability continuing and the country's economy
showing no signs of improving, Mbeki continued working in the
background consulting the warring factions to end the stalemate. The
three parties (including MDC-M) also held their own separate meetings.
These talks frequently deadlocked and Mbeki was summoned to kick-
start them (Southern Africa Report 2008:6). With no hope on the
horizon for an early breakthrough, an announcement was made that the
parties were close to reaching an agreement. On 21 July 2008, the
three parties came together and signed a Memorandum of Under-
standing (MOU) which was to pave the way for substantive talks
between them (Sasa 2008:20). This was a proud moment for Thabo
Mbeki who savoured the occasion, feeling vindicated for his quiet
diplomacy. Mbeki congratulated the three leaders as he gently coerced
them to shake hands for the international media which had gathered in
Harare to bring to the world this momentous occasion which was only
second to the inauguration of Zimbabwe's independence. In their
speeches which followed the signing, the three leaders committed
themselves to working to bring peace and stability to the country. Here
are excerpts from their speeches (Sasa 2008:21):
Mutambara
''We must put national interest before personal interests. We
must be driven by national interests as we negotiate in the next
two weeks. The people's will must be supreme and sovereign.
Let's have shared national economic vision.''
121 APC3701/1
Tsvangirai
''My commitment to this process is unquestionable, it is not
superficial, it is total because we want to achieve what
Zimbabweans out there want to achieve. I sincerely believe that
if we put out heads together, we can find a solution; not finding
a solution is not an option.''
Mugabe
''As we begin this interaction, we shall be doing so as
Zimbabweans, entirely as Zimbabwean with the help of South
Africa. And we should cut whatever influences on us from
Europe and the United States. We must act as Zimbabweans,
think as Zimbabweans, be masters of our own destiny.''
The signing of the MOU led to the coming into being of the Global
Political Agreement (GPA) in September 2008. The GPA led to the
formation of an inclusive government in February 2009 (Matalosa
2010:196). The power-sharing government was constituted with
Mugabe remaining as president of the country. Tsvangirai became
the Prime Minister and Mutambara was appointed as one of the Deputy
Prime ministers. Cabinet positions were supposed to be shared
equitably between the parties. According to the agreement, the three
leaders were supposed to act in concert at all times in the appointment
of people to senior positions. Disputes and misunderstandings between
the parties were supposed to be referred to the Joint Monitoring and
Implementation Committee (JOMIC).
Naturally the people of Zimbabwe who were at the receiving end of
political and economic instability welcomed the power-sharing govern-
ment as it signalled hope for them. However, there was scepticism
about the agreement particularly from Britain and the US who adopted
a ``wait and see attitude''. They did not trust Mugabe, given his past
behaviour. They insisted that they wanted to see progress in
accordance with the agreement before they could give it their support.
They were not in a hurry to recognise it and give legitimacy to Mugabe.
They were also not prepared to lift sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe.
Problems and challenges facing the power-sharing government

It did not take long for those sceptical of the agreement to be proven
right that Mugabe was not to be trusted. This confirmation occurred
during the swearing in of the cabinet ministers. Mugabe was not
prepared to swear in Roy Bennett whom the MDC had chosen to be the
deputy minister of agriculture. Instead of enjoying the privilege of
being a minister, Bennett was arrested and charged with treason. This
infuriated the MDC.
The GPA has not been without its fair share of problems, all attributed
to Mugabe. There has been continuing friction between the parties,
particularly the MDC and Mugabe. In the two years that the agreement
122
was signalled, there has been continued wrangling between the parties
over a multitude of issues. The leaders of the two parties were
ambivalent on the GPA. At times they would express the view that it
was the only alternative and was working, albeit there were a few
teething problems. The next time they would raise doubts about it.
There were accusations and counter-accusations between the parties.
This is the view held by Molomo (2010:65) on the power-sharing
government:
Although the government of national unity was embraced by
both ZANU-PF and the MDC and the SADC, it was stillborn. ZANU-
PF, which has held on to key positions in government and has no
veto powers, has continued to erode the concessions won by the
opposition. The power-sharing deal has only served to legitimize
the authoritarian rule of Mugabe without the opposition gaining
any effective concessions. Zimbabwe remains at a crossroads
and a lasting peace is not in sight.
What heightened tension between the parties, was Mugabe's arbitrary

appointment of people in senior positions. Without consulting the other
parties he appointed provincial governors and ambassadors. He also
refused to dismiss the Governor of the Reserve Bank, Gideon Gono as
well as the Auditor-General. The MDC appealed in vain to the SADC to
intervene. Mugabe's action resulted in Tsvangirai threatening to pull
out of the power-sharing agreement. On 16 October 2009, he addressed
a press conference where he spelled out the reasons for his party's
intention to partially pull out, not from the government proper, but
disengaging from Zanu-PF and cabinet until all outstanding issues
bedevilling the power-sharing government had been resolved (Sasa
2009:20). This was rather confusing. Familiarise yourself with the
reasons advanced by Tsvangirai and decide if they were valid.
Towards the end of 2010 it was clear that the GPA was tottering and
only hanging by a thread as both Mugabe and Tsvangirai said it was not
working. Tsvangirai had threatened to take Mugabe to court for making
appointments without consulting the other parties to the agreement. He
described the appointments as `ùnconstitutional, null and void''.
Mugabe on the other hand, expressed the view that the power-sharing
agreement was not working. He accused the MDC of dragging its feet.
He called for elections to be held in 2011. It has been pointed out that
the atmosphere in Zimbabwe is not conducive for holding elections. At
the beginning of 2011 violence broke out again with both parties
accusing the other of the violence. MDC members had warned Mugabe
to drop his party's plans for an early election as this could lead to a
bloodbath.
Zanu-PF was agitating that sanctions against Zimbabwe must be lifted.
You may want to ask ``which sanctions?'' Be that as it may, those who
had imposed them were steadfast that there must be an improvement in
the country before talk about lifting sanctions could be entertained.
123 APC3701/1
Zanu-PF held the MDC responsible for the sanctions and said it should
campaign for them to be lifted. In February 2011, the EU announced
that it was extending the sanctions while it removed 35 names from the
travel-ban and asset-freeze list. The EU said it noted significant
progress in addressing Zimbabwe's economic crisis and in delivery of
basic social services (News24 2011:1).
Consider the following questions:
(1) Compare the approaches to land reform followed by Zimbabwe and
South Africa.
(2) To what extent has South Africa's ``quiet diplomacy'' with regard
to Zimbabwe succeeded? Do you think this is the best approach?
(1) Explain how the ESAP contributed to Zimbabwe's economic
hardships.
(2) Discuss the factors that led to the foundation of the MDC.
(3) Why was Zimbabwe's draft constitution, which was meant to
replace the Lancaster House constitution, rejected?
(4) Discuss the reasons for the increasing opposition against the
Zimbabwean government.
(5) Describe the efforts of the Zimbabwean government to
redistribute land to peasants.
(6) How did the ongoing conflict in Zimbabwe impact on the
country's politics and economy?
(7) Explain the situation in Zimbabwe prior to the 2008 elections.
(8) In your view, was the power-sharing government a solution to
Zimbabwe's problems? Motivate your answer.
124
STUDY UNIT 17
Factionalism in Zambian politics
LEARNING OUTCOMES
(1) trace the origins of factionalism in the third republic
(2) analyse the reasons for factionalism
(3) evaluate the effect of factionalism on the ruling party
(4) have an understanding of Chiluba's corrupt regime
(5) discuss Zambia under the leadership of Mwanawasa
A This is a very short study unit. The most important reading matter
for this study unit are the articles by Ihonvbere (1998), Van Donge
(2008), and Cheeseman & Hinfelaar (2009).
You should integrate points from other study units when you discuss
Zambia's third republic and the problems Zambia faced during that era.
17.1 INTRODUCTION
In comparison with the political conflict in Zimbabwe, where hundreds
of people lost their lives, Zambia experienced only minor problems.
Nobody came to any harm as a result of the conflict in Zambia. To call
the events in Zambia ``conflict'' is in fact an overstatement. The
appropriate term to use would be factionalism. The Zambian public
was entertained by their leaders' antics, which brought lighter
moments to the politics of the country. Zambian politics during the
third republic was characterised by factionalism within the MMD,
whose members frequently defected from the party ± they then joined
or formed other parties, or returned to the MMD.
17.2 ORIGINS OF FACTIONALISM IN THE THIRD REPUBLIC

We have already mentioned that the MMD was founded by disgruntled
former members of Kaunda's Unip party. Their reasons for leaving
Unip varied, but some of the founding members of the MMD had been
expelled from Unip for engaging in unlawful activities. Accusations of
drug trafficking were constantly made against some senior party
125 APC3701/1
Source: BBC Focus on Africa

126
leaders. The former Unip members did not see eye to eye, and when
they formed the MMD their bickering only continued. This resulted in
factionalism within the new party. After the party had come to power,
the factionalism did not disappear, it intensified. Chiluba's leadership
style did nothing to improve matters and party members accused him
of being autocratic.
The Chiluba government was in power for less than three years when
the MMD was rocked by defections. These came amidst allegations of
corruption and drug trafficking against senior party leaders (Ihonv-
bere 1998:230). Ihonvbere (1998) argues that corruption had become
so endemic that it divided the party, led to the dismissal or resignation
of several ministers and some founding members of the MMD, forced
the donor community to withhold foreign aid, and tainted the good
intentions of the government.
The MMD lost 13 members of parliament in 1993, among them 3
cabinet ministers. Other prominent supporters of the MMD also left the
party. This gave rise to the formation of another party, the National
Party (Ham 1993:32). The three officials who left the party were the
minister of foreign affairs, Vernon Mwaanga, the deputy speaker of
parliament, Sikota Wina, and his wife, Nakatindi Wina. Two other
parties were founded by former members of the MMD, namely the
Zambia Democratic Congress (ZADECO) and the Liberal Democratic
Party. They joined Unip as opposition parties. Over 34 parties were
founded in Zambia in a short period of time. Among the new parties
were ZADECO and the Caucus of National Unity (CNU).
ACTIVITY
What was the root cause of the MMD's problems after it had come
to power?
FEEDBACK
The MMD's problems were the result of corruption and a lack of
discipline in the first and second republics. These factors spilt over
into the third republic, because the same corrupt leaders of the
MMD occupied leadership positions in the new party. They were
untouchable and did not respect Chiluba.
The divisions within the MMD became more pronounced when the
country was heading for its third democratic elections. As we have
explained, Chiluba was reluctant to relinquish his position. He wanted
the constitution to be amended so that he could serve a third term, but
he was challenged by civil society and members of the MMD who asked
him to step down graciously. Church leaders, members of the legal
127 APC3701/1
fraternity and nongovernmental organisations supported the call for

Chiluba to step down. They formed an organisation called the Oasis
Forum, which campaigned against a third term. The ruling party was
weakened by the ongoing factionalism.
Chiluba was determined to serve a third term and took action against
party members opposed to the idea. A former vice-president, Christon
Tembo, and eight other ministers were dismissed for publicly opposing
the idea of a third term (Kunda 2000:14). Tembo responded by forming
a new party, the Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD). Other
ministers promised to join the FDD (Kunda 2000:16), but as the
election date drew closer, the FDD was also rocked by internal
squabbles. A number of senior party leaders made it known that they
intended to stand for the presidency of the country.
Intense public pressure forced Chiluba to abandon the idea of running
for a third term. He appointed Mwanawasa as his successor.
17.3 ZAMBIA UNDER LEADERSHIP OF MWANAWASA

After reluctantly standing down as the leader of Zambia when his
efforts to contest for a third term were defeated, Chiluba's ``ghost''
continued to haunt the country's politics. From the onset of his short
term in office, Mwanawasa had to contend with Chiluba's presence as
he was accused of being involved in corruption. This necessitated him
being brought to trial to face charges of corruption. As a result, Chiluba
was always in the news, albeit for the wrong reasons. Chiluba
strenuously denied the charges against him. When Chiluba anointed
Mwanawasa as his successor he had hoped that he would not pursue
allegations of corruption which had been levelled against him.
However, this was not the case as Mwanawasa thought otherwise.
He surprised his detractors who saw him as a Chiluba appointee when
he turned against his former boss and launched an anti-corruption
crusade against him and several of his associates (Mbewe 2008:57).
Not only did he do this, but he removed Chiluba's immunity from
prosecution (Van Donge 2008:75). This paved the way for Chiluba to be
charged with corruption. When he took over the presidency, Mwana-
wasa dedicated himself to fighting corruption. He said he was going to
pursue this without fear or favour. Mwanawasa uttered the words
below to indicate his seriousness about fighting corruption:
`Ì was driven purely by my love for the country and there was
no malice. I was always grieved to see so much poverty among
our future leaders {the youth}. I hope that this fight will
continue.'' (Mbewe 2008:57)
Mwanawasa's leadership was like a breath of fresh air in Zambian

politics after the 27 years of Kaunda's autocratic rule and Chiluba's
corrupt and chaotic leadership. Prior to him taking over from Kaunda,
Chiluba had made many promises of how the new democratically
128
elected MMD government would turn the country around by bringing

economic stability. As discussed above, this did not occur. No tangible
progress was visible to the ordinary masses who remained dissatisfied.
On the contrary, Chiluba went on a looting spree of the country's
treasury. According to Van Donge (2008:74), towards the end of his
second term, Chiluba lost the respect of the people because of
increasing accusations of corruption. Van Donge (2008:75±81) dis-
cusses Chiluba's involvement in corruption in detail in his article. This
included the corruption charges he faced. However, it was not only
Chiluba who was involved in corruption, but also senior government
administrators. Money laundering using companies was very common
under Chiluba.
However, under Mwanawasa progress was made in tackling the
country's economic problems. The West had applauded his firm hand
on the economy. His fight against corruption and his economic growth
policies resulted in GDP increasing to 6,2 percent in 2007. Western
nations approved of his conduct and cancelled the country's debt.
Zambia built up foreign reserves to a record of R8,25 billion while
inflation was kept to the 10 percent level. Under him the country
achieved numerous successes which are discussed in the article by
Mbewe (2008:57). You should be able to identify and discuss them.
Although he was in office for only seven years, Mwanawasa's record
was impressive. He had left an indelible mark on the politics of Zambia.
This is what, Mumba Malila, the Attorney-General of Zambia said about
Mwanawasa's efforts to improve the country (Mbewe 2008:57):
``he fought to mend Zambia's wounded life. In seven years he
had been in office, he managed to transform Zambia's stagnant
economy into an engine of hope and this is the path that the
nation must follow.''
It needs also to be mentioned that Mwanawasa was one of two

presidents who were members of the SADC who spoke out openly about
Mugabe's authoritarianism and rigging of the 2008 elections. He died
on the eve of an important African Union meeting where the issue of
Zimbabwe was on the agenda. It is reported that Mwanawasa once
likened the Zimbabwe economy to the Titanic, and described SADC
leaders' silence over the rigged one-man runoff ``won'' by Mugabe as
scandalous, pointing out that free campaigns have not been allowed
and the opposition have been denied access to the media (Southern
Africa Report 2008:4).
ACTIVITY
Explain the reasons why Mwanawasa was popular with the
Zambian people.
129 APC3701/1
FEEDBACK
It was because he committed himself to fighting corruption and he
stabilised the country resulting in economic growth.
Death of Mwanawasa and power struggle for the presidency

(Please read the article by Cheeseman & Hinfelaar)
Unfortunately for Zambia, Mwanawasa died on 19 August 2008 in
Egypt. In death he was eulogised by the clergy who said Zambia had
lost a Moses, but God will raise a Joshua (Mbewe 2008:57). Even
before he could be laid to rest, a power struggle ensued within the
MMD over his succession. The power struggle involved seven senior
members of the party. However, the race narrowed to two members,
finance minister, Ng'andu Magande and Rupiah Banda, the acting
president. According to Mbewe (2008:58), although Mwanawasa had
not anointed a successor, a claim surfaced that he had settled for
Magande. This was confirmed by Mwanawasa's widow. However, this
was disputed by some members of the cabinet who backed Banda.
Eventually the party had decided on Banda as Mwanawasa's successor,
pending the general elections which were due to be held on 30 October.
Banda continued as the acting president and became the fourth
Zambian president after independence when he won the elections held
in August 2008. As is customary in Africa, the leader of the opposition,
Michael Sata, said the elections had been rigged.
Banda had a rough start as president of Zambia. Firstly, he had to build
on the foundation laid by the popular Mwanawasa. This was
undoubtedly a tough act to follow. Secondly, he was faced with a
united opposition which was determined to wrest power away from the
MMD. According to Mbewe (2008:58), two of the country's opposition
parties came together and formed a pact. They were the Patriotic Front
(PF) of Michael Shata who had challenged both Chiluba and
Mwanawasa in previous elections, and United Party for National
Development. There were also problems within the party as there was
no agreement on when to hold the party congress.
Banda did not do his tenuous hold on power any good when he was seen
to be supporting Chiluba who was facing corruption charges of stealing
$500 000 from the public. He is reported as having said that Chiluba's
acquittal had brought relief to the nation. This had resulted in some
party officials who had condemned Chiluba retracting their condemna-
tion of Chilube. On his election, Banda had promised to continue with
the legacy of Mwanawasa's prudent economic management, while
cutting taxes on food and fuel. He had also warned foreign investors to
respect Zambia's labour laws and to improve wages (Southern Africa
Report 2008:6).
Mwanawasa succeeded in bringing order and stability to Zambia. His
130
untimely death stopped the progress that he was making. It is left to be

seen if Banda would be equal to the task in continuing with the progress
which his predecessor had made. At the time of writing (2011) he had
only been in power for two years. In 2011, Banda's party the MMD lost
the election to Michael Shata's Patriotic Front (PF). Shata become
Zambia's fith post-independence leader.
(1) Analyse the reasons that gave rise to factionalism within the
MMD.
(2) Name the organisation founded by the people opposed to a third
term.
(3) Discuss corruption in Zambia during the rule of Chiluba.
(4) Discuss the successes of Mwanawasa during his short term as
Zambia's president.
131 APC3701/1
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OPTION 2
The politics of Angola, Mozambique

and Namibia
138
LIST OF MAPS
Political map of Angola
Map showing the major ethnolinguistic communities of Angola
Political map of Mozambique
Map showing ethnic groups in Mozambique
Political map of Namibia
139 APC3701/1
STUDY UNIT 1
General introduction
1.1 STUDYING THE POLITICS OF AFRICA

One of the most important recent publications on the politics of Africa
is Governance and politics in Africa, edited by Hyden and Bratton
(1992). We will discuss some of the points made in this publication,
and will apply them to our study of Angola, Mozambique and Namibia.
The authors say that 1990 was a benchmark year for Africa in much the
same way as 1960 was. For the first time since independence, African
leaders took the initiative to share political power with others in
society. They began to acknowledge that political conduct mattered and
took the first steps towards what many Africans are inclined to call
``the second liberation''. As in 1960, politics is currently believed to be
a primary prerequisite for development. In the past, however, this
conceptualisation of politics served as an invitation to leaders to
concentrate political power in their own hands. Politics became an
activity that was confined to a small clique and there was very little
sense of accountability to the general population. Political leaders lost
legitimacy from the 1960s onwards, and so did politics as a public
concern. Hyden and Bratton (1992:ix) believe that the alienation of
leaders from their followers
was at the root of Africa's economic and social ills. Political will
had been crippled and social energy exhausted. In short, the
political formula adopted by the vast majority of African states
of òne leader, one ideology, and one political party' had run its
course.
Angola, Mozambique and Namibia fall into this pattern. All three of
these countries have had successive elections since 1990 and have
either amended, drafted or are in the process of drafting new
constitutions. Namibia, in particular, involved elected representatives
in the constitution drafting process. The constitution drafting process
and democratisation are one of the themes of this option, which
involves all three countries.
In the early chapters of the book, Hyden explains what he understands
by the concept ``governance''. This concept features increasingly in
literature on Africa and in the practical political sphere. You should
140
therefore take particular note of the meaning of the concept as set out
below. (Note: you are not required to study the book for the purposes of
this option.)
Hyden and Bratton use the concept ``governance'' in comparative
political analysis. They use it to indicate ``the management of regime
relations; that is, the rules that set the framework for the conduct of
politics'' (Hyden & Bratton 1992:x). The authors list the following four
properties as particularly important to good politics:
(1) reciprocity
(2) trust
(3) accountability
(4) authority
We will briefly discuss each of these properties.

Reciprocity refers to the quality of the social action among members of
a political community. An important indicator of this property is the
extent to which individuals are free to form associations to defend and
promote their interests in the public realm.
Trust refers to a normative consensus on the limits of action in a
political community. An indicator of trust within a political community
is the extent to which individuals and groups in society cooperate in
associations that cut across broad divisions, such as those based on
ethnicity, race, religion and class.
Accountability refers to the effectiveness with which the governed can
exert influence over their governors. Indicators of accountability
consist of various forms of state structures by means of which elected
and appointed officials are held responsible for their decisions and
actions.
Finally, authority depends on two variables. Citizens judge political
decisions according to two criteria: how effectively these decisions
solve specific problems that affect them, and the manner in which these
decisions are carried out. Indicators of authority are not only
compliance with the given policies, but also the policy-making process
itself (that is, the extent to which leaders respect rules or change them
in ways that are acceptable to the governed).
Hyden and Bratton (1992) identify the following four shortcomings as
the major causes of ``bad'' politics in Africa:
(1) personalised nature of rule
(2) frequent violations of human rights
(3) lack of delegation by central authorities
(4) tendency for individuals to withdraw from politics
You should, firstly, evaluate the politics of Angola, Mozambique and

Namibia against the desirable criteria of good governance. Then you
should evaluate it against the criteria of bad governance, as explained
141 APC3701/1
above. Note that you will not be examined specifically on the concept
``governance'' and its application to these three countries. Never-
theless, you should attempt to apply the criteria outlined above in your
studies.
Another important theoretical approach to the study of politics, which
has emerged in recent years, is that of ``rational choice theory''. The
essence of rational choice theory is that ``when faced with several
courses of action, people usually do what they believe is likely to have
the best overall outcome'' (Marsh & Stoker 2002:65). Rational choice
theory is also known as ``public choice theory''.
An important recent publication on the politics of Africa, entitled
Institutions and reform in Africa: the public choice perspective
(Mbaku 1997:12), utilises this broad approach to explain some of
Africa's postindependence development failures. The book examines
institu-tional reform on the continent and offers suggestions on how
Africans can develop the kind of institutional arrangements that would
maximise the participation of all groups in national development, allow
for peaceful coexistence and create incentive systems that maximise
wealth creation. Mbaku (1997:63) defines institutional arrangements
as ``processes through which individuals within a society collectively
make choices and undertake activities, including the production and
consumption of goods and services''. Constitutions fall under the
heading of institutions and are fundamental to the production and
consumption of goods and services. Mbaku (1997:12) maintains that
efficient and properly functioning institutions are needed for the
continent's rehabilitation. Public choice involves the application of
economic theory in the study of politics. Public choice theorists apply
the voluntary exchange paradigm of economic theory, according to
which individuals are assumed to maximise their self-interest. Thus,
rules and institutions should be designed to minimise opportunism and
maximise the contributions of all relevant population groups to
national development in order to provide for peaceful coexistence
(Mbaku 1997:13).
A major part of the book is devoted to helping African countries develop
efficient and self-enforcing constitutional rules. Mbaku (1997:13)
argues that Africa failed primarily because it inherited inefficient and
inappropriate institutions from the departing Europeans at indepen-
dence, which have not allowed individuals to maximise their self-
interest. When studying Angola, Mozambique and Namibia, you should
consider whether these countries inherited appropriate institutions at
independence or whether the institutions they inherited contributed to
many of the problems they experienced.
Answer this question for yourself: Should these countries have made
other institutional choices? (Note: you will not be examined specifi-
cally on the public choice perspective and its application to the three
countries under consideration.)
142
1.2 WHY STUDY ANGOLA, MOZAMBIQUE AND NAMIBIA?

Angola and Mozambique are currently subjects of interest because of
the wars fought within their borders over many years, and recent
attempts at restoring lasting peace and stability. Both countries
achieved independence through violent struggle. Angola, Mozambique
and Namibia are important to southern Africa as a whole because of
their natural resources and their pivotal position for overland
transportation. In addition, Angola and Mozambique (both with a
history of Portuguese colonial rule) provide case studies of African
Marxist attempts at creating new societies and the subsequent
reversals of those attempts. Angola and Mozambique have achieved
relative peace and stability, with Mozambique achieving rapid
economic growth and Angola poised to achieve rapid economic growth
through its oil and diamond revenues.
Namibia was also subjected to colonial rule, initially by Germany and
later by South Africa. Namibia is of interest because of its long
association with South Africa and because of the internationalisation of
its independence process. Namibia is also of interest because of more
than a decade of democratic rule and questions as to whether this form
of rule is likely to survive into the future. The country has close
economic links with South Africa and provides a recent example of
successful African constitution drafting. It is experiencing a period of
peace, stability and economic growth.
Note that the literature that we use for Angola and Mozambique does
not give a complete picture of the politics of these countries because of
the following reasons:
(1) Although there is a substantial amount of literature in Portuguese,
we mainly use sources in English. Also, Angola and Mozambique
are countries where statistics, local studies and other documenta-
tion are often not adequate or reliable.
(2) Because of the politically radical nature of the two countries' past,
much of the literature has been politically partisan, supporting one
side or the other.
(3) Because of the wars in both countries, access for journalists and
researchers has been limited. Writings on these two countries
therefore focus on accessible sources and material, such as reports
on the war and attempts to bring about peace.
K How should one approach the politics of Angola, Mozambique and

Namibia? Here are four preliminary guidelines derived from the
literature:
(1) We should understand the internal dynamism of these societies and
have some empathy for African history. Writing of traditional
African societies, Davidson (1969:80) says: ``the key to under-
standing ... rests in a comprehension of their moral order''. We
should appreciate that, despite technological simplicity, African
peoples ``had tamed a continent'' (Davidson 1969:4). He suggests
143 APC3701/1
that successful new structures in Africa will and should be

``nourished by the vigour and resilience of native genius, by all
the inheritance of self-respect and innovating confidence that has
carried these people through past centuries of change and cultural
expansion'' (Davidson 1969:317). We should consider whether the
peoples of the three countries have indeed used their inherited
creativity to reconstruct their respective countries.
(2) In the case of Angola and Mozambique, the period of colonisation of
coastal areas by the Portuguese lasted several centuries until 1974/
1975. The effects of this period will be felt for many years to come.
Colonialism shaped the two societies through racism and economic
exploitation (Bender 1978). It also created a ``central society''
(Heimer 1979) or ``modern sector'' through the growth of towns
and infrastructure. The withdrawal of Portuguese colonial rule
from Angola and Mozambique led to the collapse of state and
economic structures: The foreign base of the colonial economy was
a major contributing factor to the weakness of the present states.
(3) Angola and Mozambique are weak new states. Both have been
engaged in almost constant war since independence (with the
Angolan war only ending in 2002). The countries are in formation
and transition. Angola's policy, especially, has been one of ``war
socialism'' (Young 1982:84). To what extent can Angola's and
Mozambique's problems be blamed on past foreign and domestic
destabilisation, and on the war footing forced on the two countries?
You should bear this question in mind when you study the
literature referred to below.
(4) Both Angola and Mozambique have been involved in peacemaking
efforts, and political and economic reform programmes. Interna-
tional agencies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
the World Bank have become involved in the economies of both
countries. Both countries are attempting to democratise and make
multiparty systems of government work (at the time of writing in
2011, Mozambique appears to be more successful than Angola).
(5) Namibia experienced two phases of colonisation, the traces of
which remain to this day. In the first phase the German colonists
introduced a ``reservation'' system which restricted African access
to land and water rights. German colonial policies led to the Herero
rebellion of 1904 and war between the two parties. This conflict
has been described as ``the most bitter war in colonial history''
(Sparks & Green 1992:12). German colonial policy was distin-
guished by its brutality and, by the end of the Herero rebellion,
about 80 percent of the Herero population (some 65 000 people)
had died. The white population, by contrast, had increased from
4 700 in 1903 to 14 000 in 1913. This was a period of great
economic success for white people (Sparks & Green 1992:13±14).
(6) During the second colonisation phase, from 1920 until 1990, the
territory was administered as an integral part of South Africa.
Many discriminatory race laws, formulated in South Africa, were
extended to the territory and perpetuated many old German
144
policies. White emigration to the territory was also encouraged by

successive South African governments. Economically, the territory
became increasingly integrated with South Africa. The South
African government was one of the most intractable former colonial
powers in Africa when it came to granting independence to the
territory. Namibia also experienced a guerrilla war on its northern
border over a period of about 20 years. Once again, bear these
colonial inheritances in mind when you study the literature on
independent Namibia referred to below.
A READING
At this point you should study and summarise the article by
Sidaway and Simon (1993) in the prescribed reader for an overview
of political developments in each country up to the early 1990s. (We
will deal with each country in greater detail in subsequent study
units.) Note the following points in this article:
(1) All three countries were subject to white minority rule and
experienced armed struggles within their borders.
(2) The liberation movements in each country have undergone
ideological conversions and jettisoned much of their former
socialist rhetoric.
(3) Both internal and external factors have brought about changes
in these countries.
In the case of Angola, the country's administration was placed under

direct military control as the war progressed. Note the factors which
led to greater regional autonomy in the socioeconomic sphere and the
holding of elections in September 1992 and 2008.
Also note the factors which mainly led to a revival of the conflict ± a
lack of trust between the two parties. What effects did the conflict have
on the economy of the country?
As far as Mozambique is concerned, the country also experienced
internal conflict and a change in ideological commitment. Mozambique
has engaged in a process of decentralisation of power since 1997 to
politically autonomous municipalities. Three elections have been held
in this country since Sidaway and Simon (1993) wrote their article.
Both Mozambique and Angola have, however, been devastated by their
respective conflicts.
Namibia, by contrast, has enjoyed peace in its postindependence
period, which has enabled the Swapo government to restructure the
country's administrative system. Note the basic features of the
Namibian constitution. Also note that since Sidaway and Simon
(1993) wrote their article, regional and local government elections
145 APC3701/1
have been held at the end of 1992, and further elections for the central
legislature and presidency in 1994 and 1999. Third and fourth
elections were held in 2004 and 2009.
K Are there any parallels between the three countries in terms of

administrative continuities before and after independence?
1.3 REGIONAL RELATIONS: ANGOLA, MOZAMBIQUE AND NAMIBIA

Globalisation and regionalism are simultaneous phenomena which are
evident in many parts of the world at the beginning of the 21st century.
Globalisation refers to the increasing interconnectedness among
countries of the world, whereas regionalism refers to the belief that
certain desired values are best attained by the cooperation between
countries across national boundaries.
At present, several initiatives are being pursued across Africa, which

aim at promoting regional integration. The most important of these is
the Southern African Development Community (SADC), to which
Angola, Mozambique and Namibia belong. The others are the Commu-
nity of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Southern African
Customs Union (SACU), the Common (Rand) Monetary Area (CMA), the
East African Community (EAC) and the Cross Border Initiative (CBI).
When the Southern African Development Coordination Conference

(SADCC) was formed in 1980, its objectives were to promote self-
reliance in the region and to reduce dependence on South Africa. In
1992 the SADCC became the SADC. The Windhoek Treaty laid out the
SADC's aspirations for regional cooperation and equitable develop-
ment.
The SADC has fourteen member countries and its aim is to build a
community that can compete globally, with regional integration
yielding economic growth and development for its member states.
The problem of regional integration has, however, been made
problematic by political and economic differences, and difficulties
which at times have resulted in political failures and conflict.
Regional integration is also made difficult by low levels of indus-

trialisation, a heavy extraregional dependency where there are low
levels of industrialisation, a heavy extraregional dependency on
imports and foreign trade, high transport costs, and small economies
and population numbers (Mills & Sidiropoulos 2001:5). Take note of
these factors in your study of the three countries as they are likely to
influence the processes of integration in the region.
146
Much of the SADC's work is carried out through sectoral commissions

and coordinating units which are led by specific member states. For
example: Angola is responsible for energy; Mozambique for culture,
information, transport and communication; Namibia for marine fish-
eries and resources; and South Africa for finance and investment, and
health. In 1995 the SADC formed an organ on politics, defence and
security, and a rapid deployment force was formed to respond to
potentially explosive situations. This organ was employed in 1998 to
respond to a military revolt in Lesotho following a general election that
year. On the economic front, South Africa is likely to dominate as its
economy is four times the size of the other member states put together.
Angola might, in time, through its oil and diamond exports, and its
intention to increase those exports, wield a greater economic influence
among SADC member states.
1.4 PORTUGUESE COLONIAL POLICY: ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE

There is some debate about the motivations behind Portuguese
colonialism. On the one hand, there are those who maintain that it
was primarily a religious exercise; while others perceive it more as a
search for empire. The search for empire played an important role with
regard to both Portuguese national pride and their national economy
(Serapiao & El-Khawas 1979:1±25).
Problems also arise when one tries to understand the nature of
Portuguese colonial policy itself. The policy was highly sensitive to
changes in the metropolitan Portuguese political scene and, for much of
the time, played a very important role in Portuguese politics.
Nonetheless, one can distinguish three distinct periods of Portuguese
colonial rule once it was formally established after the Berlin
Conference in 1884±1885:
(1) Up to the fall of the republican government in Portugal in 1926:
During this period the colonies were allowed a considerable degree
of autonomy.
(2) From 1928 to 1962: During this period Portugal was under the
political dictatorship of Antonio Salazar who strove for much closer
relations between the metropolis and the colonies, especially in the
economic sphere.
(3) From 1962 until the end of colonial rule in 1974: This was a period
of moderate reform and greater colonial autonomy under Salazar's
successor, Caetano (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983:28).
These periods had three main characteristics in common: a relatively

close relationship between the metropolis and the colonies; the
existence of particularly severe labour policies; and a cultural policy
that, theoretically, did not differentiate between black and white but
stressed the primacy of Portuguese culture. The closeness of the
relationship between Portugal and its colonies was most pronounced
147 APC3701/1
during the Salazar period, when the colonies were regarded as part of
the metropolis. However, even during the republican period and the
Caetano period, which ended in 1974, the majority of political and
economic decisions affecting the colonies were made in Lisbon. This
policy differs sharply from the policies of other colonial powers at that
time, particularly those of Britain.
Portugal, which has always been relatively underdeveloped compared
with other European countries, saw the colonies as offering it
particular advantages in terms of both prestige and economic gain.
Thus statements such as ``Without Africa, Portugal is nothing'' by the
governments of the day were commonplace (Seegers 1984:27). Largely
because of this attitude, it is usually held that Portugal derived great
economic benefits from its African colonial undertakings ± at great cost
to the colonies in both the short and the long term (see Mondlane 1983;
Henriksen 1978a; Isaacman & Isaacman 1983; Munslow 1983).
Recently, there has been some debate on this issue. Clarence-Smith
(1985:19, 116) argues that the practice of Portuguese colonialism is
poorly understood, that the economic benefits Portugal obtained from
its colonial holdings have been exaggerated and that its colonies would
not have been much better off under a different colonial power.
The main means by which Portugal hoped to exploit the colonies was
the use of their abundant labour. In the colonial period the widespread
use of slave labour gave way to legalised forced labour. This system
was modified at various times (for example in 1928), but remained in
operation throughout the colonial period (Isaacman & Isaacman
1983:34; Henriksen 1978a:118). The harsh labour laws were all based
on a racial division between white Portuguese and ``natives'' (Isaacman
& Isaacman 1983:34); this despite the fact that the Portuguese prided
themselves on having a non-racial colonial policy.
For much of the colonial period, a system operated which comprised
two categories of citizens. On the one hand were the indigenas, or
natives, who had no citizenship rights and were subject to numerous
constraints, including the labour obligations described above. The
second category of citizens comprised all the white people and wealthy,
well-educated black people who had fully adopted a Portuguese way of
life. These black people were known as assimilados. Less than five
percent of black people in Portuguese Africa achieved the high
standards set for assimilado status (Mondlane 1983:41).
In 1961, following the outbreak of violence in Angola, legal changes
were made to this system. In practice, however, the situation remained
virtually the same. The racial policies flowed logically from the
Portuguese attitude of seeing their own culture as the only valid one
(Clarence-Smith 1985:140). This had a particularly pronounced effect
on educational policies. Given the Portuguese attitude to black labour
as a resource to be exploited, black education was naturally treated as
a very low priority. It was largely undertaken by religious organisa-
tions and was very strongly oriented towards Portuguese culture
148
(Mondlane 1983:61±69). Whatever the weight given to the impact of

Portuguese colonial policy in Africa, the effects of colonial policy in
Mozambique and Angola are still visible to this day.
1.5 NAMIBIA AND SOUTH AFRICAN POLICY

The South African policy towards Namibia has been described in
various ways. Du Pisani (1989) refers to three phases: the compulsion
to incorporate, the politics of controlled change and neorealism. From
about the 1940s, increasing attempts were made to achieve the goal of
incorporation. Over the years, the links between the territory and
South Africa were cemented by the growing convergence of views
between white political parties in Namibia and the South African
government. South African government control was reinforced by the
publication of the Odendaal Commission Report in 1964, which
advocated racial policies similar to those implemented in South Africa.
The socioeconomic consequences for the people of the territory were
far-reaching. One should bear this background in mind when assessing
the potential for reconciliation in postindependence Namibia.
In the early 1970s, the South African government started the second
phase, which was characterised by a policy of ``controlled change''.
Such change was predicated on three core interests:
(1) Regional security.
(2) The political and economic interface between Namibia and South
Africa.
(3) The nature and timing of political transition within Namibia (Du
Pisani 1989:295). By the late 1970s, the South African government
preferred the prospect of friendly independence to risky and costly
military and political domination.
The third phase, characterised by the policy of neorealism, was

accompanied by a reappraisal of policy, and interest in reaching a
political settlement of the interlinked Namibian and Angolan conflicts.
As Portuguese colonialism left its mark on Angola and Mozambique,
South African colonialism left its mark on independent Namibia.
Diescho (1994:103) sees these legacies in the features of landlessness,
cultural alienation, illiteracy, poverty and underdevelopment.
A READING
You should study the following articles on Angola in the prescribed
reader:
Munslow (1999)
Le Billon (2000)
Schubert (2010)
Additional reader articles are referred to in Tutorial Letter 101.

149 APC3701/1
Political map of Angola
Source: Minter (1994)

150
Map showing the major ethnolinguistic communities of Angola
Source: Henriksen (1978a)

151 APC3701/1
STUDY UNIT 2
Angola
CHRONOLOGY
c 500CE Ancestors of Bantu-speaking peoples of Angola
move into the territory
1400 The kingdom of Kongo emerges
1483 First Portuguese contact with Angola
c 1500 Slave trading starts in Angola
1575 Start of Portuguese wars of conquest against
Kongo and Mbundu people
1596 Luanda founded
1878 Slavery abolished in Angola; contract labour
imposed
1884±1885 Berlin Conference on the division of Africa
between European powers
1926 Fascist new state in Portugal
mid-1940s Movement of young intellectuals starts in Luanda
1956 MPLA formed
1957 UPNA formed (forerunner of UPA and FNLA)
1961 Massive popular uprisings followed by harsh
repression
1966 MPLA opens its eastern front
1966 Unita formed
1966 Oil discovered in Cabinda
April 1974 Military coup in Portugal
1975 Civil war develops; South African and Cuban
armies enter Angola
11 November 1975 Independence Day in Luanda
December 1977 First Ordinary Congress of the MPLA
1979 President Neto dies; Dos Santos takes over
1980 Special Congress of the MPLA-PT (workers' party)
1985 Second Congress of the MPLA-PT
152
1988 Negotiations over Cuban withdrawal and Nami-

bian independence in New York; SEF (economic
and financial restructuring) begins
January 1989 Cuban withdrawal begins
1989 Gbadolite Declaration
1991 Bicesse Accords
1992 Elections
1993 Resumption of war
October 1994 Lusaka Protocol
1995 New peace agreement concluded in Lusaka
1999 Cessation of United Nations' peacekeeping opera-
tion
22 February 2002 Jonas Savimbi assassinated
4 April 2002 Unita ceasefire
August 2002 Unita disarmed
September 2012 General election
2.1 INTRODUCTION
THEMES
Our study of Angola is based on four broad themes:
(1) the origins of the conflict between the nationalist movements
and attempts at resolving it
(2) reconstruction, reconciliation and economic development in the
postindependence period
(3) Angola's resource war
(4) Democracy, elections and constitutionalism
LEARNING OUTCOMES
. describe the origins of the Angolan nationalist movements
. describe the attainment of independence and the ensuing conflict
. describe the quest for peace and the background to the 1992
elections
. provide an overview of the constraints on economic development
. explain what is meant by Angola's resource war
. describe the recent attempts at democratisation and constitution
redrafting
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2.1.1 Some basic facts

Angola is a sparsely populated country (an estimated 18,5 million
inhabitants in 2009). The country is rich in natural resources, such as
oil, diamonds, iron ore, phosphates and copper. It accommodates
several different ethnic and language groups (see map). Its land area is
1 246 700 square kilometres (slightly larger than South Africa). Its
shape is roughly a square, with the Atlantic to the west, Democratic
Republic of Congo (the DRC) to the north and east, Zambia to the east
and Namibia to the south (see political map on p 149). The Cabinda
enclave (which is bordered by the sea, Congo (Brazzaville) and the
DRC) lies to the north of the Congo river. Most Angolan oil is produced
offshore from Cabinda, and contributed about 60 percent to the GDP in
1993 (Handbook of the Nations 1993) and 90 percent of total exports
from the country by 2001 (Malaquias 2001).
Angola is a new country, which gained independence from Portugal on
11 November 1975. Areas around Luanda were colonised for almost
five centuries and the country has been in a state of conflict for most of
the independence period. The first multiparty election took place in
September 1992; it was preceded by an interlude of peace and followed
by a return to war. A shaky peace was again achieved in May 1995, but
war resumed in the late 1990s. The war ended in 2002, with the signing
of a ceasefire agreement.
2.1.2 A brief history of Angola

A look at early Angolan history will help us to see that present-day
Angola is a product of local historical forces deriving from dynamics
within the traditional societies which interacted with the ``colonial
nucleus'' (Clarence-Smith 1979). Although Portuguese contact with the
kingdom of Kongo started in the late 15th century, the Portuguese
stepped into a history that was already in process. As their influence
grew, the Portuguese had to establish diplomatic, military and
economic relations with the people in the interior of Angola. Portuguese
colonialism turned to extreme forms of domination and exploitation.
Between 1500 and 1850 approximately ``13 million persons were
captured in the hinterland of Angola to supply 4 million slaves (who
managed to avoid death) to the ships sailing for the Americas''
(Henderson 1979:94). One should not, however, lose sight of the
continuing historical influence of indigenous African groups. This
influence surfaced in nationalist movements in the run-up to
independence and beyond.
2.1.3 The post-1884 period

Following the Berlin Conference of 1884, Portugal had to demonstrate
`èffective occupation'' (Henderson 1979:105) to the other European
powers. As a result, there was a move to much tighter control of the
154
territory: There were more conquests of previously unpacified areas

and the by then prohibited slave trade was replaced by a system of
contract labour ± `à cloak to hide slavery'' (Henderson 1979:116).
After 1920, greater efforts were made to stimulate white settlement.
From 1932 to 1968, this coincided with the rule of Salazar in Portugal
(Somerville 1986:19ff). Initially (up to 1950), relatively few Portu-
guese had settled in Angola (more came after World War II). By the
early 1970s, the number of white people had quadrupled to 350 000,
although most of the settlers were not committed to staying in Angola
(Bender 1978:97, 129). This later period of colonisation also led to the
development of infrastructure and export industries (Henderson 1979:
chapter 5).
Portuguese colonisation was a complex phenomenon. Some of the
important issues are the following:
(1) extreme discrimination in education (Bender 1978:53), and the
activities of Catholic and Protestant missionaries
(2) the top Catholic hierarchy's alliance with the colonial administra-
tion
(3) Protestant and some Catholic missionaries' promotion of education
and opportunities for Africans (GroÈhs & Czernik 1983)
Late colonial policy in Angola (after 1960) developed mainly in

response to the rising revolt among the African population. Between
1961 and 1965, the armed forces increased from 9 000 to 50 000 men
and hasty educational reforms were effected (Henderson 1979:183,
186). This is evidence of a strategy of repression and reform. After
1960, economic growth was rapid (Henderson 1979: chapter 5).
K An important question is: What impact did colonialism have on

contemporary Angola? One obvious effect is that the white population
had a monopoly on skills and dominated Angolan society. About 90
percent of the white Portuguese population left the country between
1973 and 1976. The exodus of these colonists led to economic collapse.
Secondly, intense colonial racism undoubtedly had an effect on the new
society. There is some debate on whether Portuguese colonialism was
less racist than the British, French or Dutch varieties. Bender (1978)
argues convincingly that Angola had all the practices of racial
domination, though without `èxplicit or legalistic forms of racial
discrimination'' (Bender 1978:213). A third important effect is the
extent to which the colonial system affected different sectors of
society. If the interior was only effectively colonised after 1884, and
much of it only after 1920, what were the consequences for
development and national cohesion?
We will now turn to a brief discussion of the growth of African
nationalism in the country.
155 APC3701/1
2.2 THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

At dawn on 15 March 1961, the rebels attacked in Northern
Angola. Groups of 100 to 150 men, armed with machete knives
and assorted firearms, attacked simultaneously over a wide
area ... . Their faces painted red and shouting Lumumba they
fell on plantations and outlying farms ... . Whites and blacks
were killed indiscriminately. Women and children were cut
down. It was the slaves' revolt (Ehnmark & WaÈtberg 1963:18).
The Portuguese responded like fury ... six months after the
fighting had started, African casualties were estimated at
20 000 (Marcum 1969:144).
These dramatic and shocking events brought Angola's rebellion to the

world's attention, especially in the wake of the violence in the Congo in
1960. It was a major breakdown of Portuguese colonialism in Angola;
the all-too-long expected nightmare of settlers. This event became a
source of numerous fearful stereotypes of African rebellion among
white people in Southern Africa. A serious analysis of the 1961
rebellion will not discount the intensity and extent of usually repressed
anger among exploited and humiliated rural people. But there were
other causes for the violent outburst besides anger. There were specific
economic reasons, as well as the ``terribly mistaken'' policy of
incitement without organisation of Holden Roberto's Union of the
People of Angola (UPA) (Davidson 1972:192).
What we should note at this point, however, is the nationalist
mobilisation of people, and the extreme and violent bitterness of the
conflict on both the Portuguese and the African sides.
2.2.1 The origins of the nationalist movement

In order to understand Angolan politics and the postindependence
conflict, we should understand the nature of the nationalism that led to
independence in 1975. Why were there three movements (the MPLA,
FNLA and Unita)? What were their origins? What were their policies
and how did they relate to the actual problems of Angola?
K What alignments did the parties have?

When we study the background of the three movements, we find that
they displayed a confusing degree of fluidity and change. The names
and membership of political groups, for example, changed frequently.
The Union of the Populations of Northern Angola (UPNA) (1957) led to
the formation of the UPA (1958), which in turn gave rise to the Angolan
National Liberation Front (FNLA) (1962). The same people became the
Revolutionary Government in Exile (GRAE). Political alliances changed
continuously. For example: From 1962 to 1964, Savimbi and Holden
Roberto were together in the GRAE, then Savimbi broke away and
formed the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
156
(Unita). Before independence, the South West Africa People's Organisa-

tion (Swapo) and Unita had a cordial relationship. That did not last.
Roberto's movement experienced rebellions; so did Savimbi's move-
ment in 1964 and again in 1972. The Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola (MPLA) had a number of major defections
(Henderson 1979:229). In 1960 and 1972 there were attempts at
cooperation between the MPLA and the FNLA (Marcum 1978:206).
During the independence period (January 1975), the `Àlvor Agree-
ment'' between the MPLA, the FNLA and Unita was signed (Heimer
1979:56). Yet, generally, the movements' relationships were char-
acterised by conflict and betrayal as is evident in Savimbi's coopera-
tion with the Portuguese after 1972 (Minter 1988).
In In the eye of the storm: Angola's people, Davidson (1972:143)
portrays modern revolt as proceeding in two streams:
(1) continued local revolts of particular peoples in the towns; and
(2) from the mid-19th century onwards, an anticolonial yet elitist
``nationalism'' was expressed in numerous small journals. David-
son (1972:157ff) sees a breakthrough after World War II, when
groups of assimilados in Luanda and Portugal developed a political
consciousness that linked the urban, educated class in Angola with
employed workers and rural peasants, and their needs.
The three nationalist movements that eventually emerged had definable

differences in origin and orientation. In his study of the Angolan
revolution, Marcum (1969) identifies three seedbeds of nationalism in
three ethnically and geographically distinct communities in the
Mbundu, Bakongo and Ovimbundu-Chokwe areas. However, he does
say that `àll three major streams of Angolan nationalism derive from or
were to some extent influenced by the strong flow of urban and
intellectual protest that first developed in Luanda and then spread into
its Kimbundu-speaking hinterland'' (Marcum 1969:13).
2.2.2 The MPLA

The MPLA inherited the bulk of the urban and intellectual protest
movements mentioned above. Some important features are the
following:
(1) The MPLA developed a strong base in the area around the capital
city of Luanda.
(2) There were a number of highly educated leaders in MPLA circles,
for example Agostinho Neto, Mario de Andrade and Viriato da Cruz.
(3) Its other personnel (its cadres or groups of activists) were better
educated than those of the FNLA and included `ùrban dwellers,
civil servants and technicians. By comparison the FNLA, Holden
Roberto's supporters, had few educated men at the top ± no
intellectuals ± and had spent much of its history at [sic] the
cocktail parties of Kinshasa ... Unita was about the same except for
Savimbi'' (Stockwell 1978:64).
157 APC3701/1
(4) The MPLA also included Angolan Marxists, through the newly
formed (1955) small Angolan Communist Party.
(5) The MPLA had relatively little contact and influence in areas such
as the north of Angola and the predominantly Ovimbundu central
highlands.
2.2.3 The FNLA

Holden Roberto's movement, the UPA (later FNLA), started off as a
sectional ethnic Congo ``nationalism''. When Roberto met African
leaders from other countries, ``he discovered that the idea of
resurrecting the old Congo Kingdom was considered a tribal anachron-
ism'' (Henderson 1979:175). When the neighbouring Belgian Congo
suddenly became independent in 1960, Roberto ``found powerful
friends in the Adoula grouping ... especially General Joseph Mobutu''
(Davidson 1972:210), people with traditionalist and antiradical ideas
similar to Roberto's. Hence some important initial features of the FNLA
are as follows:
(1) The FNLA had a strong populist base among one people (the Congo
people).
(2) The area where the Congo people lived, bordered on the DRC
(ZaõÈ re) ± so guerrilla campaigns could be organised across the
border.
(3) The number of skilled personnel in the FNLA was small.
(4) Roberto allied himself to a pan-African, antiradical stream, thus
setting a collision course with the MPLA. The FNLA adopted a
position which enabled the Americans and Chinese to use it in anti-
radical or anti-Soviet political manoeuvres.
(5) The FNLA did not successfully organise areas outside the north
especially after it had lost its Ovimbundu contingent to Unita in
1964.
2.2.4 Unita
Why was Unita formed when there were already two competing
nationalist groups? To answer this question we need to know some-
thing about Savimbi's background. Savimbi came from the Ovimbundu
people in the central highlands. While working with Roberto in the
GRAE (formed by the FNLA), he was concerned about the lack of
Ovimbundu influence in both the GRAE and the MPLA:
``These two parties together still leave outside the political
struggle more than half the population'' (Henderson 1979:207).
He organised a split in the GRAE, which involved a group of

Ovimbundu members. This split happened partly because of personal
antagonism towards Roberto (Marcum 1978:134). Following an over-
seas tour during which he met high-powered world revolutionaries
such as Mao Tse-Tung, Savimbi was invited by the MPLA to join them.
158
He turned the offer down, ``relishing his autonomy and ambition''

(Marcum 1978:161). Unita was formed. It had a strong Ovimbundu
ethnic appeal. It organised dissidents from the GRAE, and student and
other groupings. The following are some important features of Unita:
(1) It has less of a tradition than the other two movements; it was a
reaction against both of them.
(2) It appealed to a political constituency that was not otherwise
catered for ± the peasantry of the central highlands.
(3) Savimbi displayed individualistic and perhaps problematic poli-
tical characteristics. He needed to have his own movement; he
made sudden shifts in his political position and alliances ± the
Chinese told him that they could not trust him (Marcum 1978:160).
(4) While Unita was organisationally small, Savimbi was a strong
leader.
From these points you should be able to see that each of the three main
nationalist groups had a real constituency. However, they differed in
their primary concerns for Angola. They also differed in the interna-
tional alliances they were likely to make, in their levels of adminis-
trative and technical skills, and in the ambitions of their leaders.
159 APC3701/1
STUDY UNIT 3
Developments before independence
How did these groups develop up to 1974 (when the coup occurred in
Portugal)?
The nationalist movements faced difficulties. After 1961, the Portu-
guese adopted major military and economic strategies to defuse
nationalism. The movements were also often dependent on the moods
of the governments of Zambia, the DRC (ZaõÈ re) and Congo (Brazzaville).
However, the 1961 rebellion gave great impetus to both the FNLA/
GRAE and the MPLA. While the MPLA was calling for united action, the
FNLA/GRAE was militarily stronger between 1962 and 1963, and had
more African diplomatic support (Somerville 1986:32). In 1962,
however, Agostinho Neto became the manifest leader of the MPLA,
and the MPLA displayed coherent organisation and planning (Marcum
1978:27±32). By 1966 the influence of the MPLA had grown and,
because the FNLA/GRAE had shrunk due to internal conflicts and a
weak strategy, it could present itself as the exclusive representative of
the Angolan people (Marcum 1978:172). The MPLA consolidated a
military site in the Dembos forest area not far from Luanda in 1966 and
opened an eastern military front. By 1968, this eastern front was a
serious military challenge to the Portuguese and, by 1970, it was
estimated that 59 percent of nationalist actions were performed by the
MPLA (Marcum 1978:176, 212, 214). During this period, partly as a
result of popularly oriented guerrilla action and diplomatic strength,
the MPLA developed a ``clearly socialist outlook'' (Somerville 1986:34±
38). As with Frelimo in Mozambique, active guerrilla struggles
influenced the MPLA's political philosophy (Chabal 1983, Davidson
1972).
A major split (led by Daniel Chipenda) weakened the MPLA in the 1970s
and the movement suffered some military setbacks. In addition, the
former USSR had temporarily suspended aid because of the Chipenda
affair (Somerville 1986:39). As a result, when the Portuguese coup
occurred in 1974, the MPLA was in a weakened state.
Notwithstanding its diplomatic successes of the early 1960s, by 1970
the FNLA had faded as a strong political force. It had become
`ìncreasingly wary of any real mass-mobilisation ... The FNLA thus
built up a small elitist army in exile and waited for the Portuguese to
withdraw'' (Clarence-Smith 1980:118). The FNLA increasingly lost
touch with its guerrillas inside Angola. After 1970, however, ZaõÈ re (the
160
DRC) rebuilt the FNLA in ZaõÈ re, but not in Angola. The FNLA was
militarily strong, though not very active, in 1974 (Marcum
1978:220ff).
Unita's position, as described by Marcum (1983), was weak. It was
expelled from Zambia in 1967 and incidents of direct conflict with
MPLA guerrillas occurred. `Ùnita relied largely on a little-combat, low-
profile strategy focusing on constructing a self-reliant political under-
ground'' (Marcum 1978:217). Unita organised itself from an area in
central Angola. A major reason for its survival during this period was
Savimbi's secret cooperation with the Portuguese authorities (Marcum
1978:218).
In April 1974, without much warning, a military coup (which was to
lead swiftly to decolonisation) took place in Portugal. The Portuguese
coup leaders did not wish to continue the wars in the colonies as it was
a drain on Portuguese resources. They wanted to rid themselves of the
overseas colonies.
3.1 INDEPENDENCE
On November 11, 1975, the day of Angolan independence, a
small force of fifteen hundred men altogether FNLA, the
Zaiarian Seventh and Fourth Battalions, and a hundred
Portuguese commandos moved across the Quifangondo valley,
twenty kilometres from Luanda. The advancing column was
supported by a dozen small armored cars
... The four South African 5.5 inch artillery pieces were
emplaced on the ridge behind, manned by South African
artillery men ... CIA and South African advisors watched the
column's movement across the valley ... Morale was high ...
Roberto saw the goal of a lifetime's struggle just beyond the next
ridge, beyond a few MPLA soldiers and some Cubans.
Then the Cubans' 122 mm rockets began to land in the
Quifangondo valley, not like single claps of thunder, but in
salvos, twenty at a time ... CIA observers on a ridge behind
estimated that two thousand rockets rained on the task force as
it broke and fled in panic, scattering across the valley in aimless
flight, abandoning weapons, vehicles and wounded comrades
alike ... for the FNLA and Zaiarians the war was virtually over
(Stockwell 1978:213±214).
This dramatic quotation brings together many of the elements of

Angola's transition to independence: the full-scale civil war that
ensued; massive foreign involvement and foreign manipulation; sudden
escalations in military hardware; and how weak, divided and embattled
Angola was on its independence day.
Let us make a few general remarks about the conflict before focusing on
some of its details.
161 APC3701/1
Many foreign countries intervened in this conflict: the USA, China, the
former USSR, Cuba, South Africa and ZaõÈ re (now the DRC), among
others. Also, various forms of foreign support antedated this period; for
instance, Mobutu of ZaõÈ re and Idi Amin of Uganda gave aid to the FNLA
before 1974 (Marcum 1978:220), and the Chinese gave aid from 1973
onwards (Stockwell 1978:67). The MPLA had received modest aid from
the Soviet Union since the 1960s (Somerville 1984a), except for a brief
withdrawal of support in 1974. The MPLA also received consistent
diplomatic support from Cuba prior to 1974.
The first increase in military support after the Portuguese coup of April
1974 came from the Chinese, who sent the FNLA 112 military advisers
(starting in May 1974) and 450 tons of weapons (in early August). In
July 1974, the CIA started secretly giving funds to Roberto (Marcum
1978:246, Stockwell 1978:67). Unita received support from South
Africa and the United States (Pazzanita 1991).
The important point about all this foreign intervention is that the three
liberation movements became clients of the international community.
The conflict thus assumed an international dimension.
A few additional points should be made concerning this early
independence period. When the Salazar regime in Portugal was
removed in a military coup on 25 April 1974, a decolonisation process
was initiated in the Portuguese provinces. The new Portuguese leaders
recognised that not one liberation movement had sufficient support in
Angola. The Portuguese leaders entered into an agreement, referred to
as the `Àlvor Agreement'', in terms of which the three groups were to
attempt to work together in a transitional regime (established on
28 March 1975), which would govern Angola until elections and
independence. Independence was set for 11 November 1975. Within a
month, the agreement broke down and a full-scale civil war ensued.
The MPLA made its presence felt in the capital of Luanda and Unita was
relegated to the rural areas.
In November 1975 South African forces intervened in the conflict.
Pazzanita (1991) argues that the intervention of South African forces
led to more African countries recognising the MPLA government and
requesting assistance from its long-time backers, the Soviet Union and
Cuba. Cuba sent approximately 20 000 troops who were not used in
combat against South African forces or Unita, but served in a training
capacity and as garrison forces. They also ensured the safety of the oil
fields in the province of Cabinda.
The presence of Cuban troops in the country was linked to Namibian
independence as the MPLA backed the South West Africa People's
Organisation (Swapo) in its quest for independence for Namibia. South
African military incursions into the country continued. By the late
1980s, the presence of Cuban troops in Angola became one of the
negotiating issues that dominated the future independence of Namibia.
162
3.2 WAR AND DISINTEGRATION

Postindependent Angola suffered war, destruction and great economic
difficulty. But what kind of state has emerged, and how are people
organised and represented? What is the quality of their daily lives? And
what exactly has happened to the economy? We should answer these
questions in order to gain insight into the atmosphere and context of a
final peace, and the problems of reconstruction and reconciliation.
The early years of independence in Angola were extremely stressful.
The new state was born in a situation of war. The war and the
departure of most of the Portuguese induced economic collapse
(Bhagavan 1986, Hodges 1987), especially in some manufacturing
industries and commercial agriculture. The undeclared war with South
Africa escalated again after 1979 (Hanlon 1986a:158); after which
Unita's wide-ranging destructive ability increased greatly, so that
`àbout nine tenths of the country [was] considered unsafe'' (Hodges
1987:15, Bridgland 1988).
163 APC3701/1
STUDY UNIT 4
The quest for peace
A READING
You should study the following article in the prescribed reader:
Munslow (1999)
Additional readings will be referred to in Tutorial Letter 101.
Here are a few more general comments on this process.

On 22 December 1988 (in New York) Angola, Cuba and South Africa
signed treaties providing for the removal of foreign forces from Angola
and Namibia.
In this and other negotiating processes, different actors saw different
problems and priorities in the Angola/Namibia region. For some the
cardinal issue was the ending of apartheid in South Africa, including
the creation of an independent Namibia through the implementation of
United Nations (UN) Resolution 435. For others, Cuban intervention in
Angola and Soviet involvement were essential. Some set great store by
support for Jonas Savimbi's Unita against the Marxist government in
Luanda, while Unita was anathema to others. These different
perspectives made the peace process in Angola more difficult.
In the 1988 round of talks a linkage approach was followed, with the
assistance of the United States Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs. The South African government agreed to Namibia's indepen-
dence in terms of UN Resolution 435, in return for Cuban troop
withdrawal from Angola over a period of 27 months. South Africa also
removed its own troops from Angola. A joint commission was
established, which included the United States and the former USSR,
to oversee the peace process. This commission became known as
UNAVEM I (United Nations Angola Verification Mission I) and
functioned from January 1989 to June 1991.
This agreement was followed by the Gbadolite Declaration which
became effective on 24 June 1989. This declaration, mediated by
former President Mobutu Sese Seko of ZaõÈ re, provided for a cessation of
hostilities between the MPLA and Unita, and the establishment of a
commission to oversee the implementation of a national reconciliation
164
plan. Shortly after this declaration, the agreement that it embodied

began to disintegrate, with accusations by both sides about breaches of
the provisions of the declaration.
Following the failure of the declaration, the United States again became
involved in the peace process through its Assistant Secretary of State,
Herman Cohen. After protracted negotiations, peace accords (the
Bicesse Accords) were signed in Lisbon, Portugal, on 31 May 1991,
which effectively brought the war to an end. They were concluded
between Dos Santos and Savimbi, and were witnessed by United States
Secretary of State Baker, the former Soviet Union Foreign Minister
Bessmertnykh and Portuguese Prime Minister Silva. The accords
provided for a multiparty political system; the integration of MPLA
and Unita armed forces in a single, reorganised national military force
by August 1992 (comprising 40 000 army, 6 000 air force and 4 000
navy personnel); and UN-monitored free and open elections, which
were subsequently set for 29 and 30 September 1992.
With the collapse of the Bicesse Accords after the elections, the Abidjan
Protocol (in March 1993) and the Lusaka round of talks (ending in
1995) followed.
4.1 THE 1992 ELECTIONS: BACKGROUND TO THE ELECTIONS AND THE

RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES
The 1992 elections and the resumption of hostilities
We will refer to a number of key points in the articles by Pycroft (1994)
and Pereira (1994), which deal with the 1992 elections and the
resumption of hostilities. It should be noted that both parliamentary
and presidential elections took place simultaneously in September
1992. At the presidential level, neither Dos Santos nor Savimbi won 50
percent plus one of the votes that were cast: Dos Santos won 49,57
percent of the votes and Savimbi 40,07 percent. The MPLA won a clear
majority of seats at the parliamentary level, but did not obtain a
majority over its Unita opponent, Jonas Savimbi, at the presidential
level. The MPLA won 70 seats at the national level and 59 at the
provincial level, while Unita won 44 seats at the national level and 26
seats at the provincial level. There were 129 parliamentary seats that
were contested. Savimbi's refusal to accept the results and his failure
to contest a second round of the presidential election precipitated the
return to war. The ``winner takes all'' nature of the elections meant
that Savimbi would have had minimal influence in the government. He
also claimed that massive vote rigging had occurred. Savimbi rejected
the results and returned to war.
According to Pereira (1994), plenty of evidence indicates that Angola
was not ready for elections in September 1992. Some of his arguments
are that much of the infrastructure in the country had been destroyed,
and the elections and constitutional system were ``designed in such a
165 APC3701/1
way to give the winners a lot of (if not all) power'' (Pereira 1994:16).
How does this compare with the Mozambican and Namibian electoral
systems?
Pereira (1994) further says that the continuing conflict in Angola
revolved around differences in nationalism of the two opposing sides.
He says the continuing conflict in Angola ``should be seen as a state-led
inclusive nationalism clashing with a particularistic nationalist move-
ment trying to seize the state'' (Pereira 1994:17). He sees the MPLA as
pursuing state-led nationalism and Unita pursuing particularistic
nationalism.
According to Pereira (1994:17), there are three key factors to the
understanding of the resumption of conflict in Angola and the failure of
the 1991 peace plan. They are the low degree of national unity at
independence due mainly to Portugal's weak colonial rule, the
exacerbation of the armed struggle between the MPLA and Unita
caused by massive infusions of military aid from foreign countries
thereby strengthening the positions of both sides, and, finally, the
limitations of the Bicesse Accords.
4.2 NEW CONSTITUTION, PEACE EFFORTS AND CHALLENGES

The MPLA adopted a new constitution in 1990, which provides for a
multiparty state, the protection of basic freedoms and a market-
oriented economy. Unlike Namibia, there was no general agreement
between the main parties on a constitution for the country. Note from
your reading, the ensuing diplomatic initiatives to restore peace and
the provisions of the Abidjan Protocol, as well as the imposition of
sanctions against Unita by the UN Security Council.
Peace negotiations resumed in Zambia in November 1993 and the
MPLA government made a number of concessions to Unita. A peace
agreement was concluded in Lusaka in May 1995.
A number of challenges face Angola. Despite the accord reached
between the MPLA government and Unita in Lusaka, fighting resumed.
The article by Manning (1999) in the prescribed reader details the
reasons for the collapse. Summarise and study this article for yourself.
Note what Manning says about natural resources fuelling the conflict
(diamonds for Unita and oil for the MPLA). Compare Manning's (1999)
view on this issue with those of Le Billon (2000). Also note the attempts
that were made since 1997 to incorporate Unita and the breakaway
groups within Unita into the governing structures.
Since 1988, the UN has been involved in attempts to bring about peace
between government and rebel forces in Angola. The first attempt was
UNAVEM I from April 1989 to January 1992; the second was UNAVEM
II from July 1991 to April 1995; the third was UNAVEM III from
February 1995 to June 1997; and the fourth was MONUA (United
Nations Observer Mission In Angola) from July 1997 to early 1999.
166
Early in 1999, the Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Anan, announced
that the organisation would end its peacekeeping operation in Angola.
In his report to the UN Security Council, Anan blamed the Angolan
government and Unita for destroying all hopes of peace in the country.
President Dos Santos's government had previously called for the
complete isolation of Unita and the imposition of sanctions so that
fighting could continue uninterrupted with the objective of militarily
defeating Savimbi (Africa Research Bulletin 1999).
4.3 ECONOMY AND RECONSTRUCTION
4.3.1 Inheritance
The year 1973 was the best ever (and the last good one) for the Angolan
economy. Oil and coffee contributed 30 percent and 27 percent
respectively to export earnings. Diamonds were also a significant
export. Since 1960, the economy had grown by about 8 percent per
annum. When Angola was plunged into war in mid-1975, the disruption
of the economy was devastating. For several months the country was
divided into zones under the control of rival armies and there was
serious damage to infrastructure. Meanwhile almost all the white
people fled abroad. Thousands of farms and businesses were literally
abandoned. The country lost most of its business people, commercial
farmers, senior and middle-level civil servants, engineers, doctors,
teachers and shopkeepers (Hodges 1987:30±31).
Oil production was maintained because it was under the control of
multinational corporations. By the 1980s oil was providing over 90
percent of export earnings and over 50 percent of state revenues. As
earlier loans became due and the country ran into balance of payments
difficulties, the government was induced to move in a free market
direction and to secure membership of the World Bank and the IMF.
Under normal circumstances, the oil revenues would probably have
been used to rehabilitate the country and support the farming
community, which in turn would have provided food for the
population. The war resulted in drastically reduced crop production
and food had to be imported. The peasant population reverted to
subsistence farming and the large commercial farmers also produced at
a lower level. The urban areas tended to be favoured in the importation
of food at the expense of the rural areas (Minter 1994).
4.3.2 The government's economic policy since 1976

How did the government respond to the problems created by the flight
of white people and the war? Let us look at a few issues concerning the
evolution of government policy from 1976.
The first issue was what should be done with the abandoned
enterprises. In the crisis immediately after independence, 6 250 farms
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and plantations, and over 5 000 abandoned manufacturing enterprises

had to be dealt with (Bhagavan 1986:153, 158). State intervention was
necessary because the workers were not skilled enough for self-
management and there was no strong entrepreneurial class to take
over. The state takeover of the farms ± grouping them into AUPs
(registered state companies) ± and of the manufacturing industry fitted
in with the 1976 MPLA policy of moving towards a planned, socialist
economy directed by the vanguard party (Somerville 1986:133). At the
same time, it is important to note the pragmatic nature of the actual
policy: private investment was encouraged (this included the oil
industry) and peasant land was not nationalised (Somerville
1986:132±133). A rigid pricing system was instituted after 1977,
which was geared towards guaranteeing rations for all and making
central planning easier. All these moves were instituted amid a
continuing crisis: `ìn 1977 manufacturing output was only 28 percent
of its 1973 level'' and commercial agriculture did not recover (Hodges
1987:31, 33).
The years up to 1981 nevertheless showed ``signs of modest progress in
reviving production in several sectors of the economy, with the glaring
exception of market-oriented agriculture'' (Hodges 1987:41). There
were successes in mining, oil production and the production of some
consumer goods. The 1980 special congress reaffirmed the MPLA's
commitment to a centrally directed economy, and greater efficiency
and planning were called for (Somerville 1986:138). Yet the following
years saw indifferent growth and years of contraction (Hodges
1987:43). What happened?
Up to 1981, government spending rose faster than revenues from the
one big success story, the oil industry (Bhagavan 1986:160±164). From
1981 onwards, increased attacks by South Africa and Unita forced a
steep rise in defence expenditure. The government attempted to control
this expenditure through austerity budgets from 1981 to 1983, which
reduced deficits but severely dampened economic activity.
By the time of the second congress in 1985, it was clear to the MPLA
that many more far-reaching economic reforms would be necessary.
Defence spending had become the top priority; the pricing system was
chaotic, with a black market running parallel with official prices in
shops. Food imports to the towns had been rising since 1981 and the
rural areas were not supplying the towns. Unita attacks and smuggling
had almost ruined the diamond industry in the northeast. Iron-ore
mining in the south at Cassinga never resumed after independence
because of South African attacks (Hodges 1987:81) and the food
industry in the towns had collapsed with the breakdown of rural-urban
trade. The economy depended heavily upon oil, which provided 96
percent of export earnings in 1985 (Hodges 1987:39).
By 1987, according to Pazzanita (1991), there was growing disillu-
sionment among Angolans with the MPLA's austerity measures and
military-oriented spending patterns. The upkeep of Cuban troops
168
became an unbearable burden. Moreover, former President Gorbachev

of the Soviet Union began to make critical comments about the
continuing huge expenses being borne by his country on behalf of Third
World clients.
In order to tackle some of the economic problems confronting Angola,
President Dos Santos outlined a reform programme in August 1987.
This programme, known as the Saneamento de Economica e Financeiro
(SEF), called for the encouragement of small-scale private enterprise in
all spheres of economic life; incentives for foreign investment,
especially from Western Europe; a reduction in size of the state's
centralised bureaucracy; and adoption of a market-based pricing and
wage system. As mentioned already, the Angolan government applied
for IMF membership in 1987.
The embrace of such IMF-style economic reforms helped to alter
the American image of the MPLA (never wholly accurate, to be
sure) as a Soviet-dominated party. The regime's shift towards the
west carried with it the possibility that Washington could be
persuaded to distance itself from South Africa, and at least partly
come around to the MPLA's rationale concerning the presence of
the Cuban forces and Luanda's proposed timetable for their
withdrawal. In addition, the Government's economic and diplo-
matic steps could be thought of as part of the competition with
UNITA, given Savimbi's high profile and evident popularity among
American conservatives. And the reforms could ameliorate the lot
of ordinary Angolans so that they could resist UNITA's blandish-
ments (Pazzanita 1991:97).
These considerations and others led to the peace initiatives already

discussed.
How has the Angolan economy performed since the implementation of
the SEF? By 1990 the government admitted its failure and launched a
governmental action programme (PAG). A reduction in the money
supply as a result of a currency changeover resulted in a fall of
production and an increase in prices. High inflation led to labour
discontent, which particularly affected output from the key oil and
diamond sectors. As Somerville (1995) points out: in 1995 the country
was in dire need of foreign aid but, until common ground was found
between the two parties, the task of eliciting this aid was difficult.
More recently the IMF and the World Bank have again become involved
in programmes to reform the Angolan economy. The MPLA government
has not been enthusiastic about reforms required by the IMF, which
require better accounting for oil and diamond revenues. Consider
reforms of this nature against the views of Le Billon (2000) concerning
the need to dispense patronage.
A further issue confronting the country is the unrecorded income and
expenditure through which power is wielded by the government. It was
believed in 2003 that there was a discrepancy of roughly a billlion US
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dollar between stated government funds and actual revenue from the
oil sector. A fiscal deficit of 9 percent of GDP is forecast for 2004
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 12 December 2003). The government also
has high interest oil loans to redeem. Government finances are
fragmented between offshore accounts and oil and diamond funds,
and remain in poor shape. These financial practices result in macro-
economic instability, including high inflation of over 100 percent, large
fiscal imbalances, monetary growth and a lack of investment in the
social sectors of the economy. These macroeconomic imbalances have
resulted in reluctance on the part of donor communities to invest in the
economy. The Angolan government seems likely to rely on the revenue
from oil production to drive economic growth. However, the problem
with such growth is that it is capital intensive and import dependent. It
has few linkages to other sectors of the economy and will, therefore,
not have much impact on unemployment.
The relationship between the Angolan government and the World Bank
has been more positive, with the World Bank supporting two projects
that are worth US$ 50 million. However, support for larger projects
will depend upon the government's acceptance of an IMF reform
programme, although by September 2003 not much progress had been
made in this area (Africa Confidential, 21 February 2003).
4.4 CONSTRAINTS ON FUTURE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
4.4.1 The present state of the economy

According to Somerville (1995), inflation was running at over 110
percent a month in 1995, approximately 37 percent or one third of the
population survived on food aid, and the government functioned
through the use of its oil earnings. By 2010, inflation dropped to
roughly 13,3 percent per annum.
4.4.2 War damage

It is believed that the war has caused damage estimated at US$25
billion. Roads, railways, bridges, farms, schools and industry were
destroyed. At the time of writing (2011) Angola's own financial
resources are limited despite increasing revenue from oil exports.
The only other source of finance is aid from the international
community. However, it is debatable whether the international
community will be able and willing to supply sufficient aid for
rebuilding Angola considering the relationship between the government
and the IMF referred to above.
4.4.3 Agricultural development

In the past, agriculture (particularly coffee cultivation) produced a
great deal of export revenue for Angola. The Angolan government has
170
pledged itself to a market-driven economy and the privatisation of

state-owned farms. A question raised by this policy is whether private
individuals will be able to afford these farms. A further problem
remaining from the war is the presence of antipersonnel landmines.
These landmines were laid indiscriminately in many parts of the
country and no maps exist to indicate their location. It is estimated that
there are more than 300 000 mines in the Kuando-Kubango province
alone. There were, however, signs that by 2003 the government had
made progress on demining, which is likely to facilitate agricultural
development.
4.4.4 Industrial development

Opening up industry to foreign investment is seen as the key to getting
factories working again. The Angolan government prefers joint
ventures between itself and private investors. In its turn, foreign
investment depends on the implementation of an IMF structural
adjustment programme, which (as mentioned above) had certain social
and political costs for the MPLA government when it was faced with
elections in September 1992. These measures involved currency
devaluations, lifting price and wage controls, and reducing the size of
the civil service. Foreign investors, moreover, required political
certainty. Consider the implications of these measures. A further
constraint on industrial development is the lack of skilled human
resources in the country. What about the refugee problem referred to
above? We have already mentioned the illiteracy level in the country. At
the time of writing (2011) a number of training programmes are being
offered by international organisations, such as the World Bank and
Unicef. However, the MPLA bureaucracy tends to be slow to respond
and, even in the best of circumstances, imparting new skills takes time.
Think about these issues while you study the literature.
171 APC3701/1
STUDY UNIT 5
Angola's resource war
A READING
Study the following article in the prescribed reader:
Le Billon (2000)
Much of the discussion and literature referred to in previous study

units has emphasised the role of ethnicity and class in the conflict in
Angola. During much of the cold war period, wars were driven largely
by external imperatives in which global players sought to extend their
influence. Recent studies indicate that economic agendas appear to be
central to the origins of many wars ± in other words, greed causes war
(Cilliers et al 2000:1±2). Two lines of thinking underpin this view on
the relationship between war and economics (resource wars), namely
that easily exploitable natural resources are used to finance civil wars
and that the perpetuation of war in certain African countries serves as
an alternative way of gaining income. Cilliers et al (2000:2) caution,
however, that although economic factors may be important causes of
war, they can seldom be used as single factor explanations for violent
conflict. Cilliers et al (2000:2) continue that the political and ethnic
origins of the war in Angola remain salient and serve to complement the
resource war view.
The reference, then, to the Angolan war as a resource war, should be
considered as a partial explanation to the perpetuation of the war. We
will study, in depth, the article included in your prescribed reader by
Le Billon (2000), entitled ``The political economy of resource wars''. Le
Billon maintains that violence and wealth in Angola has had a long
history. He distinguishes between ``scarce resource wars'' and
`àbundant resource wars'', and categorises the Angolan conflict in
the latter category. In the case where there is an abundance of natural
resources, poor economic performance and greater socioeconomic
inequalities may result. Resource rents may provide leaders with the
means for staying in power by offering them the resources to offer
patronage and rewards to followers, and to punish opponents. Le Billon
also makes the point that the control of resource sectors by a political
elitist group leaves little scope for the accumulation of wealth outside
this group.
172
He concludes that although the main source of wealth for Unita has
been diamonds, the diamond fields are dispersed. It is not as easy to
gain control over the diamonds fields as it is over oil, which is a
centrally controlled resource. Oil is financially more important than
diamonds, and with the isolation of Unita, the final resolution of the
conflict is likely to favour the MPLA. Since resources should be
considered in the longer-term resolution of conflicts, one should
consider the resource issue in the post-Savimbi era and whether it will
be a greater or lesser issue in achieving long-term peace and prosperity
in Angola.
You should make a thorough study and summary of the Le Billon's

article for yourself.
5.1 CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE: THE ATTAINMENT OF A LASTING

PEACE
The assassination of Jonas Savimbi on 22 February 2002 means that
peace is more likely to be attainable. The government is in the process
of setting up camps to accommodate Unita soldiers. About 5 000 Unita
soldiers and officers are to be given posts in the Angolan army.
Weapons held by Unita soldiers are supposed to be surrendered to the
government, but it is not known how many have in fact been
surrendered. It is hoped that the remaining weapons will not be used
if the government assists in providing vocational training and helps
Unita soldiers get back into civilian life. If this hope does not
materialise, this could once again precipitate conflict. On 23 August
2002, the government and Unita elaborated on an earlier ceasefire
agreement signed on 4 August 2002, under which Unita would lay
down arms in return for a number of cabinet and diplomatic posts.
Multiparty elections were scheduled for 2004, but have been be

delayed to 2012 in order to benefit the MPLA, which is in a position to
dispense patronage and use oil revenues to favour itself (as referred to
above). Unita accepted a period of a few years during which it would
reorganise politically to face an even stronger MPLA. Unita is one of
many opposition parties. On the face of it, these two large parties
appear unenthusiastic about measures that would help smaller parties
grow, since it could mean their loss of power to control the allocation of
oil resources. Besides Unita, the Frente para a LibertacËaÄo de Cabinda
(FLEC) is fighting for the independence of the Cabinda enclave, which
produces over 60 percent of the country's oil ambassadorships. A
peace agreement still needs to be negotiated in the oil producing region
of Cabinda.
173 APC3701/1
The MPLA government was keen to move ahead with the holding of
elections but argued that the appropriate conditions should be in place,
including freedom of movement, a new constitution and an election
register (Economist Intelligence Unit, 12 December 2003). Elections
are to be held in 2012. The delay in the holding of elections and the
acceptance of the MPLA by Unita may make a return to war unlikely.
However, a peace agreement between elites did not help Angola's
economy. Despite a growth in oil revenues, this revenue is not finding
its way to the countryside and, in particular, to areas that support
Unita. Diamond revenues are not benefiting the people, particularly in
the Cuango valley. Moreover, the MPLA government has not invested in
farming activities, which, it is felt, could assist in promoting
reconciliation between the MPLA and some four million displaced
persons who suffer from malnutrition and a lack of medical assistance.
Unita has elected a new leader, Isaias Samakuva, and the movement
has formally apologised for its wartime abuses. The MPLA has refused
to accept responsibility for many war crimes it has been accused of,
such as underage recruitment, assassination of political opponents,
and wrongful arrest and imprisonment. A further factor which could
once again precipitate conflict is Unita's loss of revenue from the
diamond fields and a growth in insecurity among Unita members.
A constitutional commission was appointed in 1999 to make recom-
mendations on constitutional change. The parties agreed that a
president should appoint the governors of the provinces, that there
should be a one-chamber parliament and that a consultative council of
traditional rulers function alongside the parliament.
Think about the ``winner takes all'' electoral system which possibly
partly led to the resumption of the conflict after the 1992 elections.
What modifications could have been made to placate minority groups?
Munslow (1999) argues that Angola is making three highly complex
transitions simultaneously, namely from war to peace, from single-
party Marxist-Leninist rule to multiparty democracy and from a
centralised command-based economy to a free market one. Study and
summarise Munslow's (1999) article in the prescribed reader. What
are the inhibiting factors likely to be to the consolidation of democracy
in the post-Savimbi era?
5.2 GOVERNANCE: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT

(1) Reciprocity. A number of political parties were able to compete in
the 1992 and 2008 elections. Given the growing dominance of the
MPLA, the past distrust between leaders and political parties, and
the resources available to political parties, the environment is not
conducive to individuals forming associations and supporting
opposition political parties to promote their interests in the public
realm.
174
(2) Trust. As far as Hyden and Bratton's (1992) first criterion of good
governance is concerned, the two main political movements (the
MPLA and Unita) have not displayed a great deal of this in the past.
A level of trust has not developed between the two parties despite
the formal conclusion of hostilities on several occasions. Time will
tell whether trust can be established between the two main parties
in the post-Savimbi era. Innovative constitutional solutions might
promote trust between the parties.
(3) Accountability. As far as this third property is concerned, with the
signing of a peace agreement, it is likely that the government will be
able to exert a greater influence over the territory. However,
considering the resources at the disposal of elites, it is uncertain
whether the governors will account for their decisions and actions.
(4) Authority. At the time of writing (2011), the MPLA government
was not distributing resources effectively to the vast majority of
the population which had been affected by the conflict, particu-
larly in the social sphere. The question remains whether the MPLA
government will adopt an inclusivist approach to policymaking and
will adhere to rules agreed upon. It seems as if the MPLA
government is respecting the rules of the constitution, but is
reluctant to grant authority to subsidiary structures rather than to
the central government.
As far as the major causes of ``bad'' politics are concerned, as of 2000:

(1) Savimbi's rule was personalised
(2) Dos Santos's rule was not personalised
(3) there were many violations of human rights
(4) the MPLA does not seem prepared to delegate authority
As the situation in Angola is in a state of flux, it is perhaps not possible

to make a thorough assessment of good ``governance'' and ``bad''
politics in Angola.
A READING
Study and summarise the following articles in the prescribed

reader:
Alden & Simpson (1993)
Munslow (1999)
Le Billon (2000)
Roque (2009)
Schubert (2010)
175 APC3701/1
TEST YOURSELF
(1) Write an essay in which you compare the constraints on
economic development in Angola and Mozambique.
(2) The continuing conflict in Angola ``should be seen as a state-led
inclusive nationalism clashing with a particularistic nationalist
movement trying to seize the state'' (Pereira 1994). Sketch the
development of this conflict since 1975 and the possible
constitutional solutions to it.
(3) Why did the Angolan factions return to war after the 1992
elections?
(4) ``Led by Jonas Savimbi, [Unita] was usually perceived as the
ethnically oriented party of the Ovimbundu.'' Do you agree with
this statement?
(5) Identify and explain the factors which hindered the achieve-
ment of peace in Angola in the 1990s.
(6) ``The wealth of Angola has contributed to the poverty of its
people.'' Do you agree with this statement? Justify your
answer.
(7) According to Munslow (1999), `Àngola is undertaking three
highly complex transitions simultaneously''. Identify and
explain these transitions.
(8) ``Peace making processes need to understand the role of
resources in conflicts and challenge the concerned actors,
whether they are foot soldiers, warlords, domestic and foreign
politicians, or multinationals.'' (Le Billon 2000). Explain this
statement.
(9) Evaluate the following statement: ``The road to real democracy
in Angola will indeed be long and tortuous, but may in one way
or another have begun.''
176
STUDY UNIT 6
Mozambique
CHRONOLOGY
c 100-400 CE First waves of Bantu-speaking people arrive in
Mozambique
c 1300 Establishment of Mwenumutapa kingdom
1498 Arrival of Portuguese off Mozambique island
1884±1885 Berlin Conference; Portugal begins to establish
formal colonial rule in Mozambique
1885±1913 Resistance to establishment of Portuguese
colonial rule
1962 Establishment of Frelimo (Front for the
Liberation of Mozambique) in Dar es Salaam
1964 Commencement of armed struggle
1968 Second Frelimo Party Congress in Niassa province
1969 Eduardo Mondlane assassinated
1970 Samora Machel appointed president of Frelimo
1974 Coup d'ee tat in Portugal; Lusaka talks between
Frelimo and new Portuguese government; estab-
lishment of transitional government
1975 Mozambican independence
1976 War with Rhodesia and establishment of the
Mozambican National Resistance (MNR)
1977 Third Frelimo Party Congress and establishment
of Frelimo as a vanguard party
1983 Fourth Frelimo Party Congress
1986 Samora Machel killed in aeroplane crash and
Joaquim Chissano assumes leadership of Frelimo
1987 Launch of the Economic Rehabilitation
Programme (PRE)
1989 Fifth Frelimo Congress
1990 Partial ceasefire agreement between Renamo and
Frelimo; adoption of a new constitution
1994 Multiparty elections
177 APC3701/1
1999 Second multiparty elections

November 2003 Local government elections
2012 Presidential and Parliamentary election
Political map of Mozambique
Source: Minter (1994)

178
Map showing ethnic groups in Mozambique
Source: Henriksen (1978a)

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6.1 INTRODUCTION
A READING
Study the following articles in the prescribed reader:
Alden and Simpson (1993)
Manning (2001)
Ostheimer (1999)
Pitcher (2006)
Manning (2010)
Hanlon (2010)
THEMES
Our study of Mozambique is based on four broad themes:
(1) origins of the internal conflict and its resolution
(2) formulation of a constitution and the holding of elections in
1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009
(3) problems of reconstruction, reconciliation and economic deve-
lopment in the postindependence period
(4) Multiparty politics and democratisation
LEARNING OUTCOMES
After you have completed this study guide, you should be able to
. briefly outline the early development of Mozambique before
colonial rule
. describe the nature of colonial rule
. describe the origins of the nationalist movement and Renamo in
Mozambique
. describe how peace was achieved in Mozambique
. evaluate the success of the democratisation process in the
country
6.1.1 Some basic facts

The country is a long, narrow, low-lying region on the east coast of
Africa. With a surface area of 801 590 square kilometres, it is the
smallest of the three countries we are studying. Although it has a
number of excellent harbours (most notably Nacala, Beira and
Maputo), nature has not been overly kind to Mozambique. Much of
the south is covered with infertile Kalahari-type sand, and the country
as a whole is in the rain shadow of Madagascar and thus highly
vulnerable to drought. Furthermore, the northern part of the country is
a tsetse fly zone, making animal husbandry very difficult. There are
180
few known mineral resources of any kind, with the exception of a little
coal, natural gas and rare minerals such as beryl, tantalite and mica
(Clarence-Smith 1985:10).
Mozambique is one of Africa's poorest countries. It had an estimated
GDP of US$7,559 (2007 estimate) compared to Namibia's GDP of
US$4,8 billion in 2004. To make these figures more meaningful,
compare the population sizes of the two countries. Namibia had a
population of approximately 2 million, whereas Mozambique's popula-
tion was estimated at 21,3 million in 2007. In the years 1988 to 1998,
the annual growth in Mozambique's GDP was approximately 7,7
percent per annum, compared with a negative annual growth rate of
3,9 percent in the period 1977±1987. In 1999, the economy grew by an
estimated 10 percent. Mozambique had an estimated annual inflation
rate of 50 percent in 1992 (Handbook of the Nations 1993) and 4,8
percent in 1999 (High Commission of the Republic of Mozambique
2000). Economic performance was seriously affected after 2000,
reducing the growth rate to 2,1 percent, as a result of extensive
flooding, displacement of up to 300 000 people, and the destruction of
crops and infrastructure. Average annual GDP growth for the period
2001±2010 was 7,9 percent and for the period 2011 to 2015 it is
predicted to be 7,7 percent per annum.
Administratively, Mozambique is divided into 10 provinces ± 11 if one
includes the capital, Maputo. Mozambique's population of 17 million
people is distributed mainly in the rural areas and is divided into a
number of fairly distinct ethnic groups (see the map on the previous
page).
6.1.2 Population groups

The largest of Mozambique's population groups, the Makua-Lomwe,
live in the northeast in Zambezia, Nampula, Niassa and Cabo Delgado.
They are Islamicised and speak Swahili. To the north are the highly
Islamicised Yao and the animist Makonde who offered the fiercest
opposition to the Portuguese. The other major northern groups are the
Nyanja and Chewa around Lake Niassa.
To the south are the Thonga, Chopi and Shona groups. Substantial
differences exist between the people who live in the north and these
southerners. Having benefited from their relative proximity to most of
the economic and educational development in Mozambique, not to
mention extensive contact by means of migrant labour with nearby
South Africa and Zimbabwe, the southerners are regarded by people
from the north as `àggressive'', ``domineering'' and ``corrupt''. In
turn, southerners see people from the north as ``backward'' and
``primitive'' (Opello 1975:69).
In addition to these groups there are small numbers of white people,
Asians and people of mixed race (known in Mozambique as mesticos).
They are found mainly in the south, especially in the urban areas.
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K Before we deal with specific themes, you should acquaint yourself

with the broad scope of recent events in Mozambique. Note the
reference to Mozambique's colonial history, the internal conflict
and attempts at achieving peace. Also note the 1994 election
processes and the results.
6.1.3 Early history

We should acquaint ourselves briefly with some of Mozambique's
precolonial and colonial history in order to place the present problems
of the country in proper perspective. Early Mozambican society is most
commonly considered to have been shaped by two successive
``revolutions''. The first of these was the migration of Bantu-speaking
people into the general area of Mozambique and the successive
processes of state formation and decline that followed. The second
``revolution'' resulted from the intensification of Mozambique's ties
with the wider world, facilitated mainly by maritime innovations
introduced in Europe in the 15th century (Isaacman & Isaacman
1983:11).
6.1.4 Indigenous state formation

The migrations of the various groups of iron-age Bantu speakers
displaced the stone-age hunter-gatherers who had previously populated
Mozambique. There was much interaction and assimilation among the
groups, who settled in agricultural communities which took the form of
independent chieftaincies. The chiefs controlled the land and were
assisted by councils of elders.
For much of the time before the 17th century, these chieftaincies were
loosely organised into one of two systems or confederations:
(1) the Mwenumutapa kingdom in central Mozambique and present-
day Zimbabwe,
(2) the Malawi confederation in the north (Isaacman & Isaacman
1983:11±13)
6.1.5 Trade, conquest and slavery

Both of these systems or ``states'' were always heavily involved in
trade (especially in gold and ivory) with Swahili merchants. From a
very early date, these merchants established commercial and religious
sultanates along the East African coast, most notably in Mozambique,
the Angoche islands and Sofala (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983:13±14).
Their control over trade in the region was challenged by the arrival of
the Portuguese in 1498. The Portuguese, who were anxious to secure
gold and ivory to finance their Indian spice trade and to establish
182
refreshment stations, took military action against the Muslim mer-

chants. By 1525, they had seized control of most of the coastal centres
and had also established a number of trading settlements in the
interior, for example at Sena and Tete (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983:13±
14). These commercial undertakings were always accompanied by
evangelistic missions, mainly Jesuit and Dominican (Duffy 1959:103±
129). Unlike the Muslims, who were content merely to exchange cheap
consumer goods for gold and ivory, the Portuguese wanted to control
production. Initially, they tried to achieve this by converting the Rozvi
aristocracy of the Mwenumutapa kingdom to Christianity. Following
mixed results from this policy, they resorted to taking military action
against the two confederations. Faced with fierce opposition from the
threatened communities and numerous natural obstacles, especially
the climate, it took Portugal over 30 years to gain sovereignty over the
area by finally defeating the declining Mwenumutapa and concluding
an alliance with the Malawi confederation.
In order to strengthen their rather tenuous position in the region, the
Portuguese seized land and distributed estates to Portuguese na-
tionals. These were to form the basis of a permanent white settler
community which would promote Portuguese civilisation and perform
certain functions on behalf of the crown, for example collecting taxes
and subduing neighbouring territories. The estates, established mainly
in the Zambezi valley, but also in Sofala, were known as prazos and the
holders as prazeiros. They were entitled to a share of the taxes that
were collected, and full rights over the land and labour that were
assigned to them, on condition that their families remained ``white''
(Isaacman & Isaacman 1983:13±15).
This policy was not successful because the prazeiros became increas-
ingly autonomous, establishing strong local fiefdoms. Furthermore,
many prazeiros became Africanised, assuming local names and
customs and usually even losing their command of Portuguese. Many
came to oppose rather than represent Portuguese interests (Isaacman &
Isaacman 1983:22±23).
This situation, combined with increasing resistance from the local
population, led to a much reduced Portuguese presence and influence in
the area. Their role in regional trade was largely taken over by Asians
(Isaacman & Isaacman 1983:15).
The nature of trade in the area changed dramatically after the mid-18th
century because of an increasing demand for labour: first from the
sugar plantations of the islands of Ile de France and Bourbon, and later
from Brazil, the United States and the Caribbean (Henriksen 1978a:66).
The slave trade revived Muslim and Portuguese commercial activity in
the area, but the Yao and Makonde tribes and the prazeiros were also
very active. Naturally, slavery itself and the slave trade were not new
in this part of Africa. Nearly all the traditional societies made use of
slave labour, which formed the basis of the prazeiros mode of
production. However, while slaves had previously been obtained by
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means of negotiation between local aristocracies and alien traders, or

as a by-product of wars, the booming demand for slaves, coupled with
the introduction of modern weapons, meant that they were now
obtained by means of large-scale raids and conquest. By the early 18th
century, slaves were Mozambique's principal export and, although the
trade never reached such proportions as those in Angola, over 10 000
slaves were legally exported from Mozambique every year. Given the
prevalence of smuggling, the real numbers were no doubt much higher
(Henriksen 1978a:66; Duffy 1959:29, 146).
Although officially terminated under British pressure in 1836, the slave
trade continued unofficially well into the 1880s (Duffy 1959:145). Even
after this, it persisted in various modified forms, for example as corveÂe
labour sent to the cocoa plantations of Sao TomeÂ (Henriksen 1978a:66;
Isaacman & Isaacman 1983:16±18).
All in all, over a million Mozambicans were removed from the country
in this manner. Considering that the majority of them would have been
in the prime of life and the most productive sector of society, the social
and economic implications are obvious. The situation was exacerbated
by the fact that, in order to avoid being taken as slaves, many of these
people escaped to inaccessible, usually unproductive, areas. Further-
more, while removing the most productive members of society, the
slave trade contributed very little in return. The vast profits made were
not invested locally and the received goods were unproductive, for
example cloth, beads and alcohol (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983:18). One
should bear this historical background in mind when considering the
problems of underdevelopment in the country.
6.2 COLONIAL RULE
6.2.1 Background
The Mozambican colonial experience is a particularly important factor
in any explanation of the current situation in the country. As described
in study unit 1, the Portuguese had a strongly interventionist colonial
policy. Thus they played a big role in shaping a society that had already
experienced much social upheaval in the preceding 400 years through
the process of indigenous state formation. The Portuguese involvement
with the wider world through trade in general, and through the slave
trade in particular, was especially influential in shaping Mozambican
society.
6.2.2 The establishment of Portuguese colonial rule

Portugal only really established firm control over what is now
Mozambique after its historical ``claim'' to the area was rejected by
the other colonial powers at the Berlin Conference of 1884±1885,
which was organised to resolve the disputes arising from their
184
``scramble for Africa''. The conference decided that, in order to win

recognition as the colonial power in Mozambique, Portugal needed to
fully pacify and effectively control the area (Isaacman & Isaacman
1983:21).
A 30-year period of extensive military activity followed, during which
the Portuguese eventually subdued the population and a number of
recalcitrant warlord prazeiros. An attempt at administrative reorga-
nisation of the country followed from 1907 onwards, but the
Portuguese soon ran into problems because they lacked the resources
to administer the whole country effectively. They increasingly looked
towards the establishment of chartered companies (along the lines of
the British South African Company in Southern Rhodesia) which could
perform this task for them. Three companies were prominent in this
undertaking: the Mozambique Company in the centre of the country,
the Zambezia Company and the Niassa Company. Foreign capital was
dominant in all three companies which, in return for rights to resources
and taxes, were obliged to develop the area.
6.2.3 Company rule

The companies were ineffective both as commercial enterprises and as
agents of development. Their administration of the area was particu-
larly harsh, leading someone to observe in 1914 that `às far as the
natives are concerned, this is a land of blood and tears where the most
brutal ill treatment is no crime and murder merely a slight indiscre-
tion'' (Vail 1976:401).
6.2.4 The nature of Portuguese colonial rule

In common with the chartered companies, particularly the Niassa
Company, Portugal relied on the exploitation of labour as a means of
``developing'' the colony and benefiting the metropolis. Besides making
use of chibalo (or forced, unpaid labour), the Portuguese authorities in
Mozambique also exported labour, particularly to South Africa and
Southern Rhodesia. The government entered into a series of agree-
ments with South Africa and the Witwatersrand Native Labour
Association (WNLA), starting in 1897 and culminating in the
Portugal-South Africa Convention of 1928. These treaties gave the
WNLA recruiting rights in southern Mozambique; in return, the
Transvaal had to route 47,5 percent of all its exports through the port
of Lourenco Marques (now Maputo). In addition, the Portuguese
government received a fixed sum for each worker. Workers' wages
were to be paid to the Portuguese government in gold at the official
price, which was well below the market price. The Portuguese
government would then pay the miners in Mozambican escudos and
resell the gold on the world market, reaping a substantial financial
profit for Portugal (Henriksen 1978a:120; Isaacman & Isaacman
1983:35). Labour was also exported to Southern Rhodesia (though on
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a far smaller scale) and Rhodesian goods all came through the port of
Beira, bringing in substantial tariff revenue for Mozambique. Also
important in this regard was the heavy tourist trade from both
Rhodesia and South Africa.
The service component of the Mozambican economy had significant
implications for economic development because the colonial govern-
ment relied increasingly on the income from its migrant labourers and
the transit trade. This reliance was exacerbated by the Portuguese
policy of blocking any form of industrial development within the
colonies during much of the colonial period in order to retain the
colonies as a protected market for manufacturers from the uncompe-
titive metropolitan industrial sector. Allied to this policy was the
imposition of forced cotton cultivation, introduced by Salazar in 1938
to provide cheap raw cotton for Portugal's emergent textile industry.
By 1945, over a million peasants in northern Mozambique were being
forced to grow cotton, for which they were paid extremely low prices
and received very little infrastructural support (Isaacman & Isaacman
1983:41).
With the emphasis on exploiting Mozambican labour, the Portuguese
paid very little attention to the provision of social services in their
policy. There were two separate school systems: one church-run, the
other financed and organised by the government. High fees, a low cut-
off age for entering school and the general shortage of places served to
exclude the vast majority of Mozambicans from any form of education
(Mondlane 1983:61±69).
The health sector suffered from similar neglect; most healthcare was
all but inaccessible to blacks. No immunisation campaigns were carried
out until the late 1950s, although a number of small improvements
were made afterwards (Henriksen 1978a:146±147).
Thus the colonial period in Mozambique badly distorted the country's
economy, society and politics. On an economic level, the country
became increasingly dependent on South Africa and Southern Rhode-
sia, and was geared towards servicing those countries' needs.
Portuguese colonial policy and the practices of the chartered
companies directed Mozambique's economy to the export of labour
and primary products. Thus very little industrial or infrastructural
development took place. Where it did, it tended to be financed by
foreign capital (mostly South African), which again increased Mozam-
bique's dependence. The export of labour exacerbated the already
severe effects of the slave trade by removing the society's most
productive members, thus seriously undermining the rural economy.
The effects of colonial social policies, particularly in the realm of
education, further inhibited any economic development in the short
term and were to pose serious problems for the country in the long
term.
186
STUDY UNIT 7
The nationalist movement
The liberation struggle is usually considered to be particularly

significant for the study of the politics of independent Mozambique.
Besides the historical interest in the liberation struggle, it is seen by
many (Henriksen 1978b; Meyns 1981; Luke 1982; Isaacman &
Isaacman 1983; Young 1988) as the most important factor that initially
shaped Frelimo as a party, and then shaped the political and
development strategy the party adopted once it had assumed power.
Although Chabal (1983) challenges the wisdom of accepting this view
without question, it is clear that the struggle involved more than
merely the way in which Frelimo was able to seize power from the
Portuguese. Rather, it served as a kind of laboratory in which the
structure of the party itself was refined and in which its policies were
shaped by experience. The party structure and policies were retained
after independence. We will describe the formation of Frelimo, the way
in which the war was conducted and the party's later ideological shifts,
particularly as far as economic policy is concerned.
7.1 THE FOUNDING OF FRELIMO AND THE BEGINNING OF THE ARMED

STRUGGLE AGAINST PORTUGUESE RULE
The war itself began in mid-1964, but the territory had a long history of
opposition to Portuguese colonial rule, either by way of outright armed
opposition or through more subtle forms of resistance, for example
strikes and emigration from Portuguese-controlled areas (Isaacman &
Isaacman 1983:61±78; Henriksen 1978a:155±168). By the beginning of
the 1960s, a number of externally based nationalist organisations came
into existence.
The most prominent among these were Undenamo (National Demo-
cratic Union of Mozambique), Manu (Mozambique-Makonde Union) and
Unami (National African Union of Independent Mozambique). Each of
these had their own particular regional support base (Isaacman &
Isaacman 1983:80; Henriksen 1978a:169).
Despite early setbacks in their opposition to the Portuguese colonial
government and vicious repression within Mozambique, the three
organisations came together in Tanzania in 1962 to form Frelimo. This
merger was the result of much encouragement by Tanzanian president
Julius Nyerere and the CONCP (Congress of Nationalist Organisations
of the Portuguese Colonies), the umbrella body of nationalist organisa-
tions in all the Portuguese territories. Opponents of Portuguese rule
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from within Mozambique, particularly from the Makonde tribe, and

Mozambican exiles abroad also joined in forming Frelimo. A member of
the latter group, Eduardo Mondlane, a Mozambican academic based in
the United States, was elected as the first leader of the party (Isaacman
& Isaacman 1983:81; Henriksen 1978a:170).
At its First Party Congress in September 1962, Frelimo did not go into
much detail about its aims and the methods by which it hoped to
achieve them. The party's main concern was to establish an
independent Mozambique, free from Portuguese colonial rule, and to
create, as Mondlane put it, ``conditions for a successful armed
struggle'' (Seegers 1977:66±67).
Mobilisation began in 1964, mainly in the Cabo Delgado and Niassa
provinces. Frelimo forces, trained initially in Algeria but increasingly
in Tanzania itself, specialised in small-scale attacks aimed at weaken-
ing the Portuguese army by a process of attrition (Seegers 1977:68;
Henriksen 1978a:186).
Over the years, the organisation became increasingly radicalised. The
fact that for much of the war Frelimo received very little Western
support or recognition, probably contributed to this tendency. The
substantial support it received from the former communist bloc (in
particular the Soviet Union, China and Vietnam), combined with its
experiences in the ``liberated zones'', led Frelimo to adopt an
increasingly radical and Marxist line.
The liberated zones were areas in which Frelimo claimed to have
control. By the end of the war, Frelimo claimed to have liberated nearly
a third of the country and to be the de facto government of over a
million people (Henriksen 1983:145). In these areas it reputedly set
about changing social and economic relations, and establishing new
systems of government. Frelimo experimented with new ways of
organising agricultural production and set up numerous lojas de povo
or people's shops (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983:86).
The liberated zones have generated considerable debate. Firstly, there
is some doubt about the degree to which Frelimo can accurately claim
to have been in control of the areas allegedly liberated by them.
Secondly, there is further doubt concerning the extent to which they
substantially altered socioeconomic relationships within those areas
(Henriksen 1983:145±154; Seegers 1984:32).
There can be little question, however, about the role the liberated zones
played in shaping Frelimo's ideology and much of its postindependence
development strategy. In 1973 Samora Machel spelled this out clearly:
The establishment of the liberated zones creates the material
basis for the transformation of the anticolonial liberation
struggle into a revolutionary struggle, a struggle for the
establishment of new political, economic, social and cultural
188
structures which give expression to the complete power of the

masses over the society in its totality (Meyns 1981:49).
7.1.1 The end of the war

By 1974, Frelimo guerrillas were active in Cabo Delgado, Niassa, Tete,
Manica e Sofala and Zambezia provinces (but not in the south). Here
they pursued their policy of small-scale hit-and-run operations against
the Portuguese, aimed increasingly at economic targets. The coup that
removed the Lisbon government and replaced it with a more moderate
military regime, which was committed to ending the wars in the
colonies, did not bring these operations to a halt. Frelimo persisted,
determined to maintain its advantage and come to the negotiating table
in the strongest possible military position.
K What were the likely advantages of this decision? Did it help to

weaken the chances of a neo-colonial independence settlement or
was it merely a reflection of Frelimo's concern to penetrate more of
the country (particularly the south where they were virtually
unknown)?
7.1.2 Decolonisation and the transition to independence

Frelimo and the Portuguese government held talks in Lusaka in June
1974. After some tough bargaining on the part of Frelimo, an agreement
was reached on 7 September which guaranteed the liberation move-
ment virtually all it asked for. Under the terms of this agreement, a
transitional government was established which consisted of Portuguese
and Frelimo officials. Frelimo held a number of important posts,
including that of prime minister, to which position Joaquim Chissano
was elected. Similarly, Portuguese officials joined with their Frelimo
counterparts to form a joint military commission. This was to act,
together with the transitional government, in a coordinating and care-
taking role until the unconditional handover of power that was to take
place in June 1975 (EgeroÈ 1987:61±64).
The announcement of the terms of the Lusaka Agreement helped to
trigger an uprising by a group of conservative whites in Maputo.
Calling themselves Fico (''I stay''), they seized the radio station and
called on South Africa for assistance. They were soon crushed by a
combined Portuguese-Frelimo force; but this action, together with a
number of attacks on the white community (sometimes in response to
provocation by the white people), helped to escalate an already massive
flow of white people from the country (EgeroÈ 1987:61±64). It is
estimated that between 1973 and 1977, the white population decreased
by around 80 percent (Seegers 1984:35±36).
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This outflow of white people caused the new Frelimo government

severe immediate problems. Because of the skewed educational and
employment policies of the colonial government, the vast majority of
senior jobs in all sectors of the state and the economy had been held by
white people. With over 90 percent of the black population illiterate,
there was a serious shortage of personnel to replace the white people
who had left. Not only had the white people left, but most of them had
abandoned their businesses and farms, taken all that they could with
them and sabotaged what they were forced to leave behind (EgeroÈ
1987:67±71; Collins 1978:12). Thus the state and the economy were
plunged into chaos.
The situation was further exacerbated by the existence of over 30 000
black former members of the Portuguese colonial army, who had been
demobilised after Frelimo had refused to absorb them into its ranks.
There were also disciplinary problems within Frelimo itself. But by far
the most serious problem was that Frelimo was virtually unknown in
the south and in all the cities (Seegers 1984:37; Collins 1978:12).
In order to try to prevent large-scale economic collapse and at the same
time entrench Frelimo's position in the country, the transitional
government set up small, locally based organisations known as grupos
dinamazidores or dynamising groups. Their task was to raise the
political consciousness of the masses and help overcome the worst of
the crises in the economy and the bureaucracy. Although there were
numerous problems with the dynamising groups, they appear to have
been successful in helping to forge the sense of national unity with
which Mozambique celebrated independence under President Samora
Machel on 25 June 1975 (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983:117±118).
7.2 INDEPENDENCE
Under this heading, we will study the following three themes of this
study unit:
(1) the formation of Renamo and its subsequent conflict with Frelimo
(2) Frelimo's attempts at resolving Mozambique's economic problems
(3) the attainment of peace, the democratisation process and the
holding of elections in the country
We should mention two points before proceeding: Firstly, independent

Mozambique has been strongly influenced by its history; hence,
current events cannot be understood without this historical perspec-
tive. Secondly, the situation in Mozambique, as in any country, is
dynamic ± it is constantly changing under the influence of many
different forces. Frelimo's economic policy, for example, has changed
considerably over time.
190
7.2.1 The Mozambique National Resistance Movement (MNR/Renamo)

There is some debate about the exact origins of the MNR (later known
as Renamo). Some (eg Thomashausen 1983:126) maintain that it was
formed by a number of Frelimo members who were expelled during the
crises of the 1960s, in particular those who came together to form
Coremo (ComiteÂ Revolusionae rio de Mozambique) in Lusaka in 1965.
Although many members of Coremo emerged as members of the MNR,
it seems more likely that the conventional view of its origins is correct.
This is that it was formed by the Rhodesian Special Branch after
Frelimo came to power in 1974 (Metz 1986:492±493).
The Rhodesians wanted to use the MNR for covert action against Zanu
(Zimbabwe African National Union) in its base areas in Mozambique in
order to contribute to the general destabilisation of the country, which
would indirectly help the Rhodesian army in its actions against Zanu
and Frelimo. They were assisted in setting up the MNR by former
agents of PIDE, the Portuguese secret police. Membership of the MNR,
at that stage, was largely drawn from former members of the black
anti-insurgency units established by the Portuguese. Some of these
people had fled across the border into Rhodesia at independence;
others had remained in Mozambique, trying to shed their past for fear
of retribution. The Rhodesian Special Branch was able to contact and
blackmail many of them into joining the MNR, using the files on the
anti-insurgency units which they had received from PIDE after the
units were disbanded (Metz 1986:491±495).
Their ranks were swelled by disgruntled members of Frelimo, people
who had been liberated by the Rhodesians from Frelimo re-education
camps and other guerrillas who had been expelled from Frelimo for
various reasons. One of these people, AndreÂ Matzangaissa, became the
first leader of the MNR. He was a former Frelimo officer who was
expelled for vehicle theft (Legum 1983:2). He was succeeded by
Alfonso Dhlakama.
Rhodesian support for the MNR fell away when Zimbabwe gained
independence in 1980. At that stage, all evidence points to a takeover of
Rhodesian patronage of the organisation by South Africa. The head of
the British military team who supervised the transition to indepen-
dence in Zimbabwe, Lieutenant-General Sir John Ackland, witnessed
and reported the wholesale airlifting of MNR personnel and goods from
an airstrip outside Mutare by SADF transport aeroplanes (Legum
1983:2; Saul 1987:75). They were apparently taken to bases in
Phalaborwa in the Limpopo province of South Africa, from which they
were later moved into Mozambique (Gunn 1986:6). From that time on,
the war in Mozambique entered a new phase. MNR guerrillas became
active in more parts of the country; their activities increased
considerably and tended to focus more on Mozambican economic,
political and civilian targets. The MNR also became more sophisti-
cated as an organisation (Metz 1986:491±495; Campbell 1984:845).
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7.2.2 External support for the MNR

The question of external support has always been a major one in any
consideration of the MNR. This is no doubt because of the important
role that outside actors apparently played in its formation. Most people
who consider this question concern themselves with the former South
African government's support for the MNR. During much of the early
1980s the former South African government firmly denied having any
connection with the MNR. Since then, however, substantial and
irrefutable evidence emerged which shows a close relationship
between the two. The former South African government's support of
the MNR seems only to have stopped in the early 1990s. South Africa is
said to have provided arms, communication equipment, medical
supplies, material to produce propaganda, transport, and military
advice to the MNR (Metz 1986:498; Isaacman 1988:25).
Another growing source of support over the years was elements of the
former Portuguese business community, many of whom lost sub-
stantial property, either when they left Mozambique at independence
or through Frelimo's nationalisations. Evidence of such involvement
first came to light in 1984, but seems to have increased afterwards. In
the post-Nkomati period the MNR appears to have included the return
of confiscated Portuguese property in its rather hazy programme (Gunn
1985:3). The former Portuguese business community was mostly
involved in financing the MNR.
There were also other minor sources of support, both moral and
material, for the MNR. Among these were West Germany (Gunn
1985:4) and conservative organisations in the United States (Africa
Confidential 1988:1±2). Funds also seem to have come through the
Comores and Oman, though the exact sources of the funds are unknown
(Gunn 1986:4).
It would be wrong, however, to focus exclusively on external support
for the MNR. To have existed this long and to have had the impact and
made the gains that it had, the organisation obviously has acquired a
dynamic of its own. We shall now look at reasons for the internal
support of the MNR and for Frelimo's seeming inability to contain it.
7.2.3 Internal reasons for the success of the MNR

For too long, Frelimo ignored the internal causes behind the growth and
resilience of the MNR. There were three main reasons for this, namely:
(1) conditions in the rural areas
(2) inability of the army to cope with the MNR challenge
(3) Frelimo's excesses
Frelimo, and hence the government, only really began to address the
issue of the rural areas and the problems that existed there at the
Fourth Party Congress in 1984 (Campbell 1984:847). The fundamental
192
problem was the lack of attention the government paid to the rural
family sector. This left many peasants with little or no allegiance to the
government and discouraged agricultural production by that sector.
Peasant production was further discouraged by the breakdown of the
rural marketing system. The decline in production contributed greatly
to the famine that was already rife in rural areas, which in turn
fostered the growth of the MNR. Many recruits joined the MNR
because they saw it as a good way of securing access to food. The
unfortunate thing is that the activities of the MNR itself further
depressed production, worsening the situation in rural areas and
creating a vicious circle (Gunn 1986:7).
The neglect of the family sector was not the only factor that affected
the rural areas. Many peasants were alienated by other government
policies. Among these was the government's policy on communal
villages. This was part of the general policy for socialising the
countryside, but was also intended to make social facilities (such as
schools and clinics) more readily available to the rural population. To
some extent the communal villages were established around the
protected villages or aldeamentos set up by the Portuguese during
the war. However, many were started from scratch with little thought
for local conditions and often without first providing basic amenities.
This contributed to the scepticism already felt by many peasants about
the projects. The government often put tremendous pressure on the
rural population to cooperate in communal village projects, which
helped fuel antigovernment feeling. This in turn was translated into, if
not support for the MNR, at least indifference (instead of what could
have been antagonism) towards them, and a lack of identification with
the government and its aims (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983:153±155).
Another reason often cited for tacit support of the MNR is the bad
treatment meted out to the people by state functionaries, particularly
the army (Campbell 1984:847).
The army itself has attracted a lot of attention because of its seeming
inability to deal with the MNR. Since late 1981, Frelimo has made a
serious effort to improve the situation by seeking both internally
oriented and external solutions. On the internal front, the army seems
plagued by two major problems: It has been transformed into a
conventional army, ill-equipped to deal with a guerrilla war, and it has
been badly trained and poorly supplied. The transformation took place
soon after independence when Mozambique seemed to be facing an
invasion by Rhodesia, which could best have been repelled by an army
using modern weaponry and heavy artillery (Metz 1986:495±498).
Mozambique has also looked to her neighbours for support against
Renamo. Zimbabwean troops have played a major role in protecting
vital installations, particularly the Beira corridor, and in anti-MNR
operations. Numbers have varied, but since 1984 there have been over
10 000 Zimbabwean troops in Mozambique. Tanzania also committed
itself to help, although it sent far fewer troops (around 2 000) who have
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played a far less active role than the Zimbabwean contingent. Since
1987 Malawian troops have been involved in guarding the Malawi-
Nacala railway (Isaacman 1988:28±31).
K In the light of the 1994 and 1999 election results, and political
changes in the region, can one agree with Morgan (1990) that
Renamo ``has acquired a dynamic of its own''?
194
STUDY UNIT 8
The quest for peace and the new

constitution
On 10 July 1990, a long awaited meeting took place in Rome between

delegations of the Frelimo government and Renamo. The Frelimo
delegation was headed by Armando Gueguza, Minister of Transport
and Communications at the time, and the Renamo delegation by Raul
Domingos, head of Renamo's foreign department. This meeting was
preceded by a number of informal contacts and was mediated by the
Italian government, the Roman Catholic community of Santo Egidio and
the Bishop of Beira. Informal contacts between Renamo and Roman
Catholic Church bishops began in 1988 `ìn the forest'' and, in 1989,
these were followed by contacts in Niarobi. The possibilities for
negotiation were enhanced by the atmosphere prevailing before and
during the Fifth Frelimo Conference, to which we refer below. At this
conference Frelimo adopted the ``Renamo'' acronym, instead of
referring to the movement in official documents as one of a group of
`àrmed bandits''.
After the meeting on 10 July, a communiqueÂ was issued that stated the
following:
Both the parties recognising themselves as compatriots and
members of the great Mozambican family, expressed their
satisfaction for this direct, open and frank meeting ... [both
parties] have manifested their interest and will to do all that is
possible to help the building process for the achievement of
durable peace, commit themselves to bring war to an end and to
create the political, economic and social conditions for a durable
peace (Gianturco 1991:2).
Following this first meeting, the negotiation process went through a

difficult phase, with one of the stumbling blocks being the presence of
Zimbabwean troops in Mozambique. Renamo believed that these troops
supported Frelimo. Eventually, on 1 December 1990, an agreement was
signed by Presidents Dhlakama and Chissano, which provided for a
partial ceasefire and the confinement of Zimbabwean troops operating
on Mozambican soil to two corridors (one stretching from Beira into the
interior and the other along the Limpopo river into the interior). This
agreement also set up zones which Renamo could not attack. A Joint
Verification Commission (COMIVE) was created to monitor observance
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of the agreement. It comprised representatives of the United States, the

former Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, Portugal, Zambia, Kenya
and the Congo.
The negotiating process had to overcome deep distrust between the
parties, which was exacerbated by years of no contact between them.
Both movements, moreover, had their own vested interests and
internal dynamics which were difficult to change.
ACTIVITY
What are the parallels between the Angolan peacemaking process
and that in Mozambique? Third-party mediation? Why did Mozam-
bique attain peace before Angola? From what point onwards could
one say the wars in both countries became civil wars, rather than
wars supported by external forces? Which approach is likely to be
more successful: peace, followed by the formulation of a constitu-
tion, or the formulation of a constitution in the hope of future peace
(as is the case with Frelimo)?
At this point, you should again study the article by Alden and Simpson
(1993) in the prescribed reader. What factors, which facilitated the
attainment of peace between the two parties, do Alden and Simpson
mention? Also, what do the authors mean when they speak of Frelimo
presenting Renamo with its terms of surrender?
Following economic changes in 1989 (to which we refer below) the
Frelimo government introduced a new constitution in 1990.
The new constitution, which came into effect on 30 November 1990,
dropped all references to Marxism-Leninism and referred instead to
justice and equality. The constitution provided for a unitary state and
the decentralisation of power to provincial governments. It also
provided for a president who would become head of state and
government, a council of ministers (cabinet) and an elected assembly.
The constitution permits the existence of political parties other than
Frelimo, but prescribes that they ``be national in scope; defend national
interests; contribute to the formation of public opinion particularly on
major national issues; and strengthen the patriotic spirit of citizens and
the consolidation of the Mozambican nation'' (Article 32).
8.1 ELECTIONS AND THE DEMOCRATISATION PROCESS

On 27, 28 and 29 October 1994, Mozambique held its first elections
which were conducted according to a party list system. Approximately
90 percent of the 6,4 million Mozambicans on the electoral register
turned out to vote in the presence of 2 200 international observers. At
the end of the first day of voting Raul Domingos, head of Renamo's
political department, announced that Renamo was withdrawing from
196
the elections. Renamo explained its withdrawal by stating that a

surplus of ballot papers existed; there was a lack of ballot papers at
polling stations; the stipulations as to what constituted a ballot paper
were relaxed; and there were irregularities in the distribution and
monitoring of ballot boxes. Dhlakama came under pressure from,
among others, the UN Security Council, the European Union, interna-
tional members of ONUMOZ (the United Nations Operation in
Mozambique, which was given the task of monitoring and supporting
a ceasefire, the demobilising of forces and the holding of elections), the
frontline states and Mozambican church groups. After assurances by
the West that irregularities would be investigated, Renamo returned to
the elections. The final result in the presidential election was that
Frelimo won 53 percent, Renamo 33,73 percent, and other contestants
12,96 percent of the votes. In the National Assembly elections, Frelimo
won 51,6 percent, Renamo 44,8 percent and other parties 3,6 percent
of the votes (Harrison 1995:115±118).
From 3 to 5 December 1999, Mozambique held its second multiparty
elections. Twelve parties contested the elections, the main ones being
Frelimo and Renamo. The latter formed an electoral union with smaller
parties, known as the Renamo Electoral Union. In the presidential
election President Joaquim Chissano won 52,3 percent of the votes as
opposed to 47,7 percent for his rival, Alfonso Dhlakama of Renamo.
The president was elected directly by the people for a five-year term. In
the parliamentary election Frelimo won 133 of the 250 seats and the
Renamo-Electoral Union won 117. Members of parliament were elected
from party lists for a five-year term.
Renamo challenged the election results by appealing to the Constitu-
tional Court. It alleged that corruption and fraud had taken place, and
that a large number of votes were left out of the count. Renamo
demanded a vote recount. The Court ruled against Renamo and
confirmed the results that had previously been announced. Renamo
rejected the Court's ruling and threatened to establish a parallel
government to rule in six provinces where his party had obtained a
majority of votes if the government refused to recount the votes or hold
new elections. Nevertheless, Renamo parliamentary representatives
attended the opening of parliament and subsequent sessions of the
legislature (High Commission of the Republic of Mozambique 2000).
Study Ostheimer's (1999) article in your prescribed reader. Note the
reasons advanced by the author for Renamo's transforming itself into a
political party.
When constituting his 1994 19-member cabinet after the election,
Chissano did not appoint members from Renamo to government posts.
It was speculated that he found it impracticable to have members of
Renamo in his government. He made one concession to Renamo by
giving it a role in government in the form of membership of a
consultative presidential forum which he established. The forum
included members of political parties and civil society.
197 APC3701/1
However, in appointing his cabinet, Chissano appointed members from

both the north and south of the country. Previous governments tended
to have more southerners than northerners (Campbell 1995).
8.2 FRELIMO'S ECONOMIC INHERITANCE AND EVOLVING ECONOMIC

POLICY
Like Angola's economy, Mozambique's economy depended on forced
agricultural labour and the skills of Portuguese settlers. Industrial
production grew by almost 7 percent a year between 1957 and 1970.
Mozambique's crops, produced both in plantations and by the peasant
population, supplied the bulk of the exports (Minter 1994).
The transition to independence was accompanied by a decline in all
sectors. In the period 1973±1974, agricultural production dropped by
11 percent, industrial output by 38 percent and services by 28 percent.
The overall decline was 21 percent (Minter 1994). When comparing
Mozambique with Angola at the time of independence, there were
important differences between the economies of the two countries.
Mozambique did not suffer from the effects of a war which, as was the
case in Angola, commenced at the time of independence. The Angolan
economy exported oil, which provided a large portion of its foreign
exchange requirements. By contrast, the Mozambican economy
depended on the export of agricultural products and the provision of
services. The Mozambican service sector provided rail and port
facilities to countries in the interior, and labour to South Africa and
Rhodesia. The Mozambican economy was therefore highly vulnerable
to developments in these neighbouring countries. The sabotage of the
railway, for example, would have an impact on foreign exchange that
was derived from that source. In addition, Mozambique decided in
1976 to comply with UN sanctions against Rhodesia. Between 1976
and 1979, this policy led to the loss of export earnings estimated at
US$556 million (Minter 1994). Migrant labour to Rhodesia was also cut
off as a result of this policy. As from 1976, the South African
government began cutting back on migrant labour from Mozambique
and the number of Mozambican miners dropped from 118 000 in 1975
to 41 000 in 1977.
As a result of these and other events, by the late 1980s Mozambique
had a current account deficit (export account shortfall) of about
US$1 billion per annum (Minter 1994). There was therefore little
money available for the importation of food, for the war or for rural
development ± thus the country had to turn to international donors and
agencies for help.
When Frelimo assumed power in 1975, it took over a retarded and
misdirected economy (Torp 1989). In its first statement on economic
policy adopted by the Third Party Congress in 1977, it committed itself
to ``building a popular democracy in which the foundation for passing
to the stage of a socialist Revolution was to be created'' (Torp
198
1989:31). The programme was designed to concentrate the rural

population in communal villages which were to be modernised through
the creation of state farms and producers' cooperatives. A heavy
industry sector was also considered important. In the late 1970s, this
policy had not achieved the success that was expected, largely because
of low productivity, organisational problems, and low levels of literacy
and skills among the Mozambican population. In 1981 another
government document emphasised that the state should increase its
dominance in all sectors of the economy, and that agriculture should
feed the population and generate capital for the construction of heavy
industry (Torp 1989). However, at the time that this government
document was released, the economy was declining even further.
Torp (1989) lists a number of factors that contributed to this decline,
including lower foreign exchange revenues derived from transporta-
tion to and from Rhodesia, declining remittances from migrant
workers, and insecurity and destruction caused by Renamo.
Frelimo's Fourth Party Congress in 1983 recognised that adjustments
to the economic policy were badly needed and made further
adjustments. The party was criticised for its support of state farms,
and the neglect of family agriculture and the cooperative sector; for the
limited role of private enterprise in economic development; for
concentrating too much on the state sector; and for its preoccupation
with large projects. As a result of these criticisms, Frelimo launched an
economic action programme which included the introduction of an
export retention scheme, new labour legislation that gave enterprises
more autonomy to manage their labour forces, increases in fixed prices
of commodities and services, the abolition of price control on a few
farm products, and the introduction of a new foreign investment code.
These reforms were, however, not sufficient and were bedevilled by the
war in the rural areas.
The economy continued to decline and in January 1987 the government
launched its Economic Rehabilitation Programme (PRE) in order to
arrest the decline. Study the article by O'Meara (1991) in the
prescribed reader and summarise it and the factors which brought
about the collapse of Mozambican socialism.
The Fifth Frelimo Congress was dominated by the expectation of
negotiations with Renamo. Before the congress, the issues that it would
consider were made available for discussion to Mozambican society as
a whole. They were also discussed at a national conference and at
provincial conferences. The topics included the impact of both the war
and the PRE. A new draft constitution for Mozambique was discussed
at this congress and adopted by the Mozambican parliament in
November 1990 (as referred to above).
199 APC3701/1
8.3 ECONOMIC REFORM AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT

The IMF and the World Bank became involved in the introduction of the
PRE in Mozambique in 1987. This programme resulted in a series of
currency devaluations, import liberalisation, reduction of government
expenditure, limitation of foreign borrowing and rescheduling of
foreign debt.
Economic growth was spread unevenly. Many rural agricultural
producers, for example, did not increase production for fear that
Renamo would steal their crops, attack their villages and force them to
abandon their farms.
Moreover, the PRE stimulated corruption in the allocation of food
supplies. This in turn led to students at Eduardo Mondlane University
boycotting lectures, and to workers striking in support of better
working conditions and higher wages. The PRE also entailed the
removal of food subsidies, which meant higher prices and demands for
wage increases.
Because of the poor performance of the Mozambican economy, the size
of the government was reduced, which had a major impact on the
quality of, and access to, education and health services.
Inflation was estimated at 13,5 persent in 2010 and GDP growth is
expected to average 7,4 persent in the period 2011±2012.
8.4 MOZAMBICAN CONTROL AND FOREIGN DONORS

Mozambique's economic recovery depends on foreign aid. What is the
major difference in this respect between Mozambique and Angola?
With the aid inflow into Mozambique, control of the economy has to a
large extent been assumed by agencies such as the IMF/World Bank,
bilateral donors and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs). In this
process, Mozambique (like the many other recipient countries) has lost
a certain amount of sovereignty. We referred to this issue in your
second-year political economy module.
In his book, Mozambique: who calls the shots? Hanlon (1991) explains
Mozambique's relationship with the international donor community in
great detail. We will mention some of his points to illustrate the control
that the international donor community exercises over Mozambique.
Hanlon (1991:248) writes the following:
Aid is explicitly political. At the global level there is IMF
conditionality, as well as the demands for further turns to the
west and correct votes in the UN. At a local level there are NGO
demands to be allowed to distribute food, and donor demands to
push economic and social policies to help preferred groups,
ranging from children to private farmers.
Mozambique's economy and expenditure pattern have been described

200
as ``donor driven'' and Hanlon (1991) speaks about the recolonisation

of the country. Foreign white men from the World Bank and donor
agencies, who differ little from the former colonial administrators, are
issuing orders in Maputo. In addition, some Portuguese are returning
and reclaiming the properties which they had previously abandoned.
Portuguese and English companies are given exclusive rights over
peasant cotton production and Portuguese are running small busi-
nesses. The parallels with the colonial era are very striking.
One of the big issues affecting the Mozambican economy is the question
of debt. The IMF and the World Bank consider Mozambique a Heavily
Indebted Poor Country (HIDP). In April 1998 the IMF and the World
Bank cancelled some of Mozambique's debt, but the country's debt
service payments actually rose. In terms of this agreement, Mozambi-
que will use 20 percent of its export earnings to pay principal debt and
interest on outstanding debt. This means that a considerable part of
Mozambique's export earnings is being diverted from, for example,
health and education in order to repay debt. Members of the
Mozambican government believe that, in view of the fact that the
country has been devastated by war and is one of the poorest countries
in the world, it should ``receive total debt forgiveness'' (Africa
Research Bulletin 1998). Following the extensive floods in the early
part of 2000, the Mozambican government believes that it requires aid
far in excess of its almost US$100 million annual debt repayment
commitments. An option for the international community, therefore,
would be to write off Mozambique's outstanding debt.
K Many questions arise from the abovementioned argument. How

long will Mozambican society be able to sustain the impact of
structural adjustment policies (SAPs) and the ravages of more than
20 years of war? What are the implications of this for effective
governance?
One implication, Harrison (1999) argues, is corruption. Structural

adjustment has created an unstable political economy in which social
boundaries are unclear. Because of this general condition, those who
are well placed have adopted strategies to enrich themselves. What is
the solution to corrupt practices in Mozambique? A reassessment of the
processes of economic liberalisation?
The IMF published a review of Mozambique's poverty reduction and
growth facility (PRGF). It noted that the government's macroeconomic
programme had been satisfactory and most of the quantitative targets
had been met, but that there were weaknesses in the financial sector.
The IMF is, however, expected to conclude a new lending agreement
with Mozambique.
201 APC3701/1
K How does Mozambique's economic performance compare with that

of Angola? Use your own resources to answer this question.
202
STUDY UNIT 9
Democratisation: prospects for

the future
A READING
Study the following article in the prescribed reader:
Manning (2001)
Hanlon (2010)
Manning (2010)
Local government elections were held in November 2003 and Renamo

won a number of the 33 municipality elections that were contested. In
October 2009, presidential and parliamentary elections were held ± the
fourth elections since the multiparty system was introduced. Mr
Armando Guebuza, become President upon the retirement of former
President Chissano.
As a result of a survey of attitudes towards democracy in the country,
74 percent of the participants preferred democracy to any other form
of government as compared with 57 percent in Namibia. Democracy in
Mozambique was seen in terms of the promotion of civil liberties and
personal freedoms. These findings suggest strong prospects for
democracy in the future.
We will refer to a few points made by Manning (2001). The article
compares the three elections (1994, 1999 and the 1998 local
government elections) in terms of the progress towards establishing a
democratic political system in Mozambique. Manning (2001:141)
states that the three elections ``show that democratic institutions have
functioned adequately only where political actors have paid close
attention to the need to build confidence in those institutions as part
and parcel of the democratic process.'' He continues that ``the pitfalls
of equating elections with democracy are well known'' (Manning
2001:142). List these pitfalls for yourself. Manning (2001:151) refers
to the ``the interaction between actors and the institutions that
elections occasion''. Explain what is meant by this phrase.
203 APC3701/1
Finally, Manning (2001:166) states that the challenge to democracy in

Mozambique is to balance the divisive tendencies of electoral
competition with the ongoing need for political reconciliation and
accommodation. Make sure that you can explain what is meant by this
challenge.

Hyden and Bratton (1992) list four properties of good governance,
namely:
(1) There should be trust within a political system. At the time of
writing (2011) there seems to be a fair degree of trust between the
Frelimo and Renamo leadership, and across ethnic lines in the
Mozambican provinces (although there have been disputes and
court challenges questioning the fairness of election results).
(2) Reciprocity refers to the social interaction among members of a
particular political community and the ability to form associa-
tions. The elections were contested by a number of smaller political
parties and Renamo has continued to exist.
(3) Accountability refers to the effectiveness with which the governed
can exert influence over their governors. With increasing corrup-
tion, it may be argued that the government is not displaying the
desired levels of accountability.
(4) Authority refers to the ability to carry out and enforce decisions,
and to follow constitutional rules. The ruling party and the
opposition (despite their dissatisfaction with the way in which
the 1999 election was conducted and with the 2003 local
government election results) seem to be abiding by the rules of
the constitution.
At the time of writing (2011), the following could be said regarding the
characteristics of ``bad'' politics: The nature of Mozambican rule is not
personalised; it is unclear whether any human rights violations have
occurred; power seems still to be centralised despite the high level of
participation at the time of the elections. Corruption is present in
certain sectors of Mozambican society.
A READING
Study the following articles in the prescribed reader:
Manning (2001)
Ostheimer (1999)
Pitcher (2006)
Manning (2010)
Hanlon (2010)
204
TEST YOURSELF
(1) Refer to the articles by Ostheimer (1999), Manning (2001;
2010) and Hanlon (2010) in the prescribed reader. Discuss the
factors that are likely to determine whether Mozambique's
newly established democracy will be permanent.
(2) Briefly describe the origins of the internal Frelimo-Renamo
conflict and explain how it was resolved.
(3) Refer to the 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009 Mozambican election
results. Do these results reflect any discernible trends towards
single-party-ism or multiparty-ism?
(4) Discuss Mozambique's postelection political and economic
challenges.
(5) Compare the constraints on democratisation and economic
performance in Mozambique, Angola and Namibia.
Political map of Namibia
Source: Dreyer (1992)

205 APC3701/1
STUDY UNIT 10
Namibia
THEMES
Our study of Namibia is based on three broad themes:
(1) the drafting and nature of Namibia's independence constitution
(2) trends in Namibia's electoral politics and democratisation
processes since 1989
(3) challenges facing the country in the areas of reconciliation,
democratisation and economic development during the post-
independence period
LEARNING OUTCOMES
. briefly describe the early history of Namibia until independence
. describe the Namibian constitution drafting process
. describe the evolution of the multiparty system in the post-
independence period
. describe and analyse the prospects for economic development
and political stability in the country
10.1 INTRODUCTION: SOME BASIC FACTS

Namibia is a large country with a surface area of 823 145 square
kilometres. It is the fifteenth largest country in Africa, but counts
among the 15 countries with the smallest populations. Its population
was estimated at two million in 2004, so it ranks (together with
Western Sahara and Botswana) among the three most sparsely
populated countries in Africa. It has an average population density of
only 1,5 persons per square kilometre. More than 55 percent of the
population lives within 150 kilometres of the country's northern
border. Most of the country is marginal for human existence and
suffers from a shortage of water. The Namib desert accounts for 15
percent of the land area (Handbook of the Nations 1993). Since
independence, Namibia has been divided into 13 new regions for
administrative and socioeconomic development purposes. In 1997 the
country had an economic growth rate of 3,0 percent compared to
206
Angola's 5,9 percent and Mozambique's 7,9 percent in the same year
(SADC Regional Human Development Report 1998). The mining of
minerals (including diamonds, uranium, copper, lead and zinc) makes a
major contribution to the Namibian economy. The fishing industry is
also an important sector of the economy.
Namibia became independent on 21 March 1990, after a protracted
period of negotiation, and became the 160th member of the UN.
10.2 A BRIEF HISTORY
10.2.1 Uniqueness
Until independence in 1990, Namibia had occupied the attention of the
international community for a longer period than perhaps any other
African country. Its relationship with the international community over
the decades has been extremely complicated ± certainly more so than
the relationships Angola and Mozambique had with that community.
Three parties were involved in negotiating independence for the
territory: The international community, the former South African
government and Namibian political parties.
Namibia is unique in that its independence constitution was not
negotiated with a colonial power, but was produced by a Constituent
Assembly elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage. Similarly
unique is the fact that independent Namibia is the outcome of UN
Security Council Resolution 435, which was adopted on 29 September
1978 to secure independence through free and fair elections under the
supervision and control of the UN. Provision for such supervision was
made by the establishment of the United Nations Transition Assistance
Group (Untag).
The founding elections in November 1989 paved the way for
independence and were the most expensive in African history, with a
per capita expenditure of US$77,60. The percentage poll was
exceptionally high: 95,65 percent of eligible voters cast their ballots.
The political-legal dispute over the international status of South West
Africa/Namibia featured frequently on the General Assembly agenda
since 1946 and, since 1948, the Namibian question was considered
annually by the Security Council. It has also been the subject of six
appearances before the International Court of Justice at The Hague. It
has without doubt prompted more resolutions, generated more
committees and produced more judicial decisions than any other
matter submitted to the UN organs (Dugard 1973:XI).
To understand the background to this uniqueness, we should review
the political history of Namibia up to the independence elections of
November 1989. Then we can study the current political, constitutional
and economic issues.
207 APC3701/1
10.2.2 The internal dimension

The first European settlers were missionaries who arrived in the
territory as early as 1802.
By the 1840s, these missionaries began to engage in trade with the
African population. In the 1850s another European group, comprising
merchant traders, was attracted to the territory by the news that it had
vast mineral resources. The resources were not as vast as expected and
many of these entrepreneurs abandoned the territory, leaving it to
people such as FAE Luderitz. Luderitz acquired a vast tract of land
along the coast, from which he made a considerable fortune through the
export of diamonds.
Also at this time, German and British merchants penetrated the
northern part of the territory (known as the Ovambo region), and also
made their presence felt in the Herero and Nama regions. Pressures on
the land, indebtedness resulting from trade with the Europeans,
hostilities and casualties resulting from the ownership of arms and
ammunition became problematic and the German settlers considered
German protection necessary to resolve the problems. At the time,
there was also rivalry between Germany and Great Britain to exploit
the resources of the territory. This rivalry was eliminated in 1884,
when Great Britain recognised German sovereignty over the whole
territory in exchange for British control over the port of Walvis Bay, an
enclave on the coast. Thus the territory became known as German
South West Africa (Sparks & Green 1992:7±10).
Germany encouraged Germans to settle in the territory. These, together
with other white settlers, utilised more of the land. Reserves were
created for the African population. By 1913, the white population
numbered approximately 14 000 (Sparks & Green 1992:14).
In 1915, during World War 1, South West Africa was occupied by
South African troops and, on 17 December 1920, the territory was
entrusted to the government of the Union of South Africa as a C-
mandated territory by the newly established League of Nations. Among
other provisions, the mandate stipulated that the South African
government would have ``full power of administration and legislation
over the territory ... and may apply the laws of the Union of South
Africa to the territory ...'' (Sparks & Green 1992:163±64).
German rule thus came to an end and South West Africa was
administered as an integral part of South Africa. This was the
beginning of what is described as South African colonialism (Sparks
& Green 1992:14). Over the years, South African racial legislation was
applied in the territory (sometimes in modified form) and continued
right up to the late 1970s.
The League of Nations was finally dissolved on 19 April 1946, after
coexisting with the United Nations Organisation for three months. No
special provision was made for its successor, the UN, in respect of
208
territories which were under mandatory supervision. It was appar-

ently accepted that all states which administered mandated territories
would place their mandates under the new International Trusteeship
system of the UN. According to this system the remaining mandated
territories would be placed in trust. This procedure was in fact
followed by all countries which administered mandates, with the
exception of South Africa.
The South African government, in contrast to other mandate holders,
renewed its efforts to have South West Africa incorporated into the
Union. Incorporation had been South African government policy from
the 1920s.
An important decision was taken on 27 October 1966, when the UN
General Assembly resolved that South Africa had failed to fulfil its
mandatory obligations and that its mandate should be terminated. The
UN believed that it had a right to supervise the government of the
territory. As a result, in 1967, the UN Council for South West Africa,
later known as the Council for Namibia, was established to govern
South West Africa from outside and lead it to independence. The South
African government, however, denied that the UN had any jurisdiction
over the territory.
Thus, entrenched in terms of administration, policing and defence, and
even the economy and language, South Africa blocked virtually all UN
attempts to wrest authority from it. The South African government
referred to the territory as South West Africa, while the UN called it
Namibia since 1967.
10.2.3 An international issue: summary

Namibian decolonisation and independence was not simply an issue
between a colonising power and the inhabitants of a territory, as was
the case with many other African countries. The international
community became increasingly involved because of different inter-
pretations of what South West Africa's future as a mandated territory
should be.
What follows is a summary of the international community's involve-
ment in the destiny of the territory. This background is important
because it had a bearing on the later constitution drafting process and
the nature of that constitution. (There is obviously some overlapping
between Namibia's internal history and developments initiated by the
international community.)
Shortly after its formation in 1946, the UN General Assembly requested
the International Court of Justice to issue an opinion on the status of
South West Africa as a mandated territory.
The Court delivered advisory opinions in 1950, 1955 and 1956, which
stated that the mandate still existed and that South Africa was thus
obliged to report on its administration to the UN. The Court, however,
209 APC3701/1
endorsed South Africa's view that it was under no legal obligation to

conclude a trusteeship agreement with the UN. But the Court further
ruled that South Africa was not competent to alter the international
status of the territory unilaterally.
In 1960, Ethiopia and Liberia, the only African members of the UN
which had also been members of the League of Nations, instituted legal
proceedings against South Africa in the International Court of Justice.
Their grounds were that South Africa was administering South West
Africa in a manner inconsistent with the League's Mandate, the UN
Charter, the Statute of the International Court of Justice and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
In 1965 the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) recognised Swapo as
the ``sole and authentic'' representative of the Namibian people. Swapo
was the largest of a number of Namibian liberation movements at the
time.
In 1966 the International Court of Justice dismissed the claims of the
applicant states (Ethiopia and Liberia), because it found that these
states had no locus standi (rights or interests in the case) and that the
Court was not entitled to pronounce on the merits of South Africa's
administration in South West Africa. The UN General Assembly
immediately ``terminated'' the mandate and declared that South West
Africa would henceforth be the direct responsibility of the UN in terms
of Resolution 2145. The following year (1968) the General Assembly
changed the name of the region from South West Africa to Namibia, and
established the UN Council for Namibia and the Namibia Institute to
train civil servants for a future independent Namibia. The institute was
based in Lusaka, Zambia.
The Court's decision convinced Swapo's leaders that the UN would not
liberate Namibia and the organisation turned to an armed struggle.
In 1969 the UN Security Council also endorsed the termination of South
Africa's mandate in terms of Resolution 264.
In 1970 Resolution 276 of the UN Security Council called on all member
states to refrain from economic or other dealings with South Africa in
all matters which involved Namibia.
In 1971 an Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice
declared South Africa's presence in Namibia illegal, and stated that UN
member states should cease to have commercial or other relations with
the South African administration in the territory. This advisory opinion
led to the personal intervention of the UN Secretary-General, Dr Kurt
Waldheim, in the dispute. He visited the territory and reported to the
UN Security Council that the African population supported a unitary
constitution and popularly elected government for the territory. This
was the first indication by an international body of a constitutional
preference for the territory.
210
In 1973 the UN recognised Swapo as the `àuthentic'' representative of

the Namibian people.
In September 1975, the South African government, in response to
increasing international pressure, initiated a constitutional conference
in the territory. What became known as the Turnhalle Constitutional
Conference proposed the establishment of an interim government and
the drafting of a constitution for the territory. Swapo was excluded and
tribal leaders were invited to participate. Out of this conference
emerged a political grouping known as the Democratic Turnhalle
Alliance (DTA), which formed the main internal opposition to Swapo.
The DTA was organised and worked along ethnic lines.
In January 1976 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 385,
calling for free and fair elections in Namibia under UN supervision and
control.
In October 1976 the three Western permanent members of the UN
Security Council (the United States, United Kingdom and France)
vetoed a resolution calling for sanctions against South Africa because
of its refusal to comply with Resolution 385.
By April 1977, the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference drafted a plan
for Namibia that was based on a national assembly of ethnic leaders,
regional ethnic governments and racially divided town councils. South
Africa was on the point of giving the Turnhalle Constitutional
Conference executive powers in Namibia and promised independence
by 31 December 1978.
At the UN, there were again calls for sanctions against South Africa
because of its refusal to comply with Resolution 385. The Western
powers asked for a last chance to negotiate with South Africa. Canada
and West Germany (members of the Security Council for 1977 and
1978) joined the United States, United Kingdom and France in these
discussions.
In July 1977 the first discussions bore some fruit: South Africa did not
grant executive powers to the Turnhalle but appointed an adminis-
trator-general to rule by proclamation.
In September 1977, South Africa's Proclamation R249 terminated
South West Africa's representation in the South African parliament.
Earlier, Section 38 of the South West Africa Constitution Act 39 of 1968
was amended to empower South Africa's state president to amend any
Act of parliament with a view to South West Africa achieving
independence. Control and administration of Walvis Bay returned to
the Cape provincial authorities.
In April 1978 South Africa agreed to Western proposals for elections in
Namibia under UN supervision (but not control, as formulated in
Security Council Resolution 385).
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In September 1978 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 435

which called for elections in Namibia under supervision of a UN civilian
and military force.
In October 1978, with sanctions again being discussed, five Western
foreign ministers travelled to South Africa in an attempt to get South
Africa to agree to UN-supervised elections for the territory. The South
African government defied these attempts and organised its own
elections, which were won by the DTA (Swapo did not participate).
In January 1979 the UN team visited Namibia to prepare a detailed
plan for implementing Resolution 435 and in February UN Secretary-
General, Dr Kurt Waldheim, presented this plan, suggesting 15 March
1979 as the date for a ceasefire between South Africa and Swapo. South
Africa protested against the Waldheim plan's provision for Swapo
bases in Namibia.
In May 1979 the South African government converted the Constituent
Assembly in Namibia into a National Assembly with legislative
authority and formed the Advisory Council to the Administrator-
General. In August of the same year the National Assembly received
further powers.
In January 1980, the Pre-Implementation Meeting (PIM) was held in
Geneva, the first occasion on which representatives of the South
African government and Swapo sat down face-to-face to talk about
Namibia's future. The meeting was intended to finalise details for the
implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435. The South
African delegation announced that it was ``premature'' to agree to a
ceasefire and the holding of free elections under UN supervision.
In 1981 negotiations with the Western Contact Group continued and all
parties accepted a set of principles to govern a constitution for an
independent Namibia. These principles, known as the 1982 Constitu-
tional Principles, were eventually incorporated into the independence
constitution. The principles prescribed that Namibia should be a
unitary, sovereign and democratic state, and that elected councils for
local and regional administration should be established.
Also in 1981, the South African government and the United States
demanded withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola concomitant with
the implementation of Resolution 435. In August 1983 UN Secretary-
General Perez de Quellar visited South Africa and Namibia to pursue
the independence process.
In 1983 a constitutional conference consisting of 16 internal political
parties and movements was convened. Referred to as the Multi-Party
Conference (MPC), it produced a set of principles similar to those
drafted by the 1981 Western Contact Group.
In 1985 the Constitutional Council was established at the earlier
212
insistence of the MPC. The council produced a draft constitution which

was presented to the National Assembly in 1987. This draft constitu-
tion contained many features of the 1982 principles.
In May 1988 peace talks between Angola, Cuba and South Africa
started in London, and in August the Protocol of Geneva was signed.
South Africa completed a troop withdrawal from Angola on 30 August
of that year.
In April 1989 the Implementation of Resolution 435 commenced and by
September 1989 the registration of voters was completed.
An election was held in terms of Resolution 435 in November 1989 and
the Constituent Assembly met for the first time on 21 November.
In February 1990 the constitution of the Republic of Namibia was
approved and on 21 March 1990 Namibia became independent. A
Swapo government headed by President Sam Nujoma took over the
governing of the country.
Note the South African government's policy of incorporation, which
was gradually phased out in favour of controlled change. Also note the
formation of Swanu (South West African National Union) in 1959 and of
Swapo in 1960. Thirdly, note Du Pisani's (1989:293) observations
about the re-emphasis of South West Africa's ``separate international
status'' and the early stages in the formulation of a constitution for the
territory. The first stage was the establishment of the Prime Minister's
Advisory Council in 1973, followed by the Turnhalle Constitutional
Conference in 1975 and the appointment of a South African Adminis-
trator-General in 1977. Finally, note the factors which brought about a
change of policy from about 1985 onwards.
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STUDY UNIT 11
The origins and drafting of the

independence constitution
Under this heading, you are required to study and summarise the
prescribed article by Diescho (1994), The Namibian Constitution in
perspective. We will discuss a number of key issues.
Note that the drafting of the constitution for an independent Namibia
took place within the framework of UN Security Council Resolution
435, as indicated above. The constitution was drafted by an elected 72-
member Constituent Assembly comprising representatives from seven
political parties.
Untag was established in terms of Resolution 435. It had three
functions: to ensure that all hostilities ceased, to ensure the conduct of
free and fair elections, and to oversee the formulation of a constitution
for Namibia.
As we have said, the origins of the Namibian Constitution had an
international dimension; what were known as the 1982 Constitutional
Principles made certain specifications regarding the nature of the new
state. Pay particular attention to these principles and to internal
attempts at drafting a constitution.
The election for the Constituent Assembly and Parliament took place in
November 1989. Over 700 000 voters went to the polls to choose the 72
members of the Constituent Assembly. Swapo obtained 41 seats, the
DTA 21 and five smaller parties shared 10 seats among them. Note the
results of this election and the decision-making procedure that was
followed in the Constituent Assembly.
Try to answer this question: Why did the final constitution drafting
process proceed with such remarkable ease considering Namibia's
fragmented past and the many roleplayers involved in the exercise?
Also: Is it a legitimate constitution and what are the prospects for its
survival?
11.1 THE CONSTITUTION

The Constitution of the Republic of Namibia is composed of 21 chapters
with 148 articles. We will merely highlight a few important articles
here.
214
Article 1 establishes the Republic and identifies its territory, which

consists of ``the whole of the territory recognised by the international
community through the organs of the UN as Namibia''. At the time of
independence, the status of Walvis Bay, the Penguin Islands off the
coast of Namibia and the southern boundary with South Africa along
the Orange River were in dispute with the South African government.
This dispute has since been resolved with the incorporation of these
land areas into Namibia.
Article 3 recognises English as the only official language, but states
that there will be no constitutional prohibition of the use of any other
language as a medium of instruction in private schools or in schools
financed or subsidised by the state.
Article 5 protects fundamental human rights and freedom. From this
flows Article 6's prohibition of the death penalty. Thus no court is
permitted to impose a penalty of death upon any person, regardless of
the severity of the crime. Personal liberty is enshrined in Article 7,
while Article 8 regards personal dignity as inviolable. In terms of the
provisions of Article 10, all persons are equal before the law.
Therefore, discrimination on the grounds of sex, creed, or social or
economic status is outlawed.
Article 11 stipulates that no persons shall be subject to arbitrary arrest
or detention, while Article 12 decrees a fair and public hearing or trial
by an independent, impartial and competent court or tribunal. Article
13 protects the privacy of all persons, their homes, correspondence or
communications, save as in accordance with the law.
Children's rights are enshrined in Article 15.
Article 16 enshrines the right to private property. In the event that the
state deems it necessary to expropriate property in the public interest,
payment of just compensation shall be made in accordance with
requirements and procedure to be determined by an Act of parliament.
Article 17 recognises the right of citizens to ``participate in peaceful
political activity intended to influence the composition and policies of
the Government''. Furthermore, every citizen of 18 years and older
shall have the right to vote, and those aged 21 years and older shall
have the right to be elected to public office.
Article 21 recapitulates the ``fundamental freedoms'' of speech and
expression, and of the media. Freedom of thought, conscience and
belief includes academic freedom in institutions of higher learning.
Article 21 also protects freedom of religion, peaceable assembly,
association, labour unionism, movement, residence and resettlement,
and freedom to practise one's profession.
Article 23 outlaws apartheid and encourages affirmative action.
Article 26 stipulates the conditions under which a state of emergency
may be declared.
215 APC3701/1
Chapter 5 of Article 27 defines the powers of the President and Article

28 specifies the provisions for his or her election, among which is
election by ``direct, universal and equal suffrage''. To hold office, the
President must receive more than 50 percent of the votes cast. Anyone
over the age of 35 years, who is eligible for election to office as a
member of the National Assembly, is eligible for election as President.
The President's term of office, according to Article 29, is five years
unless he or she dies or resigns before the expiry of the said term or is
removed from office. If the National Assembly is dissolved (according
to the provisions of Article 57(1)), the President's term of office also
expires. In addition, he or she is subject to impeachment and removal
from office if two thirds of the members of the National Assembly,
confirmed by a two-thirds' majority of all the members of the National
Council, adopt a resolution of impeachment on the grounds that the
President was guilty of a violation of the Constitution or guilty of a
serious violation of the laws of the land. He or she also cannot hold
office as President for more than two terms. The functions, powers and
duties of the President are spelled out in detail in Article 32.
Article 29 was amended early in 2000 so as to allow President Sam
Nujoma to serve a third term as President of the country. A great deal
of controversy surrounded the amendment of this article. It could be
argued that such an amendment was characteristic of bad politics.
The Constitution provides not only for an Executive President but also
for a Prime Minister, who is appointed by the President. The Prime
Minister is the first in the line of succession if the President's office
were to become vacant or if the President should be unable to fulfil the
duties of the office.
Article 32 may, in part, appear to conflict with Article 27 (which deals
with executive powers in general), since Article 32(5) makes clear
reference to the legislative (as opposed to the executive) sphere. It
would seem that the President's assent to legislation is a matter that
requires no meaningful advisory role from the Cabinet; on the other
hand, the initiation of legislation is a matter which is expressly
entrusted to the Cabinet in terms of Article 40(b). Given so many
checks and balances in the prescriptions for presidential conduct,
could the President really appoint, for instance, six members of
parliament at his or her own discretion?
Article 44 vests the National Assembly with the legislative authority
for Namibia. It is this Assembly which is empowered to make laws with
the assent of the President. In certain circumstances the Assembly's
legislation is subject to the powers exercised by the National Council.
The Assembly comprises 72 members, elected by direct, secret ballot
by all Namibians who qualify for the franchise in terms of Article 17.
The Assembly also comprises six members appointed by the President
by virtue of their special expertise, status, skill or experience. These
additional members have no vote in the Assembly.
216
Article 56(1) requires that all bills passed by the Namibian Parliament
be assented to by the President before they become law. The President
cannot merely refuse to give his or her assent. This is because the
President has no option but to assent to a bill when it has been
approved by a majority of two thirds of all the members of the
Assembly and has been confirmed by the National Council (Art 56(2)).
Article 64, however, provides that the President is entitled to withhold
assent to a bill if, in his or her view, the bill conflicts with the
Constitution. If the President so deems, he or she should inform the
Speaker who, in turn, should inform the National Assembly and the
Attorney-General. The latter may then take the appropriate steps to
have the matter settled judicially. The Namibian Parliament has an
upper legislative house, called the National Council, which forms part
of Parliament. Article 44 decrees that the National Assembly has the
power to pass legislation which should be approved by the National
Council. The National Council resembles an upper legislative house in
that each region, as defined in Article 102, elects two members of the
appropriate Regional Council to the National Council. It is strongly
linked with local and regional authorities, since the candidates have to
be elected members of a local authority.
Article 78(a) provides for the independence of the judiciary and Article
89 for the establishment of an ombudsman who, like the judiciary, is
independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law. He or she
should, according to Article 90, be appointed by presidential
proclamation on the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commis-
sion. He or she holds office until the age of 65; however, the President
has the prerogative to extend the ombudsman's term of office for a
further five years.
Article 131 prohibits any repeal or amendment of any of the provisions
of Articles 5 to 25 (that is, fundamental rights and freedoms, their
protection and enforcement, etc). Enhancement or extended protection
of these fundamental freedoms and rights is possible, but there can be
no diminution of them whatsoever (other than in the unlikely event of
the entire Constitution being irrevocably abandoned). This is perhaps
the most important article in the entire Constitution.
217 APC3701/1
STUDY UNIT 12
Elections
The elections that were held for Namibia's Constituent Assembly and
Parliament in 1989 were only the first step in the creation of elected
structures of government. In terms of the Namibian Constitution, a
delimitation committee was to be established to delimit the country
into regions, constituencies and local government units. It eventually
decided on 13 regions for the country.
Seven parties gained representation in the Constituent Assembly and
the National Assembly in the 1989 elections. They were Swapo (with 41
seats), the DTA (with 21 seats) and five smaller parties (with between
one and four seats each).
Regional and local government elections were held at the end of
November and the beginning of December 1992. In a further set of local
government elections early in 1998 (with a very low voter turnout of 40
percent), Swapo won control of 27 of 45 local authorities. The 1992
turnout was 82,3 percent. Of the 40 contested local council elections,
Swapo won control of 27 councils, the DTA won 9, the UDF 3, residents
associations 2 and the remaining 4 councils did not have an absolute
majority for any party (Mail & Guardian, 19 February 1998).
What is important here are the trends established during these
elections, which were perpetuated in the presidential and parliamen-
tary elections in 1994. A third set of elections were held for the
presidency and parliament from 30 November to 1 December 1999.
The results were as follows.
At presidential level, President Sam Nujoma of Swapo won 76,8
percent of the votes; Ben Ulenga of the newly formed Congress of
Democrats (COD) 10,5; Katuurike Kaura (DTA) 9,6; and Chief Justus
Garoeob of the UDF 3,0 percent (Internet: Elections of the World).
Nujoma was therefore elected for a further five-year term of office.
Parliament, as indicated above, has two chambers. The National
Assembly has 78 members who are elected for a five-year term: 72
members are elected by proportional representation and 6 are
appointed by the president. The National Council has 26 members
who are elected for a six-year term in double seat constituencies which
coincide with the 13 regions. In the National Assembly election, held
from 30 November to 1 December 1999, Swapo won 76,1 percent of the
votes and 55 seats; the Congress of Democrats won 9,9 percent of the
votes and 7 seats; the DTA won 9,5 percent of the votes and 7 seats; the
218
United Democratic Front won 2,9 percent of the votes and 2 seats; and
the Minority Action Group won 0,7 percent of the votes and 1 seat
(Internet: Elections of the world).
A Your prescribed reader contains the following important journal

articles on the topic of the Namibian elections and democratisation:
Bauer (2001)
Hartmann (2009) and
Melber (2010)
Study these articles carefully.
. In Bauer's article, refer to table 1. Note the percentage of the votes

won by Swapo and the DTA in the 1989 and the 1992 elections (at
both national and regional government levels). In the local govern-
ment elections, Swapo won 80 percent of the 50 constitu-encies. Do
these figures suggest a strengthening of Swapo at the expense of its
main opposition, the DTA? What does Bauer say about the emergence
of the Congress of Democrats (COD)?
. Melber (2010) analyses the 2009 election results. What do you think
the prospects are for continuing multiparty democracy in the
country?
12.1 POSTINDEPENDENCE
How has Namibia performed on the political and economic fronts since
independence? What are some of the constraints on progress?
On the political front, the Namibian Constitution has been described as
``perhaps the most democratic constitution in Africa'' (Grundy
1991:215). It would seem that the provisions of the constitution have
been respected, particularly the first-generation rights; the exception
being the amendment of Article 29 to allow the president to serve for a
third term. The Namibian government has experienced greater
difficulty in respecting second-generation rights. Article 95(i), for
example, provides for the `ìnsurance that workers are paid a living
wage adequate for the maintenance of a decent standard of living''. It
is difficult to honour this article, particularly in view of the vast
number of refugees who have returned to the country and added to an
already high unemployment rate. The economy is not sufficiently
robust to provide work for all Namibians, let alone refugees.
At independence, the Namibian government adopted a policy of
reconciliation. How successful has this policy been? What are some
of the constraints on reconciliation? What about the integration of
former combatants in the Namibian Defence Force? Are there any
parallels between Namibia and Angola?
219 APC3701/1
What are some of the constraints on

(1) economic performance and development?
(2) a budget deficit?
(3) an economy based on the export of minerals (uranium and
diamonds)?
(4) the concentration of skills in the hands of the white population?
What about foreign aid and loans? Has Namibia been successful in this
regard? If not, why not? How does Namibia compare with Angola and
Mozambique in this regard?
Study and summarise Lindeke's (1995) article, Democratization in
Namibia: soft state, hard choices, in your prescribed reader. Lindeke
writes about Namibia and ``state softness''. Summarise the three
aspects of state softness which are particularly problematic to African
countries. Because of Namibia's state softness, the country faces the
same difficult choices as many other African countries did at the time
of independence. Lindeke examines several aspects of state softness,
including economic structure, ethnicity, electoral experiences, political
processes and government policies. Summarise each of these aspects
for yourself. Is state softness still a problem to Namibia?
12.1.1 Twenty years after independence

Ten years after independence, Namibia has a growing economy and has
enjoyed peace and relative stability. In theory, the liberal democratic
Namibian Constitution has functioned well. In practice, however, there
has been a drift of power to the centre. Besides being head of state,
head of government and leader of Swapo, President Sam Nujoma
assumed the position of Minister of Home Affairs after a post-1994
election cabinet reshuffle. Questions were asked about the constitu-
tionality of having the president serve as Minister of Home Affairs.
President Nujoma has since relinquished this position.
As far as appointments are concerned, Swapo loyalists tend to be
awarded cabinet and other government posts. Ministers and the
president are not criticised for fear of retribution. Democracy at the
lower levels of society does not function very vigorously because
debate was not encouraged in the colonial past. Public participation in
political life is limited because people have little access to the mass
media.
Land redistribution issues are likely to be an important political issue
in the next few years. The government has failed to achieve its land
redistribution targets owing to the cost of `à willing buyer-willing
seller policy''. The government did, however, in November 2003 block
an attempt to occupy fifteen farms by farm workers and recommitted
itself to a lawful land reform programme (EIU 1 December 2003).
The Namibian economy was estimated to have grown by 4,6 percent in
220
2010, and inflation averaged around 5,8 percent in 2010. Mining,

including zinc and diamond production, is likely to grow in future years
by about 3,5 percent per annum.

We referred to the concept of governance in study unit 1. We will make
a tentative evaluation of postindependence Namibia in terms of Hyden
and Bratton's (1992) four criteria of good governance.
(1) Trust requires cooperation across racial and ethnic lines. It seems
as though Namibia has achieved success in this regard. Regional
governments provide for participation and cooperation across
ethnic lines. This is also the case at central authority level. The
cabinet, for example, is composed of members of different ethnic
groups.
(2) Reciprocity refers to the freedom to form associations. Six political
parties contested the 1992 regional and local elections, and eight
political parties contested the 1994 and 1999 elections and
fourteen the 2009 elections. Hence there is a considerable degree
of reciprocity at the party political level.
(3) Accountability refers to the ability to hold elected officials
responsible for their decisions and actions. So far, it would seem
that no elected officials have been removed from office by the
electorate, but the potential does exist to do so through the
electoral process. There is general respect for the rule of law and a
democratic culture prevails in the country.
(4) Authority refers to the extent to which rules are effective and the
extent to which they are respected. The Namibian Constitution
seems to have been an effective regulator of governmental power
and it appears to have been respected. Although the term of office
of the president was extended, this was done in terms of the
provisions of the constitution. It could be argued that this
constitutional amendment does not augur well for good govern-
ance in the country.
There have also been signs of ``bad'' politics. At the time of writing in
2011, an element of personal rule was creeping into the political
system. During President Nujoma's term, he assumed increasing power
as head of state and government, leader of Swapo and, at one time,
Minister of Home Affairs. His term of office was extended by
constitutional amendment for another period of five years, ending in
2004 and further magnifying his stature in Namibian politics. This
could be viewed as an attribute of bad politics. Also, political power in
Namibia has remained centralised. Little power has been allocated to
the regions.
What is your assessment of the ``good'' and the ``bad'' criteria in so far
as Namibian governance is concerned?
221 APC3701/1
K READING
Study the following articles in your prescribed reader:
Bauer (2001)
Diescho (1994)
Melber (1998)
Lindeke (1995)
Hartmann (2009)
Melber (2010)
TEST YOURSELF
(1) Write an essay in which you describe the processes that were
followed in drafting Namibia's independence constitution. Also
describe the constitution's unique features.
(2) Considering the electoral trends in Namibia since independ-
ence, what are the prospects for the survival of a multiparty
democracy in the country?
(3) Write an essay outlining the main constraints on economic
development in Namibia.
(4) Refer to Lindeke's (1995) article in your prescribed reader.
Write an essay in which you explain what state softness is and
why it has been, and continues to be, a problem to Namibia.
(5) Refer to Bauer's (2001) article. Describe how democratic
Namibia has been during the first decade of independence and
what the future prospects are for democracy in the country.
(6) Evaluate Hartmann's (2009) argument that democracy was a
fortuitous by-product of independence.
(7) Did democracy win in Namibia's 2009 national assembly and
presidential elections? Critically analyse Melber's (2010)
article.
222
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Study unit Page

1 GOVERNANCE, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT 3

2 THE ORIGINS OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE IN ZIMBABWE 11

3 THE EMERGENCE AND GROWTH OF ANTICOLONIALISM IN NORTH-

4 LATE POLITICAL FORMATIONS IN BECHUANALAND 24

5 THE EMERGENCE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 28

Study unit Page

7 SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN ZIM-

8 POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN ZAMBIA'S THREE

9 THE EMERGENCE OF THE MOVEMENT FOR MULTIPARTY DEMOC-

10 BOTSWANA: A DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 61

11 RAPID ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN BOTSWANA 63

Study unit Page

14 ZAMBIA: FROM ONE-PARTY TO MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY 87

15 MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY IN BOTSWANA 92

Study unit Page

3 DEVELOPMENTS BEFORE INDEPENDENCE 159

4 THE QUEST FOR PEACE 163

Study unit Page

7 THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT 186

8 THE QUEST FOR PEACE AND THE NEW CONSTITUTION 194

9 DEMOCRATISATION: PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE 202

Study unit Page

The politics of Zambia, Zimbabwe

This study guide introduces you to the politics of Zambia, Zimbabwe

Governance, democracy and

1.1 A WORD OF WELCOME

1.2 DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS

problems is a crisis of governance''. Governance was described as ``...

If we take the above as a yardstick of good governance, then African

In fact the concept has provoked an enormous output of

Christenson, Engel, Jacobs, Rejoi and Woltzer (1972:5) define political

Ideologies serve a variety of purposes, but they are by and large

Consider what Tordoff (1992:43) has to say about governments and

While Botswana did not adopt any radical ideology on attaining

Tordoff (1992:48) argues that some countries face internal and

Tordoff (1992:49) gives the following as examples of internal

As a result of their poor performance, Zimbabwe and Zambia had no

Development in a political environment entails

Nationalism, the rise of political

The origins of the armed struggle in

CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR POLITICAL EVENTS IN ZIMBABWE'S POLITICAL

2000 Formation of the Movement for Democratic Change

2.2 JOSHUA NKOMO AND THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS (ANC)

2.3 THE FORMATION OF THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (NDP)

Encouraged by the assertiveness and bold leadership of the NDP and by

2.4 FACTIONALISM WITHIN BLACK FORMATIONS

2.5 OPPOSITION TO INTERNAL SETTLEMENT AND THE BEGINNING OF

involvement by South Africa, America and the frontline presidents

The emergence and growth of

CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR POLITICAL EVENTS IN ZAMBIA'S HISTORY

1994 Kaunda returns to politics

Copper Belt formed ``welfare organisations'', led chiefly by clerks and

3.2 THE FORMATION OF A FEDERATION

3.3 THE EMERGENCE OF MILITANT NATIONALISM

3.4 THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE

Late political formations in

CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR POLITICAL EVENTS IN BOTSWANA'S HISTORY

4.2 THE EMERGENCE OF POLITICAL PARTIES